GAS NEGOTIATIONS and Ukrainian-Russian relations

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06.10.2011

GAS NEGOTIATIONS and Ukrainian-Russian relations

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in late September 2011, 27% of Ukrainians described relations between Ukraine and Russia as warm, including 5% who called them friendly, 12% good-neighborly, and 10% fairly warm. At the same time, 46% assessed the relations as cool, including 23% as cool, 21% as tense, and 2% as hostile. In addition, 20% of respondents described the relations as neutral, while 7% were undecided.
Relations between Ukraine and Russia are viewed most positively in the South of the country, where 40% describe them as warm, and most negatively in the Donbas, the West, and the East, where only 22% do so.
In gas-related matters, perceptions are much more negative. Only 5% of Ukrainians describe relations with Russia in the gas sphere as warm, including 1% friendly, 2% good-neighborly, and 2% fairly warm. In contrast, 76% describe them as cool and primarily tense, including 26% cool, 43% tense, and 7% hostile. Another 12% describe gas relations as neutral, while 9% are undecided. Overall, Ukrainians see relations between the two neighboring states as more cool than warm, and in the gas sector as clearly tense and even hostile.
It should be noted that Russians assess Ukrainian-Russian relations in a very similar way, although somewhat more mildly. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in Russia in August 2011, 28% of Russians described relations between Ukraine and Russia as warm, including 5% friendly, 11% good-neighborly, and 12% fairly warm, while 39% described them as cool, including 26% cool, 11% tense, and 2% hostile. Another 27% assessed the relations as neutral, and 7% were undecided. Other Levada Center surveys show that Russians currently view relations with Ukraine better than in 2006–2007, but worse than in 2003 and significantly worse than in 1999–2000, when about 50% described them as warm, compared to only 28% today.
Fifty-six percent of Ukrainians support signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the European Union, while 26% oppose it and 18% are undecided. The strongest supporters of the agreement are residents of the North, West, and also the East, as well as supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, Batkivshchyna, and the UDAR party.
At the same time, 53% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 28% oppose it, and 19% are undecided. Support for the Customs Union is strongest in the East, the Donbas, and the South, as well as among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions.
At least 30% of Ukrainians simultaneously support both joining the Customs Union and signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU, particularly in the North and the East, where this share reaches 40%. There are also those who oppose both options, accounting for 4% of respondents, most notably in the Center, where this reaches 9%. Given these mixed attitudes, respondents were asked directly which option would be more beneficial for Ukraine. According to their answers, signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU is seen as more beneficial by 39%, while joining the Customs Union is preferred by 34%; 27% could not decide.
As a result, the West, North, and Center are more inclined toward the EU agreement, while the Donbas, South, and East lean more toward the Customs Union. However, 14% of Batkivshchyna supporters also favor joining the Customs Union, and 14% of Communist Party supporters favor the EU agreement. Similarly, 27% of Party of Regions supporters back the EU agreement, while 22% of Front for Change supporters favor the Customs Union. The younger the respondents, the more they support the EU agreement, from 47% among those aged 18–29 to 27% among pensioners, while support for the Customs Union increases with age, from 27% among young people to 43% among pensioners.
On gas issues, the majority of Ukrainians, 60%, believe that Ukraine pays Russia a price for gas that is above the market level and inflated. Only 13% believe the price is market-based, and 1% think it is below market level, while 26% are undecided, mainly residents of the Donbas and the East. In all regions, most respondents, especially in the North, view the gas price as inflated. Even in the South, 48% share this view, although a quarter of respondents there believe the price is market-based and 3% say it is below market level.
Accordingly, 70% believe that Ukraine should seek a reduction in the gas price, and most of them, 53%, think this should be done without making any concessions. Only 9% would accept selling Ukraine’s gas transmission system to Russia in exchange for a lower price, 5% would accept a merger between Naftogaz and Gazprom, and 3% would accept joining the Customs Union. At the same time, 7% believe Ukraine should not demand anything and should simply fulfill the ten-year gas contract signed with Russia in 2009, particularly residents of the South and supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. Another 23% are undecided.
Despite this confidence in the need to lower gas prices, Ukrainians see Ukraine’s negotiating position with Russia as weak. Sixty percent believe Russia’s position in gas negotiations is currently stronger, 17% think the positions are equal, and only 6% believe Ukraine’s position is stronger, while 18% are undecided. The strongest perception of Russia’s advantage is in the North, where complaints about high gas prices are also most common. Only 26% of Ukrainians believe Ukraine will be able to persuade Russia to lower the gas price in the near future, while 53% do not believe this, and 21% are undecided.
If Russia refuses to lower the price, 44% believe Ukraine should develop its own gas fields, including shale gas, 37% think Ukraine should look for other suppliers, 32% support switching to alternative energy sources, and 31% would raise the transit fee for Russian gas transported to Europe. Smaller shares favor promoting energy efficiency in industry at 26% and among households at 21%, increasing Russia’s lease payments for its military presence in Crimea at 23%, involving Europe in the negotiations at 20%, shortening the term of Russia’s fleet in Crimea at 15%, or challenging the gas agreement in international courts at 12%. Some respondents also suggest restricting imports of Russian goods, rejecting Russian as a state language, intensifying cooperation with NATO, or leaving the CIS.
If the gas price were lowered as a result of negotiations, 48% of Ukrainians say their attitude toward Russia’s leadership would improve and 51% would view Ukraine’s leadership more positively. Conversely, if the price were raised, 44% say their attitude toward Russia’s leadership would worsen and 48% toward Ukraine’s leadership, especially in the East and the Donbas, where attitudes toward Ukraine’s leadership would deteriorate more sharply.
About 60% of Ukrainians are familiar to some extent with President Yanukovych’s statement of September 3, 2011, in Dushanbe criticizing pressure from Russia in gas negotiations. Only 14% are well informed, 21% know about it in general terms, 22% have heard something, and nearly 40% have heard nothing. Among those who had heard of the statement, 60% liked it and 22% did not. However, after the statement, 63% did not change their attitude toward the president, 17% improved their view, and 8% worsened it.

Methodology

Survey population: population of Ukraine aged 18 and older
Sample size: 2,000 respondents
Method: face-to-face formalized interview
Margin of error (95% confidence): no more than 2.2% near 50%, 2.0% near 30%, 1.3% near 10%, 1.0% near 5%
Fieldwork period: September 17–27, 2011

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