News and Press releases

 • The ninth national poll conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 26, 2022, showed that 80% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 10% disagreed with this assessment, while another 10% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the direction of things in the country as a correct one continues to dominate in all the regions of Ukraine and across all the age groups. 

• The assessment of international assistance from Ukraine’s Western partners have improved over the past 1.5 months. In particular, the respondents pointed to the positive dynamics in the provision of diplomatic, humanitarian, and financial assistance. About 60% consider diplomatic and humanitarian aid sufficient (this share was about 50% in early March). 46% consider financial support sufficient (39% in March).

• The assessment of the provision of weapons to Ukraine almost has not changed: 29% consider it sufficient and 65%, insufficient. The assessment of economic sanctions against Russia has deteriorated: only 20% consider them sufficient (this share was 33% in March).

• Over the past two months, Ukrainians' attitudes toward the leaders of Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Lithuania, and France have improved significantly. 92% of the respondents have a positive attitude to Polish President Duda, 87%, to British Prime Minister Johnson, 86%, to US President Biden, 76%, to Turkish President Erdoğan, 75%, to Lithuanian President Nausėda, and 75%, to French President Macron. 66% have a positive attitude towards the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen.

• At the same time, the attitude towards German Chancellor Scholz has deteriorated: 30% have a positive attitude towards him, while 54% have a negative attitude (in January 2022, the share of the latter ones was 23%). 26% report a positive attitude towards German President Steinmeier, while 44% have negative attitude towards him. 

• The absolute majority of the respondents have a negative attitude towards the leaders of Belarus (96%) and Russia (98%).

• The Ninth national poll, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 26, 2022, showed that 20% of adults in Ukraine had to change their place of residence (this figure has been constant since mid-March). Most of those who were forced to leave are from the eastern regions (58%) and among the young people (33%).

• Since the beginning of April, the share of those who plan to return home has slightly decreased (from 29% to 22%). Instead, the share of the respondents who would like to return, but a little later, has increased (from 24% to 31%). The share of those who intend to return home, but after the war is over, has not changed (43%).

• A gradual increase of the number of Ukrainians returning to work can be seen. Currently, 59% of those who had a job before the war continue to work (this share was 46% in March). In particular, the number of those who are working in the usual mode has increased (from 23% to 32%). 24% are working part-time or remotely, and 3% started at a new job. Most of those who are working now are the residents of the western and central regions (about 60%). The share of the residents of the South of Ukraine who are working is 52%, and the one of the residents of the East of Ukraine is about 40%. The gradual recovery of employment is observed in the Center, South and East of Ukraine. In the West of Ukraine, on the other hand, the situation with employment has stabilized since the beginning of April.

• At the same time, 39% of those who were employed before the war still do not have a job (this share was 53% in March and 41% in early April).

• Half of the respondents (54%) who lost their jobs during the war believe that they will be able to return to their previous jobs. 40% do not think so. The shares of the latter ones are the highest among the rural residents, the senior respondents and women. 

• An important finding is that two thirds of the respondents who lost their jobs as a result of the war are willing to change jobs. 58% of the respondents who lost their jobs do not mind retraining for another occupation, and 49% are ready to work in another region of Ukraine. Most of those who are ready to change their occupations and jobs are among the residents of the eastern regions of Ukraine.

• 70% of the respondents support the possible mobilization of conscripts of certain occupations to rebuilding the country instead of serving in the army. 6% do not support this. Older respondents are more often in favor of such an initiative, while young people are relatively less supportive.

• 55% heard about the “Gardens of Victory” initiative (28% heard a lot, 27% heard something). 45% don’t know anything about it. 82% assess this idea positively.

• 56% of the respondents said they have a plot of land and plan to plant a garden this year, while 9% do not have their own land, but also plan to plant with relatives or friends. Only 8% said they have a garden, but will not plant anything. Another quarter of the respondents don’t have land plots. Most of those who are going to plant gardens are the residents of the West and the Center of the country. The share of the respondents who are going to plant gardens is 83% among the rural residents, 65% among the residents of small towns, and 50% among the residents of regional centers.

• 33% said they attended church on Easter, while 67% did not. This is a higher share than during the first quarantine (in April 2020), but lower than before 2020. The highest shares of those who went to church on Easter are among the residents of the western regions of Ukraine and among the rural population.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 16, 2022, among permanent residents of Ivano-Frankivsk and internally displaced persons (IDPs) showed that the absolute majority (over 90%) of the city residents, both permanent ones and newcomers, feel hope when thinking about the situation in Ukraine.

• More than 95% of respondents in both groups fully support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, more than 80% support the actions of President Zelensky (and another 15% rather support them).

• 67% of the surveyed permanent local residents completely support the actions of Ivano-Frankivsk mayor Ruslan Martsinkiv, and another 29% rather support them. 32% completely support the actions of Svitlana Onyshchuk, the head of the regional state administration, while 38% rather support them (a quarter of the respondents hesitated to answer). 

• Permanent residents express a high level of satisfaction with some areas of the life of their city. They assess public order and food supply relatively better. They are somewhat less satisfied with the strengthening of the city's defenses and providing medicines.

• Estimating possible military threats, the permanent residents express more concern than the IDPs. Specifically, the city's residents (both locals and the IDPs) are most afraid of missile strikes on military facilities (33% of locals and 30% of the IDPs estimate their threat as a high one). The respondents are slightly less afraid of sabotage against infrastructure (its threat was estimated as a high one by 27% of locals and 22% of the IDPs) and of missile strikes on civilian objects (19% of both locals and the IDPs estimate their threat as a high one). Local residents are more afraid of diversions against the civilian population (20% estimate their threat as a high one) than the IDPs (14%). On the other hand, the threat of the seizure of settlements was not estimated as a high or moderate one by the majority of the respondents in either group. 

• The vast majority (over 80%) of local residents are involved in defending Ukraine. 59% help financially, 41% volunteer, 20% work in critical infrastructure, another 20% are engaged in the informational area, and 3% serve in the territorial defense or in the Armed Forces. Only 11% said they are not able to help the country (the share of such respondents is relatively higher among the oldest ones). 

• Half of the surveyed IDPs in Ivano-Frankivsk are residents of the central regions of Ukraine, 38% arrived from the eastern regions, and only 12% arrived from the southern ones. Almost 80% are women (55% of them have children aged up to 17 years). The average age of the IDPs is 44 years. One third of them speak Russian at home, 45% speak two languages (both Ukrainian and Russian), and a quarter speak only Ukrainian.

• 61% of the surveyed IDPs named the presence of relatives or close friends in the city as the main reason for choosing Ivano-Frankivsk as a city for temporary stay. 14% chose the city because of the information about the availability of temporary accommodation. Only 4% said they went to Ivano-Frankivsk because of the decision of the organization responsible for their resettlement, and 3% went there due to the opportunity to get a job. 

