Press releases

Oleksii Antypovych, Rating Group

• At the end of February, 78% of respondents were convinced that the early elections in the Ternopil region would take place on time — March 15. Almost 68% expressed readiness to participate in them. Residents of the Ternopil region did not believe that attempts to cancel the local elections were connected with the desire to save money during the crisis — only 19% of respondents thought so. At the same time, 68% are convinced that such attempts are driven by fear of losing the elections.
• The election results could have been symptomatic on the scale of the entire country. The latest sociological studies show several defining trends.
• During the campaign, the fastest growth in support was demonstrated by VO “Svoboda” (from 13.2% in December to 26.4%) and YeTs (from 2.5% to 6.4%). Former leaders of electoral sympathy are now on the margins.
• The decline of NSNU ratings, which began back in 2006, no longer surprises anyone. The cooling of support for BYuT is also not new. But what we now see that is truly new is the decline of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s personal rating. Back in January, trust in and support for the Prime Minister personally exceeded support for BYuT by one third. Now these indicators are equally low — 17%. The loss of Tymoshenko’s electoral strength is the second trend that deserves attention. If the early elections in Kyiv were called Stalingrad for Tymoshenko, then the Ternopil elections could have been a kind of Kursk Bulge for BYuT.
• It is already obvious that leading the Government has not benefited the former Galician favorite (in the last parliamentary elections, more than 50% of voters here voted for BYuT). 68% of Ternopil residents negatively assess her performance as Prime Minister. At the same time, the most popular answers to the question “What or who prevents Yuliia Tymoshenko from governing effectively?” were “Tymoshenko’s own inability to organize work” and “the lack of professionalism of government members” (28% and 13% of respondents respectively), another 15% blame the President and 21% his Secretariat.
• Respondents mostly do not consider Tymoshenko’s complaints about Viktor Yushchenko to be justified. 55% are convinced that if Yushchenko were not President and Tymoshenko were Prime Minister, she would still make mistakes but would find other culprits. 59% consider Tymoshenko personally guilty of the economic crisis (the same share as Yushchenko). Almost the same number (58%) are convinced that, as head of the Government, she is not capable of overcoming this crisis, and 40% think that she is not even trying to do so.
• Almost two thirds of respondents believe that over the last six months Tymoshenko has moved closer to the leadership of Russia. This was supported by a majority of supporters of all parties, including half (!) of BYuT supporters. At the same time, in the West there is a widespread belief that if Tymoshenko secures the support of Vladimir Putin in the 2010 presidential elections, this will only harm her chances of winning; 69% are convinced that from any mutual agreements between Tymoshenko and Putin it is the latter who would benefit. Seeing the hopelessness of such cooperation for the Prime Minister herself and its harmfulness for the country, voters are gradually losing interest in Tymoshenko as a future candidate for President of Ukraine.
• A significant share of voters who are still ready to vote for BYuT are only waiting for someone else to appear. In the case of elections to the Ternopil Oblast Council, this was supposed to be VO “Svoboda.” Who the political process will give birth to at the all-Ukrainian level — time will tell.

• At the end of February, 78% of residents of Ternopil region believed that the early elections to the regional council would take place on time, on 15 March 2009. Only 15% did not believe that the early elections to the regional council would be held on 15 March. 68% of respondents expressed their readiness to take part in these elections. 68% of residents of Ternopil region are convinced that attempts by certain political forces to disrupt the local elections are caused by fear of losing them. Residents of Ternopil region did not believe that attempts by certain political forces to disrupt the local elections were connected with the desire to save state budget funds during the crisis – only 19% believed this.
• Support for the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc in the elections to the Ternopil Regional Council has decreased by one third since December 2008 and by more than half compared to the 2006 elections. The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” is in the lead. Next come the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and “Our Ukraine,” whose support weakened the most in the second half of 2008.
• During the election campaign, the fastest growth in voter support was demonstrated by the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (from 13.2% in December to 26.4%) and by “Yedynyi Tsentr” (from 2.5% to 6.4%). As for the latter, it is worth noting that the relatively high level of trust in the list leader, the head of the regional state administration Y. Chyzhmar (16%), allowed Yedynyi Tsentr to count on higher electoral dividends from the campaign.
• The Lytvyn Bloc closes the group of parties expected to pass the electoral threshold. The Ukrainian People’s Party, “Pora,” and the Party of Regions also had chances to compete for representation in the regional council, as their ratings were close to the electoral threshold.
• The main reason for the growth of support for the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” is disappointment in the traditional leaders of electoral preferences (the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and “Our Ukraine”). In particular, over just the last month, Yulia Tymoshenko’s personal rating (in the presidential elections) decreased from 25% to 17%. The downward trajectory of Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating as a result of the crisis repeats the dynamics of support for the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. At the same time, respondents who in December–January did not support any political force intended in February to vote mainly for the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda.”

