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Swedish society strongly opposes any concessions to Russia that could mean Ukraine's surrender in exchange for peace. This is the key insight of a recent Gallup Nordic/Novus study, which is based on a similar poll by the Rating Group among Ukrainians.

The “mirror” Gallup Nordic/Novus study is a powerful testament to the shared values ​​of Ukraine and Sweden. It also confirms the international recognition of Ukrainian sociology's high standards. This was made possible, in particular, thanks to the effective cooperation of Tetiana Skrypchenko, Deputy Director of Rating Group, and Torbjörn Sjöström, CEO of Novus Group International AB & President of Gallup Nordic.

The results of the survey in Sweden are compared with data from the recent survey in Ukraine by Rating Group.

See the full research report on the website of Gallup Nordic or Novus.

Key Findings

• 75% of Swedes support Ukraine in the war against the Russian invasion.
• 72% of Swedes, like 81% of Ukrainians, are convinced that the best way to end the war is a compromise with international diplomatic support.
• Only 1% of Swedish citizens support a scenario in which Ukraine must agree to all the aggressor's demands. 61% also believe that Russia will become a greater threat to Sweden if it retains control over the occupied territories in Ukraine.
• 70% of Swedes support the creation of a common European military defense.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky enjoys exceptionally high support in Sweden (90%), while Russian president Vladimir Putin has an almost absolute negative evaluation (98%).

On February 22-24, 2025, the Rating Sociological Group conducted a public opinion survey on the issue of civilian captivity. The survey was carried out at the request of the NGO "NUN" within the framework of a grant provided by the EU Project "Pravo-Justice," which is implemented by Expertise France.

Key Findings

• 78% of respondents are either well-informed or have heard about the issue of civilian captivity.
• A vast majority (84%) are aware of or have heard about the Geneva Conventions and the prohibition of taking civilians captive.
• 16% of respondents have friends or acquaintances who have been or are currently in civilian captivity.
• The most common information encountered by those aware of civilian captivity relates to the release or exchange of captives (55%).
• The primary sources of such information include messenger channels (45%), social media (45%), television (41%), and online news media (35%).
• The majority of respondents believe that state authorities bear responsibility for addressing the issue of returning civilian hostages.
• 14% of respondents are aware of NGOs that work on the return of civilian hostages.

Awareness about the issue of civilian captivity

• 27% of respondents stated that they are well aware of the practice of the unlawful detention of civilians (non-military Ukrainians) in the temporarily occupied territories or in Russia—civilian captivity. About 51% have heard about it, while 22% said they know nothing about it.
• The most informed groups include respondents from central regions (33%), younger and middle-aged individuals (34% and 32%, respectively), and internally displaced persons (38%).
• Among those respondents who know about civilian captivity, 55% have heard information about the release or exchange of captives, 48% - about isolated, unsystematic reports on the existence of such a phenomenon without specifics, 21% - about the number of civilian captives, 17% - about the activities or initiatives of Ukrainian government bodies regarding this issue, and 14% - about the activities or initiatives of international authorities.
• Regarding the Geneva Conventions and the prohibition of taking civilians captive, 42% of Ukrainians are well aware of their existence, while another 42% have heard about them. Meanwhile, 15% of respondents are uninformed on the matter. The most knowledgeable groups include residents of central regions (46%), younger and middle-aged individuals (53% and 49%, respectively), men (48%), returned IDPs (47%), and those who are well-informed about civilian captivity (74%).
• 16% of Ukrainians have friends or acquaintances who have been or are currently in civilian captivity, while 83% do not. Such friends or acquaintances are more common among internally displaced persons (25%).

Sources of information about the civilian captivity

• Among the most common sources of information about prisoner exchanges, respondents most frequently mention messenger channels in Telegram or Viber (45%), social media (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and others) (45%), television (41%), and online news media (35%).
• Other sources cited include relatives and acquaintances (17%), radio (12%), and personal experience (4%). The general trend in responses remains consistent across various socio-demographic groups.
• At the same time, in western regions, respondents more often learn about prisoner exchanges through social media, while in other parts of Ukraine, Telegram or Viber channels are the primary sources. Younger respondents are more likely than other age groups to get information from messenger channels and acquaintances, whereas older respondents (51 and older) rely more on television and radio.
• Those who have relatives in captivity are more likely to learn about exchanges through online media, acquaintances, and personal experience, while those who do not have relatives in captivity most often rely on television.

Return of civilian hostages

• According to 88% of respondents, the issue of returning civilian hostages should be handled by Ukrainian state authorities. Other responses include international organisations (37%), Ukrainian charitable foundations and volunteers (27%), families, relatives of captives (21%), and local authorities (19%).
• The overall trend remains consistent across different socio-demographic groups, with respondents primarily placing responsibility on the state authorities. At the same time, residents of western and central regions are comparatively more likely to believe that international organisations, Ukrainian charitable foundations, and volunteers should also be involved in addressing the issue. Younger respondents more often believe that local authorities should take responsibility, while middle-aged respondents consider families and local authorities to play a key role.
• Those who have relatives in captivity are more likely than others to believe that international organisations should also be responsible.
• 14% of respondents are aware of NGOs working on the return of civilian hostages, while 79% are not. Awareness is comparatively higher among those who have relatives in captivity (23%) and young people (19%).
• In an open-ended question about awareness of such NGOs, respondents who knew anything about them most frequently mentioned the Red Cross (32%), Come Back Alive (21%), Ukrainian Ombudsman (7%), volunteers (5%), UN (5%), HUR (4%), Zolkin Fund (3%), and White Angels (3%). About 43 other different NGOs have been mentioned sporadically.

On March 4, 2025, Ukraine Crisis Media Center hosted a presentation of a survey concerning justice in the context of war that was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on January 3-12 at the request of the Human Rights Centre ZMINA. The survey covers the impact of the war on Ukrainian society, citizens' attitudes towards lustration, preservation of the memory of the war and the state policy of recovery.

See the key findings of the survey below.

You can also watch the recording of the broadcast here:

https://www.youtube.com/live/TrutVNN0mSY

Lossess casued by the war

• Half of the respondents (50%) reported experiencing a deterioration in their psycho-emotional state due to the war. Additionally, 36% noted a decline in their health, 24% reported a loss of income, 21% suffered the loss of a loved one, and 20% experienced family separation.
• Other reported losses included job loss (17%), injury to a loved one (17%), estrangement from family members or close ones (15%), destruction or damage to property (16%), forced displacement or migration (14%), and loss of a business (7%).
• Meanwhile, 9% stated that they had not experienced any of the listed losses. Compared to 2023, the number of those who lost a loved one increased from 19% to 21%, while the percentage of those who lost income (from 29% to 24%) and jobs (from 22% to 17%) decreased.

Lustration

• The majority of respondents (68%) believe that lustration can serve as one of the tools for restoring trust in government institutions after the war, while 27% disagree with this view.
• According to the respondents, lustration as a mechanism for restricting access to public office for those who collaborated with the occupying authorities should primarily apply to individuals who remained in Ukrainian-controlled territory but cooperated with or supported Russia (53%), were elected as deputies or heads of illegally created bodies (51%), worked in illegal occupation administrations (50%), or served in the military, law enforcement, or judicial bodies in occupied territories (37%).
• About a quarter (23%) of respondents are well aware of the lustration process carried out in Ukraine between 2014 and 2016, while 44% have heard something about it, and 33% are unaware of it. Among those familiar with or who have heard about lustration, 58% view it positively, 26% negatively, and 9% are indifferent.
• Regarding responsibility for conducting lustration to address the consequences of the war, 43% of respondents believe this should be handled by a newly created nationwide body. Meanwhile, 19% support assigning this task to a national lustration commission under the Ministry of Justice or another ministry, 18% believe it should be managed by local governments and territorial communities, and 10% think the responsibility should lie with a national lustration commission under the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.

Liability for ties with Russia

• A vast majority (79%) believe that individuals who maintained ties with Russia after its aggression began in 2014 should be barred from holding any positions in state authorities. Additionally, 62% support a ban on positions in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, while 57% believe higher political and military positions should be restricted. Meanwhile, 18% think bans should apply to positions in local and national government bodies, whereas 3% believe there should be no restrictions at all.
• When asked whether Ukrainian lawyers who continued working in temporarily occupied territories should face professional restrictions, most respondents (73%) stated that each case should be assessed individually. Meanwhile, 17% believe such lawyers should be barred from practicing in Ukraine, while 8% argue that they should not face restrictions, as they provide legal assistance to Ukrainians under occupation.
• The majority of respondents (82%) believe that criminal liability should apply only to lawyers who collaborated with Russia and the occupation administrations, including those who held official positions. Meanwhile, 10% think that all lawyers who continued working in occupied territories should be held criminally responsible, while 6% believe they should not face punishment for working under occupation.
• A majority (69%) of respondents are willing to provide any known information about Ukrainian citizens' cooperation with the occupying authorities to the body responsible for lustration. Additionally, 14% are only willing to report cases where they or their loved ones were personally affected, while 15% are unwilling to provide any information.

