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Recently, the Sociological Group "Rating" completed a comprehensive study in collaboration with the globally renowned Gallup International research institute. The survey was conducted as part of the "End of Year" 2023 project. Let's delve into the third theme of the extensive study: attitudes towards BRICS. BRICS is an intergovernmental organization consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.

• Overall, there is neither a strongly negative nor strongly positive attitude towards the alliance among all countries surveyed.
• The most negative attitude towards the global BRICS alliance is demonstrated by respondents in the United States and European countries. Overall, Sweden exhibits the most negative attitude towards the alliance.Ukraine also ranks among the countries with the most negative attitudes towards the alliance. However, 40% of Ukrainians know nothing about this alliance.
• Even among the members of the alliance, some citizens are uninformed about it: half of the respondents in the newly joined Saudi Arabia know nothing about the alliance.
• Among the surveyed member countries, the highest percentage of negative attitudes towards the alliance is observed in India, while Russians demonstrate the most positive attitude.
• Overall, respondents from African, Latin American, and Central Asian countries demonstrate the most positive attitudes towards the global BRICS alliance.

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The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition initiated and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted every year. This year, the project was carried out in 41 countries worldwide.

Recently, the Sociological Group Rating completed a large-scale study in collaboration with the globally renowned Gallup International research institute. The survey was conducted as part of the "End of Year" 2023 project.

Let's delve into the second of the ten topics of the comprehensive study: nuclear threat.

Ukraine is among the countries with the lowest level of fear regarding nuclear threats.

• Overall, there hasn't been a significant decrease in fears of nuclear threats worldwide throughout the year. Two-fifths of respondents now perceive a high risk of nuclear weapon use. Almost an equal proportion assesses the risk as moderate, with only 14% perceiving no risk.
• In general, European countries have fewer respondents who perceive the threat of nuclear weapon use as high compared to countries in Asia, Africa, and South America, where perceptions of nuclear threats are more pessimistic.
• At the same time, Italy, Portugal, and Romania are the most fearful of nuclear threats among European countries, with more than half assessing the threat as high. Indonesia, Nigeria, Ecuador, Syria, and Argentina have the highest proportion of respondents who perceive the nuclear threat as high.
• Conversely, Ukraine, Iran, Pakistan, and Armenia have the highest percentage of respondents who perceive no such risk.
• The youngest group of respondents holds the most pessimistic views regarding the nuclear threat.

The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition initiated and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted every year. This year, the project was carried out in 41 countries worldwide. In Ukraine, the survey was conducted by the Rating Group.

Recently, the Sociological Group Rating completed a large-scale study in collaboration with the globally renowned research institute Gallup International.

The survey was conducted as part of the "End of Year" project in 2023. Let's delve into the first topic of the extensive research: expectations for 2024.

Most people worldwide anticipate 2024 to be marked by unrest rather than peace. Additionally, the majority foresee economic difficulties rather than prosperity in the coming year.

• Overall, about 40% of respondents worldwide anticipate a better year ahead, while approximately 25% expect a worse one. Another third expect the upcoming year to be similar to the previous one.
• In Ukraine, 26% anticipate a more peaceful year, 33% expect a more turbulent one, and 36% expect it to be similar. The rest couldn't provide an answer.
• Western countries exhibit greater concern. The most positive expectations come from Global South and Far East countries, such as Afghanistan and Indonesia, with 68% expressing positive expectations regarding peace and war.
• Ukraine also demonstrates more positive expectations for 2024 compared to other countries, with every second person hoping for a better year than the previous one.
• Conversely, European countries show the lowest level of expectations for positive changes in 2024.

The Gallup International End of Year Survey (EoY) is an annual tradition initiated and developed in 1977. Since then, the survey has been conducted every year. This year, the project was carried out in 41 countries worldwide.

The  public opinion survey in Ukraine conducted by the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Center for Insights in Survey Research (CISR) finds strong majorities believe that Ukraine will defeat Russia in the war and are optimistic about the future. Support for joining the European Union (EU) and NATO is high.  

Ukrainians are overwhelmingly optimistic about their future. When asked if Ukraine will win the conflict with Russia, 88% responded “yes.” Additionally, 80% said the future of their country looks “rather promising.”

The poll also shows that Ukraine wants to align with the West. Seventy-seven percent of Ukrainians would support joining the EU relative to a customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Similarly, 77% also stated they would vote in support of Ukraine joining NATO if a referendum were held today.  

The survey was conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on behalf of the Center for Insights in Survey Research of the International Republican Institute throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) from February 17-21, 2024, through computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile telephone numbers. The total sample consists of n= 2,000 Ukrainians aged 18 and older.  The survey data obtained in each city was weighted by gender and age indicators using data by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of January 1, 2022.  The margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level for each does not exceed +/-3.5 percentage points. The average response rate was 14 percent.   

The study was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

As part of the study "Justice in the context of Russian armed aggression" conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating", with the support of Switzerland through the Peace and Human Rights Division, results were obtained regarding Ukrainians' understanding of justice, punishment, and compensation in the context of Russia's military aggression; perceptions of collaborationist activities and commemoration.

Assessment of the situation

   
• 78% of respondents believe that the economic situation in the country has deteriorated over the past year, 6% believe it has improved, and another 13% believe it has remained unchanged. 59% mentioned negative changes in their family's financial situation, while for 36%, the situation has not changed, and for 4%, it has improved. Half of the respondents indicated a decrease in confidence in the future and the political situation in the country. In comparison with November 2022, the indicators of the situation deterioration have significantly increased. For a quarter of the respondents in these areas, nothing has changed, and about 15% observe improvement.

Losses due to war 

   
• Among the losses suffered by respondents as a result of the war, 50% reported worsening of their psychoemotional state, while approximately 40% mentioned deterioration in their physical health. About 30% experienced income loss. Separation from family was noted by 23%, while 22% mentioned job loss. Close to 20% of respondents indicated the loss or injury of a loved one and the breakdown of relationships with family members.
   
• According to surveyed Ukrainians, the worst harm caused by Russia is the loss of civilians (68%) and military personnel (65%), as well as injuries and disabilities suffered by citizens (40%).
   
• According to the survey results, the key victims of Russian aggression are relatives of the deceased (60%); individuals who have been held captive (41%); those who have suffered physical injuries (34%), and have lost their homes (33%). Respondents identify these same categories, as well as war veterans and relatives of the disappeared, as those who should be prioritized for compensation for the damages incurred. 
   
• Opinions among respondents regarding the appropriateness of supporting Ukrainians abroad are divided: 40% believe that support should be provided, while 57% disagree. The necessity of support is more frequently mentioned by the youth, as well as residents of the partially occupied, frontline territories, and conflict zones.

Understanding of Justice

   
• According to 47% of respondents, justice in the context of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine entails holding accountable those responsible for war crimes. For 30%, it involves uncovering the truth about all events, while 17% view it as compensating for damages to all affected parties. 
   
• 75% of respondents disagree with the idea that justice can be achieved without the arrest and trial of those responsible for the attack on Ukraine and military crimes. Only 22% agree with the possibility of achieving justice under such conditions. 
   
• Among the priority directions of activity for the Ukrainian government and society in ensuring justice, respondents most frequently mentioned holding the guilty accountable (55%), cleansing the government by removing and preventing those who collaborated with occupiers from holding office (46%), and locating missing persons and repatriating deportees (30%). Approximately a quarter of respondents indicated establishing facts of crimes and obtaining financial compensation, while one in five mentioned strengthening sanctions and freezing the assets of Russia and its citizens. 
   
• According to half of the respondents, achieving justice for war victims depends mostly on the President. 37% of respondents see Parliament as responsible, while 35% attribute responsibility to the Government. Approximately a quarter of respondents believe that Ukrainian citizens are responsible, with the youth expressing this opinion more frequently than other age groups. 
   
•  Nearly 90% of respondents believe that along with judicial proceedings, additional mechanisms for ensuring justice should be applied (such as lustration commissions, establishing the truth about war events, and compensating damages to victims): 51% indicated that they should be applied on a permanent basis, while 38% said they should be temporary. The majority of respondents (84%) believe that such mechanisms should operate throughout the territory of Ukraine. 
   
• 41% of respondents believe that the legality and legitimacy of these institutions' activities will be ensured through their creation based on agreements between Ukraine and several other countries. Twenty-four percent think that this will be influenced by establishing such institutions through changes in the Constitution and legislation, while another 18% suggest that the activities of additional institutions should be endorsed by UN structures. 
   
• The issue of the justification of vigilante justice regarding those guilty of war crimes is ambiguous among respondents: 46% consider vigilante justice justified, while 51% hold the opposite view. 
   
• An overwhelming majority (95%) of respondents consider it important to ensure transparency and regular information provision to citizens and victims about the progress of court proceedings regarding war crimes. 
     

Perceptions of reintegration

   
• The introduction of international temporary administration to facilitate the adaptation process in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea is supported by 76% of respondents, while 20% oppose this idea.
   
• According to the majority of respondents, the state should already be implementing measures to support and establish communication with the population remaining in the occupied territories. 47% believe that such initiatives should be directed only towards those who support Ukraine, while 40% suggest they should be aimed at all residents who remain in the occupied territories. 8% indicated that such measures are not a priority, while another 3% believe that the state should not allocate resources for this purpose at all.
   
• About 40% of respondents mention social and pension payments, as well as ensuring the broadcast of Ukrainian channels, as support measures for the population remaining in the occupied territories. Additionally, around 33% cite assistance in facilitating the relocation of people from these areas. Close to 30% mention guarantees of recognition for documents obtained during the occupation and organizing safe access to government services. Furthermore, approximately 23% note programs aimed at engaging youth from the occupied territories.
   
• 54% of respondents believe that restrictions on rights (such as the right to vote, hold certain positions, and engage in business activities) should not be applied to residents of the occupied territories, while 43% hold the opposite view. Regarding the appropriateness of restricting rights for Ukrainian citizens who have emigrated abroad, 29% of respondents indicated support for such initiatives, while 68% were against it.
   
• The situation and living conditions in the occupied territories are of constant interest to 34% of respondents, while an additional 25% show frequent interest. Rare interest is expressed by 33% of respondents, while 7% are almost never or never interested. Respondents from older age groups and those who have relatives in the occupied territories tend to show more frequent interest in the situation. 
   
• Regarding the justification of obtaining Russian citizenship, 10% of respondents unequivocally agree, while another 39% tend to agree. Forty-six percent of respondents disagree. Those who do not agree with the possibility of justifying obtaining Russian citizenship are more often respondents who do not have relatives in the occupied territories and residents of central and western regions.

Perceptions of collaborative activities

   
• Most often, respondents associated collaborationist activities with holding leadership positions in the authorities of the occupying regime (50%), serving in the ranks of the occupying armed forces (47%), involvement in organizing so-called elections and referendums (46%), serving in law enforcement and judicial bodies (32%), and holding any positions in the authorities of the local occupation self-government. Respondents living in conflict zones more frequently than others pointed out the collaborationist nature of holding positions in local occupation self-government. 
   
