Press releases

• Some skeptics today claim that there is no joy or happiness in our lives because of the crisis, the epidemic, and other hardships. The sociological group Rating Group disagreed with this view and decided to compile and present a special Joy Rating based on data from a nationwide survey. The team also had its own reason to celebrate, as this was their 500th survey, which they wished to share with the public.
• Almost 70% of Ukrainians consider themselves happy, including 27.1% who say they are definitely happy and 42.5% who say they are probably happy. Nearly 20% consider themselves unhappy, while about 10% were unable to say whether they are happy or not. In terms of how often people feel joy, 28.5% of respondents say they experience joy every day, 24.4% several times a week, and 13.6% several times a month. In total, about two thirds experience joy at least once a month. About 20% say they rarely feel joy in life, and 12% were undecided.
• The survey shows a strong link between happiness and joy: the happiest Ukrainians feel joy every day. In the West, 40% of residents say they feel joy daily, the highest share among regions, while in Donbas this figure does not exceed 20%, and in the Center it is only 13%. Joy declines with age: nearly half of respondents aged 18–29 feel joy every day, while among those aged 50 and over, especially pensioners, only about 20% do so. At the same time, the share of those who rarely feel joy increases from 9% among those aged 18–39 to 35% among those aged 60 and older.
• Education also matters: the lower the level of education, the less joy people report. Married respondents feel joy less often than those who are unmarried or living in a civil partnership. The greatest sources of joy for Ukrainians are family, mentioned by more than 60%, followed by children at 47% and friends at 37%. Completing the top five are watching television at 32% and money at 27%. Almost 20% enjoy nature, and one in six Ukrainians finds joy in travel. Ukrainians enjoy receiving gifts more than giving them, and vacations and holidays more than work or study. For 13% household chores bring joy, and for 10% pets do so. Among the arts, music brings joy to 16% and cinema to 14%, while theater brings joy to only 2%. Books bring joy to 12% of Ukrainians. One in ten finds joy in food, and one in ten in sex, which ranks higher than prayer, shopping, sports, cheering for a favorite team, singing, or alcohol.
• As people age, enjoyment from friends, music, vacations, travel, cinema, birthdays, sex, shopping, sports, the internet, dancing, studying, and money declines. As family and children appear, some pleasures become less relevant or inaccessible, while others grow in importance. The joys that become more important with age include family, children, watching television, being in nature, household chores, books, pets, prayer, singing, and solitude. Enjoyment from work remains stable and even increases in middle age, as do food and alcohol. Attitudes toward gifts remain largely unchanged over time.
• The more children people have, the more joy they derive from them: only 8% of childless respondents find joy in children, compared to 53% of those with at least one child and 74% of those with four or more. Among unmarried respondents and those in civil partnerships, fewer than 40% derive joy from family, while 70% of married respondents name family as a key source of joy. Prayer brings the most joy to believers of the UAOC and Greek Catholics, and the least to followers of the UOC of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates. In the West, one in five respondents finds joy in prayer, compared to about 4% in the South and Donbas and only 3% in the North.
• Men more often than women derive joy from friends, television, the internet, vacations, work, sports, victories of their favorite teams, alcohol, and money. Men also enjoy sex about twice as much as women, while women enjoy shopping about three times more than men. Women’s joy rankings also include family, children, household chores, books, pets, and prayer. Women enjoy gifts more than men, both receiving and giving them. However, both men and women enjoy nature, music, travel, cinema, food, and dancing to similar degrees.
• The higher the level of education, the more joy respondents derive from music, theater, books, travel, work, sex, shopping, the internet, and learning, while the opposite is true for prayer. Analysis shows that people who enjoy family also enjoy children, gift giving, household chores, pets, and prayer. Friends are associated with the internet, sports, alcohol, birthdays, music, and learning. Television is linked with alcohol, food, cinema, and receiving gifts. Money is associated with sex and shopping. Nature is linked to solitude, theater, household chores, dancing, and church. Music is associated with learning, theater, cinema, dancing, the internet, and birthdays. Books are linked to solitude, theater, cinema, and learning. Sex is associated with dancing, sports, the internet, birthdays, and learning.
• According to the survey, 3% of respondents have sex every day, 20% several times a week, and 13% several times a month. Nineteen percent say they do not have sex at all, and 33% refused to answer. This means that only 36% of Ukrainians aged 18 and over, and 54% among those aged 18–49, say they are sexually active. The study also shows that sex increases joy: the more frequently people have sex, the more often they feel joy, with several times a week being optimal. Sexual activity is highest in the South, Donbas, and the East, and lowest in the West and Center. Men are one and a half times more sexually active than women, with the most active age group being 23–37. The most regular sexual activity is found among couples in civil partnerships, especially those without children.
• Summing up, Rating Group encourages everyone to change the statistics by rediscovering sources of joy across generations.

• About one third of Ukraine’s adult population identify themselves as football supporters: 5% consider themselves fans, 10% active supporters, and another 18% non-active supporters. Football has a clear unifying potential: the highest share of supporters is found in Donbas, the Centre, and the West of the country.
• Urban residents are more likely to identify as football supporters (35%) than rural residents (27%). The highest level of involvement is among young people aged 18–29 (41%), while the lowest is among those aged 60+ (25%). The gender gap is substantial: 54% of men and only 15% of women say they are football supporters.
• Football is also linked to family status and lifestyle. The highest share of supporters is among unmarried people (46%) and those living together without formal marriage (39%). Among married respondents the figure is 33%, among the divorced 23%, and among widowed respondents 18%. The more children there are in a household, the fewer football supporters it tends to have. The same pattern applies to social factors: higher education and better material well-being are associated with higher interest in football.
• Politically, football supporters are more likely than others to support Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Oleh Tyahnybok and Anatolii Hrytsenko, and less likely to support Arsenii Yatseniuk, Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Symonenko.
• Overall assessments of Ukrainian football in 2009 were positive. Sixty-four percent of supporters rated the performance of the national team positively, and 59% approved of the work of head coach Oleksii Mykhailychenko. The most positive evaluations came from respondents in the East and West, and the most negative from Donbas. A majority of respondents (57%) believed the national team should be coached by a Ukrainian specialist; 21% preferred a European coach and only 3% a Russian one. Those who were dissatisfied with Mykhailychenko were more likely to favor a foreign coach.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents had a positive attitude toward Andriy Shevchenko’s return to Dynamo Kyiv. Support was highest in the South, North, West and Centre, and lowest in the East and Donbas.
• Sixty-two percent believed Ukrainian clubs could repeat their previous season’s successes in international competitions. At the beginning of October, supporters rated Shakhtar Donetsk’s chances of advancing from its group higher than those of Dynamo Kyiv. It should be noted that at the time of the survey (3–12 October), respondents did not yet know that Shakhtar would defeat Toulouse and secure a place in the playoffs, or that Dynamo would draw with Inter in the Champions League.
• At that time, 51% believed Dynamo Kyiv would reach the next round of the Champions League (by finishing first or second in its group), while nearly 70% believed Shakhtar Donetsk would advance to the next round of the Europa League. Shakhtar’s chances were rated highest in the East, Donbas, Centre and South; Dynamo’s chances in the East, Centre and North. Supporters in Donbas were significantly more confident in Shakhtar’s success in particular than in the overall success of Ukrainian football.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted in October 2009, a plurality of Ukrainians (39.6%) do not believe that a coalition of parliamentary factions with more than 226 MPs will be formed in the Verkhovna Rada of the current convocation. Only 27.2% believe that such a coalition will be created, while 33.2% were unable to decide. Skepticism about the possibility of forming an effective parliamentary coalition is strongest in Donbas, the Center, and the West, while respondents in the North are the most optimistic. Among supporters of political parties, those more likely to believe such a coalition will be formed are supporters of BYuT, Nasha Ukraina, and the Lytvyn Bloc, whereas supporters of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Yatsenyuk Bloc tend not to believe this.
• For a relative plurality of Ukrainians (18.1%), the most optimal coalition in the new Verkhovna Rada would be an alliance of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc. The second most preferred option is an alliance between the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Yatsenyuk Bloc, supported by 11.7% of respondents. An alliance between the Party of Regions and BYuT is supported by 8.5%, while 8.3% support a coalition between the Party of Regions and the Yatsenyuk Bloc. At the same time, the most likely coalition in the new Verkhovna Rada, according to a relative plurality (15.5%), is an alliance between the Party of Regions and BYuT.
• Among party supporters, views differ markedly. Forty-three percent of Party of Regions supporters and 60% of Communist Party of Ukraine supporters believe the best coalition would consist of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc. Only 11% of Party of Regions supporters think that an alliance with BYuT would be the best option, yet 19% believe that such a coalition will in fact be formed. Only 14% of BYuT supporters support an alliance with the Party of Regions, although 21% expect such a coalition to emerge. Thus, both BYuT and Party of Regions supporters generally oppose an alliance between these two forces, yet a relative plurality in both camps believe that this is what will actually happen in the new Verkhovna Rada.
• Most BYuT supporters (36%) believe their party should ally with the Yatsenyuk Bloc, and the same view is held by most Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters (35%). At the same time, 21% of BYuT supporters favor a return to the previous coalition format of BYuT, the Lytvyn Bloc, and Nasha Ukraina. Meanwhile, 18% of Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters favor an alliance with the Party of Regions, a position also shared by 19% of Party of Regions supporters.

