Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 31% of Ukrainians believe that 2022 will be better than the previous year. Another third think that nothing will change, and the same number believe that next year will be worse than 2021. Last year, expectations were more optimistic: at that time, 52% expected 2021 to be better than 2020. In general, younger respondents (under 40) expect the coming year to be better, while older respondents think that nothing will change or that things will get worse.
• Overall, 67% of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction, 24% believe it is moving in the right direction, and 9% are undecided.
• The most important problems facing the country are corruption (55%) and the war in Donbas (51%). Other issues include the economic crisis (32%), the incompetence of the authorities (31%), the coronavirus epidemic (27%), the influence of oligarchs on politics (24%) and poor-quality healthcare (24%).
• The trust rating among politicians is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who is trusted by 38% of respondents, while 61% do not trust him. The next highest level of trust is observed for Volodymyr Groysman, trusted by 32%, with 60% not trusting him. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 30%, while 41% do not trust him and another quarter of respondents say they do not know him. Yuliia Tymoshenko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 73%. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 75%. Yurii Boiko receives 22% trust, 61% distrust, and 15% say they do not know him.
• A majority of respondents support the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers: 63% and 58%, respectively. At the same time, support for the resignation and early election of the President is somewhat lower: 43% favor resignation, while 54% are opposed.
• A quarter of respondents consider the National Security and Defence Council to be a strong body, a third consider it weak, and another third consider it neither strong nor weak. Sixteen per cent consider the president to be strong, 40% consider him weak, and another 43% consider him neither strong nor weak. Eight percent consider the prime minister to be strong, 42% consider him to be weak, and another 42% consider him to be neither strong nor weak. Six percent consider parliament to be strong, 61% consider it to be weak, and another 31% consider it to be neither strong nor weak.  
• Fifteen per cent consider the opposition in parliament to be strong, 43% consider it to be weak, and another 35% consider it to be neither strong nor weak. Eleven per cent consider the coalition to be strong, 44% consider it to be weak, and another 33% consider it to be neither strong nor weak.
• The party ranking is led by Servant of the People, which is supported by 19.1% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. European Solidarity stands at 13.5%, Batkivshchyna at 11.2%, and Opposition Platform – For Life at 10.5%. The Strength and Honor party is supported by 7.3%, Razumkov’s Smart Politics by 6.2%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman by 6.0%, Murayev’s Nashi by 5.6%, the Radical Party by 4.2%, UDAR of Vitalii Klychko by 3.8%, Sharii’s Party by 3.4%, and Svoboda by 3.0%. Support for all other political forces is below 2%.
• In a hypothetical “Prime Minister election,” 14% of respondents would choose V. Groysman, 12% would choose Yu. Tymoshenko, 11% — Yu. Boiko, 10% — D. Razumkov, and 9% — A. Yatseniuk. Ye. Murayev would receive 7%, I. Smeshko and P. Poroshenko — 6% each, O. Liashko — 5%. The current Prime Minister D. Shmyhal would be chosen by 3%, and O. Honcharuk by 2%. Another 5% would choose a different candidate.
• At the same time, one-third of respondents believe that among recent prime ministers, V. Groysman would be the most capable of improving the current economic situation. One-quarter consider that Yu. Tymoshenko or A. Yatseniuk could do so; one in five holds this view regarding M. Azarov; and one in six regarding V. Yushchenko. V. Yanukovych, D. Shmyhal, and A. Kinakh are each chosen by 8%, Yu. Yekhanurov by 7%, and O. Honcharuk by 5%. 8% would not choose any of the candidates.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group between 10 and 12 December 2021 among Kyiv residents by telephone showed that the city's residents have a relatively positive assessment of the local situation. Thus, 46% believe that Kyiv is moving in the right direction, while the same number believe the opposite. Over the last quarter, the number of those who believe that the capital is moving in the right direction has increased.
• 51% of respondents trust Vitalii Klychko, while 48% do not. 39% trust V. Zelenskyi, and 59% do not. 33% trust P. Poroshenko, and 66% do not. 31% trust D. Razumkov, 44% do not trust him, and 19% say they do not know him. 31% trust S. Prytula, 49% do not trust him, 10% say they do not know him, and 10% were undecided.
• In the party rating for the city council, Vitalii Klychko’s UDAR leads with 19.1%. European Solidarity follows with 17.0%, Servant of the People with 13.3%, Razumkov’s Smart Politics with 9.4%, and Sergii Prytula’s party with 7.5%. Batkivshchyna stands at 5.4%, Strength and Honor at 4.9%, Opposition Platform – For Life at 4.8%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman at 3.7%, Sharii’s Party at 3.4%, and Svoboda at 3.2%. Support for all other political forces is below 3%.
• 65% support the idea of introducing district councils in Kyiv. 23% are against such an initiative.
• 59% are aware that a law is being prepared on the capital, which divides the powers of the mayor of Kyiv and the head of the Kyiv City State Administration (37% have heard a lot, 32% have heard something). 41% know nothing about it. 43% do not support this initiative, while 33% support it. Among those who are well informed about this idea, 65% do not support it.  
• 64% do not support the idea of the central government appointing someone other than the current mayor to the position of head of the Kyiv City State Administration, while 30% support it. Over the last quarter, the number of those opposed to this initiative has grown (in July, it was 54%).
• 62% of Kyiv residents believe that a conflict exists between President Zelenskyi and Kyiv Mayor Klychko. 24% do not think so, and 14% were undecided. Among those who consider the conflict between the President and the capital’s mayor to be real, 39% support Vitalii Klychko in this confrontation, 15% support Volodymyr Zelenskyi, and 45% support neither of them. 68% of these respondents believe that the confrontation is primarily driven by the President’s attempt to eliminate a political competitor. 23% think that the reason lies in Zelenskyi’s attempt to restore order in the capital.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on 6-8 December 2021 show that two-thirds of respondents are superficially familiar with the content of the Minsk agreements, while a quarter are completely unaware of them. Only 11% of respondents said they were well acquainted with the essence of these agreements.
• Despite this, the majority (54%) believe that the Minsk agreements need to be revised and new ones signed. 21% believe that it is necessary to withdraw from the negotiation process altogether and make decisions without the participation of international mediators. Only 12% are convinced that Ukraine should fully implement the Minsk agreements.
• Among the options for the format of negotiations to resolve the conflict in Donbas, a relative majority (45%) support the idea of expanding the ‘Normandy’ format to include the United States and the United Kingdom. 21% are in favour of direct negotiations with Russia, 12% are in favour of negotiations with representatives of the so-called DPR and LPR. Only 11% are in favour of the ‘Normandy’ format in its usual composition (Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany) being the platform for negotiations on the settlement of the conflict in Donbas.
• 56% are in favour of direct negotiations with Russia (as the only option), while 41% are against.
• 46% support the involvement of Turkey in negotiations to resolve the conflict in Donbas, while the same number are against.
• Over the past two years, the number of supporters of the idea of introducing visas with the Russian Federation has grown: today, 52% support this idea, while 44% oppose it.
• Respondents consider Canada, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States and Turkey, to be Ukraine's greatest allies. Slightly fewer consider France, Germany and China to be allies, with the latter being considered more of a neutral country.
• Ukrainians mostly consider Belarus to be a hostile country towards Ukraine, with the number of such respondents more than doubling over the past year (from 22% to 48%). The majority of respondents (72%) consider Russia to be a hostile country, with only 12% considering it an ally.
• Over the past year, attitudes towards Turkey and the United Kingdom have improved significantly, while attitudes towards Belarus have deteriorated.
• If a presidential election were held in the near future, 23.5% would vote for V. Zelenskyi (among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice). 13.4% would support P. Poroshenko, 9.9% — Yu. Tymoshenko, 9.3% — Yu. Boiko, 7.5% — D. Razumkov, 6.7% — I. Smeshko, 6.5% — Ye. Murayev, 5.5% — V. Groysman, 3.2% — O. Liashko, and 3.1% — A. Yatseniuk. Support for other candidates is below 3%.
• The anti-rating is led by P. Poroshenko, with 47% saying they would not vote for him under any circumstances. 37% would not vote for Yu. Tymoshenko, 35% — for Yu. Boiko, 33% — for V. Zelenskyi, and 22% — for O. Liashko. Every sixth to seventh respondent would not vote under any circumstances for A. Yatseniuk, V. Klychko, Ye. Murayev, V. Groysman, or O. Tyahnybok.
• The party ranking is led by Servant of the People, which is supported by 18.0% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. European Solidarity stands at 13.7%, Opposition Platform – For Life at 11.4%, and Batkivshchyna at 11.4%. Razumkov’s Smart Politics is supported by 7.5%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman by 6.2%, Strength and Honor by 6.0%, Murayev’s Nashi by 5.2%, UDAR of Vitalii Klychko by 4.2%, the Radical Party by 4.0%, Sharii’s Party by 3.1%, and Svoboda by 3.0%. Support for all other political forces is below 3%.
• Fourteen percent of respondents heard (saw) the President's annual address to the Verkhovna Rada on 1 December in its entirety. Thirty-four percent heard (saw) selected excerpts. Fifty-two percent knew nothing about it.
• At the same time, respondents are much better informed about the initiative to introduce an economic passport for Ukrainians (32% are well aware of the idea, 40% have heard something about it, and 28% know nothing about this initiative). At the same time, the majority (53%) have a positive attitude towards this initiative, 28% are neutral, and 16% are negative. Among those who are well informed about the initiative, support stands at 62%, while a quarter do not support it.
• As in previous surveys, about half of those polled (47%) support the idea of introducing dual citizenship in Ukraine. Approximately the same number (50%) oppose it.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group in early December showed that 70% of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction, 22% believe it is moving in the right direction, and 8% are undecided.
• The most likely outcomes are considered to be an increase in gas and heating tariffs (72%) and an exacerbation of the economic crisis (67%). Almost half of those surveyed expect an increase in coronavirus cases (one in five considers this unlikely). Forty-six per cent consider an escalation of the war in the east to be likely (23% consider it unlikely), while 44% expect mass protests and riots (30% consider them unlikely). The least likely events are considered to be Ukraine's involvement in the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border (35%) and mass power cuts for the population (32%). Over the past year and a half, expectations of mass riots and protests, as well as an escalation of the war, have increased slightly.
• The main reasons why an economic crisis could occur in Ukraine are the incompetence of the authorities (31%) and corruption in the government (22%). The war in Donbas was cited as the cause of the crisis by 16%, the coronavirus by 13%, global influence by only 8% and the energy crisis by 5%. Older respondents were more likely to mention incompetence and corruption, while younger respondents were more likely to mention the impact of the war and the virus.
