News and Press releases

The sociological study “Socio-political situation in Ukraine” was conducted by two sociological services: the Center for Social and Marketing Research SOCIS and the Rating Group.

• At the end of 2016, 69.9% of respondents described the current situation in Ukraine as tense, while another 23.2% considered it explosive. Only 5.2% said the situation in the country was stable, and 1.9% could not give a clear answer.
• 54.3% of respondents identified the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine as the main problem requiring immediate resolution. Another 37.9% pointed to rising prices for basic goods and inflation. 37.8% said low wages and pensions need urgent attention, 33.9% pointed to utility tariffs, 27.5% to corruption in the central government, 26.9% to lack of jobs and unemployment, and 19.7% to the high cost and low quality of medical services. Smaller shares mentioned social inequality and the gap between rich and poor (12.8%), corruption in courts, police and the prosecutor’s office (12.0%), insufficient social protection (10.6%), and crime and public safety (7.5%). Only small minorities named unfavorable conditions for small and medium business (4.3%), low quality of education (2.8%), and lack of freedom and democracy (2.2%) as urgent problems.
• Respondents showed relatively high readiness to take part in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. 37.8% said they were fully certain they would vote, and another 34.0% said they were likely to come to the polling stations. At the same time, 25.4% stated that they would definitely not participate, and 2.9% could not answer.
• Among all respondents, the leaders of the presidential rating were Petro Poroshenko with 9.6% and Yuliia Tymoshenko with 9.4%. Yurii Boiko was supported by 6.3%, Vadym Rabinovych by 6.0%, Oleh Liashko by 5.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 5.2%, and Andrii Sadovyi by 4.3%. Other candidates listed in the survey were supported by less than 3%. There was a strong demand for a hypothetical “other candidate”, with 12.1% saying they would likely support someone not listed in the questionnaire. 12.7% could not decide or refused to answer, while 21.6% said they would not participate in the elections at all.
• A simulated presidential election based only on those who intended to vote and had made a choice produced the following results. Petro Poroshenko would receive 14.7%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 14.6%, Yurii Boiko 10.0%, Vadym Rabinovych 9.2%, Oleh Liashko 9.2%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.8%, Andrii Sadovyi 6.8%, Oleh Tiahnybok 3.1%, Nadiia Savchenko 2.4%, Dmytro Yarosh 2.4%, Arsenii Yatseniuk 1.1%, and Viktor Medvedchuk 1.0%. 17.7% would vote for other candidates not listed.
• 47.2% of respondents supported holding early parliamentary elections, while 44.9% opposed this idea and 8.0% were undecided.
• 36.3% said they were fully ready to participate in parliamentary elections if they were held next Sunday, and 34.5% said they were rather ready to vote. 25.2% were not confident they would participate, and 4.0% could not answer or refused to respond.
• Among all respondents, 10.0% would vote for Batkivshchyna, 9.3% for Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, 7.3% for the Opposition Bloc, 6.4% for Samopomich, 5.8% for Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, 5.7% for For Life, 4.8% for Civic Position, 3.2% for Svoboda, and 2.8% for the Movement of New Forces. Other parties had less than 2%. 12.3% were undecided or refused to answer, and 22.4% said they would not vote at all.
• A simulated parliamentary election among those who intended to vote and had chosen a party gave the following results. Batkivshchyna would receive 15.5%, Petro Poroshenko Bloc 14.1%, Opposition Bloc 11.2%, Samopomich 9.8%, Radical Party 9.1%, For Life 8.8%, Civic Position 7.1%, Svoboda 4.9%, and the Movement of New Forces 4.1%. Other parties would receive less than 2%.
• 20.1% of respondents named Yurii Boiko as the leader of the current opposition, 14.5% named Yuliia Tymoshenko, 11.5% Oleh Liashko, 7.7% Vadym Rabinovych, 7.5% Mikheil Saakashvili, 4.1% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 4.0% Andrii Sadovyi, and 2.2% Oleh Tiahnybok. 25.1% could not answer or refused to respond.
• 60.7% said they would vote in favor of joining the European Union if a referendum were held soon, 23.8% would vote against, 9.2% would not participate, and 6.3% were undecided.
• If a referendum on joining NATO were held, 47.2% would vote in favor, 33.6% against, 11.0% would not participate, and 8.3% were undecided.
