The National Centre for Culture published on its website (www.nck.pl/badania) the report “Ukrainians on History, Culture and Polish–Ukrainian Relations”, prepared by Tomasz Stryjek, Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, and Kamila Zacharuk.
The report presents the results of a study conducted by the National Centre for Culture and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The research was carried out in Ukraine at the end of 2016 and consisted of qualitative and quantitative parts, conducted in parallel. Fieldwork was carried out by the Rating Group (Kyiv, Ukraine).

In the qualitative part of the study the following questions were asked:Given the complexity of the research questions and the rule that one focus-group discussion should not last longer than two hours, the research team decided to conduct two group interviews of different types (“History” and “Culture and Memory Politics”) in each of the four regions of Ukraine (a total of eight focus groups). Each group consisted of 9 to 11 participants.

• What beliefs and assessments do representatives of contemporary Ukrainian humanitarian and creative intelligentsia express regarding the influence of Poland and Poles on the history of Ukraine, the cultural heritage in Ukraine remaining from the period when both countries – partially or entirely – belonged to one state (14th–20th centuries), and the current state of preservation of this heritage?
• How does the contemporary Ukrainian intelligentsia assess the accessibility of Polish culture in Ukraine, and how familiar are its representatives with the activities of specific Polish institutions and programs implemented in this field?
• How does Ukrainian intelligentsia view contemporary Polish and Ukrainian historical policies conducted by these two countries toward each other?

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In the quantitative part, the survey was conducted on a sample of 4,000 respondents, selected to be representative for the four Ukrainian macro-regions (West, Center, South, East) and for the whole country. This sample made it possible to draw conclusions on percentage distributions within each region with accuracy of at least ±3%.

The main research questions of the quantitative part:The full report (available in Polish) presents the results of both parts of the study, starting with the survey findings.

• What does it mean to be Ukrainian, and does this definition include reference to the past?
• Which symbols of the past are important for Ukrainians today?
• What is the attitude of Ukrainians toward selected past events and how much do they participate in maintaining memory of them?
• What do Ukrainians know about the common Polish-Ukrainian past and how do they relate to it?
• How are opinions about current events formed among Ukrainians?
• What influences the perception of the past and to what extent?

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHORS

Conclusions from the quantitative part

Residents of Ukraine most often identify themselves through citizenship – 42% indicated this. Ethnic identification (Ukrainian, Russian, etc.) is relatively popular only in the West, where it is slightly less common than civic identification.

The history of Ukraine is considered very important or important by 83% of respondents; 82% say the same about the history of their region. Only 51% consider the history of the USSR important.

Participation in memory-preserving activities (anniversaries, visits to memorial sites) is low, despite the high declared importance of history.

Main sources of historical knowledge:

• Family and relatives – 40%
• School – 38%
• Books – 36%
• Films – 29%
• Ukrainian TV – 25%
• Internet – 24%

The most watched historical films concern World War II:

• Iron Hundred (2004) – 55%
• White Bird with a Black Mark (1970) – 49%
• Haytarma (2013) – 48%

Highest positive evaluations among 22 historical figures:

• Taras Shevchenko – 92%
• Bohdan Khmelnytsky – 84%
• Yaroslav the Wise – 83%
• Volodymyr the Great – 82%
• Mykhailo Hrushevsky – 75%
• Viacheslav Chornovil – 65%

Most negative evaluations:

• Stalin – 78%
• Lenin – 59%
• Gorbachev – 53%
• Catherine II – 51%
• Khrushchev – 43%
• Bandera – 40% (36% positive, 19% neutral, 4% unknown)

52% believe the Khmelnytsky uprising (1648) was a struggle for Ukrainian independence.
63% describe the Holodomor as genocide committed by the Soviet authorities against Ukrainians.

48% chose only positive characteristics of OUN, 22% only negative.
51% chose only positive characteristics of UPA, 6% only negative.

34% believe the collapse of the USSR brought more losses than benefits; 29% think the opposite.

Most important holidays:

• Victory Day (9 May) – 39%
• Independence Day (24 August) – 30%

58% consider decommunization unnecessary; 34% consider it necessary.

Among 10 countries, Poland ranks second after Russia in how important history is for relations:

• Russia – 70%
• Poland – 67%

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Conclusions from the qualitative part

Perceptions of Poland’s role in Ukrainian history are ambivalent. Poland is seen both as a carrier of Western civilization and as a power that limited Ukrainian political and cultural emancipation before 1939.

Regional differences do not support the idea of “two” or “four” Ukraines in memory or identity. The only clear pattern is that critical views of Poland are strongest in the West and decrease eastward and southward.

The war in Donbas has led to greater social consolidation. Many respondents believe weak or unclear memory policy contributed to the loss of Crimea and Donbas.

Key events in Ukrainian–Polish memory:

1. Cossack–Polish conflicts
2. 1918–1921 struggle and cooperation
3. Volhynia and Eastern Galicia 1943–44 and Operation Vistula
4. WWII repression by Nazis and USSR
5. Poland’s support of Ukraine after 1991

Polish focus on Volhynia is perceived as one-sided and dismissive of Polish responsibility before 1939.

Ukrainians do not have a clear image of responsibility for Volhynia, including the role of UPA. The Polish parliament’s 2016 classification of UPA actions as genocide is widely perceived as imposed.

Respondents see medieval, 19th-century, and post-1991 periods as mostly positive for Polish-Ukrainian relations and believe Poland should focus more on these periods.

Since the Maidan, civil society has grown strongly, and Polish-Ukrainian cooperation now happens mostly through NGOs, humanitarian aid, culture, and youth work.