Dynamics of ideological markers: April 2011

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27.04.2011

Dynamics of ideological markers: April 2011

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in April 2011, 44% of respondents support granting the Russian language the status of a state language, while 47% oppose it. In 2009, more than 50% of citizens consistently supported granting Russian this status; in 2010 support declined to 46–47%, and in 2011 it fell further to 44%. At the same time, opposition to making Russian a second state language has steadily increased: from 40% in 2009 to 46% in 2010 and to 47–48% in 2011. The share of undecided respondents on this issue has remained almost unchanged at 7–8%.
Support for granting Russian the status of a second state language is highest in Donbas, the South, and the East, particularly among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, and to a lesser extent among supporters of Strong Ukraine and UDAR.
In 2010, 44–45% of respondents consistently supported the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus, while roughly the same proportion opposed it. In January 2011, support rose to 48%, but by April 2011 it declined to 47%. At the same time, the share of those opposing such a union continued to fall—from 44% in January to 40% in April—while the number of undecided respondents increased from 8% to 13%.
Support for a union with Russia and Belarus is strongest in Donbas, the South, and the East. Supporters of the Communist Party back the idea of a single state with Russia even more strongly than they support granting Russian the status of a state language. Around 70% of supporters of the Party of Regions support both bilingualism and the unification of Ukraine with Russia into a single state. The strongest opponents of these ideas are supporters of Svoboda, as well as those of the Front for Change, Civic Position, and Batkivshchyna.
Against this background, public support for European integration has declined to approximately its 2009 level. In October 2009, 51% supported Ukraine’s accession to the European Union; this rose to 52% in April 2010, 57% in September 2010, and 56% in January 2011, but fell back to 51% by April 2011. About 30% oppose EU accession.
Notably, 37% of those who support the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This view is held by about one in four residents of Donbas, the South, and the East. For these respondents, economic considerations—primarily expectations of improved living standards—outweigh ideological ones.
The higher the level of education and the younger the respondent, the more likely they are to support EU accession and the less likely they are to support a union with Russia and Belarus or the granting of Russian the status of a second state language.
Public attitudes toward NATO membership have also deteriorated. In October 2009, 22% supported Ukraine joining NATO; this increased to 24% in April 2010 and 26% in September 2010, but fell to 24% in January 2011 and to 22% by April 2011. More than 60% oppose NATO membership. Strong support for NATO exists only in Western Ukraine, where about half of respondents favor joining. Among party supporters, NATO membership is most strongly backed by Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Front for Change.
Support for extending the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has continued to decline—from 46% in September 2010 to 42% in January 2011 and to 41% in April 2011—while opposition has stabilized at 41%. The number of undecided respondents has increased from 13% to 18%. Support is highest in the South (73%), followed by Donbas (56%) and the East (52%). Younger respondents tend to oppose the extension, while older respondents are more likely to support it.
Support for creating a gas consortium to share ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system between Russia, the EU, and Ukraine has fallen sharply, from 36% in March 2010 to 27% in April 2011, while opposition has risen from 35% to 56%. Support is highest in Donbas, the South, and the East, particularly among Communist Party supporters.
Support for revoking President Yushchenko’s decree awarding Stepan Bandera the title Hero of Ukraine declined slightly from 53% in March 2010 to 51% in April 2011, while opposition increased from 28% to 32%. Eighteen percent remain undecided.
Twenty-seven percent of respondents support recognizing the OUN–UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence (72% in Western Ukraine), while 49% oppose it (73% in the South). Over the past year, support for recognition has increased from 20% to 27%, while opposition has fallen from 61% to 49%. Support is highest among Svoboda supporters (nearly 90%), and about half of supporters of the Front for Change, Civic Position, and Batkivshchyna.
Fifty-eight percent of respondents agree that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people; 29% disagree and 13% are undecided. Support for this view declined from 61% in March 2010 to 53% in January 2011 but rose again to 58% by April 2011. Nearly 90% of Western Ukrainians, about 70% in the North and Center, and about half in the East agree with this characterization. Even around 40% of Party of Regions supporters and 30% of Communist Party supporters agree.
Fifty-five percent of respondents view positively the initiative to display Soviet red flags alongside the Ukrainian state flag on Victory Day (May 9), while 30% view it negatively and 15% are undecided. Support is highest in the South (86%) and Donbas (75). It is strongest among Communist Party supporters (over 90%) and Party of Regions supporters (75%), and lowest among Svoboda supporters.
Eighty-three percent of respondents view positively the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR; only 5% view it negatively and 12% are undecided. Support is highest in Donbas, the Center, and the East, and lowest in the South, particularly in Crimea. Sixty percent believe Crimea should retain autonomous status within Ukraine, 23% support making it a regular oblast, 2% support a Crimean Tatar autonomy, and only 4% favor transferring Crimea to Russia.
Half of respondents believe a unitary state is the optimal form of government for Ukraine, while one quarter favor a federation and one quarter are undecided. Support for a unitary state is strongest in the West, North, and Center, while support for a federal system is highest in Donbas and the South. Donbas is the only region where federalism is supported by more people than unitarism.

Methodology

Survey population: population of Ukraine aged 18 and over.
Sample size: 2,000 respondents.
Method: face-to-face formalized interview.
Sampling error (0.95 confidence level): up to 2.2% for values near 50%, 2.0% for values near 30%, 1.3% for values near 10%, and 1.0% for values near 5%.
Fieldwork period: 30 March – 9 April 2011.
Regional breakdown:
- West – Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi.
- Center – Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy.
- North – Kyiv city, Kyiv region, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv.
- South – Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Sevastopol.
- East – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv.
- Donbas – Donetsk, Luhansk.