• Forty per cent are well informed that the energy crisis could lead to rolling blackouts, almost as many have heard something about it, and about 20% know nothing about it.
• At the same time, 50% believe that Ukraine can avoid power and heating cuts, 39% do not believe so, and another 12% were unable to answer. People are more likely to disbelieve in the possibility of preventing cuts in the east: 40% believe so, 48% do not.  
• According to the population, the President and the Cabinet of Ministers bear the greatest responsibility for fair tariffs – 27% and 24%, respectively. At the same time, in terms of dynamics, the responsibility of the Government is decreasing, while that of the President is increasing. Another 15% place the responsibility on the Verkhovna Rada, 12% on supplier companies, and 10% on local authorities.  
• Older people and residents of the east place the most responsibility for tariffs on the President, while young people are more likely to place responsibility on the Verkhovna Rada. The Cabinet of Ministers and local authorities are considered responsible in the south and east, while service providers are considered responsible in the west.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating,” 68% of citizens stated that they are well aware that the Holodomor Remembrance Day is marked on the last Saturday of November in Ukraine. Another 24% said they had heard something about it, while 8% did not know about it at all. Awareness is higher among residents of the West, older respondents, and voters of the parties Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, European Solidarity, Strength and Honor, and Ukrainian Strategy.
• 85% agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 13% disagreed. The latter group is most numerous in the East and South (every fourth to fifth respondent in these macro-regions), as well as among voters of the Opposition Platform – For Life, Murayev’s Nashi, and Sharii’s party.
• Respondents most often consider Joseph Stalin personally responsible for organizing the Holodomor — 44% (in 2018 — 47%, in 2008 — 43%) — and the central leadership of the USSR — 41% (2018 — 39%, 2008 — 38%). Another 17% (2018 — 28%, 2008 — 23%) place responsibility on the repressive bodies of the USSR (NKVD, GPU), and 12% (2018 — 23%, 2008 — 17%) on the highest leadership of Soviet Ukraine. Only 3% stated that Ukrainian peasants (kulaks) who refused to voluntarily surrender their harvest were to blame. 10% believe that the Holodomor was caused by natural factors (2018 — 5%, 2008 — 11%). Residents of the western and central regions more frequently mentioned the personal guilt of Stalin and the Soviet leadership. Meanwhile, natural explanations were more common in the South and East. The belief in natural causes is most widespread among those who deny the genocide.
• In recent years, support for holding a trial of those responsible for the Holodomor of 1932–33 has increased: 37% in 2008, 48% in 2018, and 61% in 2021. Support has also risen for the initiative to provide compensation to the victims of the genocide and their families: 46% in 2008, 63% in 2018, and 78% in 2021. The idea of holding a trial enjoys greater support in the West and Center. By contrast, support for providing compensation to families affected by the Holodomor is relatively uniform across all regions.
• The share of those who believe that Russia should pay compensation to Ukrainian citizens affected by the Holodomor and to their families has increased from 31% to 43% (2018 — 31%, 2021 — 43%). The number of respondents who believe that financial responsibility should lie with the Ukrainian state has also grown (2018 — 10%, 2021 — 18%), as well as those who believe the United Nations should bear this responsibility (2018 — 12%, 2021 — 17%). The view that Russia should pay compensation is most common in the West, among older respondents, and supporters of European Solidarity and Svoboda. Meanwhile, in the South and East, respondents attribute potential financial responsibility both to Russia, the UN, and the Ukrainian state. Every fourth to fifth respondent in the southeastern regions was undecided on this question.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on 10–13 November 2021 show that 23% of respondents believe the country is moving in the right direction, while 69% consider it to be moving in the wrong direction, and 8% were unable to answer. Over the past two months, the share of those who believe the country is developing in the wrong direction has increased (in early September it was 58%). The proportion of those who view the direction of the country’s development as correct is relatively higher among young people and voters of the Servant of the People party.
• The trust rating among politicians is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who is trusted by 38% of respondents, while 59% do not trust him. Yuliia Tymoshenko is trusted by 27% and not trusted by 71%. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 73%. Yurii Boiko is trusted by 24%, not trusted by 59%, and 12% say they do not know him.
• If a presidential election were held in the near future, 23.1% would vote for V. Zelenskyi (among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice). 13.3% would support P. Poroshenko, 10.7% — Yu. Tymoshenko, 9.2% — Yu. Boiko, 8.3% — D. Razumkov, 7.0% — Ye. Murayev, 6.9% — I. Smeshko, 6.1% — V. Groysman, and 3.3% — O. Liashko. Support for other candidates is below 3%.
• The anti-rating is led by P. Poroshenko, with 44% saying they would not vote for him under any circumstances. 35% would not vote for Yu. Boiko, 34% — for Yu. Tymoshenko, 32% — for V. Zelenskyi, 26% — for A. Yatseniuk, 22% — for O. Liashko, and 21% — for V. Klychko. Every sixth to seventh respondent would not vote under any circumstances for Ye. Murayev or V. Groysman.
• Second-round presidential election modelling produced the following results. President Zelenskyi wins in all hypothetical pairings with his closest opponents. In a Zelenskyi–Poroshenko matchup, the result is 59% vs. 41% (among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice). In a Zelenskyi–Tymoshenko matchup, the result is also 59% vs. 41%, and in a Zelenskyi–Boiko pairing, 62% vs. 38%.
• The party ranking is led by the Servant of the People party, supported by 18.0% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. European Solidarity stands at 13.9%, Opposition Platform – For Life at 10.7%, and Batkivshchyna at 10.1%. Support for other political forces is somewhat lower: Razumkov’s “Smart Politics” — 7.9%, Strength and Honor — 6.4%, Murayev’s “Nashi” — 5.5%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman — 5.0%, the Radical Party — 4.5%, UDAR of Vitalii Klychko — 3.7%, Sharii’s Party — 3.1%, and Svoboda — 2.1%. Support for all other political forces is below 2%.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on 10–13 November 2021, 46% of respondents stated that they had already been vaccinated (first or second dose). 16% said they were ready to be vaccinated, while 36% were not ready. It is important to note that the survey was conducted only among the adult population of Ukraine, whereas official vaccination statistics are calculated for the entire population. Over the past month, the share of those who had received a vaccine increased (from 36% to 46%). The proportion of those unwilling to be vaccinated is relatively higher among young respondents.
• 55% support mandatory vaccination for representatives of certain sectors (teachers, medical workers, civil servants), while 35% oppose it. Nearly 40% support banning access to public venues without a COVID certificate or test, while 53% oppose such a measure. Almost 30% support banning unvaccinated individuals from using public transport, while 65% do not support it.
• Overall, mandatory vaccination for certain groups, as well as allowing access to public places only with a COVID certificate or test, is more widely supported by older respondents, residents of Kyiv and the Central region, and those who are vaccinated or generally supportive of vaccination.
• Nearly three-quarters of respondents (71%) consider restrictions on unvaccinated individuals to be a violation of rights, while 26% hold the opposite view. The highest share of those who do not view such restrictions as a violation is found in Kyiv, among the oldest respondents, and among those already vaccinated. At the same time, 49% do not support politicians who refuse vaccination. 35% are indifferent, and 14% support such politicians. Opponents of anti-vaccination politicians are most numerous in the capital, among older people, and among those who are already vaccinated or intend to get vaccinated.
• Two-thirds of respondents (61%) believe that Ukraine is capable of developing its own COVID vaccine, while 37% do not believe so. Optimism regarding Ukraine’s capacity to develop a vaccine is highest among the oldest respondents.
• 40% of respondents believe that no one is to blame for the rise in COVID cases. However, 21% blame people who refused vaccination. 15% blame the Ministry of Health. 7–8% consider the President or the Cabinet of Ministers responsible, and 2% blame local authorities. Belief in natural or spontaneous reasons for the rise in cases is more common among those unwilling to be vaccinated. Conversely, vaccinated individuals and those intending to be vaccinated more often blame the rise in infections on those who refuse to get vaccinated.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” on 4–9 November 2021, if a presidential election were held in the near future, 21.8% would vote for V. Zelenskyi (among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice). 14.5% would support P. Poroshenko, 11.0% — Yu. Boiko, 10.8% — Yu. Tymoshenko, 8.8% — D. Razumkov, 6.4% — Ye. Murayev, 6.2% — I. Smeshko, 5.7% — V. Groysman, 4.0% — O. Liashko, 2.6% — A. Sadovyi, 2.4% — O. Tyahnybok, and 1.7% — V. Klychko.
• The party ranking is led by the Servant of the People party, supported by 17.3% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. European Solidarity stands at 14.0%, Batkivshchyna at 12.2%, and Opposition Platform – For Life at 11.0%. Support for other political forces is somewhat lower: Dmytro Razumkov’s party — 6.8%, Strength and Honor — 5.8%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman — 5.2%, Murayev’s Nashi — 4.9%, the Radical Party — 4.8%, Svoboda — 3.3%, Sharii’s Party — 3.2%, UDAR of Vitalii Klychko — 3.1%, For the Future — 2.1%, Samopomich — 1.7%, and Holos — 1.4%. Our Land stands at 1.1%.
• 33% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of President V. Zelenskyi, while 65% are not satisfied. 22% are satisfied with the work of the President’s Office, and 72% are not. 18% are satisfied with the work of Prime Minister Shmyhal, while 68% are not satisfied, and 14% were unable to assess it. Among central government institutions, respondents are most dissatisfied with the work of the Cabinet of Ministers (80%) and the Verkhovna Rada (83%).
• 58% support the idea of dissolving Parliament and calling new elections, while 38% do not. 55% support the resignation of the Government and the appointment of a new Cabinet, while 39% do not. The idea of the President’s resignation and early presidential elections is supported by 40%, while 58% do not support it.
• 37% of respondents believe their region is currently in economic decline, 33% believe it is developing economically, and 26% say nothing is happening. Reports of economic development were more frequent in the West and in Kyiv, while economic decline was more often noted in the East and South.
• The central government (35%) and local authorities (34%) are considered most responsible for regional problems. Another 19% blame the residents themselves. Those seen as capable of solving these problems include the central government (32%), local authorities (28%), and city residents (24%). The central government is blamed more often in the East and in Kyiv, by older respondents, and by supporters of the Sharii, Murayev, and Opposition Platform parties. Local authorities are blamed more often in the West and among voters of Strength and Honor, the Radical Party, Ukrainian Strategy, Svoboda, and Servant of the People. Belief that the region’s problems can be solved by residents themselves is more common in Kyiv and in the West, among young people, and among voters of Svoboda and UDAR.
