News and Press releases

• The Sociological Group "Rating" within the framework of the Nineteenth national survey in the conditions of war, on November 20-21, 2022 carried out comprehensive research on the assessments of changes in various spheres of life, and citizens’ expectations and hopes for the next year.

• As of the end of 2022, over 82% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction, only 7% think this direction is wrong. Assessment of the right direction of things’ development dominates in all regional cuts and age groups.

• The absolute majority of respondents (97%) are sure that Ukraine will be able to beat off Russian attack.

• Two-thirds of the polled expect the next 2023 year to be better than the previous one. 12% believe that next year will be the same, 16% - worse. Compared to last year's study, the indicators are more optimistic. Also, almost 90% wait for 2023 with optimism, only 6% with pessimism.

• When assessing changes in various spheres over the last year, more positive rates were recorded referring the political situation (about half said it had improved) and a feeling of confidence in the future (almost 40% of respondents said it had improved).

• Regarding the assessment of their own state of health, two-thirds of the polled indicated no changes, one-third mentioned deterioration. The respondents rated the economic situation in the country the worst: 80% noted deterioration, 10% - no change, only 6% - improvement. More than 60% said that the economic situation of their family had worsened, one-third mentioned no change, and only 4% - improvement.

• Considering the dynamics over the last year, the feeling of confidence in the future and assessment of the political situation in the country have improved. Although the assessment of both one's own economic situation and the country’s has undergone negative changes over the year, the indicators are not worse than the 2018 level. Negative trends in the assessments of the economy and finances among the younger and middle-aged generations’ representatives are especially noticeable.

• Evaluating changes in specific spheres, the best ratings are observed in the assessment of the country's defense capacity (90%) and Ukraine's international image (86%).

• Referring freedom of speech and democracy, half of the respondents have not noticed any changes, 34% believe that the situation has improved, 12% think it has worsened. Regarding the roads’ condition, 42% have hardly noted any changes, 24% - improvement, and 28% - deterioration. The situation with the fight against corruption has not changed for 46%, improved for 22%, worsened for 17%. The quality of healthcare and housing and communal services has not changed for almost half of the polled, improved - for 12% and 8% respectively, worsened - for 23% and 41% respectively.

• The worst rated are the situation with the prices for basic goods and medicines (worsened for 94%), opportunities to find a job (worsened for 72%), and quality of education (worsened for 55%).

• Referring the dynamics, negative trends are observed regarding the evaluation of the roads’ condition, the opportunity of finding a job, and the quality of education. There were no changes during the assessment year regarding the prices for basic goods and medicines. Indexes regarding the quality of housing and communal services, healthcare, fight against corruption, freedom of speech and democracy, and especially the international image, have improved.

• Sociological group «Rating» by order of the public organization «Transatlantic Dialogue Center» carried out a study «Reconstruction of Ukraine and international aid» on November 20-21, 2022. According to the results of the survey, Ukrainians' views on when to begin the repair of damage in the de-occupied territories are somewhat diverse: 44% think it should be done as soon as possible, and 52% believe it is worth waiting for the war end. Differences are observed within the regional distribution: residents of the Eastern regions are more likely to be in favor of reconstruction as soon as possible, while respondents from the Western and Central regions are more supportive of the idea of postponing it until the war ends. 

• Restoration of jobs and income sources is more important for Ukrainians as direct financial support. Thus, among the programs most needed for war-affected communities, the most often chosen were the restoration of businesses and jobs (60%) and the damage repair (55%). Financial support was identified as an important program by 44%. 37% named medical and humanitarian assistance as important. Children's development programs and psychosocial care are significant for a quarter of the polled. Instead, programs for either democratic institutions development or cultural and social cohesion were chosen less often – by 3 to 6%.

• There are certain differences in the relevance of reconstruction programs within regional and age cut. Thus, for the residents of the East, the issues of returning to work and damage repair are more critical. Humanitarian assistance and support for children's development are more important for young people as compared to older people. Also, one-third of the younger population declared the need for a psychosocial care program. Moreover, displaced people more often than others record the need for reconstruction: those who have moved more often than others talk about the need for jobs restoration, damage repair, and the need for medical and humanitarian assistance.

• Communications and energy infrastructure (64%) are the main priority for recovery in conflict-affected communities according to all respondents. Reconstruction of social infrastructure (schools, hospitals) was most often chosen as the second priority (29%), somewhat less often - restoration of private housing and communications (24% each), transport infrastructure (17%).

• Opinions on the reconstruction strategy for the damaged infrastructure are diverse: 48% believe that the recovery should take place as soon as possible, while 49% stand for the recovery to last longer but include the introduction of green, energy-saving technologies and modernization. Among the polled from the Eastern regions, there are somewhat more of those who prefer quick recovery, but still among them there are also about 40% who do not mind waiting for infrastructure modernization. Among the residents of the Center and West, there are somewhat more of those in favor of slower reconstruction, but with modernization. There are also generational differences: while older people want to rebuild infrastructure as soon as possible, most young people want to modernize and advocate for the introduction of green energy.

• In general, the majority of respondents positively perceive the participation of countries that do not commit aggression against Ukraine referring the reconstruction. Thus, potential aid from Great Britain, the USA, Germany, and France is perceived very positively: 81-90% of respondents support the participation of these states in the reconstruction. Regarding Turkey, 67% share this opinion (22% are neutral, 10% are negative). As for China, 45% support such an initiative (a quarter are neutral and the same number are negative).

• Evaluating different scenarios of foreign countries' involvement in Ukraine's reconstruction, the majority (55%) advocate that foreign countries provide finances and supervise Ukrainian companies. The scenario in which foreign companies are directly involved in the reconstruction was supported by 29%. 13% supported the idea that foreign countries provide finances while Ukrainian companies carry out the reconstruction works on their own. Participation of foreign countries only at the consultation level was supported by only 2%. Among those who are positive towards the foreign countries’ involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction, the support for the ideas of direct participation of foreigners or control on their part is more often observed.

• Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, the conviction that Ukraine's victory in the war is the liberation of all its territories, including Crimea and occupied Donbas, has increased (from 74% in March to 85% in November 2022). Only 9% chose the option of returning only the territories that Ukraine controlled until 24.02.22. At the same time, no more than 5% support the continuation of hostilities on the Russian territories. Support for the de-occupation of all territories of Ukraine without exception is absolute (more than 80%) among representatives of all regions of the country.

• The number of those who support the reinstatement of nuclear-weapon-state status for Ukraine has increased (from 47% in 2019 to 53% in 2022).

• Ukraine's accession to NATO (61%) and Russia's nuclear disarmament (50%) are measures to deter future attacks against Ukraine which are most often supported by respondents. Ukraine's accession to the EU and guarantees from Western countries to supply Ukraine with weapons are supported by 34% of respondents as measures of deterrence. Nuclear weapons of Ukraine and financial aid to our state were chosen by 17% each. Only 8% supported signing peace agreements with Russia as a method of deterring aggression. Residents of the East and South, as well as those who support the military recapture of only the territories controlled as of February 24, 2022, are somewhat more likely to believe in the effectiveness of signing peace agreements with Russia. At the same time, in all regional and age groups, an overwhelming majority chose Ukraine's accession to NATO and Russia's nuclear disarmament as the best guarantees of security.

• The majority of the population of Ukraine has not heard anything about the initiative of French President Macron «European Political Community». Only 3% know something about it, 29% have heard something about it. In general, 54% among all believe in the benefits of such a platform, and 63% of them among those who have heard something about it. A quarter of Ukrainians believe that such an initiative would not be effective in countering Russian aggression.

• The vast majority of respondents (60%) consider Germany to be a friendly country towards Ukraine, about one-third considers it rather neutral. Only 1% consider Germany hostile in relation to our state. The attitude towards the involvement of Germany in the reconstruction is somewhat better as compared to the perception of it as an ally, because referring the issue of reconstruction the positive attitude towards it is at the level of 85%.

• The main factors that influence the perception of Germany as a friendly country were the supply of arms to Ukraine and aid to Ukrainian refugees (over 50%). 38% noted that the factor that positively influenced their opinion of Germany was its financial aid to Ukraine. 14% rate Germany as friendly because they believe the German population supports Ukraine. Among other factors that influenced the positive assessment, only 7% of respondents identified the introduction of sanctions against Russia by Germany, 5% - the pro-Ukrainian stance of German politicians. 5% said they simply like this country.

• Instead, the main factor determining Ukrainians' perception of Germany as an unfriendly or neutral country is that German politicians have a pro-Russian stance (44% among those who consider Germany to be neutral or hostile). The fact that Germany continues to cooperate with Russia (28%) and that it supplies insufficient amount of weapons (27%) also play a significant role in this assessment. About the insufficiency of financial aid, or German population support to Russia, the polled spoke much less often (9-10% each). 2-5% of respondents noted either lack of sympathy for Germany.

The research carried out in cooperation with the Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Serhii Dembitskyi

• According to the results of the nineteenth national survey "Ukraine in the conditions of war" carried out by the Sociological group "Rating", in general, at this stage, Ukrainian society is characterized by an almost equal number of those who believe there are no generally recognized norms in our society (anomie state), and those who, on the contrary, believe that such norms exist (non-anomie state). The number of the first category is 46%, while the number of the latter is 48%. 6% of respondents belong to the intermediate group, and it is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding their attitude towards the existence of generally accepted norms in society.

• Throughout the entire history of modern Ukraine, society was dominated by the anomie condition, which has been weakening very slowly and inconsistently (from 82% in 1992 to 72% in 2021). But after the start of Russia's large-scale war against Ukraine at the beginning of 2022, anomie sentiments have significantly decreased and ceased to be decisive, although they remain quite widespread.

• The key indicators that still point out the existence of anomie attitudes among the respondents are uncertainty about the future and a sense of the destruction of what their parents believed in. These observations fit perfectly into the logic of what is currently happening in Ukraine. At the same time, the vast majority of respondents clearly understand what is happening around them, and are also confident in their assessments of what is currently true and what is not.

• Considering the regional cut, there are almost no differences regarding the anomia state among the respondents. Though the following differences are present among the residents of different settlement types, age groups, and genders:

1) the larger the size of the settlement, the less widespread is the anomie feeling;

2) anomie becomes more common with age;

3) anomie feeling is weaker among men compared to women.

Reference: Anomie Scale (McClosky & Schaar) makes it possible to assess anomie demoralization. Anomie demoralization is a psychological reaction of people to a social situation, when one system of norms and values, which unites people into a community, is broken, and the other is not yet formed.

• According to the results of the survey conducted by the Sociological group "Rating", 93% said that they agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932-1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people. The number of those who do not support this thesis is 3%; 4% hesitate to answer.

• Over the past ten years, an increse of one and a half times is being observed in the number of respondents who agree with the thesis that the 1932-33 Holodomor was a genocide of the Ukrainian people (compared to last year - increase of 8 percentage points). The Holodomor of 1932-33 is recognized as genocide by the absolute majority of residents in the western, central, and southeastern oblasts. Also, no significant deviations in age distributions in this matter were recorded.