• According to the results of a nationwide survey conducted in October 2009, voter activity increased over the previous two months. Thus, 57.5% of respondents stated that they would definitely take part in the presidential election (49% in August), while 26.2% said they would rather take part (31% in August).
• The presidential sympathy ratings are led by Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko. Over the past two months, both front-runners have strengthened their positions. The greatest growth was recorded for Yu. Tymoshenko (from 15.4% to 19.4%), and slightly less for V. Yanukovych (from 28.9% to 31.1%). Both politicians are working on mobilizing their core electorate. Support for Yu. Tymoshenko increased across the country, most notably in the West and the North. In turn, V. Yanukovych increased his support in Donbas, the South, the Center, and the North, while losing some ground in the East.
• Support for A. Yatsenyuk fell from 12.3% to 8%. The leader of the “Front of Change” suffered the greatest losses in the West, where his rating dropped from 24% to 13%. Accordingly, for the first time in the past six months Yu. Tymoshenko topped the sympathy rankings in the West. In addition, A. Yatsenyuk lost support in the East, the South, and the North.
• An increase in support for S. Tihipko was recorded, whose rating has almost tripled since August (from 1% to 2.9%). The largest progress was seen in the East, where his rating rose from 1.7% to 6.4%, as well as in the Center, the North, and Donbas. As a result, S. Tihipko has nearly caught up with V. Yushchenko and P. Symonenko and slightly overtakes V. Lytvyn.
• A slight improvement in the positions of V. Yushchenko was also recorded (from 2.6% to 3.4%), primarily in the West, along with a slight decline in the positions of V. Lytvyn (from 3.7% to 2.2%), mainly in the North. In virtually every region there is a tendency toward a decrease in the number of respondents intending to vote for so-called “other” candidates, indicating a crystallization of voters around the main favorites.
• The distribution of votes among those who intend to take part in the presidential election is as follows: V. Yanukovych – 35.6%, Yu. Tymoshenko – 22.1%, A. Yatsenyuk – 9.1%, P. Symonenko – 3.9%, V. Yushchenko – 3.8%, S. Tihipko – 3.3%, and V. Lytvyn – 2.3%. The remainder account for 4.6%, “against all” – 7.2%, and undecided – 7.9%.
• In response to the question “Who would you vote for if the second round featured V. Yanukovych and Yu. Tymoshenko?”, almost 40% of respondents favored the leader of the Party of Regions and 30% favored the leader of BYuT. It should be noted that in August the gap between these two candidates in a second round was 12.5%, while in October it narrowed to 10%.
• Regarding the alternative pair “Yanukovych–Yatsenyuk”, the opposite trend is observed: in August the difference was 10.5%, while in October it widened to 13% (39% versus 26%) in favor of V. Yanukovych. In the hypothetical pair “Yatsenyuk–Tymoshenko”, Yu. Tymoshenko prevails in October with 27% to 23%, whereas in August A. Yatsenyuk had led with 23% to 19%.
• No Ukrainian politician has a positive trust–distrust balance. In the trust ranking, V. Yanukovych leads (41% trust him, 53% do not). The highest trust in the leader of the Party of Regions is recorded in Donbas and the South (69% and 62% respectively), and the lowest in the West (16%), where 79% of respondents distrust him.
• Yu. Tymoshenko and A. Yatsenyuk have nearly equal overall trust levels, at about 31% each. However, almost twice as many respondents fully trust the BYuT leader compared to the leader of the “Front of Change” (15% versus 9%). At the same time, more respondents distrust Yu. Tymoshenko than A. Yatsenyuk (64% versus 56%).
• V. Lytvyn is trusted by 30% (only 4% trust him fully) and distrusted by 60%. The highest trust in the Speaker of Parliament is in the North and the South (38% and 36% respectively), and the lowest in Donbas (18%). V. Yushchenko is trusted by 9% (only 3% fully), while 86% do not trust him. The highest trust in the incumbent President is in the West and the North (24% and 10% respectively), while in other regions trust ranges from 1% in Donbas to 5% in the Center.
• Party ratings mirror the trends in support for presidential candidates. The distribution of votes among those who intend to take part in the parliamentary elections is as follows: Party of Regions – 35.8%, BYuT – 21.5%, Yatsenyuk Bloc – 7.8%, Communist Party of Ukraine – 3.9%, Our Ukraine – 3.1%, Tihipko Bloc – 2.5%, and Lytvyn Bloc – 1.9%. Other parties and blocs account for 4.8%, “against all” – 8%, and undecided – 10.7%.

• When speaking about the importance of EURO-2012 for Ukraine, most respondents believe it is primarily a matter of national prestige (42.3%), the creation of new jobs through infrastructure development for the championship (40.3%), and improvements in the quality of roads, airports, and hotels (35.9%). About one third of respondents also believe that hosting EURO-2012 gives Ukraine an opportunity to earn additional revenues (32.7%), to present Ukraine in a more positive light to Europe and the world (32.5%), and to ensure the development of host cities (29.8%). Somewhat fewer respondents pointed to other reasons for the importance of EURO-2012: nearly one quarter see it as a test of whether Ukraine is a civilized European state, while 18.6% believe it will provide an additional boost to sports and 16.5% to culture. Almost every sixth Ukrainian believes that EURO-2012 gives Ukraine new opportunities to join the European Union. Only 8.8% of respondents think that EURO-2012 is not important for Ukraine, and another 8.4% were unable to decide.
• It should be noted that in Eastern Ukraine EURO-2012 is primarily associated with new jobs, in Donbas with the development of host cities, in the South with the opportunity to earn additional money, while respondents in the West, Center, and North focus mainly on national prestige. Ukrainians are generally opposed to abandoning the idea of hosting EURO-2012. Almost half of respondents (46.4%) tend to view such an отказ negatively, while only 9.3% would support giving up the championship. At the same time, one in five respondents is indifferent to whether EURO-2012 takes place in Ukraine, and another quarter were unable to decide. Support for EURO-2012 is highest in the North and East and lowest in the South. There is also a clear pattern: the younger the respondents, and the higher their education and material status, the more likely they are to support EURO-2012. Respondents of Ukrainian nationality support hosting EURO-2012 more than Russians. Women are almost twice as likely as men to be indifferent to the championship.
• Ukrainians believe that the central authorities bear more responsibility for organizing EURO-2012 (35.1%) than local authorities (4.4%), although half of respondents believe that both levels of government share equal responsibility. When asked who is currently coping better with preparations for EURO-2012, 29.6% said that neither the central nor local authorities are coping well, 22.8% said that both are coping, 15.9% credited only local authorities, and 13.2% only the central authorities. Respondents in the Center and North assessed the performance of the central authorities more positively than that of local authorities, while in other regions the opposite pattern prevailed.
• According to respondents, Kyiv and Donetsk are the cities best able to represent Ukraine at EURO-2012 and are most likely to host matches. A clear majority (63.2%) believe that Kyiv is the city that can best represent Ukraine, while Donetsk follows with 39.6%. About a quarter of respondents named Kharkiv and Lviv as cities that could best represent Ukraine (23% and 22.6% respectively). As for the likelihood of actually hosting matches, Kyiv’s chances were rated slightly lower than its potential (56.7%), Donetsk’s slightly higher (43.1%), while Kharkiv and Lviv were rated at roughly the same level (21.4% and 20.6%). Residents of the West and East believe that their own cities, Lviv and Kharkiv, together with Kyiv, can best represent Ukraine, although they rate Donetsk’s chances of actually hosting the championship higher.
• The level of Ukraine’s readiness for EURO-2012 was rated by citizens at 2.4 out of 5, while Poland’s readiness was rated at 3.4. Respondents in the North and Donbas assessed Ukraine’s readiness higher than those in the West and South. Another trend is that the higher the level of education of respondents, the more critical their assessments were. Among the obstacles hindering preparation for EURO-2012, respondents primarily named traditional domestic problems rather than those emphasized by UEFA inspectors. The main obstacles were the economic crisis (61.2%), political crisis (54.4%), and corruption in government (50.5%). Infrastructure problems were mentioned less often: poor-quality roads (39%), slow stadium construction (30.3%), lack of modern airports (17.5%), insufficient quality hotels (17.2%), difficult urban transport (14.3%), and railway transport problems (8.8%). Residents of Donbas see the economic and political crises as the main obstacles, residents of the South emphasize corruption, while the West and North focus on slow stadium construction. Donbas highlights poor roads, and the East the lack of hotels and airports.
• Forty-three percent of Ukrainians do not believe that Ukraine will meet most UEFA requirements by 30 November, while only 25.7% believe this will happen. Optimism is highest in the North and lowest in the South and Donbas. Ukrainians rate the chances of meeting UEFA requirements by 30 November about one third higher than Russians do, and the higher the education level, the more optimistic respondents are. Thirty-eight percent of respondents believe that R. Akhmetov has done the most to ensure the successful hosting of EURO-2012 in Ukraine; at least 30% in every region named him, except in Donbas where nearly 60% did so. G. Surkis was named by 21.6%. Other figures were mentioned less often: Y. Tymoshenko (9.2%), V. Yanukovych (8.3%), Y. Chervonenko (7.5%), V. Yushchenko (7%), Y. Pavlenko (5.6%), A. Yatsenyuk (2.5%), V. Lytvyn (2.4%), I. Vasiunyk (0.9%), and others (0.9%). At the same time, 11.6% believe that none of these politicians has done anything for EURO-2012, and 34% were unable to answer. If EURO-2012 were not to take place in Ukraine, most respondents believe that V. Yushchenko (57.8%) and Y. Tymoshenko (42%) would bear the greatest responsibility, while G. Surkis (7.9%), Y. Pavlenko (7%), V. Lytvyn (2.8%), and I. Vasiunyk (2.7%) were mentioned much less often.