• 42% of respondents wanted to receive compensation for their Oshchadbank deposits but did not receive it. Only 32% both wanted and received compensation from Oshchadbank. 22% did not want to receive compensation for lost deposits. 4% were undecided.
• Only 19% of respondents still expect Yulia Tymoshenko to fulfill her campaign promise to return Oshchadbank deposits. 81% (including 80% of BYuT supporters) do not expect Y. Tymoshenko to return the deposits.
• According to 36% of respondents, Y. Tymoshenko bears the main responsibility for the suspension of compensation payments for lost Oshchadbank deposits. Another 22% place the main responsibility on Viktor Yushchenko, while 31% believe that Y. Tymoshenko and V. Yushchenko share equal responsibility. 5% do not consider either of them responsible. Only 1% of respondents said they did not feel the suspension of payments for lost Oshchadbank deposits. 5% were undecided.
• Almost half of respondents (46%), answering the question “How did Y. Tymoshenko’s attempt to fulfill the promise of compensation for Oshchadbank deposits affect the economic situation?”, said it had a negative impact because people received additional funds and prices increased. At the same time, the same share of respondents (46%) noted a positive impact of compensation payments for lost Oshchadbank deposits on the economic situation, as people received additional money.

Oleksii Antypovych for the newspaper Express (No. 24)

• The decline in the ratings of Our Ukraine and Viktor Yushchenko is no longer news. Today, the trajectory of falling ratings is being repeated by the BYuT bloc, especially in Western Ukraine. The early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council, scheduled for March 15, may record this defeat: any result in the repeat elections below the 50% that BYuT gained in the previous elections cannot be considered a victory.
• Sociological studies show that since the 2007 early elections, BYuT’s ratings in the Ternopil region have almost halved.
• The main trigger for disappointment was the policy of confrontation between the two key Orange politicians.
• The situation collapsed with the onset of the economic crisis. People are dissatisfied with the authorities: in 2008, only 1.7% of voters in the Ternopil region assessed the Prime Minister’s work fully positively, 21% rather positively, while 73.1% assessed Yulia Tymoshenko’s performance negatively. Even among BYuT supporters, more than half—53%—are critical of the Prime Minister’s activities. According to these results, Tymoshenko’s rating could potentially fall by another half.
• One may assume that voters choose Y. Tymoshenko only due to the absence of a real alternative candidate.
• In addition to the difficult economic situation, the main reason for the negative dynamics of BYuT’s rating is the bloc leader’s inability to establish constructive cooperation with the President—something expected by 65% of her voters (the same share of Yushchenko’s supporters also hope for this). Whereas earlier the majority placed responsibility for the conflict on the President and his entourage, now only 18% of the region’s residents do so.
• Y. Tymoshenko is also reproached for failing to fulfill key campaign promises, such as not abolishing military conscription (64.7% of voters) and suspending payments of lost savings in the Savings Bank (66.7%).
• Economic miscalculations by the government also did not go unnoticed. 73.7% of voters blame Y. Tymoshenko for rising prices.
• Voters reacted no less sensitively to the political somersaults of the BYuT leader.
• 67.9% of voters do not support Tymoshenko’s rapprochement with Vladimir Putin.
• BYuT’s ratings in the Ternopil region were particularly damaged by joint voting with the Party of Regions: only 18.4% believed this was necessary to restore order in the country. The rest perceived such behavior as an attempt to please Russia or to take revenge on the President. Joint voting for the de facto official status of the Russian language in Ukraine was approved by only 3.6% of Ternopil residents, while 56% believe that BYuT either complied with the Party of Regions’ demands or that the language issue is unimportant to Y. Tymoshenko.
• People are especially troubled by problems they encounter at the local level. On these issues, virtually none of the parties represented in Ternopil’s authorities has much to boast about. But, as always, the greatest responsibility lies with leaders at the national level.
• To the question, “Representatives of which political force earn the most from land deals?” 31.7% of voters—the highest share—named BYuT. The same proportion consider BYuT representatives in the executive branch guilty of embezzling funds allocated for flood relief.
• Most striking is that 30% of Tymoshenko’s own voters share this view. This effectively means that BYuT is losing support even among its sympathizers.
• Overall, one can also note a change in the profile of Yulia Tymoshenko’s electorate. If earlier the most patriotically minded citizens voted for the current Prime Minister, now these are people neutral toward the national idea or even oriented pro-Russian.
• BYuT’s decline is the most striking, but other political players are also disappointing their voters. As a result, there is no automatic transfer of sympathies. Rather, we are seeing total disillusionment followed by refusal to participate in voting.
• The election campaign in Ternopil forces politicians to reflect. Therefore, it is not surprising that so many have appeared who want these elections canceled.

