TYMOSHENKO CASE: citizens' assessments in dynamics

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16.11.2011

TYMOSHENKO CASE: citizens' assessments in dynamics

Rating Group continues to study public attitudes toward the Tymoshenko case (the first results were presented at the end of September 2011).
One month after the verdict was announced, the majority of Ukrainians continue to recognize Yulia Tymoshenko’s guilt in the “gas case”, but at the same time consider this case to be more political and insist that the former Prime Minister should be free.
Opinions on whether the former Prime Minister should have the right to participate in the 2012 elections, and whether the statements of European politicians constitute interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, are almost evenly divided.
The dynamics indicate that the Tymoshenko case is moving from the economic or anti-corruption sphere clearly into the ideological one.
In the opinion of the majority, the final decision in this case belongs to the President, not to the courts or the prosecutor’s office.
As one month earlier, respondents consider Yulia Tymoshenko rather guilty (44%) of abuse of power or official authority during the signing of the 2009 gas agreements with Russia than not guilty (36%). One in five has not decided on this issue.
At the same time, only one quarter (24%) of respondents support the prison sentence in the Tymoshenko case regarding the 2009 gas agreements. A majority (52%) insist on mitigation or cancellation of the sentence.
Thus, 12% support a suspended sentence or amnesty after the court decision on imprisonment;
21% believe that the 2009 gas agreements were unfavorable for Ukraine, but that criminal liability should be removed from Tymoshenko;
another 18% believe that all charges against the former Prime Minister should be dropped.
22% of respondents are undecided on this issue.
As one month earlier, only about one quarter (27%) believe that the criminal case against Yulia Tymoshenko is rather the enforcement of the rule of law, while a majority (54%) see it as political persecution. Another 19% are undecided.
More than half (51%) also consider the new criminal case against Yulia Tymoshenko—regarding the transfer of the debts of the EESU corporation to the state budget of Ukraine—to be political persecution. Only 28% believe that this new case is rather the enforcement of the law.
Thus, in public perception the Tymoshenko case is becoming increasingly political and may intensify regional polarization. This is indicated, in particular, by regional dynamics.
Only in the Donbas and the South has the number of people who consider Tymoshenko guilty increased. In all other regions, including the East, it has decreased, and accordingly the number of those who do not recognize her guilt has increased.
Only in the Donbas does the number of those who support imprisonment exceed the number of those who insist on mitigation or cancellation of the sentence. In all other regions the opposite is true.
The view that this is political persecution dominates in all regions except the Donbas.
Opinions on whether Yulia Tymoshenko should be allowed to participate in the 2012 parliamentary elections are almost evenly split: 42% believe she should, and 40% believe she should not. 18% are undecided.
In the West, North, and Center, more people agree that the former Prime Minister should be allowed to participate in the next elections; in the East, South, and Donbas, more believe that she should not.
The right of Yulia Tymoshenko to participate in the next elections is supported by 100% of Batkivshchyna supporters, about 60% of Svoboda, Civic Position, and Front for Change supporters, more than half of UDAR supporters, one third of those voting “against all” and the undecided, and only 9% of Party of Regions supporters.
A majority of respondents (41%) believe that the final decision in the Tymoshenko case (whether she will be released or not) depends only on President Viktor Yanukovych.
Far fewer believe that the final decision depends on the courts (19%) or the Prosecutor General’s Office (10%). Even fewer believe it depends on the Verkhovna Rada (5%) or the Security Service of Ukraine (3%).
2% believe it depends on none of the above, and 16% are undecided.
Only residents of the Donbas and supporters of the Party of Regions believe that the final decision depends more on the courts; all other respondents believe it depends more on the President.
A majority (46%) believe that after a change of power, criminal cases will also be opened against representatives of the current authorities. Only one third disagree. Another 21% are undecided.
Interestingly, the least likely to believe that criminal cases will be opened against today’s authorities after a change of power are supporters of the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna, while the most likely to believe this are supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, and UDAR.
40% of respondents believe that comments by European Union politicians on the Tymoshenko verdict do not constitute interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Slightly fewer (36%) consider it interference. One quarter could not answer.
At the same time, 40% view the comments of EU politicians on the Tymoshenko verdict positively, and 31% view them negatively. For 15% it is irrelevant, and another 15% are undecided.
The position of those who see this as interference is not categorical, since only two thirds of them view the EU politicians’ comments negatively. At the same time, one in ten of them views the EU statements positively, and more than one in ten is indifferent.
The most positive attitudes toward EU politicians commenting on the Tymoshenko case are found in the North, West, and Center—this includes over 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, almost 60% of Svoboda and Civic Position supporters, and almost 50% of Front for Change and UDAR supporters.
The most negative attitudes are in the Donbas, South, and East—including over 60% of Party of Regions supporters and over 40% of Communist Party supporters.

Methodology

Survey population: population of Ukraine aged 18 and over.
Sample size: 2,000 respondents.
Method: face-to-face formalized interviews.
Margin of error (95% confidence):
– near 50%: not more than 2.2%
– near 30%: not more than 2.0%
– near 10%: not more than 1.3%
– near 5%: not more than 1.0%
Fieldwork period: October 25 – November 6, 2011.
Regional breakdown:
- West: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi
- Center: Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy
- North: Kyiv city, Kyiv region, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv
- South: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Sevastopol
- East: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv
- Donbas: Donetsk, Luhansk