News and Press releases

The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition that was launched and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted annually. This year, the project was conducted in 35 countries.

A total of 35,882 people were interviewed worldwide. In each country, a representative sample of about 1,000 was surveyed in October-December 2024. In Ukraine, the survey was conducted by the Rating Group for the second time for this project. The first topic of the study: expectations for the new year 2025.

• Ukrainians expect that in general, the new year 2025 will be better than 2024, but they expect the economic situation to deteriorate in the new year. In general, assessments of the future have become less optimistic compared to last year: a new wave of the survey conducted by the Rating Group in cooperation with Gallup International showed that Ukrainians' expectations for the next year are somewhat worse than they were last year.

• Currently, 45% of Ukrainians expect that 2025 will be better than 2024, another 27% expect deterioration, and 20% believe it will be the same. 8% have not decided on their expectations for 2025. Compared to last year, estimates have shifted to more pessimistic expectations. Last year, 51% had positive expectations (6% more than last year), and 17% had negative expectations (10% less than last year).

• Globally, Ukraine ranks 15th among the countries with the most positive expectations for 2025.

• Ukraine ranks 19th in the Net Hopes Index, with Colombia, Kenya, and Sweden three positions ahead.

• The leaders in the Net Hope Index ranking are Saudi Arabia, China, and Kosovo.

• Compared to other Eastern European countries, Ukraine ranks first in the ranking at 17%, while other countries in the region have negative values of the index: -14% in Poland, -15% in Bulgaria, -21% in Serbia, and -38% in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• The most optimistic in their expectations is the group aged 65+: among them, 54% have optimistic expectations for the next year. On the other hand, young people aged 18-24 mostly do not expect any changes - 33% of them believe that 2025 will be the same as 2024. Expectations for the next year also depend on the respondent's financial situation: the more affluent the respondents, the smaller the share of the group expecting the situation to worsen in 2025.

• At the same time, the vast majority of respondents expect economic difficulties in the country in the new year: 63% expect economic difficulties, only 13% expect economic prosperity, while 20% believe that the economic situation will not change, and 5% are undecided. Compared to the last year, expectations about the economic situation in the country have also deteriorated somewhat: last year, 17% of Ukrainians hoped for economic prosperity, 52% expected difficulties, and 29% did not expect any changes.

• Expectations about the economic situation for the next year among Ukrainians are generally worse compared to other Eastern European countries, as only a third (35%) of these countries expect economic difficulties in the region as a whole.

• Ukraine is ranked 32nd in the Economic Prosperity Expectations Index, being among the three countries with the lowest scores: in addition to Ukraine, these are Germany (33rd) and Australia (34th). Poland (31st) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (30th) are two steps higher.

• The leaders in the Prosperity Expectations Index are Saudi Arabia, China, and Indonesia.

• Ukrainian young people aged 18-24 show the highest positive expectations for the country's economic situation next year.

•             According to the nationwide survey carried out by the Sociological Group “Rating” on the initiative of the Ukrainian Veterans Fund of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine on 5-6 December 2024, 54% of the polled indicated that among their relatives and friends there were those who took part in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine from 2014 to 2021. 71% have among their relatives those who have fought or are fighting at the front since 24 February 2022. Compared to previous surveys, since 2022, the number of those whose relatives are currently fighting at the front has been increasing.

•             40% of respondents allow that they may become a veteran in the future, 56% share the opposite opinion. Residents of the Central and Western regions, the youngest respondents, men, and those who have relatives and friends who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting were the most likely to consider becoming a veteran.

•             The highest levels of trust towards the military continue to be recorded in society. At the same time, there are significant differences in the level of trust by category of military. Specifically, 96% trust ATO veterans who are now fighting again, 91% trust veterans of the current war, and 88% trust veterans of the ATO (JFO) of 2014-2021. In the military category, 94% trust the Armed Forces personnel serving on the frontline, 76% trust those serving in the rear (not the TRC - territorial army recruitment centers). By contrast, 67% of respondents do not trust the military personnel of the TRC, while 29% trust them. Regarding the latter, the highest level of distrust is recorded among residents of the Western and border regions, the youngest generation, and men. 

•             Among the risks that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war may face after returning from service, the top three are psycho-emotional instability, physical health problems and difficulties in obtaining medical care, lack of inclusive space and adapted workplaces for people with disabilities, as well as problems with obtaining social benefits and conflicts in the family. The respondents also consider the lack of social understanding, unemployment, alcohol or drug abuse, and the incompatibility of military experience with civilian life to be quite likely. About half of the respondents noted the risk of suicide among veterans and the risk of them breaking the law and engaging in crime. Compared to the survey in March 2024, the number of those who see risks in alcohol and drug abuse, lawbreaking, and involvement in crime has increased. Expectations of risks related to unemployment and suicide have somewhat decreased. Relatives of veterans who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting are relatively more likely to experience these problems. 

•             64% of respondents said that the image of veterans in the Ukrainian media is mostly positive. 20% said it was rather neutral. Only 4% mentioned a negative image of veterans in the media. On the other hand, 36% said that the image of veterans in real life does not correspond to the one portrayed in the media. 58% shared the opposite opinion. Those who have relatives who have fought in the ATO/JFO since 2014 were more likely to mention the discrepancy between the image of veterans in real life and the media.

•             The number of those who believe that the state fulfils its obligations to veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war continues to decline: in August 2022, the number of such people was 69%, in January 2023 - 53%, in September 2023 - 33%, in March 2024 - 25%, and in December 2024 - 25%. Today, the number of those who think otherwise is 68%. Residents of the Western and border regions, as well as those who have relatives who have fought since 2014 and are currently fighting, are most likely to have a negative opinion of the state's obligations to veterans.

•             Among those who believe that the state fails to fulfil its obligations to veterans, the majority (59%) believe that the Verkhovna Rada is the institution that primarily fails to fulfil its obligations (59%). 30% said that the Cabinet of Ministers does not fulfil its obligations, 28% - the President, 27% - local councils and executive committees, 19% - ministries and departments.

•             78% of respondents believe that society today respects veterans. Compared to the survey conducted in March 2024, the number of respondents has slightly increased (76% in March). Today, 17% share the opposite opinion. The number of such respondents is higher among those who have relatives who have fought in the ATO/JFO since 2014, residents of the Western and border regions.

•             53% believe that government programmes to create inclusive (accessible) space and infrastructure for people with disabilities are ineffective. 37% share the opposite opinion. Residents of the frontline and central regions, older people (51+), and relatives of those who fought in the ATO and those who are currently fighting were more likely to say that such programmes are ineffective.

•             The number of those who said they were well or rather well informed about the problems of veterans has not changed compared to March 2024 (56%). 43% said they were not informed. The number of the latter is higher among the residents of the border regions, older people, and those who do not have relatives or friends who are fighting.

 In September 2024, the Sociological Group Rating conducted a survey commissioned by the OSCE among young people aged 16-35 on assessments of youth centres and spaces and opportunities for young people in Ukraine.  

Key results: 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH

• About a third of young people believe they have enough opportunities for self-fulfilment both in their locality and in Ukraine as a whole. 

• Compared to other categories of young people, opportunities for self-realization in Ukraine are generally more positively assessed by young people from regional centres; Kyiv city, central and western regions; and young people under 21 years of age.

• Opportunities for activities related to leisure, education and creativity are rated positively (50% or more report having such opportunities), while opportunities for economic activity are rated lower.

• In general, regional centres, Kyiv, and entrepreneurs rate economic possibilities for young people better.

• Young people from eastern regions and rural areas see the least opportunities for self-realisation in their localities.

• The presence of a youth centre in a settlement contributes to a better assessment of opportunities in general and an assessment of opportunities for self-fulfilment of young people in this locality.

• If there is a youth centre or space in the town/village, young people are much better at assessing opportunities for leisure and art.

VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS 

• Their safety, the safety of their relatives and the independence of Ukraine are among the most important priorities of young people. Security is more important for residents of the eastern regions, as well as for women. At the same time, equal opportunities are somewhat more important for young men. 

• Corruption, energy challenges, low income, and mobilization are the primary concerns nowadays, according to Ukrainian youth. Mobilization is more frequently identified as an issue by men, particularly those aged 26-30. However, for young women, the issues of low income and unemployment are more pressing.

• Youth from rural areas are more likely to highlight economic challenges, including low income and unemployment.

• Young people with Internally Displaced Person (IDP) status are three times more likely to point out the lack of housing as a problem.

AVAILABILITY AND ASSESSMENT OF YOUTH CENTERS AND SPACES

• 47% of young people report that there are youth centers and spaces in their localities. Another 28% are unaware of such spaces. 25% indicate that no such spaces exist. 

• There is a significant settlement gap. Among residents of regional centres, the majority (58%) report that such a centre exists in their city, while in rural areas, the majority (60%) indicate that no such centre is available. 

• At the same time, respondents from areas where such centres exist generally view them as a “safe space,” and most acknowledge their impact on young people's lives. However, opinions about the ability of youth centres to help young people find employment are nearly evenly split. In general, the more frequently young people visit these centres, the more they perceive their positive influence

EXPERIENCE OF VISITING YOUTH CENTRES

• 19% of respondents have visited youth centres at least once over the past few years. 

• The results of the quantitative research indicate that the primary audience for youth centres consists of:

- Youth under 25 years old

- More often women

- More often residents of regional centres

- More often students, public sector employees, and young entrepreneurs

- Those engaged in volunteer activities

- Individuals who study or live near the centre

• Among those who have visited youth centres, 42% are supporters (willing to recommend the centre to others), 21% are critics of youth centres, and 37% hold a neutral stance.