• 52% of respondents believe that any cooperation with the occupying administrations warrants criminal responsibility, while 47% believe it applies only to cooperation that led to serious consequences and crimes. 
   
• Most respondents (66%) believe that restrictions on holding certain positions could serve as punishment for collaboration with the occupying authorities. A quarter of respondents consider fines appropriate, while about 20% suggest restrictions on participation in public life or community service as potential punishments. Residents of conflict zones and frontline areas slightly more frequently opt for community service as a potential punishment. 
   
• 66% of respondents believe that the punishment for collaborating with the occupying administrations, such as being barred from holding public office or engaging in business activities, should be indefinite. Another 30% think it should have a limited duration.
   
• 61% of respondents believe that the courts should determine the degree and non-criminal forms of punishment for collaborationist activities. About a quarter believe that such decisions should be made by local government bodies, while more than 20% suggest that affected communities and their relatives should have a say. Active community involvement is deemed more relevant by older respondents, while younger individuals consider the role of courts and local government to be more important.

Possible amnesty

   
• Approximately 40% of respondents believe that amnesty could be granted to those convicted of crimes that did not result in loss of life, or on the condition of performing socially beneficial work to rebuild the country. Providing important and truthful testimony, compensating victims, may also be grounds for amnesty, according to about a quarter of respondents. Voluntary confession to a specific crime could be a condition for 20% of respondents. Fourteen percent of respondents consider amnesty for individuals guilty of committing war crimes during the war to be impossible under any circumstances. 
   
• Among the categories of residents of the occupied territories who collaborated with the occupiers and could potentially be eligible for amnesty, 58% of respondents mentioned teachers, doctors, and social workers, while 33% mentioned local municipal enterprise managers (schools, hospitals, municipal enterprises). Seventeen percent of respondents believe that amnesty cannot be applied to any group.

Perceptions of the future

   
• Among the initiatives that respondents are willing to support to stabilize the situation in the country after the war, a quarter are ready to agree to the preservation of Crimea's autonomy status. Approximately 20% are ready to support the introduction of a transitional administration under the auspices of the UN in the liberated territories of Donbas and Crimea; granting the liberated territories expanded economic powers. Only 17% are willing to support granting autonomy status to the liberated territories of Donbas. 23% of respondents are not willing to support any similar initiatives.
   
• More than 90% of respondents believe that Ukraine has a common future with the residents of the territories that were occupied in 2022. 83% of those surveyed see a common future with the residents of Crimea and Donbas, which were occupied in 2014. 
   
• Regarding the need for a national discussion among representatives from different regions of Ukraine about the format of a shared future after the liberation of the occupied territories, 83% of respondents indicate agreement, while 14% hold the opposite view.
   
• According to 48%, discussions should commence after the end of the war, while 32% believe that the process should begin now. Additionally, 19% stated that discussions should start after the situation on the front stabilizes. 51% see Ukrainian citizens as the initiators of the process, 39% - local authorities, 33% - national authorities, and 30% - civil society organizations.

Commemoration of memory

   
• Nearly 70% of respondents participated in events commemorating the memory of those affected and killed as a result of Russia's aggression: 34% in cases involving close relatives or personally, 35% in official events at the state or community level. 30% did not participate in such events. Youth and residents of western and central regions more frequently mentioned their participation in memorial events.
   
• Questions of historical memory and corresponding state policy are important for 91% of respondents. 
   
• 94% of respondents agree with the statement that Ukraine should already dignify the memory of the victims of Russian armed aggression, particularly through various national and local initiatives.
   
• Nearly 90% of respondents view positively the renaming of cities, streets, or squares in honor of fallen soldiers, military personnel, and veterans. Renaming place names in honor of volunteers is positively received by 78%, in honor of civilians by 68%, and in honor of the country's military-political leadership by 57%.
   
• According to 42% of respondents, national government bodies should act as coordinators of initiatives to honor the memory of victims of Russian aggression. Additionally, roles should be given to local authorities (34%), victims and their family members (29%), civil society organizations (27%), associations of victims (18%), and to the church and religious figures (5%).

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 28% of Chernihiv residents surveyed rated their emotional state over the past week as calm, 36% as tense, and 35% gave average ratings. Higher levels of anxiety were recorded among women, older people, and those with lower incomes.
   
• More than half of those surveyed (52%) consider a repeat attack on Chernihiv in the next six months unlikely. About 15% rated the possibility of a repeat attack as highly likely, while 28% gave average ratings.
   
• 74% of respondents are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack, while more than 20% have the opposite opinion. Over the past year and a half, the number of those who are confident in the possibility of repelling Russia's attack has decreased (from 93% in December 2022 to 74%).
   
• Almost 70% believe that it will be impossible to restore friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians immediately after the end of the war. 20% believe this will be possible in 20-30 years, 6% in 10-15 years, and 2% within a few years.
   
• About 60% of respondents noted that they have close relatives serving in the war.
   
• Among politicians, respondents trust V. Zaluzhny the most (87% trust him, 7% do not trust him). V. Zelensky is trusted by 57% and distrusted by 39%, S. Prytula is trusted by 46% and distrusted by 43%, V. Klitschko is trusted by 34% and distrusted by 48%, P. Poroshenko is trusted by 17% and distrusted by 79%.
   
• Almost 60% are satisfied with the activities of the acting mayor of Chernihiv, O. Lomako, and the city council, while 30% are dissatisfied. 28% are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv Regional Military Administration, while 53% are dissatisfied (the satisfaction rate has deteriorated: 59% versus 28%). 27% are satisfied with the activities of the Chernihiv City Military Administration, while 55% are dissatisfied. The work of the head of the regional military administration, V. Chaus, was rated positively by 24% and negatively by 68%. The work of the head of the Chernihiv city military administration, D. Bryzhynsky, was rated positively by 19% and negatively by 59%.
   
• More than 80% believe that the elected city council should deal with issues related to ensuring the city's vital functions. 11% believe that this should be done by the appointed city military administration.
   
• Almost 65% believe that acting mayor O. Lomako is effectively performing his duties as mayor. 27% have the opposite opinion. Older respondents consider the acting mayor's activities to be more effective.
   
• More than half of respondents (54%) said that the creation of a city military administration is more likely to hinder the city's development, 22% said it is beneficial, and about a quarter were undecided. The benefits were most often noted by younger and more affluent respondents.
   
• Sixty-four percent of respondents consider the creation of a city military administration to be a political confrontation with the team of former mayor V. Atroshenko. Twenty-three percent assessed it as a security necessity. One in ten was undecided. Young people and those who are more affluent more often pointed to security needs.
   
• Among local politicians, respondents had a more favorable opinion of V. Atroshenko (83% positive, 12% negative). O. Lomak had a 66% positive rating and a 23% negative rating. Chaus is viewed positively by 25% and negatively by 65%. D. Bryzhinsky is viewed positively by 17%, negatively by 55%, and 14% have not heard of him.
   
• 94% have heard about the decision of the Yavoriv District Court, according to which Chernihiv Mayor V. Atroshenko was stripped of his right to hold the office of mayor for one year (59% have heard a lot, 35% have heard something). 76% of respondents do not support this court decision, while 14% expressed their support.
   
• 75% of respondents believe that this court decision is more of a pressure on local authorities, while 15% consider it a fight against corruption.
  

The survey was conducted on the initiative of the "Ukrainian Veteran Fund" Of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine. Funded by the Sociological Group "Rating".

• Based on the findings of the twenty-seventh nationwide survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" under the initiative of the "Ukrainian Veterans Foundation" of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine from March 2 to 5, 2024, 55% of respondents reported having close relatives who participated in military activities within Ukraine from 2014 to 2021. Furthermore, 70% of participants mentioned having close ones who have either served or are currently serving on the front lines since February 24, 2022. Comparatively, there is an observed increase in the number of individuals with close relatives currently engaged in frontline service, as opposed to previous survey results.
• 41% of respondents acknowledge the possibility of becoming a veteran in the future, while 53% hold the opposite view. The discussion about the potential of becoming a veteran was most prevalent among residents of western regions, the youngest respondents, males, and those who have relatives and close ones involved in warfare since 2014 and are currently serving.
• In society, the military consistently receives the highest levels of trust: 96% express trust in ATO veterans currently in active service, 94% trust the Armed Forces of Ukraine and veterans involved in the present conflict, and 84% trust ATO (JFO) veterans from 2014-2021 who are not currently engaged in warfare. Regardless of region or age, the overwhelming majority places trust in these demographic groups.
• Among the potential challenges that veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war may face upon returning from service, the top concerns include psychoemotional instability, issues with physical health, difficulties in accessing medical assistance, the absence of inclusive spaces and adapted workplaces for individuals with disabilities, as well as challenges related to the processing of social benefits. Respondents also consider the likelihood of conflicts within the family, unemployment, societal misunderstandings, the mismatch of military experience for civilian life, and substance abuse, including alcohol or drugs. Approximately half of the respondents mentioned the risk of suicides among veterans. About a third of those surveyed pointed out the risks of legal violations and involvement in criminal activities. However, compared to the September 2023 survey, there is an increase in the number of individuals recognizing risks in all the aforementioned issues. The presence of these problems is felt more acutely by close associates of veterans who have been in combat since 2014 and are currently serving.
• The number of those who believe that the state fulfills its obligations to veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war continues to decrease: in August 2022, it was 69%, in January 2023 – 53%, in September 2023 – 33%, and in March 2024 – 25%. Currently, more than 60% hold a different opinion. Negative views on the state's fulfillment of obligations towards veterans are most commonly expressed by residents of western regions and those who have close relatives involved in warfare since 2014 and are currently serving.  
• 76% of respondents believe that society currently respects veterans. However, compared to the September 2023 survey, their number has remained almost unchanged (79% in September). The opposite opinion is held by 18% of individuals, with a higher proportion among residents of western regions and the younger demographic.
• The number of those who indicated being well or fairly informed about veterans' issues has slightly increased (56%). 42% mentioned that they are not informed. A higher percentage of the latter group is found among residents of eastern regions, older individuals, and women.  
• Nationwide survey #27. The image of veterans in Ukrainian society (March 2-5, 2024)

   
•  In general, the majority considers the USA and Great Britain (81% each), Germany (80%), Poland and Lithuania (79% each), Canada (78%), France (70%), and Japan (55%) as friendly to Ukraine.    
   
• Poland remains a friendly country for the majority of Ukrainians, but the positive assessment has decreased from 94% to 79% compared to last year. In addition, the share of those who consider Poland unambiguously friendly has decreased from 79% to 33%.
   
• Although for the majority of Ukrainians, the USA continues to be perceived as a friendly country, but also from 61% in June to 35% nowadays the share of those who say the USA is unambiguously friendly has decreased and instead choose the option “rather friendly”.  
   
• The absolute majority of Ukrainians consider russia (97%), Belarus (90%), and Iran (75%) as hostile countries.  
   