• Two thirds of surveyed citizens named Kyiv as the most attractive city for tourists, half named Lviv, and more than one third named Odesa. Other large cities of Ukraine did not receive more than 10% of preferences. While Kyiv ranked first in almost every region of Ukraine, except for the South where Odesa took the lead, other cities were evaluated very differently across regions. Lviv was rated highly in terms of tourist attractiveness in the West, Center, North, and East; Odesa in the South and Donbas; Kharkiv only in the East; and Donetsk only in Donbas. Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia received rather low ratings everywhere.
• In the West, Lviv as the most attractive tourist city in Ukraine received 59% of preferences and Odesa 34%, while in the South the situation was reversed, with 32% for Lviv and 59% for Odesa. There were also differences in evaluations depending on demographic characteristics. For example, the higher the level of education and material well-being and the lower the age of respondents, the fewer undecided answers were recorded. Urban residents were more informed about the tourist potential of large cities than rural residents.
• Regarding Lviv and Kyiv, there was a clear relationship: the higher the level of education, the higher the attractiveness ratings of these cities. Lviv was more often mentioned by people who rated their own material well-being highly, while Odesa was more often chosen by young people. Interestingly, Lviv and Kyiv were more often named by respondents who identified as Ukrainians by nationality, whereas Odesa and Kharkiv were more often named by ethnic Russians.
• The mayors of Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv were considered the best city leaders, each receiving 11–12% of support nationwide. The mayors of Donetsk and Odesa were mentioned by 9–10% of respondents, and the mayors of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro by about 5%. It should be noted that 19% of respondents said that none of the mayors of large cities could be considered the best, while another 43% were unable to give an answer. The responses differed noticeably by region. Andrii Sadovyi was recognized as the best city leader in the West at 20% and in the Center at 17%, Leonid Chernovetskyi in the North at 15% and in the South at 15%, Mykhailo Dobkin in the East at 27%, and Oleksandr Lukianchenko in Donbas at 31%. Eduard Hurvits received his highest ratings in the South at 13%, while Yevhen Kartashov and Ivan Kulichenko received their highest ratings in the East at 14% and 12% respectively.
• In addition to regional differences, demographic patterns were also evident. Among those who were undecided, there were more people with lower levels of education and lower material well-being. The higher the level of education of respondents, the higher the ratings given to Andrii Sadovyi and Eduard Hurvits. Depending on self-assessed material well-being, Oleksandr Lukianchenko received higher ratings.
• Interestingly, Mykhailo Dobkin and Leonid Chernovetskyi received almost twice as low ratings from rural residents as from urban residents, while Andrii Sadovyi and Oleksandr Lukianchenko, on the contrary, received better ratings from respondents living in rural areas. The mayor of Lviv ranked first among respondents who identified as Ukrainians by nationality, while the mayors of Kharkiv and Donetsk received almost twice as high ratings from ethnic Russians than from ethnic Ukrainians.

• According to the results of a nationwide survey conducted in August 2009, 49% of respondents said that if a presidential election were held next Sunday, they would definitely take part, while another 31% said they would rather take part. For parliamentary elections, the figures were 45% and 32% respectively. Thus, voter turnout is expected to be slightly higher in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones.
• The presidential race is led by Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliia Tymoshenko, and Arsenii Yatseniuk. Compared to May 2009, support for V. Yanukovych increased from 25.3% to 28.9%; support for Y. Tymoshenko remained almost unchanged, declining slightly from 15.9% in May to 15.4% in August; and support for A. Yatseniuk also remained almost unchanged, moving from 13.2% to 12.3%.
• The next group of candidates is clustered at the 3–5% level. Compared to May, support for V. Lytvyn decreased from 6.2% to 3.7%, support for P. Symonenko remained almost unchanged, from 4.4% to 3.9%, and support for V. Yushchenko also remained almost unchanged, from 3.1% to 2.6%.
• Among those who intend to vote, the distribution of support is as follows: V. Yanukovych 34.6%, Y. Tymoshenko 18.3%, A. Yatseniuk 14.4%, P. Symonenko 4.4%, V. Lytvyn 4.2%, V. Yushchenko 3.0%, O. Tiahnybok 1.4%, I. Bohoslovska 1.3%, and S. Tihipko 1.1%. Other candidates together account for 1.6%, 7.8% would vote against all, and 7.9% are undecided.
• When asked whom they would support if the second round were between V. Yanukovych and Y. Tymoshenko, 35% of respondents preferred the leader of the Party of Regions and 23% chose the BYuT leader. In a Yanukovych–Yatseniuk runoff, Yanukovych also leads, 34% to 24%. In a Yanukovych–Yushchenko matchup, Yanukovych’s advantage is even greater, 37% to 8%. In a hypothetical Yatseniuk–Tymoshenko runoff, the leader of the Front for Change would win, 23% to 19%, and he would also defeat Yushchenko, 29% to 4%.
• V. Yanukovych’s electoral core is formed in Donbas, the South, and the East, where his support reaches 40–50%. At the same time, he is supported by 13–14% in the North and Center and by about 8% in the West. Y. Tymoshenko enjoys her strongest support in the North and Center, at 26%, and in the West, at 20%. A. Yatseniuk is most popular in the West, at 24%, and lags far behind the BYuT leader in the North and Center, at 11–13%. In other regions, support for Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk is nearly equal, with a slight advantage for the prime minister in the South and for the former speaker in the East and Donbas.
• V. Lytvyn has his strongest support in the North and Center, P. Symonenko in the South, East, and Donbas, V. Yushchenko and O. Tiahnybok in the West, I. Bohoslovska in the South and Donbas, and S. Tihipko in the South and East.
• Electoral preferences differ between urban and rural residents. V. Yanukovych’s support is 1.5 times higher in cities, while his main opponents are stronger in rural areas, especially Y. Tymoshenko, whose support in rural areas is one third higher than in cities.
• Among supporters of the Party of Regions leader, people with secondary and vocational education prevail. Support for the BYuT leader is almost independent of education level, while for the Front for Change leader there is a clear trend: the higher the education level of respondents, the higher the support for A. Yatseniuk.
• Older people are the most decided in their electoral choice and also include the smallest share of those who intend to vote against all. For most candidates, there are no strong age-related trends in support, except for P. Symonenko, who is traditionally supported by pensioners three times more than by other age groups.
• Support for Y. Tymoshenko among women is one quarter higher than among men. Respondents who identify as ethnic Russians support V. Yanukovych twice as much as ethnic Ukrainians.
• The economic crisis largely determines today’s fears and anxieties. Fifty-nine percent of Ukrainians named economic decline among the three main threats to the country, 42.9% rising unemployment, and 38.9% arbitrary actions by the authorities. The devaluation of the hryvnia ranks fourth at 27.8%, and one in five Ukrainians is concerned about the degradation of the population.
• Voters of V. Yanukovych are more worried about economic decline than voters of Y. Tymoshenko, 64% versus 55%. Voters of A. Yatseniuk do not share this pessimism of the Party of Regions electorate, but they do fully share concerns about arbitrary rule, at about 40% compared to 29% among Tymoshenko’s supporters. Supporters of the Front for Change leader are more concerned than supporters of both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych about the threat of Ukraine losing control over its gas transit system and about the loss of independence.
• It is notable that those who are undecided, those who intend to vote against all, as well as supporters of both V. Yanukovych and A. Yatseniuk, are most united by their concern over arbitrary actions by the authorities.
• The top three in parliamentary elections are traditionally the Party of Regions, BYuT, and the hypothetical Yatseniuk Bloc. Compared to May 2009, support for the Party of Regions increased from 24.9% to 28%; support for the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc remained almost unchanged, from 15.2% in May to 14.6% in August; and support for the Arsenii Yatseniuk Bloc also remained stable, from 10.4% to 10.6%.
• At a considerable distance but still with chances to cross the 3% threshold follow the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc, and Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party. Compared to May 2009, support for the Lytvyn Bloc declined from 6.1% to 3.1%, support for the Communist Party fell slightly from 5.4% to 4.4%, and support for Our Ukraine remained essentially unchanged, from 2.8% to 2.4%.
• Among those who intend to vote, the distribution of support is as follows: Party of Regions 34.1%, BYuT 17.7%, Yatseniuk Bloc 12.7%, Communist Party of Ukraine 5.2%, Lytvyn Bloc 3.5%, Our Ukraine 2.7%, and All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda 2.1%. Other parties and blocs together account for 5.8%, 7.9% would vote against all, and 8.3% are undecided.