National memory and commemoration

• Two-thirds of respondents (65%) believe that memorial sites and commemorative events should evoke gratitude and recognition of heroism, while half (50%) emphasize the importance of remembering events and honoring the fallen. Other emotions and sentiments mentioned by respondents include a sense of responsibility for the future (29%), hope that such events will not be repeated (28%), the restoration of justice (24%), grief and sorrow for the victims (21%), and an awareness of historical significance (17%).
• Two-thirds (66%) of respondents believe that, in response to Russian aggression, the primary focus of commemoration should be the heroism of the military, while 59% highlight the role of volunteers and the rescue of civilians. Other frequently mentioned aspects include fundraising efforts for the army (28%), civilian resistance, including actions in occupied territories, and efforts to restore critical infrastructure under shelling (both at 24%).
• Among the preferred ways to commemorate the Russo-Ukrainian war, respondents most often mentioned the implementation of support programs for the families of fallen soldiers (52%) and the creation of documentary and feature films (48%). Other frequently suggested initiatives include the establishment of a museum and thematic exhibitions (36%), the creation of a Memory Park (35%), the installation of a monument or sculpture (34%), scholarships for children and young people in honor of the fallen (30%), the introduction of a national remembrance lesson (26%), the creation of a Digital Memorial and archive (25%), the development of a Memory Alley (24%), and educational courses in schools and universities (21%).
• When asked about personal participation in commemorative activities, 64% of respondents expressed willingness to visit burial sites of the fallen, while 39% would attend the opening of a memorial site or monument. Other commonly mentioned events or locations included burial sites or memorials in different regions (23%), public gatherings at significant locations (20%), and museum exhibitions (17%).
• More than half of respondents (56%) believe that the design of gravestones, memorial plaques, and other commemorative objects should be chosen individually based on personal preferences and financial means, a view most strongly supported by residents of active combat zones. Meanwhile, 41% advocate for a unified design standard.
• Decisions regarding commemorative measures for victims and participants of the Russo-Ukrainian war should, according to 39% of respondents, be made by local governments, while 36% believe the responsibility should lie with the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. Additionally, 32% think that the relatives of the fallen and affected individuals should have a say. Other institutions frequently mentioned include the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (27%), the government or specific ministries (25%), the President of Ukraine (22%), and public or charitable organizations (19%).
• Half of the respondents (52%) believe that the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory should focus primarily on collecting and researching information about the events of the war. Nearly a third (31%) consider its main role to be spreading awareness about the war internationally, while 28% emphasize the importance of preserving records and verifying cases of collaboration with the occupiers. Additionally, 24% see its role in fostering patriotism, national identity, and civic engagement, as well as countering the effects of Russian propaganda. Other suggested priorities include developing and implementing state memory policies (21%), initiating the creation of memorials, cemeteries, and monuments (19%), and organizing an archival record of wartime events (19%).

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the most positively viewed world leaders in Ukraine are E. Macron (77%), A. Duda (72%), Ursula von der Leyen (67%). More than half of respondents hold a positive view of O. Scholz and R. Erdogan (both 57%), K. Starmer (56%). Overall, attitudes toward most of these leaders have improved compared to last year’s results. For Macron and Starmer, these are the highest positive approval ratings recorded in the measurements.
• The most negatively perceived leaders are V. Orban (11%), A. Lukashenko (8%), and V. Putin (1%).
• Two-thirds of Ukrainians trust President Zelenskyy, while one-third do not. Since January, trust in him has increased from 57% to 65%. Valerii Zaluzhnyi is trusted by 76% of respondents, 16% do not trust him. Serhii Prytula is trusted by 34%, and 51% do not trust him. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 22%, while 76% do not trust him, Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 19%, and 41% do not trust him, Yuliia Tymoshenko is trusted by 11%, and 86% do not trust her.

• The survey results indicate that Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject (91% oppose) US-Russia negotiations on ending the war without Ukraine’s participation. They believe that normalizing relations between these countries would primarily benefit Russia while harming both Ukraine and the European Union. At the same time, a significant portion of Ukrainians (64%) support direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and this figure showing an upward trend. The vast majority (81%) consider finding a compromise solution through negotiations involving other countries as a realistic path to ending the war.
• Moreover, 83% of respondents support a ceasefire, but only if Ukraine is provided with security guarantees.

Today, Rating Group officially became a corporate member of ESOMAR - European Society of Marketing Research Professionals, one of the most famous research associations in the world.

We thank our new partners for their trust and continue our work in accordance with the highest research standards.

Rating Group is also a member of WAPOR, ISA, and the Sociological Association of Ukraine (SAU).

On 1-2 February, Rating Sociological Group conducted a national survey entitled ‘The energy situation in Ukraine: expectations, challenges and prospects’. We learned how Ukrainians:

• View the energy supply situation in general.    
• Assess the actions of the authorities in the energy sector.    
• Feel about different energy sources.    
• Consume and save electricity.

Assessments of the energy supply situation

• 81% of Ukrainians assess the electricity supply situation as stable and note the absence of power cuts, 17% of respondents experience minimal power cuts, and 1% experience constant power cuts. Compared to the survey conducted in October 2024, the number of Ukrainians with a stable electricity supply has increased from 64% to 81%. The situation in eastern and southern Ukraine remains the least stable.    
• Most Ukrainians (62%) say that the energy supply situation is better than they expected, while a third (32%) say that it meets their expectations. 5% said that the situation has worsened.

Assessments of government actions

• Among the measures taken by the government to improve the situation in the Ukrainian energy sector, respondents are most aware of the restoration of destroyed energy facilities (48%), strengthening the protection of energy facilities (38%), and attracting funds and energy equipment from international partners (37%). Twenty-four per cent are aware of the increase in electricity imports, 18% are aware of the development of distributed generation, and 11% have not heard of any of these measures. Compared to October 2024, the proportion of people who are aware of the increase in electricity imports has grown (from 19% to 24%). Young people are better informed about measures aimed at improving the energy situation.
• 69% of respondents consider the government's actions to improve the energy situation to be effective, while 25% consider them to be ineffective.  
• 72% of respondents responded positively to President Zelensky's initiative to build, with the help of partners, up to 1 gigawatt of gas-fired power generation in 2024 and another 4 gigawatts in the coming years. 18% view this initiative negatively. A positive attitude is more common among the wealthier segments of the population. According to 57% of respondents, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine will be able to implement the initiative to develop gas-fired power generation, while 31% believe that it will not be able to do so.

Energy generation sources

• According to 54% of Ukrainians, nuclear power plants (NPPs) provide the largest share of electricity production in Ukraine, 9% believe that it is thermal power plants (TPPs), 6% - solar power plants (SPPs), 5% - hydroelectric power plants (HPPs and PSPs), 2% - wind power plants.    
• 76% of respondents support the development of nuclear energy, while 18% disagree with the prospect of developing nuclear energy.
• 80% of respondents responded positively to the initiative to complete the construction of power units at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, while 16% responded negatively to this initiative. The completion of power units is most supported by residents of the eastern and southern regions.

Electricity consumption

• 92% of respondents always pay their electricity bills, 6% pay from time to time, and 1% do not pay.    
• The vast majority (94%) of respondents try to use electricity sparingly: 72% try to do so always, and 22% do so from time to time. 6% do not try to save.

The Rating Sociological Group has launched a series of periodic national sociological surveys. They concern various aspects of the life of Ukrainians during the war (general state of affairs, vision of the future, perception of the region, factors of social unity and division, etc.).

In the first wave (November 20 – December 4, 2024), a combined survey was conducted. It consisted of two stages:

   
1. CATI (telephone) survey: nationwide sample (2,000 respondents) + additional subsamples for 9 near-frontline and border regions (400 respondents each). 5,600 respondents in total.
   
2. Focus groups with respondents.

General state of affairs, challenges, and expectations

   
• Among Ukrainians, criticism in assessments of the general state of affairs is growing: about half (49%) of respondents believe that the situation in the country is developing in the wrong direction (35% believe that it is developing in the right direction).
   
• Most Ukrainians speak of a negative changes in several contexts over the past year: in the economic (80%), political (62%) situation of the country, the financial situation of the family (60%), the cohesion of Ukrainians (55%), and the state of health (54%).
   
• Among the main threats, respondents most often name economic (price increases – 33%, economic crisis – 32%), as well as security (more severe shelling – 27%, further occupation of territories – 25%).
   
• The general emotional state of Ukrainians is primarily influenced by the experience of losing a loved one (40%), health and physical well-being (31%), financial situation (29%), security situation (28%), news and events in Ukraine and the mobilization of loved ones and relatives to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (23% each). 
   
• Despite significant difficulties, the majority of citizens remain optimistic about the future of Ukraine (71%) and continue to believe in Ukraine's ability to repel a Russian attack (69%). And in general, respondents mainly feel positive emotions about Ukraine: hope (68%) and pride (44%). This indicates a high level of patriotism and resilience of citizens.

Perception of the region and plans to move

• In their region, respondents most positively assess the comfort of living (75%), leisure (65%), affordability of school and preschool education (63%).
   
• Respondents mostly have negative perceptions of the opportunities for young people in the region (56% say there is a shortage), finding a job (51%), feeling of security (51%), and salary (48%).
   
• Despite all the challenges of the war, the absolute majority of respondents (81%) do not plan to move from their region. However, among young people aged 18-29, almost 40% expressed their intention to leave their region in the future while 14% intend to move to another country.

Factors of unity and division in the society

• The factors of unity and division of Ukrainians somewhat mirror each other. For example, the fight against corruption (50%) and economic prosperity (44%) can unite, whereas the growth of corruption (58%) and economic decline (49%) can divide.
   
• Other significant factors of disunity may be political elections (29%) and different experiences during the war (28%).
   
• In contrast, respondents consider recovery (37%) as another important factor uniting Ukrainians.

Civic participation

• The absolute majority of respondents (76%) express readiness to participate in changes in the country.
   
• Respondents are most interested in information about the fight against corruption (52%) and the course of the war (34%).
   