• Supporters are more prevalent among women, as well as those who visit the centres more frequently.

• While older individuals visit youth centres less often than younger ones, those older visitors who have started to attend demonstrate strong loyalty to the centres. 

• There is a slight increase in supporters among those who view the primary advantage of youth centres as being a “safe space.”

ADVANTAGES OF VISITING YOUTH CENTRES 

• Visitors to youth centres and spaces identify opportunities for socialisation, personal development, and leisure activities as some of the key benefits of attending.

• When discussing the benefits of youth centres, visitors from rural areas are more likely to highlight development opportunities and emphasize the centres' role as a safe space for youth. 

• Those who visit the centres more frequently generally mention more advantages, particularly citing the ability to organise their events and the comfortable environment. 

• Young people over 25 are more inclined to emphasise development opportunities as a key benefit of the centres. In contrast, younger individuals (under 25) tend to view youth centres as platforms for initiatives, particularly in terms of public engagement and organising their activities.

• Women value youth centres more than men for the opportunity to engage in social participation and for being safe spaces for young people. In contrast, men were slightly more likely to highlight advantages such as the ability to organise their activities and the opportunity to make new friends and find like-minded individuals.

BARRIERS TO ATTENDING YOUTH CENTRES 

• Those who have not visited youth centres primarily cite lack of free time, insufficient information about the centre, and the absence of a youth centre in their town or village as the main reasons. 

• Residents of rural areas are significantly more likely than those from other types of localities to mention the lack of a local youth centre as a key reason for not attending.

• Young people aged 16-21 often express that there is nothing of interest for them at youth centres, and they also mention the lack of companions to go there with. Older individuals tend to cite the lack of free time as their main barrier.

• Importantly, 68% of respondents indicated they would be more likely to visit a youth centre if one were to open near their place of residence. Among those who have never visited, around 65% said they would be willing to go under such circumstances.

USAGE OF YOUTH CENTRE SERVICES 

• 15% of respondents stated that they have used youth centre services at least once, with the services primarily focused on leisure activities, cultural development, and personal growth. Among those who have visited youth centres multiple times, 80% have utilized such services.

• Residents of rural areas more often used informational services and psychological counselling. In contrast, people in cities preferred leisure services, non-formal education, and career counselling.

• Young people aged 16-25 were more likely to participate in leisure activities and developmental programs. For the older group (26-35), cultural events and informational services were more popular.

• Informational services had little impact on loyalty to youth centres. However, there was a clear difference between supporters and critics when it came to cultural programs, developmental activities, and especially psychological counselling.

• 84% gave positive feedback about some services they received at youth centers.

• The most satisfied groups were:

- Women

- People who used youth center services multiple times

- Young people who sought psychological counselling, cultural activities, and developmental programs.

REQUESTS FOR YOUTH CENTER ACTIVITIES 

• When asked about preferred activities in youth centers, respondents most often mentioned military medical training, events for parents with children, and psychological support. At the same time, people who visited youth centers frequently showed a higher interest in creative workshops.

• The primary objectives of youth centres, as identified by respondents, include fostering intellectual development, promoting youth employment, and encouraging a healthy lifestyle.

• According to the respondents, the top priorities for youth centres should be education and self-development, national and civic education, sports and health, as well as psychological support. Psychological support must hold greater significance for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women.

• In eastern regions, activities for parents with children are more commonly mentioned. It is also observed among rural residents. Additionally, such activities tend to appeal more to older youth, whereas younger individuals are more interested in entertainment.

• Women place higher importance on events for parents with children and creative workshops. In contrast, men show a greater interest in sports-related events.

• Regarding activities, young people serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) frequently highlight the importance of sports and health initiatives as well as national-patriotic education. 

COMMUNICATION WITH YOUTH CENTRES

• 62% of respondents have at least some awareness of the activities of youth centres. Women, residents of central and western regions, and individuals living in cities with established youth centres tend to be better informed.

• 18% of respondents follow youth centres on social media. Among regular visitors to these centres, this figure rises to 70%. The most followed platforms are Instagram, Facebook, and Telegram. Men are more likely to use Telegram, while women prefer Instagram and Facebook.

• 70% of followers of youth centre pages have a positive perception of the content published. Women tend to rate it slightly higher.

• 13% of these followers frequently share content from these pages, while 59% do so occasionally.

• Female subscribers, individuals aged 16-21, and TikTok users are relatively more likely to share content. If the content is engaging, the likelihood of it being shared increases significantly.

• Followers of youth centre pages rate the communication style, the interest and usefulness of the information, and the design most positively, whereas interaction with followers receives lower scores.

• The strongest connection between content preference and evaluation criteria is observed with the interest and usefulness of information and the communication style. Statistically, the communication style is the most impactful factor—content with an appealing communication style is shared more frequently.

MIGRATION

• 32% of surveyed youth expressed a desire to move abroad if given the opportunity, while 45% indicated they would not. People from eastern regions, small towns, internally displaced persons (IDPs), men, individuals aged 22-25, and students are more inclined to seek relocation.

• The primary motivations for migration include safety, higher earning potential, and opportunities for children. Additionally, better living conditions and the ability to travel are relatively significant factors. 

• The issue of migration from rural areas is primarily driven by economic factors: rural residents wishing to move abroad frequently cite the potential for higher earnings and improved employment opportunities as their main reasons.

• Compared to other age groups, individuals aged 16-21 are more often motivated to relocate by aspirations for better living conditions, opportunities for self-realisation, career prospects, and access to quality education.

• From a gender perspective, women are more likely to justify their desire to move abroad with concerns for safety and opportunities for their children, while men often emphasize travel opportunities and prospects for personal development.

SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT OF YOUTH 

• 73% of respondents believe they lack the ability to influence local government decisions. Respondents residing in large cities and those who are members of civil social organizations (SOs) are comparatively more optimistic about their potential to make an impact. Young people frequently involved in volunteering also have a more positive view of their ability to influence local authorities.

• 60% of youth reported participating in volunteer or community service activities over the past year: 16% frequently, 26% occasionally, and 18% rarely. 

• The highest levels of youth engagement are observed among residents of Kyiv, regional centres, individuals aged 16-21, young entrepreneurs, and students. 

• Most active citizens are observed among individuals who have visited youth centers. At the same time, among those engaged in volunteering, only 8% volunteered specifically at youth centers. Predominantly, these are young people aged 16-25 and those who have visited youth centers multiple times.

• 5% of respondents have undergone internships in local government bodies, and 3% in central government institutions. Among those currently employed in the public sector, this share increases to 10% and 8%, respectively.

• Every fifth respondent considers the possibility of pursuing a career as a youth worker in the future. This perspective is more commonly considered by rural residents, young people aged 16-21, students, individuals currently unemployed, women, those who have frequently visited youth centers, and those actively involved in volunteering.

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The International Republican Institute together with the Sociological Group ‘Rating’ conducted a focus group study "Life in the de-occupied territories through the eyes of residents: problems of reconstruction and priorities for future development".

   Key findings:

   
• Residents who stayed during the      occupation and those who returned after the de-occupation were motivated      by the same reasons – having      a family, private property, work, and an emotional connection to home.      While both groups reported feeling afraid of danger in the occupied      settlements, the level of fear was lower than that of the uncertainty of      migration.
   
• Residents face a lack of basic      resources and living conditions but demonstrate resilience and a desire to      rebuild their communities.
   
• The economy is recovering      slowly, with a shortage of jobs, and with businesses remaining destroyed.      In the healthcare sector, there is a lack of staff, equipment and      accessible pharmacies.
   
• The proximity to the frontline      and mined areas are serious obstacles to recovery.
   
• Communications, roads, and      housing are priority areas for recovery. The extent of foreign donor      assistance depends on how well known the affected region is.
   
• Education remains remote or      mixed due to the lack of proper shelters, and some schools have closed due      to lack of students and migration.
   
• Older participants are more      interested in participating in the reconstruction process, while younger      people are less interested, in part due to lack of skills and time.
   
• The unwillingness to engage in      the reconstruction process is linked to a lack of trust in local      government and the belief that reconstruction should be carried out by specialised      organisations and people.

 Тhе latest public opinion survey in Ukraine conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) strong majorities believe that Ukraine will defeat Russia in the current war and support recapturing all lost territory.  

   
• Ukrainians are optimistic about winning the conflict with Russia. When asked about an outcome, 88% of Ukrainians said they will win the war. 
     
   
• The poll also found that 71% of adults agree that the government should recapture all lost territory. Further, 64% of Ukrainians are willing to take on a higher burden of the war through increasing military tax from 1.5% to 5%. 

On 28 October 2024, EUAM Ukraine unveiled results from a nationwide public opinion survey conducted by Rating Group for the Mission. Presented at the Ukrinform press centre, the findings highlighted levels of public trust in law enforcement and judiciary, attitudes towards reforms and EU support in these areas, as well as key information sources relied on by Ukrainians. The event featured remarks from Rolf Holmboe, Head of EUAM Ukraine, Oleksii Antypovych, the Head of Rating Group, Mariana Reva, the Head of the Communication Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Kyrylo Viktorov, the Deputy Head of the Center for Countering Disinformation’s Department for Countering Information Threats to National Security.

Trust in Law Enforcement and Judiciary 

According to the survey, the National Guard of Ukraine has the highest public trust among law enforcement agencies, with 86% of respondents expressing confidence, up from 72% in 2023. The Security Service of Ukraine follows with 73%, an increase of 14% from the previous year. 

