Press releases

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 30-31, 2022 shows that 78% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 11% disagreed, while another 11% could not make an assessment. The assessment of this direction as the right one continues to prevail in all the regions of Ukraine and among all the age groups. 

• 95% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack, but the confidence in the quick victory “over a few weeks” has slightly decreased: from 47% to 35%. Instead, the shares of the answers “several months” and “six months to a year” increased. 14% of the respondents could not answer this question.

• The support for NATO accession continues to decline. In the first days of the war, the support for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance increased from 62% to 76%. After the first week of the war, this support decreased to 72%, and at the end of March, it equals 68%, i.e., it is approaching the pre-war levels.

• At the same time, the support for EU accession is growing. In the first days of the war, it increased from 68% to 86%, then its growth continued, and as of the end of March, 91% support Ukraine’s membership in the EU – an absolute record over all the years of our surveys.

• At the same time, the majority of the respondents (56%) are convinced that Ukraine will become a member of the European Union in one or two years, while 23% believe it will happen in five years. Over the last month, the share of those who believe that Ukraine will join the EU in the very short term decreased slightly (from 61% to 56%), and the share of those who believe Ukraine will join the EU in five years increased (from 13% to 23%).

   
• Over the last decade, there has been a steady growth in the number of those who consider Ukrainian their mother tongue: from 57% in 2012 to 76% in 2022. The share of the Russian language has decreased from 42% to 20% over the 10 years. Several trends should be pointed out in this dynamic. The first one is that significant changes in language self-identification took place between 2012 and 2016. One of the key reasons was a) the reaction of Ukrainian society to the experiments of the then government in the language policy; b) the events of the Revolution of Dignity; and c) Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and the temporary occupation of Crimea and some territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The second trend is that the positive dynamics in the self-identification took place due to the change in the attitudes towards the Ukrainian language in the Center, as well as in the South and East of Ukraine.
   
• At the same time, the practical aspect of this issue is somewhat different: the language self-identification and the everyday language are two different areas. We can confirm the steady decrease of the Russian-speaking segment of Ukrainians: in 2012, there were about 40% of such respondents, at the end of 2021, 26%, and at the beginning of the war, 18%. The Russian speakers instead “shift” into the segment of “bilingual speakers” (from 15% to 32%). The number of those who constantly use only Ukrainian at home has increased slightly from 44% to 48%.
   
• The transition to another language of communication is not a one-time event and requires some adaptation. What is important today is that two thirds of those who use both Ukrainian and Russian languages in their everyday life are ready to switch exclusively to Ukrainian soon. Among the Russian speaking respondents, these respondents comprise one third.
   
• Unprecedented unity of Ukrainian society during the war had a dramatic impact on the attitudes to the status of the languages: today, the absolute majority (83%) support Ukrainian being the only state language in Ukraine. This opinion dominates in all macro regions and in all age and language groups. On the other hand, almost a quarter of Ukrainians supported granting Russian the status of the state language before the war, and today, it is only 7%. In peacetime, residents of the South and East of Ukraine had traditionally advocated for granting Russian the status of the state language. But even in these regions, the share of such respondents was only one third, and today this share has almost halved.
   
• Today, the data suggest that language is more of a regional feature than a way of thinking. For example, in December 2021, 65% of bilingual speakers and half of those who speak Russian considered Russia an aggressor. At the same time, in the Ukrainian-speaking segment, one in ten had pro-Russian views. The sympathy to Russia was determined not so much by the language of communication as by political views and the influence of propaganda and was associated with the support for pro-Russian parties (“The Opposition Platform — For Life”, “Nashi” and Shariy’s party).
   
• Today, the majority (67%) believe that there are no issues between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. 19% believe that the language issue exists, but it is not that important. Only 12% believe that this issue is a threat to domestic security. It is important that the statements about the existence of the language problems are more prevalent not among the Russian-speaking population, but in the western regions, where Ukrainian dominates in all areas. Importantly, according to our previous survey, only 2% of Ukrainians believe that Russia came to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. This myth was not accepted by Ukrainians.

Summing up, we can make the following conclusions:

   
1. The language self-identification of Ukrainians is growing steadily. The war, being a challenge for the whole society, will only accelerate this process. Today, the Ukrainian language is only strengthening as one of the cornerstones of Ukrainian statehood, and the lines of opposition on this issue are disappearing.
   
2. The transition to Ukrainian in everyday life is happening in an evolutionary manner. The destruction of the myth of the “brotherly people” and the isolation of Russia from the world’s cultural and informational context will only contribute to its acceleration in the Ukrainian society.
   
3. The “language issue” and the attempts to initiate arguments around this topic are not supported by the majority of the population. This problem is purely political and partly local. Nevertheless, most citizens, regardless of their language of communication, realize that we have one common enemy: Russia, which is trying to destroy our statehood. The Russian-speaking cities of the East are the most affected by the aggressor's actions. Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking people are fighting in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and they are united by the common goal: the victory over the enemy. After the victory, we can expect continued changes in the language self-identification of the citizens and the expansion of the use of the Ukrainian language in all areas.

 • The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 19, 2022 shows that two thirds of the citizens of Ukraine hope that it will be possible to rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy in less than five years after the war. 13% think it is possible to do over a year, while 51% think it will take up to five years. 18% believe that rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy will take up to ten years. There are not many skeptics who believe that the recovery will take more than ten years: only 10%. The younger respondents and the residents of the western regions of Ukraine are more optimistic about the rapid reconstruction. Those who had to leave their cities also demonstrate optimism regarding the recovery process.