• A significant share (79%) state that they are interested in the situation in the occupied territories (this is especially common among residents of frontline and border regions). On the other hand, half of the respondents (52%) believe that the media do not provide enough information about living conditions in the occupied territories.

The End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual global survey by Gallup International which studies opinions of people in different countries. It includes the topics of the future, happiness, and economic expectations. In 2024, 35 882 respondents were surveyed in 35 countries.

This is the second time the Rating Group conducted the EoY survey in Ukraine. In December 2024, we asked 1000 Ukrainians about their views on the international role of the US.

Will the US be a superpower in 2030?

   
• The majority of Ukrainians (66%) believe that the US will be a superpower as of 2030. Slightly less than a quarter of respondents disagree. 
   
• Young people aged 18-24 (72%) are more confident in the US’s future as a superpower. People with high income also lean to this point of view (70%).
   
• Ukrainians are more confident that the US will be a superpower than the respondents in the 35 countries on average. At the same time, the opinions of Ukrainians align with those of the American respondents. 

The US’s foreign influence

   
• 51% of Ukrainians have a positive opinion on American foreign policy concerning Ukraine whereas 26% gave a negative response. Another 12% believe it has no effect and 11% could not answer.
   
• Ukrainians are more likely to speak of the positive effects of American foreign policy than the respondents from the 35 countries on average. In fact, Ukraine ranks in the top-5 countries with the most positive opinion on the US’s influence (after Kosovo, India, the Philippines, and Columbia). 
   
• The most criticism towards the US’s foreign influence on their country comes from people in Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. Pakistan, Serbia, and Kazakhstan are also countries where the majority are skeptics or critics of the US’s foreign policy.

The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition that was launched and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted annually. This year, the project was conducted in 35 countries.

A total of 35,882 people were interviewed worldwide. In each country, a representative sample of about 1,000 was surveyed in October-December 2024. In Ukraine, the survey was conducted by the Rating Group for the second time for this project. The first topic of the study: expectations for the new year 2025.

• Ukrainians expect that in general, the new year 2025 will be better than 2024, but they expect the economic situation to deteriorate in the new year. In general, assessments of the future have become less optimistic compared to last year: a new wave of the survey conducted by the Rating Group in cooperation with Gallup International showed that Ukrainians' expectations for the next year are somewhat worse than they were last year.

• Currently, 45% of Ukrainians expect that 2025 will be better than 2024, another 27% expect deterioration, and 20% believe it will be the same. 8% have not decided on their expectations for 2025. Compared to last year, estimates have shifted to more pessimistic expectations. Last year, 51% had positive expectations (6% more than last year), and 17% had negative expectations (10% less than last year).

• Globally, Ukraine ranks 15th among the countries with the most positive expectations for 2025.

• Ukraine ranks 19th in the Net Hopes Index, with Colombia, Kenya, and Sweden three positions ahead.

• The leaders in the Net Hope Index ranking are Saudi Arabia, China, and Kosovo.

• Compared to other Eastern European countries, Ukraine ranks first in the ranking at 17%, while other countries in the region have negative values of the index: -14% in Poland, -15% in Bulgaria, -21% in Serbia, and -38% in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• The most optimistic in their expectations is the group aged 65+: among them, 54% have optimistic expectations for the next year. On the other hand, young people aged 18-24 mostly do not expect any changes - 33% of them believe that 2025 will be the same as 2024. Expectations for the next year also depend on the respondent's financial situation: the more affluent the respondents, the smaller the share of the group expecting the situation to worsen in 2025.

• At the same time, the vast majority of respondents expect economic difficulties in the country in the new year: 63% expect economic difficulties, only 13% expect economic prosperity, while 20% believe that the economic situation will not change, and 5% are undecided. Compared to the last year, expectations about the economic situation in the country have also deteriorated somewhat: last year, 17% of Ukrainians hoped for economic prosperity, 52% expected difficulties, and 29% did not expect any changes.

• Expectations about the economic situation for the next year among Ukrainians are generally worse compared to other Eastern European countries, as only a third (35%) of these countries expect economic difficulties in the region as a whole.

• Ukraine is ranked 32nd in the Economic Prosperity Expectations Index, being among the three countries with the lowest scores: in addition to Ukraine, these are Germany (33rd) and Australia (34th). Poland (31st) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (30th) are two steps higher.

• The leaders in the Prosperity Expectations Index are Saudi Arabia, China, and Indonesia.

• Ukrainian young people aged 18-24 show the highest positive expectations for the country's economic situation next year.

•             According to the nationwide survey carried out by the Sociological Group “Rating” on the initiative of the Ukrainian Veterans Fund of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on 5-6 December 2024, 54% of the polled indicated that among their relatives and friends there were those who took part in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine from 2014 to 2021. 71% have among their relatives those who have fought or are fighting at the front since 24 February 2022. Compared to previous surveys, since 2022, the number of those whose relatives are currently fighting at the front has been increasing.

•             40% of respondents allow that they may become a veteran in the future, 56% share the opposite opinion. Residents of the Central and Western regions, the youngest respondents, men, and those who have relatives and friends who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting were the most likely to consider becoming a veteran.

•             The highest levels of trust towards the military continue to be recorded in society. At the same time, there are significant differences in the level of trust by category of military. Specifically, 96% trust ATO veterans who are now fighting again, 91% trust veterans of the current war, and 88% trust veterans of the ATO (JFO) of 2014-2021. In the military category, 94% trust the Armed Forces personnel serving on the frontline, 76% trust those serving in the rear (not the TRC - territorial army recruitment centers). By contrast, 67% of respondents do not trust the military personnel of the TRC, while 29% trust them. Regarding the latter, the highest level of distrust is recorded among residents of the Western and border regions, the youngest generation, and men. 

•             Among the risks that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war may face after returning from service, the top three are psycho-emotional instability, physical health problems and difficulties in obtaining medical care, lack of inclusive space and adapted workplaces for people with disabilities, as well as problems with obtaining social benefits and conflicts in the family. The respondents also consider the lack of social understanding, unemployment, alcohol or drug abuse, and the incompatibility of military experience with civilian life to be quite likely. About half of the respondents noted the risk of suicide among veterans and the risk of them breaking the law and engaging in crime. Compared to the survey in March 2024, the number of those who see risks in alcohol and drug abuse, lawbreaking, and involvement in crime has increased. Expectations of risks related to unemployment and suicide have somewhat decreased. Relatives of veterans who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting are relatively more likely to experience these problems. 

•             64% of respondents said that the image of veterans in the Ukrainian media is mostly positive. 20% said it was rather neutral. Only 4% mentioned a negative image of veterans in the media. On the other hand, 36% said that the image of veterans in real life does not correspond to the one portrayed in the media. 58% shared the opposite opinion. Those who have relatives who have fought in the ATO/JFO since 2014 were more likely to mention the discrepancy between the image of veterans in real life and the media.

•             The number of those who believe that the state fulfils its obligations to veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war continues to decline: in August 2022, the number of such people was 69%, in January 2023 - 53%, in September 2023 - 33%, in March 2024 - 25%, and in December 2024 - 25%. Today, the number of those who think otherwise is 68%. Residents of the Western and border regions, as well as those who have relatives who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting, are most likely to have a negative opinion of the state's obligations to veterans.

•             Among those who believe that the state fails to fulfil its obligations to veterans, the majority (59%) believe that the Verkhovna Rada is the institution that primarily fails to fulfil its obligations (59%). 30% said that the Cabinet of Ministers does not fulfil its obligations, 28% - the President, 27% - local councils and executive committees, 19% - ministries and departments.

•             78% of respondents believe that society today respects veterans. Compared to the survey conducted in March 2024, the number of respondents has slightly increased (76% in March). Today, 17% share the opposite opinion. The number of such respondents is higher among those who have relatives who have fought in the ATO/JFO since 2014, residents of the Western and border regions.

•             53% believe that government programmes to create inclusive (accessible) space and infrastructure for people with disabilities are ineffective. 37% share the opposite opinion. Residents of the frontline and central regions, older people (51+), and relatives of those who fought in the ATO and those who are currently fighting were more likely to say that such programmes are ineffective.

•             The number of those who said they were well or rather well informed about the problems of veterans has not changed compared to March 2024 (56%). 43% said they were not informed. The number of the latter is higher among the residents of the border regions, older people, and those who do not have relatives or friends who are fighting.

 In September 2024, the Sociological Group Rating conducted a survey commissioned by the OSCE among young people aged 16-35 on assessments of youth centres and spaces and opportunities for young people in Ukraine.  

Key results: 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH

• About a third of young people believe they have enough opportunities for self-fulfilment both in their locality and in Ukraine as a whole. 

• Compared to other categories of young people, opportunities for self-realization in Ukraine are generally more positively assessed by young people from regional centres; Kyiv city, central and western regions; and young people under 21 years of age.

• Opportunities for activities related to leisure, education and creativity are rated positively (50% or more report having such opportunities), while opportunities for economic activity are rated lower.

• In general, regional centres, Kyiv, and entrepreneurs rate economic possibilities for young people better.

• Young people from eastern regions and rural areas see the least opportunities for self-realisation in their localities.

• The presence of a youth centre in a settlement contributes to a better assessment of opportunities in general and an assessment of opportunities for self-fulfilment of young people in this locality.

• If there is a youth centre or space in the town/village, young people are much better at assessing opportunities for leisure and art.

VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS 

• Their safety, the safety of their relatives and the independence of Ukraine are among the most important priorities of young people. Security is more important for residents of the eastern regions, as well as for women. At the same time, equal opportunities are somewhat more important for young men. 

