• Over the 30 years of Ukraine’s Independence, a generation has emerged whose views, ideas, values and aspirations differ markedly from other demographic groups. In sociological measurements of recent years, ideological and regional differences have become less significant, giving way to the age factor. Young people who were born and raised in the new conditions of a globalized world, without the barriers of the Soviet era, are now setting new life trends, breaking stereotypes and traditions, and forming new societal demands. This is the Independence Generation.
• To mark the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence, Rating Group conducted the first large-scale sociological study with a total sample of 20,000 respondents. Its purpose was to explore the thinking and lifestyle of the new generation of Ukrainians — their value systems, motivations, and their assessments of themselves and of Ukraine. The results are presented across age, gender, regional (by oblast), economic and psychological dimensions. The survey was conducted from July 20 to August 9, 2021, through telephone interviews; 20,000 respondents from all regions of the country were interviewed, excluding the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas.

Identity

• In terms of identity, 80% of respondents stated they would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence today. Only 15% would not support it, and 5% were uncertain. The highest level of support comes from those born after 1991 (87%). Support is also higher among residents of western and central regions and among more affluent respondents. Despite some variations, no fewer than two-thirds of respondents in every demographic group would support Independence today.
• When describing their self-identification, 75% of respondents said they consider themselves citizens of Ukraine, while 11% do not. At the same time, 26% identify as Europeans, and 21% still describe themselves as “Soviet people.” Among the Independence Generation, 86% identify as citizens of Ukraine and 40% as Europeans. Older respondents are far less likely to see themselves as Europeans and more likely to identify with the Soviet past. Regionally, western oblasts and Kyiv feel more European than Soviet, while eastern regions show the opposite tendency. Those who travel more within the country feel a stronger civic connection to Ukraine.

Self-assessment

• Regarding self-assessment, Ukrainians evaluate their personal situation at a moderate level, while their assessment of the country is somewhat lower. When asked to place themselves on a seven-step ladder — from the lowest to the highest social standing — 22% placed themselves on the bottom two rungs, 66% on the middle rungs (third to fifth), and 9% on the top two (sixth and seventh). Looking ten years ahead, only 18% expect their situation to be poor, 31% see it as average, and 32% believe they will be on the highest rungs of the social ladder.
• The current situation of Ukraine is perceived more pessimistically: 36% placed the country on the bottom two steps, 55% on the middle ones (with 27% specifically placing it on the third step), and only 4% placed the country at the top. Expectations for the future of Ukraine, however, are more optimistic: 44% hope the country will be on the highest rungs, 34% expect it to be at the middle level (more than half of these on the fifth step), and 18% doubt its positive prospects. Younger respondents give higher assessments both to their own status and to the country’s. Men tend to rate their personal situation higher, while women tend to be more optimistic about Ukraine’s future. The highest self-evaluations and assessments of the country come from supporters of Zelensky. Their expectations for Ukraine’s future are even more positive than their expectations for their own lives ten years from now. Supporters of Poroshenko and Groysman also show relatively positive assessments. In contrast, supporters of Boyko and Murayev are the most pessimistic about both themselves and the state. Western and central regions evaluate themselves and the country more positively, while in the east and south the assessments are lower, and expectations for the future — more restrained.

Emotions

• In terms of emotions, the two main feelings people experience when thinking about Ukraine are sadness (37%) and pride (34%). Interest is reported by 20%, joy and shame by 18% each, fear by 16%, and only 5% express indifference or anger. Regarding themselves personally, 37% feel interest, 34% feel joy, 22–24% feel sadness and pride, 14% feel fear, 6% feel shame, and 3–4% feel anger or indifference. Nearly half of young people feel pride and interest when thinking about the country, and one-third feel joy. They are considerably more positive about themselves and Ukraine than older respondents. Regionally, emotional perception moves from pride in the West toward more negative emotions, such as sadness, in the East.
• The strongest feelings of pride for the country are found among supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko, who also report far less shame either for themselves or for Ukraine. Their perceptions of both themselves and the country are significantly more optimistic than those of supporters of other candidates. Conversely, voters of Boyko — and especially Murayev — demonstrate the most negative emotional background. They rarely feel pride in themselves or in Ukraine, and when thinking about the country they mostly experience sadness or even shame.