• About 40% believe their region will become one of the most developed in Ukraine in the next 5–10 years. Another 22% expect development in the next 10–20 years, while 16% say their region will never be economically developed. At the same time, 16% state that their region is already among the most developed—most often residents of Kyiv and those who currently see their region as economically developed.
• Almost half of Ukrainians do not make any plans for the future. One-quarter plan their lives a few years ahead, about 15% — for six months to a year, and 13% — for a few months. Making future plans is easier for younger, wealthier respondents and residents of the capital.
• For 55% of the population, the main source of income is wages; for 30%, pensions. Another 13% receive income from business, and 6% from social benefits.
• Most respondents assess their current income level as low (36%) or below average (36%). 31% consider it average. Only 8% assess their income as above average or high.
• One-quarter say they would be satisfied with a monthly income of up to 10,000 UAH. Another 22% say they need more than 30,000 UAH per month. The remaining respondents named intermediate amounts: 14% — 11–15 thousand, 18% — 16–20 thousand, 8% — 21–25 thousand, 11% — 26–30 thousand. The lower the current income, the lower the desired income respondents name. Noticeably lower desired incomes were named by women, especially older women — most of whom would be satisfied with up to 10,000 UAH. The highest desired incomes were named by men of middle and younger age, as well as by residents of the capital.
• 62% of respondents would support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union if a referendum were held today (32% would not support it). 58% would support joining NATO, while 35% oppose it. Residents of the western and central regions are the most supportive of European integration, while the least supportive are residents of the eastern regions, where fewer than half back Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. The most skeptical about joining these alliances are voters of the Opposition Platform, Sharii’s party, and Murayev’s party.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group on 21–23 October 2021, the trust rating among politicians is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who is trusted by 39% of respondents, while 59% do not trust him. Yuliia Tymoshenko is trusted by 26% and not trusted by 72%. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 73%. Yurii Boiko is trusted by 24%, not trusted by 57%, and 16% say they do not know him.
• If a presidential election were held in the near future, 25.1% would vote for V. Zelenskyi (among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice). 14.1% would support P. Poroshenko, 10.1% — Yu. Tymoshenko, 9.5% — Yu. Boiko, 7.3% — D. Razumkov, 7.1% — I. Smeshko, 6.0% — Ye. Murayev, 5.1% — V. Groysman, 4.3% — A. Hrytsenko, 3.9% — O. Liashko, 2.0% — O. Tyahnybok, and 1.5% — A. Sadovyi.
• The party ranking is led by the Servant of the People party, supported by 20.4% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. European Solidarity stands at 15.8%, Opposition Platform – For Life at 12.0%, and Batkivshchyna at 10.9%. Support for other political forces is somewhat lower: Strength and Honor — 6.4%, Murayev’s Nashi — 6.3%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman — 5.3%, the Radical Party — 4.8%, UDAR of Vitalii Klychko — 4.2%, Sharii’s Party — 3.8%, Svoboda — 2.9%, Holos — 2.2%, and Samopomich — 1.9%.
• 41% expressed concern about the possibility of personally contracting COVID-19, while 57% do not have such fears. Regarding the health of their relatives, 77% are worried and 23% are not. Since spring, anxiety about one’s own health during the pandemic has slightly decreased. The highest levels of concern, as before, are recorded among older respondents and women. Those already vaccinated fear illness less than those who only intend to get vaccinated.
• 36% of respondents stated they had already been vaccinated (first or second dose). 18% said they were ready to be vaccinated, while 43% were not ready. It is important to note that the survey was conducted among the adult population only, whereas official vaccination statistics are calculated for the entire population. Compared with July, willingness to vaccinate has increased. The share of those unwilling to be vaccinated is relatively higher among young respondents.
• 37% of respondents believe that responsibility for vaccinating the population lies with the Minister of Health. 18% say it should lie with the President, 13% with the Chief Sanitary Doctor, 10% with the Verkhovna Rada, and 3% with the Prime Minister.
• Compared with the spring wave of research, support for a “strict lockdown” has somewhat decreased. 54% support introducing a lockdown (in April — 65%), while 44% oppose it. Opposition to lockdown is relatively higher among residents of the East, people of middle age, and those who are not afraid of contracting the virus.
• 84% are aware of the record increase in natural gas prices in Europe (49% — well aware, 35% — have heard something about it). 16% say they are unaware. Despite this, a majority (59%) state that gas tariffs in Ukraine should not increase even if prices rise in Europe. 33% say tariffs may rise slightly but the state should partially compensate the difference. Only 5% believe that tariffs should correspond to market prices for energy resources.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating , residents of Ternopil assess the situation at the local level significantly better than at the national level. Only 27% of respondents believe that things in the country are moving in the right direction, while 60% hold the opposite view. Regarding Ternopil, 57% think that things are moving in the right direction, while 30% think the opposite.
• Almost two-thirds (59%) believe that the situation in the city has improved over the past year. 30% did not notice any changes, and only 8% saw a deterioration.
• An absolute majority (90%) consider Ternopil comfortable for living. Only 8% disagree.
• 33% are satisfied with the work of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, while 59% are not satisfied. 18% are satisfied with the performance of Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, and 58% are not. 16% are satisfied with the work of the Verkhovna Rada, while 74% are not.
• 72% are satisfied with the work of the Mayor of Ternopil, Serhii Nadal, while 24% are not. 59% are satisfied with the city council, and 27% are not. 36% are satisfied with the work of Mykhailo Holovko, head of the Ternopil Regional Council, 27% are not satisfied, and 38% could not evaluate his performance. 33% are satisfied with the work of Volodymyr Trush, head of the Ternopil Regional State Administration, 27% are not satisfied, and 40% could not evaluate his work.
• 50% are satisfied with the work of educational institutions, 29% are not satisfied, and 22% could not assess. 43% are satisfied with municipal services, while 53% are not. 43% are satisfied with the police, 32% are not, and 25% could not evaluate. The public transport system received 38% positive and 49% negative assessments. Medical services received 38% positive and 53% negative assessments.
• The leaders in the trust rating are Serhii Prytula (trusted by 37%, not trusted by 52%), Volodymyr Zelenskyi (33% / 61%), Petro Poroshenko (30% / 62%), and Volodymyr Groysman (30% / 60%). Vitalii Klychko is trusted by 24% and not trusted by 64%. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 21%, not trusted by 59%, and 10% say they do not know him. Yuliia Tymoshenko is trusted by 16%, not trusted by 77%. Yurii Boiko is trusted by 9%, not trusted by 69%, and 14% do not know him.
• Residents of Ternopil declare relatively high electoral mobilization: 65% are definitely ready to participate in parliamentary elections. 15% are uncertain (50/50), 4% would possibly participate, and 14% say it is unlikely they would vote.
• In the parliamentary ranking, the leading parties are European Solidarity (23.0% among those who have decided and intend to vote), Servant of the People (20.7%), and Svoboda (20.0%). Batkivshchyna stands at 10.5%, Strength and Honor at 4.8%, and Holos at 4.3%. Support for other political forces is below 3%. About 20% are undecided.
• In the city council election rating, the leader is Svoboda, supported by 32.5% of those who have decided and intend to vote. European Solidarity would receive 15.8%, Servant of the People — 15.1%, Batkivshchyna — 8.8%, Holos — 4.2%, Syla Liudei — 3.5%, and For the Future — 3.0%. Support for other political forces is below 3%. About 18% are undecided.
• In the mayoral election, Serhii Nadal would win with 71.8% among those who have decided and intend to vote. Support for other candidates is significantly lower: about 5% would vote for Ivan Sorokalit or Leonid Bytsyura, and about 3% for Viktor Ovcharuk, Taras Demkura, or Mykhailo Ratushniak. Support for all other candidates is 1–2%. About 10% are undecided.
• The main areas to which city authorities should give the greatest attention, according to respondents, are: combating illegal construction (37%) and addressing traffic congestion (30%). Other priority issues include the quality of municipal services (23%), medical services (23%), increasing parking spaces (22%), job creation (21%), development of public transport (20%), waste collection and disposal (20%), and road repair and construction (20%).
• The key areas where the mayor has achieved the greatest success, according to residents, are road repair and construction (49%), improvement of courtyards and adjacent territories (40%), and reconstruction of parks and squares (34%).
• 35% of adult respondents have already been vaccinated against COVID-19 (first or second dose). 19% are ready to be vaccinated, while 41% do not intend to do so. The latter group is relatively larger among respondents under 35 and those with the lowest incomes.
• 38% reported having contracted COVID-19, while 57% said they had not. The share of those who said they had been ill is relatively higher among the middle-aged group (36–50 years) and among women.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, the main sources of information about events in Ukraine for residents of Lviv are social media (63%), news websites (57%), and television (46%). 17% receive news from groups and channels in messaging apps, 16% from relatives and acquaintances, 13% from radio, and 6% from the press. Younger respondents more often rely on online sources (social media and websites), while older respondents more often rely on television.
• 39% of respondents report watching television every day. However, one in four do not watch TV at all. 36% watch television programs once or twice a week or less often, and 12% watch somewhat more frequently. The highest share of frequent TV viewers is found among the oldest age group and among women.
• “1+1” is the leading national TV channel among Lviv residents in terms of viewing frequency (41%). Over the past month, about one-third of respondents watched STB, ICTV, and “Ukraina”; one-quarter watched “Novyi Kanal”. Between one in five and one in seven watched Channel 24, Inter, Channel 5, Pryamyi, and Ukraina-24. “UA: Pershyi” and Espresso TV were each viewed by 12%, while “Nash” was viewed by 7%.
• Local TV channels are watched significantly less. 32% of those who watch television do not watch local channels at all. About one in five to one in six Lviv residents watch local channels such as “Pravda TUT: Lviv”, “UA: Lviv”, NTA, and “Zakhidnyi”.
• Among television content, Lviv residents most often watch news (48%). 39% watch movies on TV, 34% watch documentary and educational programs, 27% watch series, 24% watch entertainment shows, 20% watch political talk shows, and 11% watch cartoons or investigative programs. Only 8% watch programs on socio-economic topics.
• Nearly 80% of Lviv residents use the Internet daily. Only 11% do not use it at all (primarily the oldest respondents). The leading social network is Facebook (61%). 53% visit YouTube, 35% Instagram, and 10% TikTok. While YouTube and Facebook have sizable audiences among older respondents (around 40%), Instagram and TikTok are used mainly by the youngest age groups.
• Among messaging apps, Viber is the most widespread (67%). Facebook Messenger is used by 58%, Telegram by 39%, WhatsApp by 21%, and Skype by 15%.