• 61% of the respondents are ready to personally contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine's infrastructure: financially or by participating in construction works. A third of the respondents would like to contribute to the rebuilding of the infrastructure, but cannot. Only 5% believe that this is solely the responsibility of the government, not the people. More than 70% of men are ready to join the reconstruction compared to the half of women. Those who have left their city at the moment are more willing to join the reconstruction.

• 90% are convinced that it is Russia that must compensate all the expenses for the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. 20% believe that international organizations or European countries should invest in it, 12%, that the United States should do this, and 10%, that Ukraine itself should do this.

• Among those who previously had a job, 45% continue to work during the war, including 22% who are working as usual, 21% who are working part time or remotely, and 2% who even got a new job. 53% of the respondents who were employed before the war are currently unemployed. In the western regions, there is a bigger share of those who did not lose their jobs (47%). In the South, they comprise about 40%, and in the East, less than 25%. About half of the respondents who remained in their cities are employed. Among those who left their cities, about a third keep working, with 5% of them having already found a new job. There are also slightly more employees who work as usual among the senior workers; many of them may be working in the critical infrastructure.

• The economic situation of the families of 18% of the respondents did not change during the war. For 28%, it rather got worse, and for 52%, got definitely worse. The economic situation of the residents of the eastern regions, as well as of those who lost their jobs since the war started, has deteriorated the most. On the other hand, more than a quarter of retirees say their economic situation has not changed, probably because they continue to receive benefits from the government.

• In case they lose their source of income, 53% of the respondents have savings for several months or more: for 25%, their savings will be enough for up to 2 months, for 13%, up to three months, and for 15%, up to six months or more.

• 40% of the respondents have savings for less than a month, but this share is smaller compared to the quarantine crisis of 2020. Back then, the share of those who had limited savings was 55%. The younger respondents have bigger savings than the older ones. The situation is also better in the western and central oblasts, as the residents of the eastern and southern regions may have already lost their jobs and started spending their savings more intensively.

• One out of two respondents say they have a proactive position toward their own lives at the moment. One out of five say that their life position is neither active nor passive. A third of the respondents said that they have virtually no effect on their lives now. The younger respondents, men, and those who continue working have proactive attitude in their lives more often.

• 43% of the population feel aggressive at the moment, while 38% do not. The rest of the emotions are experienced by the minority of the respondents: 27% feel pessimistic, while 47% do not, and 31% feel despaired, while 53% do not. Only 17% say they feel apathetic, while 66% do not.

• Apathy, despair and pessimism are more pronounced among the residents of the East of Ukraine, while aggression, on the contrary, is more present in the Center and in the West. Women are more likely than men to experience negative emotions except aggression, which is more pronounced among men. In addition, senior respondents are experiencing negative emotions more at the moment.

• Those who lost their jobs during the war feel apathy, despair and pessimism more than those who continue working now.

• Also, those who believe they have no impact on anything at the moment experience more pronounced negative emotions than people with a proactive attitude.

• Interestingly, those whose homes have been damaged do not experience more negative emotions than others. But those who do not know what happened to their homes experience more pronounced of despair, apathy, and pessimism because of the uncertainty.

• Those who had to part with their family or partner due to the war, as well as those who communicate with their relatives and friends less frequently experience more negative emotions. 

• 44% of the respondents said they had to temporarily separate from their family or partner because of the war. The highest shares of such people are in the eastern and central regions and among young people.

• 19% of the respondents (adults) said they had to leave their city or village because of the war. The highest share of such respondents is in the East of Ukraine (35%). In the Center and South of Ukraine, one in five or six was forced to leave their place of residence, and in the West, almost one in ten. About a third of young respondents left their city or village.

• One out of four people who have left their homes do not know what is the condition of their house now. The houses of one in five such respondents are either destroyed or damaged. Nevertheless, 58% of those who left their homes said their homes are intact. 93% of those who left their homes want to return there. Only 5% said they did not intend to go back.

• 60% believe in God and do not doubt His existence. 14% believe in God, but have some doubts, while 17% do not believe in God, but believe in other higher powers. Only 6% identify themselves as total atheists. Compared to the pre-war period, the share of those who believe in God and do not doubt His existence has not changed. The highest level of religiosity is traditionally observed in the West of the country, among the elderly and among women.

• About half of the respondents intend either to travel around the country or to obtain additional education or new knowledge after the war. A third want to learn a new profession, a quarter want to start a business or to get a pet, and one in five are ready to change their job. At the same time, only 8% want to change their place of residence within Ukraine, and only 3% want to leave Ukraine.

• The respondents most often communicate with their family members and close ones (72%, constantly, and 18%, often). 48% constantly communicate with their friends, while 23% communicate with them often. 38% constantly talk to neighbors, and 17%, often. 28% communicate constantly with colleagues at work, and 16%, often. Interestingly, compared to the first lockdown in 2020, despite the difficult times, the respondents are much more active in communication with family and friends.

• The frequency of communication with relatives remains virtually the same regardless of the region and age. The residents of the East and the West as well as the youngest and the oldest ones speak with their friends slightly more often. The youngest respondents and those who have left their cities speak with their neighbors least often. 

• Compared to the pre-war times, the role of the TV, the groups and channels in messengers, the radio, as well as the one of relatives and friends as the sources of information about the events in Ukraine has increased. The TV is a source of information about the events in Ukraine for 62% of the respondents, internet sites, for 47%, groups and channels in messengers, for 42%, social networks, for 37%, relatives and acquaintances, for 28%, and regional television and radio, for 15% to 16%.

• The respondents in the West and in the Center of Ukraine use the TV and the radio more frequently. In the East, on the other hand, the frequency of hearing news from relatives and acquaintances has increased.

 • The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 18, 2022 shows that 77% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. Only 14% disagreed with this, and 10% could not make an assessment. The assessment of the direction as a positive one dominates in all the regions and among all the age groups.

