The study was carried out as part of the project "Investigation of key problems and consideration of expert opinions in the development of the reintegration strategy" implemented the Institute for Peace and Common Ground (IPCG) with the support of ISAR Ednannia within the framework of the project "Initiative of sectoral support of civil society", which is implemented by ISAR Ednannia in a consortium with the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) and Center for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM) thanks to the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development.

Assessment of the situation

   
• Over 80% of surveyed individuals believe that the economic situation in the country has worsened over the last year, 10% feel it has remained the same, and 2% see an improvement.
   
• According to 64% of respondents, the political situation in the country has deteriorated; 22% think it has stayed the same, while 7% report improvements.
   
• 57% of participants noted a decline in their confidence about the future; for a quarter, there has been no change over the last year, and nearly 10% feel more confident, with the highest percentage among the oldest age group.

Ten percent of respondents were undecided.

   
• The financial situation of families has worsened for 60%, remained unchanged for 35%, and improved for 4%. Improvements are more frequently reported by respondents under the age of 30.
   
• An increase has also been observed in the proportion of those perceiving deterioration across all assessed areas, with the most significant rise noted among those who perceive a decline in the political situation—14%.

Losses due to war 

   
• The most common losses due to the war include deterioration in mental and emotional health (49%) and worsening of physical health (39%). About a quarter of the respondents experienced loss of income and family separation. Twenty percent reported the death of a loved one or job loss. Respondents living in combat zones more frequently reported experiencing these losses. Deterioration of health is more common among respondents over 50 years old and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
   
• The worst damage caused by Russian armed aggression, according to respondents, includes the death of civilians (72%), the death of military personnel (70%), and physical injuries leading to disabilities (31%).
   
• Priority for damage compensation should be directed to the relatives of the deceased (68%); individuals who lost homes and property (44%); individuals who have been in captivity (38%), and those who suffered physical injuries (36%). About 30% believe that veterans should be prioritized for compensation; one-fifth think it should be directed to the relatives of the missing.
   
• About 60% of respondents consider it inappropriate to provide support to Ukrainians living abroad, while 37% believe it should be offered. Support is more often favored by respondents from combat zones, the youth, and those with experience of displacement and migration.

Understanding of Justice

   
• For half of the respondents, the concept of justice is associated with the punishment of those guilty of crimes, with older respondents finding this especially relevant. For 30%, justice means establishing the truth about all events; for 15%, it involves compensating all victims, a view more commonly held by younger people.
   
• 76% of respondents believe that achieving justice without the arrest and trial of those responsible for the attack on Ukraine and war crimes is impossible in the near future. Another 20% believe it is possible to achieve justice without these conditions.
   
• The priority for Ukrainian authorities and society in ensuring justice for the victims should be to hold the guilty accountable (50%), to remove/prevent from power those who collaborated with the occupiers (43%), and to find the missing and return deported individuals (33%). Compared to last year, the role of obtaining financial compensation has increased: 30% now see it as a priority for ensuring justice, compared to 23% last year.
   
• According to respondents, the establishment of justice for victims and those affected by the war largely depends on the President (50%), the Government (37%), and Parliament (35%). About 20% of respondents attribute a primary role to Ukrainian citizens and international institutions.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents believe that along with judicial proceedings, additional mechanisms for ensuring justice should be applied (lustration commissions, establishing the truth about war events, compensation for victims). Most respondents (86%) believe that such mechanisms should operate throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.
   
• The legality and legitimacy of these institutions will be ensured by their creation based on an agreement between Ukraine and several other countries, according to 39% of respondents. 22% believe that this will be influenced by the creation of these institutions through amendments to the Constitution and legislation, and another 16% think that the activities of additional institutions should be approved by UN structures.
   
• The question of the justification of vigilantism against those guilty of war crimes is ambiguous among respondents: 48% consider vigilantism justified, while 50% hold the opposite view.
   
• An overwhelming majority (95%) of respondents believe it is important to ensure transparency and regular information for citizens and victims about the progress of court cases regarding war crimes.

Perceptions of reintegration

   
• 77% of respondents support the introduction of an international temporary administration to facilitate the adaptation process in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, while 18% are against this idea.
   
• According to the majority of those surveyed (84%), measures to support and establish connections with the population remaining in the occupied territories should already be implemented by the state. It is believed by 46% that such initiatives should be directed only at those who support Ukraine, while 38% think they should be directed at everyone remaining in the occupied territories. It is indicated by 9% that such measures are not a priority, and another 5% believe that resources definitely should not be allocated for this by the state. 
   
• Among the support measures for the population remaining in the temporarily occupied territories, priorities include facilitating the relocation of people from these areas (35%); providing social and pension payments to those who remain (34%); and ensuring the broadcasting of Ukrainian media (33%). Other necessary measures include the recognition of documents issued during the occupation (28%), engaging the youth from these territories (26%), and organizing access to state services (24%)—a quarter of respondents see these as priorities.
   