• 30% of the surveyed permanent residents of Ivano-Frankivsk said they are already hosting IDPs from other regions of the country. Another 25% are ready to host IDPs. 44% did not express a desire to host IDPs.

• Three-quarters of Ivano-Frankivsk residents said they have personally provided assistance to the IDPs. 51% expressed a positive attitude to the possibility that a part of the IDPs might stay in the city to live or work there. 43% are neutral about this possibility, and only 5% have negative attitude. 

• 92% support the initiative to relocate enterprises from the war-affected regions to Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. 74% support the idea of building permanent housing for the IDPs.

• 89% think that local authorities effectively manage to accommodate refugees from other regions of Ukraine (35% think they manage quite effectively, and 54%, rather effectively).

• In general, the IDPs assess the attitude of the locals towards themselves better than the residents of Ivano-Frankivsk assess their own attitude towards the IPDs. Specifically, 57% of the surveyed IDPs say that the attitude of locals towards them is very positive, while 30% say it’s rather positive. In their turn, 20% of the locals said that their attitude toward the IDPs is completely positive. 42% report a rather positive attitude, and 27%, a neutral one. Only 3% of the surveyed Ivano-Frankivsk residents said they have a negative attitude towards the IDPs.

• More than 90% of the IDPs would like to make acquaintances and friends with the locals. On the other hand, more than 80% of Ivano-Frankivsk permanent residents would not mind finding friends among the IDPs. 16% of the locals would not like to do this.

• Despite the fact that the majority of the respondents who recently arrived to the city (over 65%) speak either both Ukrainian and Russian or only Russian at home, the vast majority of them (82%) try to communicate with locals only in Ukrainian (it’s two thirds among the Russian speakers).

• 57% of the IDPs do not see any issue of language-based misunderstanding with the local residents. 37% see this as a minor problem, and only 6%, as a significant one. On the other hand, 13% of the locals believe that there is a significant problem of language-based misunderstanding with the IDPs, 51% consider it a minor problem, and 35% do not see any problem with the language.

• 44% of the surveyed Ivano-Frankivsk permanent residents said that they were unaware of any violations of social norms and indecent behavior by the IDPs from other regions of Ukraine. 42% know about such cases only from the media. Only 13% have personally witnessed such cases. 

• 83% of Ivano-Frankivsk residents are ready to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine with weapons in hand. 86% are ready to endure financial difficulties for the sake of the victory over Russia as long as necessary. Among the IDPs, 60% are ready to fight with weapons and 79% are ready to endure financial difficulties (as mentioned, 80% of the IDPs are women).

• Almost 80% of the surveyed local residents do not consider going abroad in case of military escalation in the region. Among the IDPs, this share is 59%.

• 46% of the surveyed Ivano-Frankivsk residents have close relatives (husbands, wives, sons, daughters, fathers or mothers) who participate in the war against Russia. Among the IDPs, this share is 34%.

• Both permanent Ivano-Frankivsk residents and IDPs absolutely agree that Ivano-Frankivsk is a comfortable city to live in.

• Only 7% of the surveyed IDPs said they lack food, while 15% said they do not have enough household goods. 16% complained about the lack of medicines, and 21% complained about the lack of clothing. Half of the surveyed IDPs received social and humanitarian assistance from the government, from volunteers, or from other people.

• 20% of the IDPs would like to stay in Ivano-Frankivsk or find a job there. 40% would consider such a possibility, while 39% do not have such intentions. In turn, 51% of the locals expressed a positive attitude to the possibility that a part of the IDPs could stay in the city to live or work there. 43% are neutral about this, and only 5% have negative attitude.

• One third of the surveyed IDPs who have school-age children said that their children are already studying at local schools. Half of such respondents said that their children continue their education at their former schools. Children of 14% of the IDPs are not studying at the moment.

• 51% of the IDPs currently live in the homes of their relatives, friends, or acquaintances. 33% rent an apartment, while 7% live in the homes of strangers. Only 3% live in hotels or hostels, and 2%, in refugee shelters. Among those who rent housing, 63% consider the cost of the rent too high, while 32% consider it acceptable.

• 10% of the surveyed IDPs plan to return to their homes soon, while 45% plan to return, but a little later. 40% intend to return only after the war is over. Only 3% do not intend to return at all.

В рамках восьмої хвилі проекту «Україна в умовах війни» Cоціологічною групою «Рейтинг» було проведене дослідження психологічних маркерів війни: стратегій адаптації до стресових станів, рівнів життєстійкості та психологічного виснаження.   

АДАПТАЦІЯ ДО СТРЕСОВИХ СТАНІВ

• За більше, ніж місяць війни Індекс емоційного напруження піднявся з 2.7 до 3.5. Сьогодні кількість тих, хто оцінює свій емоційний стан як дуже напружений або напружений складає майже 50%.У спокійному емоційному стані сьогодні лише 8% опитаних, тоді як до війні цей показник коливався в межах 22-26%. 

• Найбільше емоційно напруженим свій стан визначають старші люди. Також така ситуація спостерігається серед жінок, які зазвичай емоційніше реагують на складні ситуації. З них майже 60% сукупно мають високі та надвисокі рівні емоційної напруги, тоді як серед чоловіків таких  лише 35%. Абсолютна більшість (74%) тих, хто перебуває у складних обставинах, оцінюють свій стан як напружений.

• Загалом, лише 5% респондентів зазначили, що перебувають у складній ситуації. Ще 44% мають труднощі, але вони терпимі. У відносно нормальних обставинах знаходиться 51% опитаних. 

• Найбільше складнощів відчувають ті, хто вимушено змінили місце проживання, особливо мешканці східних областей. Легше тим, хто має роботу, або хоча б часткову занятість. Відповідно найважче тим, хто не працює – лише 40% з них перебувають у відносно нормальних обставинах. Отже, можливість якнайшвидше відновити роботу, запустити підприємства залишається вкрай важливим для відносної нормалізації життя українців під час війни.

• У складних життєвих обставинах людина може обирати різні стратегії поведінки: наразі, 50% опитаних намагаються активно вирішувати свої проблеми – для умов війни це показник хорошої адаптації до ситуації та прийняття відповідальності за своє життя на себе. 35% намагаються перечекати, не поспішають з рішеннями, отже займають пасивну позицію. 13% шукають підтримки в інших людей (здатні спиратися на інших та залучати їх до рішень). В цілому, конструктивні стратегії поведінки в складних життєвих обставинах притаманні сьогодні 63% опитаних.

• Найменш активну стратегію поведінки використовують мешканці сходу (41%), і вони ж більше за інших звертаються за допомогою (17%). Молодь більше схильна перечекати і не поспішати з рішеннями (40%). Жінки більше, ніж чоловіки шукають підтримку в інших людей (16% проти 10%) і набагато менш схильні до активного вирішення своїх проблем (44% проти 56%). Це відповідає традиційним гендерним типам поведінки, які актуалізувалися під час війни. 