Values and motivations

• Across the value spectrum of Ukrainians, the dominant priorities are universalism, benevolence, conformity and security. The lowest scores are associated with wealth and stimulation, while self-direction, hedonism and achievement remain at mid-level. In the age breakdown, the youngest group is most inclined toward hedonism, autonomy and stimulation. Young people and those of middle age also converge in their emphasis on achievement. Older respondents, by contrast, lean more strongly toward tradition and place the least importance on wealth. The group aged 16–24 stands out in particular: they are the most open to change and most driven by self-assertion, and they are the only cohort whose openness to change exceeds their conservatism. Women in all age groups show a stronger orientation than men toward self-transcendence values (benevolence and universalism). Income-based analysis reveals that the value of wealth is almost insignificant for poorer respondents.
• Electoral preferences also reveal three broad clusters of voters: the conditionally positive and change-oriented (supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko); those with moderate emotional attitudes toward the country and more conservative value structures (supporters of Tymoshenko, Lyashko, Groysman and Smeshko); and the strongly conservative segment (supporters of Murayev and Boyko).
• A relative majority of respondents (57%) report being satisfied with their lives overall, 21% are dissatisfied and 23% give a neutral assessment. Satisfaction grows with younger age and higher income. Notably, even among poorer groups within the 16–24 cohort, life satisfaction remains relatively high.
• Motivational orientations divide society almost evenly: half (49%) want to live “no worse than others,” while slightly fewer (45%) want to live “better than others” and achieve success. The drive to “live better than others” appears more often among the Independence Generation and middle-aged groups. Among respondents aged 51 and older, the opposite tendency dominates—they prioritise living “no worse than others.” The aspiration for a better life is most common in Kyiv, among more affluent respondents, and among women. Among young women aged 16–24, the motivation to “live better than others” reaches particularly high levels.
• If faced with a sharp decline in income, 60% would rather seek additional earnings, while 36% would cut expenses. Younger and more affluent respondents, as well as those who place greater value on wealth, are more inclined to look for new income sources. The Independence Generation—especially those aged 16–24—show the strongest readiness to pursue opportunities: more than 80% of them would not cut their spending but would instead seek additional income.
• Sixty-one percent believe they can influence their income levels, whereas 38% think it does not depend on them. Younger, more affluent, more satisfied and success-oriented respondents express the highest sense of control over their earnings.
• When reflecting on their life trajectory, 41% believe their best years are still ahead; 24% feel they are living them now; and 31% think their best years are already behind them. Only a third of those aged 25–50 believe they are currently in their best period. Optimism about the future is strongest among young and middle-aged respondents and those with higher incomes. Among the oldest respondents, more than 70% believe their best years have passed.
• When choosing a desirable job, the most important criterion is salary (75%), followed by social benefits (31%), workplace relationships (26%) and work schedule (22%). The least important factors are career prospects (14%) and prestige or social status (10%). The Independence Generation is the only age group that shows heightened interest in career advancement. A flexible schedule matters more to those under 40, homemakers, the unemployed and students. For people aged 40–60, neither schedule nor career advancement is of major importance. For pensioners, only salary and social guarantees matter. Manual workers prioritise salary as well, while office workers place notable importance on workplace atmosphere. As income rises, so do expectations toward employers: wealthier respondents value nearly all criteria—from guarantees to career development—while poorer respondents focus primarily on salary as a means of meeting basic needs.