• As part of the Eighteenth national survey during the war, Sociological group “Rating” on October  8-9, 2022 conducted a comprehensive study of the general assessment of the situation, the perception of the nuclear threat danger from russia, as well as the attitude towards foreign countries and their assessment according to the "ally" index.

• Results of the survey confirmed the growth dynamics referring those who believe the things in the country are going in the right direction. Within this survey, a record indicator was observed throughout the whole history of the studies - 86% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction. Only 6% have revealed the opposite opinion, 8% could not answer on the matter. In all regions and within all age groups, the assessment of the countries development direction as correct dominates.

• Two-thirds of Ukrainians do not believe that russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, and even more respondents do not believe in the possibility of a nuclear strike on NATO countries (84%). Compared to the survey in April of this year, the confidence that russia will not launch a nuclear attack on Ukraine and the Western countries - members of the North Atlantic Alliance – has strengthened.

• According to Ukrainians, currently Poland, Lithuania, Great Britain, the USA, and Canada are the most friendly towards Ukraine. Finland, Sweden, Denmark, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Japan are also considered to be friendly. About half of the polled believe Turkey and Kazakhstan to be friendly, though 40% think these two countries are rather neutral towards Ukraine.

• China currently remains mostly neutral country for Ukrainians. Hungary, on the contrary, "turned" into a "hostile" state - 41% find it hostile, 26% - neutral, 21% - friendly. Belarus (85%) and russia (97%) are absolutely hostile countries for Ukrainians. Over the recent months, the attitude of Ukrainians towards Canada, Poland, Lithuania, Great Britain, and the USA has improved; towards France it has hardly changed. Instead, the neutral attitude towards Turkey has grown. There is also a trend of attitudes’ worsening towards China (especially compared to 2021 data).

As a part of the eighteenth wave of the “Ukraine during the war” project, Sociological Group “Rating” conducted another study of psychological markers: the levels of resilience and psychological exhaustion as well as the consumer behavior strategies

 SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CITIZENS OF UKRAINE

• The share of the respondents who have been forced to leave their places of permanent residence since February 24, 2022, has increased somewhat. The growth is due to the increase in the number of internally displaced persons from the Eastern and Southern regions.

• 85% of the polled express their intention to return home: 21% - soon, 19% - willing to return, but are going to wait, and 45% - will return, but only when the war is over. Only 6% said they will not return home. Compared to July of this year, the share of those who plan to return soon has been increasing, while the share of those who either will return after the war, or will not return at all, has been decreasing.

• The gradual return of the citizens to their workplaces continues. Currently, 38% of those who had worked before the war have returned to their regular job places, while 18% are working remotely, and 7% have found a new job. Despite this, one-third of such respondents are still not employed. Most of the latter are among the youngest and the oldest respondents, as well as among women and residents of the East of the country. This survey for the first time recorded positive trends in returning to work among residents of the South and East. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that regional identification is made according to the place of residence until February 24, 2022.

LEVEL OF RESILIENCE

• During the eighth month of the war, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a good level of resilience (3.9 points out of 5). The components of this indicator: psychological resilience (3.9) and maintaining physical health (3.7) – has not changed significantly as compared to June.

• Curiosity about what is happening around (4.5), plans for the future (4.2), normal nutrition (4.2), absence of regrets about the past (4.1), and confidence in one's decisions (4.0) primarily contribute to the relatively high index of psychological resilience. 

• These days, Ukrainians suffer most from fatigue (only 34% do not feel it) and lack of good sleep (only 47% have good sleep). Such reactions of the body are natural for stress and at the same time quite exhausting. Despite this, other emotional and moral indicators of citizens are better. 

• Since April, there has been a decrease in indicators of normal nutrition, while at the same time, indicators of good sleep have been increasing. And this allows to keep a relative balance of physical health support.

• Women have a lower level of resilience than men. A relatively lower level of resilience has been recorded within the youngest and oldest age groups. The availability of work has a positive effect on resilience: those who work full-time or part-time feel better than those who do not work, because work (employment, team) and salary cover the basic need for security and belonging to the community. Also, a higher level of resilience is observed among those who have relatives who currently bear arms.

• In the regional terms, this survey has revealed no significant differences in terms of the integral indicator. At the same time, there is a significant gap between the index of physical health (relatively lower level) and psychological stability (relatively higher level) among the residents of the South.

• For all groups of the polled, psychological resilience (3.9) is higher than the indicators of physical condition (3.7). Similarly, like in the previous study, the hypothesis is proven: the war has physically exhausted Ukrainians to a bigger extent, while psychological endurance still remains better. 

• The dynamics of the resilience index has somewhat improved. Eight months of war but Ukrainians still have enough physical and moral strength to live in tough circumstances, to work, to help, and to fight. 

LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXHAUSTION

• The dynamics of research of the emotional states for the period from March till October, 2022 reveals that the changes in day-to-day assessment of one’s emotional stress are still insignificant. The peak of stress was observed at the beginning of April 2022 (3.5), while in June there has been a gradual decrease of the stress (3.3), and in October it has remained at that exact level (3.3).

• 24% of Ukrainians feel calm and very calm. 40% feel tense and very tense, and this is a relatively low indicator as for wartime. Tension increases with age, probably due to narrowing opportunities to take care of oneself, as well as material and other resources. Also, tension is more common for women (probably due to their higher sensitivity and need to take care not only of themselves, but also of their children) and for those who have changed their place of residence, - the need to adapt to a new place, situation of uncertainty, change in the usual living conditions significantly increase stress.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is still quite moderate (2.0). Considering dynamics, it has not changed from April to October 2022, except for the indicator of trust in people (it has decreased). The share of those who believe that people cannot be trusted and of those who think that something bad may happen has increased. The latter trend is probably related to the news about the destruction and the dead, and the realization that there are few left who were not at least indirectly affected by it.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is mainly “warranted” by mistrust of people (2.7) and sad mood (2.6). However, Ukrainians still do not feel “dead” inside (1.6) and can rely on themselves (1.4). Also, the majority do not feel weak, and the surrounding world is not perceived as hostile and dangerous. Since April, there has been a decrease in indicators of "sad" mood; at the same time, there has been an increase in mistrust of others and despair in the ability to rely on oneself.

• Those youngest and oldest respondents, women, residents of the East and West, those who are not working or are retired, those who have changed their place of residence, as well as those who have relatives currently bearing arms feel the most exhausted.

• Monitoring of emotional states, level of resilience and psychological exhaustion from March to October 2022 has revealed that, in general, Ukrainians were able to maintain and stabilize their psychological and emotional state, acquire sufficient competence in overcoming stressful events of war life. Those younger and older people, women, and those who have lost their jobs remain the risk groups.

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES

• Most often, respondents make decisions about buying products and goods based on the compatibility of price and quality (42%). 29% are guided by the fact that they regularly buy the same goods (regular consumption strategy) or because of the opportunity to buy them cheaper (cost minimization strategy). 20% buy because the purchase brings pleasure (hedonists), 13% buy the best quality goods (perfectionists). Only 4% buy products impulsively (impulsive consumption strategy), 2% - because the product is new (novelties consumption). Compatibility of price and quality and regularity of purchase are more likely for the younger and middle-aged generation, who are guided by a rational approach to spending. Buying because of a lower price is more likely for older people, since they often have lower incomes and are forced to save. Young people are also relatively more likely to buy either because it brings pleasure or guided by the quality indicator - it corresponds to the values of the younger generation, who are more hedonistic and perfectionist. Regularity and the "cheapness" motive prevail among women; compatibility of price and quality, especially better quality - among men. Thus, women have more rational strategies, while men have more emotional strategies (although women are usually seen as oriented on emotions, but women usually have lower incomes as compared to men).

• The results of the cluster analysis of the consumer behavior strategies made it possible to divide consumers into the following groups: hedonists (38%), rationalists (24%), traditionalists (21%), and thrifty (19%). "Hedonists" - choose goods of the best quality, buy something based on the compatibility of price and quality and something that brings pleasure; prevail among young people, men, and those who have job (respectively, higher incomes). "Rationalists"- buy cheaper and when there is a good "price-quality" ratio; more of them are among representatives of the middle-aged generation, men, those who have job, as well as retirees. "Traditionalists" - buy the same goods in the "price - quality" ratio; more of them are among young people and those who work. "Thrifty" - buy cheaper and the same things; more of them are among the elderly, women (more of them among the oldest category), unemployed, and retired. In general, these are worthy, adequate strategies of developed societies with good economic indicators.

For comments on the results of this study, please contact Professor Marianna Tkalych, Director of the Rating Lab research laboratory, Doctor of Psychological Sciences. Tel.: +38 (050) 322-09-25 (WhatsApp, Signal), e-mail: tkalych@ratinggroup.ua 

 • Sociological group "Rating" within the framework of the "People's Top" project continued the research of outstanding Ukrainians of all times. With the help of an open ended question, the respondents, without receiving any lists or prompts, named those famous personalities whom they consider worthy of this rating.

• Taras Shevchenko once again became the leader of the "People's TOP" rating (63.9%). Volodymyr Zelenskyi (29.8%), Lesya Ukrainka (19.6%), Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (17.3%), and Stepan Bandera (12.8%) also entered top 5 most outstanding Ukrainians. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (11.6%), Ivan Franko (10.1%), Ivan Mazepa (8.8%), Vyacheslav Chornovil (8.7%) and Valery Zaluzhnyi (7, 7%) entered top 10.

• Hryhoriy Skovoroda (6.7%), Vasyl Stus (3.4%), Volodymyr Veliky (2.6%), Yaroslav Mudryi (2.5%), Leonid Kravchuk (2.5%), Ivan Sirko (2.4%), Vitaliy Klitschko (2.2%), Oleksandr Usyk (2.2%), Andriy Shevchenko (1.8%), and Petro Sagaidachnyi (1.8%) entered the second ten of the rating.

• Third ten is represented by: Roman Shukhevich (1.7%), Leonid Kuchma (1.5%), Taras Bulba (1.5%), Ivan Kotlyarevskyi (1.4%), Lina Kostenko (1.3%), Ihor Sikorskyi (1.2%), Petro Poroshenko (1.2%), Mykhailo Kotsiubinskyi (1.1%), Mykola Amosov (0.9%), and Pavlo Skoropadskyi (0.9%).

• Respondents indicated a total of 148 names. At the same time, about 8% of respondents could not name (remember) a single outstanding Ukrainian.

The survey was conducted as part of the project of the Public Organization "Center for Promotion of the Volunteer Movement "Volonter.Org": "Assessment of the damage caused by the war crimes of the Russian Federation in Ukraine". The survey and the report were developed within the framework of the project "Urgent support of the EU for civil society", which is implemented by ISAR Ednannia with the financial support of the European Union. Its content is entirely responsibility of the Public Organization "Center for Promotion of the Volunteer Movement “Volonter.Org" and does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union. Expert support and consultations during the research have been provided by the representatives of the Coalition "Ukraine. Five in the morning".

