12.07.2018

Socio-political moods of the population: July 2018

  • According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, Yuliya Tymoshenko remains the leader of the presidential rating: 17.1% of those who intend to participate in the vote and have already decided on their choice are ready to vote for her. Anatoliy Hrytsenko is supported by 9.7%, Yuriy Boyko by 8.9%, Volodymyr Zelenskyy by 8.5%, Oleh Liashko by 8.1%, Petro Poroshenko by 7.8%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 6.6%, Yevhen Murayev by 4.2%, Vadym Rabinovych by 3.7%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 2.6%, Andriy Sadovyi by 2.2%, Serhiy Taruta by 1.5%, Arseniy Yatsenyuk by 1.3%, and Roman Bezsmertnyi by 1.2%. Among respondents who intend to vote, almost one in five has not yet decided on their choice.
  • In the so-called “second choice” rating, the leading positions are held by Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (5.3%), Yuliya Tymoshenko (4.9%), Volodymyr Zelenskyy (4.7%), and Anatoliy Hrytsenko (4.7%).
  • The negative rating continues to be led by Petro Poroshenko: almost half of respondents stated that they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Yuliya Tymoshenko would not be supported by 28.5% of respondents, Arseniy Yatsenyuk by 26.9%, Oleh Liashko by 26.2%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 18.9%, Yuriy Boyko by 16.1%, and Vadym Rabinovych by 15.6%.
  • Three quarters of those surveyed believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction. Thirteen percent hold the opposite view, while 12% are undecided in their assessment. In the perception of problems, the tendency persists whereby the war in Eastern Ukraine and corruption remain the most important nationwide issues, while at the personal level social problems dominate, primarily low wages and pensions as well as high utility tariffs.
  • The number of supporters of pro-Western integration exceeds the number of its opponents: 50% support accession to the European Union, while 28% are opposed; 42% support Euro-Atlantic integration, while 35% are opposed. When choosing between directions of integration into economic unions, 42% of respondents support accession to the European Union, 36% support equidistance from both Russia and the EU, 11% support joining the Customs Union, and another 11% are undecided. In regional terms, a trend can be observed whereby supporters of equidistance prevail in the southern and eastern regions (40–45%). At the same time, in the South the number of supporters of joining the Customs Union is half that of supporters of European integration, while in the East their numbers are almost equal.
  • Sixty-one percent of respondents believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language, while Russian should be freely used in all spheres of life. Seventeen percent support granting Russian the status of an official language in certain regions while preserving Ukrainian as the state language, and 19% support granting state status to both Ukrainian and Russian. The largest number of supporters of granting Russian some form of official status is recorded in the South and East. At the same time, even in these regions, 40–45% support maintaining the status quo in state language policy.
  • Respondents have the most positive attitudes toward Belarus (74%), Canada (68%), and the European Union (68%). Attitudes toward the United States are positive among 58% and negative among 27%; toward the CIS, 44% positive and 31% negative; toward Russia, 35% positive and 52% negative. Attitudes toward international organizations are as follows: 58% view the UN positively and 20% negatively; the OSCE, 50% positively and 26% negatively; NATO, 49% positively and 30% negatively; the IMF, 39% positively and 35% negatively. About a quarter of respondents were unable to express any attitude toward these international institutions. Western countries and institutions are viewed more positively in the West and Center of Ukraine, while Belarus, the CIS, and Russia receive more positive attitudes in the South and East.
  • Two thirds of respondents support peaceful ways of resolving the problem of the occupied Donbas: 32% support ending hostilities and recognizing these territories as temporarily occupied (freezing the conflict), 24% support granting these territories autonomy or a federal status within Ukraine, and 9% support their complete separation. At the same time, 21% support continuing military actions until full restoration of Ukrainian authority throughout Donbas. The view that the conflict in Donbas should be resolved by armed means is not dominant in any macro-region of the country.
  • Only 9% of respondents stated that they know the content of the Minsk agreements well. Another 49% said they are superficially familiar with them and have heard about them in the media, while almost 40% are not familiar with their content at all. Only 14% believe that Ukraine should fully implement all the conditions set out in the Minsk agreements. In turn, 17% believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiation process and make decisions without international mediators, while a relative majority of 32% argue that the agreements should be revised and new ones signed. About one third of respondents were unable to answer this question. The better respondents are acquainted with the substance of the agreements, the more clearly they express their views on their future. Over the past year, the share of respondents who support revising the Minsk agreements and signing new ones has slightly increased.

Methodology

  • Audience: population of Ukraine aged 18 and older. The sample is representative by age, gender, region, and type of settlement.
  • Sample size: 3,200 respondents.
  • Method: face-to-face formalized interviews.
  • Margin of sampling error does not exceed 1.7%.
  • Fieldwork dates: June 22 – July 5, 2018.