• When asked whether they would support the Maidan today, 10.2% said they would regularly participate, 21.8% would not participate personally but would morally support the protesters, 13.5% would occasionally join protests, and 9.2% would support financially without participating. At the same time, 31.9% said they were against the Maidan, 6.7% were indifferent, and 6.8% could not answer.
• 16.9% believe another Maidan is highly likely in the near future, 38.3% consider it quite likely, 27.8% think it is unlikely, and 9.5% see it as almost impossible, while 7.6% were undecided.
• At the same time, 44.1% do not support the idea of a new Maidan, 16.2% would support it and personally participate, 30.8% would support it without personal participation, and 8.9% were undecided.
• 59.5% consider participation in elections the most acceptable way to defend their position. 21.1% would turn to protests, 9.5% to civil disobedience actions, 3.8% would defend their position with weapons, and 3.8% would do so by joining an opposition party. 18.0% said none of these forms suited them, and 6.6% could not answer.
• 46.3% believe the November protests in Kyiv were organized and paid for by political forces, 33.7% think they were genuine protests of ordinary people, and 20.1% could not evaluate them.
• 47.0% consider continued diplomatic efforts the best way to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 20.8% favor a referendum on the status of the occupied territories, 12.7% support isolating the territories and freezing the conflict, 9.8% support military mobilization to regain them, 2.1% propose other solutions, and 7.7% were undecided.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, the leader of electoral support among political parties is Batkivshchyna. 17.4% of respondents who intend to vote and have decided on their preferences would vote for this party. 12.6% would support BPP Solidarity, 11.1% the Opposition Bloc, 8.4% the Radical Party, 7.4% Samopomich, 6.2% the party “For Life”, 6.1% Svoboda, 5.6% Civic Position, 3.1% the Saakashvili Party, and about 3% would support Yarosh’s Movement and the UKROP party.
• In six-month dynamics, the top five parties remain almost unchanged. Batkivshchyna’s rating is stable (16–18%), while BPP Solidarity has gradually grown after its summer decline (from 9% to 13%). The decline of the Opposition Bloc (from 17% to 11%) is primarily linked to the emergence of the For Life party, which has a similar electorate. Samopomich (from 12% to 7%) and the Radical Party (from 11% to 8%) have also declined. Ratings of Civic Position, Svoboda, the Saakashvili Party, and UKROP remain stable.
• Regionally, Batkivshchyna leads in the West and the Center, with BPP Solidarity in second place, coming close to the leader in the West. In the South and East, the Opposition Bloc leads, while Batkivshchyna and BPP Solidarity share second and third places.
• The leader in presidential electoral preferences is Yuliya Tymoshenko — 17.7% of those ready to vote and who have decided on their preferences would vote for her. Petro Poroshenko is supported by 14.3%, Yuriy Boyko by 10.2%, Oleh Liashko by 9.9%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko by 8.2%, Vadym Rabinovych by 7.5%, Andriy Sadovyi by 7.3%, Oleh Tiahnybok by 4.5%, and Dmytro Yarosh by 2.4%. Compared to September, no significant changes occurred. Over six months, Tymoshenko’s support rose from 15% to 18%, and Poroshenko’s from 12% to 14%. Boyko declined (from 14% to 10%), Sadovyi fell (from 10% to 7%), and Nadiya Savchenko lost almost all support (from 10% to 2%).
• In the West, Poroshenko narrowly leads, with Tymoshenko second. In the Center, Tymoshenko leads and Poroshenko is second. In the South and East, Boyko narrowly leads, followed by Tymoshenko (South) and Poroshenko (East).
• 11% believe that Tymoshenko would win if elections were held soon, 9% believe Poroshenko would win, while half could not decide. Among Batkivshchyna supporters, 68% believe in Tymoshenko’s victory; among BPP supporters, 60% believe Poroshenko would win.
• In a second-round simulation, between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, 16% would support Poroshenko, 27% Tymoshenko, 45% would not vote, and 12% are undecided. Tymoshenko has stronger support in all regions and among supporters of other candidates.
• Between Poroshenko and Liashko, support is almost equal (20% vs 19%), with 47% not voting.
• Between Poroshenko and Boyko, 23% would support Poroshenko and 17% Boyko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Boyko, 33% would vote for Tymoshenko and 15% for Boyko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Liashko, 28% would vote for Tymoshenko and 13% for Liashko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Sadovyi, 25% would vote for Tymoshenko and 20% for Sadovyi.