• The economic crisis largely defines today’s fears and anxieties of citizens. Fifty-nine percent of Ukrainians named economic decline among the three main threats to Ukraine, 42.9% cited rising unemployment, 38.9% arbitrary actions by the authorities, 27.8% the devaluation of the hryvnia, and 20.9% the degradation of the population. Between 10% and 13% of respondents mentioned rising crime, environmental disasters, and deterioration in healthcare.
• Around 10% of Ukrainians are convinced that the country faces the threat of fragmentation and the loss of control over its gas transmission system. Between 6% and 8% of respondents are most concerned about mass emigration of Ukrainians abroad, a demographic crisis, and a decline in the quality of education.
• About 7% believe Ukraine is threatened by an unconstitutional coup, around 6% by the loss of independence, 4% by civil war, 3% by a military threat from Russia, and 1.5% by a threat from the West. Less than 1% fear terrorism in Ukraine.
• There are notable regional and demographic differences. Fear of economic decline is strongest among residents of the Center, South, East, and Donbas, regions with developed industrial production, primarily among economically active people aged 30–49 with secondary or vocational education. Rising unemployment worries young people aged 18–29 the most, and this concern is present in almost all regions, especially in the South and least in the North. Women, particularly those living in rural areas, fear unemployment more than men.
• Arbitrary actions by the authorities are of greater concern to residents of the South, East, and Donbas, regions dissatisfied with the current government. Urban residents are more worried about this threat than rural ones.
• The devaluation of the hryvnia is most feared in the West. Ethnic Ukrainians are significantly more concerned about this issue than ethnic Russians, likely because some associate this threat not only with the erosion of their incomes and savings but also with a weakening of the state.
• The higher the level of education of respondents, the greater their concern about the degradation of Ukraine’s population. This fear is especially widespread in the North and East and is more common in cities than in villages.
• Rising crime worries residents of Donbas the most, environmental disasters concern people in the North and East, and the deterioration of healthcare is most feared in the South.
• Mass emigration of Ukrainians abroad mainly concerns residents of the West and Center. A demographic crisis is feared most in the North, while declining education standards are most feared in the South.
• Those who believe Ukraine risks losing control over its gas transmission system are mostly young people, predominantly men with higher education, with the highest shares in the North, South, West, and East.
• Residents of the Center, West, and North are three times more likely than those in the South, East, and Donbas to cite the loss of independence as a threat. These are mostly older people and ethnic Ukrainians. A military threat from Russia is also expected most often in the West, Center, and North. At the same time, fear of civil war is highest in Donbas and the South. The risk of the country’s fragmentation is most feared in the South and Center and least in the West, while ethnic Russians expect this threat more often than ethnic Ukrainians.
• The regional classification used in the survey was as follows. West: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi. Center: Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy. North: Kyiv city, Kyiv region, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv. South: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv. East: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia.

• Public support for the need to amend the Constitution this year is growing. Whereas in March 2009, 48.9% of respondents believed that constitutional reform was not timely that year, by May 2009 this share had fallen to 44.5%. By contrast, in March only 23.8% supported the idea of amending the Basic Law that year, while in May this figure rose to 31.6%. The share of respondents who were undecided on this issue also declined from 27.3% to 23.9%.
• Compared with March 2009, the number of respondents who believe that amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine should be approved only by a vote in the Verkhovna Rada increased from 12.1% to 15.7%.
• At the same time, public opinion continues to be dominated by the view that constitutional amendments should be approved only through a nationwide referendum, a position held by 62.1% of respondents.
• Only 3.1% believe that constitutional amendments can be legitimized solely by the President’s signature, and 1% solely by the signature of the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada. A further 18.2% of respondents were unable to answer this question.
• According to a relative majority of respondents, 45.5%, constitutional changes should strengthen the powers of the President. One quarter believe that parliament should be granted greater powers, 17.6% think that the Constitution should not be changed at all, and 10.7% were undecided.
• Seventy-eight percent of respondents do not support the idea of electing the President in parliament, with 51.6% completely opposed and 26.4% rather opposed. The share of supporters of this idea stands at 11.4%.
• Only 47.2% of respondents were able to name the correct date of Constitution Day in Ukraine, 28 June. A further 19.6% named a different date, while one third do not know at all when this state holiday is celebrated.

• Over the past two months, support for the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, has increased the most, from 20.1% to 25.3%. Support for the leader of BYuT, Yulia Tymoshenko, has instead declined, from 16.8% to 15.9%.
• Support for Arsenii Yatsenyuk has also increased slightly, from 12.2% to 13.2%.
• Support for the incumbent President Viktor Yushchenko fluctuates at around 3–4%, for the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn at 6–7%, and for the leader of the Communists at 4–5%.
• 15.8% would vote “against all,” and 9.6% are undecided.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held next Sunday, five political forces would enter parliament: the Party of Regions (24.9%), BYuT (15.2%), the Yatsenyuk Bloc (10.4%), the Lytvyn Bloc (6.1%), and the Communist Party of Ukraine (5.4%).
• Close to passing the 3% threshold are Our Ukraine (2.8%) and Svoboda (2.4%). 13.4% would vote “against all,” and 11.3% are undecided.
• 54% of respondents agree that parliament should dismiss the Minister of Internal Affairs, Yurii Lutsenko, while 34.3% disagree.
• One third of respondents believe that trade unions in Ukraine primarily defend the interests of company management, and one in five believe they defend the interests of politicians. Only 15% of citizens think that trade unions defend the interests of ordinary workers, 16.6% believe they do not defend any interests at all, and 14.6% were unable to answer this question.
• Accordingly, only 16.8% of respondents rated the activity of trade unions in Ukraine over the past six months positively, while 28.5% rated it negatively. At the same time, 37.2% of respondents think that trade unions in Ukraine play no role at all. 17.5% were undecided.