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• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, residents of Chernivtsi assess the situation at the local and national levels almost equally. Only 25% of respondents believe that things in the city are moving in the right direction, while 56% hold the opposite opinion. Regarding the country, 27% believe things are moving in the right direction, and 64% think otherwise.
• Only 21% say that the situation in the city has improved over the past year. 37% noticed deterioration, and 38% saw no changes.
• 31% are satisfied with the performance of Chernivtsi Mayor Roman Klichuk, while 54% are dissatisfied. The work of the city council is rated positively by 22%, and negatively by 62%.
• 45% are satisfied with educational institutions, 29% dissatisfied, and 27% could not assess. 41% are satisfied with medical institutions, 48% dissatisfied. 39% are satisfied with the police, 34% dissatisfied, 27% could not assess. Public transport received a positive rating from 31% and a negative rating from 48%. Municipal services received the worst evaluations: 27% positive and 68% negative.
• The leaders in local political trust are Vitalii Mykhailyshyn (trust – 33%, distrust – 57%), Oleksii Kaspruk (trust – 33%, distrust – 57%) and Roman Klichuk (trust – 29%, distrust – 59%). 17% trust Serhii Osachuk, 46% do not trust him, and 31% do not know him.
• Residents of Chernivtsi demonstrate relatively high electoral mobilization: 60% are definitely ready to participate in the elections of the city council and mayor. 14% are uncertain (50/50), 5% might participate, and 20% are unlikely to come to the polling stations. Willingness to vote is higher among older respondents.
• The leading parties in the election to the city council are “Yedyna Alternatyva” (19.1% among those who have decided and intend to vote) and “Komanda Mykhailyshyna” (18.4%). 13.6% are ready to support “Servant of the People”, 8.6% — European Solidarity, 8.2% — Batkivshchyna, and 7.7% — Propozytsiia. The ratings of other political forces are below 3%. About 16% are undecided.
• In the mayoral ranking, the leaders are Vitalii Mykhailyshyn (28.5% among those who have decided and intend to vote) and Roman Klichuk (27%). 20.1% are ready to vote for Oleksii Kaspruk, and 6.1% for Olena Lys. The ratings of other candidates are below 3%. Around 15% are undecided.
• In the parliamentary ranking, the leading party is “Servant of the People”, supported by 31.2% of those who have decided and intend to vote. European Solidarity has 16.2%, Batkivshchyna — 16.1%, Opposition Platform – For Life — 7.2%, Strength and Honor — 5.2%, UDAR of Vitalii Klychko — 3.5%, Holos — 3.3%, and Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman — 3.1%. The ratings of other political forces are below 3%. About 14% remain undecided.
• In the presidential ranking, the leader is Volodymyr Zelenskyi, supported by 37.9% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Petro Poroshenko receives 14.1%, Yulia Tymoshenko — 11.5%, Yurii Boiko — 7.4%, Volodymyr Groysman — 6.1%, Ihor Smeshko — 6.0%, and Dmytro Razumkov — 4.6%. The ratings of other candidates are below 3%. Around 9% remain undecided.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, residents of Oleksandriia rate the situation at the local level much more positively than at the national level. 47% of respondents believe that things in the city are moving in the right direction, while 38% hold the opposite view. As for the country, only 20% believe it is moving in the right direction, and 66% disagree. Over the past year, the share of those who think the city and the country are moving in the right direction has increased.
• The leading local politician in terms of attitudes is Serhii Kuzmenko. 71% of respondents view him positively, 19% neutrally, and only 9% negatively.
  Toward Andrii Kolomiitsev, 28% express positive views, 22% neutral, 9% negative, while 41% do not know him.
  Toward Volodymyr Dozhdzhanyk, 25% view him positively, 29% neutrally, 19% negatively, and 26% do not know him.
  Toward Oleksandr Kiiashko, 20% express positive views, 27% neutral, 24% negative, and 29% do not know him.
  Toward Serhii Kovalenko, 18% express positive views, 20% neutral, 9% negative, and 53% do not know him.
  Toward Liudmyla Davydenko, 16% express positive views, 27% neutral, 33% negative, and 25% do not know her.
  Toward Vitalii Zhuravlov, 13% are positive, 27% neutral, 17% negative, and 44% do not know him.
  Toward Serhii Hrytsenko, 12% are positive, 29% neutral, 15% negative, and 45% do not know him.
  Toward Yurii Shkliaruk, 11% are positive, 19% neutral, 8% negative, and 61% do not know him.
• “Servant of the People” is the leading political force in the parliamentary ranking, supported by 27.3% of those who have decided and intend to vote. 14.4% support Opposition Platform – For Life, 13.2% support Batkivshchyna, 12.7% support European Solidarity, 7.3% support Strength and Honor, 5.7% support Murayev’s “Nashi”, and 4.2% support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko. The ratings of other parties are below 4%. Around 11% remain undecided.
• Modeling the mayoral election with the same candidates as in October 2020 shows that Serhii Kuzmenko would now receive 75.2% of the vote among those who have decided and would participate. Stepan Tsapiuk would receive 22.5%, and Volodymyr Trofymenko — 0.1%. Compared to last year, Kuzmenko’s support has grown by nearly 20 percentage points.
• 77% are satisfied with the work of Oleksandriia Mayor Serhii Kuzmenko, while 15% are not satisfied. The city council’s work is rated positively by 56%, negatively by 23%, and 22% could not assess.
• 61% are satisfied with educational institutions, 17% dissatisfied, 22% uncertain.
  Public transport is rated positively by 58%, negatively by 22%, uncertain by 21%.
  Police performance is rated positively by 36%, negatively by 34%, with 30% unable to assess.
  Residents are more dissatisfied than satisfied with municipal services and medical institutions: 42% rate medical facilities positively and 50% negatively; 44% rate municipal utilities positively and 47% negatively. Over the past year, satisfaction with city institutions has increased.
• 53% believe that during the current mayoral term of Serhii Kuzmenko, the overall situation in the city has improved. 36% see no change, and only 3% say things have worsened.
• Major projects implemented by Mayor Serhii Kuzmenko — such as the capital renovation of the city hospital, road repairs, restoration of the Oleksandriia theater, reconstruction of Shevchenko Park, procurement of new municipal buses, and construction of a covered multifunctional sports complex — were positively evaluated by the overwhelming majority of residents (around 90%).
• The cost of utilities (78%) and drug and alcohol abuse (59%) are the two main issues that most concern residents. Stray animals worry 39%, waste collection and disposal 30%, and the poor condition of sidewalks and pedestrian paths 23%. Poor road conditions, corruption in the city government, low qualifications of medical workers, and poor condition of courtyards and surrounding areas concern 16–18%. Rising crime and public transport fares concern 13% each.
• The main sources of socio-political news for residents are online pages (60%), national television (54%), social networks (52%), and local television (38%). 18% get news from messaging apps, 12% from relatives or acquaintances, 6% from the local press, 5% from radio, and only 2% from the national press.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, residents of Kharkiv assess the situation at the local level much more positively than at the national level. 51% of respondents believe that things in the city are moving in the right direction, while 31% hold the opposite view. Regarding the country, only 19% think that developments are moving in the right direction, whereas 66% believe the opposite.
• An overwhelming 93% consider Kharkiv a comfortable place to live: 37% say it is very comfortable and 56% say it is rather comfortable. Only 6% disagree with this. The work of medical institutions, the cost and quality of utilities, and efforts to combat corruption are viewed as the city’s key development priorities. Additionally, about one-quarter of residents consider social protection of low-income groups, road quality, crime prevention, and the performance of educational institutions to be important areas for municipal policy.
• Overall, 59% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Acting Mayor Ihor Terekhov, while 29% are dissatisfied. The city council receives positive evaluations from 40%, negative evaluations from 34%, and 27% of respondents could not offer an assessment. In terms of trust in local political figures, Ihor Terekhov leads with 53% expressing trust and 37% distrust. Oleksandr Yaroslavskyi is trusted by 37%, distrusted by 32%, and unknown to 22%. Mykhailo Dobkin is trusted by 33% and distrusted by 59%; Oleksandr Feldman is trusted by 31% and distrusted by 57%. Yevhen Murayev is trusted by 30%, distrusted by 37%, while 29% say they do not know him. Arsen Avakov receives trust from 11% and distrust from 78%. Most respondents are unfamiliar with Kyrylo Kernes and Tetiana Yehorova-Lutsenko: Kernes is trusted by 13% and distrusted by 30%, while Yehorova-Lutsenko is trusted by 1% and distrusted by 18%.
• 60% of respondents express a firm readiness to participate in the mayoral elections, and 71% believe that the election campaign in Kharkiv is taking place calmly. 22% perceive it as tense. Electoral preferences show Ihor Terekhov as the leading candidate for mayor, supported by 57.6% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Mykhailo Dobkin receives 27.6% support. The remaining candidates each receive less than 4%, and about 14% remain undecided. Moreover, 63% of respondents are convinced that Ihor Terekhov will win the mayoral election, while 14% expect Mykhailo Dobkin to prevail. Confidence in the victory of any other candidate is below 2%.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, 82% of respondents noticed an improvement in the condition of roads and an increase in road repairs over the past year (in 2020, this figure was 76%, in 2018–2019 — about 60%). 17% hold the opposite view.
• Respondents attribute the greatest credit for the improvement of roads in Ukraine to the President (36%). 33% believe this is the achievement of local authorities, 8% attribute it to the Ministry of Infrastructure/Ukravtodor, 1% to the Prime Minister, and 2% to the Parliament. Over the past year, the share of those who credit the President has increased, while the share of those who credit local authorities has decreased.
• 64% are satisfied with the work of Ukravtodor in Ukraine, while 29% hold the opposite view. Over the past year, satisfaction with this institution has increased.
• 61% of respondents believe that more roads are being repaired under Zelenskyi compared to Poroshenko (6%). 19% think that the amount of construction was the same under both. Assessing the quality of roads during both presidencies, 45% believe the roads are of better quality under Zelenskyi, 24% say they are the same, and 4% say the roads were better under Poroshenko.
• Comparing all presidents, 41% believe that the most road repairs have been carried out under Zelenskyi. 9% believe this was during Poroshenko’s term, 7% — Yanukovych, 7% — Kuchma, 2% — Kravchuk, and 1% — Yushchenko. 10% believe it was the same under all presidents, 9% say that under no president were roads repaired, and 12% could not answer.
• Among the areas of infrastructure where modernization has taken place recently, respondents rated roads the highest.
• One-third noticed improvements in tourist travel within Ukraine. Improvements in the construction of social infrastructure were noted by 29%, and 25% noticed improvements in road safety. By contrast, respondents more frequently reported deterioration in the quality of medical services and education. Negative assessments were given by 38% for education and 46% for medical services. Improvements in these areas were noted by 16–20%, and 27–28% saw no change.
• In the dynamics of the past three years, there has been a gradual increase in positive evaluations of the condition of roads and road safety. There is also positive growth regarding the quality of medical care. At the same time, the quality of education has shown a slight decline since 2020.

