I. Perception of presidential candidates by Lviv residents

So what is the dynamic of electoral sentiments among Lviv residents in 2009? Let us begin with the expectations of the people of Lviv regarding the upcoming presidential elections.

We are comparing data from a survey conducted in April 2009 with data from a survey conducted at the end of December of last year. Over these four months, Arsenii Yatseniuk has moved to the top of the list of presidential candidates. In fact, for us, the growth of support for Yatseniuk was an expected trend, and I am convinced that he had already taken first place in January–February of this year, while we only confirmed it in April. The dynamics of his rating were positive throughout this period, starting in October, when Yatseniuk began to be actively discussed as a presidential candidate. At present, he has almost 23.5%.

As for the other candidates, Yulia Tymoshenko has, of course, lost the most. She now has only 19.5%. Compared with the end of last year, she has lost a full 5 percentage points. This is a significant drop, especially given that those 5% have become supporters of her direct competitor in Lviv — Arsenii Yatseniuk. Here we see a clear trend: Tymoshenko is going down, Yatseniuk is going up.

At the moment, my assessment is that the growth of Yatseniuk’s rating and, correspondingly, the decline of Tymoshenko’s rating have stopped. I think that over the next month or two, and perhaps even until autumn, their positions will remain roughly at this level.

The candidate who is now closest to these two leaders is Oleh Tyahnybok. At present, his rating is just over 10%. It should be noted that over the past four months he has lost some of his positions. However, this is probably not so much due to his own personal performance, but rather to the fact that in the most recent April survey we included Anatolii Hrytsenko, who is seen as a certain alternative to the main politicians. He is a new face. He was a relatively “tough” Minister of Defense and also positions himself as a “strong hand.”

So you think that some of Tyahnybok’s supporters moved to Hrytsenko because they have a similar image of strong-willed, authoritarian-type leaders who are capable of “restoring order”?

That is generally how people perceive Hrytsenko. Therefore, I believe that the 2–2.5% decline in Tyahnybok’s rating occurred due to the entry of Anatolii Hrytsenko into the presidential race, whom we included in this list for the first time.

As for Viktor Yushchenko, his rating is stable; over four months it has neither increased nor decreased. At present, it stands at around 7%. It should be said that this is also a certain point at which his rating is likely to remain for quite some time. These are the main positions.

And what about Yanukovych?

Viktor Yanukovych is traditionally perceived rather negatively in Lviv. At present, 4% of Lviv residents are ready to vote for him. On the one hand, this is very little, but on the other hand, it is somewhat more than a year or two ago.

And what has been the dynamic over the past four months?

His rating has been stable. It has not moved in any direction. That is, the people who have gradually become disappointed in the current authorities have not chosen Yanukovych as an alternative. No matter how you look at it, he is not accepted in Western Ukraine, and particularly in Lviv.

So we can say that in Lviv the supporters of the main political figures have already made their choices and the overall picture has stabilized. Are any surprises still possible?

I do not think that any surprises should be expected, even though about 10% of Lviv residents remain undecided. Practice shows that these 10% will in fact be choosing among four candidates — Yatseniuk, Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko. And people tend to vote for those who are leaders, who have a chance to win. Therefore, in practice, it is Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko who will compete for the votes of the 10% of Lviv residents who have not yet decided.

I should also say that in our survey about 10% are ready to vote “against all” in the presidential election, and slightly less than 5% do not intend to participate in the election at all. On the one hand, this group can be considered small, but on the other hand, these figures are higher than last year or the year before. People are disappointed. You know that usually those who vote “against all” make up no more than 2–3%. In our surveys, this figure now stands at as much as 10%, three or even four times higher than usual. However, I think that as the elections approach and the active phase of the campaign begins, a significant share of these people will decide and vote.

We are now talking about ratings in percentages, but could you translate these percentages into absolute numbers?