• Belief in victory remains at its highest level: 93% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. Confidence in victory prevails in all the regions of the country.

• Half (47%) of respondents hope that Ukraine will be able to win the war with Russia over the next few weeks. A quarter (23%) believe that the war will last several months. Only 12% think that the war will end in six months or more. There are almost no people who do not believe in victory at all. 17% were not able to answer this question.

• Inflation and rising prices (45%) as well as fuel shortages (38%) are the threats that Ukrainians believe are likely to arise over the next few months. Depreciation of the hryvnia and disruption of the sowing campaign are believed to be likely by no more than a quarter of respondents, and hunger, by 13%. The residents of the eastern regions are slightly more afraid of these threats than the residents of other macro regions.

• The vast majority of the respondents (82%) consider the threat of the country being split unlikely. This confidence has increased significantly due to the public cohesion during the war.

• According to Ukrainians, Poland, Lithuania, the United Kingdom and the United States are the friendliest countries to Ukraine today. The Czech Republic, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Turkey, France and Slovenia are also considered friendly. About half of the respondents consider Hungary, Georgia and Germany to be friendly countries, while a third of the respondents consider these countries neutral.

• China is now mostly considered by Ukrainians to be a neutral country. However, Russia (98%) and Belarus (84%) are seen by Ukrainians as hostile countries. Attitudes toward these countries have deteriorated significantly since they started the war against Ukraine. The attitude of Ukrainians towards China has also slightly deteriorated. Almost nothing has changed in regards to Germany, Hungary, and Georgia. The attitude to Turkey, France, Poland, Lithuania, the UK, the USA and Romania has improved.

• This change of attitudes has been accompanied by their regional consolidation. While previously, the attitudes of the residents of the East and South of Ukraine were more neutral towards the United States and other Western countries, now these countries are seen as friendly equally by the residents of all macro regions. The same applies to hostile countries: Russia and Belarus are considered hostile countries by the vast majority of Ukrainians, regardless of place of residence.

• 74% of the respondents support Zelenskyy's direct talks with Putin on ending the war, while a quarter of the respondents do not. There are slightly more supporters of the direct talks in the South and in the East of Ukraine, but in other regions they comprise the majority as well.

• At the same time, signing a temporary truce with Russia without withdrawing its troops from Ukraine is viewed as unacceptable by Ukrainians (89%).

• The support for the creation of a military and political union of Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom increased from 61% in January to 85%. Today, the support for such an alliance is higher than the support for Ukraine's membership in NATO (72%).

• 44% of the respondents believe that Ukraine should join NATO, while 42% believe that Ukraine should continue to cooperate with NATO, but should not become its member. More people support NATO cooperation outside of the Alliance than before the war, a figure that has increased at the expense of those who previously said there was no need to cooperate with NATO at all (currently it’s only 7%). Most proponents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO are in the West and Center of Ukraine. Those in the South and the East of Ukraine are more supportive of the cooperation with NATO outside of the membership.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 12-13, 2022, shows that 76% of the respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction. This is the highest share in the history of our measurements. Only 15% disagreed with this and 10% could not to give their estimate. The assessment of the direction as the right one dominates in all the regions and among all the age groups.

• The self-esteem of Ukrainians significantly increased during the war. Now, most respondents see Ukraine either among the “leaders” (34%) or among the “average ones” (42%) compared to European countries, while as recently as two months ago, most placed Ukraine among the “outsiders”. At the same time, 63% see Ukraine as a “leader” among the countries of the former Soviet Union, while as recently as two months ago they saw the country mainly among the “average ones”.

• The vast majority of the respondents support the initiative to give cities the status of a hero city (93%) and rename the streets in honor of the Heroes who are currently defending Ukraine (92%). Maximum support for such an initiative is observed in all the regions of Ukraine. It presents a unique chance to create a new history through the new heroes who unite the nation.

• 56% of the respondents believe that the main goal of Russia's invasion is the complete destruction of the Ukrainian people, and this view dominates in all the regions of Ukraine. Another half believe that the target of the attack is the occupation of Ukraine and its annexation by Russia. Only 15% to 17% think that Russia is pursuing the goal of changing Ukraine's political course or preventing the deployment of NATO bases. 10% believe that Russia’s motive is the destruction of military infrastructure, while 5%, that it’s provoking NATO to a war. Those who believe that the Russian invasion was aimed at protecting Russian speakers comprise only 2%.

• The majority (64%) of the respondents consider looking for compromises at the negotiations that involve other countries as a real way to end the war. Almost a third of the respondents believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiations and fight until the liberation of all its territories, while only 1% believe that Ukraine should agree to most of Russia’s demands. 

• Ukrainians are not ready to give up either the Crimea or Donbas: most believe that Ukraine should use all the opportunities to return the occupied territories of Donbas (86%) and the Crimea (80%). Residents of all the regions believe so, and this share is now higher than in the pre-war times.

• A half of the surveyed Ukrainians estimate the probability that Russia will carry out a military attack on one of the European countries as a high (25%) or medium (26%) one. Only 22% deny such a possibility at all: it is primarily elderly people.

• The support for Ukraine's accession to NATO has decreased slightly from a record 76% to 72% over the last two weeks. The main reason is the lack of the decision to close the sky over Ukraine, which almost 90% of Ukrainians demanded. 

• According to the survey conducted by the Sociological Group "Rating" on March 8-9, 91% of the respondents feel hope when thinking about the situation in Ukraine. Only 6% feel hopeless. The highest level of hope was recorded in all the regions. 