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• Roads (50%) and railways (42%) are the infrastructure sectors that, according to respondents, require the greatest state support. 18% consider postal services and tourism to be priority sectors, 13% — river ports, and 9% — airports.
• Respondents assign the greatest responsibility for the development and modernization of infrastructure in Ukraine to the Ministry of Infrastructure (24%), the President (23%), and local authorities (23%). Only 12% assign such responsibility to the Parliament, and 9% to the Prime Minister.
• 32% stated that they had traveled within Ukraine for tourism in the last two years. 68% had not done so. The share of those who traveled is relatively higher among residents of Kyiv, younger respondents, wealthier individuals, and those who own and frequently drive a car.
• The most popular travel destinations are the Carpathians (55%) and the southern seaside resorts (48%). 37% traveled to natural attractions, 26% to interesting cities in Ukraine, and 17% to places of historical events and battles.
• Most car owners (77%) are willing to use toll highways if they are of higher quality, safer, and allow a speed limit of 130 km/h.
• 69% of respondents did not use suburban trains in the past year. 8% traveled by them frequently, while 23% traveled rarely. 74% did not use interregional trains during this period. Only 4% used them frequently, and 22% rarely. About 70% of those who use these types of transport are willing to pay more if the quality of services improves. About one-third are not willing to pay more.
• 46% have a positive attitude toward the initiative to create a state mortgage program at 7% for 20 years. 40% are neutral, and only 11% view it negatively. At the same time, 28% say they want to use this program, while 69% do not. The share of those intending to use the mortgage program is higher among respondents who evaluate the initiative positively.