• According to the survey results, about a quarter of the respondents said they were forced to change their place of residence in Ukraine during the full-scale invasion of russia in Ukraine. Most of them are among those who lived in the war zone * (64%) and in Kyiv (42%). One-third of those who left their homes have already returned. Also, 9% of those displaced plan to return in the nearest future, 15% intend to wait. At the same time, another one-third intend to return, but only if the war ends. Only 6% do not plan to return at all. Considering the de-occupied localities, half of those who had left during the war have already returned.

• 32% of the polled stated they experienced material losses as a result of the war; 67% did not. More than a half of the inhabitants of the territories where hostilities were or are still ongoing have suffered losses. Among the losses, money was most often mentioned – by 36%, housing - 23%, household appliances - 14%. 7% said they had lost animals, 6% - cars, 5% - production, 4% - commercial real estate. 

• Every tenth respondent stated that their housing was either destroyed (2%) or damaged (8%). 5% are not aware of the current condition of their housing. For 85%, the housing situation has not changed. About one-third of those whose home is either in the de-occupied territory or in the war zone said that their home was damaged. Also, every fifth of those whose housing is still in the occupation zone, does not know anything about its condition.

• In a third of the damaged buildings, reconstruction works have already begun: 4% have started major renewal, 27% - partial renewal. Despite this, 66% have not yet started any works. Among those who lost their homes, 18% have already filed a claim for damage to DIYA, 16% - to law enforcement bodies, 15% - to other state institutions, 67% - have not appealed anywhere yet. 39% of victims believe that their houses should be rebuilt as soon as possible, 59% - on the contrary, think that it is worth waiting for the end of the war first.

• The majority of those who lost their homes (58%) plan to use their own funds for reconstruction. 27% expect to restore the housing using state funds, 12% - funds of international organizations, 9% - funds of volunteers, and 7% - funds of relatives or charitable funds. Owners of destroyed housing expect more help from the state, while owners of partially damaged housing expect to cope using their own resources. In general, those who have already started repairs proceed mostly at their own expense. In general, residents who have already returned home are more active in restoring their housing - most of them have already started reconstruction and filed a claim for damage.

• Currently, among those who had had a job before the war, 61% are working: full-time - 36%, remote or part-time - 19%, found a new job - 6%. Instead, 37% lost their jobs and are not working now. The highest number of those who lost their jobs was recorded among the residents of the East, women, those with the lowest income, and internally displaced persons. Over the month, the indicators of employment have not changed significantly in general; however, compared to the previous surveys, positive trends in terms of the return to work in the Central and Western regions are observed.

• The main source of income for the majority of respondents is salary (56%) and pension (31%). 8% had income from private business, and the same number received social assistance. Since the beginning of the war, only 2% of respondents declare growth of income; 33% say their income has not changed. On the other hand, two-thirds of the polled have seen a worsening of the income situation: 18% have had a slight decrease of income, 32% - a significant decrease, and 14% have lost almost all of their income. Residents of the South and East and middle-aged people have experienced the greatest financial losses. Half of the polled said that in case of a complete loss of income, their savings would last for month, 19% - up to 2 months, 12% - up to 3 months, the same number - up to six months or more.

• Among those whose source of income before the war was business, only 12% noted that it continued to operate fully. Almost a half indicated that their business was operating, but with lower profits. On the other hand, 12% plan to close their business, 28% - have already stopped operating. 30% of business income recipients have had employees. Among them, almost 40% of employers had to fire employees, more than 20% - to reduce salaries.

• 35% of the polled had to temporarily separate from their family/partner due to the war: 12% had to, but they have already reunited, 23% are still living separately. Most of them are among the residents of the war zone, young people, those with higher income, and those whose relatives are fighting. 52% said they were not separated from their families because of the war.

• More than a half of the respondents noted the deterioration of their physical health, more than 60% spoke the same about their mental health. Deterioration of health is observed among the residents of de-occupied, front-line, and war zones, older people, those with lower income, those who had to be separated from their families, and those who have lost relatives because of the war.

• 47% indicated that they had close relatives who bear arms. Almost 20% reported that they had close relatives with whom they had lost contact and still do not know where they are. 5% have among their relatives those who died due to the war, 3% - those who were forcibly deported either to russia or to the occupied territories of the East or Crimea. 7% of the polled noted that they personally or their close relatives had been injured or disabled due to military actions.

• 95% did not apply to law enforcement agencies over the last six months on issues caused by the invasion of russia.

• Over 90% believe russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses during the war. At the same time, only one-third of the respondents believe in this compensation. 14-15% expect for compensation from European countries and international organizations, 10% - from the USA, and 9% - from Ukraine. More than 70% believe in the possibility of compensations from these countries.

• Special trials with the participation of national and foreign judges (63%) and international institutions (23%) are considered to be the most effective mechanism to deal with war crimes of russia. Only 5% believe Ukrainian courts can be such a mechanism. One-third of the polled are ready to personally participate in lawsuits in order to claim compensation for lost property/health in Ukrainian and international courts.

• Among the sources of information about the war in Ukraine, the most trusted are the TV marathon (40%), the stories of eyewitnesses and acquaintances (35%), and social media channels (33%).

• Almost 40% believe that five years are enough to restore Ukraine's infrastructure and economy. 25% believe that it takes up to ten years, 23% - more than ten years. 4% think that reconstruction will last up to one year.

• The majority of Ukrainians are ready to participate in the reconstruction of the country: 42% - personally, 49% - ready, but do not have the opportunity. Residents of Kyiv, those aged 18-50, men, those with higher income are more likely to participate in reconstruction.

* For the purposes of this survey, several approaches to regional distribution are used. In the answers that refer to damage assessment, an atypical distribution is used, taking into account the intensity of hostilities during a full-scale russian invasion in Ukraine in 2022. Hhostilities zones (partially or fully occupied regions in which active hostilities are taking place): Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson regions. Front-line zones (regions near the hostilities zone, some of which are subject to constant fire): Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa. De-occupied zones (regions that were partially occupied until April 2022): Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv. West and Center (regions that were not occupied (absolutely or almost): Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi, Cherkasy. Kyiv is picked out in a separate group due to its proximity to hostilities until April 2022 and a high level of internal migration.

In other cases, a more traditional distribution into 5 macro-regions is used: West, Center, South, East, and the city of Kyiv.

• According to the results of the national survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" in October 1-2, 2022, 86% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the event of a referendum (3% - against, 7%  - would not vote). The support of joining the EU is unanimous among the representatives of all macro-regions and age groups.

• The support of Ukraine’s NATO membership is the highest in the history of observations: 83% would support such an initiative in a referendum, 4% have the opposite opinion, and 9% would not vote. In June 2022, 76% supported joining the Alliance. In contrast to joining the EU, joining NATO is more cautiously perceived by the respondents from the eastern regions of Ukraine (69% of them support the membership, 9% - are against, 17% - would not vote). Despite this, in comparison with the previous survey, the dynamics of support for joining the Alliance among residents of this regions is very positive (in June 2022, 55% - support joining, 20% - against, 22% - would not vote).

• In its Seventeenth national survey during the war, Sociological group “Rating” conducted a comprehensive study of various markers of patriotism of Ukrainians. On the eve of Ukraine’s Independence Day, the respondents were asked the questions about their confidence in victory, emotions they feel today about the country and themselves, assessment of the position of Ukraine in the world, their civic and linguistic identity, the frequency of consumption of Russian content, and their attitude towards various ethnic groups. The dynamics of changes of the values of Ukrainian society was studied separately according to the abbreviated method of Schwartz (Schwartz Shalom H.).

• Three quarters of Ukrainians (74%) assess the direction of the country's development as the right one. Only 13% believe that it is moving in the wrong direction, while the same share of the respondents could not answer. After a slight drop in May, these indicators stabilized. 

• The absolute majority of the respondents (93%) are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia’s attack. About 60% said that a longer time is needed to win the war: 20% believe that more than a year is needed, while 40%, six months to a year. At the same time, almost a quarter estimate the time needed for victory to be up to several months.

• Pride is the main emotion the respondents feel when thinking about Ukraine (75%). Other emotions include sadness (29%) and joy (26%). About 10% feel interest or fear. The emotions the respondents feel when thinking about themselves were equally distributed: pride (34%), sadness (31%), interest (29%), and joy (23%). Over the past year, pride and joy for the country have doubled. At the individual level, the indicators of pride have also increased, while likewise, there is a rise in sadness and fear. At the same time, fear and sadness about the respondents themselves are more articulated than the ones about the country. The situation with pride is similar. But the opposite is true for interest: the respondents report higher interest towards themselves than towards the country. The residents of the South of Ukraine and women feel sadness for the country relatively more often. Fear is reported more often by women and by the poorer population groups. At the individual level, the residents of the East of Ukraine, women and the poor feel fear more often, while younger people feel joy more often.

• If there was a choice today to support the declaration of the Independence of Ukraine or not, the absolute majority would support it (86%, definitely, and 11%, rather). Compared to last year, this indicator increased from 80% to 97%, and compared to 2012, from 62% to 97%.

• On a 7-point scale, where 7 is the highest step and 1 is the lowest one, the respondents rated Ukraine's position above the medium level: at 4.6 points, which is 1.5 times higher than the last year's indicator (3.0).

• The respondents assessed Ukraine’s future in 10 years at 6.4 points out of 7, which is also significantly higher than the last year's measurement (4.5). At the same time, two-thirds of the respondents rated Ukraine's future prospects at the highest level.

• The majority of Ukrainians see their country as free, independent and rich in the future.

• Specifically, in an open question, the respondents were offered to use three words to describe how they see Ukraine in the future. “Free” was most often the first word. Also, “strong”, “blooming”, “prosperous”, “peaceful”, and “happy” were often mentioned as the first words. The respondents most often used “independent” as the second attribute to characterize the future of Ukraine. The third attribute is most often “rich”, while such characteristics as “European”, “developed”, and “united” were also used.

• Our analysis by age groups showed that the younger respondents more often than those in other age groups see the future Ukraine as free, independent and strong, the middle-aged respondents, as peaceful, prosperous and successful, and the elderly, as rich, prosperous and happy. There are also differences by gender. Men more often see the future Ukraine as free, independent, strong, progressive, democratic, and European without corruption. Meanwhile, women see their country as rich, prosperous, peaceful, happy and invincible.

• The absolute majority of the respondents identify as citizens of Ukraine (94%). Almost as many identify as the residents of their region. Half of the respondents identify as Europeans (about 30% do not). Almost 10% think of themselves as a “Soviet person”, but more than 80% do not.

• As for civic identity, there are no significant regional and age differences. Young people more often consider themselves Europeans, while older people more often consider themselves “Soviet people”.

• The share of those who speak Ukrainian at home continues to grow. Specifically, today, 51% say they speak Ukrainian at home (48% said so in April 2022), while a third of the respondents speak both languages, and 13% speak Russian. More than half of the residents of the South and East of Ukraine are bilingual, about a quarter are Russian-speaking. The use of Russian in everyday life has decreased by about half.

• 76% indicated Ukrainian as their native language, while 19%, Russian. At the same time, 30% of Russian speakers consider Ukrainian to be their native language.