• 57% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to win the war with Russia over the coming weeks: 18% think that we will win in a week, while 39%, in a few weeks. 18% of the respondents believe that the war will last several months, and only 9% think that the war will end in six months or more. There are almost none of those who do not believe in Ukraine’s victory at all. 16% could not answer this question. The residents of the Western region are the most optimistic. Still, in other oblasts, the majority also believe that the war will not last long.

• 92% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. This share is increasing almost on a daily basis. Today, only 6% do not have such confidence. The belief in Ukraine’s victory prevails in all the regions of the country.

• More than 80% answered that they are helping in the defense of Ukraine in some way. In particular, now 39% of the respondents are helping people and the army as volunteers, 37% help financially. Also, 18% participate in the informational resistance, and 12% continue to work in the critical infrastructure. 10% of Ukrainians said they participate in the territorial defense. Only 19% said they are not able to help the country now. More often, it's elderly people. However, even among the elderly people, most are involved in the resistance at the moment.

• The vast majority (97%) of respondents plan to stay in Ukraine in the nearest future.

• 63% support the idea of severing ties between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church. Only 10% do not support this idea. Another 18% said they did not care, and 9% could not answer. Among the members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, more than half also support severing ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, a quarter say they are indifferent and only 13% oppose the severance.

• 40% of Ukrainians believe that most Russians support the war against Ukraine. A quarter of the respondents believe that every second person in Russia supports the war, and a quarter think that supporters of the war are in the minority there.

• 42% believe that there can be no discussion of ever restoring friendly relations between Ukrainians and Russians. 22% think that it is possible in 20-30 years after the war, 18%, that it is possible in 10-15 years, and only 12% believe that the restoration of friendship is possible in a couple of years after the war. Residents of the South and the East and those who have relatives in Russia believe in the restoration of those relations a little more. But even among them, more than a third do not believe in the return of friendship between the two nations.

• The survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on March 8-9, 2022, showed that Ukrainians consider the diplomatic (48%) and humanitarian (47%) support for Ukraine from Western partners to be relatively sufficient.

• The types of support that they consider rather insufficient are financial support (39%, sufficient; 45%, insufficient) and economic sanctions against Russia (32%, sufficient; 62%, insufficient).

• Military assistance to Ukraine was rated the worst: only 29% consider it sufficient, while 62% consider it insufficient. From the regional point of view, the various types of support are rated the worst in the South and in the East, and relatively better, in the West and in the Center. 

• Military assistance to Ukraine is the type of international support that Ukrainians expect the most (63%). Regarding this assistance, the respondents demand “closing the sky” (89%) and providing weapons (47%). In addition, one fourth of the respondents consider military medical care and foreign volunteers necessary, while one in five consider it necessary that Ukraine is provided with equipment (walkie-talkies, thermal imagers, etc.), protective vests and helmets.

• Although the majority (50%) believe that the “sky” over Ukraine will be “closed”, only 19% believe that NATO will make such a decision in the nearest future, while 31% think that it will happen later. 43% do not believe that the Western countries will take such a step.

• 79% believe that NATO countries’ delay with “closing the sky” is due to the fear of a direct war with Russia. 12% believe that NATO countries do not want to spoil relations with Russia. 

• At the same time, the vast majority of respondents (90%) believe that Ukraine should keep up the pressure on NATO to “close the sky”.

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group, 55% of respondents believe that only the Russian authorities are to blame for the war against Ukraine. Another 38% place responsibility on both the authorities and the people of the Russian Federation (RF).

• Regarding Belarus, 70% place the blame for the invasion exclusively on the Belarusian authorities, and only 24% on both the authorities and the people of Belarus.

• In a regional breakdown, relatively fewer people in the southern and eastern regions blame both the people and the authorities of Russia for starting the war against Ukraine, placing the blame solely on the RF leadership. As for Belarus, the overwhelming majority across all macro-regions (from 60% in the West to 80% in the East) place the blame for the invasion only on the leadership of that state.

• According to the survey conducted by the Sociological group "Rating" on March 1, 90% of the respondents feel hope when they think about the situation in Ukraine. Only 5% experience disappointment. Compared to the pre-war times, the share of those who feel hope has tripled. The record high level of hope is observed in almost all the regions of Ukraine.

• 88% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will be able to repel Russia's attack. This number is increasing almost daily. Today, only 10% are not confident in this. The belief in Ukraine’s victory prevails in all regions of the country.

• 98% of the respondents support the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 93% support the activities of the President, and 84% support the actions of local mayors.

• 80% of the respondents said they were ready to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine with weapons in hand. Compared to the pre-war times, this figure has significantly increased (it was 59% in 2020). The highest level of readiness is observed in the West and in the Center, while a slightly lower one, in the South and in the East. But even in the South-Eastern regions, the readiness to fight for the Motherland is extremely high (almost 80% in the South and almost 60% in the East).

• The support for Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO is the highest over the history of our surveys: 86% support accession to the EU and 76% support joining NATO. Compared to the pre-war period, the support for EU and NATO accession has increased by more than 20 percentage points. This positive dynamics took place due to the growing support for accession to the Western structures among the population of the South and the East. In terms of age, there is unanimous support for Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO in all the categories.

• 61% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU in the nearest future (within 1 or 2 years). 13% believe that our country will become a member of the EU in 5 years, while 6% believe it will happen later. 17% are not sure in their estimates. Only 4% do not believe that Ukraine will become a member of the EU. Compared to last year, the share of those who do not believe in Ukraine's European integration has decreased significantly (it was 26% in November 2021).

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group, 70% of respondents are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel the attack of the Russian occupiers, while 16% are not confident. The level of belief in our own Armed Forces has increased significantly over the past week. No region shows a prevalence of pessimistic sentiments. The highest level of confidence in the Armed Forces is in the West and Center (75-78%). It is relatively lower in the South and East (64-66%).