• Активно вирішують свої проблеми ті, хто працює повноцінно або частково (60%). Ті, хто не працює більше готові перечекати і не поспішати з рішеннями (41%). Активна життєва позиція сприяє збереженню або поверненню на робоче місце і навпаки – наявність роботи сприяє можливості активно вирішувати свої проблеми, бо людина зберігає свій соціальний статус і має матеріальне забезпечення.

• Зрозумілою є набагато нижча активна позиція у тих, хто перебуває у складних життєвих обставинах (36%), вони більш схильні перечекати (39%) та шукати підтримки в інших людей (18%), на відміну від тих, хто знаходиться у відносно нормальних обставинах та відчувають незначні труднощі. 

• Країна згуртувалася у боротьбі з ворогом і у підтримці один одного та взаємодопомозі. Стосунки та взаємодія з рідними є миролюбними (94%). Лише 5% уникають цих стосунків. Також хороші взаємини зберігаються із сусідами (89%). З незнайомими мають миролюбні взаємини 67%. Водночас, майже третина уникають контактів з незнайомцями. Агресивні стосунки з іншими практично відсутні. Отже, навіть з незнайомцями більшість нормально взаємодіє – це хороший показник атмосфери взаємин та довіри і низький рівень підозрілості до співгромадян.

• Найбільше уникають незнайомих людей мешканці центру та півдня, люди середнього віку, жінки та ті, хто не змінили місце проживання у зв’язку з війною.  

РІВЕНЬ ЖИТТЄСТІЙКОСТІ

• Українці на другому місяці війни демонструють хороший рівень життєстійкості  (3.9 з 5). Індекс життєстійкості складається із психологічної стійкості (4.0) та підтримки фізичного здоров’я (3.8).

• Низький рівень життєстійкості мають лише 2% опитаних. У більшості він на середньому рівні (59%). Високу стійкість все ще мають 39%. Хоча війна вже триває більше місяця, але насправді це критично, оскільки  резерви психіки розраховані на більш тривалий складний період життя. 

• Психологічна життєстійкість пов’язана з інтересом до життя, відчуттям себе корисним, здатністю приймати рішення, наявністю планів на майбутнє та відсутністю жалю за минулим. Українці в цьому є достатньо сильними:  цікавляться тим, що відбувається навколо (92%), та мають плани на майбутнє (82%). Однак втоми не відчувають лише третина, мають повноцінний сон лише 40%, слідкують за своїм здоров’ям половина.  Водночас, нормально харчуються більшість (83%).

• Найменшу стійкість мають мешканці сходу, пенсіонери та ті, хто втратили роботу. У жінок підтримка фізичного здоров’я у гіршому стані, ніж психологічна стійкість. Найгірший стан у тих, хто перебуває у складних життєвих обставинах. Підтримка фізичного здоров’я в них на незадовільному рівні. В усіх категоріях опитаних психологічна життєстійкість є вищою за фізичний стан. Тож наразі війна фізично виснажила більше, а психологічно ми є більш витривалими. 

• Дещо вищий рівень психологічної витривалості, готовності до тривалої боротьби виявляють люди до 50 років, в основному чоловіки, ті, хто повноцінно працюють, перебувають у відносно нормальних обставинах, здатні активно вирішувати проблеми та не змінили місце проживання у зв’язку з війною. Тому зрозумілим є прагнення багатьох швидше повернутися до дому, який є важливим ресурсом в житті людини. Це не лише матеріальна, але і важлива емоційна складова підтримки, нормалізації життя.

• Також найбільша життєстійкість у тих, хто відчуває такі емоції щодо країни як радість (53%), гнів (43%) та гордість (40%), а найменше у тих, кому страшно (28%) та сумно (33%). Гнів не є позитивною, але є активною емоцією, яка дозволяє підтримувати життя та рухатися вперед, не завмирати та не розсипатися. Особливо коли гнів справедливий.

РІВЕНЬ ПСИХОЛОГІЧНОГО ВИСНАЖЕННЯ

• На сьогодні високий рівень виснаження мають лише 2% опитаних, у 71% він на середньому рівні, а у 27% на низькому. Резерви психіки людини набагато більші, ніж на такий короткий проміжок часу. Ми здатні швидко адаптуватися і достатньо повноцінно жити, бути активними та дієвими. В умовах війни часто відкривається «друге дихання» і безумовно з’являється жага до життя, коли навколо багато смерті та руйнувань. Не відчувають себе «мертвими» всередині 79%, можуть покластися на себе 69%, не відчувають себе слабкими – 55%. Тоді як часто відчувають на собі загрозу від світу лише 6%.

• Виснаження у більшості проявляється у сумному настрої, зниженні довіри до інших людей, думках про власну безпорадність і що зі ними може статися щось погане. 

• Найбільшими є гендерні відмінності: жінки почуваються вдвічі більш психологічно виснаженими, ніж чоловіки. Війна емоційно і фізично є більш травмуючим досвідом для жінок, це підтверджується в усіх попередніх наших дослідженнях.

• Також відносно вищий рівень психологічного виснаження у тих, хто зараз не працює, хто вимушено змінив місце проживання, та у молоді. Найважча ситуація у тих, хто перебуває у складних обставинах. Поведінкова стратегія на активне вирішення проблем як стратегія поведінки сприяє низькому рівню психологічного виснаження. 

• Результати також доводять, що радість та гордість за країну країни найбільше сприяють хорошому психологічному стану. Повернення додому (як з’явиться така можливість) теж зміцнює людину і допомагає відновитися швидше.

Аудиторія: населення України віком від 18 років і старші в усіх областях, крім тимчасово окупованих територій Криму та Донбасу. Вибірка репрезентативна за віком, статтю і типом поселення. Вибіркова сукупність: 1200 респондентів. Метод опитування: CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews - телефонні інтерв'ю з використанням комп'ютера). Помилка репрезентативності дослідження з довірчою імовірністю 0,95: не більше 2,8%. Терміни проведення: 6  квітня 2022 р.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on April 6, 2022, showed a significant increase in pride regarding Ukraine among the respondents. While in August 2021, 34% of the respondents said they felt proud of their country (at that time, the emotion that prevailed was sadness regarding Ukraine), today this feeling is dominant (80%). 32% feel sadness regarding Ukraine, 20% feel joy, 16%, fear, 11%, anger, and 6%, interest. Today, such emotions as indifference and shame regarding Ukraine are practically absent among the respondents.

• The emotion of pride regarding Ukraine is dominant among all the respondents, regardless of their age or region of residence. Residents of the Center of the country feel a little more joy (the time of this survey coincided with the liberation of three central regions from the occupiers). In addition, joy is a more common emotion regarding Ukraine among the youth. At the same time, fear for Ukraine is most often registered among the residents of the East of Ukraine today.