• hereas in September 2007 respondents to a similar question tended more toward the answer that the country lacked legality above all, in May 2009 it was order that was seen as most lacking (an increase from 41.4% to 45.3%). Perceived shortages of stability (from 21.8% to 25.1%), leadership (from 20.1% to 23.6%), wisdom (from 8.9% to 11.3%), money (from 5.4% to 8.1%), and faith (from 2.8% to 5.3%) also increased. Perceptions of a lack of honesty, justice, decisiveness, and patriotism decreased slightly or remained unchanged.
• Almost 90% of respondents felt the effects of the economic crisis personally.
• In order to reduce the impact of the crisis, 47.2% of citizens cut spending on food, 43.2% abandoned planned purchases of household appliances and electronics, and nearly one in ten limited themselves in everything. In addition, 28.7% of respondents turned to relatives and close ones for help, 17.1% gave up summer holidays, and 14.3% converted all their savings into U.S. dollars.
• Only 1.7% of respondents turned to the state for assistance.
• At the same time, 7.5% of respondents did nothing to reduce the impact of the economic crisis.

I. Perception of presidential candidates by Lviv residents

So what is the dynamic of electoral sentiments among Lviv residents in 2009? Let us begin with the expectations of the people of Lviv regarding the upcoming presidential elections.

We are comparing data from a survey conducted in April 2009 with data from a survey conducted at the end of December of last year. Over these four months, Arsenii Yatseniuk has moved to the top of the list of presidential candidates. In fact, for us, the growth of support for Yatseniuk was an expected trend, and I am convinced that he had already taken first place in January–February of this year, while we only confirmed it in April. The dynamics of his rating were positive throughout this period, starting in October, when Yatseniuk began to be actively discussed as a presidential candidate. At present, he has almost 23.5%.

As for the other candidates, Yulia Tymoshenko has, of course, lost the most. She now has only 19.5%. Compared with the end of last year, she has lost a full 5 percentage points. This is a significant drop, especially given that those 5% have become supporters of her direct competitor in Lviv — Arsenii Yatseniuk. Here we see a clear trend: Tymoshenko is going down, Yatseniuk is going up.

At the moment, my assessment is that the growth of Yatseniuk’s rating and, correspondingly, the decline of Tymoshenko’s rating have stopped. I think that over the next month or two, and perhaps even until autumn, their positions will remain roughly at this level.

The candidate who is now closest to these two leaders is Oleh Tyahnybok. At present, his rating is just over 10%. It should be noted that over the past four months he has lost some of his positions. However, this is probably not so much due to his own personal performance, but rather to the fact that in the most recent April survey we included Anatolii Hrytsenko, who is seen as a certain alternative to the main politicians. He is a new face. He was a relatively “tough” Minister of Defense and also positions himself as a “strong hand.”

So you think that some of Tyahnybok’s supporters moved to Hrytsenko because they have a similar image of strong-willed, authoritarian-type leaders who are capable of “restoring order”?

That is generally how people perceive Hrytsenko. Therefore, I believe that the 2–2.5% decline in Tyahnybok’s rating occurred due to the entry of Anatolii Hrytsenko into the presidential race, whom we included in this list for the first time.

As for Viktor Yushchenko, his rating is stable; over four months it has neither increased nor decreased. At present, it stands at around 7%. It should be said that this is also a certain point at which his rating is likely to remain for quite some time. These are the main positions.

And what about Yanukovych?

Viktor Yanukovych is traditionally perceived rather negatively in Lviv. At present, 4% of Lviv residents are ready to vote for him. On the one hand, this is very little, but on the other hand, it is somewhat more than a year or two ago.

And what has been the dynamic over the past four months?

His rating has been stable. It has not moved in any direction. That is, the people who have gradually become disappointed in the current authorities have not chosen Yanukovych as an alternative. No matter how you look at it, he is not accepted in Western Ukraine, and particularly in Lviv.

So we can say that in Lviv the supporters of the main political figures have already made their choices and the overall picture has stabilized. Are any surprises still possible?

I do not think that any surprises should be expected, even though about 10% of Lviv residents remain undecided. Practice shows that these 10% will in fact be choosing among four candidates — Yatseniuk, Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko. And people tend to vote for those who are leaders, who have a chance to win. Therefore, in practice, it is Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko who will compete for the votes of the 10% of Lviv residents who have not yet decided.

I should also say that in our survey about 10% are ready to vote “against all” in the presidential election, and slightly less than 5% do not intend to participate in the election at all. On the one hand, this group can be considered small, but on the other hand, these figures are higher than last year or the year before. People are disappointed. You know that usually those who vote “against all” make up no more than 2–3%. In our surveys, this figure now stands at as much as 10%, three or even four times higher than usual. However, I think that as the elections approach and the active phase of the campaign begins, a significant share of these people will decide and vote.

We are now talking about ratings in percentages, but could you translate these percentages into absolute numbers?

I am not ready to operate with exact absolute numbers, but we can make a rough calculation. If there are about 530,000 voters in Lviv, then this means that roughly one in five — just over 100,000 — are ready to vote for Tymoshenko. For Yatseniuk, it is 23.3%, meaning about one in four, around 120,000 voters. These are absolute numbers from the total electorate. However, about 70% of voters will actually come to the polls. Presidential elections are more important for people, and turnout is usually higher. Perhaps about 75% will come to vote in Lviv — that would be roughly 420,000 voters. Calculations should be based on this number.

It would be interesting to draw an electoral map of Ukraine from the point of view of different politicians. On such a map, Lviv, for example, would be a city of 120,000 voters for Yatseniuk, but only 15,000 for Yanukovych…

I agree. It would be interesting to compare Lviv with other million-plus cities. Then one should speak not only about percentages and ratings, but also about the absolute weight of the population. After all, 20% in Lviv may correspond in absolute numbers to only 5% in Donetsk. And that is what the competition is about. For Yanukovych, of course, Lviv is not very interesting, but still — the larger the city, the greater its weight in the national sample.

Can one draw a group portrait of a Lviv voter who supports one candidate or another?

We can talk about those candidates who enjoy significant support in Lviv, namely Yatseniuk, Tymoshenko, and Tyahnybok, who has twice the support of Yushchenko. So I would focus on these three typical electorates.

Supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko, who four years ago were considered a protest electorate — that is, people who opposed the authorities and wanted change — have now become the least protest-oriented, since Tymoshenko is in power. This does not mean that the electorate has changed — that four years ago one group voted for Tymoshenko and now another does. These are the same people, but they have changed their attitude toward their leader. And because Tymoshenko is now prime minister and part of the governing authorities, they have also changed their attitude toward politics in the country. As a result, they are currently not ready for early elections or for protest actions.

Are Tymoshenko’s supporters mainly women or men, and what is their age?

Sixty percent of Tymoshenko’s electorate are women and 40% are men. For example, for Lytvyn the picture is the opposite — 65% of his supporters are men. The same is true for Tyahnybok, where 60% of his supporters are also men.

If we continue to draw an average Lviv supporter of Tymoshenko, it is a woman under 30 years old and among the less affluent, which translates into the socialist and populist attitudes characteristic of this electorate. We have already mentioned that compared to a year ago, Tymoshenko’s rating has dropped significantly, by about 10 percentage points, and she has accordingly suffered electoral losses, including in Lviv. However, the 20% who are currently ready to vote for Yulia Tymoshenko are the most confident in their choice. They may be disappointed in Tymoshenko herself, in the economic crisis, in the Ukrainian authorities, and in the electoral process, but they do not see another option or another politician they could vote for. Therefore, she still has a stable core electorate. And as I said earlier, her ratings are unlikely to fall further.

Supporters of Arsenii Yatseniuk

Very different people are his supporters. This is primarily because he is a new name among presidential candidates and represents a relatively new political force. In fact, the core of his electorate consists of people who just a year ago were supporters of Our Ukraine or Viktor Yushchenko, meaning a center-right electorate. It was precisely from among Yushchenko’s supporters that Yatseniuk’s rating began to grow — at least initially. But that was only the beginning. The subsequent growth, the roughly 5 percentage points he gained this year, came at the expense of Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has already bottomed out at 6–7% and is unlikely to fall further. At this point, Yatseniuk is already gaining support from the Tymoshenko Bloc.

Since Yatseniuk’s electorate is being replenished by supporters of different politicians, it has become quite heterogeneous. His electorate is not clearly defined. However, it can be said that almost half of Yatseniuk’s supporters are people under 40 years of age. These are mostly young and active people. They are ready to participate in protest actions, meaning they are more politically active than others. They are among the most financially secure — not necessarily the richest, but those who have been least affected by the economic crisis. These are people who are able to cope even in the difficult conditions in which we now find ourselves.