Other institutions, such as the State Border Guard Service, are trusted by 54%, but 42% of respondents distrust it. Both the National Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have 48% trust, but also considerable levels of distrust (51% and 38% respectively). Trust in the National Police has slightly decreased since 2023 (down from 56%). 

The State Bureau of Investigation has a 45% trust rate, with 50% expressing distrust. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Prosecutor General's Office, and the State Customs Service share similar trust levels (around 33%), while over 60% do not trust these institutions. 

Finally, the judiciary holds the lowest level of trust, with only 25% expressing confidence and 72% showing distrust. 

Attitudes Towards Reforms and EU’s Support 

The survey shows that 74% of respondents view fighting corruption as the most critical reform. Reforms in national security, defence, and the judicial system also garnered 36% support each, while police and customs reforms are priorities for 10% of respondents. 

The digital transformation reform received the highest approval, with 66% of respondents fully or mostly satisfied, 20% dissatisfied, and 13% uncertain. Half of the respondents expressed satisfaction with gender equality initiatives, while 30% were dissatisfied and 21% were undecided. National security reform showed a balance, with 46% satisfied, 47% dissatisfied, and 7% unsure. Police reform left 57% dissatisfied and 40% satisfied. Customs reform saw 56% dissatisfaction, 30% satisfaction, and 15% undecided. Judicial reform had the lowest satisfaction, with 73% dissatisfied and only 21% satisfied, while anti-corruption efforts were rated the poorest, with 15% satisfied and 84% dissatisfied.

When it comes to EU support, assistance to liberated territories (43%), support in investigating war crimes (38%), and ensuring fair justice (31%) rank among the most relevant areas for Ukraine, with fighting corruption leading at 62%. Notably, the survey also shows that among these priorities, EU support for liberated territories is viewed as the most effective, with 48% of respondents rating it positively, and support for war crimes investigations deemed effective by 38%.

Information Sources 

According to the survey, Telegram is the most popular source of information for 47% of respondents, followed by YouTube (26%), the United Marathon (21%), and eyewitness accounts and official government sources (both 19%). Other sources include television channels not part of the United Marathon (16%), Ukrainian online media (15%), and international media (14%). 

Social media is viewed as the main source of disinformation (53%), followed by messenger channels (including Telegram) (35%) and television (32%). 89% of respondents see disinformation as a serious problem, with 56% considering it "very serious" and 33% viewing it as "somewhat serious." Only 10% don’t consider it serious. 

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 29% of Chernihiv residents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction, while 56% believe they are moving in the wrong direction. Meanwhile, 43% of respondents assessed the direction of affairs in Chernihiv as correct, and the same number assessed it as incorrect.
• Sixty-four percent of respondents are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack, while more than 30% hold the opposite view. Over the past two years, the number of those who are confident in Ukraine's ability to repel Russia's attack has decreased (from 93% in December 2022 to 64%).
• 64% believe that it will be impossible to restore friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians some time after the end of the war. 22% believe this will be possible in 20-30 years, 8% in 10-15 years, and 4% within a few years.

• 69% are satisfied with the activities of the acting mayor of Chernihiv, O. Lomako, while 24% are dissatisfied (the satisfaction rate has improved: 59% vs. 69%). 62% are satisfied with the activities of the city council, while 27% are dissatisfied. 23% are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv Regional Military Administration, while 59% are dissatisfied (the satisfaction rate has deteriorated: 59% in December 2022 versus the current 23%). Twenty-two percent are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv city military administration, while 62% are dissatisfied. Twenty-two percent rated the work of the head of the regional military administration, V. Chaus, positively, while 70% rated it negatively. Seventeen percent rated the work of the head of the Chernihiv city military administration, D. Bryzhynsky, positively, while 68% rated it negatively.
• 70% believe that the acting mayor, O. Lomako, is effectively performing the duties of mayor. 20% have the opposite opinion.
• 60% consider the activities of the city military administration in Chernihiv to be rather ineffective. 26% rated it as effective.
• 71% of respondents believe that the activities of Chernihiv Acting Mayor Oleksandr Lomako contribute to the development of the city, while 14% hold the opposite view.
• Fifteen percent consider the activities of the city's military administration, led by Dmytro Bryzhynsky, to be beneficial to the city's development. Sixty-four percent believe that it tends to hinder the city's development.
• 19% of respondents believe that the activities of the regional military administration led by Vyacheslav Chaus contribute to the development of the city, while 58% expressed the opposite opinion.
• 84% believe that the elected city council should be responsible for ensuring the city's functioning. 9% believe that this should be done by the appointed city military administration
• 71% support the liquidation of the city military administration headed by Dmytro Bryzinsky and the full restoration of the powers of the city council and executive committee. 10% expressed the opposite opinion—in favor of the complete transfer of the powers of the city council and executive committee to the city military administration.
• 53% believe that the recent searches in the Chernihiv city council and the open criminal proceedings are more likely to be pressure on the local authorities. 37% consider this to be a fight against corruption.
• 94% of respondents support the initiative to strip city council members of their mandates for systematically failing to attend sessions.
• Among local politicians, respondents have the most positive attitude toward V. Atroshenko (84% positive, 11% negative). O. Lomako is viewed positively by 70% and negatively by 21%. V. Chaus is viewed positively by 23% and negatively by 67%. D. Bryzhinsky is viewed positively by 17% and negatively by 63%, while 10% have not heard of him.
• 94% have heard about the decision of the Yavoriv District Court, according to which the mayor of Chernihiv, V. Atroshenko, was deprived of the right to hold the office of mayor for a year (50% have heard a lot, 44% have heard something). 77% of respondents do not support this court decision, 14% expressed their support.
• 77% of respondents believe that this court decision is more of a pressure on local authorities, while 8% consider it a fight against corruption.
• Among the sources of information about the war in Ukraine, the most trusted are channels on Telegram or Viber messengers (47%) and social networks (42%). Stories from eyewitnesses, acquaintances, and Ukrainian online media are trusted by 28-29%, while international media are trusted by 23%. The Telethon (a joint broadcast by Ukrainian TV channels) is trusted by 19%, while TV channels not participating in the Telethon are trusted by 18%.

The Rating Group conducted a study on energy supply in Ukraine, finding that 64% of Ukrainians have a stable electricity supply, while 13% of residents in eastern regions face frequent power cuts. 80% of respondents support the development of nuclear energy, and 95% support increasing the share of alternative energy sources. Most respondents positively assess the actions of the authorities in the energy sector and actively save electricity.

Assessments of the energy supply situation

At the time of the survey, 64% of Ukrainians surveyed had a stable electricity supply, while another 30% reported minimal outages. 4% experience frequent outages, and another 1% experience them constantly. Among the regions, the worst situation is in the eastern regions: 13% of respondents report frequent outages.

Almost 90% of respondents plan to spend the autumn-winter period of 2024 at their permanent place of residence. About 10% plan to move: 4% within the region, 3% within the country, and 2% abroad. Younger respondents and residents of the east are more likely to mention plans to move.

64% of respondents said that nuclear power plants currently provide the largest share of electricity production in Ukraine. Thermal power plants are the main energy producers, according to 7% of respondents. Hydroelectric and solar power plants were chosen as the main types of generation by 6% of respondents. Wind power plants – 1%.

Assessments of government actions

Among the measures taken by the government to improve the situation in the Ukrainian energy sector, the respondents are most aware of the restoration of destroyed energy facilities (50%), the attraction of funds and energy equipment from international partners (38%), and the strengthening of protection for energy facilities (36%). Between 19% and 20% of respondents are aware of the development of distributed generation and increased electricity imports. Eight per cent are unaware of any of these measures. Younger groups are generally more aware of measures aimed at improving the energy situation.

Sixty-six per cent of respondents consider the government's actions to improve the energy situation to be effective: 12% consider them to be completely effective, and 54% consider them to be somewhat effective. Thirty per cent consider the actions to be ineffective (23% rated them as somewhat ineffective, and 7% as completely ineffective).

Attitudes towards nuclear energy

Almost 80% of respondents consider the development of nuclear energy to be necessary (38% - definitely necessary, 40% - rather necessary), 12% consider it rather unnecessary, and 5% - definitely unnecessary.

Almost 80% of respondents have a positive opinion of the initiative to complete the construction of nuclear power units at the Khmelnytskyi NPP (41% have a very positive opinion, 36% have a somewhat positive opinion). 17% oppose this initiative. Young people and residents of eastern regions are most supportive of the completion of the power units.

Alternative energy sources

The vast majority of respondents (95%) support the idea of increasing the share of electricity generated by alternative sources (solar and wind power plants, etc.) in Ukraine's overall energy structure.

Electricity consumption practices

93% of respondents said they always pay their electricity bills on time. 6% pay their bills on time from time to time. 1% said they do not pay their bills on time.

The vast majority (96%) of respondents try to use electricity sparingly: 74% try to do so always, and 22% do so from time to time. 4% do not try to save.

83% of respondents consider it appropriate to introduce financial compensation for reducing electricity consumption as a mechanism to encourage energy saving. 15% consider such an initiative unnecessary. Older respondents are more likely to support the introduction of this mechanism.

The study assessed the level of integrity on a scale from 0 (no integrity culture) to 10 (very high integrity culture). The highest scores were given to the President of Ukraine and the education sector (6.0), followed by the healthcare sector (5.4) and local government authorities (5.1). Civil service integrity was rated at 4.9 points, the police at 4.3, and the courts at 3.7 points.

The image of a statesman

Among the traits and characteristics that a civil servant should possess, integrity ranks first, with 60% of surveyed Ukrainians considering it important. This trait is most frequently mentioned by city dwellers and older participants.