• Corruption, energy challenges, low income, and mobilization are the primary concerns nowadays, according to Ukrainian youth. Mobilization is more frequently identified as an issue by men, particularly those aged 26-30. However, for young women, the issues of low income and unemployment are more pressing.

• Youth from rural areas are more likely to highlight economic challenges, including low income and unemployment.

• Young people with Internally Displaced Person (IDP) status are three times more likely to point out the lack of housing as a problem.

AVAILABILITY AND ASSESSMENT OF YOUTH CENTERS AND SPACES

• 47% of young people report that there are youth centers and spaces in their localities. Another 28% are unaware of such spaces. 25% indicate that no such spaces exist. 

• There is a significant settlement gap. Among residents of regional centres, the majority (58%) report that such a centre exists in their city, while in rural areas, the majority (60%) indicate that no such centre is available. 

• At the same time, respondents from areas where such centres exist generally view them as a “safe space,” and most acknowledge their impact on young people's lives. However, opinions about the ability of youth centres to help young people find employment are nearly evenly split. In general, the more frequently young people visit these centres, the more they perceive their positive influence

EXPERIENCE OF VISITING YOUTH CENTRES

• 19% of respondents have visited youth centres at least once over the past few years. 

• The results of the quantitative research indicate that the primary audience for youth centres consists of:

- Youth under 25 years old

- More often women

- More often residents of regional centres

- More often students, public sector employees, and young entrepreneurs

- Those engaged in volunteer activities

- Individuals who study or live near the centre

• Among those who have visited youth centres, 42% are supporters (willing to recommend the centre to others), 21% are critics of youth centres, and 37% hold a neutral stance.

• Supporters are more prevalent among women, as well as those who visit the centres more frequently.

• While older individuals visit youth centres less often than younger ones, those older visitors who have started to attend demonstrate strong loyalty to the centres. 

• There is a slight increase in supporters among those who view the primary advantage of youth centres as being a “safe space.”

ADVANTAGES OF VISITING YOUTH CENTRES 

• Visitors to youth centres and spaces identify opportunities for socialisation, personal development, and leisure activities as some of the key benefits of attending.

• When discussing the benefits of youth centres, visitors from rural areas are more likely to highlight development opportunities and emphasize the centres' role as a safe space for youth. 

• Those who visit the centres more frequently generally mention more advantages, particularly citing the ability to organise their events and the comfortable environment. 

• Young people over 25 are more inclined to emphasise development opportunities as a key benefit of the centres. In contrast, younger individuals (under 25) tend to view youth centres as platforms for initiatives, particularly in terms of public engagement and organising their activities.

• Women value youth centres more than men for the opportunity to engage in social participation and for being safe spaces for young people. In contrast, men were slightly more likely to highlight advantages such as the ability to organise their activities and the opportunity to make new friends and find like-minded individuals.

BARRIERS TO ATTENDING YOUTH CENTRES 

• Those who have not visited youth centres primarily cite lack of free time, insufficient information about the centre, and the absence of a youth centre in their town or village as the main reasons. 

• Residents of rural areas are significantly more likely than those from other types of localities to mention the lack of a local youth centre as a key reason for not attending.

• Young people aged 16-21 often express that there is nothing of interest for them at youth centres, and they also mention the lack of companions to go there with. Older individuals tend to cite the lack of free time as their main barrier.

• Importantly, 68% of respondents indicated they would be more likely to visit a youth centre if one were to open near their place of residence. Among those who have never visited, around 65% said they would be willing to go under such circumstances.

USAGE OF YOUTH CENTRE SERVICES 

• 15% of respondents stated that they have used youth centre services at least once, with the services primarily focused on leisure activities, cultural development, and personal growth. Among those who have visited youth centres multiple times, 80% have utilized such services.

• Residents of rural areas more often used informational services and psychological counselling. In contrast, people in cities preferred leisure services, non-formal education, and career counselling.

• Young people aged 16-25 were more likely to participate in leisure activities and developmental programs. For the older group (26-35), cultural events and informational services were more popular.

• Informational services had little impact on loyalty to youth centres. However, there was a clear difference between supporters and critics when it came to cultural programs, developmental activities, and especially psychological counselling.

• 84% gave positive feedback about some services they received at youth centers.

• The most satisfied groups were:

- Women

- People who used youth center services multiple times

- Young people who sought psychological counselling, cultural activities, and developmental programs.

REQUESTS FOR YOUTH CENTER ACTIVITIES 

• When asked about preferred activities in youth centers, respondents most often mentioned military medical training, events for parents with children, and psychological support. At the same time, people who visited youth centers frequently showed a higher interest in creative workshops.

• The primary objectives of youth centres, as identified by respondents, include fostering intellectual development, promoting youth employment, and encouraging a healthy lifestyle.

• According to the respondents, the top priorities for youth centres should be education and self-development, national and civic education, sports and health, as well as psychological support. Psychological support must hold greater significance for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women.

• In eastern regions, activities for parents with children are more commonly mentioned. It is also observed among rural residents. Additionally, such activities tend to appeal more to older youth, whereas younger individuals are more interested in entertainment.

• Women place higher importance on events for parents with children and creative workshops. In contrast, men show a greater interest in sports-related events.

• Regarding activities, young people serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) frequently highlight the importance of sports and health initiatives as well as national-patriotic education. 

COMMUNICATION WITH YOUTH CENTRES

• 62% of respondents have at least some awareness of the activities of youth centres. Women, residents of central and western regions, and individuals living in cities with established youth centres tend to be better informed.

• 18% of respondents follow youth centres on social media. Among regular visitors to these centres, this figure rises to 70%. The most followed platforms are Instagram, Facebook, and Telegram. Men are more likely to use Telegram, while women prefer Instagram and Facebook.

• 70% of followers of youth centre pages have a positive perception of the content published. Women tend to rate it slightly higher.

• 13% of these followers frequently share content from these pages, while 59% do so occasionally.

• Female subscribers, individuals aged 16-21, and TikTok users are relatively more likely to share content. If the content is engaging, the likelihood of it being shared increases significantly.

• Followers of youth centre pages rate the communication style, the interest and usefulness of the information, and the design most positively, whereas interaction with followers receives lower scores.

• The strongest connection between content preference and evaluation criteria is observed with the interest and usefulness of information and the communication style. Statistically, the communication style is the most impactful factor—content with an appealing communication style is shared more frequently.

MIGRATION

• 32% of surveyed youth expressed a desire to move abroad if given the opportunity, while 45% indicated they would not. People from eastern regions, small towns, internally displaced persons (IDPs), men, individuals aged 22-25, and students are more inclined to seek relocation.

• The primary motivations for migration include safety, higher earning potential, and opportunities for children. Additionally, better living conditions and the ability to travel are relatively significant factors. 

• The issue of migration from rural areas is primarily driven by economic factors: rural residents wishing to move abroad frequently cite the potential for higher earnings and improved employment opportunities as their main reasons.

• Compared to other age groups, individuals aged 16-21 are more often motivated to relocate by aspirations for better living conditions, opportunities for self-realisation, career prospects, and access to quality education.

• From a gender perspective, women are more likely to justify their desire to move abroad with concerns for safety and opportunities for their children, while men often emphasize travel opportunities and prospects for personal development.

SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT OF YOUTH 

• 73% of respondents believe they lack the ability to influence local government decisions. Respondents residing in large cities and those who are members of civil social organizations (SOs) are comparatively more optimistic about their potential to make an impact. Young people frequently involved in volunteering also have a more positive view of their ability to influence local authorities.

• 60% of youth reported participating in volunteer or community service activities over the past year: 16% frequently, 26% occasionally, and 18% rarely. 

• The highest levels of youth engagement are observed among residents of Kyiv, regional centres, individuals aged 16-21, young entrepreneurs, and students. 

• Most active citizens are observed among individuals who have visited youth centers. At the same time, among those engaged in volunteering, only 8% volunteered specifically at youth centers. Predominantly, these are young people aged 16-25 and those who have visited youth centers multiple times.

• 5% of respondents have undergone internships in local government bodies, and 3% in central government institutions. Among those currently employed in the public sector, this share increases to 10% and 8%, respectively.

• Every fifth respondent considers the possibility of pursuing a career as a youth worker in the future. This perspective is more commonly considered by rural residents, young people aged 16-21, students, individuals currently unemployed, women, those who have frequently visited youth centers, and those actively involved in volunteering.

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The International Republican Institute together with the Sociological Group ‘Rating’ conducted a focus group study "Life in the de-occupied territories through the eyes of residents: problems of reconstruction and priorities for future development".

   Key findings:

   
• Residents who stayed during the      occupation and those who returned after the de-occupation were motivated      by the same reasons – having      a family, private property, work, and an emotional connection to home.      While both groups reported feeling afraid of danger in the occupied      settlements, the level of fear was lower than that of the uncertainty of      migration.
   
• Residents face a lack of basic      resources and living conditions but demonstrate resilience and a desire to      rebuild their communities.
   
• The economy is recovering      slowly, with a shortage of jobs, and with businesses remaining destroyed.      In the healthcare sector, there is a lack of staff, equipment and      accessible pharmacies.
   
• The proximity to the frontline      and mined areas are serious obstacles to recovery.
   
• Communications, roads, and      housing are priority areas for recovery. The extent of foreign donor      assistance depends on how well known the affected region is.
   
• Education remains remote or      mixed due to the lack of proper shelters, and some schools have closed due      to lack of students and migration.
   
• Older participants are more      interested in participating in the reconstruction process, while younger      people are less interested, in part due to lack of skills and time.
   
• The unwillingness to engage in      the reconstruction process is linked to a lack of trust in local      government and the belief that reconstruction should be carried out by specialised      organisations and people.

