26.04.2018

Socio-political moods of the Ukrainians: New challenges

  • According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 75% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, while 14% hold the opposite view and 11% are undecided. Relatively less pessimism is expressed by residents of Kyiv and the Podillia cluster (Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi regions), while the highest level of criticism is observed in the southern and eastern regions.
  • Demand for change is gradually increasing. Today, almost 70% of respondents believe the country needs radical transformations; another 10% think it is better to keep things as they are, as long as they do not worsen; while 16% favor a return to the way things were in the past. In almost all electoral groups—except supporters of the current authorities—the number of those demanding change exceeds the number favoring stability or a return to the past. A relatively higher demand for a backward turn is found among supporters of Yurii Boiko, Vadym Rabinovych, and Oleh Liashko (over 20%), while a preference for stability is most common among supporters of Petro Poroshenko (45%). The strongest demand for change is among younger respondents (under 40), wealthier and more educated individuals, as well as those seeking political change and looking for alternatives among “new” parties in upcoming elections—particularly supporters of Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and Volodymyr Zelenskyi. At the same time, demand for radical change remains high across other categories as well.
  • Society is showing a growing demand for modernization of the political environment. In 2012, half of respondents were ready to support parties represented in parliament and only 21% wanted to replace them. By April of the current year, the situation had reversed: 46% expressed readiness to support new political projects, while only about one third would vote for parliamentary parties. Demand for political change is highest among youth, wealthier respondents, and urban residents. Even among supporters of “old” parties, at least one third are ready to seek alternatives.
  • Ending military hostilities in eastern Ukraine and strengthening the fight against corruption are the two main expectations from the future President of Ukraine. Additionally, 38% expect the revival of industry, nearly one quarter expect improvements in healthcare quality and social standards, 16% expect a reduction in oligarchic influence on politics, 11% expect revival of the agricultural sector, and 7% expect stimulation of business development.
  • New faces in Ukrainian politics enjoy the highest levels of public trust. Thirty-three percent trust Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (47% do not), while 32% trust Volodymyr Zelenskyi (50% do not). Trust levels for other politicians are as follows: Anatolii Hrytsenko—26%, Yuliia Tymoshenko—20%, Oleh Liashko—17%, Yurii Boiko—18%, Volodymyr Hroisman—17%, Andrii Sadovyi—17%, Vadym Rabinovych—14%, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko—14%, Petro Poroshenko—13%, Oleh Tiahnybok—11%, and Arsenii Yatseniuk—8%.
  • In the presidential rating among all respondents, Yuliia Tymoshenko leads with about 9%, followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko at 7%. Yurii Boiko, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi each receive around 6%; Petro Poroshenko and Oleh Liashko—5%; Vadym Rabinovych—4%; Andrii Sadovyi—2%; Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Oleh Tiahnybok, and Arsenii Yatseniuk—1% each. Eleven percent would support another candidate, while about one third are undecided or do not intend to vote.
  • Among those who intend to vote and have made a choice, support is as follows: Yuliia Tymoshenko—about 14%, Anatolii Hrytsenko—11%, Yurii Boiko, Petro Poroshenko, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk—9% each, Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Oleh Liashko—8% each, and Vadym Rabinovych—6%.
  • Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads the so-called “second choice” ranking: up to 6% would support him if their primary favorite were absent. About 4% would then vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Anatolii Hrytsenko, or Oleh Liashko; around 2% would choose Vadym Rabinovych, Yurii Boiko, Andrii Sadovyi, Oleh Tiahnybok, Petro Poroshenko, or Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.
  • Supporters of “new” candidates, if their favorite does not participate, are more likely to vote for other “new faces” rather than long-standing political figures. At least one third of Vakarchuk’s supporters would vote for Zelenskyi under such circumstances.