Around half of the respondents believe that experience and competence are necessary qualities, while 46% consider intelligence and education to be essential. Incorruptibility and patriotism are valued by 36-37%, with younger respondents more frequently emphasising incorruptibility. Simplicity and approachability are important to 30% of respondents, with this trait being more commonly mentioned by those living in rural areas.

Nearly one in five respondents highlighted the importance of qualities such as hard work, a principled stance, and leadership abilities. Hard work was more often selected by those in rural areas, while leadership was prioritised by younger individuals and city residents. 

Flexibility, energy, and courage are important traits for 15% of respondents, while oratory skills and communication abilities are valued by 10%. The least frequently chosen traits were influence, cunning, youth, charisma, and a sense of humour, with only up to 5% selecting these characteristics. 

Compared to measurements taken in June 2019, a larger portion of respondents now value incorruptibility, patriotism, and experience. Meanwhile, the proportion of those who highlighted courage, leadership, and hard work has slightly decreased.

Evaluation of Integrity 

The study assessed the level of integrity on a scale from 0 (no integrity culture) to 10 (very high integrity culture). The highest scores were given to the President of Ukraine and the education sector (6.0), followed by the healthcare sector (5.4) and local government authorities (5.1). Civil service integrity was rated at 4.9 points, the police at 4.3, and the courts at 3.7 points. The lowest scores for integrity were given to the Cabinet of Ministers (3.3) and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Younger people and rural residents generally gave higher ratings of integrity across most sectors.

Half of the respondents believe that honesty should be one of the core principles guiding civil servants, with this view being more prevalent among residents of small towns, villages, and older respondents. Additionally, 38% stated that responsibility should be a key principle, while 34% pointed to professionalism, a trait more frequently mentioned by city residents. One in four respondents stressed the importance of transparency in the work of civil servants, with urban dwellers, youth, and middle-aged respondents more likely to mention it. Effective communication with citizens was highlighted by 16%, regular reporting on performance by 12%, speed in decision-making by 7%, and openness to criticism by 4%. 

According to 45% of respondents, civil servants primarily act based on personal gain, while around 20% believe they are guided by official instructions. A third of respondents believe that civil servants are influenced by both personal interests and official guidelines. 

The majority of respondents (77%) believe that increasing penalties for corruption would enhance the integrity of civil servants. A third think that banning individuals from public service after being caught in corruption would improve integrity. Twenty percent see strict punishment for those offering bribes as an effective measure. Increasing the frequency of corruption inspections was viewed as effective by 16%, improving transparency in reporting and digitising decision-making processes by 14%, raising civil servants' salaries by 8%, and introducing principles of anonymity and collegiality in decision-making by 2% and 4%, respectively. 

The study was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the NGO Internews Ukraine. The report was prepared based on the results of in-depth interviews with journalists, representatives of civil society organisations, and digital security experts.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, threats in the information space have intensified. On the one hand, informants note a significant increase in the number of cyberattacks on media resources, the spread of fake information on social networks, and information and psychological special operations (hereinafter referred to as IPSO) in general. On the other hand, cybersecurity experts and representatives of civil society organisations often speak not so much about the emergence of qualitatively new threats as about the growing interest and intensity of malicious actors in hacking resources and conducting IPSO.

An obvious factor in the increase in threats is the armed and information aggression on the part of the Russian Federation, whose special services are most often mentioned by informants among the beneficiaries of cyberattacks. Other attackers mentioned include individual representatives of the Ukrainian authorities (more often as figures in anti-corruption journalistic investigations), Ukrainian special services (as tools in the hands of unscrupulous Ukrainian officials), and fraudsters (in particular transnational groups). In addition to the intensification of the war itself, respondents note the development of technologies, in particular artificial intelligence (hereinafter referred to as AI), which lead to a quantitative and qualitative increase in fake information, as well as an intensification of cyberattacks.

Another factor is the spread and penetration of social networks among the Ukrainian population, resulting in a relative decline in the average level of information literacy, an increased risk of hacking into the accounts of relatives and acquaintances of journalists, and, accordingly, an increase in threats to personal digital security. Among the particular dangers, journalists mention increased pressure on them and, as a result, the spread of self-censorship due to fears about the possible consequences of publishing certain materials. These processes are leading to the erosion of journalism as a whole due to a general decline in trust in the institution, which in the long term will threaten the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine.

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The increase in threats is leading to stricter digital security requirements, for which media and civil society organisations are unprepared. Over the past 2-3 years, informants have faced DDoS, phishing and virus attacks, resulting in the hacking of access to website admin panels, social media pages and servers storing data, including sensitive data.

Despite measures aimed at strengthening digital security, informants note the relevance of threats such as personal data leaks, the creation of fake channels on social networks and messengers that mimic real ones, the construction of high-quality deepfakes using AI, eavesdropping and external surveillance, including GPS tracking, and massive cyberattacks. Only a few respondents believe that their organisation has a high level of protection.

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According to digital security experts, the state of an organisation's digital protection directly depends on the intensity of personal cyber hygiene practices. The study showed that informants mostly say they are familiar with the basic rules, among which they most often mention those related to passwords for websites and pages (generating and regularly updating complex passwords through managers, two-factor authentication), and are cautious when receiving messages via electronic means of communication. Only a few respondents add to this list the use of antivirus software, VPNs, creating backups of information, and reading technical documentation when installing programmes (which remains largely selective), using and regularly updating licensed software, preventing documents from being downloaded to personal devices, and transferring work exclusively to the Internet. Despite general awareness of the existence of digital security rules, informants note that they and their colleagues often do not fully comply with them. Among the reasons most often cited are that the implementation of changes leads to a disruption of the usual way of life and work, which initially causes aversion, a feeling of lack of strength and time; lack of motivation, exacerbated by the unwillingness to identify oneself as a potential victim of attackers who are supposedly not interested in the activities of local organisations; lack of funding for programmes and devices that provide more reliable digital protection, as well as isolated cases of technical problems with generated complex passwords due to power outages and/or malfunctions in gadget operating systems.

A weak point in the organisation of personal digital security remains the fact that journalists unconsciously distinguish between services that are necessary for their professional activities and those they use in their free time (mostly for entertainment). Accordingly, they do not apply digital security rules to such programmes and applications. Some of the organisations surveyed have a separate digital security policy, while others do not have a formalised policy but take individual measures to implement digital security. There are various ways of familiarising employees with digital security rules, including direct communication between the security service and individual departments (divisions) of the organisation and/or system administrators, familiarisation during onboarding, regular training and instruction on information security (both internal and external), and sending instructions through organisational communication channels (both one-off and regular). Information security rules are usually limited to basic instructions on how to handle the resources and services that the organisation works with. Only some organisations have enhanced security rules, including protocols for responding to account or server hacking, restrictions on access to organisational resources and working from personal devices, and the use of backup clouds and closed servers. Some organisations have a dedicated security service responsible for preventing digital security breaches and responding to such incidents. Only a few organisations attempt to combine technical and social (organisational, personal) aspects of digital security.

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A separate vulnerability in cybersecurity is the services used by journalists for internal communication. Some organisations do not have a policy that defines an exhaustive list of such services, so their employees can use several at the same time. In large companies, employees can use corporate email, Google Drive, Trello, Notion, and various messengers, which creates additional problems and threats. Among messengers, informants most often mention Telegram (while emphasising their understanding of the risks associated with the origin of this resource) and WhatsApp, and less often Facebook, Signal, and Slack messengers. Only some organisations divide communication into work-related communication, which involves the use of documents (mostly via corporate email), and non-work-related communication (mainly via messengers). The reluctance to switch to more secure communication services is related to convenience (the need to send large amounts of information, including photos and videos, limits the range of services available) communication with employees who may be located, in particular, in occupied territory leads to attempts to simplify communication methods) and the costs required to use them.

According to informants, employees in their organisations are usually familiar with phishing protection algorithms. Some respondents noted that they learn about such rules during training sessions conducted either by their own organisation or by a partner organisation specialising in digital security. A smaller number of respondents are not sufficiently familiar with such algorithms, so they solve phishing problems by consulting with the security department or representatives of partner organisations, which usually leads to unnecessary time consumption. Individual technical departments and divisions are more often responsible for organising security measures in organisations. Their competence mostly extends to the organisation of technical parameters and the application of solutions aimed at countering planned mass attacks. In small media and public organisations, individual employees are responsible for security measures: the relevant technical specialist, HR, office manager, department head or head of the organisation. To strengthen digital security in organisations, it is common practice to conduct training (more often in-house, less often with invited organisations specialising in digital security). In some organisations, instead of joint training, individual sessions are organised with the involvement of partner organisations. Opinions on the level of complexity of such training courses were divided: on the one hand, many informants responded that they did not consider such training courses to be complex, while on the other hand, some reported that their colleagues were not personally interested in such events. However, despite the prevalence of personal lack of motivation, all respondents indicated the relevance of the knowledge and skills acquired during such training. According to them, the routine nature of work processes leads to a loss of vigilance, so it is important to regularly remind people of the basic rules of digital security.

According to some informants, the existing measures are sufficient to achieve digital security in general. Other informants mentioned the relevance of such steps, which have been implemented only in some organisations:    

• drawing up an internal security protocol;    
• forming a security department whose task would be to monitor compliance,    
• availability and implementation of automatic security solutions, primarily to prevent threats of mass cyber attacks;    
• increasing the responsibility of individual employees for their own actions;
• allocating funds to improve the security level of the site;
• introduction of periodic training sessions, which would additionally cover practical cases and the potential consequences of non-compliance with certain cyber hygiene rules;
• separation of work and personal digital spaces.    

