Press

16.10.2013

Dynamics of ideological markers: October 2013

  • According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 53% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 35% do not support it and another 12% are undecided. At the same time, a plurality believes that signing the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (47%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (34%), while 19% could not decide. Over the previous three years, the share of respondents who consider signing the EU Agreement more beneficial increased from 39% to 47%, reaching the highest level recorded during that period. Western and Northern regions show significantly higher support for the EU Agreement, while the South and Donbas are more supportive of joining the Customs Union. The Center and East act as transitional regions where support for both integration directions is roughly balanced, with slightly more support for the EU Agreement in the Center and for the Customs Union in the East.
  • Support for integration options differs significantly by electoral preferences. The absolute majority of Petro Symonenko’s voters (82%) support the Customs Union, while voters of Oleh Tyahnybok (85%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (75%), Yulia Tymoshenko (73%) and Vitalii Klitschko (72%) support signing the EU Agreement. Among Viktor Yanukovych’s voters, support for EU accession (42%) and opposition to it (45%) are almost equal. At the same time, about half of his voters consider joining the Customs Union more beneficial for Ukraine, while about one quarter support signing the EU Agreement.
  • Almost half of respondents (49%) expected that Ukraine and the European Union would sign the Association Agreement in November 2013, while about one quarter did not believe this would happen. Over the previous month, the share of those expecting the Agreement to be signed increased from 39% to 49%, including a significant increase among opponents of European integration. Most respondents (38%) believed that signing the Agreement would be the result of joint efforts by Ukraine and the EU, while 13% attributed it mainly to Ukraine’s efforts and 26% to the EU’s efforts. For the European Union, potential signing of the Agreement would be seen more as a victory (49%) than a defeat (3%), while 30% believed it would mean neither. For Ukraine, it would also be seen more as a victory (45%) than a defeat (16%), while 22% believed it would mean neither. For Russia, however, signing the Agreement would more likely be seen as a defeat (52%) than a victory (2%), while 29% believed it would mean neither. A majority of respondents (56%) expected that if the Agreement were signed, Russia would increase pressure on Ukraine, while 10% expected a decrease in pressure and 19% believed nothing would change.
  • At the same time, 38% of respondents support the creation of a unified state including Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, while 50% oppose this idea and 12% are undecided. Over the previous three years, the share of supporters reached its lowest level, while the share of opponents reached its highest. The share of respondents who simultaneously supported both EU accession and a unified state with Russia declined from about 40% in 2011 to about 20% in October 2013. Regarding language policy, 43% support granting Russian the status of a state language, while 51% oppose it and 5% are undecided. Support for bilingualism was higher than opposition in 2009, equal in 2010–2011, and since mid-2012 opposition has consistently exceeded support. The strongest support for bilingualism is recorded in the Donbas (85%), South (69%) and East (57%).
  • Only 20% of respondents support Ukraine joining NATO, while about two thirds oppose it and 15% are undecided. Relatively higher support for NATO membership is recorded only in Western Ukraine and among voters of Tyahnybok and Klitschko, which is partly explained by a higher share of men among their supporters, as men traditionally show higher support for NATO membership than women. Additionally, 27% of respondents support recognizing OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukrainian state independence, while 52% oppose this and 20% are undecided. Public opinion on this issue remains unstable and fluctuates yearly. Support is highest among voters of Tyahnybok and Tymoshenko and lowest among voters of Yanukovych and Symonenko. Only about 5–6% of residents in the Donbas and South support such recognition, while in Western Ukraine support exceeds 70%.

Methodology

  • Survey population: population of Ukraine aged 18 and over
  • Sample size: 2,000 respondents
  • Method: face-to-face interviews
  • Margin of error (95% confidence):
    • near 50%: ≤ 2.2%
    • near 30%: ≤ 2%
    • near 10%: ≤ 1.3%
    • near 5%: ≤ 1%
  • Fieldwork period: September 26 – October 6, 2013