At the same time, they declaratively seek stability. When we ask people whether they want radical change or stability, Yatseniuk’s supporters overwhelmingly choose stability. These are likely people involved in business, who depend on the economic and political situation in the country. For them, stability is the best option; they do not want radical change. They want to continue living as they have been living, to grow gradually, without revolution and without collapse.

These are interesting people — ready to go to a revolution in order to achieve stability.

That is the paradox. They choose Yatseniuk as someone who is perceived as a pragmatist, a supporter of the European course, and not associated with radical or unpredictable decisions, unlike, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko.

The main advantage of Yatseniuk is that he is seen as a new face in politics, someone not implicated in corruption. That is why Lviv residents are willing to give him a chance in the upcoming presidential election.

Supporters of Oleh Tyahnybok

Tyahnybok also has a very clearly defined electorate. Both he and his political force have for a long time been consistently articulating the same positions and are ideologically well defined. The vast majority of Tyahnybok’s supporters have supported him for many years. We see that his roughly 10% in the presidential race or the 17.5–18% for the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda in parliamentary elections were accumulated gradually, step by step. There have been no sudden spikes; the growth of his rating has been steady.

Back in 2006, about 3% of the population of Lviv Oblast voted for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. Today, according to our surveys, almost 18% in Lviv are ready to vote for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. This is significant growth, but it took four full years. This gradual growth is very good for this politician and this political force, because these people come consciously and are not likely to defect to another party tomorrow.

Please describe the portrait of a voter who would vote for Oleh Tyahnybok.

As I said, most of Tyahnybok’s supporters are men, and almost two thirds of them are over 40 years old. These are people with clearly defined views. They come to Svoboda not because of some short-term campaign or political situation, but consciously, seriously, and for the long term, often for ideological reasons. We can say that about half of Svoboda’s supporters choose ideology over the economy. For Ukraine, this is a very high figure.

Everyone who votes for Tyahnybok trusts him, but not everyone who votes for Svoboda is ready to vote for Tyahnybok as a presidential candidate. They do not believe he can win, and therefore they do not see the point in voting for him. Some of them will vote for Yatseniuk, and a very small share for Tymoshenko.

Both Yatseniuk’s and Tyahnybok’s supporters favor holding early elections at all levels — presidential, parliamentary, and local. This is understandable, since these political forces are not represented in power and want their representatives there. In contrast, the Tymoshenko Bloc and Tymoshenko’s supporters are categorically opposed to any early elections.

Supporters of Viktor Yanukovych

There is only one thing that can be stated with certainty: they are predominantly Russian-speaking people, mostly of retirement age and with higher education. Yanukovych, like the Party of Regions, has in Lviv taken over the votes of those who always voted for socialists and communists. In fact, this pro-Russian vector was transferred to Yanukovych from those two political forces. He himself did not create it here.

Anothers to add, about another 0.5% of Yanukovych’s rating consists of people who vote for him simply to express their disagreement with the Orange politicians. He is the only politician from the “non-Orange” camp who has gained any support in Western Ukraine. Even Oleksandr Moroz, who had 1% in Lviv in December, now has zero; Symonenko has 0.1%.

Lytvyn could also be considered a kind of alternative for some Lviv voters, but the 3% he has are simply people who personally view Lytvyn positively. In the second round, they would vote for someone — or perhaps not come at all. Between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko they might refuse to choose, but between Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk they would likely choose Yatseniuk as a real alternative. In 2006, Lytvyn’s entire campaign was built on the idea of the need for an alternative and a unifying force. In that sense, in a second round his supporters would vote for Yatseniuk.

So Yatseniuk has the greatest growth potential in Lviv?

Yes, because he is perceived as a new politician. Given that Tymoshenko’s rating has been declining over the past one to two years, I do not see a reason why it would suddenly start growing now. Of course, it might increase slightly due to an active campaign, visits, and agitation, but this is unlikely to change the overall picture. Her decline has stopped, and during the campaign she may gain one or two percentage points as people make their final decisions, but she is unlikely to take first place in Lviv or Lviv Oblast.

• In spring 2009, rising prices and the devaluation of the hryvnia are becoming increasingly painful issues for Lviv residents. 51.4% believe that the situation in Ukraine is deteriorating, while 40.3% think it is not changing. Only 2.1% of respondents feel that the situation in the country is improving.
• Only 7.5% of respondents have not felt the effects of the financial and economic crisis in Ukraine. 47.3% have felt the impact of the crisis very seriously, and another 42.9% have felt it to some extent.
• 85.6% of respondents are most concerned about rising prices (in December it was 73.4%), and 40.3% are concerned about the depreciation of the hryvnia (in December it was 33.9%). At the same time, concern about job losses decreased from 48% to 29.1%, and concern about delayed wage payments decreased from 20.1% to 12.5%.
• 58% of respondents personally are ready to take part in various protest actions, including due to non-payment of salaries or pensions (44.5%), deterioration of their personal financial situation (41.4%), rising prices or utility tariffs (40%), and the tense political situation in the country (33.6%). 22% are ready to protest for money or some form of remuneration.
• 11.9% are ready to participate in all of the listed protest actions. 33.4% are confident that they will not take part in any of these protest actions.
• Lviv residents want to primarily elect deputies rather than parties. 49% are against introducing a bicameral Parliament in Ukraine. 26.3% of respondents are ready to support the introduction of a bicameral Parliament, while 24.6% are undecided.
• Residents of Lviv are mostly against early elections. In particular, 47.6% do not support early elections to the Verkhovna Rada (45.5% are in favor), and 52.3% are against early presidential elections (40.9% are in favor). Notably, 37.9% support both early parliamentary and early presidential elections, while 43.9% support neither early presidential nor parliamentary elections.
• Lviv residents do not support elections being held under the existing proportional electoral system with closed party lists. This applies both to elections to the Verkhovna Rada, where only 10.4% called it optimal, and to local council elections, where only 10% consider it the best option.
• Respondents view the majoritarian electoral system most favorably. 33.6% consider it the best for parliamentary elections, and 36.6% for local elections. 20.3% believe that a proportional system with open lists is optimal for elections to the Verkhovna Rada, while 17.5% consider it the best for local elections. 22% believe that a mixed system, combining proportional and majoritarian elements, is the best electoral system.
• In Lviv, the Yatsenyuk Bloc became the leader of electoral support in parliamentary elections. The Hrytsenko Bloc passes the 3% threshold.
• Since the beginning of the year, support for the Yatsenyuk Bloc has increased from 13.6% to 21.4%, allowing it to overtake the BYuT, which has 19.1%. Third place belongs to Svoboda with 16.5%. More than 3% was received by Our Ukraine (5.3%), the Party of Regions (4.4%), and the Hrytsenko Bloc (3.4%).
• Voters’ motives in supporting political forces differ. 40% of BYuT supporters have supported this force for a long time and have not become disillusioned with it, while another 40% have become disappointed but still consider it the best among the alternatives. Meanwhile, 82% of Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters and 48% of Svoboda supporters began supporting these forces recently because they became disappointed with others.
• Notably, 22% of Hrytsenko Bloc supporters support it “out of spite” toward another political force.
• In Lviv, trust in Yushchenko and Tymoshenko continues to decline. Over the past year, trust in Viktor Yushchenko in Lviv has fallen from 77.3% to 22.8%, and trust in Yulia Tymoshenko has fallen from 85.4% to 37.4%. Distrust in the President stands at 66.9%, and in the Prime Minister at 57.1%.
• At the same time, since the beginning of the year, trust in all national leaders has declined, most notably in Oleh Tiahnybok (from 56.6% to 42.6%) and Yurii Lutsenko (from 39.3% to 28.9%). The exception is Arsenii Yatsenyuk, whose level of trust has not changed since the beginning of the year.
• The highest levels of trust among Lviv residents are enjoyed by Yatsenyuk (63.3%), Tiahnybok (42.6%), and Tymoshenko (37.4%). Only Yatsenyuk has a positive trust balance (+35.3%). Respondents were most uncertain in their attitudes toward Anatolii Hrytsenko (18.3%).
• The politician who is most distrusted in Lviv is traditionally Viktor Yanukovych (89.3%).
• In the presidential elections in Lviv, Yatsenyuk leads with 23.3%, followed by Tymoshenko with 19.5%, and Tiahnybok with 10.4%. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has stabilized at 6.9%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko is fifth with 5.5%. 10.8% of respondents would not vote for any of the candidates, and another 9.5% have not decided.
• It is interesting that in Yulia Tymoshenko’s electorate in Lviv, 59% are women, while among Volodymyr Lytvyn’s voters, 65% are men. The highest shares of voters with higher education are found among Viktor Yanukovych’s and Anatolii Hrytsenko’s supporters.