Some of the informants expressed personal interest in regular training to monitor threats arising in the information space. Accordingly, the main need of the respondents is to maintain the current level of awareness of information threats, preferably using materials with specific cases.

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Only a few informants have specific requests:  

• information about types of VPNs;    
• ways to protect media sites, including cloud-based ones;    
• ways to store sensitive content;    creating secure channels for information transfer;    
• protection against illegal surveillance, methods of identifying eavesdropping via devices;    
• features of data encryption protocols in messengers;    
• the use of AI to produce fakes and methods of recognising deepfakes;    
• features of IPSO;    
• methods of identifying individuals who complain about content on social networks, leading to the blocking of an organisation's pages (individuals, groups of people, competitors, etc.).

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According to respondents, for users who are just beginning to learn the basics of digital security, it is advisable to use a training format where they can get answers to common questions, while individual consultations are optimal for more advanced users.

Participation in offline training is considered more effective because it allows participants to ask more questions and focus their attention, which is key to effective learning, as well as minimising the impact of power outages. During training in any format, it is advisable to pay attention to specific cases, ideally from the organisations themselves; focus on a single programme used in the organisation; use homework assignments, which together allow for a better understanding of the nuances; and conduct training on different topics for different representatives of the organisation. Only some of the informants require digital security services. Most often, they mention security audits of servers, website admin panels, corporate email, etc. Some respondents emphasised the need to use additional software, in particular cloud storage, which requires more funds. One of the informants mentioned the need for a hotline that can be contacted in case of a breach of the organisation's resources. However, potential barriers to conducting an audit may include a high level of distrust of the organisation conducting it, as well as unwillingness to incur the associated financial costs.

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Only a few informants expressed interest in creating an online platform that would bring together digital security initiatives. First of all, they do not understand the purpose of their involvement, since journalists prefer to contact specialists personally for relevant services when needed. Cybersecurity experts and representatives of civil society organisations showed greater interest. To increase their interest, it is worth explaining how such a platform would work, the conditions for joining it, the sources of funding for the platform, the terms of cooperation, and the degree of its security. According to informants, the platform could perform the following functions:

• round-the-clock support, posting contacts of specialists in various fields;    
• a place to develop training programmes and checklists for organisations that want to solve digital security problems on their own;
• rapid exchange of experience on the latest threats, risk areas, and ways to ensure the digital protection of organisations;    
• publication of digests on trends in the field of information security (current threats, case studies on the consequences of breaches, ways to determine the level of risk to resources, methods for recognising deepfakes, changes in social media policies, software that will help secure an organisation, etc.).

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On August 20th, the issue of ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation, which recommended its adoption. This development effectively paves the way for finalizing nearly a decade-long discussion and addresses the remaining formalities needed to ensure Ukraine's full participation in the activities of this institution. The International Criminal Court (ICC) gained the authority to investigate crimes committed during Russia's war against Ukraine after the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized its jurisdiction through declarations in 2014 and 2015.

This formal step had been delayed for a long time due to political maneuvering, fueled by myths, misconceptions, and the frequent exploitation of the military’s name for political advantage.

Recognizing the need to understand Ukrainian military personnel's perspectives on justice and the ratification of the Rome Statute, the NGO "Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group" (ULAG), in collaboration with the Sociological Group "Rating" and supported by the International Renaissance Foundation, conducted a survey titled "Justice in the Context of Russian Armed Aggression: Military Personnel's Assessments and Attitudes."

The survey targeted active military personnel, with a sample size of 660 respondents. The method used was formalized face-to-face interviews, with a margin of error of no more than 4.0% at a confidence level of 0.95. The survey was conducted between July 25 and August 12, 2024.

The research aimed to capture the views of military personnel using sociological methods rather than through the interpretations and assumptions commonly seen during the preparation for the vote on the ratification bill.

The findings contradict the claims made by politicians regarding military resistance to ratification issues or the establishment of justice in the context of war crimes committed during the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014. 

Attitudes towards the ratification of the Rome Statute

   
• Over 70% of active military personnel who are informed about the Rome Statute back Ukraine's ratification of it, while 15% oppose it. Another 14% remain undecided. Public sentiment aligns with these views, as evidenced by a December 2022 national survey by the Sociological Group "Rating" in collaboration with ULAG, showing that 32% of Ukrainians fully support the ratification and 47% generally favor it. This indicates a broad national consensus on the issue among both the public and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
   
• It is important to note that 40% of surveyed military personnel believe the President of Ukraine bears the primary responsibility for the final decision on ratifying the Rome Statute. Another 40% attribute this responsibility to the Verkhovna Rada, and 8% to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Additionally, 51% of respondents think this decision should primarily reflect public opinion. Nearly 40% say the opinions of military personnel should be considered, just over a fifth believe the views of the senior military command are important, and almost one fifth think veterans' opinions should be taken into account. 
   
• 58% believe that the International Criminal Court can investigate the most serious international crimes committed on Ukrainian territory and hold Ukrainian military and political leaders accountable without the ratification of the Rome Statute. Conversely, 27% think it cannot. Additionally, 15% were unable to provide a definitive answer to this question. 
   
• Among military personnel, there is a high level of understanding and awareness of the workings of the ICC, including the potential benefits and risks associated with investigating war crimes. According to respondents, the most significant advantages of ratifying the Rome Statute include enhanced guarantees for the arrest of individuals by third countries based on ICC warrants (38%) and a positive impact on criminal justice reforms in Ukraine to ensure justice for victims (35%). Among the primary risks of ratification, more than a third of respondents mentioned the obligation to cooperate with the ICC regardless of whose officials are under investigation. Nearly 20% pointed out that the ICC lacks the authority to investigate Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine. Additionally, 14% noted the necessity of contributing financially to the ICC’s budget. About 10% of respondents believe there are no threats associated with ratification. 
   
• Despite a significant demand for information about the progress of investigations and the overall activities of the ICC, surveyed military personnel rate their own level of awareness about the investigation, documentation, and adjudication of war crimes as relatively low. 38% are unaware of the progress of ICC investigations into war crimes. This lack of information correlates with a moderate assessment of the ICC's effectiveness in investigating and adjudicating war crimes: 28% view it as completely or rather effective, 42% as rather or completely ineffective, and 30% are undecided.

Demand and Vision of Justice

   
• Military personnel believe that Ukrainian authorities should prioritize punishing those guilty of severe international crimes (64%), compensating victims (46%), uncovering the truth of events (35%), locating missing persons and repatriating deportees (31%), and purging collaborators from the government (26%).
   
• Nearly 40% of surveyed military personnel believe that ensuring justice for war victims primarily depends on the President, 30% on the International Criminal Court, 28% on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and 27% on Ukrainian citizens. In contrast, the general population of Ukraine attributes more responsibility to governmental bodies: 50% to the President, 37% to the Government, 35% to Parliament, and less to the citizens themselves (21%).
   
• Nearly 90% of military personnel are willing to support investigations into war crimes, regardless of the side that committed them, if it ensures the guaranteed accountability of Russia's top leadership. 
   
• Opinions are divided on which courts should adjudicate war crimes resulting from Russia's aggression: 40% of respondents believe that only Ukrainian courts possess the necessary authority and understanding, while 41% feel that this expertise is found only in foreign courts. 
   
• 53% of military personnel view proceedings in the International Criminal Court as a reflection of the high capability of Ukrainian courts and the potential for synchronizing judicial systems. Conversely, more than a third believe that such proceedings indicate a low capability of Ukrainian courts. 
   
• Almost half of the military personnel surveyed think that special courts with a mix of national and international judges are the most effective way to prosecute war crimes committed by Russia. Additionally, 35% believe international institutions should manage these cases, while 13% see Ukrainian courts as suitable for this role. 
   
• More than 80% of respondents favor establishing a special court system to handle crimes committed during Russia’s war against Ukraine, whereas almost 15% oppose this initiative.
   
• An overwhelming majority (93%) of respondents believe it is crucial to ensure transparency and regular updates to the public and victims about the progress of court cases regarding war crimes. Nearly half think the International Criminal Court should be responsible for this. Additionally, 29% believe either Ukrainian media or the Supreme Court of Ukraine should handle the updates, while 27% suggest the office of Ukraine's Prosecutor General should do so.

The study was carried out as part of the project "Investigation of key problems and consideration of expert opinions in the development of the reintegration strategy" implemented the Institute for Peace and Common Ground (IPCG) with the support of ISAR Ednannia within the framework of the project "Initiative of sectoral support of civil society", which is implemented by ISAR Ednannia in a consortium with the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) and Center for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM) thanks to the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development.

Assessment of the situation

   
• Over 80% of surveyed individuals believe that the economic situation in the country has worsened over the last year, 10% feel it has remained the same, and 2% see an improvement.
   
• According to 64% of respondents, the political situation in the country has deteriorated; 22% think it has stayed the same, while 7% report improvements.
   
• 57% of participants noted a decline in their confidence about the future; for a quarter, there has been no change over the last year, and nearly 10% feel more confident, with the highest percentage among the oldest age group.

Ten percent of respondents were undecided.

   
• The financial situation of families has worsened for 60%, remained unchanged for 35%, and improved for 4%. Improvements are more frequently reported by respondents under the age of 30.
   
• An increase has also been observed in the proportion of those perceiving deterioration across all assessed areas, with the most significant rise noted among those who perceive a decline in the political situation—14%.