• China and Hungary have moved into the category of rather unfriendly countries: 58% consider China hostile and 52% consider Hungary hostile. Earlier, these two states were perceived more neutrally: in June 2023, China was considered hostile by 34% of respondents, and 52% - neutral, while Hungary was previously considered hostile by 42% of respondents, and another 26% - neutral.
   
• The attitude to Belarus has also worsened: the share of those polled, who treat Belarus as an absolutely hostile country, has grown from 56% to 71%.
   
• Israel is considered neutral and friendly: 44% assessed it as neutral, 38% - friendly. Turkey is considered by the majority of Ukrainians as a neutral country (51%). At the same time, compared to June 2023, the prevalence of the opinion that Turkey is a friendly country decreased from 40% to 30%. 

As part of the twenty-sixth wave of the nationwide survey, the Sociological Group Rating conducted a study of the dynamics of public attitudes of the population of Ukraine. 

KEY FINDINGS

   
• The assessment of the direction of things as right has decreased to 36%, and now the negative assessment (46%) prevails.
   
• Pride is still the most frequent emotion of respondents regarding Ukraine (56% of respondents answered this way). In dynamics, pride has slightly decreased, but the share of feelings of sadness (from 29% to 39%) and fear (from 11% to 21%) has increased.
   
• The majority of Ukrainians are confident in Ukraine`s ability to repel an attack of the russian federation (85%). However, only 19% are confident of victory in the absence of international support.
   
• Expectations that it will take more than a year to win have increased: this figure has risen from 25% in June 2023 to 39% nowadays.
   
• The older the respondents are, the more positive their expectations of victory and the state of affairs in the country.
   
• Ukrainians first of all name increased armament as the necessary conditions for victory, and secondly – overcoming corruption, change of power, the cohesion of society, assistance of partners, and mobilisation.
   
• Russia`s seizure of new territories is considered unlikely by the majority of respondents.

ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL SITUATION  

   
• According to 36% of respondents, affairs in the country are going in the right direction, while 45% believe that things are going in the wrong direction. Another 19% found it difficult to answer.
   
• After the peak of positive during 2022, the assessment of the state of affairs in Ukraine continues to decline. As a result, for the first time since March 2022, negative assessments of the overall state of affairs in the country prevail over positive ones.  
   
• Older respondents are more optimistic overall. Among Ukrainians aged 51+, 44% have a positive assessment of the state of affairs (vs. 39% who believe that things are moving in the wrong direction). This is the only age category where the positive assessment prevails over the negative one. Whereas among the youngest, only 27% see things heading in the right direction.  
   
• In Western regions, the assessment that affairs are going wrong is slightly more common. 

EMOTIONS REGARDING UKRAINE

   
• When asked what two emotions respondents feel when they think about Ukraine, the most frequently mentioned were pride (56%), then sadness (39%) and fear (21%). 
   
• The general trend is an increase in negative emotions and a slight decrease in optimism. In August 2022, 75% felt pride, now 56% do, although it is still the dominant emotion.  
   
• Also, feelings of sadness (from 29% to 39%) and fear (from 11% to 21%) increased from August 2022 to February 2024.
   
• Confidence/unconfidence in Ukraine`s victory generally corresponds to the propensity for positive/negative emotions. For example, among those who are convinced of the victory, there is a higher share of pride (64% vs. 21%) and joy (12% vs. 2%) for the country. And among those who are not convinced of victory, on the contrary, sadness prevails (56% vs. 36%), fear (25% vs. 21%), anger (18% vs. 7%), and shame (19% vs. 5%) are higher.
   
• Younger generations are more likely to feel sadness (41% each) and anger (10%) than older generations (36% and 7%, respectively). On the other hand, young people aged 18-35 are more likely to have an interest (15%) in the future of Ukraine.
   
• Fear is an emotion that significantly fluctuates among different categories of respondents. For example, this feeling is more common among IDPs (31% vs. 20%), among respondents whose relatives are now in the AFU (25% vs. 19%), and among young people (26% vs. 20% among older respondents).

CONFIDENCE IN UKRAINE`S VICTORY

   
• The absolute majority of surveyed (85%) are generally confident that Ukraine will be able to repel an attack by the russian federation. 15% are not sure about it.  
   
• An important condition for victory is international support: only 19% of respondents believe that Ukraine`s victory is possible without international assistance, while 79% are not sure that it will be possible to win without Western assistance. 
   
• The overall percentage of those convinced of the victory has not changed significantly, but over the six months the percentage of those who were absolutely sure of it has decreased: in June, 71% of Ukrainians were sure of the victory, nowadays – 42%. At the same time, the percentage of those who do not believe in the victory increased (from 3% in June last year to 15% today).
   
• More absolute confidence in Ukraine`s victory has older people, as well as those whose relatives are in the war. If among 18-35-year-old Ukrainians 31% are absolutely sure of the victory, then among respondents aged 51+ there are 50% of such respondents.
   
• 31% believe that Ukraine will need six months or less to defeat russia. However, more often (39%) say that it will take more than a year to win. This position has become more widespread in general compared to June 2023 (25% thought so then).  
   
• The younger the respondents are, the longer, in their opinion, the way to victory: Young people aged 18-35 are more inclined to believe that victory requires more than a year (52%), than respondents aged 36-50 (38%) or 51 and older (31%).
   
• Residents of the eastern regions are the least confident about the specific timeframe for victory: among the eastern region, 38% of respondents could not answer when to expect victory, while in other regions the share of such answers was not more than a quarter.
   
• Respondents were asked to name three things that Ukraine needs to win. The most frequent answers were related to an increase in weapons (46%). The answers referred to increasing the number of weapons in general and supplies from partners, manufacturing their weapons, providing ammunition and modern weapons, aeroplanes, drones, heavy equipment (e.g. tanks) and the like. The second most frequently mentioned alternative was the necessity to fight corruption (34%) – this alternative was mentioned more often by those who are not very confident in victory: 
     - Unity and cohesion of Ukrainian society
     - Necessity for changing of power. Usually, respondents indicated a reset of the political leadership in general or specific bodies were mentioned (need for a new Verkhovna Rada, new deputies, President, etc.). 
     - Assistance of partners to Ukraine in general
     - Mobilisation, increase of the army

   
• About 14% also named patience of the population and belief in victory as an important factor. 6-9% said that money for the army, the development of the economy and its conversion to the military, as well as the activity of citizens and support for the AFU, were important for victory. Less frequently (about 3%) spoke about strong military command, negotiations, the return of Zaluzhnyi, and dialogue between the authorities and society. Sporadically (up to 2%) also named the fight against traitors, social justice, and development of international relations.    
   
• There is a difference in requests depending on a person`s confidence in victory. For example, those who are confident in victory almost twice as often speak about the need for more weapons, as well as about the necessity for unity/cohesion of society. On the contrary, those who are not confident in victory slightly more often point to the need to overcome corruption and change the government.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

• In general, the majority of Ukrainians consider it unlikely that Russia will seize new territories (64%).  

• More than half also do not believe in mass riots/protests (53%). Also, more than half of Ukrainians believe that the establishment of a military dictatorship is rather unlikely. At the same time, as for the risk of establishment of dictatorship of the current government, the respondents` answers were somewhat worse: 46% consider this scenario unlikely, 20% are hesitant, and 24% think it is possible.

• Ukrainians consider aggravation of economic (48%) and political (45%) crises as more probable threats. Up to 35% hesitate whether it is possible, and up to 20% think that there will be no crisis.

• Respondents who are confident in Ukraine`s victory are generally more optimistic about other events: for example, they do not consider Russia`s seizure of new territories as a possible scenario, they believe less in the possibility of establishing a dictatorship or a crisis. 

• Younger generations have somewhat pessimistic assessments of threats than older generations. For example, in the 18-35 age group, 32% believe that riots and protests are likely, while only 16% of the 51+ age group think so. Younger people also consider the seizure of new territories and the onset of crises more likely. 

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Sociological research “Cultural practices and needs for population recovery in deoccupied and frontline communities” is supported by the Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative (UCBI), implemented with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukrainian territories has not only changed the physical landscape of Ukrainian regions, but has also led to rapid changes in their social structure and socio-psychological dynamics of certain communities and their members.

Without exception, all respondents in the study confirm that the war has altered perception of their own culture and themselves. It has strengthened the sense of the culture significance as something that shapes and sustains the nation in the struggle for its sovereignty.

The study focuses on understanding of how these changes have occurred, the problems they have manifested in communities near the frontlines, how communities experience access or lack of access to cultural services, and what cultural needs they have. Frontline, border, and liberated territories are examined in the research in terms of the state of culture. 

The fundamental questions of the research were:

   
• Evaluation of the population's satisfaction with the current (or pre-war) state, diversity, and quality of cultural services and infrastructure
   
• Studying the opinions of various target audiences regarding their vision of the desired ideal state of the cultural sphere (cultural services, cultural infrastructure, cultural service providers, public engagement, etc.)
   
• Exploring the opinions of different target audiences regarding the role and significance of culture in Ukraine's resistance to Russian aggression, and respondents’ self-assessment of changes in their own identity since the onset of the full-scale invasion
   
• Investigating the opinions of various target audiences regarding the place and tasks of culture in post-conflict recovery

LEISURE PRACTICES 

The primary forms of leisure activities among respondents in the surveyed regions of Ukraine include meeting friends (56%), watching TV at home (56%), and browsing content on social media (52%). Approximately 40% engage in listening to music and reading books, while 25% pursue creative activities/hobbies and another 25% participate in sports. Additionally, 16% enjoy hiking, 15% visit cinemas, and an equal percentage attend church. Board games attract 13% of respondents, and 11% are involved in community work or volunteering. Only 9% opt for cultural experiences by visiting theatres and museums, while 7% explore zoos and attractions. Moreover, 6% attend concerts, 6% go on guided tours, and 2% participate in festivals. Lastly, 2% engage in gambling activities.

Individuals of various age groups are expected to have different leisure practices. Younger respondents (18-35 years old) have a higher tendency to meet with friends, browse social media content, and listen to music, engage in creative activities, participate in sports, watch movies in cinemas, and play both board and gambling games. On the other hand, the older participants (51 and above) more frequently watch TV at home, read books, and attend church. Variations are also observed among respondents residing in different types of settlements. For instance, residents of regional centres are more inclined to spend time with friends, listen to music, read books, participate in sports and various hobbies, visit cinemas, museums, and zoos.

Among the content consumed by respondents on social media, news (articles and videos) prevail at 75%, followed by movies and TV series at 64%, online music at 57%, and feeds with photos and videos at 56%. Nearly half of those consuming information from social media engage with educational or informative content, including documentary narratives (46-48%). Around 40% of these respondents watch comedic shows or conversational interviews with notable individuals or bloggers. Approximately a quarter watch stand-up comedy or comedian performances, entertainment shows, or reality TV.

Among consumers of television content, films and TV series are the dominant products with a consumption rate of 72%, followed by news at 66%. 40% of the audience views documentary narratives, while 35% enjoy comedic shows. The average consumption rate for educational and informative content is 33%, while the average consumption rate for conversational interviews with notable individuals is 32%, and entertainment and reality shows is 23%.