Tolerance 

• The analysis of values shows an interesting contrast: although Ukrainians readily declare the importance of universalism and benevolence, these ideals do not fully translate into tolerance. Forty-seven percent express negative attitudes toward the LGBT community, and 42% feel negatively about people who choose to be childfree; around half are neutral toward these groups, and only 7–8% express positive views. Attitudes toward people who do not believe in God are noticeably more tolerant: only 28% reject them, while 63% are generally neutral and 8% view them positively.
• Young women aged 16–24 form a distinct trend of heightened tolerance: one in three holds positive views of LGBT people and the childfree, whereas among men of the same age, the share is three times smaller. Overall, the Independence Generation—especially the 16–24 cohort—stands out as the most tolerant group. Across all three categories, their views tend to be predominantly neutral (60–70%), with roughly one-fifth expressing positive attitudes and up to one-fifth negative ones. Tolerance declines steadily with age, reaching its lowest levels among those aged 61 and older, where negative attitudes dominate—66% toward the childfree and 65% toward LGBT people.
• Regionally, Kyiv is the most tolerant. The East and West are similar in their conservatism, though with different emphases: the more religious West is less tolerant of non-believers, while Donbas shows the strongest rejection of LGBT people. The least accepting of pro-Western values are the voters of Boyko and Murayev. In contrast, supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko display comparatively higher levels of tolerance across all categories, most often expressing neutral views.
• Religious belief remains widespread: 60% of the population believe in God without doubt, 17% believe but have doubts, and 14% believe in higher powers generally. Only 7% identify as atheists. Faith intensifies with age and exceeds 60% after age 50. Religiosity is highest in Halychyna and the western regions more broadly, while Kyiv and the youngest cohort (16–24) have the lowest share of believers—less than half. Among those who firmly believe in God, 40% express negative attitudes toward atheists. This group is also less tolerant toward LGBT people (55% negative) and toward the childfree (49% negative).
• Support for restoring the death penalty in Ukraine is split: 51% support the idea, while 45% oppose it. Support is strongest among older, poorer and less educated respondents, among men, and among people who experience negative emotions toward themselves—such as shame, anger, sadness, indifference or fear.

Electoral sympathies

• The presidential ranking is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who would receive 27.2% of the vote if elections were held in the near future (among those who intend to vote and have made their choice). He is followed by Petro Poroshenko with 14.9%, Yurii Boiko with 10.5%, Yuliia Tymoshenko with 9.7%, Ihor Smeshko with 6.6%, Yevhenii Murayev with 5.6%, and Volodymyr Hroisman with 5.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed four percent.
• Zelenskyi leads in 17 regions of the country. In Kyiv, as well as in Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts, he shares the top position with Poroshenko, while in Kharkiv oblast he shares the lead with Boiko. Only in Lviv oblast does Poroshenko take first place, in Vinnytsia oblast the leader is Hroisman, and in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts Boiko comes out on top.
• Among the Independence Generation, every second respondent who intends to vote and has made a choice supports Zelenskyi. Within this group, his result is more than four times higher than Poroshenko’s. Zelenskyi also records very high support among the youngest respondents who are not yet eligible to vote (aged 16–17): more than half choose him overall, and almost 70% among those who hypothetically would vote and have chosen a candidate.

Foreign policy vectors

• The dominant foreign policy direction in Ukraine remains European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Across all questions related to Ukraine’s future on the international stage, at least half of respondents expressed pro-Western aspirations. Support for joining the European Union stands at 64%, while 54% favour joining NATO. These attitudes are strongest among the youngest cohort (ages 16–24): 66% support NATO membership and 75% support EU membership. Even among the oldest respondents, at least half remain oriented toward the West.
• EU membership, although influenced by regional differences—with support decreasing from West to East—does not divide society as sharply as the question of NATO accession. Overall, the youngest generation (16–24) demonstrates the clearest consolidation around a pro-European vision for Ukraine’s future. Even in the East, where the majority opposes EU membership, a majority of young people (58%) support the country’s European course.
• At the same time, the most stable alternative to European integration is not a pro-Russian orientation, but rather a preference for equal distance from both the West and Russia. This option is chosen by 35% of respondents. Among those who oppose EU membership, only a quarter advocate movement toward Russia; most prefer an independent trajectory. By age, the strongest supporters of this “equidistant” model are those between 25 and 50. In the eastern regions, this preference dominates over the pro-European direction, while in the western regions it dominates over the pro-Russian one.
• Interestingly, this vision of Ukraine’s future does not reveal sharp regional divides. With the exception of Halychyna, where support for equidistance is around 20%, levels of support in all other macro-regions range from 30% to 45%.