• 91% of Ukrainians support the actions of President Zelenskyy. 6% do not support them, and 3% were unable to answer. Importantly, support for the actions of the President of Ukraine has tripled since December 2021.

• An extremely high level of support for Zelenskyy is observed in all regions of the country: over 90% in the West and Center, and over 80% in the East and South.

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group on February 11-18, 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy leads the confidence rating for politicians: 41% of respondents trust him, while 57% distrust him. Volodymyr Groysman is trusted by 35% and distrusted by 55%. Vitali Klitschko is trusted by 34% and distrusted by 57%. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 32%, distrusted by 38%, and 25% are unfamiliar with him. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 28% and distrusted by 70%. Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 26% and distrusted by 72%. Arseniy Yatsenyuk is trusted by 24% and distrusted by 72%. Ihor Smeshko is trusted by 24%, distrusted by 34%, and 37% are unfamiliar with him. Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 22% and distrusted by 62%. Arsen Avakov is trusted by 22% and distrusted by 66%. Oleh Lyashko is trusted by 18% and distrusted by 76%.

• The political party rating is led by the 'Servant of the People' party, which is ready to be supported by 19.6% of those who will vote and have decided on their choice. Following are the 'European Solidarity' party with 17.7%, 'Batkivshchyna' with 11.5%, and 'Opposition Platform – For Life' with 9.5%. The 'Strength and Honor' party is ready to be supported by 7.6%, Razumkov's 'Smart Politics' party by 6.7%, Murayev's 'Nashi' party by 5.4%, the 'Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman' party by 4.8%, the Radical Party by 3.9%, All-Ukrainian Union 'Svoboda' by 3.2%, People's Front (Yatsenyuk, Avakov) by 3.2%, and 'UDAR of Vitali Klitschko' by 3.1%.

• V. Zelenskyy is the leader of the presidential rating, whom 24.6% of those who have decided on their choice and intend to vote are ready to support. P. Poroshenko is supported by 18.0%, Y. Tymoshenko by 9.5%, and Y. Boyko by 8.3%. I. Smeshko is ready to receive 7.5% of the votes, D. Razumkov 6.9%, Y. Murayev 5.9%, V. Groysman 5.3%, O. Lyashko 2.9%, and A. Yatsenyuk 2.2%. The ratings of other candidates do not exceed 2%.

• According to a survey conducted by the 'Rating' Sociological Group on February 16-17, 2022, 19% of respondents assess the probability of a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine by Russia as high, 33% as medium, and 20% as low, while 25% believe there is no threat at all. The number of respondents who see no threat differs significantly by region: from 14% in the West to 42% in the East of the country.

• At the same time, the majority of respondents (64%) are confident that Ukraine will be able to repel the attack if a Russian invasion occurs. One-third are not confident in this. The number of respondents who believe in their own Armed Forces prevails in all regions of the country (relatively higher in the West and Center, relatively lower in the East).

• Thus, over the last few days, the assessment of the threat's probability as high decreased from 28% to 19%. At the same time, citizens' confidence that Ukraine will be able to repel the attack if a Russian invasion occurs increased from 58% to 64%.