Compared to December last year (survey conducted 8–15 December 2008), support for the Party of Regions fell from 25.4% to 19.4%, and for Our Ukraine from 4% to 2.4%. At the same time, support increased for Yatsenyuk’s Bloc (from 7.5% to 10.1%) and for the Communists (from 7.4% to 9.2%).
The ratings of BYuT and the Lytvyn Bloc changed only marginally.

In addition, the number of respondents who do not support any party or are undecided increased.

Among political leaders, the biggest drop was recorded for Viktor Yanukovych, whose support declined from 25.1% to 18.9%. The largest increase was for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, whose rating rose from 8.1% to 12.9%. The ratings of Yulia Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Symonenko remained almost unchanged.

Again, the share of respondents who do not support any political leader or are undecided also increased.

• 52% of respondents consider the demand by the Party of Regions faction to put the issue of the government’s resignation to a vote in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 5 February 2009 to be untimely. At the same time, 36% view this demand as timely, while 12% were unable to answer.
• Only 11% of those surveyed assessed the opposition’s chances of dismissing the government on 5 February 2009 as high, whereas nearly half (47%) considered them low, and another 25% rated them as “50–50.” 17% were undecided.
• 60% of respondents believe that bringing the issue of Tymoshenko’s government’s resignation to a vote was more advantageous for the coalition, while only 24% think it benefited the opposition. 16% could not decide.

The decline in the ratings of Our Ukraine and President Viktor Yushchenko, which began back in 2006 and now seems to have reached its lowest point, is no longer news. Today, the focus of attention not only for politicians and journalists but also for citizens is the dynamics of BYuT’s ratings, especially in Western Ukraine, where Yulia Tymoshenko and her political force are rapidly losing support. The early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council, scheduled for March 15, 2009, could lock in this defeat, because any result below the 50% that BYuT received in the previous elections would be seen as a loss.

Sociological surveys conducted in Ternopil Oblast show that since the 2007 early parliamentary elections, BYuT’s ratings have fallen by more than half. Since October 2008, Tymoshenko’s personal rating has dropped by 10 percentage points. In local elections, the situation looks even worse: BYuT’s support at the regional level is lower than at the national level. As a result, Arseniy Yatsenyuk has become the leader of public sympathy in the oblast.

A decline in trust in Tymoshenko has also been recorded in Lviv Oblast. In March 2008, 85% trusted Tymoshenko and 77% trusted Yushchenko, but by October 2008 these figures had fallen to 53% and 39% respectively. This is not surprising. In Western Ukraine, people are tired of being hostages to the conflict between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. The latest political crisis, driven by their constant confrontation, became a key trigger for disillusionment. The economic crisis, which affected almost every Ukrainian family, further deepened dissatisfaction. People are unhappy with the authorities, which at both the local and national level are largely represented by BYuT and Our Ukraine. Even though 42% of residents of Lviv Oblast positively assess the government’s anti-crisis efforts, 45% rate them negatively. If these trends continue, they could trigger a wave of local early elections across the country.

In the 2007 parliamentary elections, BYuT achieved record results and secured victories in key strategic regions. The main beneficiary of BYuT’s decline could be Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who is best positioned to capture the “free” votes of disappointed supporters of Our Ukraine and BYuT. Another potential winner is Svoboda, whose rating in Ternopil Oblast rose from 3% to 13% in just one year.

However, Yatsenyuk’s attempts to consolidate his position in Western Ukraine have so far been weak. The leaders of his “Front for Change” movement have been publicly presented only in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. In other regions, they remain largely unknown. This makes it advantageous for Yatsenyuk’s competitors to agree to early elections only if he is not ready for them.

