The decline in the ratings of Our Ukraine and President Viktor Yushchenko, which began back in 2006 and now seems to have reached its lowest point, is no longer news. Today, the focus of attention not only for politicians and journalists but also for citizens is the dynamics of BYuT’s ratings, especially in Western Ukraine, where Yulia Tymoshenko and her political force are rapidly losing support. The early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council, scheduled for March 15, 2009, could lock in this defeat, because any result below the 50% that BYuT received in the previous elections would be seen as a loss.

Sociological surveys conducted in Ternopil Oblast show that since the 2007 early parliamentary elections, BYuT’s ratings have fallen by more than half. Since October 2008, Tymoshenko’s personal rating has dropped by 10 percentage points. In local elections, the situation looks even worse: BYuT’s support at the regional level is lower than at the national level. As a result, Arseniy Yatsenyuk has become the leader of public sympathy in the oblast.

A decline in trust in Tymoshenko has also been recorded in Lviv Oblast. In March 2008, 85% trusted Tymoshenko and 77% trusted Yushchenko, but by October 2008 these figures had fallen to 53% and 39% respectively. This is not surprising. In Western Ukraine, people are tired of being hostages to the conflict between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. The latest political crisis, driven by their constant confrontation, became a key trigger for disillusionment. The economic crisis, which affected almost every Ukrainian family, further deepened dissatisfaction. People are unhappy with the authorities, which at both the local and national level are largely represented by BYuT and Our Ukraine. Even though 42% of residents of Lviv Oblast positively assess the government’s anti-crisis efforts, 45% rate them negatively. If these trends continue, they could trigger a wave of local early elections across the country.

In the 2007 parliamentary elections, BYuT achieved record results and secured victories in key strategic regions. The main beneficiary of BYuT’s decline could be Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who is best positioned to capture the “free” votes of disappointed supporters of Our Ukraine and BYuT. Another potential winner is Svoboda, whose rating in Ternopil Oblast rose from 3% to 13% in just one year.

However, Yatsenyuk’s attempts to consolidate his position in Western Ukraine have so far been weak. The leaders of his “Front for Change” movement have been publicly presented only in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. In other regions, they remain largely unknown. This makes it advantageous for Yatsenyuk’s competitors to agree to early elections only if he is not ready for them.

According to the Central Election Commission, regular local elections are scheduled for 2010, while the timing of parliamentary elections remains uncertain. It is widely expected that parliamentary elections will be early, but it is unclear whether they will be held together with the presidential elections.

If early local elections are announced in other regions after Ternopil, BYuT risks losing its leadership in Western Ukraine, or at least cementing its weakened position. On the other hand, if local elections are held together with parliamentary elections, BYuT could rely on Tymoshenko’s personal rating as the core of its campaign.

So the key question remains: will early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council actually take place? Even though the campaign officially started on January 15, 2009, attempts to block the elections scheduled for March 15 cannot be ruled out.

The first sign of this came on January 16, 2009, when 237 MPs from BYuT, Our Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc voted to postpone the consideration of the report of a parliamentary investigative commission into the activities of the Ternopil City Council. That commission, headed by BYuT MP Ivan Denkovych, was established in June 2008 after accusations that the city authorities had illegally distributed land. It was expected that its work would lead to the re-election of the Ternopil mayor and city council. However, BYuT appears to have backed away, possibly after the painful defeat in Kyiv’s early elections or due to pressure from local elites.

At the same time, a December 2008 survey showed that 54% of Ternopil Oblast residents believe the region urgently needs radical change. A high turnout is expected: 40% said they would definitely vote on March 15, 35% probably would, 20% would not, and 5% were undecided. These elections clearly matter to citizens.

If any political force were to sabotage the elections, it would only damage its own ratings. This applies to all parties, including Yatsenyuk, in whom many voters have placed high—perhaps overly high—hopes. Another disappointment amid the crisis would only deepen public distrust.

Ternopil Oblast may not be large, but the political significance of these elections should not be underestimated. That is why leaders of all major political forces—Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Lytvyn, Yanukovych, and Kyrylenko—should publicly and honestly state their positions: Will these elections take place or not? Will early local elections follow in other regions? People deserve clarity about what is really happening in their regions.