• 86% believe that Ukrainian language should be the only state language. 10% support the status of Russian as the official language in certain regions, while only 3% support Russian as the second state language in Ukraine.

• Before the war, more than half of the respondents always spoke Ukrainian, a quarter, sometimes, and every fifth one, rarely or never. Over the past six months, the share of those who began speaking Ukrainian on a regular basis increased to 64%. 24% speak Ukrainian sometimes, and 12%, rarely or never. The residents of the South and East of Ukraine and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) began to use Ukrainian more often. Since the beginning of the war, 19% of Ukrainians have switched to permanent or more frequent use of the Ukrainian language. In general, since the beginning of the war, 41% of Russian speakers and bilinguals began to speak Ukrainian more often: 24%, constantly, and 17%, more often.

• There is a sharp decrease in the consumption of Russian content among Ukrainians.

• More than 40% of the respondents stopped watching Russian TV series altogether, while another quarter did not watch them before and do not watch them now. In general, almost 70% had not watched Russian TV series during the last six months, and this figure has tripled. Only 15% continue to watch Russian series as before.

• More than 40% of respondents stopped listening to Russian music altogether, while another 18% did not listen to it before and do not listen now. In general, almost 60% had not listened to Russian music during the last six months, and this figure increased almost fivefold. Only a quarter continue to listen to Russian music as before.

• Before the full-scale Russian invasion, older respondents, women, and the residents of the East and South of Ukraine watched Russian TV series more often than others. Young and middle-aged people, as well as men listened to Russian music more often than others. Today, representatives of the middle-aged generation and women watch Russian series somewhat more often than others. On the other hand, young and middle-aged respondents as well as men stand out significantly in the frequency of consumption of Russian music: a third of these respondents continue to listen to the music by Russian performers.

• Our survey showed a further deterioration of the attitudes of Ukrainians towards the residents of Russia and Belarus. 81% have a negative attitude towards Russians (69% reported negative attitude in April 2022, and 41%, in April 2021). 14% feel neutral, and only 3% feel positive towards Russians. 52% have a negative attitude towards Belarusians (in April 2022, this share was 33%, and in April 2021, 4%). A neutral attitude is reported by 34%, and a positive one, by 10%.

• The respondents have predominantly neutral attitude towards the Russians who live in Ukraine (42%). 22% have a positive attitude towards them, while 29% have a negative attitude. The attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians is mostly positive (51%) or neutral (31%). Only 14% report a negative attitude. In general, as a result of the war, the attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians improved from 37% (in April 2021) to 51% (in August 2022), although over the last four months, the positive attitudes has slightly decreased in favor of neutral ones, with no increase in negativity.

• The attitudes towards the residents of the occupied Crimea and especially towards the residents of the so-called “L/DPR” continue to deteriorate. 22% have a positive attitude towards the residents of the occupied Crimea, while 23% have a negative attitude, and 45% have a neutral attitude (in April, 41% of the attitudes were positive, 14% were negative, and 40% were neutral). Only 14% have a positive view of the residents of the so-called of the DPR/LPR, 47% have a negative view, and 32% are neutral (in April 2022, 27% had a positive view, 31% had a negative view, and 37% were neutral).

• There is a certain “softening” of the estimates of the time needed for reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians. While in April 2022 (the survey was conducted after the liberation of Kyiv region from the Russian invaders), two-thirds said that reconciliation was impossible, in August, this share comprises about half of the respondents. A third believe that it will be possible to renew the relationship in 20-30 years, 14% believe that it will happen in 10-15 years, and only 5% believe that it is possible in a few years. Older respondents, the residents of the East and South of Ukraine, and Russian speakers are more disposed to “reconciliation” in relatively shorter terms.

• There were no significant changes in the values structure in Ukraine. In general, there is a trend towards the values of self-determination and openness to change. Universalism and kindness continue to dominate as they traditionally did. Conformity remains at a high level as well as, in contrast, independence. The values of security and traditionality are also significant. Ukrainians value wealth the least, as they did last year. Over the year, the values of traditionality, hedonism, stimulation, and especially the value of independence have slightly increased.

• Traditionally, the values of independence, wealth, and hedonism are observed more among the young people. In contrast to them, the respondents in the middle-age group and especially those in the older group are more inclined to conservative values (traditionalism and conformity). On the other hand, such values as independence, universalism, kindness, security, and achievement are common to the representatives of all age groups. And while the significance of the values of stimulation, achievement and wealth (power) is significantly higher for men, security, traditionality, conformity, universalism and kindness are more significant for women. 

 The survey was initiated by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation at the Ministry for Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. The survey was conducted and funded by the Sociological Group “Rating”.

• The Sixteenth national survey in Ukraine during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” and initiate by the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation at the Ministry for Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on August 6-7, 2022, more than 40% of the respondents said that among their relatives and friends, there are those who took part in military operations on the territory of Ukraine since 2014. Specifically, 54% have those who fought or are fighting at the frontline starting from February 24, 2022 among their closest ones. 44% said that there are those who participated in the war in the East of Ukraine in 2014-2021 among their family and friends. 

• The respondents associate the term “war veteran” with different categories of the participants of military operations: for a third of the respondents, it means the veterans who have fought in the current war, while for another third, it is primarily the veterans of the World War II. Another 14% associate this term with the veterans of the Anti-terrorist operation (ATO) of 2014-2021, only 2%, with the veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and 12%, with other categories of combatants. 8% could not answer this question. It is interesting that for young people, a “veteran” is more often a participant of the World War II, and for the oldest respondents, it is someone who is fighting today. Residents of the East and South of Ukraine associate this term more often with the participants of the World War II, while the respondents from the West and Center of Ukraine mean by this term those who are fighting for Ukraine today more often.

• Regarding the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, respondents primarily feel gratitude (64%) and pride (50%). A quarter feel sadness when meeting veterans, while the same share of the respondents feel joy. Respondents named other feelings less often: guilt when meeting a veteran is felt by 3%, shame and fear, by 2% for each of these emotions, and indifference, anger, and dislike, only by 1% for each. Women talk about sadness regarding the veterans more often than men. Also, those who have close ones among the veterans of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2014-2021 feel sadness somewhat more often. The respondents who personally know those who fought in 2014-2021 and continue to fight feel gratitude and pride more often than others.

• More than 90% trust the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the veterans of the ongoing war and the veterans of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2014-2021. 67% trust the veterans of the World War II, while 15% do not trust them, and 17% could not answer. 62% trust Afghanistan veterans, 19% do not trust them, and 19% could not answer. Regardless of the region and age, the majority trust the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the veterans of the current war, and the veterans of the ATO. World War II veterans are most likely to be trusted by the youngest respondents, while Afghanistan veterans are slightly more trusted by older people.

• Patriotism is most often cited as a positive trait of the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war – it was mentioned by 75% of the respondents. Also, about a quarter noted that veterans are characterized by independence in decision-making and discipline, while another 13% called them hardworking, and 9%, law-abiding.

• As for the negative traits, the respondents found it more difficult to identify them regarding the veterans. Namely, 17% could not answer this question at all, while 11% said that none of the negative qualities listed among the answers describes this group of people. Despite this, a third of the respondents believe that veterans are characterized by emotional instability, a quarter, by closedness and isolation. Other negative qualities (cruelty, inability to adapt, and tendency to violence) were chosen less often: by the shares of respondents ranging from 11% to 17%.

• According to the respondents, first of all, veterans expect support (46%) and gratitude (36%) from the citizens. Friendly attitude, respect, and understanding were named by 20-21%, fulfillment of obligations, by 15%. The smallest share of the respondents believe that the veterans expect sympathy: only 5%.

• Half of the respondents believe that the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war are likely to face the problem of unemployment, while a little less than half think they are unlikely to. Such problems as conflicts in the families of the veterans and abuse of alcohol or drugs are considered more unlikely than likely. Regarding the risk of suicide and the one of breaking the law, the vast majority (at least two-thirds of the respondents) consider them unlikely for the veterans. Residents of the East of Ukraine and men consider the mentioned problems likely more often. Also, the presence of all these problems is reported more acutely by the friends and relatives of the ATO veterans who are no longer fighting and are adapting to life, while the friends and relatives of those who are still fighting are more optimistic about the potential risks, perhaps underestimating them so far.

• The level of salaries of the military personnel directly participating in military operations is considered optimal by 40%, lower than necessary, by 32%, and higher than necessary, by 11%. 17% were unable to assess it. Regarding the salary of the soldiers serving in the rear, half rated it as optimal, 15% rated it as lower than necessary, 15%, as above the necessary level, and 22% were unable to assess it.  

• The absolute majority (93%) believe that the Ukrainian society respects the veterans today. Only 3% have the opposite opinion.

• Almost 70% of respondents believe that the government fulfills its obligations to the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while 20% believe is does not. 

• More than 90% support the idea of granting benefits to the businesses founded by the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while only 6% are against it.

• The respondents believe that the veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war (50%), persons with disabilities (34%), and large families (31%) should have the most benefits and guarantees from the government. Equal shares of 17% of the respondents support giving benefits for pensioners and for single mothers or fathers. Benefits for people with low income and for the internally displaced persons are supported by 12-13% of respondents per each group, and only 1% support benefits for those who suffered from the Chornobyl catastrophe. 

   
• The latest public opinion survey  of the International Republican Institute (IRI)  in Ukraine conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” shows that confidence in winning the war against Russia and approval for President Zelensky remain very strong. Most Ukrainians do not believe in conceding any territory and support for NATO membership has spiked.  
   
• When asked if they believe Ukraine will win the war, 98% said yes. With regard to President Zelensky, 91% of Ukrainians approve of his job performance. 
   
•  Support for NATO membership has increased in recent months. Seventy-two percent of Ukrainians would back joining NATO if a referendum were held today. That is a jump of 13 percentage points from a poll released in May.   
   
• The poll also shows a large majority of Ukrainians do not believe they will cede any territory to their Russian invaders. Sixty-four percent say Ukraine will maintain all territories from its internationally recognized borders in 1991 after the current war. Another 14% say that Ukraine will regain territory under their control previous to Russia’s February 24 attack.  

The survey was carried out in cooperation with Serhiy Dembitskyi, Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 

• Sociological group “Rating” conducted a survey of opinions regarding cynicism in Ukraine within our 15th national survey “Ukraine during the war”. The generalized results of this survey show that 55% of the respondents completely or mostly demonstrate opinions about the presence of cynicism in the society, 29% completely or mostly demonstrate undefined opinions about this issue, while 16%, on the contrary, completely or mostly demonstrate opinions about the absence of cynicism. 

• The majority of the respondents gave an affirmative answer to almost all of the indicators that test opinions regarding cynicism. In this sense, the strongest belief (by three-quarters of the respondents) is the belief in the ability of people to lie in order to get promoted. At the same time, the belief that people are only honest because they are afraid of being exposed in a lie is the exception: in this case, the share of people who disagree with this statement is almost equal to the share of those who agree with it.