According to the Central Election Commission, regular local elections are scheduled for 2010, while the timing of parliamentary elections remains uncertain. It is widely expected that parliamentary elections will be early, but it is unclear whether they will be held together with the presidential elections.

If early local elections are announced in other regions after Ternopil, BYuT risks losing its leadership in Western Ukraine, or at least cementing its weakened position. On the other hand, if local elections are held together with parliamentary elections, BYuT could rely on Tymoshenko’s personal rating as the core of its campaign.

So the key question remains: will early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council actually take place? Even though the campaign officially started on January 15, 2009, attempts to block the elections scheduled for March 15 cannot be ruled out.

The first sign of this came on January 16, 2009, when 237 MPs from BYuT, Our Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc voted to postpone the consideration of the report of a parliamentary investigative commission into the activities of the Ternopil City Council. That commission, headed by BYuT MP Ivan Denkovych, was established in June 2008 after accusations that the city authorities had illegally distributed land. It was expected that its work would lead to the re-election of the Ternopil mayor and city council. However, BYuT appears to have backed away, possibly after the painful defeat in Kyiv’s early elections or due to pressure from local elites.

At the same time, a December 2008 survey showed that 54% of Ternopil Oblast residents believe the region urgently needs radical change. A high turnout is expected: 40% said they would definitely vote on March 15, 35% probably would, 20% would not, and 5% were undecided. These elections clearly matter to citizens.

If any political force were to sabotage the elections, it would only damage its own ratings. This applies to all parties, including Yatsenyuk, in whom many voters have placed high—perhaps overly high—hopes. Another disappointment amid the crisis would only deepen public distrust.

Ternopil Oblast may not be large, but the political significance of these elections should not be underestimated. That is why leaders of all major political forces—Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Lytvyn, Yanukovych, and Kyrylenko—should publicly and honestly state their positions: Will these elections take place or not? Will early local elections follow in other regions? People deserve clarity about what is really happening in their regions.

• An overwhelming majority of residents of Ternopil Oblast (70%) trust Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Nearly half of those surveyed also trust Yuliia Tymoshenko (46%) and Oleh Tiahnybok (40%).
• Arseniy Yatsenyuk holds the highest presidential rating among residents of Ternopil Oblast. At the same time, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s personal rating declined by 10% compared to the survey conducted in October 2008. Compared to October, Oleh Tiahnybok’s rating increased slightly, while Viktor Yushchenko’s rating remained virtually unchanged.

• These political forces have the best chances to gain the largest number of seats in the new regional council. The Lytvyn Bloc, People’s Self-Defense, and the “United Center” party also have strong chances to enter the regional council.
  At the local level, BYuT’s support is lower than its support at the national level.
• In Ternopil Oblast, more people are dissatisfied than satisfied with the performance of the local authorities.
• Despite the fact that more than half of local residents (54%) believe the region currently needs radical changes (while 40% favor stability), only 40% supported the decision to hold early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council.
• This relatively low level of support can be explained by the negative attitude toward the phenomenon of “repeat elections”, which formed after the announcement of early parliamentary elections in Ukraine in October of the previous year and was accompanied by strong criticism from certain political forces.
• Nevertheless, a high voter turnout is expected in the early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council.
  40% said they would definitely vote on March 15, 2009, 35% said they would probably vote, 20% said they would definitely or most likely not vote, and 5% were undecided.

This view is held primarily by supporters of BYuT and “Our Ukraine.” At the same time, for the former this is seen rather as a negative, while for the latter it is viewed as a positive (a merit). Supporters of other political forces, instead, name among the main reasons for the failure to form a majority of the Party of Regions and BYuT Yuliya Tymoshenko’s own refusal, due to the risk of losing her voters. The factor of opposition to such a союз from Volodymyr Lytvyn is practically not taken seriously by anyone.

This view is shared by 75% of respondents who do not believe in the effectiveness of the coalition composed of BYuT, “Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense,” and the Lytvyn Bloc. More than half of supporters of BYuT, “Our Ukraine,” and “Svoboda” think that next year there will be early elections to the Verkhovna Rada. Only supporters of the Lytvyn Bloc are skeptical about this scenario (only one quarter believe in early elections).

