31.01.2019
Monitoring of electoral moods of Ukrainians: January 2019
- According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in January 2019, almost 70% of respondents believe that the country needs radical changes. Only 12% are convinced that everything should remain as it is today, while 14% advocate a return to the past. The demand for radical change is relatively high (around 70%) in most regions. A comparatively lower demand for change is observed in the East (62%) and Donbas (52%). In the latter macro-region, one quarter of respondents express nostalgia for the past, and one in five do not want changes because they expect them to lead to deterioration.
- Over the past year, voter mobilization has increased. Forty-four percent of respondents stated that they definitely intend to participate in the presidential election of Ukraine, while another 35% said they are rather likely to do so. At the same time, the share of those who believe that their vote does not matter in elections has decreased (from 47% to 40%).
- The leaders of the presidential rating are Volodymyr Zelenskyi, supported by 19.0% of respondents who have decided on their choice and intend to vote, and Yuliia Tymoshenko, supported by 18.2% of such respondents. Petro Poroshenko is supported by 15.1%, Yurii Boiko by 10.0%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 8.5%, Oleh Liashko by 7.0%, Yevhenii Muraiev by 3.6%, Oleksandr Shevchenko by 2.9%, Andrii Sadovyi by 2.7%, and Oleksandr Vilkul by 2.6%.
- Over the past month, the ratings of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Petro Poroshenko have increased noticeably. A slight decline has been recorded in the level of support for Yuliia Tymoshenko. The electoral indicators of other candidates have not changed significantly.
- Volodymyr Zelenskyi demonstrates relatively higher electoral support among voters in the South and East; in Kyiv he shares the lead with Petro Poroshenko, while in Donbas he shares it with Yurii Boiko. Yuliia Tymoshenko leads in the Center and in the North, and in the West she shares the leading position with the incumbent Head of State. The latter is the leader of voter sympathies in Galicia.
- Volodymyr Zelenskyi is the candidate with the highest potential for electoral growth (the so-called “second choice”). He could be supported by an additional 7.4% of voters if their current favorites did not participate in the elections. Yuliia Tymoshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko could each gain an additional 6%, Yurii Boiko and Oleh Liashko 5% each, Yevhenii Muraiev, Andrii Sadovyi, and Oleksandr Shevchenko 4% each, Oleksandr Vilkul 3%, and Petro Poroshenko and Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 2% each.
- Twenty-three percent of respondents believe that Yuliia Tymoshenko will become the next president. Confidence in Petro Poroshenko’s victory is expressed by 16.3%, and in Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s by 10.3%. Recently, belief in Zelenskyi’s victory has increased significantly. Positive dynamics in this rating are also observed for Tymoshenko and Poroshenko. Belief in Tymoshenko’s victory prevails in almost all macro-regions except Galicia and Kyiv, where respondents are more convinced that the next president will be Petro Poroshenko.
- Petro Poroshenko continues to lead the anti-rating: almost half of respondents stated that they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Thirty-one percent said they would not vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, one quarter for Yurii Boiko, and one in five for Arsenii Yatseniuk and Oleh Liashko.
- Second-round modeling produced the following results. Yuliia Tymoshenko leads in pairings with Petro Poroshenko (27% versus 18%) and Yurii Boiko (28% versus 18%), but slightly loses in a pairing with Volodymyr Zelenskyi (29% versus 24%). Volodymyr Zelenskyi also wins in pairings with Petro Poroshenko (34% versus 20%) and Yurii Boiko (33% versus 17%). In the Yurii Boiko–Petro Poroshenko pairing, the incumbent president leads by a small margin (23% versus 21%). Importantly, in these hypothetical pairings more than one third of respondents state they would not participate in the vote, while 16–19% remain undecided.
- Sixty-seven percent of respondents state that Ukraine needs a leader capable of uniting, reconciling, and calming society, while 24% prefer a leader inclined toward dictatorship and strict enforcement of order. The latter expectations are relatively more common among voters of Oleh Liashko and Yurii Boiko.
- Forty-three percent continue to see the country’s leader as a politician with experience in governing the state, while 45% believe the president should be a new figure, even without experience in public administration. The demand for renewal of power is strongest among voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, Oleksandr Shevchenko, and Yevhenii Muraiev. In contrast, voters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Yurii Boiko primarily vote for experience.
- Forty-seven percent assert that new people without negative experience in senior positions, untainted by corruption and abuses, should work in government. On the other hand, 43% believe that experienced professionals should occupy senior state positions. As in the previous question, the demand for experience prevails among voters of Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, and Boiko, while the opposite view is supported by voters of “new” politicians.
- Satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent Head of State has increased slightly in recent months, while assessments of the work of the Prime Minister and Parliament have declined. Fifteen percent are satisfied with the performance of President Petro Poroshenko, while 80% are dissatisfied. Twelve percent are satisfied with the work of Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroisman, while 81% are dissatisfied. Only 5% are satisfied with the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, while 90% are dissatisfied.
- The number of respondents who place the greatest responsibility for solving the country’s problems on the President has increased: in September 2017 this figure was 49%, now it is 57%. Sixteen percent consider the Prime Minister responsible for the situation in the country, and the same share name the Verkhovna Rada. Responsibility is relatively more often attributed to Parliament by voters of Petro Poroshenko.
- Almost half of respondents believe that oligarchs (48%) and the President (45%) most hinder positive changes in the country. Over the year, the latter indicator has increased from 40% to 45%. One third are convinced that the Cabinet of Ministers is to blame for the slow pace of change (also increasing from 29% to 32%), 22% think so of the parliamentary coalition (down from 29% to 22%), 18% blame Russia, 16% the parliamentary opposition, and 12% the International Monetary Fund.
- Seventy-one percent of respondents believe that state power in the country is currently weak, while 17% hold the opposite view. The latter are most numerous in Galicia and among voters of Petro Poroshenko. Notably, over the past 3.5 years the indicator of perceived “strength” of power has increased by only 4 percentage points (from 13% to 17%).
- Half of respondents believe that the current authorities most lack honesty. One third point to a lack of efficiency, humanity, or public support; one quarter to professionalism and competence; and 13–15% to authority and managerial experience. Over the past 3.5 years, the demand for humanity and public support from the authorities has increased, while the demand for efficiency and professionalism has somewhat decreased.
- Respondents rated progress relatively better in the reform of the Armed Forces, the Ukrainization of the information space, and police reform. The lowest assessments concern anti-corruption and judicial reforms, changes to electoral legislation, de-oligarchization, the abolition of parliamentary immunity, and the adoption of legislation on presidential impeachment. Compared with the previous year, assessments improved regarding Armed Forces reform, Ukrainization, decentralization, education reform, healthcare reform, the fight against corruption, and judicial reform, while assessments of pension reform deteriorated.
- Responsibility for implementing most reforms is most often attributed either to the Government or to Parliament. Exceptions are Armed Forces reform, de-oligarchization, and anti-corruption reforms, where respondents more often consider the Head of State responsible.
- Since October 2018, support for granting the Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has increased to 51%. Twenty-one percent do not support this initiative, while 20% are indifferent. The lowest level of support is recorded among residents of the South, East, and Donbas; in these macro-regions, one third to one quarter of respondents are indifferent to this issue.
- The number of those who consider it important to live in a democratic state has gradually increased: today 40% unequivocally support this statement. No more than 10% consider it unimportant. Demand for democratic values is highest among residents of the capital and in Galicia, and lowest in Donbas.
- Almost 70% of respondents support introducing a mechanism for making state decisions through a nationwide referendum. Forty-seven percent believe voting should be conducted only through personal attendance at polling stations, while 10% support electronic voting via mobile communication or the internet, and one third support combined voting methods. Electronic voting is more popular among younger age groups.
- Sixty-four percent support the thesis that the Ukrainian language should be the sole state language; 15% favor granting the Russian language official status in certain regions; and 15% support state-level bilingualism. Support for granting any status to the Russian language is highest among residents of the South, East, and Donbas.
- Almost 60% support diplomatic ways of resolving the war in Donbas (37% favor ending hostilities and freezing the conflict, and 22% favor granting these territories autonomous or federal status within Ukraine). Only 7% support full separation of the occupied territories. At the same time, 18% support continuing military actions until full restoration of Ukrainian authority throughout Donbas. Support for this latter view is relatively higher among residents of western regions and the capital, and among voters of Ruslan Koshulynskyi and Petro Poroshenko. Meanwhile, 68% of respondents continue to consider Russia an aggressor country toward Ukraine, while 20% hold the opposite view. The largest share of respondents supporting the latter view is found in Donbas.
- Support for a pro-Western vector continues to prevail in Ukraine: 46% support accession to NATO (32% are opposed), and 50% support accession to the EU (30% favor equidistance from Russia and the West, and 9% support joining the Customs Union). Supporters of a pro-Western path dominate in all regions except the south-eastern oblasts and Donbas.
Methodology
- Audience: residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older. The sample is representative in terms of age, gender, region, and settlement type.
- Total sample: 6000 respondents.
- Personal formalized interview (face-to-face).
- The margin of error does not exceed 1.3%.
- Fieldwork dates: 16-24 January 2019
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