Movies and concerts, as well as festivals, are the most interesting cultural events for respondents, each capturing the interest of 45%. Engaging with like-minded individuals and interest-based clubs are intriguing for 36% of those surveyed, while gyms and dance studios attract 32%. The interest level for theatres is 31%, exhibitions 30%, organized tours 27%, creative clubs 23%, and meetings with famous figures 21%.

The level of interest in cultural events shows age-related dependencies. For the younger audience, movies, gyms, dance studios, creative clubs, and meetings with renowned cultural figures are more captivating. Among the older population, engaging with like-minded individuals or interest-based clubs is a more interesting cultural pastime. Regarding the type of settlement, particularly in large cities, there is a higher level of interest in all types of cultural events. Conversely, in rural areas and small towns, a higher level of interest is observed primarily in concerts and festivals, as well as creative clubs.

The main motivations influencing the decision to attend cultural events include personal interest in the theme or format of the event (41%), territorial accessibility (38%), and affordable prices (37%). The presence of company or acquaintances is also a significant factor (31%). Other factors such as the lineup of artists (14%), the charitable purpose of the event, and the need for family recreation are less significant (14% each). Advertisements on social media and in the media have minimal impact on the decision to attend cultural events.

For the younger generation, more significant factors influencing the decision to attend a cultural event include personal interest, the presence of acquaintances, and advertisements on social media or in the media. For individuals in the middle age group (36-50 years), the need for organizing family recreation becomes a notable factor. Meanwhile, factors such as territorial accessibility, price, the lineup of artists or performers, and the charitable purpose of the event are equally significant for decision-making regarding cultural event attendance across all age categories.

City residents more frequently make the decision to attend a cultural event based on their personal interest in the event's theme or the lineup of performers. Conversely, residents of rural areas and small towns more often take note of the charitable purpose of the cultural event.

ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

In all regions except for Kherson, more than half of the respondents stated that their locality has enough or sufficient cultural institutions, such as libraries, clubs, museums, and art studios. However, in these regions, at least a third mentioned that such institutions are insufficient. Discussions about insufficiency were more prevalent in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Chernihiv regions. In Kherson, only a quarter stated that there are enough cultural institutions, while more than 70% highlighted their inadequacy.

Residents of regional centres users of libraries or cultural centres, as well as older respondents (51 years and older) often spoke about the sufficiency of cultural institutions. The best situation with the work of libraries in settlements is in the Chernihiv, Sumy and Mykolaiv regions, where more than 75% of respondents noted that these cultural institutions work in their settlements. The worst situation is in Kherson (21%) and Kharkiv (48%) regions. In other regions, almost 60% indicated that libraries are working today.

Overall, only about 10% of surveyed respondents who are aware of the operation of libraries mentioned that they visit them once a month or more frequently. Approximately 15% of these respondents stated that they visit libraries once a quarter or semi-annually. At the same time, about two-thirds of the respondents do not visit these cultural institutions. In the Kherson region, the question about the frequency of library visits was not analysed due to an insufficient number of respondents.

The situation regarding the operation of clubs in populated areas is the most favourable in Chernihiv and Sumy regions, where over 75% of respondents indicated that these cultural institutions are operating in their localities. The worst situation is in Kherson (12%) and Kharkiv (41%) regions. In other regions, approximately 60% mentioned that clubs are currently operating.

Approximately 14% to 20% of surveyed respondents who are knowledgeable about clubs stated that they visit them once a month or more frequently. From 20% to 30% of respondents stated that they visit clubs once a quarter or semi-annually. At the same time, approximately 30% to 40% of respondents do not visit these cultural institutions. The highest percentage of non-visitors is in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions. In the Kherson region, the question about the frequency of visiting cultural centres was not analysed due to an insufficient number of respondents.

Assessing the work of libraries according to several criteria, their visitors relatively better appreciated the work of employees of these cultural institutions. Also, the list of services and events, as well as the condition of the premises and the material equipment of the libraries, received high marks.  The highest evaluations of library performance across different criteria were recorded among respondents in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson regions. Among library visitors in Chernihiv and Sumy regions, relatively more undefined ratings were noted regarding the assessment of the performance of these cultural institutions.

Assessing the work of clubs according to several criteria, their visitors relatively better appreciated the work of employees of these cultural institutions. Also, the list of services and events, as well as the condition of the premises and material equipment, received high marks. However, the estimates are not as good as the estimates for library work on the condition of the premises and the list of services and events.   The best estimates of club employees were recorded among the respondents of Kharkiv and Sumy regions. According to the criterion, the condition of the premises is relatively the best estimates among the respondents of the Kharkov and Odessa regions. By material equipment - in Kharkov, Odessa and Zaporizhzhya regions. According to the list of services and activities − in Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa regions.

In the Kherson region, evaluation of satisfaction with cultural centers was not conducted due to the insufficient number of respondents who visit them. 

More than 70% do not support the idea of closing cultural institutions (clubs, libraries) in sparsely populated areas if they do not cope with their functions. 22% support this initiative. 

In regional distribution, no significant differences are observed in the attitude towards the initiative, as less than 70% of respondents in all regions do not support the idea (Table 2.2.1 – in the Annexes). In terms of age groups, a slightly higher level of support (up to 27%) for optimizing cultural institutions is observed among the younger audience (18-35 years). However, even among the youth, 70% do not support such an initiative. There are also no differences in the attitude towards this idea among those who visit or do not visit libraries. However, among those who do not visit clubs, there is a slightly higher level of support for closing cultural institutions (27%) compared to those who use the services of these institutions (18%).

Despite the majority not supporting the closure of cultural institutions in sparsely populated areas, an overwhelming majority (78%) believe that restoring/rebuilding destroyed cultural institutions should only be done after the end of the war. Currently, only 17% support the immediate restoration of such institutions. Interestingly, the lowest level of support for the immediate restoration of cultural institutions is observed in the Kherson region. Among age groups and residents of urban and rural areas, no significant differences are observed in the attitude towards the necessity of restoring destroyed cultural institutions: the absolute majority in all groups support rebuilding only after the end of the war.

ASSESSMENT OF LEISURE OPPORTUNITIES

Assessing the possibilities of leisure in their areas as a whole, relatively better estimates were given to children and adolescents, the worst - to demobilized soldiers and veterans, as well as people with disabilities. With respect to the latter categories, respondents most often could not assess the level of leisure opportunities for these categories. In a regional breakdown, relatively better assessments of leisure opportunities for all age groups of the population are recorded in the Odesa region, while the worst assessments are in the Kherson region.

Concerning better assessments of leisure opportunities for all categories, they are observed among residents of regional centres, the younger population, and the more affluent.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FUNDING OF THE SPHERE OF CULTURE

The vast majority of respondents believe that the sphere of culture in their community is not sufficiently funded. Also, a significant part of the respondents (from 20% to 36% in different areas) could not answer this question at all. About a sufficient level of funding said from 19% to 26% of respondents. Relatively better assessed the state of financing in the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions.

The funding situation in the cultural sphere in rural areas is better assessed, although here, the highest percentage of those who could not answer the question is also observed. Additionally, relatively better assessments were provided by young respondents (18-35 years old) and those who use the services of libraries or clubs.

Opinions regarding the necessity of allocating funds for cultural events during the war have divided the surveyed audience. Fifty percent support such initiatives, 44% do not, and 6% could not provide an answer.

A slightly higher level of support for the idea of allocating funds for cultural events during the war is recorded in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa regions, while the lowest level of support is in the Kherson region.

Regarding the higher level of support for allocating funds for cultural events during the war, it is also noted among the younger age group (18-35 years) and those who use the services of cultural institutions such as libraries and clubs.

The absolute majority believe that local authorities should finance cultural events in their communities (over 70%). Central government, businesses, charitable foundations, international organizations, and public organizations and funds are considered responsible by 19% to 29% of respondents. Ordinary citizens are seen as responsible by 8%.

Similar opinions are expressed regarding the funding of cultural institutions in communities. The majority (72%) believe that local authorities should be responsible for this. However, unlike organizing events, respondents also expect more attention to the cultural sphere from the central government (40%). Businesses, charitable foundations, international organizations, public organizations, and funds are considered responsible by 19% to 24% of respondents, while ordinary citizens are seen as responsible by 8%.

A relatively higher level of expectations regarding the financing of cultural institutions by the central authorities is observed in Odessa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhya regions. There are also relatively higher expectations for state funding among young people and users of cultural institutions.

INFORMATION SOURCES

The top three sources of information on cultural life in communities are close friends and acquaintances (51%), Telegram channels (44%), and Facebook posts (39%). Information from websites is obtained by 27%, from Instagram – 23%, local television – 16%, local press – 7%, and radio – 5%.

Information about the cultural life of the community is relatively more frequently obtained from close friends and acquaintances in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, from Telegram channels in the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, and from Facebook in the Sumy region. 

News about cultural life is more often learned from close friends and acquaintances and Facebook posts in small towns and villages than in regional centres. Internet sites, Telegram channels, and Instagram posts are more common sources of information in regional centres.

For older individuals, sources of news are more likely to be close friends, acquaintances, television, radio, or the press, while for younger audiences, internet sources and Telegram channels are more prevalent. 

IDENTITY

Among the residents of the surveyed regions, regional identity dominates in the first place. Additionally, very high indicators of Ukrainian civic identity are noted among the respondents. 

As for the sense of European identity, the assessments are moderate. A relatively higher level of European identity is observed in Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions, while the lowest is in Odesa and Kharkiv regions.

A sense of Soviet identity is recorded in a small number of respondents, somewhat more often among the older population and those with Russian as their language of communication. Somewhat more often about the Soviet identity corresponded in the Odesa and Zaporizhzhya regions, less often - in Sumy.

RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PHASE

   
1. Closeness to the borders with Russia or the frontline, systematic shelling since the beginning of the full-scale war, the experience of occupation and de-occupation have made safety the main factor defining life in all eight regions researched. War and its consequences have resulted in a tangible social isolation and disconnection of people in the studied communities. Isolation increases both within communities and as a process of isolating individual communities from each other, as well as from other regions of Ukraine. Respondents not only interact and communicate less within their communities, but they also travel less within Ukraine, visit big cities and major cultural centres less frequently. Leaving the place of residence is hindered by anxiety and fear. The most common regret expressed by respondents is the loss of travel opportunities. The exodus of individuals from frontline and border communities only heightens the processes of social isolation and depopulation. People in most regions, except for Odesa, spend their time within their homes and yards, with their families or cohabitants, because it is considered safe. Long walks, visits to the familiar sea, and walks in the familiar forest have become unavailable to people due to the war. Shelling and air raids have made people's stay outside the home functional but brief. In all regions studied, shelters are scarce in public spaces and cultural institutions, particularly in villages. People steer clear of unnecessary trips, and children are not permitted to leave without a reason. Cultural services in regions that are mainly under systematic shelling in small settlements, towns, and villages are predominantly provided online, hindering socialization. 
   
