Oleksii Antypovych for “Expert Ukraine”

• The elections of deputies to the Ternopil Regional Council produced sensational results. They showed that a politician who relies on behind-the-scenes agreements can lose the trust of voters within a single month. Only four days after the elections, on 19 March, deputies of the new convocation of the Ternopil Regional Council gathered for a session. It took place despite the decision of the Kyiv District Administrative Court of 18 March banning the official publication of the election results. In addition, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc withdrew its deputies from the regional council and appealed to the прокуратура demanding that legality be ensured.
• In the new regional council, the number of Tymoshenko Bloc deputies turned out to be unexpectedly small — only 12. The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” received the largest number of seats (50 deputies). The Yedynyi Tsentr party secured 20 mandates, the Party of Regions 14. Another 11 deputies represent the Ukrainian People’s Party bloc, eight represent Our Ukraine, and five the Lytvyn Bloc.
• Despite the chaotic nature of the electoral process (the elections were canceled 12 days before the voting date and reinstated again one day before the vote) and the sensational nature of the results, the outcome of these local elections is indicative on a national scale. Although parliament decided to cancel the elections and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc tried to derail the vote, the elections took place. This should serve as a lesson for politicians: the issue of power must be decided at polling stations, not in courts or parliamentary back rooms. And if deputies decide to boycott elections, such a campaign must be launched at least three weeks before election day with appropriate information support. The Tymoshenko Bloc’s efforts to disrupt the elections were relatively successful only in the regional center, where turnout was record low. Many residents of the region never learned that the elections were being challenged and came to polling stations on the appointed day. Leaders of the Tymoshenko Bloc claim that one of the reasons for the high activity in rural polling stations was falsification by the regional administration. Most residents of Ternopil region think otherwise. When asked “Were there falsifications in the elections?”, 26% of voters answered no, 41% reported minor violations that could not seriously affect the results of the campaign, and only 20% said there were many cases of falsification, although two thirds of them did not participate in the elections and therefore could not have been witnesses to violations. At the same time, three quarters of respondents in our survey say they perceive the court lawsuits of the Tymoshenko Bloc as an attempt to cancel unfavorable voting results.
• Three Galician defeats of Tymoshenko
• The election campaign in Ternopil was short — only three months — and very dynamic. The Tymoshenko Bloc, which was the favorite and planned to fight for monopoly power in the region, suffered a crushing defeat. The battle for Ternopil may become decisive in choosing a strategy for the presidential campaign both for Yulia Tymoshenko and for her opponents. The decline in the rating of Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine, which began in 2006, surprises no one. The cooling of sympathy for the Tymoshenko Bloc is also not news. But the fall of Tymoshenko’s personal rating is a truly new trend. Back in January, the level of voter trust in the prime minister in the region was one and a half times higher than the rating of her party. In February, Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating fell from 24% to 17% and became equal to the party’s rating.
• There are several reasons for this decline. One is the impact of the economic crisis. Sociological surveys conducted in February by Rating Group show that 58% of residents of the region are convinced that Tymoshenko, as head of government, is incapable of overcoming the economic crisis, and 40% believe that she is not even trying to do so. The second reason is fatigue in Galicia from the Yushchenko–Tymoshenko confrontation: over the past year, two thirds of voters have worsened their attitude toward both the prime minister and the president. Thus, the image of a hardworking Yulia Tymoshenko, who is prevented from working by the head of state, has been almost destroyed. (Interestingly, 55% of respondents are convinced that if Yushchenko were not president and Tymoshenko remained prime minister, she would find other people to blame for her mistakes.) Finally, the third argument, very important for residents of Western Ukraine, is the prime minister’s pro-Russian foreign policy. Almost two thirds of those surveyed believe that over the past six months the Ukrainian prime minister has been moving closer to the Russian leadership. At the same time, the majority (69%) are convinced that it is Vladimir Putin, not Yulia Tymoshenko, who benefits from their mutual agreements, and only 18% believe that the Ukrainian prime minister benefits.
• These elections will long be associated with Tymoshenko’s defeat: a few days before them, the Tymoshenko Bloc managed to punish itself. Its loyal voters were disoriented by calls to boycott the campaign, yet the Bloc failed either to disrupt the elections or to remove itself from the ballots. As a result, the Tymoshenko Bloc reduced its own result by at least half.
• Now the time has come for Yulia Tymoshenko to make tough кадрові decisions. Local party members were the main initiators of these elections, seeking to put an end to the power of representatives of the presidential secretariat in the region. In the end, they proved unable to conduct the campaign, although they once planned to hold early mayoral elections in Ternopil at the same time, but this was stopped in Kyiv.
• The Ternopil lessons
• For Svoboda, these elections may open the road to the Verkhovna Rada. It is now obvious to everyone that, with similar voter support in other Galician regions, this force would be able to overcome the electoral threshold (unless, of course, it is suddenly raised to five or seven percent). Strangely enough, Svoboda’s victory plays into the hands of the Party of Regions and the Communists, who in parliamentary races will actively exploit the thesis of the threat of radical Ukrainian nationalism. This will bring them additional votes in the south-east.
• For Yedynyi Tsentr, these elections may not bring significant dividends, but supporters of Presidential Secretariat head Viktor Baloga are clearly not among the losers. The campaign showed that administrative resources work, as does the bet on non-ideological regional leaders who enjoy a high degree of voter trust. Therefore, changing the electoral law from proportional to majoritarian, or as a compromise moving to open lists, is a priority task for Yedynyi Tsentr. This is its only path to parliament. By and large, the strong result of Yedynyi Tsentr is not so much the merit of Viktor Baloga or Ihor Kryil, but primarily a reflection of the trust of regional residents in specific candidates from the party list. Incidentally, last week Kryil registered in parliament a draft Electoral Code that contains this very model.
• The result of the Party of Regions — almost ten percent — is unexpected and is rather the result of network electoral technologies than party campaigning. A high result in the northern districts of Ternopil region (as in the 2007 elections) was delivered by voters oriented toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Pochaiv Lavra is located in the region, and local clergy enjoy authority among residents of nearby villages and do not hide their positive attitude toward the Party of Regions. It is unlikely that the Party of Regions will be able to repeat the Ternopil result across all of Western Ukraine in parliamentary elections, although it may double its traditional two-to-three-percent rating there.
• The most important lesson from these elections should be learned by Yulia Tymoshenko. If the prime minister does not change her attitude toward Russia, does not change her rhetoric toward Viktor Yushchenko, and does not revise a government policy based on making many statements that are later not backed by concrete decisions, she may permanently lose the trust of voters in western regions of Ukraine.
• Although Svoboda came first in the party race in Ternopil region, its leader Oleh Tyahnybok is not the most popular politician in the region. That position belongs to Arsenii Yatseniuk, whose rating is about 30%. In terms of trust, he is twice as popular as both Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, not to mention Viktor Yanukovych.
• The participation in the Ternopil elections of a political force directly supported by the former speaker could have seriously influenced their outcome. It is possible that such a force might even have won the elections, since the potential electoral core of Arsenii Yatseniuk is located precisely in the west of the country. In him, as in Tyahnybok, voters see an alternative to the current politicians. However, the leader of the Front for Change did not enter the Ternopil battle.
• The March electoral campaign in Ternopil region became a challenge not only for politicians but for democracy as a whole. Its results are largely emotional and will soon be reinterpreted by both voters and politicians, which will affect nationwide ratings. These elections underscored the growing demand for new faces in Ukrainian politics and confirmed that campaigns must be conducted in the regions. They proved that the winner will be the one who bets on authoritative local leaders.

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