Losses due to war 

   
• The most common losses due to the war include deterioration in mental and emotional health (49%) and worsening of physical health (39%). About a quarter of the respondents experienced loss of income and family separation. Twenty percent reported the death of a loved one or job loss. Respondents living in combat zones more frequently reported experiencing these losses. Deterioration of health is more common among respondents over 50 years old and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
   
• The worst damage caused by Russian armed aggression, according to respondents, includes the death of civilians (72%), the death of military personnel (70%), and physical injuries leading to disabilities (31%).
   
• Priority for damage compensation should be directed to the relatives of the deceased (68%); individuals who lost homes and property (44%); individuals who have been in captivity (38%), and those who suffered physical injuries (36%). About 30% believe that veterans should be prioritized for compensation; one-fifth think it should be directed to the relatives of the missing.
   
• About 60% of respondents consider it inappropriate to provide support to Ukrainians living abroad, while 37% believe it should be offered. Support is more often favored by respondents from combat zones, the youth, and those with experience of displacement and migration.

Understanding of Justice

   
• For half of the respondents, the concept of justice is associated with the punishment of those guilty of crimes, with older respondents finding this especially relevant. For 30%, justice means establishing the truth about all events; for 15%, it involves compensating all victims, a view more commonly held by younger people.
   
• 76% of respondents believe that achieving justice without the arrest and trial of those responsible for the attack on Ukraine and war crimes is impossible in the near future. Another 20% believe it is possible to achieve justice without these conditions.
   
• The priority for Ukrainian authorities and society in ensuring justice for the victims should be to hold the guilty accountable (50%), to remove/prevent from power those who collaborated with the occupiers (43%), and to find the missing and return deported individuals (33%). Compared to last year, the role of obtaining financial compensation has increased: 30% now see it as a priority for ensuring justice, compared to 23% last year.
   
• According to respondents, the establishment of justice for victims and those affected by the war largely depends on the President (50%), the Government (37%), and Parliament (35%). About 20% of respondents attribute a primary role to Ukrainian citizens and international institutions.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents believe that along with judicial proceedings, additional mechanisms for ensuring justice should be applied (lustration commissions, establishing the truth about war events, compensation for victims). Most respondents (86%) believe that such mechanisms should operate throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.
   
• The legality and legitimacy of these institutions will be ensured by their creation based on an agreement between Ukraine and several other countries, according to 39% of respondents. 22% believe that this will be influenced by the creation of these institutions through amendments to the Constitution and legislation, and another 16% think that the activities of additional institutions should be approved by UN structures.
   
• The question of the justification of vigilantism against those guilty of war crimes is ambiguous among respondents: 48% consider vigilantism justified, while 50% hold the opposite view.
   
• An overwhelming majority (95%) of respondents believe it is important to ensure transparency and regular information for citizens and victims about the progress of court cases regarding war crimes.

Perceptions of reintegration

   
• 77% of respondents support the introduction of an international temporary administration to facilitate the adaptation process in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, while 18% are against this idea.
   
• According to the majority of those surveyed (84%), measures to support and establish connections with the population remaining in the occupied territories should already be implemented by the state. It is believed by 46% that such initiatives should be directed only at those who support Ukraine, while 38% think they should be directed at everyone remaining in the occupied territories. It is indicated by 9% that such measures are not a priority, and another 5% believe that resources definitely should not be allocated for this by the state. 
   
• Among the support measures for the population remaining in the temporarily occupied territories, priorities include facilitating the relocation of people from these areas (35%); providing social and pension payments to those who remain (34%); and ensuring the broadcasting of Ukrainian media (33%). Other necessary measures include the recognition of documents issued during the occupation (28%), engaging the youth from these territories (26%), and organizing access to state services (24%)—a quarter of respondents see these as priorities.
   
• 55% of respondents believe that restrictions on rights (such as the right to vote, hold certain positions, or conduct business) should not be applied to residents of occupied territories, while 41% hold the opposite view. Regarding the appropriateness of restricting rights for Ukrainian citizens who have moved abroad, 29% of respondents find it appropriate, whereas 67% are against such initiatives.
   
• Regarding the acquisition of Russian citizenship being justifiable, 13% of respondents completely agree, while an additional 42% somewhat agree. 39% of respondents hold the opposite view. Those who agree more often with the justification for acquiring Russian citizenship are respondents who have relatives in the occupied territories. 

Perceptions of collaborative activities

   
• The activities most commonly associated with collaboration by respondents include holding leadership positions in the occupational authorities (48%), participating in the organization of so-called elections and referendums (46%), and serving in the occupational armed forces (44%). One-third of respondents consider serving in law enforcement, judicial bodies, or any positions within the occupational local government as collaboration.
   
• 46% of respondents believe that any cooperation with the occupational administrations should be criminally prosecuted, while 52% think only cooperation that led to severe consequences and crimes should be. The proportion of those who see the need for criminal accountability for any cooperation has decreased by 6% compared to the 2023 survey.
   
• The majority of respondents (65%) believe that as a punishment for interacting with the occupational authorities, restrictions on holding certain positions may be applied. About 30% consider fines appropriate. Approximately 20% think that restrictions on participating in public life and community service could serve as punishment.
   
• Punishments for collaborating with occupational administrations, such as being permanently banned from holding public positions or conducting business activities, are seen as indefinite by 63% of respondents. Another 33% believe these should be time-limited.
   
• 60% of respondents think that the degree and non-criminal forms of punishment for collaborative activities should be determined by the court. About a quarter believe that such decisions should be made by local authorities; directly by community residents, while around 20% think the victims and their relatives should decide. Active community participation is more relevant for older respondents, while the role of courts and local authorities is more pertinent for the younger generation.

Amnesty

   
• According to about 40% of respondents, amnesty could be granted under conditions such as performing community service to help rebuild the country and for crimes that did not result in the loss of life. Providing important and truthful testimonies, as well as compensating the victims, could be grounds for amnesty, according to about a quarter of those surveyed. Voluntary confession to a specific crime could also be a condition, as stated by 18% of respondents. Meanwhile, 14% believe that amnesty for those guilty of committing war crimes during the conflict is impossible under any circumstances. 

Vision of the future

   
• Among the initiatives that respondents are willing to support for stabilizing the situation in the country after the war, 28% are ready to support maintaining the status of autonomy for Crimea. 23% are willing to support the establishment of a transitional administration under the auspices of the UN in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, and 19% support granting these territories expanded economic powers. 17% are ready to support granting the liberated territories of Donbas the status of autonomy. 20% are not ready to support any of these initiatives.
   
• The idea of implementing an international temporary administration in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea, which were occupied in 2014, to ensure the adaptation process and gradual return of these territories, is supported by nearly 80% of respondents.
   
• 88% of respondents believe that Ukraine has a shared future with the residents of the territories that were occupied in 2022. 73% see a shared future with the residents of Crimea and Donbas that were occupied in 2014.
   
• 82% of respondents mention the need for a national discussion among representatives from different regions of Ukraine on the format of a shared future after the liberation of the occupied territories; another 14% do not see such a need.
   
• More than half of the respondents believe that the discussion should begin after the end of the war, while 30% think the process should start now. Another 19% indicated that discussions should begin after the situation at the front stabilizes. 51% see Ukrainian citizens as the initiators of the process, 34% local authorities, 32% national authorities, and 30% civic organizations.

Commemoration of memory

   
• 70% of respondents participated in events honoring the memory of those affected and killed due to Russian aggression: 37% in cases involving close people or themselves personally, and 33% in official events at the state or community level. 30% did not participate in such events. Residents of the western and central regions more often reported participation in memorial events.
   
• The issue of historical memory and corresponding state policy is important to 90% of respondents.
   
• 93% of respondents agree with the statement that Ukraine must now properly honor the memory of the victims of Russian armed aggression, including through various national and local initiatives.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents view the renaming of cities, streets, or squares in honor of fallen soldiers, military personnel, and veterans positively. About 80% positively view renaming places in honor of volunteers, and 67% in honor of civilians.
   
• According to about 40% of respondents, national government bodies should coordinate initiatives to honor the memory of victims of Russian aggression. This role should also be assigned to local authorities (33%), victims and their family members (32%), civic organizations (25%), associations of victims (19%), and the church and religious figures (5%).

As a result of the temporary occupation, the social, economic, public, and resource characteristics of the territorial communities of Kharkiv and Kherson regions underwent fundamental changes. Analysis and consideration of these changes are necessary for the development of an effective reintegration strategy, which must be adapted for use in the newly liberated Ukrainian territories. Kharkiv and Kherson regions have common problems and challenges, which the Ukrainian state is also expected to face in other de-occupied territories (restoration of state administration, work of local self-government bodies, restoration of destruction and assistance to the affected population, etc.).

The living conditions and opinion of the local residents is of great importance when planning certain reintegration measures, but currently there is a problem of insufficient representation of the local residents in research on the topic of cohesion and reintegration, which may lead to the neglect of their interests when developing an integration strategy. Finally, an urgent problem throughout the war period is the cohesion of society. As a result of military conflict and occupation, local communities can be divided physically and psychologically, which will lead to the loss of a common identification factor.

This publication was prepared with the support of  The Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the NGO “Transatlantic Dialogue Center” and does not necessarily reflect the position of the Foundation and/or its financial partners. At the request of the NGO “Transatlantic Dialogue Center”, a survey of experts and the public was conducted by the Sociological Group Rating, on the basis of which this publication was prepared.

 New Carnegie-sponsored (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — CEIP) opinion poll conducted by Rating Group found that Ukrainians still believe strongly in their national cause, even as doubts creep in about the path to victory.

Ukrainians overwhelmingly rejected the notion that Russia is winning the war (only 5 percent believe it is); the remaining majority was split almost evenly between those who thought Ukraine is winning and those who thought neither side is winning. 