 Тhе latest public opinion survey in Ukraine conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) strong majorities believe that Ukraine will defeat Russia in the current war and support recapturing all lost territory.  

   
• Ukrainians are optimistic about winning the conflict with Russia. When asked about an outcome, 88% of Ukrainians said they will win the war. 
     
   
• The poll also found that 71% of adults agree that the government should recapture all lost territory. Further, 64% of Ukrainians are willing to take on a higher burden of the war through increasing military tax from 1.5% to 5%. 

On 28 October 2024, EUAM Ukraine unveiled results from a nationwide public opinion survey conducted by Rating Group for the Mission. Presented at the Ukrinform press centre, the findings highlighted levels of public trust in law enforcement and judiciary, attitudes towards reforms and EU support in these areas, as well as key information sources relied on by Ukrainians. The event featured remarks from Rolf Holmboe, Head of EUAM Ukraine, Oleksii Antypovych, the Head of Rating Group, Mariana Reva, the Head of the Communication Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Kyrylo Viktorov, the Deputy Head of the Center for Countering Disinformation’s Department for Countering Information Threats to National Security.

Trust in Law Enforcement and Judiciary 

According to the survey, the National Guard of Ukraine has the highest public trust among law enforcement agencies, with 86% of respondents expressing confidence, up from 72% in 2023. The Security Service of Ukraine follows with 73%, an increase of 14% from the previous year. 

Other institutions, such as the State Border Guard Service, are trusted by 54%, but 42% of respondents distrust it. Both the National Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have 48% trust, but also considerable levels of distrust (51% and 38% respectively). Trust in the National Police has slightly decreased since 2023 (down from 56%). 

The State Bureau of Investigation has a 45% trust rate, with 50% expressing distrust. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Prosecutor General's Office, and the State Customs Service share similar trust levels (around 33%), while over 60% do not trust these institutions. 

Finally, the judiciary holds the lowest level of trust, with only 25% expressing confidence and 72% showing distrust. 

Attitudes Towards Reforms and EU’s Support 

The survey shows that 74% of respondents view fighting corruption as the most critical reform. Reforms in national security, defence, and the judicial system also garnered 36% support each, while police and customs reforms are priorities for 10% of respondents. 

The digital transformation reform received the highest approval, with 66% of respondents fully or mostly satisfied, 20% dissatisfied, and 13% uncertain. Half of the respondents expressed satisfaction with gender equality initiatives, while 30% were dissatisfied and 21% were undecided. National security reform showed a balance, with 46% satisfied, 47% dissatisfied, and 7% unsure. Police reform left 57% dissatisfied and 40% satisfied. Customs reform saw 56% dissatisfaction, 30% satisfaction, and 15% undecided. Judicial reform had the lowest satisfaction, with 73% dissatisfied and only 21% satisfied, while anti-corruption efforts were rated the poorest, with 15% satisfied and 84% dissatisfied.

When it comes to EU support, assistance to liberated territories (43%), support in investigating war crimes (38%), and ensuring fair justice (31%) rank among the most relevant areas for Ukraine, with fighting corruption leading at 62%. Notably, the survey also shows that among these priorities, EU support for liberated territories is viewed as the most effective, with 48% of respondents rating it positively, and support for war crimes investigations deemed effective by 38%.

Information Sources 

According to the survey, Telegram is the most popular source of information for 47% of respondents, followed by YouTube (26%), the United Marathon (21%), and eyewitness accounts and official government sources (both 19%). Other sources include television channels not part of the United Marathon (16%), Ukrainian online media (15%), and international media (14%). 

Social media is viewed as the main source of disinformation (53%), followed by messenger channels (including Telegram) (35%) and television (32%). 89% of respondents see disinformation as a serious problem, with 56% considering it "very serious" and 33% viewing it as "somewhat serious." Only 10% don’t consider it serious. 

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 29% of Chernihiv residents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction, while 56% believe they are moving in the wrong direction. Meanwhile, 43% of respondents assessed the direction of affairs in Chernihiv as correct, and the same number assessed it as incorrect.
• Sixty-four percent of respondents are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack, while more than 30% hold the opposite view. Over the past two years, the number of those who are confident in Ukraine's ability to repel Russia's attack has decreased (from 93% in December 2022 to 64%).
• 64% believe that it will be impossible to restore friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians some time after the end of the war. 22% believe this will be possible in 20-30 years, 8% in 10-15 years, and 4% within a few years.

• 69% are satisfied with the activities of the acting mayor of Chernihiv, O. Lomako, while 24% are dissatisfied (the satisfaction rate has improved: 59% vs. 69%). 62% are satisfied with the activities of the city council, while 27% are dissatisfied. 23% are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv Regional Military Administration, while 59% are dissatisfied (the satisfaction rate has deteriorated: 59% in December 2022 versus the current 23%). Twenty-two percent are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv city military administration, while 62% are dissatisfied. Twenty-two percent rated the work of the head of the regional military administration, V. Chaus, positively, while 70% rated it negatively. Seventeen percent rated the work of the head of the Chernihiv city military administration, D. Bryzhynsky, positively, while 68% rated it negatively.
• 70% believe that the acting mayor, O. Lomako, is effectively performing the duties of mayor. 20% have the opposite opinion.
• 60% consider the activities of the city military administration in Chernihiv to be rather ineffective. 26% rated it as effective.
• 71% of respondents believe that the activities of Chernihiv Acting Mayor Oleksandr Lomako contribute to the development of the city, while 14% hold the opposite view.
• Fifteen percent consider the activities of the city's military administration, led by Dmytro Bryzhynsky, to be beneficial to the city's development. Sixty-four percent believe that it tends to hinder the city's development.
• 19% of respondents believe that the activities of the regional military administration led by Vyacheslav Chaus contribute to the development of the city, while 58% expressed the opposite opinion.
• 84% believe that the elected city council should be responsible for ensuring the city's functioning. 9% believe that this should be done by the appointed city military administration
• 71% support the liquidation of the city military administration headed by Dmytro Bryzinsky and the full restoration of the powers of the city council and executive committee. 10% expressed the opposite opinion—in favor of the complete transfer of the powers of the city council and executive committee to the city military administration.
• 53% believe that the recent searches in the Chernihiv city council and the open criminal proceedings are more likely to be pressure on the local authorities. 37% consider this to be a fight against corruption.
• 94% of respondents support the initiative to strip city council members of their mandates for systematically failing to attend sessions.
• Among local politicians, respondents have the most positive attitude toward V. Atroshenko (84% positive, 11% negative). O. Lomako is viewed positively by 70% and negatively by 21%. V. Chaus is viewed positively by 23% and negatively by 67%. D. Bryzhinsky is viewed positively by 17% and negatively by 63%, while 10% have not heard of him.
• 94% have heard about the decision of the Yavoriv District Court, according to which the mayor of Chernihiv, V. Atroshenko, was deprived of the right to hold the office of mayor for a year (50% have heard a lot, 44% have heard something). 77% of respondents do not support this court decision, 14% expressed their support.
• 77% of respondents believe that this court decision is more of a pressure on local authorities, while 8% consider it a fight against corruption.
• Among the sources of information about the war in Ukraine, the most trusted are channels on Telegram or Viber messengers (47%) and social networks (42%). Stories from eyewitnesses, acquaintances, and Ukrainian online media are trusted by 28-29%, while international media are trusted by 23%. The Telethon (a joint broadcast by Ukrainian TV channels) is trusted by 19%, while TV channels not participating in the Telethon are trusted by 18%.

The Rating Group conducted a study on energy supply in Ukraine, finding that 64% of Ukrainians have a stable electricity supply, while 13% of residents in eastern regions face frequent power cuts. 80% of respondents support the development of nuclear energy, and 95% support increasing the share of alternative energy sources. Most respondents positively assess the actions of the authorities in the energy sector and actively save electricity.

Assessments of the energy supply situation

At the time of the survey, 64% of Ukrainians surveyed had a stable electricity supply, while another 30% reported minimal outages. 4% experience frequent outages, and another 1% experience them constantly. Among the regions, the worst situation is in the eastern regions: 13% of respondents report frequent outages.

Almost 90% of respondents plan to spend the autumn-winter period of 2024 at their permanent place of residence. About 10% plan to move: 4% within the region, 3% within the country, and 2% abroad. Younger respondents and residents of the east are more likely to mention plans to move.

64% of respondents said that nuclear power plants currently provide the largest share of electricity production in Ukraine. Thermal power plants are the main energy producers, according to 7% of respondents. Hydroelectric and solar power plants were chosen as the main types of generation by 6% of respondents. Wind power plants – 1%.

Assessments of government actions

Among the measures taken by the government to improve the situation in the Ukrainian energy sector, the respondents are most aware of the restoration of destroyed energy facilities (50%), the attraction of funds and energy equipment from international partners (38%), and the strengthening of protection for energy facilities (36%). Between 19% and 20% of respondents are aware of the development of distributed generation and increased electricity imports. Eight per cent are unaware of any of these measures. Younger groups are generally more aware of measures aimed at improving the energy situation.

Sixty-six per cent of respondents consider the government's actions to improve the energy situation to be effective: 12% consider them to be completely effective, and 54% consider them to be somewhat effective. Thirty per cent consider the actions to be ineffective (23% rated them as somewhat ineffective, and 7% as completely ineffective).

Attitudes towards nuclear energy

Almost 80% of respondents consider the development of nuclear energy to be necessary (38% - definitely necessary, 40% - rather necessary), 12% consider it rather unnecessary, and 5% - definitely unnecessary.