• According to a poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on 16-17 February 2022, 62% support Ukraine's accession to NATO. Thirty percent have a negative attitude towards this initiative. Over the past two months, support for joining the North Atlantic Alliance has grown (at the end of 2021, 55-58% of respondents supported accession). Since observations began in 2014, this is the highest level of positive perception of Ukraine's integration into NATO.
• Sixty-eight per cent support accession to the European Union, while 24% do not. As with NATO, support for EU accession has grown over the past two months and reached its highest level since surveys began in 2013.
• The idea of Ukraine's integration into Western structures enjoys greater support among respondents in the West and Centre, and less in the South. In the East, the number of supporters of NATO membership is lower than the number of opponents. With regard to the EU, there is a parity between opponents and supporters in the eastern regions. Over the past few years, there have been no significant differences in the assessment of Ukraine's foreign policy vector among age groups. However, in the electoral segments, there is a noticeable predominance of rejection of Ukraine's accession to Western structures among voters of the Opposition Platform – For Life party and Murayev's Our Party. Among voters of other political forces, the overwhelming majority are in favour of Ukraine's accession to both the EU and NATO.
• 55% of respondents believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the Minsk agreements if Russia recognises the so-called DPR and LPR as independent states. 24% are against this, while 21% are undecided. A relative majority of the population, regardless of region of residence and age, supports withdrawal from the Minsk agreements under the conditions mentioned above. Only in electoral terms is there a noticeable difference in the assessment of such a development: a relative majority of respondents who support the Opposition Platform – For Life and Nashi parties are either against withdrawing from the Minsk agreements or are undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 43% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine's international policy is moving in the right direction, 46% believe it is moving in the wrong direction, and 11% were unable to answer. At the same time, regarding the situation in the country as a whole, 67% believe that it is moving in the wrong direction, 25% believe it is moving in the right direction, and 7% are undecided.
• Half of Ukrainians are confident that the recent visits of international leaders to Ukraine are beneficial for the country, while a quarter believe that they have no impact. At the same time, only 17% think that such visits are more likely to harm Ukraine.
• About 60% of respondents believe that the US and the UK are defending Ukraine's interests in the Donbas negotiations, while a third believe that these countries have a neutral position.  
• Fifty-five per cent of respondents believe that the OSCE takes a neutral position in the negotiation process, 28% believe that it defends Ukraine's interests, and 5% believe that it defends Russia's interests.  
• 58% of respondents believe that France has a neutral position, 26% believe it defends Ukraine's interests, and 8% believe it defends Russia's interests.  
• 69% of respondents believe that Germany has a neutral position, 13% believe it defends Ukraine's interests, and 13% believe it defends Russia's interests.
• 67% of respondents said they were superficially familiar with the content of the Minsk agreements, and only 12% said they were very familiar with their content. One in five is completely unfamiliar with the content of the agreements, although this figure has fallen over the last four years from 39% to 21%.  
• Most respondents believe that Ukraine should revise the Minsk agreements and sign new ones (63%), and this figure is increasing. Only 11% believe that Ukraine should fulfil all the requirements, while 18% believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiation process altogether.  
• Most Ukrainians surveyed blame Russia for the failure of the Minsk agreements (57%), while 10% blame representatives of the so-called LNR and DNR, and only 12% blame Ukraine. 12% were unable to say who was to blame.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi currently leads the presidential ranking, with 24.6% support among those who intend to vote and have already made their choice. He is followed by Petro Poroshenko – 16.8%, Yulia Tymoshenko – 9.9%, and Yurii Boiko – 8.3%.
  Yevhen Murayev is supported by 6.9%, Ihor Smeshko – 6.6%, Dmytro Razumkov – 6.2%, Volodymyr Groysman – 5.7%, Oleh Liashko – 3.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed 3%. Compared to the previous wave, support for Zelenskyi has slightly increased, support for Boiko has somewhat decreased, while support levels for other candidates have remained nearly unchanged.
• Petro Poroshenko continues to top the anti-rating: 43% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.Boiko is rejected by about 36%, Tymoshenko and Zelenskyi — by 33% each, Liashko — 23%, Klychko and Murayev — 20% each, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok — 15%, Groysman — 13%.
• The Servant of the People party is currently supported by 18.3% of those who intend to vote and have already made their choice, while European Solidarity stands at 17.1%. Batkivshchyna is supported by 10.8%, and the Opposition Platform – For Life receives 9.7%. Razumkov’s “Smart Politics” has 5.9%, Murayev’s “Nashi” holds 5.5%. Prytula’s “24 August” is supported by 5.3%, Strength and Honor by 5.2%, the Radical Party by 4.7%, and Groysman’s Ukrainian Strategy by 4.0%. Sharii’s Party receives 3.4%, while UDAR of Vitalii Klychko and Svoboda each hold 2.8%. Support for all other political forces does not exceed 2%.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group on 21-23 January 2022, 61% support the idea of creating a military-political alliance between Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom. 21% have a negative attitude towards this initiative, while 12% are indifferent.
• In regional terms, the idea of creating such an alliance enjoys the greatest support among residents of the western and central regions, as well as Kyiv (support levels ranging from 65% to 76%).  Residents of the southern regions (51% support, 31% do not support) and eastern regions (40% support, 38% do not support) are somewhat less enthusiastic about this initiative.  
• Among supporters of political parties, the most vocal opponents of this initiative are supporters of the Opposition Platform – For Life party (62% do not support), Shariy's party (67% do not support) and Murayev's party (68% do not support). Among voters of other parties, the number of those who support such an initiative significantly outweighs the number of its opponents. The idea of creating a military-political alliance between Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom enjoys the greatest support among voters of the European Solidarity, Freedom and Strength and Honour parties (support level over 80%).

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, Chernihiv residents assess the state of affairs at the local level much more positively than at the national level. Only 20% of respondents believe that the country is moving in the right direction, while 71% believe the opposite. As for the city, 80% believe that things are moving in the right direction, while only 13% believe the opposite.
• The vast majority (94%) believe that the situation in the city has improved during Vladislav Atroshenko's tenure as mayor. Only 2% of respondents believe the opposite.  
• Almost 80% are satisfied with the activities of Chernihiv Mayor Vladislav Atroshenko, while 11% are dissatisfied. 70% are satisfied with the activities of the city council, while 18% are dissatisfied.  
• Sixty-five per cent are satisfied with the activities of the city's public utilities, while 34% are dissatisfied. Fifty-six per cent are satisfied with the work of educational institutions, 23% are dissatisfied, and 23% were unable to evaluate them. 52% rated the work of public transport positively, while 36% rated it negatively. 52% rated the work of the police positively, while 33% rated it negatively. 48% rated the work of medical institutions positively, while 45% rated it negatively.
• In the ranking of candidates for mayor, Vladislav Atroshenko is the clear favourite among city residents (83.5% among those who have made up their minds and intend to vote). Other candidates are supported by no more than 4% of respondents.  
• The leader among the parties in the city council elections is the Ridny Dim party (62.1% among those who have made up their minds and intend to vote). The European Solidarity party is supported by 7.7%, the Servant of the People party by 6.3%, the Opposition Platform – For Life party by 5.2%, the Fatherland party by 5.1%, the Radical Party by 4.9%, Our Land – 4.3%. The ratings of other political forces are less than 2%.
• Among local politicians, respondents have the most positive attitude towards Vladislav Atroshenko (88% positive, 11% negative). Oleksandr Lomako is viewed positively by 50%, negatively by 14%, and 28% do not know him. Vyacheslav Chaus is viewed positively by 24%, negatively by 17%, and 44% do not know him. 21% have a positive opinion of Oleksandr Sokolov, 68% have a negative opinion.
• 67% have heard about the searches conducted by law enforcement agencies in the departments of the city council and municipal enterprises of Chernihiv (28% have heard a lot, 39% have heard something). A third know nothing about it. 55% believe that such actions by law enforcement agencies are more likely to be pressure on local authorities, while 32% believe it is a fight against corruption. Among those who are well informed about the searches, two-thirds are convinced that this is pressure on local authorities.
• Almost 80% said that their attitude towards Mayor Vladislav Atroshenko had not changed after the aforementioned actions by law enforcement agencies against municipal enterprises and departments of the Chernihiv City Council. Only 4% of respondents said their attitude had worsened.  
• 42% of city residents are convinced that there is a conflict between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko. 37% think that there is no conflict. Among those who believe that such a conflict exists, 57% support the mayor and 8% support the president. One-third do not support either of them.

