Oleksii Antypovych, Rating Group

• It cannot be said that these processes were unpredictable for experts, but few expected such a rapid negative dynamic for the two main political favorites in Western Ukraine.
• Since March of this year, V. Yushchenko has lost almost half of his trust rating (in the West: 34% trust him, 56% do not), while Y. Tymoshenko has lost one and a half times (60% trust her, 31% do not).
• This is happening despite the fact that last year there had been a clear improvement (especially after the decision to dissolve parliament and the formation of a democratic coalition following the early elections).
• The key trigger for disappointment was the latest political crisis, or more precisely the policy of constant confrontation between the two main politicians. Ratings began to collapse already in May, when the Prime Minister started attacking the Head of State in response to attacks against her.
• For example, in March 2008, 85% of residents of Lviv region trusted Y. Tymoshenko and 77% trusted V. Yushchenko, but by October 2008 only 53% and 39% did so respectively.
• The events in the Verkhovna Rada in September were described by citizens exclusively as an escalation of the struggle for power. In connection with the situation in parliament, attitudes worsened among more than half of respondents toward V. Yushchenko (57%) and among more than one third toward Y. Tymoshenko (37%). Only very few saw improvement: 3% and 13% respectively.
• The October survey of residents of five Western Ukrainian regions only confirmed clear trends: half consider the joint parliamentary voting of BYuT and the Party of Regions to be a betrayal, and at the same time half consider the withdrawal of “Our Ukraine” from the coalition to be a betrayal.
• This confirms the thesis that for voters in Western Ukraine ideological betrayal was just as painful as the mutual betrayal of partners within the democratic coalition.
• The main culprit of the split in the team and of the country’s crisis is considered to be V. Yushchenko.
• Voters distributed responsibility for the political crisis almost evenly between V. Baloha (17%), Y. Tymoshenko (13%), and V. Yanukovych (11%), while the clear “leader” here is the President of Ukraine with 36%.
• It is characteristic that compared to a similar study conducted in July of this year, the share of respondents who believe that V. Yanukovych is responsible for the political crisis has almost halved.
• Regarding regional specifics, V. Yushchenko is blamed the most in Volyn and Rivne regions, V. Baloha in Ternopil region, Y. Tymoshenko in Ivano-Frankivsk region, and V. Yanukovych in Lviv region.
• Of course, there are other reasons for the decline in V. Yushchenko’s rating. For example, in the West one of the key issues is traditionally the fight against corruption. But respondents evaluate the President’s actions in this area either as ineffective or say that such actions do not exist at all.
• So what way out do Western Ukrainian voters see? Despite the fact that over 44% expect radical change, only one quarter support early elections. People genuinely do not understand why these elections are needed if the same politicians will come to power and nothing will change. At the same time, residents no longer believe in an effective alliance between Prime Minister Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko, and they simply do not accept V. Yanukovych as an alternative.
• In reality, whether through radical change or through stable development, citizens want change — but they associate these changes primarily with the arrival of new politicians. They are searching for an alternative, for politicians they can believe in.
• It is therefore not surprising that A. Yatseniuk is now second in the trust ranking after Y. Tymoshenko, with the same level of distrust as the Prime Minister (31%).
• In the presidential race A. Yatseniuk with 13% is also second in Western Ukraine: he loses almost threefold to Y. Tymoshenko (36%), but already beats the incumbent President (11%).
• If A. Yatseniuk were to head a new political force, he would have a chance to take second place after BYuT in early elections. A politician who is openly not a national-patriot becoming second in Western Ukraine is natural, because people are tired of confrontation.
• Another predictable surprise is VO “Svoboda” — a kind of refuge for disillusioned national-patriots from both BYuT and Our Ukraine. In Lviv, for example, Tyahnybok’s party has held second place since June 2008, ahead of Our Ukraine. If elections to the Lviv City Council were held, “Svoboda” would already be competing for first (!) place.
• It so happened that “Svoboda” did not even have to do anything. On the one hand, BYuT constantly criticized the President and Our Ukraine for possible cooperation with the Party of Regions, thus pushing away national-patriots. On the other hand, BYuT itself went into cooperation with the “regionalists.” If BYuT had formalized its alliance with V. Yanukovych, the ratings of BYuT and Y. Tymoshenko would have fallen by at least half. Under such conditions, “Svoboda”, without any parliamentary experience, would have entered the Verkhovna Rada with 100% certainty.
• These are the paradoxes of constant political confrontation.