• Two thirds of Lviv residents are convinced that Lviv should transfer no more than 30% of its funds to the state budget. Two thirds of Lviv residents are convinced that Lviv should transfer no more than 30% of its funds to the state budget. According to 41.1%, the situation in Lviv is deteriorating. 43.9% believe that the situation in Lviv is not changing, while 10% say it is improving.
• Since the beginning of the year, the thesis that Lviv today primarily needs radical change has been strengthening. The share of supporters of this view has increased from 53.4% to 57.9%. 36.4% believe that at the moment Lviv needs stability more than change.
• Trust in A. Sadovyi has decreased since the beginning of the year from 44.3% to 39.3%. 49% do not trust the mayor, compared to 46% in December. 24.9% trust M. Kmit, while 49.4% do not trust the head of the Lviv Regional State Administration. Trust in the head of the regional council, M. Senyk, stands at 14.4%, while distrust is 61.4%.
• 21.1% of respondents are convinced that Lviv should not transfer any funds to the state budget. Another 22.6% think it should transfer only 10%, 23.6% a share of 30%. Only 11.9% believe the city should give half of its funds to the state treasury, and another 7.1% think it should give 70%.
• Under conditions of crisis, 21% of Lviv residents are not at all concerned about the city’s preparation for Euro 2012. In December 2008, this share was 16.3%. Those who are very concerned about preparations for Euro 2012 now account for 32% (previously 29.4%). 42.5% are somewhat concerned about preparations for the European Football Championship.
• 44.3% of Lviv residents do not believe that former judge Zvarych will be convicted for corruption. 32% believe that I. Zvarych will be convicted. 16.9% of respondents are undecided on this issue. According to 20.8% of respondents, it would be more appropriate to release former judge I. Zvarych in exchange for him revealing the names of high-ranking officials involved in corruption. At the same time, 61.5% are convinced that he should be convicted. 17.8% were unable to answer this question.
• In the elections to the Lviv City Council, the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda is leading with 19.3%. Also among the top three are the Yatseniuk Bloc (19%) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, whose support has fallen from 23.1% in December 2008 to 16.9%. These trends are mainly explained by the demand for new forces. In particular, 43.3% of surveyed Lviv residents expect the emergence in Lviv of a qualitatively new political force that would truly represent the interests of Lviv residents. 32% do not expect such a political force to appear.
• Close to passing into the city council are Our Ukraine (5.3%), the Party of Regions (3.6%), and the Civic Party Pora (2.6%). The share of those who intend to vote “against all” has increased over four months from 8.6% to 12.8%, while the number of those who are undecided has decreased from 10.8% to 7.4%.
• 92.6% of Lviv residents go to church on Easter to have their paskas blessed, and 45.9% observe the conditions of the Easter fast. 97.8% of city residents celebrate Easter, while only 1.9% do not. Only 5.1% do not have their paskas blessed on Easter. Almost two thirds of them are men, and almost half have higher or incomplete higher education. 40.4% of respondents do not observe the conditions of the Easter fast, with men and women represented almost equally. 13.8% were undecided on this question.

Oleksii Antypovych for “Expert Ukraine”

• The elections of deputies to the Ternopil Regional Council produced sensational results. They showed that a politician who relies on behind-the-scenes agreements can lose the trust of voters within a single month. Only four days after the elections, on 19 March, deputies of the new convocation of the Ternopil Regional Council gathered for a session. It took place despite the decision of the Kyiv District Administrative Court of 18 March banning the official publication of the election results. In addition, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc withdrew its deputies from the regional council and appealed to the прокуратура demanding that legality be ensured.
• In the new regional council, the number of Tymoshenko Bloc deputies turned out to be unexpectedly small — only 12. The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” received the largest number of seats (50 deputies). The Yedynyi Tsentr party secured 20 mandates, the Party of Regions 14. Another 11 deputies represent the Ukrainian People’s Party bloc, eight represent Our Ukraine, and five the Lytvyn Bloc.
• Despite the chaotic nature of the electoral process (the elections were canceled 12 days before the voting date and reinstated again one day before the vote) and the sensational nature of the results, the outcome of these local elections is indicative on a national scale. Although parliament decided to cancel the elections and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc tried to derail the vote, the elections took place. This should serve as a lesson for politicians: the issue of power must be decided at polling stations, not in courts or parliamentary back rooms. And if deputies decide to boycott elections, such a campaign must be launched at least three weeks before election day with appropriate information support. The Tymoshenko Bloc’s efforts to disrupt the elections were relatively successful only in the regional center, where turnout was record low. Many residents of the region never learned that the elections were being challenged and came to polling stations on the appointed day. Leaders of the Tymoshenko Bloc claim that one of the reasons for the high activity in rural polling stations was falsification by the regional administration. Most residents of Ternopil region think otherwise. When asked “Were there falsifications in the elections?”, 26% of voters answered no, 41% reported minor violations that could not seriously affect the results of the campaign, and only 20% said there were many cases of falsification, although two thirds of them did not participate in the elections and therefore could not have been witnesses to violations. At the same time, three quarters of respondents in our survey say they perceive the court lawsuits of the Tymoshenko Bloc as an attempt to cancel unfavorable voting results.
• Three Galician defeats of Tymoshenko
• The election campaign in Ternopil was short — only three months — and very dynamic. The Tymoshenko Bloc, which was the favorite and planned to fight for monopoly power in the region, suffered a crushing defeat. The battle for Ternopil may become decisive in choosing a strategy for the presidential campaign both for Yulia Tymoshenko and for her opponents. The decline in the rating of Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine, which began in 2006, surprises no one. The cooling of sympathy for the Tymoshenko Bloc is also not news. But the fall of Tymoshenko’s personal rating is a truly new trend. Back in January, the level of voter trust in the prime minister in the region was one and a half times higher than the rating of her party. In February, Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating fell from 24% to 17% and became equal to the party’s rating.
• There are several reasons for this decline. One is the impact of the economic crisis. Sociological surveys conducted in February by Rating Group show that 58% of residents of the region are convinced that Tymoshenko, as head of government, is incapable of overcoming the economic crisis, and 40% believe that she is not even trying to do so. The second reason is fatigue in Galicia from the Yushchenko–Tymoshenko confrontation: over the past year, two thirds of voters have worsened their attitude toward both the prime minister and the president. Thus, the image of a hardworking Yulia Tymoshenko, who is prevented from working by the head of state, has been almost destroyed. (Interestingly, 55% of respondents are convinced that if Yushchenko were not president and Tymoshenko remained prime minister, she would find other people to blame for her mistakes.) Finally, the third argument, very important for residents of Western Ukraine, is the prime minister’s pro-Russian foreign policy. Almost two thirds of those surveyed believe that over the past six months the Ukrainian prime minister has been moving closer to the Russian leadership. At the same time, the majority (69%) are convinced that it is Vladimir Putin, not Yulia Tymoshenko, who benefits from their mutual agreements, and only 18% believe that the Ukrainian prime minister benefits.
• These elections will long be associated with Tymoshenko’s defeat: a few days before them, the Tymoshenko Bloc managed to punish itself. Its loyal voters were disoriented by calls to boycott the campaign, yet the Bloc failed either to disrupt the elections or to remove itself from the ballots. As a result, the Tymoshenko Bloc reduced its own result by at least half.
• Now the time has come for Yulia Tymoshenko to make tough кадрові decisions. Local party members were the main initiators of these elections, seeking to put an end to the power of representatives of the presidential secretariat in the region. In the end, they proved unable to conduct the campaign, although they once planned to hold early mayoral elections in Ternopil at the same time, but this was stopped in Kyiv.
• The Ternopil lessons
• For Svoboda, these elections may open the road to the Verkhovna Rada. It is now obvious to everyone that, with similar voter support in other Galician regions, this force would be able to overcome the electoral threshold (unless, of course, it is suddenly raised to five or seven percent). Strangely enough, Svoboda’s victory plays into the hands of the Party of Regions and the Communists, who in parliamentary races will actively exploit the thesis of the threat of radical Ukrainian nationalism. This will bring them additional votes in the south-east.
• For Yedynyi Tsentr, these elections may not bring significant dividends, but supporters of Presidential Secretariat head Viktor Baloga are clearly not among the losers. The campaign showed that administrative resources work, as does the bet on non-ideological regional leaders who enjoy a high degree of voter trust. Therefore, changing the electoral law from proportional to majoritarian, or as a compromise moving to open lists, is a priority task for Yedynyi Tsentr. This is its only path to parliament. By and large, the strong result of Yedynyi Tsentr is not so much the merit of Viktor Baloga or Ihor Kryil, but primarily a reflection of the trust of regional residents in specific candidates from the party list. Incidentally, last week Kryil registered in parliament a draft Electoral Code that contains this very model.
• The result of the Party of Regions — almost ten percent — is unexpected and is rather the result of network electoral technologies than party campaigning. A high result in the northern districts of Ternopil region (as in the 2007 elections) was delivered by voters oriented toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Pochaiv Lavra is located in the region, and local clergy enjoy authority among residents of nearby villages and do not hide their positive attitude toward the Party of Regions. It is unlikely that the Party of Regions will be able to repeat the Ternopil result across all of Western Ukraine in parliamentary elections, although it may double its traditional two-to-three-percent rating there.
• The most important lesson from these elections should be learned by Yulia Tymoshenko. If the prime minister does not change her attitude toward Russia, does not change her rhetoric toward Viktor Yushchenko, and does not revise a government policy based on making many statements that are later not backed by concrete decisions, she may permanently lose the trust of voters in western regions of Ukraine.
• Although Svoboda came first in the party race in Ternopil region, its leader Oleh Tyahnybok is not the most popular politician in the region. That position belongs to Arsenii Yatseniuk, whose rating is about 30%. In terms of trust, he is twice as popular as both Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, not to mention Viktor Yanukovych.
• The participation in the Ternopil elections of a political force directly supported by the former speaker could have seriously influenced their outcome. It is possible that such a force might even have won the elections, since the potential electoral core of Arsenii Yatseniuk is located precisely in the west of the country. In him, as in Tyahnybok, voters see an alternative to the current politicians. However, the leader of the Front for Change did not enter the Ternopil battle.
• The March electoral campaign in Ternopil region became a challenge not only for politicians but for democracy as a whole. Its results are largely emotional and will soon be reinterpreted by both voters and politicians, which will affect nationwide ratings. These elections underscored the growing demand for new faces in Ukrainian politics and confirmed that campaigns must be conducted in the regions. They proved that the winner will be the one who bets on authoritative local leaders.