Plans and emotions for the year

• According to the results of the final annual online survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, one-third of Ukrainians were able to realise all or most of their plans in 2021. Another half managed to partially realise their plans, and only 13% said that they had not achieved anything.
  Ukrainians assessed this year's success in the same way: for one in three, the year was successful, for half, it was average, and only for one in ten, it was not successful at all.
• Almost 40% of Ukrainians say they are satisfied with their lives, another 30% are somewhat satisfied, about 20% are not very satisfied, and 11% are completely dissatisfied. Younger respondents and men were slightly more likely to say they were satisfied with their lives. Also, the higher the respondents rated their income, the more successful they considered their year to be.  
• At the same time, more than 40% of respondents often felt stressed this year. Another 29% were sometimes stressed, 22% were rarely or very rarely stressed, and only 7% were never stressed. People with lower incomes and women reported feeling stress more often.
• Interestingly, in 2021, Ukrainians felt love for others significantly more often than love for themselves. They also felt joy, sadness, and anger relatively often. Even less often, they felt surprise, and least often, fear.  
• In general, the more often people felt emotions of joy and love, the more successful they rated their year, the more satisfied they were with their lives, and the less stress they experienced.
• As it turned out, women are noticeably more emotional, and therefore they felt all emotions more often than men. Young people are also more emotional.
• Emotions of joy and self-love correlate most strongly with overall life satisfaction. Fear, sadness, and anger, on the other hand, correlate with stress and low ratings of the year's success.

Leisure activities

• The most popular leisure activities this year were watching films and TV series, as well as cooking favourite dishes. Reading or listening to books and visiting guests were also popular leisure activities.
• About 40% consumed alcohol relatively often (20% did not). A third engaged in physical training and fitness (the same number did not), while only 4% practised yoga, which was the least popular hobby among those surveyed. At the same time, a quarter often watched sports matches or competitions, and about 5% placed bets on sports.  
• About 40% of respondents played various games this year, most often on their phones, and slightly less often on computers and board games. Less than 5% played bowling or billiards.
• A third of respondents relatively often went shopping or went on nature trips and picnics. About 30% of respondents this year often or sometimes went to cafes, took up photography, or had cosmetic procedures. A quarter engaged in handicrafts and spiritual practices. A third visited church relatively often. One in ten was interested in personal development training.
• Despite the quarantine, Ukrainians went to restaurants relatively often this year – about 20%.
• Over the course of the year, one in ten went on tourist trips, travelled around Ukraine or went abroad.  
• This year, 12-15% went mushroom picking or berry picking, 11% went fishing, and 2% went hunting.  
• About 20% engaged in painting, 12% went dancing, singing, or played instruments.
• Ukrainians attended concerts, festivals, cinemas, and nightclubs much less frequently—less than 10%. About 5% visited theatres, museums, or exhibitions.  
• The higher the respondents' income, the more diverse their leisure activities and frequency. Young people are more likely to play games, engage in sports, and go to cafes and restaurants. At the same time, older people are more likely to read and go to church.
• In general, women were more active than men this year in cooking, cosmetic procedures, photography, handicrafts and creativity in general, as well as shopping. Women also watched films and TV series, engaged in music and spiritual practices, read books, and went to church relatively more often. At the same time, men watched sports matches and competitions, played computer games, went fishing, went hiking, bet on sports, and consumed alcohol more often.  
• Almost 60% of respondents harvested vegetables and fruits or made preserves this year. Even among the youngest, about half did so. And among those who live in private homes, the vast majority (about 80%) did so.

The survey results show that active leisure and hobbies throughout the year increase positive emotions and feelings of success. This is especially true for entertainment that was less accessible last year due to the pandemic: concerts, discos, and travel abroad.