Almost 80% of respondents have a positive opinion of the initiative to complete the construction of nuclear power units at the Khmelnytskyi NPP (41% have a very positive opinion, 36% have a somewhat positive opinion). 17% oppose this initiative. Young people and residents of eastern regions are most supportive of the completion of the power units.

Alternative energy sources

The vast majority of respondents (95%) support the idea of increasing the share of electricity generated by alternative sources (solar and wind power plants, etc.) in Ukraine's overall energy structure.

Electricity consumption practices

93% of respondents said they always pay their electricity bills on time. 6% pay their bills on time from time to time. 1% said they do not pay their bills on time.

The vast majority (96%) of respondents try to use electricity sparingly: 74% try to do so always, and 22% do so from time to time. 4% do not try to save.

83% of respondents consider it appropriate to introduce financial compensation for reducing electricity consumption as a mechanism to encourage energy saving. 15% consider such an initiative unnecessary. Older respondents are more likely to support the introduction of this mechanism.

The study assessed the level of integrity on a scale from 0 (no integrity culture) to 10 (very high integrity culture). The highest scores were given to the President of Ukraine and the education sector (6.0), followed by the healthcare sector (5.4) and local government authorities (5.1). Civil service integrity was rated at 4.9 points, the police at 4.3, and the courts at 3.7 points.

The image of a statesman

Among the traits and characteristics that a civil servant should possess, integrity ranks first, with 60% of surveyed Ukrainians considering it important. This trait is most frequently mentioned by city dwellers and older participants.

Around half of the respondents believe that experience and competence are necessary qualities, while 46% consider intelligence and education to be essential. Incorruptibility and patriotism are valued by 36-37%, with younger respondents more frequently emphasising incorruptibility. Simplicity and approachability are important to 30% of respondents, with this trait being more commonly mentioned by those living in rural areas.

Nearly one in five respondents highlighted the importance of qualities such as hard work, a principled stance, and leadership abilities. Hard work was more often selected by those in rural areas, while leadership was prioritised by younger individuals and city residents. 

Flexibility, energy, and courage are important traits for 15% of respondents, while oratory skills and communication abilities are valued by 10%. The least frequently chosen traits were influence, cunning, youth, charisma, and a sense of humour, with only up to 5% selecting these characteristics. 

Compared to measurements taken in June 2019, a larger portion of respondents now value incorruptibility, patriotism, and experience. Meanwhile, the proportion of those who highlighted courage, leadership, and hard work has slightly decreased.

Evaluation of Integrity 

The study assessed the level of integrity on a scale from 0 (no integrity culture) to 10 (very high integrity culture). The highest scores were given to the President of Ukraine and the education sector (6.0), followed by the healthcare sector (5.4) and local government authorities (5.1). Civil service integrity was rated at 4.9 points, the police at 4.3, and the courts at 3.7 points. The lowest scores for integrity were given to the Cabinet of Ministers (3.3) and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Younger people and rural residents generally gave higher ratings of integrity across most sectors.

Half of the respondents believe that honesty should be one of the core principles guiding civil servants, with this view being more prevalent among residents of small towns, villages, and older respondents. Additionally, 38% stated that responsibility should be a key principle, while 34% pointed to professionalism, a trait more frequently mentioned by city residents. One in four respondents stressed the importance of transparency in the work of civil servants, with urban dwellers, youth, and middle-aged respondents more likely to mention it. Effective communication with citizens was highlighted by 16%, regular reporting on performance by 12%, speed in decision-making by 7%, and openness to criticism by 4%. 

According to 45% of respondents, civil servants primarily act based on personal gain, while around 20% believe they are guided by official instructions. A third of respondents believe that civil servants are influenced by both personal interests and official guidelines. 

The majority of respondents (77%) believe that increasing penalties for corruption would enhance the integrity of civil servants. A third think that banning individuals from public service after being caught in corruption would improve integrity. Twenty percent see strict punishment for those offering bribes as an effective measure. Increasing the frequency of corruption inspections was viewed as effective by 16%, improving transparency in reporting and digitising decision-making processes by 14%, raising civil servants' salaries by 8%, and introducing principles of anonymity and collegiality in decision-making by 2% and 4%, respectively. 

The study was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the NGO Internews Ukraine. The report was prepared based on the results of in-depth interviews with journalists, representatives of civil society organisations, and digital security experts.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, threats in the information space have intensified. On the one hand, informants note a significant increase in the number of cyberattacks on media resources, the spread of fake information on social networks, and information and psychological special operations (hereinafter referred to as IPSO) in general. On the other hand, cybersecurity experts and representatives of civil society organisations often speak not so much about the emergence of qualitatively new threats as about the growing interest and intensity of malicious actors in hacking resources and conducting IPSO.

An obvious factor in the increase in threats is the armed and information aggression on the part of the Russian Federation, whose special services are most often mentioned by informants among the beneficiaries of cyberattacks. Other attackers mentioned include individual representatives of the Ukrainian authorities (more often as figures in anti-corruption journalistic investigations), Ukrainian special services (as tools in the hands of unscrupulous Ukrainian officials), and fraudsters (in particular transnational groups). In addition to the intensification of the war itself, respondents note the development of technologies, in particular artificial intelligence (hereinafter referred to as AI), which lead to a quantitative and qualitative increase in fake information, as well as an intensification of cyberattacks.

Another factor is the spread and penetration of social networks among the Ukrainian population, resulting in a relative decline in the average level of information literacy, an increased risk of hacking into the accounts of relatives and acquaintances of journalists, and, accordingly, an increase in threats to personal digital security. Among the particular dangers, journalists mention increased pressure on them and, as a result, the spread of self-censorship due to fears about the possible consequences of publishing certain materials. These processes are leading to the erosion of journalism as a whole due to a general decline in trust in the institution, which in the long term will threaten the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine.

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The increase in threats is leading to stricter digital security requirements, for which media and civil society organisations are unprepared. Over the past 2-3 years, informants have faced DDoS, phishing and virus attacks, resulting in the hacking of access to website admin panels, social media pages and servers storing data, including sensitive data.

Despite measures aimed at strengthening digital security, informants note the relevance of threats such as personal data leaks, the creation of fake channels on social networks and messengers that mimic real ones, the construction of high-quality deepfakes using AI, eavesdropping and external surveillance, including GPS tracking, and massive cyberattacks. Only a few respondents believe that their organisation has a high level of protection.

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According to digital security experts, the state of an organisation's digital protection directly depends on the intensity of personal cyber hygiene practices. The study showed that informants mostly say they are familiar with the basic rules, among which they most often mention those related to passwords for websites and pages (generating and regularly updating complex passwords through managers, two-factor authentication), and are cautious when receiving messages via electronic means of communication. Only a few respondents add to this list the use of antivirus software, VPNs, creating backups of information, and reading technical documentation when installing programmes (which remains largely selective), using and regularly updating licensed software, preventing documents from being downloaded to personal devices, and transferring work exclusively to the Internet. Despite general awareness of the existence of digital security rules, informants note that they and their colleagues often do not fully comply with them. Among the reasons most often cited are that the implementation of changes leads to a disruption of the usual way of life and work, which initially causes aversion, a feeling of lack of strength and time; lack of motivation, exacerbated by the unwillingness to identify oneself as a potential victim of attackers who are supposedly not interested in the activities of local organisations; lack of funding for programmes and devices that provide more reliable digital protection, as well as isolated cases of technical problems with generated complex passwords due to power outages and/or malfunctions in gadget operating systems.

A weak point in the organisation of personal digital security remains the fact that journalists unconsciously distinguish between services that are necessary for their professional activities and those they use in their free time (mostly for entertainment). Accordingly, they do not apply digital security rules to such programmes and applications. Some of the organisations surveyed have a separate digital security policy, while others do not have a formalised policy but take individual measures to implement digital security. There are various ways of familiarising employees with digital security rules, including direct communication between the security service and individual departments (divisions) of the organisation and/or system administrators, familiarisation during onboarding, regular training and instruction on information security (both internal and external), and sending instructions through organisational communication channels (both one-off and regular). Information security rules are usually limited to basic instructions on how to handle the resources and services that the organisation works with. Only some organisations have enhanced security rules, including protocols for responding to account or server hacking, restrictions on access to organisational resources and working from personal devices, and the use of backup clouds and closed servers. Some organisations have a dedicated security service responsible for preventing digital security breaches and responding to such incidents. Only a few organisations attempt to combine technical and social (organisational, personal) aspects of digital security.

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A separate vulnerability in cybersecurity is the services used by journalists for internal communication. Some organisations do not have a policy that defines an exhaustive list of such services, so their employees can use several at the same time. In large companies, employees can use corporate email, Google Drive, Trello, Notion, and various messengers, which creates additional problems and threats. Among messengers, informants most often mention Telegram (while emphasising their understanding of the risks associated with the origin of this resource) and WhatsApp, and less often Facebook, Signal, and Slack messengers. Only some organisations divide communication into work-related communication, which involves the use of documents (mostly via corporate email), and non-work-related communication (mainly via messengers). The reluctance to switch to more secure communication services is related to convenience (the need to send large amounts of information, including photos and videos, limits the range of services available) communication with employees who may be located, in particular, in occupied territory leads to attempts to simplify communication methods) and the costs required to use them.