When it comes to war outcomes, 73 percent of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine will eventually liberate all of its territories. A sizeable percentage also believed that Ukraine will regain some or all of its territories within the next year (56 percent) and that the war will end within two years (59 percent).

The poll results showed a chasm between older and younger generations of Ukrainians about assessments of the war’s trajectory and about policy preferences. Older Ukrainians, aged sixty and above, stand out for their war optimism across virtually every metric. This group had a rosier assessment of current battlefield dynamics and was more confident in eventual Ukrainian victory, more inclined to believe that the war will end soon, most supportive of continuing to fight until all territory has been liberated, and largely opposed to negotiating with Russia.

In contrast, younger Ukrainians, especially those under thirty-five, tended to be most pessimistic about Ukraine’s prospects for victory and most willing to accept limited war outcomes. Only 40 percent of those aged eighteen to twenty-five thought that Ukraine should fight until it liberates all of its territory to the borders established on Ukraine’s independence in 1991, compared to 60 percent of those sixty and older.

The share of Ukrainians who preferred seeking a compromise to end the war through negotiations fell from 43 percent in the yes or no question to 26 percent when respondents were asked to choose between negotiating with Russia and continuing to fight. 

Most Ukrainians who expressed openness to negotiate appeared to envision a scenario in which Kyiv was in a favorable enough position to demand the full withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes, reparations, and other conditions that are nonstarters for the Kremlin.

Asking Ukrainians about various war termination scenarios showed the divergence between their views and Russian demands. Most Ukrainians (83 percent) strongly opposed reducing Ukrainian military capabilities as a condition to end the war.

Majorities or pluralities also opposed ending the war in the following scenarios: a ceasefire that freezes the current front lines (65 percent), a Ukrainian renunciation of possible EU or NATO membership (65 percent and 60 percent, respectively).

Most Ukrainians (86 percent) believed that there is a medium or high risk that Russia will attack again even if there is a signed peace treaty, and even more (91 percent) believed that Russia’s motive to enter negotiations is to take time to prepare for a new attack. Even among those who supported negotiations with Russia, only 21 percent believed that signing a peace treaty would help Ukraine deter future Russian aggression.

Ukrainians value the support they receive from their foreign partners, and a majority believes that this support will either grow or be maintained at current levels over the next couple of years. But most Ukrainians do not expect their partners to fight on their behalf: 63 percent wanted long-range weapons, training, and defense industrial support, compared to only 26 percent who wanted partners to deploy their troops to defend Ukraine.

Read the full article on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by Nicole Gonik and Eric Ciaramella:

  Kyiv, Ukraine – The latest public opinion survey in Ukraine conducted by the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Center for Insights in Survey Research (CISR) shows strong interest in how local officials will direct the reconstruction of the country when the war ends, low reported levels of local corruption, and continued robust support for European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership.  

“This survey demonstrates that local governments and mayors are responding to their citizens’ needs under extreme wartime conditions. Mayors and other local officials will play an important role in building Ukraine’s future,” said Stephen Nix, IRI’s Senior Director for Eurasia.  

In a post-war reconstruction period, Ukrainians believe the decision-making power should be held by mayors and city councils. The survey across all cities showed a high level of interest in understanding the amount of funds received by the local government for reconstruction and the ways these funds are spent by municipalities with interest ranging from 76% and 56%. 

While corruption remains a concern for Ukrainians, an overwhelming majority of adults across all municipalities (79%-93%) said they have not encountered corruption while accessing local services.     

“The sharp decrease of those who have experienced corruption at the local level is an extremely important development in the country. It’s a testament to the work local governments have taken to tackle corruption and focus on their constituents’ needs,” said Nix.  

Consistent with IRI’s previous national poll, Ukrainians continue to want to join the EU and NATO. Support for EU membership ranges from a high of 91% to a low of 72% among residents of cities that are not located on the front lines of the war. Support for NATO membership ranges from a high of 87% to a low of 64% among the same group.  

“Our poll shows that Ukrainians believe that closer ties to the EU and NATO are in their best interest,” said Nix. 

   Kyiv, 6 June 2024 — A study conducted by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Rating Group on explosive ordnance risk awareness and safe behaviour practices among Ukrainian parents and children aged 10 to 17 has revealed that boys aged 14 to 17 (62 per cent) and adolescents from rural areas and low-income families demonstrate the riskiest behaviours. Despite 97 per cent of adolescents surveyed claiming to be aware of mine safety rules, risky behaviour remains prevalent.

The study, conducted by UNICEF and the Rating Group research company as part of European Union (EU) humanitarian assistance, took place from March to April 2024 across 27 areas contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance.

The results of what is Ukraine's most comprehensive study on awareness and behaviour among adolescents and caregivers highlight a troubling trend – boys from mine-contaminated communities are particularly prone to risky behaviour. Boys aged 14 to 17 are the most likely to exhibit dangerous behaviour related to explosive ordnance (EO). They are more independent, spend more time away from home and explore new places. Additionally, adolescents from rural areas and low-income families face a higher risk of engaging in hazardous behaviour. In contrast, older girls with similar levels of awareness tend to follow safer behaviour around EO. Specifically, 48 per cent of girls are at low risk, compared to only 38 per cent of boys. Сhildren aged 10 to 13 years demonstrate the highest level of safe behaviours. 

More than 90 per cent of the adolescents surveyed reported being covered by explosive ordnance risk education. Adolescents from the Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Kherson, Donetsk and parts of the Sumy regions demonstrated the highest level of awareness and knowledge of mine safety. In contrast, adolescents in contaminated areas of the Chernihiv, Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions showed lower awareness levels, similar to those in ‘non-contaminated’ central areas. The lowest awareness was found among adolescents from the western regions, where the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) is minimal.

“It is important to understand that high awareness doesn't always equal safe behaviour,” said Munir Mammadzade, UNICEF Representative to Ukraine. “Children who are informed about mine safety might still demonstrate risky behaviours. That is why UNICEF continues to implement behaviour change interventions with partners to foster a culture of safety among children, adolescents and their caregivers.”

Key factors influencing adolescents's behaviour:

   
• Leisure activities – Video games, especially shooters, reduce the perception of EO risk. Adolescents who spend much time online or playing computer games are more likely to engage in risky behaviour. Boys, in particular, often tend to play these games, which dulls their sense of real-life threats. At the same time, adolescents who spend their leisure time at home with their families, reading books or watching films are less likely to engage in risky behaviour. Despite more than 80 per cent of adolescents being aware of dangerous areas, a significant proportion from 'contaminated' regions still spend their free time in these risky places. High-risk behaviours during leisure time include spending time near ponds, lakes, rivers, etc (70 per cent), in forests and fields (70 per cent), on or near bridges, and railway tracks, and in destroyed and abandoned buildings (about 50 per cent), and on abandoned military positions or near equipment (30 per cent).
   
• Learning formats – Awareness-raising activities and lessons where edutainment formats are used help to safe behaviour. Adolescents who received information about mine risks through UNICEF cartoons and comic books exhibited the highest levels of safe behaviours. For instance, 59% of adolescents who viewed UNICEF cartoons and activity books displayed low-risk behaviour, while only 9% exhibited high-risk behaviour.
   
• Parental involvement – Adolescents whose parents repeatedly discussed mine risks with them showed safer behaviours (50 per cent), compared to those whose parents rarely (32 per cent) or never (31 per cent) discussed these issues. This highlights the critical role of parental engagement in fostering safe behaviour among adolescents.
   
• Myths about mines affecting perceptions of safe behaviour

– According to the qualitative phase of the study, a significant proportion of adolescents believe in common myths about EOs. These include misconceptions that using a mobile phone near a mine can trigger its detonation, that an EO will become inert after lying in the ground for several years, that it is safe to touch unexploded ordnance or detonated mines and approach anti-tank mines, and that mines can be touched carefully if sappers have already removed the TNT.

"Russia's war has already left Ukraine with a deadly legacy of explosive ordnance and mines, which will take decades to clear. Unfortunately, the situation is worsening each day, putting more lives at risk,” said Claudia Amaral, Head of the EU Humanitarian Aid Office in Ukraine. “This is why the European Union is investing efforts and funds to clear Ukraine of deadly explosive traps and to raise awareness among Ukrainians, especially the youngest, about how to protect themselves from all the dangers of living in contaminated regions.”

The study shows that educational institutions and parents are the primary sources of explosive ordnance risk education for adolescents. Children from contaminated areas receive this information mainly through their teachers, parents, State Emergency Service workers, the military and the police. While younger children are more likely to learn about EOs at school, from their parents or cartoons, older children tend to get information from social media, websites, rescue teams and the military.

Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko noted: "The study shows that altruism often drives risk behaviour. Adolescents try to help others in trouble – friends, acquaintances or animals – putting themselves at high risk, as where there is one mine, there are likely to be others. Most of the adolescents surveyed expressed a desire to provide first aid or rescue, rather than immediately calling emergency services. They forget that they are risking their own lives by approaching the affected or mined area. This underscores the importance of focusing our efforts on improving risk perception and promoting safe behaviour and practices."

Over 80 per cent of young people in Ukraine can identify explosives. Adolescents also know better (67 per cent) than their parents (42 per cent) which number to call (101) if they see a dangerous object. It turns out that younger children know this number best. However, when it comes to warning signs of the threat of EOs nearby, only 55 per cent of adolescents from contaminated areas recognise the white and red tape as a mine warning sign, while the rest do not associate it with this threat, believing it to be a warning and prohibiting passage. 