• Since August 2021, the share of the respondents who identify as the citizens of Ukraine has increased significantly (from 75% to 98%), as did the share of those who identify as “Europeans”: from 27% to 57%. Instead, fewer respondents tend to describe themselves as “the Soviet people”: their share has decreased from 21% to 7%. Also, an absolutely high level of local patriotism has been recorded. 

• The identification as the citizens of Ukraine dominates among all the age and regional groups today. Regarding the European identification, there are practically no differences among the age groups. At the same time, there are some differences from the point of view of macro regions: the European identification is somewhat more prevalent in the West and in the Center. The Soviet identity is relatively more common among the most elderly respondents.

• The vast majority (91%) of the respondents do not support the statement that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people”. Today, only 8% have such an opinion (the share of such respondents was 41% in August 2021 and 21% in March 2022). This idea is still supported by 23% of the residents of the East of Ukraine and by 13% of the older respondents. In contrast, in other macro regions and age groups, the support for this statement is almost non-existent.

• Over the last month, the share of the respondents who believe that restoring friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians is impossible has increased 1.5 times (from 42% to 64%). 22% of the respondent believe that this might happen no sooner than in 20 to 30 years. About 10% predict such reconciliation in up to 15 years. Even in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, more than half of the respondents do not believe in restoring the friendship between the two nations.

• About 80% of respondents are involved in defending their country in one way or another. 45% of the respondents help protect the country by financial contributions (in March 2022, this share was 39%). 35% volunteer: they help other people or the military. 18% participate in information resistance, 13% work in critical infrastructure, 3% serve in territorial defense, and 3% serve in the military. A quarter of the respondents are unable to help defend Ukraine.

• More and more people are resuming their jobs. Currently, 58% of those who had jobs before the war continue to work (this share was 46% in March). In general, 29% work normally, 26% work part-time or remotely, and 3% started at a new job. 41% lost their jobs during the war (53% did in March). Most of those currently employed are in the western oblasts, while only a third of the residents of the East of Ukraine have a job: other two-thirds have lost their jobs.

• 20% of the adult population of Ukraine had to change their place of residence. Most of those who were forced to leave their place of residence were in the eastern regions (46%). Also, young people moved out more (31%), while older people found it harder to leave their homes (13%). A third of those who have left their homes plan to return soon, while a quarter will wait a little longer. About 40% are ready to return, but only after the war is over.

• Almost 80% of the respondents are satisfied with the work of their mayor, the providers of utility services, and the police. Three quarters are satisfied with the work of medical institutions, while two thirds are satisfied with public transport and educational institutions.

• The vast majority of the respondents (90%) support the initiative to deprive the pro-Russian Members of Parliament of their mandates. 86% support a total ban on the activities of these MPs in Ukraine.

• 81% support the idea of raising taxes for Ukrainian businesses that continue to operate in Russia.

• 76% support the initiative to rename the streets and other objects, the names of which are linked to Russia.

• The support for the idea that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate should sever its ties with the Russian Orthodox Church is growing. 74% support this initiative (63% did in early March). Only 7% do not support it. 

• Half of the respondents (51%) believe that the Ukrainian government should ban the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine (the ban is supported by two thirds of respondents in the West and only by 29% in the East). At the same time, 21% support cancellation of the benefits of this church and the abolition of the leases of this church’s premises. Nevertheless, 20% think the government should not interfere in the affairs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate: most of all in the East (35%) and the South (25%).

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 30-31, 2022 shows that 78% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 11% disagreed, while another 11% could not make an assessment. The assessment of this direction as the right one continues to prevail in all the regions of Ukraine and among all the age groups. 

• 95% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack, but the confidence in the quick victory “over a few weeks” has slightly decreased: from 47% to 35%. Instead, the shares of the answers “several months” and “six months to a year” increased. 14% of the respondents could not answer this question.

• The support for NATO accession continues to decline. In the first days of the war, the support for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance increased from 62% to 76%. After the first week of the war, this support decreased to 72%, and at the end of March, it equals 68%, i.e., it is approaching the pre-war levels.

• At the same time, the support for EU accession is growing. In the first days of the war, it increased from 68% to 86%, then its growth continued, and as of the end of March, 91% support Ukraine’s membership in the EU – an absolute record over all the years of our surveys.

• At the same time, the majority of the respondents (56%) are convinced that Ukraine will become a member of the European Union in one or two years, while 23% believe it will happen in five years. Over the last month, the share of those who believe that Ukraine will join the EU in the very short term decreased slightly (from 61% to 56%), and the share of those who believe Ukraine will join the EU in five years increased (from 13% to 23%).

   
• Over the last decade, there has been a steady growth in the number of those who consider Ukrainian their mother tongue: from 57% in 2012 to 76% in 2022. The share of the Russian language has decreased from 42% to 20% over the 10 years. Several trends should be pointed out in this dynamic. The first one is that significant changes in language self-identification took place between 2012 and 2016. One of the key reasons was a) the reaction of Ukrainian society to the experiments of the then government in the language policy; b) the events of the Revolution of Dignity; and c) Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and the temporary occupation of Crimea and some territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The second trend is that the positive dynamics in the self-identification took place due to the change in the attitudes towards the Ukrainian language in the Center, as well as in the South and East of Ukraine.
   
• At the same time, the practical aspect of this issue is somewhat different: the language self-identification and the everyday language are two different areas. We can confirm the steady decrease of the Russian-speaking segment of Ukrainians: in 2012, there were about 40% of such respondents, at the end of 2021, 26%, and at the beginning of the war, 18%. The Russian speakers instead “shift” into the segment of “bilingual speakers” (from 15% to 32%). The number of those who constantly use only Ukrainian at home has increased slightly from 44% to 48%.
   
• The transition to another language of communication is not a one-time event and requires some adaptation. What is important today is that two thirds of those who use both Ukrainian and Russian languages in their everyday life are ready to switch exclusively to Ukrainian soon. Among the Russian speaking respondents, these respondents comprise one third.
   
• Unprecedented unity of Ukrainian society during the war had a dramatic impact on the attitudes to the status of the languages: today, the absolute majority (83%) support Ukrainian being the only state language in Ukraine. This opinion dominates in all macro regions and in all age and language groups. On the other hand, almost a quarter of Ukrainians supported granting Russian the status of the state language before the war, and today, it is only 7%. In peacetime, residents of the South and East of Ukraine had traditionally advocated for granting Russian the status of the state language. But even in these regions, the share of such respondents was only one third, and today this share has almost halved.
   
• Today, the data suggest that language is more of a regional feature than a way of thinking. For example, in December 2021, 65% of bilingual speakers and half of those who speak Russian considered Russia an aggressor. At the same time, in the Ukrainian-speaking segment, one in ten had pro-Russian views. The sympathy to Russia was determined not so much by the language of communication as by political views and the influence of propaganda and was associated with the support for pro-Russian parties (“The Opposition Platform — For Life”, “Nashi” and Shariy’s party).
   