• Despite this mostly negative picture, positive changes have been observed in the estimates of the prevalence of cynicism in Ukrainian society for the first time over the years of research. First of all, this is demonstrated by the fact that the share of the respondents who completely or mostly believe in the prevalence of cynicism decreased by 12 percentage points (from 67% to 55%). The share of those who hesitate about their position has increased by the same amount (from 17% to 29%).

• The positive dynamics is explained by the decreasing shares of the respondents who:

• believe in the ability of most people to commit dishonest acts for the sake of profit;

• believe that most people don’t like to burden themselves in order to help others.

• In almost all socio-demographic groups, from 49% to 61% of the respondents say that cynical attitudes are completely or mostly characteristic of Ukrainian society. At the same time, the most significant differences are observed in the context of the financial situation. The poor group of the respondents believe in the cynicism of the society most of all: 77%, while among the well-off, this share falls to 47%. The group of women aged between 18 and 35 years old should also be singled out: these respondents most often (22%) say that cynicism is not inherent in Ukrainian society.

Background: The cynicism scale is an additional scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The cynicism index reflects the degree of disdain for generally accepted values.

• The Fifteenth national survey during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on July 23-24, 2022, showed that 73% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction. 12% of the respondents have an opposite opinion, while another 15% could not make an estimate. A gradual decrease in the share of those who assess the direction of the country's development as the right one is observed. This share is shifting in favor of those who are undecided in their assessments. The assessment of the direction of the country’s development as the right one continues to dominate in all the regions of Ukraine and among all the age groups. The views differ in terms of income groups: for the poorest respondents, they are somewhat worse (63% of them consider the direction of Ukraine’s development to be right).

• An increase in pessimism can be observed in the assessments of the changes in the economic situation of the respondents’ families and the country over the past six months. Despite this, when talking about the economy of Ukraine in the future, respondents voice more positive expectations than they did before the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, today, 86% of the respondents say that the economic situation of Ukraine has worsened over the past six months (70% said so in January of this year). As for the personal economic situation, 74% say it has worsened (52% in January). At the same time, 25% hope that in the next 12 months their personal economic situation will improve, a quarter believe that it will not change, and a third are pessimistic about it. At the same time, the latter share has increased compared to the one in our survey of April of this year (from 27%). On the other hand, there is an increase in the share of optimistic assessments of the future of the country: the share of those who believe that the economy will improve in the next year today is 34% (it was 32% in April). Accordingly, the share of those who expect deterioration has decreased: from 42% to 37%.

• The residents of the West of Ukraine, younger respondents, those who are employed, as well as those who are better off assess their economic situation relatively better. On the other hand, no particular differences between the demographic groups are noticeable in the assessments of the dynamics of the changes in the economy of Ukraine over the past six months: negative assessments dominate everywhere. Regarding the expectations about the future, the residents of the East of Ukraine, younger people and those who are not currently working have more positive expectations about their economic situation. And regarding the expectations about Ukraine’s future, the residents of the West, South and East, those from the youngest and the oldest age groups and those who are not employed express relatively more optimistic expectations.

• A certain reassessment of their financial stability in the times of crisis is observed among the more affluent respondents. The share of those who believe that they have enough savings – for six months or more – increased compared to March of this year. The highest share of such respondents is among the wealthiest ones and among the entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the share of those who believe that their savings will last only for a month has not changed (it is approximately 40%). The highest shares of such respondents are among the unemployed, the retired respondents, and among those who are employees in the private or public sector.

• According to the estimates of this survey, the share of those who changed their place of residence in Ukraine stays at approximately 20%. The highest share of such respondents is among the residents the East of Ukraine (58%). Only 10% of the respondents do not intend to return to their homes (3% did not intend in April and 8% in June). 16% said that they will return soon, while 18% will return, but they are going to wait a little longer. 50% said that they intend to return, but only if the war ends – and this number is gradually growing.

• The dynamics of resuming employment, which has been observed over the past three months, has slowed down. Today, 59% of those who had a job before the war are currently working: 34%, full-time, 19%, remotely or part-time, and 6% found a new job. On the other hand, the share of those who nevertheless lost their jobs increased (from 35% in June to 39% in July). The highest shares of the latter are among the residents of the East of Ukraine, women, the poorest respondents, those who work in the private sector or have their own business, as well as among the internally displaced persons (IDPs).

• The dynamics by the regions shows a further increase in the share of the unemployed among the residents of the East (from 53% in June to 57% in July). A certain increase of the share of those who lost their jobs can also be noticed among the residents of the central and western regions (37% in the Center, 32% in the West).

• Half of the employed respondents experienced a salary reduction of 10% or more. For 43% of the respondents, the salary did not change, and for 9%, it increased. The biggest shares of those who have experienced a decrease in income are among those who are currently working remotely or part-time and among the entrepreneurs. At the same time, the relative majority of civil servants retained their previous salaries.

• The relative majority of the respondents (57%) are ready to continue working even if their salary is reduced, while 40% have a more active position (are going to look for a new job). The biggest shares of the latter are more among the young people and among those who work in the private sector or are self-employed.

• The employed respondents are predominantly confident that they will keep their job over the next six months (83% are convinced of this). 11% are not sure. The highest share of the latter is among those whose salary has decreased by more than 50%.

• Almost 40% of the employed respondents are confident that they would be able to find a job quickly if they lost it. 57% do not have such confidence; most often, these are older respondents, women, and public sector employees.

• Among those who lost their jobs during the war, only a third are actively looking for one now. Another 23% are thinking about it, and 41% are taking a wait-and-see position. Older respondents, civil servants, and those with savings are less motivated than others to look for a new job.

• Most of those who are currently looking for a new job are ready to change both the workplace and their professional field. Instead, they prefer not to move to another region or country for work. In general, the IDPs, those who work in the private sector, as well as those who have experienced a reduction in salaries are more open to changes.

• Salary is the dominant criterion in choosing a desired job today (70%). Salary means financial security and allows to satisfy the basic needs of the individual – this level of needs is naturally the most important one during wartime. The schedule of work and the safety of the workplace are also relatively important for the respondents (23-24%), which also covers the basic level of needs. Social guarantees are important for 17%, relationships in the team, for 16%, and the opportunity to work remotely, for 10%. Such criteria as career growth, prestige and social status are on the lowest positions among the criteria for choosing a new job (3-7%), since during the war, such levels of needs are not relevant for most due to the high number of threats and risks to life. Security (the physical and material one) is far more important than career growth and status.

• Respondents rated the opportunity to achieve success relatively better than other opportunities in Ukraine (47%). Only 26% of respondents said there is a lack of such opportunity. About a third of the respondents highly rated the opportunity to find a job and to have a stable income (the same share said there are no such opportunities). The ability to find a job was mostly rated at a medium level. About 30% believe that there are opportunities to make a career or become an entrepreneur (35-37% rated these opportunities low). The rating of the opportunities to become an entrepreneur and to achieve success has increased over the past three and a half years. 

• Residents of the West and the East, men, young people, people with higher income, as well as those who work full-time or are entrepreneurs, rate all the opportunities higher than other respondents. Also, the more active is the position of the respondents regarding the strategy of increasing their income, the better they rate their opportunities.

• The share of those who wish to start their own business has almost doubled: today, 45% would like to become an entrepreneur, 9% already have their own businesses, and 46% have no such desire. Residents of the West of Ukraine, young people, those who are better off, men, those who are employed in the private sector and those motivated to succeed show a greater desire to start their own business.

• The study of the models of economic behavior showed that in the event of an abrupt reduction of income, 62% will seek additional sources of income, and 35% will reduce their expenses. 53% want to live no worse than others, while 42% want to live better than others. Half of the respondents believe that they can influence the increase of their own income, and the same share of the respondents have the opposite opinion. Therefore, the majority of Ukrainians continue to demonstrate an active life position regarding their financial situation and the opportunities for professional fulfillment in business.

• Over the course of a year, the share of those who said that they could influence their income decreased from 60% to 50%. The war and the current socio-economic situation are objective circumstances that probably reduce the feeling of subjectivity regarding one’s own impact on income. In general, the youth, the better-off and men have a more active strategy regarding their financial opportunities, probably due to the availability of appropriate resources and the traditional value of these categories on the labor market and in business.

• Regarding external migration, 28% would personally like to work or get a job abroad (70% would not like to). 9% would like to go abroad for permanent residence (90% would not like to). The share of those who would like to go abroad for permanent residence has critically decreased from 27% to 9% over the last two years. This is also due to the fact that a large number of Ukrainians went abroad in forced immigration. The desire to work or live abroad is more prevalent among the residents of the East, young people and men.

• Construction (60%) and military industry (42%) are the industries that will be developing most after the war, according to the respondents. Construction is aimed at restoring the infrastructure destroyed by the war and at creating new architectural projects, while military industry means the support and strengthening of Ukraine’s defense capabilities, which will have high support and will be relevant for a long period after the war. The assessment of the potential of other sectors is the following: 34% expect the development of agriculture, 26%, healthcare, 18%, heavy industry and metallurgy, 16%, IT sphere, 13%, education and science, and 7%, transport and transportation. Regarding trade, culture, tourism, light industry, 5 to 6% of the respondents expect the development of each sector. 

• The majority of Ukrainians are still quite optimistic about the reconstruction of the country after the war: 43% believe that five years will be enough. 28% believe that it will takes up to ten years. The share of those who see the prospect of reconstruction as a long period of more than ten years has increased (from 10% to 21%), and the share of those who believe that reconstruction will take less than a year has decreased (from 13% to 5%).

• The share of those who are ready to personally participate in the reconstruction of the country decreased by one and a half times: from 61% to 45%. 46% indicated that they would like to, but are not able. Residents of the East of Ukraine, respondents aged 18 to 50, men, better-off people and those who have changed their place of residence are more willing to participate in the reconstruction.

• Almost 90% of respondents believe that Russia should compensate Ukraine's economic and infrastructural losses incurred because of the war. In addition, 21% of Ukrainians believe that European countries should contribute to the compensation of losses, 18% think international organizations should do it, and 11%, the USA. The share of those who believe that Ukraine should also contribute to this has increased: from 10% to 15%.

As a part of the fourteenth wave of the “Ukraine during the war” project, Sociological Group “Rating” conducted another study of psychological markers: the levels of resilience and psychological exhaustion as well as the acceptability of entertainment during the war. 

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CITIZENS OF UKRAINE

• The share of the respondents who have been forced to leave their place of permanent residence since February 24, 2022, remains practically unchanged. In contrast to previous measurements, the share of the internally displaced persons from the eastern and southern regions is increasing, and the share of those from the central regions is decreasing. 

• 87% of the surveyed IDPs express their intention to return home: 15%, soon, 24% want to return, but are going to wait, and 48% will return, but after the end of the war. 8% said that they will not return home. Compared to April of this year, the share of those who plan to return immediately is decreasing, while the share of those who either will return after the war, or not at all, is increasing.

