Dynamics of ideological markers: February 2012

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13.03.2012

Dynamics of ideological markers: February 2012

According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 52% of surveyed Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. 34% do not support it. Another 15% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past year the number of supporters of European integration has declined to the level of 2009. Thus, in October 2009, accession of Ukraine to the European Union was supported by 51% of respondents; in April 2010 — 52%; in September 2010 — 57%; in January 2011 — 56%; in April 2011 — 51%; and again 52% in February 2012. Thus, the peak of support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union occurred in late 2010 – early 2011.
Among the strongest supporters of European integration are residents of the West (78%), somewhat fewer in the Center (59%) and North (55%). Accordingly, this includes over 80% of Svoboda supporters, about 70% of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, UDAR, Civic Position, as well as Strong Ukraine. Among the strongest opponents are CPU voters, two thirds of whom do not support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Party of Regions supporters are almost evenly split on this issue: about 40% support European integration, while 45% do not.
The higher the respondents’ level of education and the younger they are, the more they support Ukraine’s accession to the EU and the less they support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus and granting Russian the status of a second state language.
At the same time, 47% of respondents support the formation of a single state of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. 42% do not support it. Another 11% are undecided. Importantly, about 30% of those who support the formation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
Compared to April of last year, the number of such people decreased by a quarter (in April it was almost 40%), which indicates an increase in polarization of society along ideological lines. This is especially visible in regional terms: the “pro-Russian” vector is gaining popularity in Donbas, the South, and the East, while the “pro-Western” vector is strengthening in Western Ukraine. This is also confirmed by the fact that for most markers the number of unambiguous supporters and unambiguous opponents is increasing.
Taking these features of the responses into account, respondents were asked a direct question. Thus, according to those surveyed, for Ukraine signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial (39%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (36%). 26% were unable to decide. Compared to October of last year, the number of supporters of the Free Trade Agreement with the EU did not decrease; instead, the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 36%).
As a result, the West, North, and Center of Ukraine are more supportive of the Agreement with the EU, while Donbas, the South, and the East support joining the Customs Union. However, about 20% of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters support joining the Customs Union, just as about 20% of Party of Regions supporters support the Agreement with the EU. Strong Ukraine supporters are split almost evenly: 40% for the EU Agreement and 41% for the Customs Union with Russia.
46% of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language. Almost the same number (45%) oppose this. Another 8% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past two years the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been almost equal. However, compared to 2009, support for granting Russian state language status has decreased (in 2009 it was over 50%).
Among the strongest supporters of bilingualism are residents of Donbas (84%), the East (71%), and the South (65%). Accordingly, these are CPU supporters (72%), Party of Regions (71%), People’s Party (58%), and Strong Ukraine (53%). Among the strongest opponents are Svoboda voters, 100% of whom oppose granting Russian state language status.
Public attitudes toward Ukraine’s accession to NATO have worsened somewhat: from 26% in September 2010 to 24% in January 2011, 22% in April 2011, and down to 20% in February 2012. More than 68% of respondents do not support Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Another 13% are undecided. Strong support for joining the North Atlantic Alliance exists only in the West of the country (about half of respondents). Among party supporters, NATO accession is traditionally advocated primarily by supporters of Svoboda and Civic Position.
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of intensified gas negotiations, the number of supporters of extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has significantly decreased. Over the year, the number of supporters fell from 42% to 33%, while the number of opponents rose from 42% to 49%. 18% were undecided. The initiative lost support not only in the Center and North, but also in the East, South, and Donbas, where no more than half of respondents support it.
Recently, attitudes toward the idea of creating a trilateral “gas” consortium to divide ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system among Russia, the EU, and Ukraine have improved. Over the past year (since January 2011), support for the initiative increased from 30% to 35%, while the number of opponents decreased from 42% to 37%. Accordingly, attitudes toward the consortium have returned to the 2009 level, when 36% supported it and 35% opposed it.
Given the ambiguity of the initiative and difficulties in understanding it (almost 30% were undecided), respondents were asked a clarifying question: “Do you support the idea of transferring control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system to Russia?” Thus, the absolute majority (78%) do not support transferring control of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Russia. Only 8% support it. 14% were undecided. The strongest support for transferring control to Russia comes from residents of the South (22%) and CPU supporters (17%). At the same time, over 70% of Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine supporters oppose it, over 80% of UDAR, almost 90% of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change, and almost 100% of Svoboda oppose it.
24% of respondents support recognizing OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 57% do not support it. Another 19% are undecided. Public attitudes toward this issue fluctuate from year to year: after support rose from 20% to 27% in 2011, it declined again in 2012 to 24%, which is less than last year but more than the year before. More than 90% of Svoboda supporters support recognition of OUN-UPA, while about the same share of CPU supporters oppose it. Among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Civic Position, and UDAR, the number of supporters and opponents is almost equal. The idea is opposed by the vast majority of supporters of the Party of Regions (83%), Strong Ukraine (63%), People’s Party (67%), and those who vote “against all” (68%).
59% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was genocide of the Ukrainian people. 26% disagreed, and 16% were undecided. It is important to note fluctuations in public opinion on this issue: in March 2010, 61% agreed; in January 2011 this fell to 53%; in April 2011 it rose again to 58%; and finally stabilized at 59% in February 2012. Almost 90% of residents of the West, over 70% of the North and Center, and about 40% of the East and South share the genocide thesis. About 40% of Party of Regions and CPU supporters also share this view.

Methodology