Nostalgia for the USSR

• Sixty-one percent of respondents do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, while 32% do. Regret is most common in the southeastern regions, among older and less affluent people. Nostalgia is also widespread among those who would not support Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence today and among individuals who believe their best years are already behind them. Attitudes in Ukraine and Russia differ fundamentally: over the past decade, nostalgia for the USSR has steadily declined in Ukraine, while in Russia it has increased.
• When assessing the overall impact of the Soviet period on Ukraine’s development, 52% describe it as neutral, 23% as negative, and 18% as positive. The strongest polarisation appears among older generations, who are more likely to provide both highly negative and highly positive assessments. The youngest cohort predominantly chooses a neutral evaluation, as the USSR for them is not a lived experience but a chapter in history textbooks.
• Areas where modern Ukraine is viewed as clearly outperforming the Soviet period include freedom of speech (77%) and opportunities for self-realisation (64%). Perceptions of living standards are evenly split: 43% believe life was better in the USSR, and 43% believe it is better today. Younger people tend to prefer the present, while older respondents lean toward the Soviet past. In evaluations of healthcare and education, modern Ukraine still “loses” to Soviet-era perceptions—only those born after 1991 believe these services are better today, while older generations consistently rate current systems as worse.
• Despite divided views on living standards, only 27% support a return to a planned economy, while two-thirds support market relations. The dividing line here is not age but income: the wealthier the respondent, the more likely they are to support a free market.
• Migration attitudes reflect similar generational divides. Thirty-two percent would like to work abroad, while 65% would not. Among the youngest respondents, the desire to leave reaches 54%, compared to only 18% among those aged 61+. In Donbas, interest in working abroad is roughly half the level recorded in western regions (20–23% versus around 40%).
• Higher wages (71%) and better living conditions (57%) are the primary motives for wanting to work abroad. Around one in five also cite better working conditions and more opportunities for self-realisation, though the latter is notably more important for the Generation of Independence than for older age groups.

Images of youth

• In the eyes of most Ukrainians, today’s youth is patriotic and moral: around 60% share this view, while roughly a third disagree. Importantly, the survey did not define the age boundaries of “youth,” so each respondent interpreted the term individually. At the same time, opinions on the educational level of young people are more critical: 56% consider youth poorly educated, and only 38% believe they are well educated. Other assessments split almost evenly — half describe youth as hardworking, the other half as lazy; similarly, 45% consider them responsible, while 50% perceive them as irresponsible.
• Young respondents themselves view their generation more favorably, especially when compared with perceptions held by those aged 31–50 — the age group that could be considered their “parent generation.” Older Ukrainians tend to rate the diligence of youth higher than other groups do. Women generally assess young people more positively than men, and wealthier respondents also express more favorable opinions.
• Perceptions of youth strongly depend on regional context. In the West, Halychyna, Central regions and Kyiv, young people are seen as more patriotic, responsible, hardworking and moral. On the Donbas, in the South and East, evaluations are noticeably more negative: youth are viewed as less patriotic, less educated, lazier, less responsible and less moral. These perceptions also correlate with emotional attitudes toward the country itself. The more pride and joy respondents feel about Ukraine, the more positively they assess its youth.
• Electoral preferences reinforce this divide. Supporters of Zelenskyy and Poroshenko give youth the highest evaluations: roughly 70% of them describe young people as patriotic and moral, and 50–60% consider them responsible and hardworking. The most negative assessments come from voters of Murayev, who rate the education, patriotism and responsibility of youth very low.
• Despite the presence of some critical views, the majority of Ukrainians agree that youth development should be a national priority. Notably, this opinion is shared equally across all age groups — older generations view investment in young people as just as important as the Generation of Independence does.

