Language issue

• About 57% of respondents expect that President V. Yanukovych will fulfill his promise to grant the Russian language the status of a second state language. Of these, 12% expect this in the coming months, 24% during 2010, and 21% over the next few years.
  At the same time, about 20% of respondents believe that Yanukovych will never fulfill this promise. For every tenth respondent it does not matter, and another one in six is undecided.
• The highest expectations of Yanukovych fulfilling this promise are in the South and Donbas, slightly lower in the East, and the lowest in the Center, North, and West. It is worth noting that supporters of the Communist Party (CPU) expect corresponding actions from the President in a shorter time frame than supporters of the Party of Regions. At the same time, the number of respondents who do not believe in the fulfillment of this promise among CPU supporters is three times higher than among Party of Regions supporters.
• The greatest disbelief in Yanukovych fulfilling his promise is in the West (33%), and at the same time this region has the largest share of those who expect action in the next few months (16%).
• 49% of respondents support the initiative of the Party of Regions to legally give local councils the right to determine themselves the language of education in schools and universities, official paperwork, etc.
  38% do not support it, and 13% are undecided.
• In Donbas, 81% support this initiative, while in the West, 71% oppose it. Accordingly, on one side are supporters of the Party of Regions and CPU, and on the other — Our Ukraine, Svoboda, BYuT, and Front for Change.
• It is worth noting that almost two-thirds of respondents believe that such actions would in practice mean granting Russian the status of a second state language in those regions. Characteristically, in this regard the views of Party of Regions supporters and the radicals of Our Ukraine and Svoboda coincide.
• Overall, 54% support granting Russian the status of a second state language, 39% are against, and 7% are undecided.
• The language issue is currently the largest potential source of protests in possible ideological confrontation.
• About 6% of respondents are ready to personally participate in protest actions if a decision is made to grant Russian state status, and another 13% would support a political force that undertakes such protests.
  At the same time, only 2% are ready to go out in support of this decision, and another 13% would support a political force that initiates such actions.
• Meanwhile, about two-thirds of respondents stated that they would not participate in any actions, either of protest or support, and would not support political forces that organize them.
• Residents of the West are far more determined to defend their position on language than residents of Donbas. Almost one in five in the West is ready to go out into the streets in protest, and one in three would support a political force that organizes such actions. The most radical are supporters of Svoboda (one in three personally ready to protest), Our Ukraine (one in five), and BYuT (one in six).
  In contrast, only 4% of Party of Regions supporters are ready to go out in support of granting Russian second state status.
• Issue of extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine
• 41% of respondents support keeping the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine after 2017, 38% oppose it, and 21% are undecided.
• The strongest supporters of extending the fleet’s presence are residents of the South and Donbas, and almost 70% of Party of Regions and CPU supporters. However, only 2% of Party of Regions supporters and 4% of CPU supporters are personally ready to go out in support.
  Only 13% of Party of Regions supporters would support a political force that organizes such actions.
• At the same time, one in ten residents of the West is ready for open protests. Again, mainly supporters of Svoboda and Our Ukraine, and somewhat fewer BYuT and Front for Change.
• Among supporters of the Lytvyn Bloc and Strong Ukraine (S. Tihipko), opinions are split evenly: about 40% for and 40% against. Their readiness for any actions is low.
• Issue of canceling President Yushchenko’s decree granting Hero of Ukraine to S. Bandera
• 53% support canceling the decree, 28% oppose it, 19% are undecided.
• Although fewer oppose the cancellation than oppose the fleet’s presence, the level of protest remains the same.
  One in ten residents of the West is ready to participate in protests if the decree is canceled.
• More than half of Svoboda supporters and slightly fewer of Our Ukraine are the most radical.
  In contrast, communists are the most ready to support cancellation — one in ten is ready to participate.
• It should be noted that supporters of BYuT and Front for Change are much less radical about defending Bandera’s title than on language or the fleet issue. Moreover, one quarter of them are ready to support cancellation of the decree.
• Issue of creating a gas transportation consortium
• About 35% support Yanukovych’s initiative to create a gas transit consortium, about 35% oppose it, and about 30% are undecided.
• This issue appears to be viewed more through a political rather than economic lens, which explains the high share of undecided respondents.
• Support is highest in Donbas and the South, opposition is highest in the West, Center, and North.
  The highest share of undecided is in the East (41%).
• In the North and Center, opponents of the consortium outnumber supporters almost two to one, making resistance here stronger than on the language issue.
• The most radical opponents are supporters of Svoboda, BYuT, and Our Ukraine.
  Among Strong Ukraine supporters, the number of supporters equals the number of opponents.
• Issue of recognition of the Holodomor
• A majority (60%) believe that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was genocide against the Ukrainian people.
  25% hold the opposite view, 14% are undecided.
• Among Communist Party supporters, negative responses prevail (37% say genocide, 58% say no).
  Among Party of Regions supporters, positive and negative are equal (40% vs 40%).
  However, in the South, East, and Donbas overall, positive evaluations prevail.
• The strongest defenders of the genocide interpretation are residents of the West, the weakest — Donbas.
• The strongest opponents are believers of the UOC–MP, although even among them supporters exceed opponents (44% vs 39%).
  The strongest supporters are Greek Catholics (95% vs 2%) and UOC–KP believers (62% vs 16%).
• The genocide thesis is least supported by respondents whose native language is Russian (34% for, 45% against).
  Among Ukrainian-speaking respondents, 81% support, 10% oppose.
  Among those who consider both languages native: 53% for, 32% against.