• The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has approved granting a loan to the city of Lviv for the development of the city’s transport infrastructure. The loan amounts to 50 million euros. The credit committee made this decision at one of its recent meetings. The 50-million-euro loan is only the first tranche from the bank, and in total the EBRD has declared its readiness to open a credit line for Lviv of 100 million euros, the Department of External Relations of the Lviv City Council reported.
• It is planned that the money will first of all be directed to the construction of a transport interchange on one of the ring roads near the future new stadium, which will be built for the UEFA Euro-2012 Football Championship. However, city deputies still have to discuss the terms of the loan and approve the agreement itself. The arrival of the bank’s consultants is scheduled for January 19. The agreement will be signed directly after the discussion of the terms, methods, and features of financing. Therefore, money for solving one of the city’s priority problems in preparing for Euro-2012 — the reconstruction of roads — is expected to start coming in the first half of next year, according to the city administration.
• However, as recent sociological surveys show, the residents of Lviv themselves are losing interest in Euro-2012. Problems of preparation are of interest to only 30 percent of those surveyed, whereas quite recently this figure was 15 percent higher, Oleksii Antypovych told Deutsche Welle in an interview.
• “This means that people have lowered their expectations regarding the championship being held in Lviv. If this trend continues, and the number of those who are not concerned about this issue becomes equal to the number of those who are interested in the preparations, then the hosting of the championship could be given to another city and there would be no significant objections in Lviv,” Antypovych noted.
• The public believes that it cannot influence the preparation for the championship, the sociologist states. And if Lviv is indeed deprived of the right to host matches, 34 percent of Lviv residents believe that the mayor of the city personally should bear responsibility for this.

• Less than 1% of Lviv residents stated that they are not concerned about the consequences of the financial and economic crisis.
• The number of those who negatively assessed the government’s anti-crisis work (45%) is practically equal to the number of respondents who assessed it positively (42%). At the same time, only 9% of respondents described the work of the Tymoshenko Cabinet of Ministers as entirely positive. Even among supporters of BYuT, the share of those dissatisfied with the government’s work is almost 30% (among supporters of “Our Ukraine” it is 55%).
• Those who assessed the Tymoshenko government’s work in overcoming the crisis negatively were predominantly citizens who today are not inclined to trust either V. Yushchenko or Y. Tymoshenko.

• The election of V. Lytvyn as Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada is supported by almost 60% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 55% of Svoboda, and 50% of Our Ukraine supporters. At the same time, Lviv residents mostly do not believe that the new coalition consisting of Batkivshchyna, Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense, and the Lytvyn Bloc will be able to work actively in the Verkhovna Rada. Only 50% of Batkivshchyna supporters and almost 40% of Svoboda and Our Ukraine supporters believe in the effectiveness of this coalition.
• According to respondents, the greatest resistance to the coalition’s activity will come from V. Yanukovych (28%), V. Yushchenko (14%), V. Baloha (8%), A. Yatseniuk (5%), and V. Medvedchuk (3%).

Halyna Stadnyk, "Deutsche Welle"

• Last weekend marked the fourth anniversary of the “Orange Revolution,” but in Lviv there were no events, no commemorations, and no celebrations. This is an atypical situation for Western Ukraine.
• If last year certain parties still commemorated the events of the “Orange Revolution,” this year in **Lviv everyone was absorbed in memorial events connected with the Holodomor anniversary. Politicians themselves say that “the revolution should remain in people’s lives, and holding any celebrations would be inappropriate.”
• Commemorating the anniversary is not only inappropriate, but also not beneficial for any political force, noted sociologist Oleksii Antypovych in an interview with “Deutsche Welle.”
• Disappointment with the Orange leaders among the public is so great that it could provoke a negative reaction, and politicians themselves understand this, says Antypovych:
  “The main remark is that we were used during the Orange events, and now anyone who wants to repeat or recall those events will look like they are using people again, and people would react negatively to that.”

