• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, none of the tested versions of joint party lists currently produces a cumulative effect — accordingly, parties running “separately” produce better final results than running together.
• The only form of unification that almost achieves a cumulative effect is a JOINT LIST OF BATKIVSHCHYNA AND FRONT FOR CHANGE. This alliance would currently be supported by 30% of voters, while the parties running separately could obtain 31%.
  Only in the West does such a union produce a gain: 51% separately vs 53% together.
• The main problem is that supporters of Front for Change perceive such a union worse (only 75% of its supporters are ready to vote for a joint list) than supporters of Batkivshchyna (90%).
  At the same time, the losses from Front for Change are compensated by flows from Svoboda, Civic Position, the European Party, and Our Ukraine. Up to 10% of the undecided and “against all” are also ready to support this union.
• It is interesting that adding Svoboda to this alliance does not increase its electoral weight. A JOINT LIST of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda would also be supported by 30%, while running separately these parties could obtain up to 35%.
• Only about 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 70% of Front for Change supporters, and 70% of Svoboda supporters are ready to back such a three-party union.
  Importantly, both Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters are more cautious about a three-party union than about a two-party one. Losses are compensated by small inflows from Our Ukraine and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (up to 15%), Civic Position and the European Party (10%), up to 10% of the undecided and 6% of “against all”.
• Only in the West does the three-party union gain more (56%) than the two-party one (53%).
  In the North they are equal (37%).
  In the Center, however, there are heavy losses: Batkivshchyna + Front for Change = 31%, but Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda = only 25%.
• Thus, adding Svoboda is perceived most painfully in the Center, and the degree of rejection grows directly with the degree of Svoboda’s radicalism.
• Batkivshchyna supporters perceive any coalition better than the supporters of its potential allies. A certain sense of insecurity, caused by the absence of a leader, is noticeable — therefore, unification is also seen as a form of protection.
• A cumulative effect is also not achieved by a union of pro-government parties. A JOINT LIST of the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Strong Ukraine would be supported by 21%, while running separately they could receive 23%.
• Supporters of the Party of Regions feel most confident (almost 90% ready to support a joint list).
  This is not the case for People’s Party (52%) or Strong Ukraine (64%).
  Up to 10% of the undecided are also ready to vote for this list.
  Supporters of the Communist Party are almost inactive — only 5% would vote for such a list.
  This format is most promising in the East and Donbas.
• It should be emphasized that in all formats most voters who do not support their party joining do not switch sides — they move into the “undecided” category.

BELIEF IN UNIFICATION IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS

• When choosing whom to vote for in 2012:
  52% will vote against the course of President Yanukovych,
  22% will vote in support of his course,
  26% are undecided.
• In Donbas, more than one third will vote in support of Yanukovych’s course, and almost 30% against.
  In all other regions, opposition voting dominates, especially in the West (74%), North (69%), and Center (56%).
• Over 90% of Party of Regions supporters, nearly half of Strong Ukraine, and one quarter of Communists will vote in support of Yanukovych.
  About 90% of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and Front for Change supporters will vote against Yanukovych.
  Half of “against all” and over one third of the undecided share this stance.
• Despite strong public demand for opposition unity, belief that it will happen is weak.
  Voters believe pro-government parties are more likely to unite (53% yes, 24% no) than the opposition (44% yes, 36% no).
• Only about half of residents of the West and North believe in opposition unity.
  Nearly 60% of Western Ukrainians believe in unity of pro-government parties.
  The East is most convinced of government unity (almost 70%).
  The South mostly believes in neither.
• Batkivshchyna supporters believe most in opposition unity; Party of Regions supporters believe most in government unity.
  Among opposition voters, UDAR supporters believe the least in unity; among government voters — Communists.

SUPPORT FOR SINGLE CANDIDATES

• Despite weak belief in unity, support for unified opposition candidates is high:
• 43% would vote for a single opposition candidate in a single-member district,
  34% would not,
  23% are undecided.
• Almost 90% of Batkivshchyna, over 70% of Front for Change and Svoboda, almost 60% of UDAR and Civic Position could support such candidates.
  Support is highest in the West (64%), North (56%), Center (46%), lower in the East and Donbas.
• For a single pro-government candidate:
  32% would support,
  46% would not,
  23% undecided.
• Support for pro-government candidates reaches 40% in the East and Donbas, about one third in the South and Center, and about one quarter in the North and West.
  Over 90% of Party of Regions, about 70% of Strong Ukraine and People’s Party, and only one third of Communists would support such candidates.