• The gradual return of the citizens of Ukraine to their workplaces continues. Today, 38% of those who worked before the war have returned to their regular jobs, while 18% are working remotely, and 7% have found a new job. Despite this, a third of such respondents are still not employed. Most of the latter are among the youngest and the oldest respondents, as well among women and among the residents of the East and the South of the country. In terms of dynamics, the best situation with returning to work is among the residents of the Center and West of Ukraine and the worst one is among the residents of the East. 

LEVEL OF RESILIENCE

• During the fourth month of the war, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a good level of resilience (3.8 points out of 5). The components of this indicator – psychological resilience (3.9) and maintaining physical health (3.7) – did not change significantly, although they slightly decreased compared to April. 

• Curiosity about what is happening around (4.4), normal nutrition (4.2), having plans for the future (4.2), confidence in one's decisions (4.0) and the absence of regrets about the past (4.0) primarily contribute to the relatively high index of psychological resilience. 

• Today, Ukrainians suffer most from fatigue (only 36% do not feel it) and lack of adequate sleep (only 44% have adequate sleep). Such reactions of the body are natural for stress. Despite this, other emotional and moral indicators of citizens are better. 

• Women have a lower level of resilience than men. With age, resilience decreases, too. Having a job has a positive effect on resilience: those who are working full-time or part-time feel better than those who are not working. 

• The more a person believes that it is necessary to live a full life, the higher their level of resilience is. Those who have relatives who are fighting in the war today have a higher level of resilience. This is perhaps explained by a heightened sense of responsibility and concern for the loved ones who are in potential danger. 

• In the regional terms, the residents of the East of the country, where today the main front line runs, as well as the most destruction and deaths take place, have the worst level of resilience.

• For all groups of the respondents, psychological resilience (3.9) is higher than the indicators of physical condition (3.7). The war physically exhausted Ukrainians to a bigger extent, while psychological endurance is still better. 

• The dynamics of the resilience index has somewhat worsened over the past 2 months. The resilience index has slightly decreased since April (from 3.9 to 3.8). However, Ukrainians still have enough physical and moral strength to live during the war, to work, to help, and to fight. The summer period is favorable in this case: the length of the day and the solar activity usually have a positive effect on mood and well-being. The most negative changes occurred with interest in the life around and with nutrition, as well as with the plans for the future and with the regrets about the past. 

LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXHAUSTION 

• The dynamics of our studies of the emotional states of Ukrainian citizens for the period from March 2020 to June 2022 shows that the changes in their day-to-day assessment of their emotional stress are insignificant. The peak of stress was observed at the beginning of April 2022 (3.5). But as of June 2022, a gradual return to the indicators of the “peaceful” time is observed (2.9). It is probably an emotional adaptation to the war, which could be linked both to the reserves of the human psyche and to the external circumstances, which for the majority of citizens have relatively stabilized or at least have become clear and defined.  

• 24% of Ukrainians feel calm and very calm. 39% feel tense and very tense. Stress increases with age. Also, stress is more common among women (probably due to their higher sensitivity and the need to take care not only of themselves, but also of their children) and among those who believe that people should restrict themselves during the war – this demand considerably increases stress.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is still quite moderate (2.0). It has not changed in the dynamics from April to June 2022, except for the indicator of trust in people (it decreased). The shares of the respondents who believe that people cannot be trusted and of those who think that something bad may happen to them have increased. The latter tendency is related to the news about the destruction and the casualties and to the realization that there are few left who have not been at least indirectly affected by this.

• The index of psychological exhaustion is mainly “warranted” by the sad mood (2.7) and mistrust of people (2.6). However, Ukrainians still can rely on themselves (1.6) and do not feel “dead” inside (1.4).

• Women, the residents of the East of the country, those who are not working or are retired, those who have changed their place of residence, as well as those who are prone to self-restrictions feel the most exhausted.

TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION TO THE WAR 

• The results of our analysis allowed us to distinguish two population groups distinguished by their level of adaptation to war conditions. The “Adapted” ones: have high resilience, do not restrict themselves in pleasures, have low emotional stress and psychological exhaustion, and use more adaptive strategies to overcome stressful situations. The “Not adapted” ones: experience significant emotional stress, tend to restrict themselves in entertainment and pleasures, are exhausted psychologically, and have low resilience. Their strategies for overcoming stress are not effective and often lead to depressed psychological state and to exhaustion.

LIFE DURING THE WAR 

• The war evokes a large number of feelings and thoughts, which are often opposite and contradictory; many things no longer have nuances, but become black and white, unambiguous and dogmatic. A person faces a high level of stress, experiences the “survivor's guilt”, the “witness trauma” and other conditions that are associated with war. A change in habitual behavior and priorities is among the consequences of such conditions. Self-blame and restricting oneself in pleasures and in the opportunities to enjoy life or even to live a normal “peaceful life” are increasing.

• Today, 59% of the respondents consider it necessary to significantly limit themselves in entertainment and shopping, while 36%, on the other hand, believe that it is necessary to try to live a full life.

• Young people under the age of 35 are less inclined to self-restrictions (only 46% support it). Also, people who work full-time (55%) or part-time (58%) restrict themselves less, probably believing that their frontline is the economic one (paying taxes, helping the army).

• In general, we did not find significant gender differences in self-restrictions. However, young women under the age of 35 are more likely to try to live a full life (54%), unlike their male peers (44%). One of the important reasons for this difference is the social acceptability of such behavior for women. According to the majority, men have different roles during the war.

• Going to the gym (84%), visiting beauty salons (67%), celebrating own birthday (62%) are the most acceptable practices. The less acceptable ones are outdoors leisure (having a barbecue): 42%, going to restaurants and cafes (37%) and buying expensive food and clothes (36%). Therefore, sports, as a sign of a healthy lifestyle, keeping oneself in good physical shape and taking care of oneself, is a positive behavior allowed during wartime. Other positions are probably considered redundant, those that people can do without. This particularly applies to expensive food and clothes, which are not essential, especially considering the fact that occupied regions or damaged cities suffer from the lack of basic products, clean water, medicine, etc. Therefore, it causes more guilt and is considered an excess.

• The respondents of the older age group (51+) are most prone to restrictions, especially regarding the purchase of expensive food and clothing and eating out. Age differences apply the least to sports and beauty salons. Therefore, the patterns of behavior that cause judgment and self-restrictions are most likely to do so among the older age group. Young people under the age of 35 who try to live a peaceful life and restrict themselves less are least likely to show judgment and self-restrictions. 

• In contrast to men, women are also less supportive of the “peaceful life behaviors” with the exception of the visits to beauty salons, where there are no gender differences. Probably, women's favoring beauty salons is not considered a surplus, but a necessity, while men support going to beauty salons because it is a more feminine practice and therefore allowed for women, towards whom there are different requirement during wartime than to men.

• Regarding macro-regional differences: the residents of the West of Ukraine more often consider it unacceptable to celebrate their own birthday and to buy expensive food and clothes. 

• Those who believe that it is necessary to restrict oneself during the war consider various activities, excluding going to the gym, to be unacceptable much more often than those who believe that it is necessary to live a full life.

• Also, those whose relatives are fighting in the war are somewhat less inclined to restrict themselves. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they feel less guilty, since someone close to them is already “paying” for their peaceful life.

• The Thirteenth national poll during the war, conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on June 18-19, 2022, shows that 75% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. 13% have the opposite opinion, and another 12% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the country’s direction as the right one continues to dominate in all the regions of Ukraine and across all the age groups. 

• 93% of respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. The high level of such confidence is observed among the residents of all the macro-regions and among the representatives of different age groups.

• Despite the high level of confidence in Ukraine’s victory in the war, the respondents are more “sober” in their estimates of the timing of the victory. Today, the majority of them (57%) believe that it will take Ukraine at least six months or more to win. A quarter of the respondents believe in the victory in a few months, and about 6%, in a few weeks. There are slightly more those who wish the victory to happen in a shorter time among the senior respondents. Nevertheless, even in this age group, half of the respondents anticipate the victory in six months to a year period.

• Polish President Duda and British Prime Minister Johnson are the foreign leaders who enjoy the highest positive attitudes among Ukrainians – over 90% (74-76% of the attitudes are completely positive, while 15-16% are rather positive). 89% of the respondents have a positive attitude to US President Biden, 73%, to Lithuanian President Nausėda, 71%, to the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, 59%, to Turkish President Erdoğan, 58%, to French President Macron, and 50%, to Romanian President Iohannis (30% don’t know him). 45% of the respondents have positive attitude to the Prime Minister of Italy Draghi (25% do not know him), and 41%, to German Chancellor Scholz. Negative attitudes prevail towards Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán: 53%. 20% have a positive attitude to him, and 20% do not know him.

• The absolute majority of the respondents have a negative attitude towards the leaders of Belarus (95%) and Russia (98%).

• The attitudes towards Chancellor Scholz and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen have improved over the last two months, while the attitudes to the President of Turkey Erdoğan and to the President of France Macron have worsened. 

• 87% of the respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the event of a referendum (4% would be against it and 8% would not vote). The support for EU accession is unanimous among the representatives of all the macro-regions and all the age groups.

• 69% of respondents believe that Ukraine will join the EU in 5 years (40% believe it will happen in 1-2 years, and 29%, up to five years). Another 14% believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU in the next 5 to 10 years, and 3%, in 10 to 20 years. Only 7% do not believe that Ukraine will integrate into the European Union.

• The support of Ukraine’s NATO membership has increased: 76% would support such an initiative in a referendum, 10% would not support it, and 12% would not vote. In March 2022, 68% supported joining the Alliance. In contrast to joining the EU, joining NATO is more cautiously perceived by the respondents in the East of Ukraine (55% of them support the membership, 20% are against, and 22% would not go to the polls).

The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on May 13-23 in the large cities of Lviv oblast among their permanent residents and internally displaced persons (IDPs) showed that the vast majority (about 90%) of residents of these cities, both permanent ones and newcomers, feel hope when thinking about situation in Ukraine.

• More than 90% of the respondents in both groups fully support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and more than 75% support the actions of President Zelensky (another 16-17% rather support them).

• 26% of the surveyed permanent local residents completely support the actions of Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyy, and 39% rather support them. 24% completely support the actions of Maksym Kozytskyy, the head of the regional state administration, while 35% rather support them (a third of the respondents hesitated to answer). 

• Permanent residents express a high level of satisfaction with some areas of the life of their city. They assess public order and food supply relatively better. They are somewhat less satisfied with the strengthening of the city's defenses and providing medicines.

• Estimating possible military threats, the permanent residents express slightly more concern than the IDPs. Specifically, both local residents and the IDPs are most afraid of missile strikes on military facilities (46% of locals and 40% of the IDPs estimate this threat as a high one). The respondents are slightly less afraid of sabotage against infrastructure and of missile strikes on civilian objects (24-26% of locals and IDPs estimate these threats as high ones). Local residents are more afraid of diversions against the civilian population (16% estimate their threat as a high one, and 40%, as moderate one) than the IDPs (15% of them estimate this threat as a high one, and 31%, as moderate one). On the other hand, the threat of the seizure of settlements was not estimated as a high or moderate one by the majority of the respondents in either group.  