Oleksii Antypovych, Rating Group

• It cannot be said that these processes were unpredictable for experts, but few expected such a rapid negative dynamic for the two main political favorites in Western Ukraine.
• Since March of this year, V. Yushchenko has lost almost half of his trust rating (in the West: 34% trust him, 56% do not), while Y. Tymoshenko has lost one and a half times (60% trust her, 31% do not).
• This is happening despite the fact that last year there had been a clear improvement (especially after the decision to dissolve parliament and the formation of a democratic coalition following the early elections).
• The key trigger for disappointment was the latest political crisis, or more precisely the policy of constant confrontation between the two main politicians. Ratings began to collapse already in May, when the Prime Minister started attacking the Head of State in response to attacks against her.
• For example, in March 2008, 85% of residents of Lviv region trusted Y. Tymoshenko and 77% trusted V. Yushchenko, but by October 2008 only 53% and 39% did so respectively.
• The events in the Verkhovna Rada in September were described by citizens exclusively as an escalation of the struggle for power. In connection with the situation in parliament, attitudes worsened among more than half of respondents toward V. Yushchenko (57%) and among more than one third toward Y. Tymoshenko (37%). Only very few saw improvement: 3% and 13% respectively.
• The October survey of residents of five Western Ukrainian regions only confirmed clear trends: half consider the joint parliamentary voting of BYuT and the Party of Regions to be a betrayal, and at the same time half consider the withdrawal of “Our Ukraine” from the coalition to be a betrayal.
• This confirms the thesis that for voters in Western Ukraine ideological betrayal was just as painful as the mutual betrayal of partners within the democratic coalition.
• The main culprit of the split in the team and of the country’s crisis is considered to be V. Yushchenko.
• Voters distributed responsibility for the political crisis almost evenly between V. Baloha (17%), Y. Tymoshenko (13%), and V. Yanukovych (11%), while the clear “leader” here is the President of Ukraine with 36%.
• It is characteristic that compared to a similar study conducted in July of this year, the share of respondents who believe that V. Yanukovych is responsible for the political crisis has almost halved.
• Regarding regional specifics, V. Yushchenko is blamed the most in Volyn and Rivne regions, V. Baloha in Ternopil region, Y. Tymoshenko in Ivano-Frankivsk region, and V. Yanukovych in Lviv region.
• Of course, there are other reasons for the decline in V. Yushchenko’s rating. For example, in the West one of the key issues is traditionally the fight against corruption. But respondents evaluate the President’s actions in this area either as ineffective or say that such actions do not exist at all.
• So what way out do Western Ukrainian voters see? Despite the fact that over 44% expect radical change, only one quarter support early elections. People genuinely do not understand why these elections are needed if the same politicians will come to power and nothing will change. At the same time, residents no longer believe in an effective alliance between Prime Minister Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko, and they simply do not accept V. Yanukovych as an alternative.
• In reality, whether through radical change or through stable development, citizens want change — but they associate these changes primarily with the arrival of new politicians. They are searching for an alternative, for politicians they can believe in.
• It is therefore not surprising that A. Yatseniuk is now second in the trust ranking after Y. Tymoshenko, with the same level of distrust as the Prime Minister (31%).
• In the presidential race A. Yatseniuk with 13% is also second in Western Ukraine: he loses almost threefold to Y. Tymoshenko (36%), but already beats the incumbent President (11%).
• If A. Yatseniuk were to head a new political force, he would have a chance to take second place after BYuT in early elections. A politician who is openly not a national-patriot becoming second in Western Ukraine is natural, because people are tired of confrontation.
• Another predictable surprise is VO “Svoboda” — a kind of refuge for disillusioned national-patriots from both BYuT and Our Ukraine. In Lviv, for example, Tyahnybok’s party has held second place since June 2008, ahead of Our Ukraine. If elections to the Lviv City Council were held, “Svoboda” would already be competing for first (!) place.
• It so happened that “Svoboda” did not even have to do anything. On the one hand, BYuT constantly criticized the President and Our Ukraine for possible cooperation with the Party of Regions, thus pushing away national-patriots. On the other hand, BYuT itself went into cooperation with the “regionalists.” If BYuT had formalized its alliance with V. Yanukovych, the ratings of BYuT and Y. Tymoshenko would have fallen by at least half. Under such conditions, “Svoboda”, without any parliamentary experience, would have entered the Verkhovna Rada with 100% certainty.
• These are the paradoxes of constant political confrontation.

• For the first time during A. Sadovyi’s tenure as mayor, more than half of city residents say they do not trust him (in October 2006 this figure was only slightly over one quarter).
• The biggest erosion of trust in the incumbent mayor occurred in late 2006 and in spring 2008.

More than half of residents of Lviv Oblast reported a worsening of their attitude toward Yushchenko, and almost 40% toward Tymoshenko.