Additional information:

From 2023 to 2024, together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, UNICEF informed over 8,000,000 Ukrainians about mine safety, engaging 1,500,000 million children and 500,000 caregivers in activities on mine safety rules. Children, adolescents, youth and their caregivers across Ukraine are learning life-saving rules through behaviour change campaigns, interactive community engagement activities and special projects, such as Mobile Safety Classes, cartoons and comics featuring Patron the Dog. UNICEF has also launched a special online course for educators, rescuers and police on how to deliver effective EORE messages to children and youth. 

About the study

The comprehensive study on mine safety awareness and safe behaviour practices among caregivers and children aged 10 to 17 was conducted from 16 to 25 March 2024. The study aimed to identify the factors that contribute to children's risk-taking behaviour with explosive ordnance and to identify these risk groups. Additionally, the role of caregivers, schools and other institutions in teaching children mine safety rules, mine risk awareness and safe behaviour practices were assessed. 

A total of 25,500 respondents were surveyed (12,750 parents and 12,750 adolescents), including a nationwide random sample (4,128 respondents) representative of families with children aged 10-17 years, and a booster random sample (21,372 respondents) representative of families with children aged 10-17 years from each of the 27 contaminated districts in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv regions. The survey was conducted in all areas except for non-government-controlled areas and areas where mobile communication was unavailable at the time of the survey.

The Rating Lab research laboratory, professional child psychologists and social and behavioural change experts from UNICEF developed a test to assess knowledge of mine safety rules and identify risk behaviours in children aged 10 to 17. The test formed the basis of a quantitative telephone survey of parents and a quantitative online survey (test) of children. In addition, a series of focus group studies were conducted with children. 

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Against the backdrop of Russia's massive strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities, the Rating Sociological Group conducted a survey on the work of Ukraine's energy sector, aimed at studying Ukrainians' awareness, assessments and plans in the context of energy consumption.

Awareness of the situation in the energy sector

   
• About 80% of respondents are aware of attacks on energy facilities, of which 38% are well informed, 43% are partially informed, and 12% know very little. Six per cent know nothing about the attacks. Residents of cities and central regions are more aware.
• More than half (57%) of respondents have seen photos or videos online showing the extent of the damage to energy facilities. Respondents from cities and more affluent groups have seen such materials more often.
      

Assessment of the energy supply situation

   
• One-third of respondents (35%) believe that the energy infrastructure is fully capable of withstanding challenges in the form of missile strikes, while the majority (56%) believe that it is partially capable; another 4% assess the situation as very critical.    
• For 54% of respondents, the situation with uninterrupted power supply is rather good, with no power cuts. However, 41% of respondents said that power cuts occur occasionally. 4% said that the situation is poor. Respondents from eastern regions reported power cuts most often — 17% said that power cuts occur frequently or constantly.
• 74% of respondents believe that missile strikes on energy facilities are part of Russia's long-term strategy aimed at destroying Ukraine's energy sector. 7% believe that such actions are sporadic. About 19% are undecided on this issue.
• 76% of respondents have heard calls from representatives of the energy sector to reduce electricity consumption during peak hours. Residents of central regions, cities, wealthier and older respondents are more likely to say they have heard such calls.
• Two-thirds of respondents said that a stable electricity supply is important to them, but that they are willing to tolerate short-term interruptions. Another 27% said that a stable energy supply is extremely important to them. Only 7% responded that a stable energy supply is not important and that they are willing to tolerate long-term outages.
• Two-thirds of respondents said that a stable electricity supply is important to them, but that they are willing to tolerate short-term interruptions. Another 27% said that a stable energy supply is extremely important to them. Only 7% responded that a stable energy supply is not important and that they are prepared to tolerate long-term interruptions.
• If the energy supply situation worsens, 54% of respondents plan to use power banks, and 43% plan to use alternative energy sources. Twenty-two per cent plan to use points of invulnerability, and 19 per cent plan to use public services. Five per cent are considering moving within Ukraine, and another 4 per cent plan to leave the country if the energy supply situation worsens.
• Urban residents, younger and wealthier respondents are more likely than other groups to mention plans to use individual energy storage devices. Respondents from the centre and west of the country, as well as rural residents, plan to make more active use of alternative energy sources. Urban residents and those with lower incomes were more likely to mention visiting points of invincibility or public places.

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Restoration of energy infrastructure

• 70% of respondents believe that last year's tariff increase allowed for the restoration of damaged energy infrastructure facilities to an adequate level. When asked whether capacity had been restored over the past year, 59% of respondents said that the infrastructure had been restored to a sufficient level, while 11% said it had been fully restored. Another 15% of respondents believe that the infrastructure was restored to an insufficient level, and 2% believe that it was not restored at all. 13% of respondents were unable to decide on this issue. Residents of eastern regions, regional centres and middle-aged respondents rate the effectiveness of restoration more poorly.
• According to 41% of respondents, all energy infrastructure needs to be restored now. 52% believe that only the most important facilities need to be restored now, with the rest to be restored after the war. Another 3% believe that any reconstruction should be postponed until after the war. Residents of the south and cities are more likely to believe that all infrastructure should be rebuilt now.

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Attitude towards tariff increases

• More than half (55%) of respondents understand the need to raise tariffs in order to repair damaged infrastructure. In particular, 45% of respondents believe that electricity tariffs can be increased to finance the repair campaign, taking into account the financial situation and consumption levels of households, while another 10% believe that tariffs should be increased for all consumers. At the same time, 40% believe that tariffs should not be increased, even if the electricity supply situation worsens. The need to increase tariffs, taking into account income and consumption, is more often mentioned by residents of central regions, regional centres, younger and wealthier respondents.    
• Most respondents (67%) agree that if tariffs are increased, vulnerable groups should receive assistance from the state. About a quarter (26%) disagree with this. Respondents from rural areas and lower-income groups are more likely than others to disagree with this statement.

Recently, the Sociological Group "Rating" completed an extensive study in collaboration with the globally renowned research institution Gallup International. The survey was conducted as part of the "End of Year" 2023 project. Let's delve into the sixth topic of the comprehensive study: Was the threat from the coronavirus exaggerated?

Overall, almost half of the respondents worldwide agree that the threat of coronavirus was exaggerated. Another quarter gave an undecided response of "agree and disagree." The rest either disagreed or did not respond.

• In Ukraine, one of the highest numbers in Europe agreed with the statement about the exaggeration of the coronavirus threat: 53% agreed, 30% disagreed, and 16% were undecided. In other European countries, fewer agreed with this statement.
• Overall, the statement "I believe the threat from the coronavirus was exaggerated" had the highest agreement (over 60%) among respondents in five countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Romania, and Georgia.
• The Middle East also shows a high level of agreement that the COVID-19 threat was exaggerated: Afghanistan (62%), Iraq (59%), and Syria (57%).
• The highest percentage of disagreement with this statement is observed among European countries: Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
• In the United States and Canada, there is almost an equal percentage of agreement and disagreement regarding the exaggeration of the threat.
• Regarding South America, Mexico has one of the highest percentages in the world of those who believe the threat from the coronavirus was not exaggerated. Argentina and Ecuador also have similar figures.

The international Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition initiated and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted every year. This year, the project was carried out in 41 countries worldwide.

Recently, the Sociological Group Rating completed a comprehensive study in collaboration with the globally renowned research institute Gallup International. The survey was conducted as part of the "End of Year" 2023 project.

Let's delve into the fifth theme of the extensive study: the level of democracy.

Ukraine ranks sixth among the surveyed countries in terms of the level of complete agreement with the statement that "Democracy may have its drawbacks, but it is the best system of governance." In this trend, it joins European countries, with Sweden, Austria, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland occupying the top five positions.

Overall, in Ukraine, 64% agree with this statement, 14% both agree and disagree, and only 16% disagree.

The most dissenting views on democracy being the best form of governance were found among respondents in Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, and Moldova.

Additionally, Ukraine is among the top ten countries that responded affirmatively to the notion that their country is governed by the will of the people. Forty-four percent agree with this statement, 17% partially agree, while 36% do not consider it so. Among the countries that believe their state is governed by the will of the people are Sweden, India, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Switzerland, and Malaysia.

The least feeling of being governed by the people was observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia.

The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition initiated and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted every year. This year, the project was carried out in 41 countries worldwide.

Recently, the Sociological Group "Rating" completed a comprehensive study in collaboration with the globally renowned Gallup International research institute. The survey was conducted as part of the "End of Year" 2023 project. Let's acquaint ourselves with the fourth out of ten topics of the extensive research: the readiness to fight for one's country in wartime conditions.Ukraine has the highest readiness to fight for its country among European nations, with the questions posed to Ukrainians being direct and not hypothetical. The percentage of those ready stands at 62%, which is nearly twice as much as those not ready – comprising 33%, while those undecided make up only 4%.

• Respondents from Asian countries demonstrate the highest readiness to fight for their country. Armenia and Saudi Arabia showed the highest levels of readiness to fight for their own country, with percentages of 96% and 94%, respectively. High levels of readiness are also observed in countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.
• In American and European countries, the highest percentage is those who are undecided.
• Respondents from Central-Eastern European countries show a higher readiness to fight compared to those from Southern European countries. Overall, the least readiness to fight for their country among European nations is found in Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain, and Bulgaria.
• Overall, the lowest percentage of those willing to fight for their country is among Japanese respondents.
• Among Ukraine's neighbors, Moldova shows relatively higher readiness to fight for their country, with this percentage slightly exceeding half. In Romania and Poland, the percentage of readiness to fight is somewhat less than half of those surveyed.

The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition initiated and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted every year. This year, the project was carried out in 41 countries worldwide.