The survey was conducted by Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine) on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research.

This annual survey provides an extensive look at citizen attitudes about local governance and municipal services.

Polling was conducted in the 24 regional capitals of Ukraine not under the control of Russian or Russian-backed forces, including Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk in the Donbas region. The survey is based on a sample size of 19,196 respondents.

The margin of error for each city does not exceed ±3.5 points. Average response rate is 65%.

Ratings of Ukrainian cities: seventh municipal survey by IRI from Rating Group

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group on 2–4 September 2021, over the past five months the share of respondents who are aware of the diplomatic initiative “Crimea Platform” has increased by one and a half times (from 45% in April to 66% in September).
• The share of those who evaluate this initiative positively has also increased (from 38% in April to 50% in September). Among respondents who are well informed about the substance of the Crimea Platform, nearly 80% have a positive attitude toward it.
• Respondents are generally well informed about the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany bypassing Ukraine: 50% know about it, 31% have heard something about it, and only 18% know nothing. 41% believe that Ukraine had no real ability to stop the construction of this pipeline. At the same time, 20% place responsibility on Poroshenko, 3% on Zelenskyy, and about a quarter on both presidents.
• Among key global leaders, Ukrainians have the most positive attitudes toward German Chancellor Angela Merkel (73% positive, 19% negative) and U.S. President Joseph Biden (64% positive, 19% negative). Over the past few months, attitudes toward the U.S. President have slightly improved, while attitudes toward the German Chancellor have slightly worsened.
• French President Emmanuel Macron is viewed positively by 57% and negatively by 19%, while 23% could not assess him or do not know him. Polish President Andrzej Duda is viewed positively by 54%, negatively by 10%, while 37% could not assess him or do not know him.
• In contrast, attitudes toward the leaders of Belarus and Russia are predominantly negative. Alexander Lukashenko is viewed negatively by 59% of respondents and positively by 34%. Over the past year, positive attitudes toward the President of Belarus have declined from 45% to 34%, and over the past two years they have fallen by half (from 67% to 34%).
• Attitudes toward Vladimir Putin are overwhelmingly negative: 81% view him negatively, while only 15% view him positively.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group between 2 and 4 September 2021 show that one third of respondents (34%) assess the country’s current direction as correct, while 58% consider it incorrect and 8% were unable to answer. Compared to July 2021, the share of those who view the direction of development as correct has increased (from 26%). This assessment is relatively more common among young people as well as residents of Western and Central Ukraine.
• The trust rating of politicians is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi: 50% of respondents trust him, while 48% do not, meaning that he has regained a positive balance of trust, similar to the one he had during his first year in office. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 29% and not trusted by 32%, while 33% say they do not know him. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 26% and not trusted by 71%. Yuliia Tymoshenko has the same level of trust (26%) with 72% distrusting her. Yurii Boiko is trusted by 23%, not trusted by 58%, and unknown to 16%. Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 17%, not trusted by 46%, while 30% have not heard of him. Viktor Medvedchuk is trusted by 15% and not trusted by 71% of respondents.
• If a presidential election were held in the near future, 31.1% of decided voters who intend to vote would support Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Compared to early August, his support increased from 27% to 31%. Petro Poroshenko would receive 13.3% of the vote, Yurii Boiko 10.9%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 9.2%, Ihor Smeshko 6.1%, Volodymyr Groysman 5.7%, Yevhenii Murayev 5.7%, Oleh Liashko 4.1%, Dmytro Razumkov 3.7%, and Arsenii Yatseniuk 3.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed 2%.
• Petro Poroshenko leads the negative rating: 45% of respondents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Similarly, 38% would not vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, 35% for Yurii Boiko, 25% for Oleh Liashko, and 24% for Volodymyr Zelenskyi. About one in six or seven respondents say they would never vote for Arsenii Yatseniuk, Oleh Tiahnybok, or Yevhenii Murayev.
• In the parliamentary race, the Servant of the People party remains in first place with 25.8% support among decided voters. European Solidarity would receive 14.1%, Opposition Platform – For Life 12.4%, and Batkivshchyna 10.6%. Other parties have significantly lower ratings: Strength and Honor is supported by 4.9%, Murayev’s Our Party by 4.7%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman by 4.5%, the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko by 4.2%, Sharii’s Party by 3.6%, UDAR of Vitalii Klitschko by 3.4%, and a hypothetical Prytula party by 3.2%. Support for other political forces does not exceed 3%.
• Among official Independence Day events, respondents rated the military parade in Kyiv most positively, with 44% expressing a positive assessment. The short film “DNA of Ukraine” received positive evaluations from 38% of respondents, President Zelenskyi’s speech at the parade from 36%, and the festive concert at the Olympic Stadium in Kyiv from 29%. Among those who actually watched these events, the short film “DNA of Ukraine” received the highest ratings, with 67% positive responses.
• Finally, 48% of respondents consider President Zelenskyi’s visit to the United States to have been successful, while 28% view it as unsuccessful. Another 17% said they were unaware of the visit or found it difficult to assess.

• Over the 30 years of Ukraine’s Independence, a generation has emerged whose views, ideas, values and aspirations differ markedly from other demographic groups. In sociological measurements of recent years, ideological and regional differences have become less significant, giving way to the age factor. Young people who were born and raised in the new conditions of a globalized world, without the barriers of the Soviet era, are now setting new life trends, breaking stereotypes and traditions, and forming new societal demands. This is the Independence Generation.
• To mark the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence, Rating Group conducted the first large-scale sociological study with a total sample of 20,000 respondents. Its purpose was to explore the thinking and lifestyle of the new generation of Ukrainians — their value systems, motivations, and their assessments of themselves and of Ukraine. The results are presented across age, gender, regional (by oblast), economic and psychological dimensions. The survey was conducted from July 20 to August 9, 2021, through telephone interviews; 20,000 respondents from all regions of the country were interviewed, excluding the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas.

Identity

• In terms of identity, 80% of respondents stated they would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence today. Only 15% would not support it, and 5% were uncertain. The highest level of support comes from those born after 1991 (87%). Support is also higher among residents of western and central regions and among more affluent respondents. Despite some variations, no fewer than two-thirds of respondents in every demographic group would support Independence today.
• When describing their self-identification, 75% of respondents said they consider themselves citizens of Ukraine, while 11% do not. At the same time, 26% identify as Europeans, and 21% still describe themselves as “Soviet people.” Among the Independence Generation, 86% identify as citizens of Ukraine and 40% as Europeans. Older respondents are far less likely to see themselves as Europeans and more likely to identify with the Soviet past. Regionally, western oblasts and Kyiv feel more European than Soviet, while eastern regions show the opposite tendency. Those who travel more within the country feel a stronger civic connection to Ukraine.

Self-assessment

• Regarding self-assessment, Ukrainians evaluate their personal situation at a moderate level, while their assessment of the country is somewhat lower. When asked to place themselves on a seven-step ladder — from the lowest to the highest social standing — 22% placed themselves on the bottom two rungs, 66% on the middle rungs (third to fifth), and 9% on the top two (sixth and seventh). Looking ten years ahead, only 18% expect their situation to be poor, 31% see it as average, and 32% believe they will be on the highest rungs of the social ladder.
• The current situation of Ukraine is perceived more pessimistically: 36% placed the country on the bottom two steps, 55% on the middle ones (with 27% specifically placing it on the third step), and only 4% placed the country at the top. Expectations for the future of Ukraine, however, are more optimistic: 44% hope the country will be on the highest rungs, 34% expect it to be at the middle level (more than half of these on the fifth step), and 18% doubt its positive prospects. Younger respondents give higher assessments both to their own status and to the country’s. Men tend to rate their personal situation higher, while women tend to be more optimistic about Ukraine’s future. The highest self-evaluations and assessments of the country come from supporters of Zelensky. Their expectations for Ukraine’s future are even more positive than their expectations for their own lives ten years from now. Supporters of Poroshenko and Groysman also show relatively positive assessments. In contrast, supporters of Boyko and Murayev are the most pessimistic about both themselves and the state. Western and central regions evaluate themselves and the country more positively, while in the east and south the assessments are lower, and expectations for the future — more restrained.

Emotions

• In terms of emotions, the two main feelings people experience when thinking about Ukraine are sadness (37%) and pride (34%). Interest is reported by 20%, joy and shame by 18% each, fear by 16%, and only 5% express indifference or anger. Regarding themselves personally, 37% feel interest, 34% feel joy, 22–24% feel sadness and pride, 14% feel fear, 6% feel shame, and 3–4% feel anger or indifference. Nearly half of young people feel pride and interest when thinking about the country, and one-third feel joy. They are considerably more positive about themselves and Ukraine than older respondents. Regionally, emotional perception moves from pride in the West toward more negative emotions, such as sadness, in the East.
• The strongest feelings of pride for the country are found among supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko, who also report far less shame either for themselves or for Ukraine. Their perceptions of both themselves and the country are significantly more optimistic than those of supporters of other candidates. Conversely, voters of Boyko — and especially Murayev — demonstrate the most negative emotional background. They rarely feel pride in themselves or in Ukraine, and when thinking about the country they mostly experience sadness or even shame.