Lifestyle

• Ukrainians today are most interested in travel, sports, a healthy lifestyle, music, and self-development — these areas were chosen by a quarter to a third of respondents. The least interest is shown in fashion (only 3%), while religion, history, and politics also attract relatively little attention (8–9%). Ecology, cooking, technology, economics, and cinema generate moderate interest (12–19%).
• The Independence Generation is most interested in sports, travel, music, and self-development. Notably, music is especially appealing to young people aged 16–24. As age increases, the importance of a healthy lifestyle rises: among those aged 40+, around 40% selected it. For the oldest group (61+), politics and economics are more interesting (18%), while these topics hardly interest the youngest (only 4–10%). After age 50, religion also becomes more relevant (12%). Interest in ecology also grows with age — 20–26% among people 50+. Conversely, interest in technology sharply declines after 50.
• Almost everyone is interested in travel, except for the oldest respondents. Interest in sports and self-development decreases after age 40: only 21% of the oldest group chose sports, compared to 50% among those aged 16–24.
• Men are more interested in sports (48%), while women are more interested in travel (39%), cooking (26%), and a healthy lifestyle (36%). Women also appear to take better care of their health, as they undergo preventive medical check-ups more often than men (most frequently women aged 23–30). Overall, however, half of Ukrainians say they do not attend medical check-ups unless they feel unwell.
• Sixteen percent of Ukrainians have not left their locality in the past five years — most of them poorer, older, or rural residents. One-third have visited another city/village once or a few times, while half travel around Ukraine frequently.
• In the past five years, twice as many Ukrainians visited European countries compared to trips to Egypt, Turkey, and similar resorts: 9% traveled to Europe many times, 21% several times, and 70% never. In contrast, trips to such resorts amount to 3%, 13%, and 84% respectively. Visits to CIS countries are also rare — 87% have never been there.
• The Independence Generation travels most actively: for example, half of those aged 25–30 and over one-third of those aged 16–24 have visited Europe. They also travel frequently within Ukraine — over 60%. Yet even among them, more than 70% have never been to popular foreign resorts, and over 80% have never visited CIS countries.
• Residents of Kyiv travel abroad and domestically more often than others. Western Ukrainians, especially Zakarpattia residents, also travel frequently to Europe: 62% reported visiting EU countries. Trips to CIS states are most common among residents of Odesa and regions bordering Russia — Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Sumy.
• Only 15% of Ukrainians in the smartphone era write messages more often than they make phone calls. However, within the Independence Generation, communication increasingly shifts toward messaging. Among respondents aged 16–17, the majority — nearly 70% — primarily use messages rather than phone calls.

Dreams

• Ukrainians dream primarily of having strong health (58%). Good physical condition is one of a person’s basic needs, and the pandemic — as a threat to health — likely contributed to the heightened relevance of this aspiration. In second place is an increase in salaries and pensions (41%). For low-income Ukrainians, this is dream number one and is even slightly more important than health.
• The dream of having children and grandchildren ranks third (40%). It is equally relevant across age groups, except for the youngest (under 24), for whom it matters less. The stereotype that the desire for children is stronger among women is not confirmed: dreams about children and grandchildren show no significant gender differences.
• Between 16–17% dream of a large house or of traveling. As with spheres of interest, women — especially up to age 40 — dream of traveling more often. The dream of owning a large house is also more important to women than to men.
• Only 10% of Ukrainians dream about a career. This aspiration is most common among young women aged 16–24 (45%). By ages 25–30, this share decreases by half (21%) as dreams about family and children emerge. Young men aged 16–24 are more oriented toward running their own business (38%) than toward a career, and more so than women of the same age (28%).
• Fourteen percent dream of happy love, and for men this dream is more important. For example, among those aged 25–40, only 14% of women dream about love, compared to 22–24% of men. Even after age 60, one in ten men still dreams of happy love, whereas almost no women at that age continue to dream about it.
• The dream of strong health is more popular among women than men: from age 25 onward, about 60% of women prioritize this aspiration. Among men, it becomes significant only after age 50.
• Among those who want to work abroad, only one in ten dreams of permanently moving there. At the same time, they more often dream of travel, career opportunities, and running their own business.