I am not ready to operate with exact absolute numbers, but we can make a rough calculation. If there are about 530,000 voters in Lviv, then this means that roughly one in five — just over 100,000 — are ready to vote for Tymoshenko. For Yatseniuk, it is 23.3%, meaning about one in four, around 120,000 voters. These are absolute numbers from the total electorate. However, about 70% of voters will actually come to the polls. Presidential elections are more important for people, and turnout is usually higher. Perhaps about 75% will come to vote in Lviv — that would be roughly 420,000 voters. Calculations should be based on this number.

It would be interesting to draw an electoral map of Ukraine from the point of view of different politicians. On such a map, Lviv, for example, would be a city of 120,000 voters for Yatseniuk, but only 15,000 for Yanukovych…

I agree. It would be interesting to compare Lviv with other million-plus cities. Then one should speak not only about percentages and ratings, but also about the absolute weight of the population. After all, 20% in Lviv may correspond in absolute numbers to only 5% in Donetsk. And that is what the competition is about. For Yanukovych, of course, Lviv is not very interesting, but still — the larger the city, the greater its weight in the national sample.

Can one draw a group portrait of a Lviv voter who supports one candidate or another?

We can talk about those candidates who enjoy significant support in Lviv, namely Yatseniuk, Tymoshenko, and Tyahnybok, who has twice the support of Yushchenko. So I would focus on these three typical electorates.

Supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko, who four years ago were considered a protest electorate — that is, people who opposed the authorities and wanted change — have now become the least protest-oriented, since Tymoshenko is in power. This does not mean that the electorate has changed — that four years ago one group voted for Tymoshenko and now another does. These are the same people, but they have changed their attitude toward their leader. And because Tymoshenko is now prime minister and part of the governing authorities, they have also changed their attitude toward politics in the country. As a result, they are currently not ready for early elections or for protest actions.

Are Tymoshenko’s supporters mainly women or men, and what is their age?

Sixty percent of Tymoshenko’s electorate are women and 40% are men. For example, for Lytvyn the picture is the opposite — 65% of his supporters are men. The same is true for Tyahnybok, where 60% of his supporters are also men.

If we continue to draw an average Lviv supporter of Tymoshenko, it is a woman under 30 years old and among the less affluent, which translates into the socialist and populist attitudes characteristic of this electorate. We have already mentioned that compared to a year ago, Tymoshenko’s rating has dropped significantly, by about 10 percentage points, and she has accordingly suffered electoral losses, including in Lviv. However, the 20% who are currently ready to vote for Yulia Tymoshenko are the most confident in their choice. They may be disappointed in Tymoshenko herself, in the economic crisis, in the Ukrainian authorities, and in the electoral process, but they do not see another option or another politician they could vote for. Therefore, she still has a stable core electorate. And as I said earlier, her ratings are unlikely to fall further.

Supporters of Arsenii Yatseniuk

Very different people are his supporters. This is primarily because he is a new name among presidential candidates and represents a relatively new political force. In fact, the core of his electorate consists of people who just a year ago were supporters of Our Ukraine or Viktor Yushchenko, meaning a center-right electorate. It was precisely from among Yushchenko’s supporters that Yatseniuk’s rating began to grow — at least initially. But that was only the beginning. The subsequent growth, the roughly 5 percentage points he gained this year, came at the expense of Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has already bottomed out at 6–7% and is unlikely to fall further. At this point, Yatseniuk is already gaining support from the Tymoshenko Bloc.

Since Yatseniuk’s electorate is being replenished by supporters of different politicians, it has become quite heterogeneous. His electorate is not clearly defined. However, it can be said that almost half of Yatseniuk’s supporters are people under 40 years of age. These are mostly young and active people. They are ready to participate in protest actions, meaning they are more politically active than others. They are among the most financially secure — not necessarily the richest, but those who have been least affected by the economic crisis. These are people who are able to cope even in the difficult conditions in which we now find ourselves.