2. The inability to conduct offline education, the lack of shelters, and the abovementioned risks have disrupted the normal process of socializing children, teenagers, and, to some extent, young adults. The majority of their time is spent with parents and relatives rather than interacting with peers, primarily through digital devices rather than face-to-face communication. According to respondents, online schooling decreases the likelihood of children participating in both online and offline cultural events. Online activities following virtual classes exhaust and burden children and teenagers. Attendance of in-person events is hindered by shelling, the unstable schedule of school activities, and the general risks associated with leaving home. 
   
3. The constant sense of danger, shelling, destruction and death all around lead to a shift in the perception of one’s lifetime by the residents in the researched communities - every day is seen as if it were the last, heightening the subjective value of time. Hence, the majority of respondents believe it is right to spend this precious time with their families. Attending cultural events and activities is diminished by the increasing anxiety and relatively high level of daily stress reported by respondents. Systemic stress affects attention span and the ability to derive satisfaction from complex cultural products such as reading books or attending performances. For some respondents, attending entertaining and cultural events may be accompanied by a feeling of guilt for experiencing joy, leading to self-restraint. Another factor reducing respondents' inclination to allocate time for cultural events is the impact of new economic and social realities. According to respondents, especially those aged 24 and older, increased work commitments result in greater fatigue, leaving them with less spare time for cultural leisure activities. 
   
4. All participants acknowledge that their cultural needs have undergone significant transformations during the time of the full-scale war. The negative outset of these transformations was influenced by the pre-war experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondents nostalgically recall times when communities practiced mass cultural events, allowing individuals to feel a sense of belonging, experience social support and cohesion, various social connections, and relationships. Social isolation has generated a strong demand for direct in-person interactions, the sense of the community's social body (through mass events), exchanging thoughts, shared emotional experiences. However, these experiences are currently unattainable due to safety restrictions. In the majority of the studied communities, any large-scale events are currently prohibited. Live meetings with familiar individuals, evening gatherings, communal spaces where one can meet peers and engage in conversations are the primary needs that respondents seek to fulfil in cultural establishments.  
   
5. In the surveyed regions, there are cultural establishments such as cultural centres, music schools, museums, libraries, leisure centres, theatres, cinemas, sports sections, and leisure clubs. All of them are in different condition, ranging from nearly completely destroyed and looted by occupiers in the communities of Kherson and Snihurivka to functioning with varying degrees of success and damage caused by both enemy actions and lack of repairs. Almost all cultural institutions lack equipped shelters (except for cultural establishments in the Odesa region, where this situation appears to be better) which is why they usually operate fully or partially online. 
   
6. Cultural institutions in the surveyed communities offer a rather limited range of services, including clubs, books, concerts, and performances (usually online). Offline events in these communities are relatively infrequent, typically occurring in the warm season and exclusively outdoors for safety reasons. In some areas, there are restrictions on gatherings (not exceeding 50 people for one event), while in others, such events are not held at all (Kherson region, Sumy region). Typical offline events include fairs, charity concerts, children's festivals, and national memorial days, all oriented towards patriotism. Often, these events raise funds for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is a significant reason for respondents to attend. According to respondents in most communities, volunteering and support for the Armed Forces have partially replaced cultural activities in cultural establishments. Workers of cultural institutions, along with attendees, engage in activities such as weaving camouflage nets, preparing trench candles, and fundraising.  
   
7. Among all age groups, the group of children and adolescents remains the most provided with opportunities for self-realization. In almost every community, depending on the security situation, they can attend online or offline clubs, music schools, seasonal and state holidays organized in shelters or under the open sky. Often, the leisure activities for children are facilitated by the efforts of international funds and organizations (the Red Cross, UNICEF). Despite the limited number of events, they still do not ensure proper development and socialization of children. More activities, such as psychological training and skill-building workshops for children and adolescents, engaging activities, and sports sections are sought by parent respondents. Sports facilities and stadiums are almost absent or not in working condition in the surveyed communities, and the demand for them is quite noticeable. Parents are willing to pay for quality leisure activities for their children within their means. The development of children is a higher priority for parent respondents than their own. 
      Individuals aged 16-24 face a scarcity of options for enriching cultural activities within their localities. The majority of these respondents used to fulfil their cultural desires in regional hubs prior to the onset of the war, and some continue to do so, especially if they are studying there. However, for those who remained in their communities, visiting regional centres (Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Mykolaiv, or Zaporizhzhia) currently appears dngerous due to the increased risk of missile attacks in large cities. As a result, these respondents are forcibly isolated in their small communities, where their peers often move abroad or to other regions. This situation compels them to build new social connections, which is challenging because there are very few public spaces in communities where young people can spend time. The primary cultural needs of respondents in this age group are to distract and relax, temporarily forgetting about the war. Festivals, concerts, comedy shows, stand-up performances, meetings with famous people, and sports events are what they dream of. Educational events such as workshops, psychological training, and theatre are also relevant to them. Some with a proactive stance join the volunteer movement. Young respondents consider the state of culture in their communities unsatisfactory and outdated. They feel a lack of interesting leisure ideas and modern equipment for their implementation within the communities. In certain communities, local cultural institutions, often with the assistance of Youth Councils, rescue this group of respondents through gatherings and evening events. Adult respondents aged 25-40 constitute the most occupied category in the survey. Their cultural needs are usually influenced by the needs of their children. In these communities, there were relatively few cultural services for them even before the war. They dream of the restoration of fairs, City and Village Days, opportunities for offline meetings with interesting people, beneficial workshops, and psychological training. They desire the chance to attend theatres, cinemas, or concerts featuring Ukrainian pop stars, and they are willing to pay for these services. This age group of respondents is more interested in contemporary Ukrainian cultural content that allows them to learn more about Ukraine, its history and present (documentary films, shows, Dmitry Komarov's series), as well as modern Ukrainian and international pop music, and contemporary Ukrainian and foreign films. Cultural self-realization for individuals aged 41 and above is typically represented by local choirs, women's interest clubs, and is often shifted toward those aged 60 and above in terms of themes and formats. This group is most interested in receiving cultural services within their community and actively consumes online content produced by community cultural institutions. However, the majority of their leisure activities still take place traditionally at home. Like other respondents, they would appreciate concerts, festivals, and performances by Ukrainian cultural figures and groups but are compelled to consume digital content. This age group is the most active library-goers and, by demand, the most patriotic consumers of cultural content. They often consider entertaining content to be not the most important at the moment.  
   
8. All study participants, including cultural service providers, consider the state of cultural institutions in communities generally unsatisfactory. Cultural institutions lack repairs, shelter facilities, and transportation for bringing people from remote villages. There is a general lack of funding and modern equipment for cultural institutions, as well as the modernization of library collections (only some communities can afford to update them, but have already forcibly removed Russian and soviet literature). The second significant problem is the shortage of modern and young professionals in the cultural system. Some communities form Youth Councils to invigorate the exchange of ideas, but generally, low salaries, small communities, and depopulation makes the personnel issue difficult to address. According to respondents, internally displaced persons can partially address it. Some communities had individuals who were internally displaced from large cities, but they were proactive and organized interesting clubs. However, retaining them in communities proved challenging. For most respondents, quality cultural services are those delivered not formally but from the heart, provided by qualified cultural workers, leaving behind valuable knowledge or a pleasant experience.  
   
9. Most communities are aware of cultural grant support and make efforts to apply for grants, with some communities having successful cases of obtaining and utilizing grants. Respondents, cultural figures, and cultural managers believe that culture in communities should be funded not only by local but also by state authorities. They emphasize the need to increase salaries for cultural workers, as respondents perceive this work as prestigious in spirit but significantly undervalued and demotivating.  
      Respondents also see cultural funding as a result of collective efforts from various stakeholders: local and state authorities, patrons, consumers willing to pay for cultural services, international funds, and donors. They recognize the importance and necessity of systemic communication and collaborative solutions among all these stakeholders at the community level. During the war, local businesses are less involved in financing culture and supporting cultural events, as their activities are more focused on assisting the army, diverting significant resources. Business respondents (except the Odesa region) have a lukewarm response to the idea of receiving grants themselves and developing culture in communities. Being a situational sponsor of children's and charity events is a more understandable concept for them.  
   
10. Funding for culture is often perceived by respondents as competing with fun

 As part of the 25th wave of the national survey “Ukraine under conditions of War” Sociological Group Rating conducted a separate study on the perception of threats and expectations of winter 2023-2024.

 Expectations for winter
 

   
• According to the expectations of half of the respondents, the situation in Ukraine as a whole will remain unchanged this winter (51%). Another 25% expect improvement in winter, 21% - deterioration. More positive forecasts about the situation prevail among residents of the central regions, the elderly and the poor: about a third believe in improvement. 
   
• Ukrainians expect improvement of the situation on the front in winter, but economic deterioration. Expectations regarding the situation on the front are the most optimistic: 46% believe in improvement. The economy leads to pessimistic expectations: 34% of respondents expect deterioration in this sphere, and 43% - do not expect any changes. The energy sector is assessed as one that will improve (17%) or remain unchanged (43%).
   
• Young people aged 18-35 are relatively more critical in assessing the situation on the front – 38% believe in its enhancement, while among older people aged 51+, which is 52%, believe in positive developments. 
   
• Kyiv residents (49%) expect a deterioration of the situation in the economy most of all. In general, the younger and better off respondents are, the higher the share of people with negative expectations about the economy.
   
• However, when it comes to changes in personal situations in winter, negative expectations are higher among the poor: among the well-off citizens, the share of those who expect deterioration of their situation is 7%, while among the poor – 28%.  In general, among all in the personal situation, 64% of respondents expect no change, 16% expect improvement, and 17% expect deterioration.
   
• Based on expectations regarding winter, a cluster analysis was conducted and several categories were identified among respondents. According to their expectations of the situation this winter, respondents are divided into three groups: pessimists (25%), optimists (21%) and those who have not defined their expectations (54%).
   
• The highest proportion of optimists is observed among residents of central regions, villages and people aged 51+. At the same time, Kyiv residents and young people (18-35 years old) are the most pessimistic.
   
• Comparative assessments of the potential energy supply situation this winter are positive: respondents believe that the situation will be better than last year (41%) or will be the same as last year (49%). At the same time, among residents of the frontline and de-occupied territories, 54% in both categories believe that their electricity supply situation will be the same as last year, while the central-western regions have more optimistic expectations and think that the situation will be better.

Preparation for winter

   
• Almost 75% of Ukrainians prepared for possible problems with energy supply in winter. Among the most popular preparation measures were buying flashlights and batteries, preparing food supplies, buying energy storage devices (accumulators) and generators, and preparing drinking water supplies – more than half of the surveyed did each of these measures. 
   
• Kyiv residents, as well as young and middle-aged people, who are more affluent, are prepared most intensively for problems with the energy supply. City dwellers more often than others bought flashlights and batteries, as well as stocked up on drinking water, while village residents more often bought generators.
   