• Today, the majority (67%) believe that there are no issues between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. 19% believe that the language issue exists, but it is not that important. Only 12% believe that this issue is a threat to domestic security. It is important that the statements about the existence of the language problems are more prevalent not among the Russian-speaking population, but in the western regions, where Ukrainian dominates in all areas. Importantly, according to our previous survey, only 2% of Ukrainians believe that Russia came to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. This myth was not accepted by Ukrainians.

Summing up, we can make the following conclusions:

   
1. The language self-identification of Ukrainians is growing steadily. The war, being a challenge for the whole society, will only accelerate this process. Today, the Ukrainian language is only strengthening as one of the cornerstones of Ukrainian statehood, and the lines of opposition on this issue are disappearing.
   
2. The transition to Ukrainian in everyday life is happening in an evolutionary manner. The destruction of the myth of the “brotherly people” and the isolation of Russia from the world’s cultural and informational context will only contribute to its acceleration in the Ukrainian society.
   
3. The “language issue” and the attempts to initiate arguments around this topic are not supported by the majority of the population. This problem is purely political and partly local. Nevertheless, most citizens, regardless of their language of communication, realize that we have one common enemy: Russia, which is trying to destroy our statehood. The Russian-speaking cities of the East are the most affected by the aggressor's actions. Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking people are fighting in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and they are united by the common goal: the victory over the enemy. After the victory, we can expect continued changes in the language self-identification of the citizens and the expansion of the use of the Ukrainian language in all areas.

 • The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 19, 2022 shows that two thirds of the citizens of Ukraine hope that it will be possible to rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy in less than five years after the war. 13% think it is possible to do over a year, while 51% think it will take up to five years. 18% believe that rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy will take up to ten years. There are not many skeptics who believe that the recovery will take more than ten years: only 10%. The younger respondents and the residents of the western regions of Ukraine are more optimistic about the rapid reconstruction. Those who had to leave their cities also demonstrate optimism regarding the recovery process.

• 61% of the respondents are ready to personally contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine's infrastructure: financially or by participating in construction works. A third of the respondents would like to contribute to the rebuilding of the infrastructure, but cannot. Only 5% believe that this is solely the responsibility of the government, not the people. More than 70% of men are ready to join the reconstruction compared to the half of women. Those who have left their city at the moment are more willing to join the reconstruction.

• 90% are convinced that it is Russia that must compensate all the expenses for the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. 20% believe that international organizations or European countries should invest in it, 12%, that the United States should do this, and 10%, that Ukraine itself should do this.

• Among those who previously had a job, 45% continue to work during the war, including 22% who are working as usual, 21% who are working part time or remotely, and 2% who even got a new job. 53% of the respondents who were employed before the war are currently unemployed. In the western regions, there is a bigger share of those who did not lose their jobs (47%). In the South, they comprise about 40%, and in the East, less than 25%. About half of the respondents who remained in their cities are employed. Among those who left their cities, about a third keep working, with 5% of them having already found a new job. There are also slightly more employees who work as usual among the senior workers; many of them may be working in the critical infrastructure.

• The economic situation of the families of 18% of the respondents did not change during the war. For 28%, it rather got worse, and for 52%, got definitely worse. The economic situation of the residents of the eastern regions, as well as of those who lost their jobs since the war started, has deteriorated the most. On the other hand, more than a quarter of retirees say their economic situation has not changed, probably because they continue to receive benefits from the government.

• In case they lose their source of income, 53% of the respondents have savings for several months or more: for 25%, their savings will be enough for up to 2 months, for 13%, up to three months, and for 15%, up to six months or more.

• 40% of the respondents have savings for less than a month, but this share is smaller compared to the quarantine crisis of 2020. Back then, the share of those who had limited savings was 55%. The younger respondents have bigger savings than the older ones. The situation is also better in the western and central oblasts, as the residents of the eastern and southern regions may have already lost their jobs and started spending their savings more intensively.

• One out of two respondents say they have a proactive position toward their own lives at the moment. One out of five say that their life position is neither active nor passive. A third of the respondents said that they have virtually no effect on their lives now. The younger respondents, men, and those who continue working have proactive attitude in their lives more often.

• 43% of the population feel aggressive at the moment, while 38% do not. The rest of the emotions are experienced by the minority of the respondents: 27% feel pessimistic, while 47% do not, and 31% feel despaired, while 53% do not. Only 17% say they feel apathetic, while 66% do not.

• Apathy, despair and pessimism are more pronounced among the residents of the East of Ukraine, while aggression, on the contrary, is more present in the Center and in the West. Women are more likely than men to experience negative emotions except aggression, which is more pronounced among men. In addition, senior respondents are experiencing negative emotions more at the moment.

• Those who lost their jobs during the war feel apathy, despair and pessimism more than those who continue working now.

• Also, those who believe they have no impact on anything at the moment experience more pronounced negative emotions than people with a proactive attitude.

• Interestingly, those whose homes have been damaged do not experience more negative emotions than others. But those who do not know what happened to their homes experience more pronounced of despair, apathy, and pessimism because of the uncertainty.

• Those who had to part with their family or partner due to the war, as well as those who communicate with their relatives and friends less frequently experience more negative emotions. 

• 44% of the respondents said they had to temporarily separate from their family or partner because of the war. The highest shares of such people are in the eastern and central regions and among young people.

• 19% of the respondents (adults) said they had to leave their city or village because of the war. The highest share of such respondents is in the East of Ukraine (35%). In the Center and South of Ukraine, one in five or six was forced to leave their place of residence, and in the West, almost one in ten. About a third of young respondents left their city or village.

• One out of four people who have left their homes do not know what is the condition of their house now. The houses of one in five such respondents are either destroyed or damaged. Nevertheless, 58% of those who left their homes said their homes are intact. 93% of those who left their homes want to return there. Only 5% said they did not intend to go back.

• 60% believe in God and do not doubt His existence. 14% believe in God, but have some doubts, while 17% do not believe in God, but believe in other higher powers. Only 6% identify themselves as total atheists. Compared to the pre-war period, the share of those who believe in God and do not doubt His existence has not changed. The highest level of religiosity is traditionally observed in the West of the country, among the elderly and among women.

• About half of the respondents intend either to travel around the country or to obtain additional education or new knowledge after the war. A third want to learn a new profession, a quarter want to start a business or to get a pet, and one in five are ready to change their job. At the same time, only 8% want to change their place of residence within Ukraine, and only 3% want to leave Ukraine.

• The respondents most often communicate with their family members and close ones (72%, constantly, and 18%, often). 48% constantly communicate with their friends, while 23% communicate with them often. 38% constantly talk to neighbors, and 17%, often. 28% communicate constantly with colleagues at work, and 16%, often. Interestingly, compared to the first lockdown in 2020, despite the difficult times, the respondents are much more active in communication with family and friends.

• The frequency of communication with relatives remains virtually the same regardless of the region and age. The residents of the East and the West as well as the youngest and the oldest ones speak with their friends slightly more often. The youngest respondents and those who have left their cities speak with their neighbors least often. 