According to informants, employees in their organisations are usually familiar with phishing protection algorithms. Some respondents noted that they learn about such rules during training sessions conducted either by their own organisation or by a partner organisation specialising in digital security. A smaller number of respondents are not sufficiently familiar with such algorithms, so they solve phishing problems by consulting with the security department or representatives of partner organisations, which usually leads to unnecessary time consumption. Individual technical departments and divisions are more often responsible for organising security measures in organisations. Their competence mostly extends to the organisation of technical parameters and the application of solutions aimed at countering planned mass attacks. In small media and public organisations, individual employees are responsible for security measures: the relevant technical specialist, HR, office manager, department head or head of the organisation. To strengthen digital security in organisations, it is common practice to conduct training (more often in-house, less often with invited organisations specialising in digital security). In some organisations, instead of joint training, individual sessions are organised with the involvement of partner organisations. Opinions on the level of complexity of such training courses were divided: on the one hand, many informants responded that they did not consider such training courses to be complex, while on the other hand, some reported that their colleagues were not personally interested in such events. However, despite the prevalence of personal lack of motivation, all respondents indicated the relevance of the knowledge and skills acquired during such training. According to them, the routine nature of work processes leads to a loss of vigilance, so it is important to regularly remind people of the basic rules of digital security.

According to some informants, the existing measures are sufficient to achieve digital security in general. Other informants mentioned the relevance of such steps, which have been implemented only in some organisations:    

• drawing up an internal security protocol;    
• forming a security department whose task would be to monitor compliance,    
• availability and implementation of automatic security solutions, primarily to prevent threats of mass cyber attacks;    
• increasing the responsibility of individual employees for their own actions;
• allocating funds to improve the security level of the site;
• introduction of periodic training sessions, which would additionally cover practical cases and the potential consequences of non-compliance with certain cyber hygiene rules;
• separation of work and personal digital spaces.    

Some of the informants expressed personal interest in regular training to monitor threats arising in the information space. Accordingly, the main need of the respondents is to maintain the current level of awareness of information threats, preferably using materials with specific cases.

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Only a few informants have specific requests:  

• information about types of VPNs;    
• ways to protect media sites, including cloud-based ones;    
• ways to store sensitive content;    creating secure channels for information transfer;    
• protection against illegal surveillance, methods of identifying eavesdropping via devices;    
• features of data encryption protocols in messengers;    
• the use of AI to produce fakes and methods of recognising deepfakes;    
• features of IPSO;    
• methods of identifying individuals who complain about content on social networks, leading to the blocking of an organisation's pages (individuals, groups of people, competitors, etc.).

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According to respondents, for users who are just beginning to learn the basics of digital security, it is advisable to use a training format where they can get answers to common questions, while individual consultations are optimal for more advanced users.

Participation in offline training is considered more effective because it allows participants to ask more questions and focus their attention, which is key to effective learning, as well as minimising the impact of power outages. During training in any format, it is advisable to pay attention to specific cases, ideally from the organisations themselves; focus on a single programme used in the organisation; use homework assignments, which together allow for a better understanding of the nuances; and conduct training on different topics for different representatives of the organisation. Only some of the informants require digital security services. Most often, they mention security audits of servers, website admin panels, corporate email, etc. Some respondents emphasised the need to use additional software, in particular cloud storage, which requires more funds. One of the informants mentioned the need for a hotline that can be contacted in case of a breach of the organisation's resources. However, potential barriers to conducting an audit may include a high level of distrust of the organisation conducting it, as well as unwillingness to incur the associated financial costs.

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Only a few informants expressed interest in creating an online platform that would bring together digital security initiatives. First of all, they do not understand the purpose of their involvement, since journalists prefer to contact specialists personally for relevant services when needed. Cybersecurity experts and representatives of civil society organisations showed greater interest. To increase their interest, it is worth explaining how such a platform would work, the conditions for joining it, the sources of funding for the platform, the terms of cooperation, and the degree of its security. According to informants, the platform could perform the following functions:

• round-the-clock support, posting contacts of specialists in various fields;    
• a place to develop training programmes and checklists for organisations that want to solve digital security problems on their own;
• rapid exchange of experience on the latest threats, risk areas, and ways to ensure the digital protection of organisations;    
• publication of digests on trends in the field of information security (current threats, case studies on the consequences of breaches, ways to determine the level of risk to resources, methods for recognising deepfakes, changes in social media policies, software that will help secure an organisation, etc.).

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On August 20th, the issue of ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation, which recommended its adoption. This development effectively paves the way for finalizing nearly a decade-long discussion and addresses the remaining formalities needed to ensure Ukraine's full participation in the activities of this institution. The International Criminal Court (ICC) gained the authority to investigate crimes committed during Russia's war against Ukraine after the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized its jurisdiction through declarations in 2014 and 2015.

This formal step had been delayed for a long time due to political maneuvering, fueled by myths, misconceptions, and the frequent exploitation of the military’s name for political advantage.

Recognizing the need to understand Ukrainian military personnel's perspectives on justice and the ratification of the Rome Statute, the NGO "Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group" (ULAG), in collaboration with the Sociological Group "Rating" and supported by the International Renaissance Foundation, conducted a survey titled "Justice in the Context of Russian Armed Aggression: Military Personnel's Assessments and Attitudes."

The survey targeted active military personnel, with a sample size of 660 respondents. The method used was formalized face-to-face interviews, with a margin of error of no more than 4.0% at a confidence level of 0.95. The survey was conducted between July 25 and August 12, 2024.

The research aimed to capture the views of military personnel using sociological methods rather than through the interpretations and assumptions commonly seen during the preparation for the vote on the ratification bill.

The findings contradict the claims made by politicians regarding military resistance to ratification issues or the establishment of justice in the context of war crimes committed during the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014. 

Attitudes towards the ratification of the Rome Statute

   
• Over 70% of active military personnel who are informed about the Rome Statute back Ukraine's ratification of it, while 15% oppose it. Another 14% remain undecided. Public sentiment aligns with these views, as evidenced by a December 2022 national survey by the Sociological Group "Rating" in collaboration with ULAG, showing that 32% of Ukrainians fully support the ratification and 47% generally favor it. This indicates a broad national consensus on the issue among both the public and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
   
• It is important to note that 40% of surveyed military personnel believe the President of Ukraine bears the primary responsibility for the final decision on ratifying the Rome Statute. Another 40% attribute this responsibility to the Verkhovna Rada, and 8% to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Additionally, 51% of respondents think this decision should primarily reflect public opinion. Nearly 40% say the opinions of military personnel should be considered, just over a fifth believe the views of the senior military command are important, and almost one fifth think veterans' opinions should be taken into account. 
   
• 58% believe that the International Criminal Court can investigate the most serious international crimes committed on Ukrainian territory and hold Ukrainian military and political leaders accountable without the ratification of the Rome Statute. Conversely, 27% think it cannot. Additionally, 15% were unable to provide a definitive answer to this question. 
   
• Among military personnel, there is a high level of understanding and awareness of the workings of the ICC, including the potential benefits and risks associated with investigating war crimes. According to respondents, the most significant advantages of ratifying the Rome Statute include enhanced guarantees for the arrest of individuals by third countries based on ICC warrants (38%) and a positive impact on criminal justice reforms in Ukraine to ensure justice for victims (35%). Among the primary risks of ratification, more than a third of respondents mentioned the obligation to cooperate with the ICC regardless of whose officials are under investigation. Nearly 20% pointed out that the ICC lacks the authority to investigate Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine. Additionally, 14% noted the necessity of contributing financially to the ICC’s budget. About 10% of respondents believe there are no threats associated with ratification. 
   
• Despite a significant demand for information about the progress of investigations and the overall activities of the ICC, surveyed military personnel rate their own level of awareness about the investigation, documentation, and adjudication of war crimes as relatively low. 38% are unaware of the progress of ICC investigations into war crimes. This lack of information correlates with a moderate assessment of the ICC's effectiveness in investigating and adjudicating war crimes: 28% view it as completely or rather effective, 42% as rather or completely ineffective, and 30% are undecided.

Demand and Vision of Justice

   
• Military personnel believe that Ukrainian authorities should prioritize punishing those guilty of severe international crimes (64%), compensating victims (46%), uncovering the truth of events (35%), locating missing persons and repatriating deportees (31%), and purging collaborators from the government (26%).
   
• Nearly 40% of surveyed military personnel believe that ensuring justice for war victims primarily depends on the President, 30% on the International Criminal Court, 28% on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and 27% on Ukrainian citizens. In contrast, the general population of Ukraine attributes more responsibility to governmental bodies: 50% to the President, 37% to the Government, 35% to Parliament, and less to the citizens themselves (21%).
   
• Nearly 90% of military personnel are willing to support investigations into war crimes, regardless of the side that committed them, if it ensures the guaranteed accountability of Russia's top leadership. 
   
• Opinions are divided on which courts should adjudicate war crimes resulting from Russia's aggression: 40% of respondents believe that only Ukrainian courts possess the necessary authority and understanding, while 41% feel that this expertise is found only in foreign courts. 
   
• 53% of military personnel view proceedings in the International Criminal Court as a reflection of the high capability of Ukrainian courts and the potential for synchronizing judicial systems. Conversely, more than a third believe that such proceedings indicate a low capability of Ukrainian courts. 
   
• Almost half of the military personnel surveyed think that special courts with a mix of national and international judges are the most effective way to prosecute war crimes committed by Russia. Additionally, 35% believe international institutions should manage these cases, while 13% see Ukrainian courts as suitable for this role. 
   
• More than 80% of respondents favor establishing a special court system to handle crimes committed during Russia’s war against Ukraine, whereas almost 15% oppose this initiative.
   