  • Petro Poroshenko leads the anti-rating: nearly half of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances. Anti-ratings are also high for Arsenii Yatseniuk (26%), Oleh Liashko (25%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (24%), Oleh Tiahnybok (18%), Yurii Boiko (17%), and Vadym Rabinovych (16%).
  • The party rating is led by Batkivshchyna, supported by about 9% of all respondents. The Opposition Bloc, Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s Servant of the People, and Anatolii Hrytsenko’s Civic Position each receive around 6%. The Radical Party, For Life, and Petro Poroshenko Bloc–Solidarity each have about 5%, Samopomich—3%, and Svoboda and the Agrarian Party—2% each. Other parties together account for about 14%, while over one third are undecided or do not plan to vote.
  • Among those who intend to vote and have decided, support for parties is as follows: Batkivshchyna—16%, Civic Position and the Opposition Bloc—10% each, Servant of the People—9%, For Life, the Radical Party, and BPP–Solidarity—8% each, and Samopomich—5%. Parties closest to passing the electoral threshold are Svoboda (4%), the Agrarian Party (3%), and UKROP (2%).
  • The most common motivation for choosing a political party is support for its socio-economic initiatives. Seventeen percent choose based on sympathy for the party leader, and 11% based on ideological principles. Over recent years, demand for socio-economic initiatives has increased significantly, while the importance of ideology has declined.
  • Society is gradually moving away from paternalistic expectations toward greater individual activity and internal locus of responsibility. In 2011, nearly 80% believed the government should be responsible for ensuring citizens’ livelihoods; today, fewer than 60% hold this view. Paternalistic values are strongest among the oldest and poorest respondents, while individual responsibility is more common among the youngest and wealthiest. Higher education also contributes to these value shifts.
  • Views on income equalization have changed similarly. Seven years ago, nearly 70% supported such initiatives; today, support has halved. Instead, support is growing for stimulating individual activity by creating opportunities to increase income.
  • By contrast, views on reducing the share of state ownership in business and industry show weaker dynamics. In 2011, 61% supported increasing state ownership; in 2017 this fell to 52%, but in 2018 it rose again to 58%.
  • Despite value shifts, amid economic and political crises there is a growing demand for order—even at the cost of limiting democratic principles and freedoms. Seventy percent support such an approach (up from 63% last year). Only 15% favor greater freedom and democracy without order (down from 22% in 2017). Demand for order is highest among the oldest, poorest, and less educated, though even among the youngest, wealthiest, and most educated, at least 60% favor order.
  • Against the backdrop of rising perceptions of local corruption, tolerance for corruption is declining. Over the past five years, those who believe corruption is increasing rose from 49% to 61%. At the same time, the share who consider bribery justified to resolve personally important issues fell from 37% to 13%. The share who personally gave bribes also declined from 27% in 2013 to 22% in 2018. Bribery is most common among respondents aged 30–50 and among wealthier and more educated individuals.
  • Attitudes toward corruption as a phenomenon are also changing. More respondents now view corruption as a disease that hinders Ukraine’s development (55%), while fewer see it as a necessary mechanism for society’s functioning (39%). Support for the latter view is highest among the youngest (under 40), the most educated, and the wealthiest. Nearly half of those who personally gave bribes in the past year share this belief, and about one third justify bribery for personal purposes.
  • An absolute majority of respondents (at least 75%) believe punishment for corruption among central government officials, law enforcement, tax and customs officials, and local authorities should be very severe (imprisonment, confiscation of property), with harsher penalties for higher-ranking officials. Between 11% and 18% believe penalties should be limited to fines or dismissal, and only 1–2% support mild punishments. Attitudes toward teachers and medical workers are more lenient: 44% support severe punishment, 32% moderate punishment, and 15% oppose any criminal liability for bribery among educators and doctors.

Methodology

  • Audience: residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older. The sample is representative in terms of age, gender, region, and settlement type.
  • Total sample: 6 000 respondents.
  • Personal formalized interview (face-to-face).
  • The margin of error does not exceed 1.5%. 
  • Fieldwork dates: 10-22 April 2018