• Compared to the pre-war times, the role of the TV, the groups and channels in messengers, the radio, as well as the one of relatives and friends as the sources of information about the events in Ukraine has increased. The TV is a source of information about the events in Ukraine for 62% of the respondents, internet sites, for 47%, groups and channels in messengers, for 42%, social networks, for 37%, relatives and acquaintances, for 28%, and regional television and radio, for 15% to 16%.

• The respondents in the West and in the Center of Ukraine use the TV and the radio more frequently. In the East, on the other hand, the frequency of hearing news from relatives and acquaintances has increased.

 • The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 18, 2022 shows that 77% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 14% disagreed with this, and 10% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the direction as a positive one dominates in all the regions and among all the age groups.

• Belief in victory remains at its highest level: 93% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. Confidence in victory prevails in all the regions of the country.

• Half (47%) of respondents hope that Ukraine will be able to win the war with Russia over the next few weeks. A quarter (23%) believe that the war will last several months. Only 12% think that the war will end in six months or more. There are almost no people who do not believe in victory at all. 17% were not able to answer this question.

• Inflation and rising prices (45%) as well as fuel shortages (38%) are the threats that Ukrainians believe are likely to arise over the next few months. Depreciation of the hryvnia and disruption of the sowing campaign are believed to be likely by no more than a quarter of respondents, and hunger, by 13%. The residents of the eastern regions are slightly more afraid of these threats than the residents of other macro regions.

• The vast majority of the respondents (82%) consider the threat of the country being split unlikely. This confidence has increased significantly due to the public cohesion during the war.

• According to Ukrainians, Poland, Lithuania, the United Kingdom and the United States are the friendliest countries to Ukraine today. The Czech Republic, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Turkey, France and Slovenia are also considered friendly. About half of the respondents consider Hungary, Georgia and Germany to be friendly countries, while a third of the respondents consider these countries neutral.

• China is now mostly considered by Ukrainians to be a neutral country. However, Russia (98%) and Belarus (84%) are seen by Ukrainians as hostile countries. Attitudes toward these countries have deteriorated significantly since they started the war against Ukraine. The attitude of Ukrainians towards China has also slightly deteriorated. Almost nothing has changed in regards to Germany, Hungary, and Georgia. The attitude to Turkey, France, Poland, Lithuania, the UK, the USA and Romania has improved.

• This change of attitudes has been accompanied by their regional consolidation. While previously, the attitudes of the residents of the East and South of Ukraine were more neutral towards the United States and other Western countries, now these countries are seen as friendly equally by the residents of all macro regions. The same applies to hostile countries: Russia and Belarus are considered hostile countries by the vast majority of Ukrainians, regardless of place of residence.

• 74% of the respondents support Zelenskyy's direct talks with Putin on ending the war, while a quarter of the respondents do not. There are slightly more supporters of the direct talks in the South and in the East of Ukraine, but in other regions they comprise the majority as well.

• At the same time, signing a temporary truce with Russia without withdrawing its troops from Ukraine is viewed as unacceptable by Ukrainians (89%).

• The support for the creation of a military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom increased from 61% in January to 85%. Today, the support for such an alliance is higher than the support for Ukraine's membership in NATO (72%).

• 44% of the respondents believe that Ukraine should join NATO, while 42% believe that Ukraine should continue to cooperate with NATO, but should not become its member. More people support NATO cooperation outside of the Alliance than before the war, a figure that has increased at the expense of those who previously said there was no need to cooperate with NATO at all (currently it’s only 7%). Most proponents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO are in the West and Center of Ukraine. Those in the South and the East of Ukraine are more supportive of the cooperation with NATO outside of the membership.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 12-13, 2022, shows that 76% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. This is the highest share in the history of our measurements. Only 15% disagreed with this and 10% could not to give their estimate. The assessment of the direction as the right one dominates in all the regions and among all the age groups.

• The self-esteem of Ukrainians significantly increased during the war. Now, most respondents see Ukraine either among the “leaders” (34%) or among the “average ones” (42%) compared to European countries, while as recently as two months ago, most placed Ukraine among the “outsiders”. At the same time, 63% see Ukraine as a “leader” among the countries of the former Soviet Union, while as recently as two months ago they saw the country mainly among the “average ones”.

• The vast majority of the respondents support the initiative to give cities the status of a hero city (93%) and rename the streets in honor of the Heroes who are currently defending Ukraine (92%). Maximum support for such an initiative is observed in all the regions of Ukraine. It presents a unique chance to create a new history through the new heroes who unite the nation.

• 56% of the respondents believe that the main goal of Russia's invasion is the complete destruction of the Ukrainian people, and this view dominates in all the regions of Ukraine. Another half believe that the target of the attack is the occupation of Ukraine and its annexation by Russia. Only 15% to 17% think that Russia is pursuing the goal of changing Ukraine's political course or preventing the deployment of NATO bases. 10% believe that Russia’s motive is the destruction of military infrastructure, while 5%, that it’s provoking NATO to a war. Those who believe that the Russian invasion was aimed at protecting Russian speakers comprise only 2%.

• The majority (64%) of the respondents consider looking for compromises at the negotiations that involve other countries as a real way to end the war. Almost a third of the respondents believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiations and fight until the liberation of all its territories, while only 1% believe that Ukraine should agree to most of Russia’s demands. 

• Ukrainians are not ready to give up either the Crimea or Donbas: most believe that Ukraine should use all the opportunities to return the occupied territories of Donbas (86%) and the Crimea (80%). Residents of all the regions believe so, and this share is now higher than in the pre-war times.

• A half of the surveyed Ukrainians estimate the probability that Russia will carry out a military attack on one of the European countries as a high (25%) or medium (26%) one. Only 22% deny such a possibility at all: it is primarily elderly people.

• The support for Ukraine's accession to NATO has decreased slightly from a record 76% to 72% over the last two weeks. The main reason is the lack of the decision to close the sky over Ukraine, which almost 90% of Ukrainians demanded. 

• According to the survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on March 8-9, 91% of the respondents feel hope when thinking about the situation in Ukraine. Only 6% feel hopeless. The highest level of hope was recorded in all the regions. 

• 57% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to win the war with Russia over the coming weeks: 18% think that we will win in a week, while 39%, in a few weeks. 18% of the respondents believe that the war will last several months, and only 9% think that the war will end in six months or more. There are almost none of those who do not believe in Ukraine’s victory at all. 16% could not answer this question. The residents of the Western region are the most optimistic. Still, in other oblasts, the majority also believe that the war will not last long.

• 92% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. This share is increasing almost on a daily basis. Today, only 6% do not have such confidence. The belief in Ukraine’s victory prevails in all the regions of the country.

