Oleksii Antypovych, Rating Group

• At the end of February, 78% of respondents were convinced that the early elections in the Ternopil region would take place on time — March 15. Almost 68% expressed readiness to participate in them. Residents of the Ternopil region did not believe that attempts to cancel the local elections were connected with the desire to save money during the crisis — only 19% of respondents thought so. At the same time, 68% are convinced that such attempts are driven by fear of losing the elections.
• The election results could have been symptomatic on the scale of the entire country. The latest sociological studies show several defining trends.
• During the campaign, the fastest growth in support was demonstrated by VO “Svoboda” (from 13.2% in December to 26.4%) and YeTs (from 2.5% to 6.4%). Former leaders of electoral sympathy are now on the margins.
• The decline of NSNU ratings, which began back in 2006, no longer surprises anyone. The cooling of support for BYuT is also not new. But what we now see that is truly new is the decline of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s personal rating. Back in January, trust in and support for the Prime Minister personally exceeded support for BYuT by one third. Now these indicators are equally low — 17%. The loss of Tymoshenko’s electoral strength is the second trend that deserves attention. If the early elections in Kyiv were called Stalingrad for Tymoshenko, then the Ternopil elections could have been a kind of Kursk Bulge for BYuT.
• It is already obvious that leading the Government has not benefited the former Galician favorite (in the last parliamentary elections, more than 50% of voters here voted for BYuT). 68% of Ternopil residents negatively assess her performance as Prime Minister. At the same time, the most popular answers to the question “What or who prevents Yuliia Tymoshenko from governing effectively?” were “Tymoshenko’s own inability to organize work” and “the lack of professionalism of government members” (28% and 13% of respondents respectively), another 15% blame the President and 21% his Secretariat.
• Respondents mostly do not consider Tymoshenko’s complaints about Viktor Yushchenko to be justified. 55% are convinced that if Yushchenko were not President and Tymoshenko were Prime Minister, she would still make mistakes but would find other culprits. 59% consider Tymoshenko personally guilty of the economic crisis (the same share as Yushchenko). Almost the same number (58%) are convinced that, as head of the Government, she is not capable of overcoming this crisis, and 40% think that she is not even trying to do so.
• Almost two thirds of respondents believe that over the last six months Tymoshenko has moved closer to the leadership of Russia. This was supported by a majority of supporters of all parties, including half (!) of BYuT supporters. At the same time, in the West there is a widespread belief that if Tymoshenko secures the support of Vladimir Putin in the 2010 presidential elections, this will only harm her chances of winning; 69% are convinced that from any mutual agreements between Tymoshenko and Putin it is the latter who would benefit. Seeing the hopelessness of such cooperation for the Prime Minister herself and its harmfulness for the country, voters are gradually losing interest in Tymoshenko as a future candidate for President of Ukraine.
• A significant share of voters who are still ready to vote for BYuT are only waiting for someone else to appear. In the case of elections to the Ternopil Oblast Council, this was supposed to be VO “Svoboda.” Who the political process will give birth to at the all-Ukrainian level — time will tell.