17.11.2016
Attitude toward certain historical figures and de-communization process in Ukraine
- According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, almost half of respondents (48%) support the ban of communist ideology in Ukraine, 36% are against it, and 16% are undecided. Over the past two years, the share of those supporting the ban has not changed. A majority of residents in the West (78%), half of residents in the Center, and one third of residents in the South support banning communist ideology, while in the East only 18% support it. The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more likely they are to support the ban of communist ideology. Men support the ban somewhat more than women. Rural residents support the ban more than urban residents. Support for banning communist ideology is strongest among supporters of patriotic parties, such as Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 80%). The strongest opposition comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (about 70%).
- One third of respondents support a ban on nationalist ideology, while 40% are against it and one quarter are undecided. Over the past two years, support for banning nationalist ideology has declined from 40% to 35%. Nearly half of residents in the South, 40% in the East, and one third in the Center support such a ban, while in the West only 20% do. The older the respondents and the lower their income, the more likely they are to support banning nationalist ideology. Women support the ban more than men. Urban residents are more supportive than rural residents (38% vs 28%). In terms of party preferences, attitudes toward banning nationalist ideology are the exact opposite of those toward banning communist ideology. The strongest support for banning nationalism comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (over 55%), while the lowest support is among voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s Movement.
- 41% of respondents support the initiative to dismantle all Lenin monuments in Ukraine, while nearly half (48%) are against it and 11% are undecided. Support is highest in the West (72%), about 41% in the Center, 26% in the South, and only 18% in the East. The younger the respondents and the higher their education, the more likely they are to support dismantling Lenin monuments. Rural residents are more supportive than city dwellers. Men support this initiative more than women. The strongest supporters are voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 75%). Among voters of BPP, Samopomich, and Civic Position, supporters outnumber opponents roughly two to one (about 60% vs 30%). Among supporters of the Radical Party and Batkivshchyna, supporters and opponents are roughly equal. Voters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc are overwhelmingly against dismantling Lenin monuments.
- Attitudes toward the renaming of Soviet-era city and street names are mixed. Overall, more people oppose (57%) than support (35%) this initiative. However, when selective renaming is considered, support rises and supporters outnumber opponents (49% vs 44%). 34% believe that only names honoring Soviet political figures who committed crimes against the Ukrainian people should be changed, and 15% believe that all such names should be changed. At the same time, 44% oppose any renaming at all, and 7% are undecided. Support for renaming is highest in the West, while in the East and South it is predominantly negative. The higher the level of education, the greater the support for renaming. Men support it more than women. The lowest support is among the 60+ age group. Rural residents are more supportive than urban residents. Among party supporters, the pattern is similar to attitudes toward dismantling Lenin monuments, though opponents are relatively more numerous.
- 72% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude toward Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 8% a negative one. About half evaluate Ivan Mazepa (52%) and Peter I (50%) positively, although negative attitudes toward Peter I are somewhat higher (29% vs 22%). 36% have a positive view of Fidel Castro, 22% a negative one, and 42% are unsure or do not know him. 35% view Stepan Bandera positively, 46% negatively, and 18% are undecided. 26% have a positive view of Symon Petliura, while 45% have a negative view. Nearly one quarter are undecided. 25% view Ronald Reagan positively, 24% negatively, while half are unsure or do not know him. Stalin and Lenin have the worst ratings: only 22% and 25%, respectively, view them positively, and about two thirds view Stalin negatively, while almost 60% view Lenin negatively.
- Dynamics show that the share of Stalin supporters has remained almost unchanged in recent years (20–24%). Positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased significantly compared to 2012 (35% vs 22%) and slightly compared to 2014 (31%). This year, positive views of Peter I declined compared to 2012, but remained at the same level as in 2014 (50%). Positive views of Mazepa increased to 50%, compared to 44% in 2012 and 41% in 2014.
- In the West, there is a positive attitude toward Ukrainian historical figures—Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura—while in the East there is a stronger positive attitude toward Russian historical figures—Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin. The higher the level of education, the more positive respondents are toward Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Petliura, and Reagan. The lower the education, the more positive they are toward Lenin and Stalin. Rural residents view Hrushevsky and Bandera more positively and Peter I, Castro, Lenin, and Stalin more negatively.
- Supporters of Svoboda have the most positive views of Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera. BPP supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura positively. Samopomich supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera positively. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc most positively evaluate Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin.
Methodology
- Audience: residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older. The sample is representative by age, sex, region, and settlement type.
- Total sample: 2000 respondents.
- Personal formalized interview (face-to-face).
- The margin of error does not exceed 2.2%.
- Fieldwork dates: 4-11 November 2016
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