• More than 80% answered that they are helping in the defense of Ukraine in some way. In particular, now 39% of the respondents are helping people and the army as volunteers, 37% help financially. Also, 18% participate in the informational resistance, and 12% continue to work in the critical infrastructure. 10% of Ukrainians said they participate in the territorial defense. Only 19% said they are not able to help the country now. More often, it's elderly people. However, even among the elderly people, most are involved in the resistance at the moment.

• The vast majority (97%) of respondents plan to stay in Ukraine in the nearest future.

• 63% support the idea of severing ties between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church. Only 10% do not support this idea. Another 18% said they did not care, and 9% could not answer. Among the members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, more than half also support severing ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, a quarter say they are indifferent and only 13% oppose the severance.

• 40% of Ukrainians believe that most Russians support the war against Ukraine. A quarter of the respondents believe that every second person in Russia supports the war, and a quarter think that supporters of the war are in the minority there.

• 42% believe that there can be no discussion of ever restoring friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians. 22% think that it is possible in 20-30 years after the war, 18%, that it is possible in 10-15 years, and only 12% believe that the restoration of friendship is possible in a couple of years after the war. Residents of the South and the East and those who have relatives in Russia believe in the restoration of those relations a little more. But even among them, more than a third do not believe in the return of friendship between the two nations.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 8-9, 2022, showed that Ukrainians consider the diplomatic (48%) and humanitarian (47%) support for Ukraine from Western partners to be relatively sufficient.

• The types of support that they consider rather insufficient are financial support (39%, sufficient; 45%, insufficient) and economic sanctions against Russia (32%, sufficient; 62%, insufficient).

• Military assistance to Ukraine was rated the worst: only 29% consider it sufficient, while 62% consider it insufficient. From the regional point of view, the various types of support are rated the worst in the South and in the East, and relatively better, in the West and in the Center. 

• Military assistance to Ukraine is the type of international support that Ukrainians expect the most (63%). Regarding this assistance, the respondents demand “closing the sky” (89%) and providing weapons (47%). In addition, one fourth of the respondents consider military medical care and foreign volunteers necessary, while one in five consider it necessary that Ukraine is provided with equipment (walkie-talkies, thermal imagers, etc.), protective vests and helmets.

• Although the majority (50%) believe that the “sky” over Ukraine will be “closed”, only 19% believe that NATO will make such a decision in the nearest future, while 31% think that it will happen later. 43% do not believe that the Western countries will take such a step.

• 79% believe that NATO countries’ delay with “closing the sky” is due to the fear of a direct war with Russia. 12% believe that NATO countries do not want to spoil relations with Russia. 

• At the same time, the vast majority of respondents (90%) believe that Ukraine should keep up the pressure on NATO to “close the sky”.

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group, 55% of respondents believe that only the Russian authorities are to blame for the war against Ukraine. Another 38% place responsibility on both the authorities and the people of the Russian Federation (RF).

• Regarding Belarus, 70% place the blame for the invasion exclusively on the Belarusian authorities, and only 24% on both the authorities and the people of Belarus.

• In a regional breakdown, relatively fewer people in the southern and eastern regions blame both the people and the authorities of Russia for starting the war against Ukraine, placing the blame solely on the RF leadership. As for Belarus, the overwhelming majority across all macro-regions (from 60% in the West to 80% in the East) place the blame for the invasion only on the leadership of that state.

• According to the survey conducted by the Sociological group "Rating" on March 1, 90% of the respondents feel hope when they think about the situation in Ukraine. Only 5% experience disappointment. Compared to the pre-war times, the share of those who feel hope has tripled. The record high level of hope is observed in almost all the regions of Ukraine.

• 88% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. This number is increasing almost daily. Today, only 10% are not confident in this. The belief in Ukraine’s victory prevails in all regions of the country.

• 98% of the respondents support the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 93% support the activities of the President, and 84% support the actions of local mayors.

• 80% of the respondents said they were ready to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine with weapons in hand. Compared to the pre-war times, this figure has significantly increased (it was 59% in 2020). The highest level of readiness is observed in the West and in the Center, while a slightly lower one, in the South and in the East. But even in the South-Eastern regions, the readiness to fight for the Motherland is extremely high (almost 80% in the South and almost 60% in the East).

• The support for Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO is the highest over the history of our surveys: 86% support accession to the EU and 76% support joining NATO. Compared to the pre-war period, the support for EU and NATO accession has increased by more than 20 percentage points. This positive dynamics took place due to the growing support for accession to the Western structures among the population of the South and the East. In terms of age, there is unanimous support for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO in all the categories.

• 61% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU in the nearest future (within 1 or 2 years). 13% believe that our country will become a member of the EU in 5 years, while 6% believe it will happen later. 17% are not sure in their estimates. Only 4% do not believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU. Compared to last year, the share of those who do not believe in Ukraine's European integration has decreased significantly (it was 26% in November 2021).

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group, 70% of respondents are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel the attack of the Russian occupiers, while 16% are not confident. The level of belief in our own Armed Forces has increased significantly over the past week. No region shows a prevalence of pessimistic sentiments. The highest level of confidence in the Armed Forces is in the West and Center (75-78%). It is relatively lower in the South and East (64-66%).

• 91% of Ukrainians support the actions of President Zelenskyy. 6% do not support them, and 3% were unable to answer. Importantly, support for the actions of the President of Ukraine has tripled since December 2021.

• An extremely high level of support for Zelenskyy is observed in all regions of the country: over 90% in the West and Center, and over 80% in the East and South.

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group on February 11-18, 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy leads the confidence rating for politicians: 41% of respondents trust him, while 57% distrust him. Volodymyr Groysman is trusted by 35% and distrusted by 55%. Vitali Klitschko is trusted by 34% and distrusted by 57%. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 32%, distrusted by 38%, and 25% are unfamiliar with him. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 28% and distrusted by 70%. Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 26% and distrusted by 72%. Arseniy Yatsenyuk is trusted by 24% and distrusted by 72%. Ihor Smeshko is trusted by 24%, distrusted by 34%, and 37% are unfamiliar with him. Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 22% and distrusted by 62%. Arsen Avakov is trusted by 22% and distrusted by 66%. Oleh Lyashko is trusted by 18% and distrusted by 76%.

• The political party rating is led by the 'Servant of the People' party, which is ready to be supported by 19.6% of those who will vote and have decided on their choice. Following are the 'European Solidarity' party with 17.7%, 'Batkivshchyna' with 11.5%, and 'Opposition Platform – For Life' with 9.5%. The 'Strength and Honor' party is ready to be supported by 7.6%, Razumkov's 'Smart Politics' party by 6.7%, Murayev's 'Nashi' party by 5.4%, the 'Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman' party by 4.8%, the Radical Party by 3.9%, All-Ukrainian Union 'Svoboda' by 3.2%, People's Front (Yatsenyuk, Avakov) by 3.2%, and 'UDAR of Vitali Klitschko' by 3.1%.