• The vast majority (over 80%) of local residents are involved in defending Ukraine. 49% help financially, 38% volunteer, 13% are engaged in the informational area, 9% work in critical infrastructure, and the shares of 3% serve in the territorial defense or in the Armed Forces. 16% said they are not able to help (the share of such respondents is relatively higher among the oldest ones). 

• Two thirds of the surveyed IDPs in Lviv oblast are residents of the eastern regions of Ukraine, 19% arrived from the central regions, and 18% arrived from the southern ones. 62% are women (half of them have children aged up to 17 years). 38% are men. The average age of the IDPs is 43 years. 46% of them regularly speak Russian at home, 34% speak two languages (both Ukrainian and Russian), and 19% speak only Ukrainian.

• 38% of the surveyed IDPs named the presence of relatives or close friends there as the main reason for choosing Lviv oblast for temporary stay. 20% chose the region because of the information about the availability of temporary accommodation, and 18%, because of the decision of the organization responsible for their resettlement. Only 7% said they went to Lviv oblast due to the opportunity to get a job. 18% named other reasons. 

• In general, the IDPs assess the attitude of the locals towards themselves better than the residents of the cities of Lviv oblast assess their own attitude towards the IPDs. Specifically, 49% of the surveyed IDPs say that the attitude of locals towards them is very positive, while 32% say it’s rather positive. In their turn, 18% of the locals said that their attitude toward the IDPs is completely positive, 35% say it’s positive, and 34%, neutral. 11% of the locals said that they have a negative attitude towards the IDPs.

• 24% of the surveyed residents of Lviv oblast said that they are already hosting IDPs from other regions of the country. Another 15% are ready to host IDPs. 57% did not express a desire to host IDPs. 

• More than 90% of the IDPs would like to make acquaintances and friends with the locals. On the other hand, a little more than half (56%) of the locals would not mind finding friends among the IDPs (34% don’t have such a desire).

• Despite the fact that 80% of those who recently arrived to Lviv oblast speak either both Ukrainian and Russian or only Russian at home, the majority of them (67%) try to communicate only in Ukrainian with the locals (this share is 57% among Russian speakers and 64% among those who speak both languages). 

• 46% of the IDPs do not see any issue of language-based misunderstanding with the local residents. 41% see this as a minor problem, and 12%, as a significant one. On the other hand, 31% of the locals do not see any problem with the language, 42% consider it a minor problem, while 25% believe it is a significant problem. 

• 61% of the IDPs believe that there is no tension between the IDPs and locals, while 36% disagree. 52% of the locals say there is some tension, and 42% of the locals say there is none.

• 39% of the surveyed permanent residents of Lviv oblast said that they were unaware of any violations of social norms and indecent behavior by the IDPs from other regions of Ukraine. 32% know about such cases only from the media. 27% have personally witnessed such cases. 

• Both permanent residents and IDPs absolutely agree that the cities where they are currently staying are comfortable to live in.

• Only 14% of the surveyed IDPs said they lacked food or clothing. 21% complained about the lack of household goods and 24% complained about the lack of medicines. 69% of the surveyed IDPs received social and humanitarian assistance from volunteers or from other people, 54%, from the government, and 48%, from charities. At the same time, 70% of the surveyed local residents said that they personally provided assistance to local IDPs.

• 79% of permanent local residents think that local authorities effectively manage to accommodate IDPs from other regions of Ukraine (35% think they manage quite effectively, and 44%, rather effectively).

• 49% of the surveyed IDPs currently live in refugee centers, while 22% in the homes of their relatives, friends or acquaintances. 21% rent an apartment and 3% live in the homes of strangers. Only 2% live in hotels or hostels. Among those who rent housing, 54% consider the cost of rent too high, while 40% consider it acceptable.

• Only 10% of the surveyed IDPs who have school-age children say their children are already studying at local schools. 70% of such respondents said that their children continue their education at their former schools. The children of 18% of respondents are not studying at the moment.

• 26% of the IDPs would like to stay in the cities of Lviv oblast or find a job there. 30% would consider such a possibility, while 41% do not have such intentions. In turn, 39% of the locals expressed a positive attitude to the possibility that a part of the IDPs could stay in their city to live or work there. 36% are neutral about this, and 22% have negative attitude.

• At the same time, 84% of the surveyed local residents support the initiative to relocate war-affected enterprises to Lviv oblast. 63% support the idea of building permanent housing for the IDPs in their cities (the share of those who are against this is 23% in general and the highest one is in Lviv: 27%).

• 18% of the surveyed IDPs plan to return home soon, while 34% plan to return, but a little later. 36% intend to return only after the war is over. Only 8% do not intend to return at all.

• Only 19% of IDPs are employed today, while 80% do not have a job. 39% of those who are temporarily unemployed intend to look for a job in Lviv oblast and 54% do not intend to. Relatively higher shares of those who intend to look for a job are among men, the young and middle-aged people, and those who are staying in Lviv.

• More than 80% of both locals and IDPs are ready to endure financial difficulties for the sake of victory over Russia as long as necessary. 

• 75% of the surveyed local residents do not consider going abroad in case of military escalation in the region. This share is 54% among IDPs (as mentioned, 62% of IDPs are women).

 • The opinion of Ukrainians on whether the direction in which things in the country are going is right almost has not changed: the absolute majority (79%) gives a positive answer. There are slight differences in this regard in different regions and age groups. However, the share of positive assessments does not fall below three quarters (74% in the South of Ukraine and among the respondents aged from 30 to 39 years).

• The assessments of the efficiency of Ukrainians government significantly improved during the war. While at the end of 2021, only 5% thought that the central government authorities had successfully performed almost all their duties, in May 2022, this share increased to 54%. The group of those who believe that the authorities hardly perform their duties has decreased symmetrically: from 44% to 4%. The number of the respondents with an intermediate assessment (the government partially performs its duties) has hardly changed. In the regional context, the assessments of residents of the East of Ukraine are somewhat more restrained. In terms of age groups, relatively better assessments are typical for young people.

• The estimates of the ratio between Ukraine's achievements and failures since its independence have moderately improved. While at the end of 2021, more than half of the respondents (53%) believed that failures have prevailed since 1991 and up to date, in May 2022, this share decreased to 30%. At the same time, the share of those who emphasized on the predominance of Ukraine’s achievements increased from 4% to 18%, and the share of those who believe that the failures and achievements compensated each other increased from 34% to 44%. It is quite interesting that the largest share of the negative assessments is observed among the residents of the Central region of Ukraine, and the smallest one, among the residents of the East. In terms of age, the assessments tend to deteriorate somewhat as the age of the respondents increases.

• Despite the war in the country, the assessments of living conditions have also improved for the majority of Ukraine's population. The vast majority of the respondents (59%) now believe that these conditions are generally satisfactory (compared to 34% at the end of 2021). The share of those who assess these conditions as generally bad ones has also decreased significantly: from 53% to 28%. As expected, the shares of the respondents who say their living conditions are poor are slightly larger among the residents of the South and East of Ukraine. In terms of age, young people (18-29 years old) stand out with better assessments.

• Significant positive changes have taken place regarding the opinions about the future of Ukraine. The share of those who believe that the situation will not change has significantly decreased (from 38% to 13%), as did the share of those who believe that the situation will deteriorate (from 35% to 7%). At the same time, the share of the optimists increased significantly: from 13% to 76%. From the point of view of the regional and age groups, the answers are quite homogeneous: all the regions believe in a better future for Ukraine.

• Together, the five indicators presented in the graphs (government efficiency, achievements and failures, living conditions, and social expectations, satisfaction with events) allow constructing a generalized image of the Ukrainian state (GSR-5 methodology), to which the respondents are leaning. In November 2021, 35% of respondents were leaning to a strongly negative image, while 32%, to a moderately negative one. About a quarter of the respondents (25%) had an intermediate image (not good, but not bad), and only 8%, a moderately or clearly positive one. As of May 2022, the situation has changed significantly. Slightly more than the half of the respondents report a clearly (5%) or moderately (46%) positive image of the state. The share of the respondents leaning to the intermediate image has hardly changed (30%). Consequently, the share of those who adhere to the moderately (15%) or clearly (3%) negative image has significantly decreased.

• In the regional context, the image of the state is somewhat more restrained among the residents of the East of Ukraine. Also, a slight deterioration in this parameter takes place as the age of the residents increases. Men and women differ insignificantly. Substantial differences are present between the electorates of different political parties. The most positive image is typical for the voters of the political parties “Servant of the People” and “Vitaliy Klychko’s UDAR”, while the most negative, for those of the political parties “Batkivshchyna” and “Razumkov’s Party”. Yet, the worst image of the Ukrainian state is typical for those who do not intend to go to the polls at all. This is the only group in which more than half of the respondents lean to a moderately or clearly negative image of the state: 38% and 15% respectively. 

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” in May 2022 and commissioned by the public initiative “Ukrainian Arsenal of Freedom” showed a significant difference in the assessments of the situation in Ukraine and the one at the local level. Speaking about Ukraine, 73% of the respondents said that the situation in the country is tense, 22% said it was critical, and only 4% said it was calm. On the other hand, when assessing the situation at the local level, 61% consider it calm, 34%, tense, and only 4%, critical. The residents of the East and South of Ukraine see the situation as more tense than the respondents from the Center and especially those from the West.

• The importance of the safety of life (52%) and the protection against terrorist and military threats (52%) has increased significantly for the respondents over the past four months – these two factors top the ranking of important components in the field of personal security. Social protection is important in this context for 20% of respondents, while protection against corruption and smuggling, for 18%, protection of health, for 17%, human rights protection, for 13%, and the environment, only for 5%.

• The right to protect their life is the most important right for the respondents today (58%) among the key rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine. Freedom of speech is the most important right for 32%, the right to personal integrity, for 30%, the right to work, for 27%, the right to social protection, for 25%, and the right to property, for 21%. The freedom of movement is the most important right for 14%, judicial protection, for 13%, education, for 11%, safe environment, for 8%, freedom of religion, for 7%, and the right to entrepreneurship, for 6%.

• Over 90% of the respondents agree that freedom is one of the main values for Ukrainians.

• Half of the respondents believe they are able to defend themselves in the event of a sudden threat to life, health or property before the arrival of the police. The other half don’t think so. Men, young respondents and those who are can use firearms perfectly consider themselves more able to defend themselves.

• The respondents are more concerned about the safety of their relatives and friends (91%) than about their own safety (63%). Women, the residents of the South and the East, as well as the respondents from the places where hostilities or occupation took place are more concerned about their personal safety.

• A personal ownership of a firearm or the ownership of a firearm by a family member provides a greater sense of security (48%) than the fact that there are other people around who own legal firearms (33%)

• During the war, the share of those who support granting Ukrainian citizens the right to own firearms and ammunition has more than doubled. Today, 58% support such an initiative, while 39% do not. Thus, for the first time in the history of the studies of this issue in Ukraine, the share of the supporters of this idea exceeded the number of its opponents (in 2018-2021, about a quarter supported this idea, while more than 70% did not support it). There are more supporters of the “armament” of the citizens among the residents of the Center of the country, the respondents in young and middle age groups, and among men. 