• 55% of respondents believe that restrictions on rights (such as the right to vote, hold certain positions, or conduct business) should not be applied to residents of occupied territories, while 41% hold the opposite view. Regarding the appropriateness of restricting rights for Ukrainian citizens who have moved abroad, 29% of respondents find it appropriate, whereas 67% are against such initiatives.
   
• Regarding the acquisition of Russian citizenship being justifiable, 13% of respondents completely agree, while an additional 42% somewhat agree. 39% of respondents hold the opposite view. Those who agree more often with the justification for acquiring Russian citizenship are respondents who have relatives in the occupied territories. 

Perceptions of collaborative activities

   
• The activities most commonly associated with collaboration by respondents include holding leadership positions in the occupational authorities (48%), participating in the organization of so-called elections and referendums (46%), and serving in the occupational armed forces (44%). One-third of respondents consider serving in law enforcement, judicial bodies, or any positions within the occupational local government as collaboration.
   
• 46% of respondents believe that any cooperation with the occupational administrations should be criminally prosecuted, while 52% think only cooperation that led to severe consequences and crimes should be. The proportion of those who see the need for criminal accountability for any cooperation has decreased by 6% compared to the 2023 survey.
   
• The majority of respondents (65%) believe that as a punishment for interacting with the occupational authorities, restrictions on holding certain positions may be applied. About 30% consider fines appropriate. Approximately 20% think that restrictions on participating in public life and community service could serve as punishment.
   
• Punishments for collaborating with occupational administrations, such as being permanently banned from holding public positions or conducting business activities, are seen as indefinite by 63% of respondents. Another 33% believe these should be time-limited.
   
• 60% of respondents think that the degree and non-criminal forms of punishment for collaborative activities should be determined by the court. About a quarter believe that such decisions should be made by local authorities; directly by community residents, while around 20% think the victims and their relatives should decide. Active community participation is more relevant for older respondents, while the role of courts and local authorities is more pertinent for the younger generation.

Amnesty

   
• According to about 40% of respondents, amnesty could be granted under conditions such as performing community service to help rebuild the country and for crimes that did not result in the loss of life. Providing important and truthful testimonies, as well as compensating the victims, could be grounds for amnesty, according to about a quarter of those surveyed. Voluntary confession to a specific crime could also be a condition, as stated by 18% of respondents. Meanwhile, 14% believe that amnesty for those guilty of committing war crimes during the conflict is impossible under any circumstances. 

Vision of the future

   
• Among the initiatives that respondents are willing to support for stabilizing the situation in the country after the war, 28% are ready to support maintaining the status of autonomy for Crimea. 23% are willing to support the establishment of a transitional administration under the auspices of the UN in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, and 19% support granting these territories expanded economic powers. 17% are ready to support granting the liberated territories of Donbas the status of autonomy. 20% are not ready to support any of these initiatives.
   
• The idea of implementing an international temporary administration in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, which were occupied in 2014, to ensure the adaptation process and gradual return of these territories, is supported by nearly 80% of respondents.
   
• 88% of respondents believe that Ukraine has a shared future with the residents of the territories that were occupied in 2022. 73% see a shared future with the residents of Crimea and Donbas that were occupied in 2014.
   
• 82% of respondents mention the need for a national discussion among representatives from different regions of Ukraine on the format of a shared future after the liberation of the occupied territories; another 14% do not see such a need.
   
• More than half of the respondents believe that the discussion should begin after the end of the war, while 30% think the process should start now. Another 19% indicated that discussions should begin after the situation at the front stabilizes. 51% see Ukrainian citizens as the initiators of the process, 34% local authorities, 32% national authorities, and 30% civic organizations.

Commemoration of memory

   
• 70% of respondents participated in events honoring the memory of those affected and killed due to Russian aggression: 37% in cases involving close people or themselves personally, and 33% in official events at the state or community level. 30% did not participate in such events. Residents of the western and central regions more often reported participation in memorial events.
   
• The issue of historical memory and corresponding state policy is important to 90% of respondents.
   
• 93% of respondents agree with the statement that Ukraine must now properly honor the memory of the victims of Russian armed aggression, including through various national and local initiatives.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents view the renaming of cities, streets, or squares in honor of fallen soldiers, military personnel, and veterans positively. About 80% positively view renaming places in honor of volunteers, and 67% in honor of civilians.
   
• According to about 40% of respondents, national government bodies should coordinate initiatives to honor the memory of victims of Russian aggression. This role should also be assigned to local authorities (33%), victims and their family members (32%), civic organizations (25%), associations of victims (19%), and the church and religious figures (5%).