Values and motivations

• Across the value spectrum of Ukrainians, the dominant priorities are universalism, benevolence, conformity and security. The lowest scores are associated with wealth and stimulation, while self-direction, hedonism and achievement remain at mid-level. In the age breakdown, the youngest group is most inclined toward hedonism, autonomy and stimulation. Young people and those of middle age also converge in their emphasis on achievement. Older respondents, by contrast, lean more strongly toward tradition and place the least importance on wealth. The group aged 16–24 stands out in particular: they are the most open to change and most driven by self-assertion, and they are the only cohort whose openness to change exceeds their conservatism. Women in all age groups show a stronger orientation than men toward self-transcendence values (benevolence and universalism). Income-based analysis reveals that the value of wealth is almost insignificant for poorer respondents.
• Electoral preferences also reveal three broad clusters of voters: the conditionally positive and change-oriented (supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko); those with moderate emotional attitudes toward the country and more conservative value structures (supporters of Tymoshenko, Lyashko, Groysman and Smeshko); and the strongly conservative segment (supporters of Murayev and Boyko).
• A relative majority of respondents (57%) report being satisfied with their lives overall, 21% are dissatisfied and 23% give a neutral assessment. Satisfaction grows with younger age and higher income. Notably, even among poorer groups within the 16–24 cohort, life satisfaction remains relatively high.
• Motivational orientations divide society almost evenly: half (49%) want to live “no worse than others,” while slightly fewer (45%) want to live “better than others” and achieve success. The drive to “live better than others” appears more often among the Independence Generation and middle-aged groups. Among respondents aged 51 and older, the opposite tendency dominates—they prioritise living “no worse than others.” The aspiration for a better life is most common in Kyiv, among more affluent respondents, and among women. Among young women aged 16–24, the motivation to “live better than others” reaches particularly high levels.
• If faced with a sharp decline in income, 60% would rather seek additional earnings, while 36% would cut expenses. Younger and more affluent respondents, as well as those who place greater value on wealth, are more inclined to look for new income sources. The Independence Generation—especially those aged 16–24—show the strongest readiness to pursue opportunities: more than 80% of them would not cut their spending but would instead seek additional income.
• Sixty-one percent believe they can influence their income levels, whereas 38% think it does not depend on them. Younger, more affluent, more satisfied and success-oriented respondents express the highest sense of control over their earnings.
• When reflecting on their life trajectory, 41% believe their best years are still ahead; 24% feel they are living them now; and 31% think their best years are already behind them. Only a third of those aged 25–50 believe they are currently in their best period. Optimism about the future is strongest among young and middle-aged respondents and those with higher incomes. Among the oldest respondents, more than 70% believe their best years have passed.
• When choosing a desirable job, the most important criterion is salary (75%), followed by social benefits (31%), workplace relationships (26%) and work schedule (22%). The least important factors are career prospects (14%) and prestige or social status (10%). The Independence Generation is the only age group that shows heightened interest in career advancement. A flexible schedule matters more to those under 40, homemakers, the unemployed and students. For people aged 40–60, neither schedule nor career advancement is of major importance. For pensioners, only salary and social guarantees matter. Manual workers prioritise salary as well, while office workers place notable importance on workplace atmosphere. As income rises, so do expectations toward employers: wealthier respondents value nearly all criteria—from guarantees to career development—while poorer respondents focus primarily on salary as a means of meeting basic needs.

Tolerance 

• The analysis of values shows an interesting contrast: although Ukrainians readily declare the importance of universalism and benevolence, these ideals do not fully translate into tolerance. Forty-seven percent express negative attitudes toward the LGBT community, and 42% feel negatively about people who choose to be childfree; around half are neutral toward these groups, and only 7–8% express positive views. Attitudes toward people who do not believe in God are noticeably more tolerant: only 28% reject them, while 63% are generally neutral and 8% view them positively.
• Young women aged 16–24 form a distinct trend of heightened tolerance: one in three holds positive views of LGBT people and the childfree, whereas among men of the same age, the share is three times smaller. Overall, the Independence Generation—especially the 16–24 cohort—stands out as the most tolerant group. Across all three categories, their views tend to be predominantly neutral (60–70%), with roughly one-fifth expressing positive attitudes and up to one-fifth negative ones. Tolerance declines steadily with age, reaching its lowest levels among those aged 61 and older, where negative attitudes dominate—66% toward the childfree and 65% toward LGBT people.
• Regionally, Kyiv is the most tolerant. The East and West are similar in their conservatism, though with different emphases: the more religious West is less tolerant of non-believers, while Donbas shows the strongest rejection of LGBT people. The least accepting of pro-Western values are the voters of Boyko and Murayev. In contrast, supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko display comparatively higher levels of tolerance across all categories, most often expressing neutral views.
• Religious belief remains widespread: 60% of the population believe in God without doubt, 17% believe but have doubts, and 14% believe in higher powers generally. Only 7% identify as atheists. Faith intensifies with age and exceeds 60% after age 50. Religiosity is highest in Halychyna and the western regions more broadly, while Kyiv and the youngest cohort (16–24) have the lowest share of believers—less than half. Among those who firmly believe in God, 40% express negative attitudes toward atheists. This group is also less tolerant toward LGBT people (55% negative) and toward the childfree (49% negative).
• Support for restoring the death penalty in Ukraine is split: 51% support the idea, while 45% oppose it. Support is strongest among older, poorer and less educated respondents, among men, and among people who experience negative emotions toward themselves—such as shame, anger, sadness, indifference or fear.

Electoral sympathies

• The presidential ranking is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who would receive 27.2% of the vote if elections were held in the near future (among those who intend to vote and have made their choice). He is followed by Petro Poroshenko with 14.9%, Yurii Boiko with 10.5%, Yuliia Tymoshenko with 9.7%, Ihor Smeshko with 6.6%, Yevhenii Murayev with 5.6%, and Volodymyr Hroisman with 5.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed four percent.
• Zelenskyi leads in 17 regions of the country. In Kyiv, as well as in Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts, he shares the top position with Poroshenko, while in Kharkiv oblast he shares the lead with Boiko. Only in Lviv oblast does Poroshenko take first place, in Vinnytsia oblast the leader is Hroisman, and in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts Boiko comes out on top.
• Among the Independence Generation, every second respondent who intends to vote and has made a choice supports Zelenskyi. Within this group, his result is more than four times higher than Poroshenko’s. Zelenskyi also records very high support among the youngest respondents who are not yet eligible to vote (aged 16–17): more than half choose him overall, and almost 70% among those who hypothetically would vote and have chosen a candidate.

Foreign policy vectors

• The dominant foreign policy direction in Ukraine remains European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Across all questions related to Ukraine’s future on the international stage, at least half of respondents expressed pro-Western aspirations. Support for joining the European Union stands at 64%, while 54% favour joining NATO. These attitudes are strongest among the youngest cohort (ages 16–24): 66% support NATO membership and 75% support EU membership. Even among the oldest respondents, at least half remain oriented toward the West.
• EU membership, although influenced by regional differences—with support decreasing from West to East—does not divide society as sharply as the question of NATO accession. Overall, the youngest generation (16–24) demonstrates the clearest consolidation around a pro-European vision for Ukraine’s future. Even in the East, where the majority opposes EU membership, a majority of young people (58%) support the country’s European course.
• At the same time, the most stable alternative to European integration is not a pro-Russian orientation, but rather a preference for equal distance from both the West and Russia. This option is chosen by 35% of respondents. Among those who oppose EU membership, only a quarter advocate movement toward Russia; most prefer an independent trajectory. By age, the strongest supporters of this “equidistant” model are those between 25 and 50. In the eastern regions, this preference dominates over the pro-European direction, while in the western regions it dominates over the pro-Russian one.
• Interestingly, this vision of Ukraine’s future does not reveal sharp regional divides. With the exception of Halychyna, where support for equidistance is around 20%, levels of support in all other macro-regions range from 30% to 45%.

Nostalgia for the USSR

• Sixty-one percent of respondents do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, while 32% do. Regret is most common in the southeastern regions, among older and less affluent people. Nostalgia is also widespread among those who would not support Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence today and among individuals who believe their best years are already behind them. Attitudes in Ukraine and Russia differ fundamentally: over the past decade, nostalgia for the USSR has steadily declined in Ukraine, while in Russia it has increased.
• When assessing the overall impact of the Soviet period on Ukraine’s development, 52% describe it as neutral, 23% as negative, and 18% as positive. The strongest polarisation appears among older generations, who are more likely to provide both highly negative and highly positive assessments. The youngest cohort predominantly chooses a neutral evaluation, as the USSR for them is not a lived experience but a chapter in history textbooks.
• Areas where modern Ukraine is viewed as clearly outperforming the Soviet period include freedom of speech (77%) and opportunities for self-realisation (64%). Perceptions of living standards are evenly split: 43% believe life was better in the USSR, and 43% believe it is better today. Younger people tend to prefer the present, while older respondents lean toward the Soviet past. In evaluations of healthcare and education, modern Ukraine still “loses” to Soviet-era perceptions—only those born after 1991 believe these services are better today, while older generations consistently rate current systems as worse.
• Despite divided views on living standards, only 27% support a return to a planned economy, while two-thirds support market relations. The dividing line here is not age but income: the wealthier the respondent, the more likely they are to support a free market.
• Migration attitudes reflect similar generational divides. Thirty-two percent would like to work abroad, while 65% would not. Among the youngest respondents, the desire to leave reaches 54%, compared to only 18% among those aged 61+. In Donbas, interest in working abroad is roughly half the level recorded in western regions (20–23% versus around 40%).
• Higher wages (71%) and better living conditions (57%) are the primary motives for wanting to work abroad. Around one in five also cite better working conditions and more opportunities for self-realisation, though the latter is notably more important for the Generation of Independence than for older age groups.