• The respondents who have relatives who are currently defending Ukraine in the war are more supportive of the idea of granting citizens the right to bear arms than other respondents.

• 61% believe that mass armament of Ukrainian citizens with firearms will help strengthen the country's defense capabilities. 36% are of the opposite opinion. Young people, men and those who want to have weapons agree with this statement more. 

• 45% believe that establishing a legal framework for the free purchase of firearms will increase the personal freedoms of citizens, while 40%, on the contrary, believe that freedoms will be infringed under such conditions. There are more latter respondents among the residents of the East of Ukraine, among women and among the opponents of creating conditions for the free purchase of firearms.

• At the same time, 58% fear that the free purchase of firearms will increase crime. The opposite opinion was expressed by 35% of the respondents. There are more latter respondents among the residents of the Center of Ukraine, among men and among those who want to become owners of firearms.

• About 80% of respondents did not feel the need to own a firearm before the Russian invasion. Instead, today 44% would like to own firearms and ammunition. Therefore, today, a third of those who did not want to have weapons before the war changed their minds, and almost half of them want family members to have weapons.

• Now, 60% of men and 28% of women would like to own firearms and ammunition. At the same time, while women are generally against owning firearms personally, most middle-aged and younger women want their family members to own weapons.

• Among those who want to have a firearm, the majority (70%) would like to have one firearm. 21%, would like to own two pieces, while 9%, three or more. Among the firearms, they prefer guns (57%) and slightly less, automatic rifles (48%). 18% would like to have a shotgun (rifle).

• Almost 60% of men and 30% of women would use the right to purchase firearms and ammunition if they had the financial and legal capacity to do so.

• At the same time, 64% believe that there is a significant threat of illicit arms trafficking after the war is over. 31% believe that although such a threat exists, it is insignificant. 3% do not see this threat at all.

• 17% of the respondents (including 31% of men and 4% of women) said that they can use firearms perfectly. 38% have general skills. 45% said they did not have such skills. Among those who know how to use firearms only in general, two-thirds would like to improve their skills. Among those who cannot use firearms at all, 37%. Interestingly, more than half of young and middle-aged women would like to learn to use a firearm.

• The majority of respondents (72%) support the idea of introducing mandatory firearms training for civilians in Ukraine. 26% do not support it.

• As a part of the Tenth national survey during the war, the Sociological Group “Rating” has conducted comprehensive research of the ideological markers of the Ukrainian society. Before May 9, the respondents were asked about the Soviet past, the role and participation of the Ukrainian people in World War II, the national liberation movement, the assessment of historical figures, and about their attitude to the ban on symbols and to the dismantling of monuments. In addition, the issues of nationality, language, and the attitude to various ethnic groups were studied.

• The full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine has significantly affected the perceptions of ideological issues, especially those related to the “shared” Soviet history. The results of many years of observations in Ukraine and Russia confirmed the shift of public opinion in opposite directions regarding the historical past. An example of this is the rate of nostalgia for the collapse of the USSR: in Russia, it has mostly been increasing over the past ten years (since 2010, this indicator increased from 55% to 63%), while in Ukraine, it decreased (from 46% in 2010 to 11% in 2022). As a result, Ukrainian national heroes and symbols have begun replacing once significant and imposed by Soviet propaganda historical figures. Thus, as of the end of April 2022, the lowest level of nostalgia for the collapse of the USSR over the history of observations was recorded in Ukraine (11%). The vast majority of the respondents – 87% – do not miss the USSR.

• At the end of February 2022, as a result of Russian aggression, a dramatic change took place in the ideological views of the Ukrainian society on any markers related to Russia. A “decommunization” and “de-Russification” of public opinion happened. Everything “Soviet” is now often perceived as the Russian one, and, consequently, the hostile one. The main reason for this is the use of Soviet symbols and speculations regarding the “common” historical past by Russian propaganda in the war against Ukraine.

• The reassessment of the attitudes towards the May 9 Victory Day is one of the key changes in the historical memory. While before 2022, this holiday was perceived by the absolute majority of the adult population of Ukraine (80%) as the one that has a significant personal symbolism, in 2022, for a considerable share of the respondents it became a relic of the past (36%), or just a regular day (23%).

• In addition, the “victorious” symbolism of this day changed to the “memorial” one. Since 2012, the gradual dynamics of rethinking this date has been recorded. But the war with Russia has dramatically changed the views of Ukrainians, and today, it is a Remembrance Day for 80% of the respondents, and only for 15%, it is a Victory Day (this share was 58% in 2018).

• Despite the change in attitude to the symbolism of the Victory Day, Ukrainians highly appreciate (78%) the contribution of the Ukrainian people to the victory over fascism, and 67% believe that Ukraine was the largest contributor to the victory over Germany in World War II. 23% think it was Russia, 24%, Belarus, and 21%, think it were other countries of the USSR. Regarding the allies, 30% of Ukrainians say the largest contribution was by the United States and 27%, by the United Kingdom. 

• The emphasis of the struggle of the Ukrainian people during the war shifted from the pro-Soviet to pro-Ukrainian. While in 2008, 74% of the respondents believed that Ukrainian soldiers and officers in the Soviet army fought for their Soviet homeland, 13% believed they fought for the liberation of Ukraine, and only 3%, for the liberation of Europe, in 2022 the share of those who believe that Ukrainians fought for their land increased to 44%. 39% believe they fought for the Soviet homeland, and 7%, for the liberation of Europe. As in 2008, only 3% believe the Ukrainians fought for Stalin.

• Interestingly, assessing the current Ukrainian-Russian war, three quarters of the respondents believe that Ukrainian soldiers and officers protect both the people of Ukraine and the peoples of Europe today, and only 22% believe that Ukrainian soldiers and officers protect only the people of Ukraine.

• Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards the warriors who defended their homeland from enemies at different times and in different armies. The vast majority (96%) have a positive attitude to the soldiers of the modern Ukrainian army. Also, a positive attitude towards the Soviet soldiers who fought against fascism (85%) and towards the UPA soldiers (71%) dominates in Ukrainian society. And while there still are regional differences in the assessments of the Soviet soldiers and the UPA soldiers, there is a complete consensus across regions and age group on the contemporary soldiers of the Ukrainian army.

• The support for the recognition of the OUN-UPA as the participants of the struggle for the national independence of Ukraine has significantly increased: 81% support it, and only 10% are against. This support has increased 4 times since 2010, and doubled since 2015.

• Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Mykhailo Hrushevsky are Ukrainian historical figures who are unequivocally positively perceived by Ukrainian society (by more than 90% of the respondents). Over the recent years, there has been a positive trend in the attitude towards Ukrainian historical figures, around which heated debates were going on in Ukrainian society decades ago. In particular, the attitudes that gradually improved are the ones towards Ivan Mazepa (44% in 2012 and 76% in 2022), Simon Petliura (26% in 2012 and 49% in 2022) and Stepan Bandera (22% in 2012 and 74% in 2022). It is important that the positive attitude towards the ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism prevails today in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine, and among those who speak only Russian in everyday life.

• In contrast, the attitudes towards Soviet leaders have been mostly negative during the last decade, and have deteriorated particularly sharply in 2022. Over the last 5-8 years, the negative attitudes towards Lenin have doubled, and negative attitudes toward Stalin have tripled. Today, only 13% have a positive attitude to Lenin and 7%, to Stalin.

• The absolute majority (89%) of the respondents support the recognition of the actions of Russian troops in Ukraine as the genocide of Ukrainian people. 76% support the ban on the use of symbols Z and V that are marked on Russian military equipment and 74% support for the ban on the “St. George's” ribbon in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that over the past 5 years, the support for the latter initiative increased from 45% to 74%.

• More than 65% support renaming the streets in Ukraine that have Russian or Soviet names. 71% support dismantling the monuments associated with Russia. 62% think that airing music from Russia on radio and television should be banned. At the same time, the initiative to exclude the works of Russian literature from the school curriculum is controversial (35% support it, 30% do not support it, and 31% are neutral). As for the dismantling of monuments related to the history of the World War II, a relative majority opposes it (40%). 19% support this initiative, while 36% are neutral.

• Dictatorship (41%) and fascism (37%) are the main characteristics used by Ukrainians to describe the current political regime in Russia. Another 10% describe the Russian regime as Nazism.

• Today, 92% of the respondents consider themselves Ukrainians by nationality. 5% consider themselves Russians, and 3% identify as other ethnicities. Interestingly, from 2008 to 2014, there was a stable distribution of ethnic identification: about 83% considered themselves Ukrainians, while about 15%, Russians. After the occupation of Crimea and a part of Donbass in 2014, the number of respondents who identified as Russians decreased to 11%, and the number of those who identified as Ukrainians increased to 87%-88%. At the same time, the share of those who considered themselves Russians has been gradually declining over the past eight years.

• Our studies of the attitudes towards various ethnic and linguistic groups living in Ukraine showed that the respondents’ attitudes towards them are mostly positive or neutral that lean positive. Ukrainians have the best attitude towards Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (95% expressed positive attitude) and Russian-speaking ones (57% have positive attitude, 30%, neutral one, and 13%, negative one). Positive attitudes also prevail towards Jews (60%) and Hungarians (49%) living in our country.

• When the war has already started, the attitudes towards Russians who live in Ukraine as well as the one towards the residents of the occupied Crimea and the residents of so-called “DNR/LNR” territories have deteriorated. 

• 41% have a positive attitude towards the residents of the occupied Crimea, 14% have a negative attitude, and 40% have a neutral one. 30% have a positive attitude towards the Russians who live in Ukraine, while 27% have a negative one, and 39%, a neutral one. 27% expressed positive attitude to the residents of so-called “DNR/LNR” territories, while 31% expressed a negative one, and 37%, a neutral one. 

• Ukrainians have much better attitude towards the residents of Belarus than towards the residents of Russia, although both categories have lost much of their credibility during the war.

• Only 22% of the respondents have positive attitude towards the residents of Belarus (this share has shrunk three times over the year). 33% have negative attitude, and 42%, a neutral one. On the other hand, a negative attitude prevails regarding the residents of Russia: 69%. 8% have positive attitude towards them (this share has shrunk more than three times over the year), and 20% have a neutral attitude.

• Thus, over the last year the attitude towards the residents of Belarus, the residents of the so-called “LNR/DNR” territories and the occupied Crimea shifted from a rather positive one to a more neutral one. Instead, the attitudes toward the residents of Russia have significantly deteriorated, while the attitudes towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians have improved.

• Linguistic self-identification and the language used in everyday life are two different matters. We can observe a steady decrease in the Russian-speaking segment of Ukrainians: in 2012 there were about 40% of such respondents, at the end of 2021, 26%, at the beginning of the war, 18%, and as of the end of April, 15%. Instead, the “flow” of Russian-speakers takes place into the segment of “bilinguals” (from 15% to 33%). The share of those who constantly use only Ukrainian language at home has slightly increased from 44% to 51%.

• 80% of the respondents consider Ukrainian their native language, 16%, Russian, and 3%, another language.