• V. Zelenskyy is the leader of the presidential rating, whom 24.6% of those who have decided on their choice and intend to vote are ready to support. P. Poroshenko is supported by 18.0%, Y. Tymoshenko by 9.5%, and Y. Boyko by 8.3%. I. Smeshko is ready to receive 7.5% of the votes, D. Razumkov 6.9%, Y. Murayev 5.9%, V. Groysman 5.3%, O. Lyashko 2.9%, and A. Yatsenyuk 2.2%. The ratings of other candidates do not exceed 2%.

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group on February 16-17, 2022, 19% of respondents assess the probability of a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine by Russia as high, 33% as medium, and 20% as low, while 25% believe there is no threat at all. The number of respondents who see no threat differs significantly by region: from 14% in the West to 42% in the East of the country.

• At the same time, the majority of respondents (64%) are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel the attack if a Russian invasion occurs. One-third are not confident in this. The number of respondents who believe in their own Armed Forces prevails in all regions of the country (relatively higher in the West and Center, relatively lower in the East).

• Thus, over the last few days, the assessment of the threat's probability as high decreased from 28% to 19%. At the same time, citizens' confidence that Ukraine will be able to repel the attack if a Russian invasion occurs increased from 58% to 64%.

• According to a poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on 16-17 February 2022, 62% support Ukraine's accession to NATO. Thirty percent have a negative attitude towards this initiative. Over the past two months, support for joining the North Atlantic Alliance has grown (at the end of 2021, 55-58% of respondents supported accession). Since observations began in 2014, this is the highest level of positive perception of Ukraine's integration into NATO.
• Sixty-eight per cent support accession to the European Union, while 24% do not. As with NATO, support for EU accession has grown over the past two months and reached its highest level since surveys began in 2013.
• The idea of Ukraine's integration into Western structures enjoys greater support among respondents in the West and Centre, and less in the South. In the East, the number of supporters of NATO membership is lower than the number of opponents. With regard to the EU, there is a parity between opponents and supporters in the eastern regions. Over the past few years, there have been no significant differences in the assessment of Ukraine's foreign policy vector among age groups. However, in the electoral segments, there is a noticeable predominance of rejection of Ukraine's accession to Western structures among voters of the Opposition Platform – For Life party and Murayev's Our Party. Among voters of other political forces, the overwhelming majority are in favour of Ukraine's accession to both the EU and NATO.
• 55% of respondents believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the Minsk agreements if Russia recognises the so-called DPR and LPR as independent states. 24% are against this, while 21% are undecided. A relative majority of the population, regardless of region of residence and age, supports withdrawal from the Minsk agreements under the conditions mentioned above. Only in electoral terms is there a noticeable difference in the assessment of such a development: a relative majority of respondents who support the Opposition Platform – For Life and Nashi parties are either against withdrawing from the Minsk agreements or are undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 43% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine's international policy is moving in the right direction, 46% believe it is moving in the wrong direction, and 11% were unable to answer. At the same time, regarding the situation in the country as a whole, 67% believe that it is moving in the wrong direction, 25% believe it is moving in the right direction, and 7% are undecided.
• Half of Ukrainians are confident that the recent visits of international leaders to Ukraine are beneficial for the country, while a quarter believe that they have no impact. At the same time, only 17% think that such visits are more likely to harm Ukraine.
• About 60% of respondents believe that the US and the UK are defending Ukraine's interests in the Donbas negotiations, while a third believe that these countries have a neutral position.  
• Fifty-five per cent of respondents believe that the OSCE takes a neutral position in the negotiation process, 28% believe that it defends Ukraine's interests, and 5% believe that it defends Russia's interests.  
• 58% of respondents believe that France has a neutral position, 26% believe it defends Ukraine's interests, and 8% believe it defends Russia's interests.  
• 69% of respondents believe that Germany has a neutral position, 13% believe it defends Ukraine's interests, and 13% believe it defends Russia's interests.
• 67% of respondents said they were superficially familiar with the content of the Minsk agreements, and only 12% said they were very familiar with their content. One in five is completely unfamiliar with the content of the agreements, although this figure has fallen over the last four years from 39% to 21%.  
• Most respondents believe that Ukraine should revise the Minsk agreements and sign new ones (63%), and this figure is increasing. Only 11% believe that Ukraine should fulfil all the requirements, while 18% believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiation process altogether.  
• Most Ukrainians surveyed blame Russia for the failure of the Minsk agreements (57%), while 10% blame representatives of the so-called LNR and DNR, and only 12% blame Ukraine. 12% were unable to say who was to blame.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi currently leads the presidential ranking, with 24.6% support among those who intend to vote and have already made their choice. He is followed by Petro Poroshenko – 16.8%, Yulia Tymoshenko – 9.9%, and Yurii Boiko – 8.3%.
  Yevhen Murayev is supported by 6.9%, Ihor Smeshko – 6.6%, Dmytro Razumkov – 6.2%, Volodymyr Groysman – 5.7%, Oleh Liashko – 3.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed 3%. Compared to the previous wave, support for Zelenskyi has slightly increased, support for Boiko has somewhat decreased, while support levels for other candidates have remained nearly unchanged.
• Petro Poroshenko continues to top the anti-rating: 43% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.Boiko is rejected by about 36%, Tymoshenko and Zelenskyi — by 33% each, Liashko — 23%, Klychko and Murayev — 20% each, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok — 15%, Groysman — 13%.
• The Servant of the People party is currently supported by 18.3% of those who intend to vote and have already made their choice, while European Solidarity stands at 17.1%. Batkivshchyna is supported by 10.8%, and the Opposition Platform – For Life receives 9.7%. Razumkov’s “Smart Politics” has 5.9%, Murayev’s “Nashi” holds 5.5%. Prytula’s “24 August” is supported by 5.3%, Strength and Honor by 5.2%, the Radical Party by 4.7%, and Groysman’s Ukrainian Strategy by 4.0%. Sharii’s Party receives 3.4%, while UDAR of Vitalii Klychko and Svoboda each hold 2.8%. Support for all other political forces does not exceed 2%.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group on 21-23 January 2022, 61% support the idea of creating a military-political alliance between Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom. 21% have a negative attitude towards this initiative, while 12% are indifferent.
• In regional terms, the idea of creating such an alliance enjoys the greatest support among residents of the western and central regions, as well as Kyiv (support levels ranging from 65% to 76%).  Residents of the southern regions (51% support, 31% do not support) and eastern regions (40% support, 38% do not support) are somewhat less enthusiastic about this initiative.  
• Among supporters of political parties, the most vocal opponents of this initiative are supporters of the Opposition Platform – For Life party (62% do not support), Shariy's party (67% do not support) and Murayev's party (68% do not support). Among voters of other parties, the number of those who support such an initiative significantly outweighs the number of its opponents. The idea of creating a military-political alliance between Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom enjoys the greatest support among voters of the European Solidarity, Freedom and Strength and Honour parties (support level over 80%).