• Thus, Poroshenko beats Boyko and sometimes Liashko, while Tymoshenko leads in all pairings.
• 14% believe Tymoshenko represents ordinary people, 12% Vakarchuk, 11% Liashko, and 42% say no politician represents them.
• 45% support dissolving parliament and holding new elections. 46% support early presidential elections.
• Only 11% think Ukraine is on the right track; 78% think it is on the wrong one. 89% say the socio-economic situation has worsened.
• Two thirds blame corruption at the top, followed by war in Donbas, oligarchs, and self-interest of officials.
• 69% hold President Poroshenko responsible for the current situation.
• 27% think the President can lead Ukraine out of crisis; 32% think he can stop the war.
• 43% receive utility subsidies; 70% support raising the minimum wage to 3,200 UAH, though only 38% expect it to improve their family finances.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, the majority of respondents (72%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people; 14% do not agree, and 14% were undecided.
• Despite the fact that the share of those who recognize the Holodomor as genocide slightly declined compared to the previous year (from 80% to 72%), it remains at the same level as in 2014 and is higher than in 2010–2012 (about 60%).
• The statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is shared by virtually all residents of the West (97%), the majority of respondents in the Center (78%), nearly two thirds in the South (57%), and slightly less than half in the East (48%).
• Residents of rural areas agree with the genocide thesis more often than urban residents (79% vs 68%). Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 83% support the statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, only 47% do. By age groups, support for the genocide thesis ranges from 70% to 75%, but the share of those who oppose it increases with age.
• Among supporters of European integration, 86% agree that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide, compared to only 48% among opponents. A similar pattern exists regarding NATO membership (91% vs 53%). In contrast, respondents who support joining the Customs Union are much less inclined to recognize the Holodomor as genocide (only 38%).
• Interestingly, nostalgia for the USSR does not decisively determine attitudes toward recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. Among those who regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 59% still agree that the Holodomor was a genocide (25% disagree). Among those who do not regret the collapse, 85% agree.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 55% of Ukrainians said they followed the U.S. presidential election. Interest was highest in Western Ukraine (67%) and lowest in the East (48%). The elections were followed more often by men, middle-aged and older people, and those with higher levels of education and income. The lowest interest was observed among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Radical Party.
• 39% of Ukrainians sympathized with Hillary Clinton, one in ten with Donald Trump, while 42% sympathized with neither candidate. Among those who followed the elections, 62% supported Clinton and 15% supported Trump.
• Support for Clinton was strongest among respondents with higher education and income, more often in cities, and especially in Western and Central Ukraine. In the East and South, most respondents did not sympathize with either candidate.
• Clinton’s support was relatively higher among women, while Trump had relatively more support among men. However, overall, both genders tended to favor the Democratic candidate.
• Among supporters of Ukrainian political parties, Clinton was most often supported by voters of BPP Solidarity, Civic Position, Svoboda, Wave (Saakashvili’s party), Batkivshchyna, and Samopomich. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc, by contrast, were more likely to sympathize with Trump.
• A plurality (42%) expect no changes in U.S.–Ukraine relations following Donald Trump’s victory. At the same time, one quarter believe relations will deteriorate, especially in Central and Southern Ukraine. Only 7% believe relations will improve.

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Ukrainians’ interest and expectations of the elections results in the USA from Ratinggroup

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, almost half of respondents (48%) support the ban of communist ideology in Ukraine, 36% are against it, and 16% are undecided. Over the past two years, the share of those supporting the ban has not changed. A majority of residents in the West (78%), half of residents in the Center, and one third of residents in the South support banning communist ideology, while in the East only 18% support it. The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more likely they are to support the ban of communist ideology. Men support the ban somewhat more than women. Rural residents support the ban more than urban residents. Support for banning communist ideology is strongest among supporters of patriotic parties, such as Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 80%). The strongest opposition comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (about 70%).
• One third of respondents support a ban on nationalist ideology, while 40% are against it and one quarter are undecided. Over the past two years, support for banning nationalist ideology has declined from 40% to 35%. Nearly half of residents in the South, 40% in the East, and one third in the Center support such a ban, while in the West only 20% do. The older the respondents and the lower their income, the more likely they are to support banning nationalist ideology. Women support the ban more than men. Urban residents are more supportive than rural residents (38% vs 28%). In terms of party preferences, attitudes toward banning nationalist ideology are the exact opposite of those toward banning communist ideology. The strongest support for banning nationalism comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (over 55%), while the lowest support is among voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s Movement.