• The intensity of preparations for energy supply problems is also influenced by sentiments about what problems Ukraine will face in winter: pessimists in anticipation of difficulties make more efforts to prepare for winter than optimists.
   
• 72% of respondents indicated that there is an “Indestructibility Points” in their locality. At the same time, in rural areas, almost 40% of residents said that there is no “Indestructibility Point” in their area. Most of all such points are in Kyiv, as well as in the de-occupied and frontline territories. Among those respondents who have an “Indestructibility Point” in their settlement, 13% used it last winter: 3% often, 10% rarely.
   
• The majority of Ukrainians (74%) do not plan to leave their homes in case of power failure during the week. At the same time, almost a quarter of Ukrainians in this case plan to move to another place: 11% within the locality, 8% - to another area, 3% - to a temporary place of residence (school, etc.), and 2% - abroad. Most often the relocation is limited to the same locality where the respondent currently lives. Residents of Kyiv are most often ready to move, in general, city dwellers, more affluent, and youth.

Live during the War

   
• 60% think that during the war it is necessary to limit themselves considerably in entertainment and shopping, and these figures have not changed much during two years of the war. 36% think the opposite – that it is necessary to try to live a full life during the war. This opinion is more often shared by residents of Kyiv and de-occupied territories. And citizens of western regions agree with the fact that it is necessary to limit themselves most of all. This question mostly divided respondents by age and income: the younger and wealthy are much more willing to live a full life than the older and financially struggling ones, who support self-restraint the most.
   
• Every second person in Ukraine nowadays does not make any plans ahead at all. Over the past year, the number of Ukrainians who plan their lives for a long period (several years) has decreased from 19% to 12%.  Another 15% plan their life for six months to a year, and 22% - for a few months at most. Kyiv residents, youth and middle-aged people, as well as wealthy citizens, plan their lives for a longer period.
   
• Almost 80% of Ukrainians feel safe in their area. The least safe are residents of frontline and de-occupied regions, as well as middle-aged and elderly people, city dwellers and less well-off citizens.

Threat assessment

   
• About a third of Ukrainians assess the threat of a missile strike on their locality as high. Most of them are among residents of Kyiv (57%), as well as residents of frontline and de-occupied territories (about 42%). On the other hand, only 10% consider military actions on the territory of their place of residence as very likely, but among the de-occupied and frontline regions up to 20% believe so.
   
• Half (51%) of Ukrainians believe that it is always necessary to declare an air alarm during take-offs of MiGs of potential “dagger missiles” carriers. About 40% of Ukrainians note the expediency of differentiating the alarms depending on the situation and the reality of the threat. The number of Ukrainians who oppose the announcement of alarms at all does not exceed 5%. The least support for this norm is among the residents of Kyiv: 59% of them believe that the alarm, in this case, should be announced not always, but depending on the situation.

Social cohesion

   
• The respondents believe that last year Ukrainians were more united than now, but they assess the future and current situation in the same way. If assessing the last year, 87% believe that the nation was cohesive, but nowadays, this assessment is given by 64%, and next year this indicator is expected to be 59%. In contrast, 34% of polled believe that Ukrainians are not cohesive now, while only 11% indicated that Ukrainians were not united last year.
   
• When assessing the current situation and future of 2024, nearly half of respondents chose the answer “cohesive” or “rather cohesive” across all regional, age and financial groups, but overall, younger people see less cohesive populations than older people.

 As part of the twenty-fifth wave of the nationwide survey, Rating Group conducted a study of the dynamics of the attitude of the Ukrainian population to international unions.

   
• As of the end of November, 78% of respondents would vote in favor of Ukraine's accession to the European Union if such a referendum were held, which is slightly less than in July of this year (85%). Only 5% of respondents are against joining the EU. Instead, the share of those who have not decided or would not like to vote is increasing: 3% and 14% respectively for now.
   
• Support for Ukraine's accession to NATO is also on the decline and stands at 77% (83% in July). Currently, the rate of support for joining NATO is at the same level as it was at the beginning of the invasion in March 2022. However, only 5% of respondents would not like to see Ukraine in the North Atlantic Alliance, 15% would not vote, and 3% are undecided.
   
• There are no age differences in support for European integration. Women are more likely than men to demonstrate uncertainty (not going to vote or hesitate to answer) both regarding accession to the EU and NATO. Respondents with the lowest income demonstrate the lowest support for the unions.
   
• In general, in each of the regions, the majority supports joining both unions, but the highest number of those who want to see Ukraine join the EU and NATO is among residents of the capital and the west.
   
• The idea of Ukraine's accession to NATO within only the territories controlled now by the state is unacceptable to more than half of respondents (53%). At the same time, 40% of respondents fully or rather support this idea: residents of the western regions and the capital are relatively more likely to take such a step, as are middle-aged people. Instead, the residents of the East, Center, and South, as well as the oldest people, support this idea to the least extent.
   
• Even among supporters of Ukraine's accession to NATO, only 44% support this idea, while 51% are against it.

 We present a survey of social capital in Ukraine, conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" at the request of the transformation communications activity supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), implemented by Chemonics international inc. The content is the sole responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of usaid or the U.S. government.  

"Social capital is the potential for mutual trust and mutual assistance that arises in relationships between people: obligations and expectations, information exchange, and social norms. Forms of social capital include organizational, mobilization resources, resources of social cohesion and social assistance." 

James Coleman, American sociologist. 

Executive summary:

● The Ukrainian society in general had a positive radius of trust: there were slightly more people who trusted others than those who did not. Nevertheless, a more detailed analysis revealed a significant difference across the age groups. The oldest were the most open to others, while the youngest were the most closed-off. Generally speaking, the problem of youth, both in Ukraine and in Western societies, is one of the challenges in the modern world. This situation is detrimental to the social capital, as the relatively higher level of distrust among young people, who are the main and most prospective basis contributing to the country’s human development, weakens the social capital. Deeper studies and strategies are needed to overcome this phenomenon.

● The research findings also confirmed the hypotheses that the level of openness and trust in others in the social groups depends on the level of income. People with higher incomes demonstrated a much higher level of openness than those with lower incomes. However, the income scale is subjective, and the group of individuals with the highest income in the Ukrainian reality is often represented by a strong middle class rather than by the truly rich.

● Despite the «average» level of trust in other people and demonstration of social cohesion, a breakdown by categories revealed a contradiction in the social mindset regarding the attitude to others. A relatively positive balance of trust/distrust in others in general was primarily shaped by an extremely high level of trust in the close circle (immediate family members and relatives). Family is one of the most important social institutions in Ukraine. Behavioral patterns in the family are often projected onto other communities. Nepotism, clannishness, and concealment of crimes are derivatives of this relationship model. Yet when it comes to strangers, people of a different nationality or those with different political views, the level of distrust towards these categories of population was significant. This is a significant risk factor in view of historical contradictions and ideological differences in Ukrainian society. On the other hand, propensity to collectivism and sacrifice of personal interests for the sake of the group are a significant advantage in a crisis, particularly in times of war. Volunteering, neighborhood associations, and a system of horizontal ties became the cornerstone of defense in the first months of the full-scale war and were examples of social mobilization in times of crisis. It is confirmed with a high level of trust in charity foundations and CSOs, which has been recorded since 2014 and was also confirmed by this research. The phenomenon paves the way for further development of social capital and building of a new decentralized model of interactions within society.

● The average indicator of trust in central and local government authorities, as an important component of the social capital, is currently a wartime phenomenon rather than an ordinary situation. Since the first days of the war, polls have recorded a rapid increase in trust in Ukraine’s key  government agencies caused by a shift in the society’s focus from priority issues (firstly, economic development and government corruption) to defense and security. The State as an institution had maximum capabilities and powers over these matters, so distrust in key government authorities during the war was perceived as a sign of betrayal. Nevertheless, socio-economic challenges and corruption issues will likely return once the hostilities end, which traditionally leads to a drop in trust in the central government. In addition, the role of the State as a central power institution in Ukrainian society is «blurred» due to partial abolishment of the social contract. The norms and values of the State in such a situation were perceived as a mere declaration rather than as a foundation for law and order. On the other hand, trust in local authorities has the potential to grow under favorable conditions, given the success of decentralization and better opportunities to liaise with citizens, and demonstrate success during postwar reconstruction.

● The media are an important tool for building social capital in the context of the all-out digitalization and informatization. Building trust as an important component of social capital today strongly depends on the quality and content of information shared almost instantly through various channels. In addition, the attitude to the freedom of speech as a keystone of a democratic society is an important indicator of the type of society and whether social capital is being built in it. In times of war, when state propaganda can be an element of defense and struggle against the enemy, Ukrainians were also quite critical of the information they were given, even though they agreed with the need for this tool in times of crisis. The survey showed that society preferred independent and «fast» online media and social media where they could access any public information. Freedom of expression is a fundamental development pillar for Ukrainians. On the other hand, there is a threat that these channels often disseminate unverified facts or sensitive topics that can lead to social confrontation. As the research showed, political intolerance often resulted in confrontation on social media that were free platforms for expressing opinions. Therefore, media literacy, the ability to identify fakes, and a critical approach to the shared information are essential for building the social capital in the Ukrainian society, which is highly vulnerable in the information landscape amid the fullscale war.

● Ukrainian society showed an extremely high level of togetherness when it came to confronting the enemy. The polls showed a rise in national (primarily pro-Ukrainian), civic, and language identity during the war.  Today, there is an overwhelming consensus on major ideological issues, such as foreign policy or history, which saw a regional divide before February 2022. Such cohesion lays strong foundations for building social capital. On the other hand, the idea of social unity is not yet dominant because of the long-term confrontation on ideological grounds, which was often played on by political parties in their election campaigns. There was also no consolidation in assessing the effectiveness of reforms and the European future, although the support for EU accession exceeded 80%. Yet, the social groups that were committed to the accession to the EU, positively perceived reforms, spoke about the ideological unity of the Ukrainian society, showed a higher level of trust in all its branches, led a more public and sophisticated social life, and were more likely to be civic activists, were an essential basis for Ukraine’s social capital. 