Images of youth

• In the eyes of most Ukrainians, today’s youth is patriotic and moral: around 60% share this view, while roughly a third disagree. Importantly, the survey did not define the age boundaries of “youth,” so each respondent interpreted the term individually. At the same time, opinions on the educational level of young people are more critical: 56% consider youth poorly educated, and only 38% believe they are well educated. Other assessments split almost evenly — half describe youth as hardworking, the other half as lazy; similarly, 45% consider them responsible, while 50% perceive them as irresponsible.
• Young respondents themselves view their generation more favorably, especially when compared with perceptions held by those aged 31–50 — the age group that could be considered their “parent generation.” Older Ukrainians tend to rate the diligence of youth higher than other groups do. Women generally assess young people more positively than men, and wealthier respondents also express more favorable opinions.
• Perceptions of youth strongly depend on regional context. In the West, Halychyna, Central regions and Kyiv, young people are seen as more patriotic, responsible, hardworking and moral. On the Donbas, in the South and East, evaluations are noticeably more negative: youth are viewed as less patriotic, less educated, lazier, less responsible and less moral. These perceptions also correlate with emotional attitudes toward the country itself. The more pride and joy respondents feel about Ukraine, the more positively they assess its youth.
• Electoral preferences reinforce this divide. Supporters of Zelenskyy and Poroshenko give youth the highest evaluations: roughly 70% of them describe young people as patriotic and moral, and 50–60% consider them responsible and hardworking. The most negative assessments come from voters of Murayev, who rate the education, patriotism and responsibility of youth very low.
• Despite the presence of some critical views, the majority of Ukrainians agree that youth development should be a national priority. Notably, this opinion is shared equally across all age groups — older generations view investment in young people as just as important as the Generation of Independence does.

Lifestyle

• Ukrainians today are most interested in travel, sports, a healthy lifestyle, music, and self-development — these areas were chosen by a quarter to a third of respondents. The least interest is shown in fashion (only 3%), while religion, history, and politics also attract relatively little attention (8–9%). Ecology, cooking, technology, economics, and cinema generate moderate interest (12–19%).
• The Independence Generation is most interested in sports, travel, music, and self-development. Notably, music is especially appealing to young people aged 16–24. As age increases, the importance of a healthy lifestyle rises: among those aged 40+, around 40% selected it. For the oldest group (61+), politics and economics are more interesting (18%), while these topics hardly interest the youngest (only 4–10%). After age 50, religion also becomes more relevant (12%). Interest in ecology also grows with age — 20–26% among people 50+. Conversely, interest in technology sharply declines after 50.
• Almost everyone is interested in travel, except for the oldest respondents. Interest in sports and self-development decreases after age 40: only 21% of the oldest group chose sports, compared to 50% among those aged 16–24.
• Men are more interested in sports (48%), while women are more interested in travel (39%), cooking (26%), and a healthy lifestyle (36%). Women also appear to take better care of their health, as they undergo preventive medical check-ups more often than men (most frequently women aged 23–30). Overall, however, half of Ukrainians say they do not attend medical check-ups unless they feel unwell.
• Sixteen percent of Ukrainians have not left their locality in the past five years — most of them poorer, older, or rural residents. One-third have visited another city/village once or a few times, while half travel around Ukraine frequently.
• In the past five years, twice as many Ukrainians visited European countries compared to trips to Egypt, Turkey, and similar resorts: 9% traveled to Europe many times, 21% several times, and 70% never. In contrast, trips to such resorts amount to 3%, 13%, and 84% respectively. Visits to CIS countries are also rare — 87% have never been there.
• The Independence Generation travels most actively: for example, half of those aged 25–30 and over one-third of those aged 16–24 have visited Europe. They also travel frequently within Ukraine — over 60%. Yet even among them, more than 70% have never been to popular foreign resorts, and over 80% have never visited CIS countries.
• Residents of Kyiv travel abroad and domestically more often than others. Western Ukrainians, especially Zakarpattia residents, also travel frequently to Europe: 62% reported visiting EU countries. Trips to CIS states are most common among residents of Odesa and regions bordering Russia — Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Sumy.
• Only 15% of Ukrainians in the smartphone era write messages more often than they make phone calls. However, within the Independence Generation, communication increasingly shifts toward messaging. Among respondents aged 16–17, the majority — nearly 70% — primarily use messages rather than phone calls.

Dreams

• Ukrainians dream primarily of having strong health (58%). Good physical condition is one of a person’s basic needs, and the pandemic — as a threat to health — likely contributed to the heightened relevance of this aspiration. In second place is an increase in salaries and pensions (41%). For low-income Ukrainians, this is dream number one and is even slightly more important than health.
• The dream of having children and grandchildren ranks third (40%). It is equally relevant across age groups, except for the youngest (under 24), for whom it matters less. The stereotype that the desire for children is stronger among women is not confirmed: dreams about children and grandchildren show no significant gender differences.
• Between 16–17% dream of a large house or of traveling. As with spheres of interest, women — especially up to age 40 — dream of traveling more often. The dream of owning a large house is also more important to women than to men.
• Only 10% of Ukrainians dream about a career. This aspiration is most common among young women aged 16–24 (45%). By ages 25–30, this share decreases by half (21%) as dreams about family and children emerge. Young men aged 16–24 are more oriented toward running their own business (38%) than toward a career, and more so than women of the same age (28%).
• Fourteen percent dream of happy love, and for men this dream is more important. For example, among those aged 25–40, only 14% of women dream about love, compared to 22–24% of men. Even after age 60, one in ten men still dreams of happy love, whereas almost no women at that age continue to dream about it.
• The dream of strong health is more popular among women than men: from age 25 onward, about 60% of women prioritize this aspiration. Among men, it becomes significant only after age 50.
• Among those who want to work abroad, only one in ten dreams of permanently moving there. At the same time, they more often dream of travel, career opportunities, and running their own business.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group on 23–25 July 2021 shows that one quarter of respondents (25%) believe the country is moving in the right direction, while 67% see the direction as wrong and 8% were unable to answer. Younger respondents are somewhat more likely to view the country’s trajectory positively.
• Volodymyr Zelensky remains the most trusted political figure: 45% trust him and 52% do not. Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 31% and distrusted by 68%; Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 57%. Petro Poroshenko receives 26% trust and 72% distrust. Viktor Medvedchuk is trusted by 18% and distrusted by 70%. Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 16%, distrusted by 51%, and 28% say they have not heard of him.
• If a presidential election were held soon, 27.7% of those who intend to vote and have made their choice would support Zelensky. Poroshenko would receive 13.4%, Tymoshenko 11.4%, Boyko 10.1%, Ihor Smeshko 7.8%, Volodymyr Groysman 6.1%, Yevhen Murayev 6%, and Dmytro Razumkov 4.1%. Support for all other candidates is below 3%.
• Poroshenko holds the highest anti-rating: 46% would not vote for him under any circumstances. Tymoshenko’s anti-rating is 36%, Boyko’s is 34%, Zelensky’s is 29%, and Oleh Lyashko’s is 26%. About one in five respondents say they would never vote for Arseniy Yatsenyuk or Oleh Tyahnybok.
• In parliamentary preferences, Servant of the People leads with 24.1% among decided voters. European Solidarity follows with 14.3%, Batkivshchyna with 12.8%, and Opposition Platform – For Life with 12.4%. Support for other forces is significantly lower: Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman polls at 5%, and both the Radical Party and Murayev’s “Nashi” receive 4.8%. UDAR has 4.3%, Strength and Honour 4.1%, and Svoboda 3.4%, while all remaining parties poll below 3%.
• Support for granting the Tomos of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine stands at 45%, while 19% do not support it and 31% are indifferent. The highest support is observed in the West and Centre, among older respondents, and among those who identify as Greek Catholics or members of the OCU. Opposition Platform voters, as well as supporters of Murayev and Shariy, tend to view the Tomos negatively.
• Three-quarters of respondents (75%) consider Ukraine the successor to Kyivan Rus. Only 8% believe Russia is the successor, while 9% do not assign that status to either country. Although Ukraine is seen as the rightful successor across all age groups and most electorates, fewer than half of respondents in the East—and fewer than half of voters for Opposition Platform, Murayev, or Shariy—share this view.
• A majority of respondents (55%) disagree with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people who belong to a single historical and spiritual space,” while 41% agree. Agreement with this statement exceeds 60% in the East and among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. In contrast, over 70% of residents of Western Ukraine reject this idea. More than 80% of voters for Opposition Platform, Murayev, and Shariy accept the notion of “one people.”