• 41% of respondents support the initiative to dismantle all Lenin monuments in Ukraine, while nearly half (48%) are against it and 11% are undecided. Support is highest in the West (72%), about 41% in the Center, 26% in the South, and only 18% in the East. The younger the respondents and the higher their education, the more likely they are to support dismantling Lenin monuments. Rural residents are more supportive than city dwellers. Men support this initiative more than women. The strongest supporters are voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 75%). Among voters of BPP, Samopomich, and Civic Position, supporters outnumber opponents roughly two to one (about 60% vs 30%). Among supporters of the Radical Party and Batkivshchyna, supporters and opponents are roughly equal. Voters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc are overwhelmingly against dismantling Lenin monuments.
• Attitudes toward the renaming of Soviet-era city and street names are mixed. Overall, more people oppose (57%) than support (35%) this initiative. However, when selective renaming is considered, support rises and supporters outnumber opponents (49% vs 44%). 34% believe that only names honoring Soviet political figures who committed crimes against the Ukrainian people should be changed, and 15% believe that all such names should be changed. At the same time, 44% oppose any renaming at all, and 7% are undecided. Support for renaming is highest in the West, while in the East and South it is predominantly negative. The higher the level of education, the greater the support for renaming. Men support it more than women. The lowest support is among the 60+ age group. Rural residents are more supportive than urban residents. Among party supporters, the pattern is similar to attitudes toward dismantling Lenin monuments, though opponents are relatively more numerous.
• 72% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude toward Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 8% a negative one. About half evaluate Ivan Mazepa (52%) and Peter I (50%) positively, although negative attitudes toward Peter I are somewhat higher (29% vs 22%). 36% have a positive view of Fidel Castro, 22% a negative one, and 42% are unsure or do not know him. 35% view Stepan Bandera positively, 46% negatively, and 18% are undecided. 26% have a positive view of Symon Petliura, while 45% have a negative view. Nearly one quarter are undecided. 25% view Ronald Reagan positively, 24% negatively, while half are unsure or do not know him. Stalin and Lenin have the worst ratings: only 22% and 25%, respectively, view them positively, and about two thirds view Stalin negatively, while almost 60% view Lenin negatively.
• Dynamics show that the share of Stalin supporters has remained almost unchanged in recent years (20–24%). Positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased significantly compared to 2012 (35% vs 22%) and slightly compared to 2014 (31%). This year, positive views of Peter I declined compared to 2012, but remained at the same level as in 2014 (50%). Positive views of Mazepa increased to 50%, compared to 44% in 2012 and 41% in 2014.
• In the West, there is a positive attitude toward Ukrainian historical figures—Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura—while in the East there is a stronger positive attitude toward Russian historical figures—Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin. The higher the level of education, the more positive respondents are toward Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Petliura, and Reagan. The lower the education, the more positive they are toward Lenin and Stalin. Rural residents view Hrushevsky and Bandera more positively and Peter I, Castro, Lenin, and Stalin more negatively.
• Supporters of Svoboda have the most positive views of Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera. BPP supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura positively. Samopomich supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera positively. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc most positively evaluate Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in October 2016, 47% of respondents stated that they use only state-run medical institutions. 26% said that in addition to public health services, they turn to private medicine if their family has extra financial resources. 15% reported that alongside public services they turn to private clinics in cases of serious illness in the family. Only 6% said they primarily prefer private medical institutions over state ones.
• Almost 70% of respondents are dissatisfied with the state medical services they received over the last five years. 24% are satisfied to some degree with the quality of services in public medical institutions. The highest dissatisfaction was recorded in the South (85%). By age and income, dissatisfaction is higher among older people and those with lower incomes.
• 55% stated that over the last two years the overall quality of public healthcare in the country has deteriorated. Only 12% saw improvement. 27% believe nothing has changed, and 6% could not answer.
• At the same time, respondents assessed changes in private medicine quite positively. 25% believe that over the past two years the quality of services in private medical institutions has improved, while only 15% said it has worsened.