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, almost 70% of respondents in the Ivano-Frankivsk community believe that the city is heading in the right direction, while 17% hold the opposite view. Internally displaced persons have a more positive assessment of the direction of affairs in the city (more than 80% rated it as positive).
• Among the available opportunities, local residents and internally displaced persons rated the opportunity to feel safe (82% and 94% satisfied, respectively, 11% and 4% dissatisfied), self-realization (71% satisfied, dissatisfied – 18% and 10%), and youth development (66% and 70% satisfied, respectively, 20% and 8% dissatisfied). Lower ratings were given to the opportunity to do business (47% and 36% satisfied, respectively, 27% and 12% dissatisfied) and decent wages (31% satisfied, 56% and 24% dissatisfied). All opportunities are rated higher by respondents with higher incomes.
• Almost 70% of respondents are satisfied with the activities of Ivano-Frankivsk Mayor Martsinkiv, while 26% are dissatisfied (among IDPs, 63% are satisfied, 15% are dissatisfied, and about a quarter are undecided). Older and poorer respondents are more satisfied with his activities. 37% are satisfied with the activities of the head of the regional military-civilian administration, Onyshchuk, 16% are dissatisfied, and almost half are undecided (among IDPs, 33% are satisfied with her activities, 5% are dissatisfied, and more than 60% did not give an assessment). Almost 40% are satisfied with the work of the regional military-civilian administration, 28% are dissatisfied, and a third are undecided (among IDPs, 41% are satisfied with its activities, 9% are dissatisfied, and more than half are undecided). Among locals, 41% are satisfied with the activities of the regional council, 21% are dissatisfied, and almost 40% are undecided (among IDPs, 43% are satisfied with its activities, 6% are dissatisfied, and more than half are undecided). 46% are satisfied with the work of the city council, 25% are dissatisfied, and almost 30% did not provide their assessment (among IDPs, 45% are satisfied with its activities, 8% are dissatisfied, and 45% are undecided).
• Sixty percent of Frankivsk residents consider the interaction between city residents and local authorities on important community issues to be effective, while about 30% consider it ineffective. Among displaced persons, 60% consider the interaction to be effective, 13% consider it ineffective, and more than a quarter are undecided.
• When assessing various areas of the city authorities' work, 71% of local residents are satisfied with the repair of roads and sidewalks and the improvement of courtyards and adjacent areas, while 25-27% are dissatisfied (among IDPs, 72-73% and 21-24%, respectively). 69% of city residents are satisfied with the functioning of the city during wartime, while 25% are dissatisfied (among IDPs, 79% are satisfied and 12% are dissatisfied). When assessing the assistance provided to IDPs, 58% of local residents expressed their satisfaction, 10% had the opposite opinion, and one-third were unable to assess this area. The displaced persons themselves are more satisfied with the assistance provided (73%), while 18% are dissatisfied. 57% are satisfied with the assistance provided by the army, 22% are dissatisfied, and 22% did not provide an assessment (among displaced persons, 57% and 15% respectively, 29% were undecided). Among local residents, 44% are satisfied with social assistance to low-income residents, 19% are dissatisfied, and more than a third are undecided (among IDPs, 46% are satisfied, 14% are dissatisfied, and more than 40% are undecided).
• The priority areas for city authorities are considered to be assistance to the army (64% among local residents and 57% among IDPs), security in the city (27% among locals and 34% among IDPs), and assistance to displaced persons (10% among locals and 25% among IDPs). The construction of shelters is considered important by 24%, the work of medical institutions (12% among locals and 16% among displaced persons), the fight against corruption (22% and 16% respectively), the organization of humanitarian aid to war victims (9% and 15% respectively), and the creation of jobs (14%). The work of schools and kindergartens and the improvement of residential areas were chosen by up to 10% of respondents, while social programs for the poor, the development of energy conservation, the quality of utilities, road repairs, and city greening were chosen by up to 5%.
• 90% of Ivano-Frankivsk residents associate their plans for the future with living in the city. Among displaced persons, less than half of those surveyed have such plans, and 40% do not plan to stay in the city.
• Nine percent of local residents and 3% of displaced persons surveyed intend to buy their own home in Ivano-Frankivsk in the near future. Another one in five is considering it (23% of local residents and 21% of displaced persons).
• According to the majority of respondents, Ivano-Frankivsk could become a tourist center in the next 5-10 years (46% of local residents and 42% of IDPs believe this). About 30% see it as a cultural center. Twenty percent of locals and 12% of displaced persons surveyed see the city as a future IT center, 19% and 24% respectively see it as an educational center, 10% and 15% see it as an economic center, and 9% and 15% see it as a medical and recreational center. Six to seven percent of respondents see Frankivsk as a military and defense center in the future. Less than 5% chose transport and agriculture as the city's development direction.
• Almost 60% of local residents and more than 40% of IDPs currently have jobs. Among those who are unemployed, up to 40% of local residents and almost 35% of IDPs plan to find employment in the city in the near future.
• Almost a quarter of local residents (20% among IDPs) are personally involved in volunteer initiatives related to the war, while 22-28% of their close friends or relatives are involved (27-32% among IDPs), distant friends/acquaintances in 14% of local residents (10% among IDPs), neighbors or other acquaintances in 6% (5% among IDPs). About 30% of Ivano-Frankivsk residents and almost 40% of IDPs are not involved in volunteering.
• 40% of Ivano-Frankivsk residents believe that the problem of language misunderstanding between local residents and IDPs is significant (among IDPs, this figure is almost 30%), while 34% consider it insignificant (40% among IDPs). Less than a quarter of Ivano-Frankivsk residents surveyed said that there is no problem (among IDPs, this figure is up to 30%). Over the past year, the number of residents of the Ivano-Frankivsk city community who believe that such a problem exists has increased (from 64% to 74%). Young people, women, and the more affluent talk about it more.
• Among local respondents, more than half have a positive attitude toward IDPs, a third have a neutral attitude, and 10% have a negative attitude. Over the past year, there has also been a decrease in positive attitudes toward IDPs (from 68% to 53%) and an increase in neutral attitudes (from 27% to 34%). Men and wealthier people demonstrate warmer attitudes toward IDPs.
• About 70% of local respondents provided assistance to IDPs. Young people and those who are more affluent mentioned this more often. Among IDPs, 44% said they received assistance from ordinary residents, and 43% from city authorities. More than 80% of IDPs surveyed mentioned assistance from the state, and about 70% from volunteers.
• More than half of the community members surveyed would welcome some of the IDPs staying to live and work in the city. About 30% gave a neutral response, and about 10% gave a negative response. Over the past year, positive attitudes toward this idea have increased slightly.
• More than 60% of local residents see tension in relations between IDPs and Ivano-Frankivsk residents (less than half of IDPs surveyed share this opinion). One-third of respondents and less than half of IDPs surveyed note the absence of tension. Young people, women, the more affluent, as well as those who see a problem of language misunderstanding and have a negative attitude towards IDPs, more often spoke of tension in relations.
• Thirteen percent of local residents reported having IDPs in their immediate circle and among their friends or distant relatives due to Russia's full-scale invasion, 11% among close relatives, and 9% among neighbors or acquaintances. More than 60% do not have IDPs in their circle.
• On the other hand, 18% of local residents surveyed have personal experience of accepting IDPs in their homes, 15% among close relatives, 9% among close friends, and 6-7% among distant relatives or neighbors. More than half said they had no such experience personally or among their circle.
• Twenty-two percent of IDPs said that their homes where they lived before the war were destroyed or uninhabitable, 30% said they were partially damaged, and another third said they remained unchanged. Sixteen percent had no information about the condition of their homes.
• Almost half of the displaced persons surveyed said they rent an apartment, while a third live in a refugee center. 10% live in hotels or hostels, and 5% live with relatives or friends.
• The main sources of news are Telegram (48% among locals and 59% among IDPs), news websites (30% and 27%, respectively), Facebook (24% and 28%, respectively), and YouTube (20% and 25%, respectively). Television and Telemaraton were mentioned by 16-19% of local residents and 6-10% of IDPs, while live communication is a source of news for 12% of Ivano-Frankivsk residents and 16% of IDPs. About 10% of respondents use Instagram and Viber to get news, 5% use TikTok, and less than 5% use radio and print media.
• About half of the respondents said that their close relatives are serving in the Defense and Resistance Forces. Twenty-eight percent of Ivano-Frankivsk residents (23% of IDPs) said that they had close friends serving in the military, 14-15% said they had distant relatives or acquaintances serving, 6-7% said they had neighbors or other acquaintances serving, and 4-5% said they were serving themselves. Less than 30% of local residents and about a third of IDPs do not have anyone in their circle who is currently serving.

 The Holodomor is one of the most horrifying tragedies in the history of the Ukrainian people. In 1932-1933, intentionally organized by the Soviet authorities, over 4 million Ukrainians, or 13% of the population, perished due to famine. References to the "great famine" can be found in almost every family. What was and what is the current attitude toward this painful topic among the contemporary population of the country? Here is the Dynamics of Attitudes towards the Holodomor of 1932-1933 from the Sociological Group "Rating.

"It is worth noting that Rating is perhaps the only company that has researched this issue. We have been conducting annual monitoring since 2010, so we share unique data.

In 2010, 60% of respondents surveyed by the Rating Group answered affirmatively to the question, "Do you agree that the Holodomor of 1932-1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people?"
As per the results of the latest Rating Group survey in 2023, 92% agree with the statement mentioned above, representing an increase of one and a half times compared to 2010.

Presenting the results of the 'National Sociological Study on the Perception of People with Disabilities in Ukraine,' conducted by the Sociological Group 'Rating' as part of the project 'Expertise Centre in the Field of Rights of People with Disabilities' commissioned by the Public Association 'All-Ukrainian Union of Organizations for Persons with Disabilities “The Strong people League”. 

Attitude of society

⅔ of the respondents believe that Ukrainian society has a positive attitude towards military personnel with disabilities. Towards civilians with disabilities, the attitude is generally neutral. It is worth noting that respondents with disabilities themselves predominantly describe the feelings people have towards them as pity. This emotion is experienced by 71% of the respondents regarding people with disabilities.

On the other hand, when meeting with military personnel with disabilities, the main emotion reported by the respondents is "gratitude," followed by "compassion."

"One of the participants in the focus group notes, 'Military people, they are more reserved; they don't need you to approach them, showing pity or sympathy. But the only thing you can do, and for me, this is right, is to come to them and say thank you."

Ukrainian society has not yet developed experience in interacting with people with disabilities. This is evident in the respondents' lack of understanding of the term "inclusivity." They use it not in the context of the overall integration of people with and without disabilities in society but specifically in relation to the education of children in inclusive classrooms.

Although 90% agree that people with disabilities can lead active lives similar to those without disabilities, it appears that the responses were given considering social desirability, an attempt to present oneself in the best light. 

On the one hand, respondents declare a high degree of approval for the social integration of people with disabilities and personal comfort in communication with them. However, at the same time, the indicator of social stigma tells a different story.

A sense of happiness and opportunity Relatives and families of people with disabilities more often than others state that these individuals perceive themselves as unhappy. Among those who personally have a disability, every fifth person agreed with the statement "people with disabilities are punished for their actions." 

The opportunities for military personnel who acquired disabilities during the war are perceived somewhat more favourably than those for civilians with disabilities. Respondents pointed out that the military personnel who lost their health in the war should receive more help and support from society.

The best opportunities for people with disabilities, according to respondents, are in the field of education and learning. Conversely, the worst opportunities for people with disabilities in Ukraine are perceived to be in finding employment and engaging in entrepreneurship.

Discriminatory aspects of people with disabilities 

What do people with disabilities say about life in Ukrainian society?

Respondents identified mobility as the primary discriminatory issue, specifically the ability to move freely outside their homes. Other challenges mentioned include the lack of access to public spaces and discrimination in job searching and employment, often taking a nominal form to meet quota requirements.