• Hobbies such as photography, beauty treatments, dancing and music, going to the cinema have the most positive effect on self-love, while concerts and travelling around Ukraine have the most positive effect on love for others.  At the same time, games (computer or mobile), alcohol, watching TV series or sporting events correlate least with feelings of love for oneself and others.
• Interestingly, leisure activities outside the home have a greater impact on life satisfaction and happiness than similar activities at home: for example, going to the cinema brings more joy than simply watching films and TV series; restaurants, cafés and barbecues bring more joy than cooking; playing sports brings more joy than watching matches.  
• Creative hobbies at home, such as painting, handicrafts, and reading, bring more positive emotions than computer/mobile games, films, and TV series, which generally bring the least pleasure, sense of success, or love.
• Of all activities, attending church brought the least joy to respondents this year, and noticeably less than those who simply engaged in spiritual practices.
• Alcohol has a rather negative impact on positive emotions: those who consumed alcohol frequently experienced more anger and fear this year and less love for others. On the other hand, the more often people visited others this year, the more positive emotions they experienced.  
• Interestingly, while harvesting (mushrooms, fruit, potatoes) has a positive effect on success and satisfaction, the tradition of making preserves has the opposite effect: people who did this this year are significantly less satisfied with their lives. And while young people are actively involved in harvesting, it is mainly older people who make preserves.
• In general, those who were involved in any activities have a higher sense of success and positivity in 2021. Therefore, fishing, mushroom picking, spiritual practices, development training, shopping, books and hiking also brought mostly positive emotions to people this year.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, Ukrainians' favourite New Year holidays are Christmas (49%) and New Year (37%). St. Nicholas Day was chosen by 6%, and Old New Year by 4%. None of these New Year holidays are liked by 2%.
• Over the past 10 years, the number of New Year's fans has been decreasing every year, while the number of Christmas fans has been increasing. As a result, this year the number of Christmas fans has exceeded that of New Year's fans.
• New Year celebrations are relatively more popular among residents of the east and south, young people and men. Christmas was chosen much more often in the west, by middle-aged and older people, women, as well as believers of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Greek Catholics. These two holidays are equally popular among residents of the centre and Kyiv.
• Only 4% celebrate Christmas on 25 December itself, while the majority of respondents (71%) celebrate on 7 January. At the same time, 18% of Ukrainians celebrate Christmas twice (on 25 December and 7 January), and their number has increased slightly over the year. Residents of the west, Kyiv and Greek Catholics were more likely to mention double Christmas celebrations. Only 6% do not celebrate Christmas at all (most of them are young people and residents of the south and east).
• A quarter of respondents support the idea of moving Christmas celebrations from 7 January to 25 December. 58% of respondents oppose this idea. Another 15% said they were indifferent to this issue, and 1% were unable to answer.  
• Over the past five years, the number of those opposed to moving the date of Christmas celebrations has decreased (from 69% to 58%), while the number of supporters has increased slightly (from 15% to 26%).
• The idea of moving Christmas is most popular in the west and in Kyiv, where about 40% support it and almost as many oppose it. Middle-aged and older respondents, as well as Greek Catholics, are slightly more supportive of this initiative.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the top three achievements of Ukraine in 2021, according to respondents, are the victory of boxer Oleksandr Usyk (35%), the success of Ukrainian Paralympians in Tokyo (32%) and the Great Construction programme (31%).
• About 20% also named the expansion of the DIA app services, mass vaccination, and the national football team's advancement to the quarter-finals of Euro 2020 as major victories.
• Another 15% chose the performance of Ukrainian athletes at the Summer Olympics and the implementation of the Ukrainian language service standard as major victories. 13-14% consider the adoption of the law ‘On Oligarchs’ and sanctions against Medvedchuk to be the main achievement, another 7-9% chose the launch of the land market and the open skies agreement with the EU, 4-5% - the ‘Crimean Platform’ and the success of ‘Go A’ at Eurovision. Only 2% said that there were no achievements this year.
• 14% responded that their sense of confidence in the future had improved over the past year, for 30% it had not changed, and for 53% it had worsened. According to the majority, the political and economic situation in Ukraine has deteriorated over the past year: 63% and 70% responded accordingly. About 20% believe that the situation has not changed, 12% believe that the political situation has improved, and 8% believe that the economic situation has improved.
• The financial situation of families remained unchanged for 40% over the year, worsened for 50%, and improved for only 9%. Despite sceptical responses, assessments of the political and economic situation improved slightly compared to December 2018. Residents of the capital and the youngest respondents are the most optimistic about changes in all these areas.
• Roads and digital technologies are the areas where Ukrainians have seen the most improvement over the past year. More than 60% of respondents noted an improvement in road conditions over the past year. Almost half of those surveyed noted positive developments in digital technologies in the public sector (DIYA app) (28% were unable to assess).
• Regarding Ukraine's international image, 20% saw an improvement (28% saw no change, 40% saw a deterioration), road safety – 19% (34% – no change, 41% – deterioration), quality of medical care – 17% (31% – no change, 45% – deterioration), quality of education – 12% (28% – no change, 40% – deterioration).
• About half of those surveyed saw no change over the year in the fight against corruption (37% noted a deterioration) and in resolving the war in Donbas (34% noted a deterioration).
• The majority also pointed to no change in areas such as the stability of the hryvnia exchange rate, freedom of speech and democracy.
• At the same time, most respondents felt that the situation with utility rates (80%) and prices for basic goods and medicines (90%) had worsened.
• About half of those surveyed saw a deterioration in the ability to find work (29% – no change, 11% – improvement) and in the quality of housing and utility services (37% – no change, 9% – improvement).
• If the presidential election were held in the near future, 24.2% would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi (among those who intend to vote and have made their choice).13.7% would support Petro Poroshenko, 9.6% – Yuliia Tymoshenko, 9.2% – Yurii Boiko, 6.9% – Yevhenii Murayev, 6.8% – Dmytro Razumkov, 6.7% – Ihor Smeshko, 6.2% – Volodymyr Groysman, 3.1% – Oleh Liashko. Support for other candidates is below 3%.
• The party ranking is led by the “Servant of the People” party, supported by 19.2% of those who intend to vote and have made their choice.14.1% would vote for “European Solidarity”, 11.1% – “Batkivshchyna”, 10.5% – “Opposition Platform – For Life”. “Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman” is supported by 6.8%, “Strength and Honor” – 6.5%, Razumkov’s party “Smart Politics” – 6.0%, Murayev’s party “Nashi” – 5.7%, the Radical Party – 4.2%, “UDAR of Vitali Klitschko” – 4.0%, VO “Svoboda” – 3.5%, Sharii’s Party – 2.6%, “Holos” – 2.2%. Support for other political forces is below 2%.
  

The survey was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the Centre for Analysis and Sociological Research of the International Republican Institute throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) between 6 and 15 November 2021.

The methodology was based on personal interviews at the respondents' place of residence, with a total sample size of 2,400 residents aged 18 and older.  The results were weighted by region, age and gender distribution based on data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine as of 1 January 2019. The margin of error at a 95% confidence level does not exceed 2%. The reach coefficient is 53%.

The survey was conducted with financial support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).