Oleksii Antypovych, Rating Group

• At the end of September, a draft law titled “On the Functioning of Subjects of Sociological Activity” was registered in the Verkhovna Rada by MP V. Chudnovskyi from the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc. At a minimum, the bill bans the establishment of sociological companies with foreign capital, restricts the right of the media to publish opinion poll data, provides for the creation of a licensing commission under the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education, and the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and introduces questionable grounds for revoking the licenses of sociological service providers, among other provisions.
• Assessing the constitutionality of this draft law is the responsibility of the Constitutional Court; assessing the losses for the Ukrainian sociological market due to the exclusion of leading foreign survey technologies and capital is the task of marketers and economists. The duty of sociologists and civil society organizations is to explain to the public what the adoption of such a law would mean for the development of sociology and for freedom of speech in general.
• The author of the bill explains its introduction by arguing that, “for an adequate response by the state to societal demands,” it must “accurately know the moods, priorities, and needs of citizens.” At the same time, it is stated that “sociologists often cannot offer politicians, administrators, and socio-economic managers reliable mechanisms and tested methodologies for the optimal use of public opinion in order to increase the effectiveness of governance.”
• Unfortunately, incompetent managers often blame sociologists for their own failures, even though it is usually managers who misinterpret sociological survey results. Those in power act more wisely when they merely formulate the task for sociological centers, which then use tested methods of analysis and problem-solving and deliver the results “turnkey.”
• Nevertheless, nothing prevents authorities from trusting certain sociological firms (that is, “their own”) while distrusting others (“outsiders”) when making decisions. Power does not want to hear opinions that differ from its own, nor does it want citizens to hear alternative views. Yet it is sociologists, not politicians, whom Chudnovskyi accuses of manipulating public opinion.
• The adoption of this bill therefore creates a threat that authorities will close down undesirable sociological companies, provoke an increase in raider attacks initiated by officials, and drive about two-thirds of the sociological services market into the shadows. Moreover, some sociological actors would be forced to publish distorted survey results merely to bring them into line with the position of those in power. After the adoption of this legal “innovation,” a whole caste of people would emerge, empowered to decide whether survey data are falsified or not, and to pressure the Ministry of Justice to revoke the licenses of unwanted sociological organizations. Most experts interpret these provisions to mean that a single standard of accuracy will be imposed by sociological companies close to the authorities. It is still unclear how the “published margin of error of a sociological forecast” mentioned in the bill would be calculated — by median, by mode across different surveys, or otherwise — but that is not the key issue. What matters is that it would be calculated around the data of “court sociologists.”
• This could mean that whenever a particular political force comes to power, for years we would observe a “consistently high level of its support,” fluctuating only within plus or minus three percent.
• Chudnovskyi explains the ban on establishing sociological companies with mixed Ukrainian-foreign capital (until now independent of the authorities) as follows: “the collection of information about the political and socio-economic life of Ukraine by sociological services can be used (and in fact is used) by foreign intelligence services to create obstacles to the implementation of Ukraine’s national interests, as well as for economic and ideological subversion against our country.”
• But what prevents non-residents from ordering research and receiving results from Ukrainian sociological companies in circumvention of the law? Does this not mean that sociological entities conducting surveys under foreign grants will be subjected to strict surveillance? Will sociological centers now be required to provide confidential information about their clients and research topics to law-enforcement or statistical authorities?
• Terms such as “foreign intelligence services” and “ideological subversion” may sound convincing only to members of parliament when spoken by their colleagues. Experienced sociologists can confidently state that most Ukrainians perceive such notions as belonging to cinema rather than to the work of sociological centers. People are far more inclined to believe that public opinion is manipulated through hourly news broadcasts or television advertising. One can therefore predict that media outlets will become the next targets of inspections and licensing after sociologists.
• One thing is clear: the draft law on subjects of sociological activity is a prelude to a new wave of “temnyky” — informal instructions — for the media and sociological centers. In essence, it is the first test balloon thrown into society to see whether it is ready for the popular slogan of “restoring order,” or whether it is better to postpone such bills for “better times.”
• In my view, journalists, civil society, and my colleagues have no choice but once again to stand up for freedom of speech. Otherwise, the authorities will once again forget what it is and under what conditions citizens have defended it.

No more than 7% of respondents believe that relations between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, or Yanukovych and Yushchenko are friendly. Hostility between these politicians was reported by respondents in all six regions, most strongly in Donbas and least in the North. At the same time, the majority of respondents, ranging from 54% to 69%, are convinced that relations between any of these three politicians will not improve over the next year.