At the same time, they declaratively seek stability. When we ask people whether they want radical change or stability, Yatseniuk’s supporters overwhelmingly choose stability. These are likely people involved in business, who depend on the economic and political situation in the country. For them, stability is the best option; they do not want radical change. They want to continue living as they have been living, to grow gradually, without revolution and without collapse.

These are interesting people — ready to go to a revolution in order to achieve stability.

That is the paradox. They choose Yatseniuk as someone who is perceived as a pragmatist, a supporter of the European course, and not associated with radical or unpredictable decisions, unlike, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko.

The main advantage of Yatseniuk is that he is seen as a new face in politics, someone not implicated in corruption. That is why Lviv residents are willing to give him a chance in the upcoming presidential election.

Supporters of Oleh Tyahnybok

Tyahnybok also has a very clearly defined electorate. Both he and his political force have for a long time been consistently articulating the same positions and are ideologically well defined. The vast majority of Tyahnybok’s supporters have supported him for many years. We see that his roughly 10% in the presidential race or the 17.5–18% for the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda in parliamentary elections were accumulated gradually, step by step. There have been no sudden spikes; the growth of his rating has been steady.

Back in 2006, about 3% of the population of Lviv Oblast voted for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. Today, according to our surveys, almost 18% in Lviv are ready to vote for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. This is significant growth, but it took four full years. This gradual growth is very good for this politician and this political force, because these people come consciously and are not likely to defect to another party tomorrow.

Please describe the portrait of a voter who would vote for Oleh Tyahnybok.

As I said, most of Tyahnybok’s supporters are men, and almost two thirds of them are over 40 years old. These are people with clearly defined views. They come to Svoboda not because of some short-term campaign or political situation, but consciously, seriously, and for the long term, often for ideological reasons. We can say that about half of Svoboda’s supporters choose ideology over the economy. For Ukraine, this is a very high figure.

Everyone who votes for Tyahnybok trusts him, but not everyone who votes for Svoboda is ready to vote for Tyahnybok as a presidential candidate. They do not believe he can win, and therefore they do not see the point in voting for him. Some of them will vote for Yatseniuk, and a very small share for Tymoshenko.

Both Yatseniuk’s and Tyahnybok’s supporters favor holding early elections at all levels — presidential, parliamentary, and local. This is understandable, since these political forces are not represented in power and want their representatives there. In contrast, the Tymoshenko Bloc and Tymoshenko’s supporters are categorically opposed to any early elections.

Supporters of Viktor Yanukovych

There is only one thing that can be stated with certainty: they are predominantly Russian-speaking people, mostly of retirement age and with higher education. Yanukovych, like the Party of Regions, has in Lviv taken over the votes of those who always voted for socialists and communists. In fact, this pro-Russian vector was transferred to Yanukovych from those two political forces. He himself did not create it here.

Anothers to add, about another 0.5% of Yanukovych’s rating consists of people who vote for him simply to express their disagreement with the Orange politicians. He is the only politician from the “non-Orange” camp who has gained any support in Western Ukraine. Even Oleksandr Moroz, who had 1% in Lviv in December, now has zero; Symonenko has 0.1%.

Lytvyn could also be considered a kind of alternative for some Lviv voters, but the 3% he has are simply people who personally view Lytvyn positively. In the second round, they would vote for someone — or perhaps not come at all. Between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko they might refuse to choose, but between Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk they would likely choose Yatseniuk as a real alternative. In 2006, Lytvyn’s entire campaign was built on the idea of the need for an alternative and a unifying force. In that sense, in a second round his supporters would vote for Yatseniuk.

So Yatseniuk has the greatest growth potential in Lviv?

Yes, because he is perceived as a new politician. Given that Tymoshenko’s rating has been declining over the past one to two years, I do not see a reason why it would suddenly start growing now. Of course, it might increase slightly due to an active campaign, visits, and agitation, but this is unlikely to change the overall picture. Her decline has stopped, and during the campaign she may gain one or two percentage points as people make their final decisions, but she is unlikely to take first place in Lviv or Lviv Oblast.