• An overwhelming majority (93%) of respondents believe it is crucial to ensure transparency and regular updates to the public and victims about the progress of court cases regarding war crimes. Nearly half think the International Criminal Court should be responsible for this. Additionally, 29% believe either Ukrainian media or the Supreme Court of Ukraine should handle the updates, while 27% suggest the office of Ukraine's Prosecutor General should do so.

The study was carried out as part of the project "Investigation of key problems and consideration of expert opinions in the development of the reintegration strategy" implemented the Institute for Peace and Common Ground (IPCG) with the support of ISAR Ednannia within the framework of the project "Initiative of sectoral support of civil society", which is implemented by ISAR Ednannia in a consortium with the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) and Center for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM) thanks to the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development.

Assessment of the situation

   
• Over 80% of surveyed individuals believe that the economic situation in the country has worsened over the last year, 10% feel it has remained the same, and 2% see an improvement.
   
• According to 64% of respondents, the political situation in the country has deteriorated; 22% think it has stayed the same, while 7% report improvements.
   
• 57% of participants noted a decline in their confidence about the future; for a quarter, there has been no change over the last year, and nearly 10% feel more confident, with the highest percentage among the oldest age group.

Ten percent of respondents were undecided.

   
• The financial situation of families has worsened for 60%, remained unchanged for 35%, and improved for 4%. Improvements are more frequently reported by respondents under the age of 30.
   
• An increase has also been observed in the proportion of those perceiving deterioration across all assessed areas, with the most significant rise noted among those who perceive a decline in the political situation—14%.

Losses due to war 

   
• The most common losses due to the war include deterioration in mental and emotional health (49%) and worsening of physical health (39%). About a quarter of the respondents experienced loss of income and family separation. Twenty percent reported the death of a loved one or job loss. Respondents living in combat zones more frequently reported experiencing these losses. Deterioration of health is more common among respondents over 50 years old and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
   
• The worst damage caused by Russian armed aggression, according to respondents, includes the death of civilians (72%), the death of military personnel (70%), and physical injuries leading to disabilities (31%).
   
• Priority for damage compensation should be directed to the relatives of the deceased (68%); individuals who lost homes and property (44%); individuals who have been in captivity (38%), and those who suffered physical injuries (36%). About 30% believe that veterans should be prioritized for compensation; one-fifth think it should be directed to the relatives of the missing.
   
• About 60% of respondents consider it inappropriate to provide support to Ukrainians living abroad, while 37% believe it should be offered. Support is more often favored by respondents from combat zones, the youth, and those with experience of displacement and migration.

Understanding of Justice

   
• For half of the respondents, the concept of justice is associated with the punishment of those guilty of crimes, with older respondents finding this especially relevant. For 30%, justice means establishing the truth about all events; for 15%, it involves compensating all victims, a view more commonly held by younger people.
   
• 76% of respondents believe that achieving justice without the arrest and trial of those responsible for the attack on Ukraine and war crimes is impossible in the near future. Another 20% believe it is possible to achieve justice without these conditions.
   
• The priority for Ukrainian authorities and society in ensuring justice for the victims should be to hold the guilty accountable (50%), to remove/prevent from power those who collaborated with the occupiers (43%), and to find the missing and return deported individuals (33%). Compared to last year, the role of obtaining financial compensation has increased: 30% now see it as a priority for ensuring justice, compared to 23% last year.
   
• According to respondents, the establishment of justice for victims and those affected by the war largely depends on the President (50%), the Government (37%), and Parliament (35%). About 20% of respondents attribute a primary role to Ukrainian citizens and international institutions.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents believe that along with judicial proceedings, additional mechanisms for ensuring justice should be applied (lustration commissions, establishing the truth about war events, compensation for victims). Most respondents (86%) believe that such mechanisms should operate throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.
   
• The legality and legitimacy of these institutions will be ensured by their creation based on an agreement between Ukraine and several other countries, according to 39% of respondents. 22% believe that this will be influenced by the creation of these institutions through amendments to the Constitution and legislation, and another 16% think that the activities of additional institutions should be approved by UN structures.
   
• The question of the justification of vigilantism against those guilty of war crimes is ambiguous among respondents: 48% consider vigilantism justified, while 50% hold the opposite view.
   
• An overwhelming majority (95%) of respondents believe it is important to ensure transparency and regular information for citizens and victims about the progress of court cases regarding war crimes.

Perceptions of reintegration

   
• 77% of respondents support the introduction of an international temporary administration to facilitate the adaptation process in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, while 18% are against this idea.
   
• According to the majority of those surveyed (84%), measures to support and establish connections with the population remaining in the occupied territories should already be implemented by the state. It is believed by 46% that such initiatives should be directed only at those who support Ukraine, while 38% think they should be directed at everyone remaining in the occupied territories. It is indicated by 9% that such measures are not a priority, and another 5% believe that resources definitely should not be allocated for this by the state. 
   
• Among the support measures for the population remaining in the temporarily occupied territories, priorities include facilitating the relocation of people from these areas (35%); providing social and pension payments to those who remain (34%); and ensuring the broadcasting of Ukrainian media (33%). Other necessary measures include the recognition of documents issued during the occupation (28%), engaging the youth from these territories (26%), and organizing access to state services (24%)—a quarter of respondents see these as priorities.
   
• 55% of respondents believe that restrictions on rights (such as the right to vote, hold certain positions, or conduct business) should not be applied to residents of occupied territories, while 41% hold the opposite view. Regarding the appropriateness of restricting rights for Ukrainian citizens who have moved abroad, 29% of respondents find it appropriate, whereas 67% are against such initiatives.
   
• Regarding the acquisition of Russian citizenship being justifiable, 13% of respondents completely agree, while an additional 42% somewhat agree. 39% of respondents hold the opposite view. Those who agree more often with the justification for acquiring Russian citizenship are respondents who have relatives in the occupied territories. 

Perceptions of collaborative activities

   
• The activities most commonly associated with collaboration by respondents include holding leadership positions in the occupational authorities (48%), participating in the organization of so-called elections and referendums (46%), and serving in the occupational armed forces (44%). One-third of respondents consider serving in law enforcement, judicial bodies, or any positions within the occupational local government as collaboration.
   
• 46% of respondents believe that any cooperation with the occupational administrations should be criminally prosecuted, while 52% think only cooperation that led to severe consequences and crimes should be. The proportion of those who see the need for criminal accountability for any cooperation has decreased by 6% compared to the 2023 survey.
   
• The majority of respondents (65%) believe that as a punishment for interacting with the occupational authorities, restrictions on holding certain positions may be applied. About 30% consider fines appropriate. Approximately 20% think that restrictions on participating in public life and community service could serve as punishment.
   
• Punishments for collaborating with occupational administrations, such as being permanently banned from holding public positions or conducting business activities, are seen as indefinite by 63% of respondents. Another 33% believe these should be time-limited.
   
• 60% of respondents think that the degree and non-criminal forms of punishment for collaborative activities should be determined by the court. About a quarter believe that such decisions should be made by local authorities; directly by community residents, while around 20% think the victims and their relatives should decide. Active community participation is more relevant for older respondents, while the role of courts and local authorities is more pertinent for the younger generation.

Amnesty

   
• According to about 40% of respondents, amnesty could be granted under conditions such as performing community service to help rebuild the country and for crimes that did not result in the loss of life. Providing important and truthful testimonies, as well as compensating the victims, could be grounds for amnesty, according to about a quarter of those surveyed. Voluntary confession to a specific crime could also be a condition, as stated by 18% of respondents. Meanwhile, 14% believe that amnesty for those guilty of committing war crimes during the conflict is impossible under any circumstances. 

Vision of the future

   
• Among the initiatives that respondents are willing to support for stabilizing the situation in the country after the war, 28% are ready to support maintaining the status of autonomy for Crimea. 23% are willing to support the establishment of a transitional administration under the auspices of the UN in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, and 19% support granting these territories expanded economic powers. 17% are ready to support granting the liberated territories of Donbas the status of autonomy. 20% are not ready to support any of these initiatives.
   
• The idea of implementing an international temporary administration in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, which were occupied in 2014, to ensure the adaptation process and gradual return of these territories, is supported by nearly 80% of respondents.
   
• 88% of respondents believe that Ukraine has a shared future with the residents of the territories that were occupied in 2022. 73% see a shared future with the residents of Crimea and Donbas that were occupied in 2014.
   
• 82% of respondents mention the need for a national discussion among representatives from different regions of Ukraine on the format of a shared future after the liberation of the occupied territories; another 14% do not see such a need.
   
• More than half of the respondents believe that the discussion should begin after the end of the war, while 30% think the process should start now. Another 19% indicated that discussions should begin after the situation at the front stabilizes. 51% see Ukrainian citizens as the initiators of the process, 34% local authorities, 32% national authorities, and 30% civic organizations.

Commemoration of memory

   
• 70% of respondents participated in events honoring the memory of those affected and killed due to Russian aggression: 37% in cases involving close people or themselves personally, and 33% in official events at the state or community level. 30% did not participate in such events. Residents of the western and central regions more often reported participation in memorial events.
   
• The issue of historical memory and corresponding state policy is important to 90% of respondents.
   
• 93% of respondents agree with the statement that Ukraine must now properly honor the memory of the victims of Russian armed aggression, including through various national and local initiatives.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents view the renaming of cities, streets, or squares in honor of fallen soldiers, military personnel, and veterans positively. About 80% positively view renaming places in honor of volunteers, and 67% in honor of civilians.
   
• According to about 40% of respondents, national government bodies should coordinate initiatives to honor the memory of victims of Russian aggression. This role should also be assigned to local authorities (33%), victims and their family members (32%), civic organizations (25%), associations of victims (19%), and the church and religious figures (5%).