The majority of respondents gave mediocre to poor evaluations of the state of sectors and initiatives for people with disabilities. Specifically, respondents with disabilities often highlighted issues with rehabilitation. Despite good quality, a common problem is that rehabilitation rooms are located on the upper floors of hospitals. Additionally, there are very limited rehabilitation opportunities in small towns.

Almost 60% of the respondents indicated that people with disabilities most need financial assistance, nearly 50% mentioned a need for medical support, and over 40% expressed a need for psychological assistance.

What exactly do people with disabilities need?

Respondents with disabilities often noted that their main need is to be seen, accepted, and normalized by society. They want to be agents of change in this direction, willing to communicate their issues, engage in improving public spaces to make them accessible and fair. They aspire to change society's perception of them and see it as part of their responsibility in this process.

The main question, considering the above, is who should address the issues of people with disabilities? People with disabilities themselves somewhat more frequently take responsibility for resolving their own issues. In contrast, the majority of surveyed citizens believe that local or central government should be involved in addressing these matters.

The Sociological Group "Rating" took into account the risks when surveying people with disabilities, so individual interviews were used as the interaction tool. Research is one of the components of the project "Center for Expertise in the Rights of People with Disabilities." The center operates thanks to a grant from the Program "Support for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)" in Ukraine, within the framework of financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. The program is implemented by Crown Agents in partnership with International Alert and in collaboration with Crown Agents in Ukraine. The content of the post does not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom, Crown Agents, International Alert, and Crown Agents in Ukraine. All information about criteria, allowable expenses, and requirements for applicants can be found on the Support for Civil Society Organizations in Ukraine

ALL-UKRAINIAN SURVEY BY THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE: OCTOBER 2023

The press release was prepared by Serhiy Dembitsky, Doctor of Social Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, head of the research project ‘Stressful conditions of the Ukrainian population in the context of war’ (funded by the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine).

A recent survey on stress levels among the Ukrainian population during wartime revealed the following important facts:

   
• Due to the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the number of people who have experienced being in a combat zone has increased from 18% to 44%.
• Given the prevalence and negative psychological impact, the ranking of stressors is as follows (from most severe to least severe): traumatic experiences such as difficult memories, stressors of social interaction (conflicts, lack of support, discrimination) and personal actions, deterioration of living conditions, health problems, and the threat to life as a possibility caused by war.    
• The most important resources for coping with stress are communication outside of work, leisure and work. However, while interaction with loved ones is sufficiently satisfied among the majority of the population, the need for leisure and work is much less satisfied.
• When considering individual psychological resources, the strongest ones are general activity (work and social) and optimism. The situation is significantly worse when it comes to emotional stability and a sense of control over the situation.
• In terms of psychological distress*, the current situation is comparable to the second half of 2020, when the Ukrainian population was awaiting another wave of coronavirus. Thus, about 69% of respondents demonstrate a normal level of psychological distress, 21% - elevated, and 10% - high. This suggests that due to the Armed Forces of Ukraine preserving a significant part of the social environment of Ukrainians, the majority of the population has sufficient resources for psychological recovery, as well as protection from the most severe stressors of war.
• In terms of prevalence, individual stress states can be ranked as follows (from least common to most common): hostility as impulsiveness and aggression, depression as despondency and melancholy, somatisation as physical discomfort, interpersonal sensitivity as low self-esteem and vulnerability, anxiety as tension, fear and foreboding, exhaustion as a decline in physical and mental abilities, paranoid ideas as suspicion, distrust and blaming others.
• The main consequences of psychological stress in wartime are deprivation of values in areas such as leisure, physical health and wealth. Instead, the three pillars of values that currently sustain individual life are interpersonal relationships, morality and knowledge.

* Psychological distress is a unique emotionally uncomfortable state experienced by an individual in response to specific stressors or a strong need for something, which leads to temporary or permanent negative consequences.

In a new poll conducted by Ukraine-based Rating Group commissioned by the Ukraine Children’s Action Project (UCAP), shows that, with some caveats, Ukraine’s children and families remain resilient, in spite of an on-going war, now entering its 20th month of fierce fighting in the East and South of the country and regular drone and missile attacks throughout the entirety of Ukraine. 

Selected key findings

School Attendance and Effectiveness

• 94% of children learn in regular, in-school or hybrid classes (Was 92% in 2/23);

• Of the 6% who do not attend school, 40% do not attend because local school is closed; 60% because of child safety concerns;

• Over 55% of students use a computer or laptop as an additional learning tool;

• School attendance has improved significantly since the previous survey in 2/23

• Mothers report that the reasons for missing school include 78% due to illness in the child (was just 44% in 2/23); 25% due to air raid alarms (was 61% in February ’23); and, 9% due to lack of electricity (was 49% in 2/23); 

• Approximately 3 out of 4 mothers stated that the educational success and quality of the education received is very good or good;

What Children Have Experienced/ Are Experiencing?

• 62% of mothers report that their children have witnessed or experienced “war related events”;

• 25% of mothers now consider the location of their home dangerous compared to 21% in February 23;

• 79% of mothers assess the physical health of their children to be very good or good;

• 73% of mothers assess the mental health of their children as very good or good;

• That said, mothers report that many children fear loud sounds (48%), are exhibiting irritability (37%), etc. They are not showing full evidence of PTSD, but are affected by the war in a number of ways; [NB: Outside this study, UCAP has found that more than 1 in 5 displaced children attending 6-day Recovery Camps in western Ukraine are found to have “probably  PTSD];

• 38% of mothers state that they need financial assistance, 14% need essential food assistance and 13% need non-food assistance (clothing, hygiene items, blankets, etc.)

• 54% of surveyed mothers believe that the ability of Ukrainian parents to address issues related to the upbringing and development of children has deteriorated compared to the times before the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine. 25% believe that it has not changed. Only 15% noted improvement. Those whose financial situation is currently the worst were the most likely to talk about deterioration. 

• Mothers from Kyiv spoke most often about such difficulties - 67%. Among mothers with a high income, the feeling of deterioration was recorded in 41%, among low-income mothers - among 59%, with the lowest income - in 54%.

View of the Future

• While 91% of mothers currently believe unequivocally that Ukraine will repel and defeat Russian invaders, the percentage of mothers who are absolutely certain that Ukraine decreased from 71% in February to 60% now;

• 55% of mothers feel that Ukraine is moving in the right direction compared to 21% who say things are moving in wrong direction (the remaining mothers could not answer);

• 62% of mothers with higher family incomes feel optimistic about the direction of the things going in Ukraine, compared to just 48% among low income families.

• 62% of mothers report deterioration of family’s economic situation, and only 27% of mothers feeling that their financial situation will improve over the next year.

• 27% of mothers with a high income note a worsening of their financial situation, among those who have an average income - 53%, low-income families - 78%, poor - 90%.

Additional Conclusions/ Concerns

• While children are attending school, air raid alarms are frequent and require children and staff to retreat to school shelters, but not necessarily leave school.

• We are concerned that while school attendance is stable, the number of absences due to sickness is increasing from 44% of mothers citing sickness as the reason for missed school in February to 78% in the current survey. This needs to be explored.  After conversations with mothers and school officials, Irwin Redlener, M.D., Cofounder, Ukraine Children’s Action Project believes that there is a legitimate question about very poor air with circulation in school bomb shelters contributing to increased frequency respiratory illnesses and allergies.

• Higher income families have far more resources to deal with challenges of a country at war than do lower income families. While this may be an obvious reality, it should prompt greater support of people with financial stress to weather the war.

• Long-term consequences of persistent psychological trauma with or without formal PTSD diagnosis, along with grieving from loss of loved ones, are concerning.

 Ukrainians Maintain Strong Commitment to Democracy & Post-War Elections 

The latest public opinion survey by the International Republican Institute finds that a majority of the Ukrainian people remain committed to democracy and elections after the war is over. Majorities of the population think post-war reconstruction priorities should be determined at the local level and that a post-war Ukraine will see its borders restored to internationally recognized borders defined in 1991. The survey also showed that Ukrainians remain overwhelmingly in favor of joining the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

The survey showed Ukrainians’ commitment to democracy remains strong with 62% supporting elections once the war is over. 

The poll also showed that Ukrainians overwhelmingly favor reconstruction priorities being decided by citizens through polling and locally elected authorities. This support has increased from a recent IRI poll in February 2023.   

Ukrainians continue to express strong support for accession into Europe. About eight in ten Ukrainians are in favor of joining the EU and NATO if given a referendum.  

The Ukrainian people remain confident in victory and that a post-war Ukraine will return to the internationally recognized 1991 borders. This sentiment is reflected in majorities across all geographic regions and age groups.  

Click here for the full poll results.  

Within the framework of the twenty-fourth wave of the “Ukraine in times of war” project, the Sociological Group “Rating” conducted another survey of public sentiments and economic situation of the population from September 5 to 7, 2023. 

Assessment of the situation

• According to the research results, 61% of the respondents believe that Ukraine is heading in the right direction, while 23% hold the opposite opinion, and an additional 16% were unable to provide an assessment. Currently, there is a decrease in the number of people who view the country’s development direction as correct. Across all regions and among all age groups, the prevailing sentiments remains in favor of viewing the direction as the right one.  

Economic situation  

• 60% of respondents have reported a decline in their personal economic situation over the past six month, with 35% experiencing no change, and only 5% noting an improvement.  Assessments of the economic conditions in Ukraine as a whole are more negative, with 73% perceiving a deterioration, 13% reporting no changes, and 9% indicating improvement. In general, respondents view the state of the economy somewhat more favorably than in previous surveys, but there is an increase in negative outlooks for the future. Indeed, when it comes to the country’s economy in the future, 29% of respondents anticipate improvement, 26% believe that nothing will change, and 32% are hopeful that their personal economic circumstances will improve next year, 41% think it will remain unchanged, and 21% have a more pessimistic outlook.   

Residents of the western and central regions, younger respondents, those currently employed and especially those, who have secured new employment, tend to provide more positive assessments of their own economic situation. These trends also extend to their outlook on the future. Additionally, residents of the Southern region tend to have a relatively more positive view of Ukraine’s economic prospects. 

Internal migration

• The number of respondents who were forces to leave their permanent place of residence has remained almost unchanged, standing at 18% today. The largest group of internal migrants is from the eastern macro-region, where about 60% of them changed their place of residence, followed by the southern macro-region, where 25% of respondents have experienced internal migration.

Job

• Currently, 44% of individuals who were employed before the war are working at their regular workplaces, 14% are working partially or remotely, and 15% have found new jobs. Nevertheless, a quarter of these respondents are still unemployed. However, there has been a reduction in the overall unemployment rate. The employment situation is relatively better for residents of the Center and West regions, men, young people, and middle-aged individuals, as well as those who are more financially stable. Among the internally displaced persons, the number of those who have settled into new jobs and are working under their usual conditions has increased in comparison to the beginning of 2023, with the percentage of unemployed individuals among them decreasing from half to 40%.