19.10.2015
Electoral moods of the population: October 2015
- According to the results of the latest survey conducted by Rating Group, if the presidential elections in Ukraine had been held in early October, 26% of decided voters would have supported Petro Poroshenko, 16% would have supported Yulia Tymoshenko, 12% would have supported Yurii Boiko, 9% would have supported Andrii Sadovyi, 7% would have supported Oleh Liashko, 6% would have supported Anatolii Hrytsenko, and more than 4% would have supported Dmytro Yarosh and Oleh Tiahnybok. The remaining voters would have supported other candidates.
- If the second round of the presidential election had included Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 42% would have supported the incumbent President and 31% would have supported the Batkivshchyna leader, while the rest would have remained undecided. If Petro Poroshenko and Andrii Sadovyi had advanced to the second round, 39% would have supported the incumbent President and 34% would have supported the Samopomich leader. If Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko had advanced to the second round, 54% would have supported the incumbent President and 21% would have supported the Opposition Bloc leader.
- If parliamentary elections had been held in early October, 20% of decided voters would have supported the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 15% Batkivshchyna, 14% the Opposition Bloc, 10% Samopomich, and about 6% the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko. In addition, parties with significant chances of entering parliament included Svoboda (5%), Civic Position (4%), the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP (4%), Right Sector (4%), as well as Vidrodzhennia (3%) and Nash Krai (3%). UKROP, Vidrodzhennia, and Nash Krai significantly increased their support over the last month due to intensified local election campaigns and, if the upward trend continues, may claim representation both in local councils and in a new parliament.
- The leaders of the anti-rating are the Opposition Bloc (36%) and the Communist Party (35%). In addition, nearly one quarter of voters would definitely not vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” one fifth would not vote for the People’s Front, and about one sixth would not vote for the Radical Party, Svoboda, or Batkivshchyna. At the same time, so-called “new” parties do not have high anti-ratings, including UKROP (6%), Vidrodzhennia (6%), Nash Krai (5%), and Samopomich (3%).
- One third of voters are fully confident in their choice and would not change it, while another third are fairly confident but admit they could change their choice. The most confident voters are those supporting the Communist Party, the Opposition Bloc, Right Sector, UKROP, and Svoboda. The least confident voters are those supporting Civic Position, Nash Krai, and Strong Ukraine.
- In addition to parliamentary ratings, potential party reserves for local elections were also studied. About 30% of respondents допускають the possibility of voting for Samopomich in local elections, 25% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 23% for Batkivshchyna, and 15% for the Opposition Bloc. More than 10% also допускають the possibility of voting for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Svoboda, UKROP, and Nash Krai, with overall attitudes toward the latter two being less negative. Over the last two months, reserve support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and the Opposition Bloc has remained unchanged, while support reserves for Samopomich, Batkivshchyna, and UKROP have grown, and reserves for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko have decreased.
- Recent electoral trends indicate growing combined support for parties that are in opposition to the current government. While coalition parties were supported by nearly 70% of voters in the last parliamentary elections, today coalition parties are supported by about 45%, with the core of the coalition – the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front – supported by only 21%. This is consistent with satisfaction levels with key government officials: only 22% of respondents are satisfied with the President’s performance, 14% with the Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr Groysman, and 10% with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk. Dissatisfaction levels are 71%, 74%, and 86% respectively.
- Regarding other issues, 28% of respondents believe it is better to tolerate material hardship to preserve order in the country, while the majority (53%) believe that if living conditions significantly worsen, it is better to protest. These indicators are almost identical to those recorded in December 2013 (29% and 50% respectively).
- Over the last six months, support for dissolving parliament and calling new parliamentary elections increased from 34% to 47%, while support for calling new presidential elections increased from 31% to 43%.
- Only 12% of respondents believe that recently adopted budget amendments, which increased the minimum wage and pensions starting September 1, are a real achievement of the government in finding resources during crisis and war conditions. Meanwhile, the majority (77%) believe this was more likely pre-election PR.
- Regarding the detention on September 17 in the Verkhovna Rada of Radical Party MP Ihor Mosiychuk on suspicion of bribery, 28% believe it was enforcement of the law and justice, while 43% believe it was political persecution of the opposition by the authorities.
- Almost 70% of respondents believe that the events of August 31 near the Verkhovna Rada, when a combat grenade explosion during a protest killed law enforcement officers, were planned and organized by someone, while one in ten believes it happened accidentally due to negligence.
- One quarter believe the Svoboda party was behind the grenade attack near the parliament, one fifth believe Russian intelligence services were responsible. In addition, 15% believe Ukrainian radical nationalist organizations were responsible, 13% believe the President was responsible, 13% believe the Security Service of Ukraine was responsible, 12% believe Ukrainian oligarchs were responsible, 7% believe the police were responsible, and 6% believe ATO participants were responsible. Notably, voters of the Opposition Bloc, Communist Party, Vidrodzhennia, and Strong Ukraine tend to blame Svoboda and other Ukrainian nationalists, while voters of Svoboda, Right Sector, as well as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” Batkivshchyna, UKROP, and Samopomich tend to blame Russian intelligence services.
Methodology
- Survey population: population of Ukraine aged 18 and over
- Sample size: 3,000 respondents
- Method: face-to-face interviews
- Margin of error (95% confidence):
- near 50%: ≤ 2.2%
- near 30%: ≤ 2%
- near 10%: ≤ 1.3%
- near 5%: ≤ 1%
- Fieldwork period: October 3 – October 12, 2015