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• Only 16.9% believe that these lawsuits would aim to defend the lawful rights of citizens. Overall, 71.5% expect that political forces will challenge the election results in court, while 22.3% do not have such expectations. At the same time, 66.6% are convinced that the court decision to reinstate the elections to the Ternopil Regional Council was fair.
• 68% are convinced that fear of losing was the key reason behind the decision of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc to withdraw from the elections at the last moment. Only 10.9% think that the Bloc sought to save state budget funds in this way, while another 12.9% believe that it was protesting against the illegal nature of these elections. 67.3% believe that the decision of the Verkhovna Rada on 3 March to cancel the Ternopil elections, adopted by the votes of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Party of Regions, was illegal, while 20.4% are confident in its legitimacy.
• 58.3% of respondents think that the political forces that insisted on canceling these elections infringed on the constitutional right of citizens to choose, while 30.5% disagree with this. 58.3% of all respondents in Ternopil are confident that the elections were conducted honestly and democratically. Among those who came to the polling stations on 15 March, 71.1% are convinced that the elections were fair and democratic.
• 25.9% are confident that there were no falsifications in the elections, while 40.8% believe there were minor violations that could not significantly affect the election results. Among the 19.9% who think that there were significant falsifications in the elections to the regional council, two thirds did not take part in the elections. 10.2% of respondents intended to vote in the regional council elections but were convinced that the elections had been canceled.
• 33% said they voted on 15 March. 17% wanted to come to the elections but could not find the time. Only 36% had no intention of participating in the early elections. 38.3% of respondents knew whom they would vote for long before the elections, 22.6% decided during the last few weeks, 15.1% decided in the last week, and 22.9% made their decision on election day.
• The most important reason for their choice of a political force, according to 36% of respondents, was that it best defends Ukrainian interests. 19.4% chose a party based on the principle of “the lesser evil,” 14.9% because it is represented by professional managers who have proven their ability to effectively run the region, 14.3% expressed in this way a protest against another political force and/or politician, and 8.3% supported the leader of that force at the national level in this way.

• 7.2% of respondents think that the economic crisis in Ukraine will be overcome within the next six months, another 19.2% within the next year, and 38.7% in 2–3 years. On the other hand, 13.9% believe that the overcoming of the economic crisis will take no sooner than in 4–5 years. 5.2% are convinced that the economic crisis in the country will not be overcome at all. 15.7% were unable to answer this question.
• 32.7% think that today in Ukraine the economic crisis is felt more strongly than the political one (16.4%). At the same time, 41.8% of respondents believe that today Ukraine is experiencing both a political and an economic crisis. Only 1.3% do not feel any crisis. 7.8% were unable to answer this question.
• In overcoming the economic crisis in Ukraine, 63.4% of respondents rely on themselves, 18.5% on domestic business, 7.6% on assistance from other countries, and only 6.1% on the authorities. 4.4% were unable to answer this question.
• 56.5% think that in conditions of crisis the authorities most lack an understanding of the problems of ordinary citizens, 54.4% a respect for the law, 45.4% unity, and 35.2% common sense. One third believe that the authorities lack professionalism, and 27.1% believe they lack decisiveness.

• To the question “Under what conditions are you personally ready to take part in protest actions?” 37.8% of respondents answered that they are not ready to take part in protests under any circumstances. 16.2% could not answer this question.
• At the same time, 35.6% of respondents (the largest share) are ready to take part in protest actions if there are delays in salary or pension payments, 27.1% — if they (or members of their families) are dismissed from work, and 22.2% — in the case of violations of their rights and freedoms. Only 15.4% are ready to take part in protests in the event of early parliamentary elections, and 4.3% — in the event of early presidential elections.
• 61.3% would not agree to take part in a protest action against the current authorities even if they were offered financial compensation. 19.1% are ready to participate in a protest action against the authorities for money. 19.6% were undecided on this question.

• 48.9% of respondents believe that the issue of reforming the Constitution of Ukraine is not timely this year, and only 23.8% are convinced that it is relevant this year. 27.3% could not answer this question.
• At the same time, 63.4% are confident that amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine should be approved only by a nationwide referendum, 12.1% — by a vote in the Verkhovna Rada, 2.9% — by the signature of the President, 1.2% — by the signature of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. 18.7% were undecided on this issue.
• 47.3% of respondents do not support calling early elections to the Verkhovna Rada, 36.3% support them, and 16.4% are undecided.
• At the same time, 52.7% support calling early presidential elections, while 35.6% do not support them. 11.7% are undecided.
• Respondents evaluate the work of V. Lytvyn as Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada the most positively (25.1%), and the work of V. Stelmakh as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine the least positively (6.8%).
• 72.7% of respondents negatively evaluate the work of V. Yushchenko as President, and 68.8% negatively evaluate the work of Y. Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. Slightly more respondents evaluate V. Yushchenko’s work as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces positively (15.4%) than his work as President of Ukraine (12.3%).
• A quarter of respondents know nothing about the activity of R. Bohatyriova in the position of Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. At the same time, 12.2% evaluate her work positively, and 42.8% negatively.
• 9.7% positively evaluate the work of O. Medvedko as Prosecutor General, and 62.3% negatively.

Party of Regions and Lytvyn Bloc gained the most in March

• Compared to February, the ratings of the leading force — the Party of Regions — increased slightly (from 19.4% to 21.2%), as did the ratings of the Lytvyn Bloc — from 5.5% to 7.4%, moving it into fifth place.
  The second highest level of support belongs to BYuT (18.5%).
  The Yatseniuk Bloc is third (9.4%) and is ahead of the Communist Party of Ukraine (8.1%).
• Support for Our Ukraine and Svoboda is close to the 3% electoral threshold.
  The share of respondents who support no party or have not decided decreased in March to 14.8% and 9.6%, respectively.

Yanukovych, Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk remain the leaders in the presidential race

• Viktor Yanukovych remains first in the presidential rating (20.1%).
  The top three also includes Yuliya Tymoshenko (16.8%) and Arseniy Yatseniuk (12.2%), whose ratings remained relatively stable.
• Over the past month, Volodymyr Lytvyn strengthened his position somewhat (7.1%), placing him in fourth place.
  All other candidates have support below 5%.