• 17% believe no changes occurred, and one third of respondents did not use private medical services at all. The highest share of those who noticed positive changes in private healthcare live in the West, the lowest in the East. By age, younger and middle-aged respondents, mainly those with higher incomes, were most likely to report improvement. Among respondents aged 51 and older, most did not use private medical services at all.
• Only 8% stated that the Ukrainian healthcare system is close to European standards, while 85% believe that the quality of medical care in Ukraine is far from European standards.
• The cost of medical services is one of the key factors when choosing where to seek treatment. 33% said that if money were not an issue, they would turn to private medical institutions, and 31% would go abroad for treatment. At the same time, 27% would still choose state healthcare, even if money were not a constraint.
• Interestingly, younger people are more inclined toward private and foreign healthcare, while older respondents would still entrust their health to state medical institutions, even if they had the money to go private or abroad.
• Among the countries respondents would choose for treatment, Israel (39%), Germany (38%), and Switzerland (21%) lead, followed by the USA (10%) and Belarus (8%). Only 3% would choose Russia.
• 33% of respondents said they consult a doctor or medical specialist less than once a year. 27% do so once a year, 18% at least every six months, 9% at least every three months, and 5% every month.
• 83% believe that treatment for themselves or their family is expensive (39% very expensive). Only 12% consider medical treatment more or less affordable.
• 36% said treatment in state medical institutions is very expensive; 77% in total consider it expensive. Only 16% find public healthcare affordable.
• 86% evaluated the cost of treatment in private clinics as expensive (58% very expensive). Only 3% said the prices are more or less acceptable.
• The perceived cost of treatment is directly linked to how often people seek care. 51% of those who go to doctors monthly say treatment is very expensive, while only one third of those who go once a year say the same. Nevertheless, the vast majority across all groups agree that healthcare in Ukraine is expensive.
• 69% said they were not asked for bribes over the last two years, while 25% reported cases of corruption.
• At the same time, 59% said they felt obliged to give non-cash gifts (alcohol, chocolate, food) to medical staff as a “thank you”. Only one third did not feel such pressure. This feeling was strongest in the West and Center (66%), and weakest in the East (48%). In the South, 42% do not feel any obligation to give such gifts. Women (64%) feel more obligated than men (53%).
• The most common “gratitude” amount demanded was 100–250 UAH (23%). 16% were asked for 250–500 UAH, 14% for 500–1000 UAH, and 16% for more than 1000 UAH. The least common was up to 50 UAH (4%).
• Only 5% said they would refuse to pay any bribe if asked.
• The main sources of information about healthcare are medical workers (67%) and friends and family (45%). About a quarter also rely on the internet, pharmacists, and TV programs.
• Two thirds know who their family doctor or therapist is. Half trust their doctor, 19% do not, and 31% could not answer.
• Trust is highest in the Center (58%) and lowest in the East, where only 38% trust their family doctor and 25% distrust the institution. Trust is higher among older people, women, and rural residents (57%) than urban residents (48%). Every fifth urban resident expresses distrust.
• 83% support childhood vaccination against polio, measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, and others. Only 9% oppose it. 77% believe vaccinations should be mandatory, 12% oppose, 11% were undecided.
• 69% support requiring ambulance drivers to complete medical first-aid training rather than just being drivers; 23% oppose this.
• 64% support the creation of a paramedic service like in Western countries, which provides first emergency care before a patient reaches full hospital treatment; 23% oppose it. Among opponents, 66% say paramedics are not doctors, 29% fear it would destroy the traditional ambulance system, 17% fear higher costs, and 10% fear doctors would lose jobs.
• Only 6% have private health insurance; 94% do not. Even among those earning over 5,000 UAH, only 14% are insured.
• 46% believe that private insurance covering real medical costs would best improve the system. 34% believe making the current system work efficiently would help most. Only 12% prefer a medical voucher system.
• 57% support funding hospitals based on the number of patients rather than number of beds; 21% oppose, 22% were undecided. Support is highest in the West (69%) and lowest in the Center (47%).

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) September 28 to October 7, 2016. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 66,9%. Additionally, 1,156 respondents were surveyed in Kharkiv oblast. The margin of error does not exceed 2,8%. Average response rate was 64,1%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

• According to the survey data, 35% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Mayor of Kyiv, which is three times higher than satisfaction with the work of the Kyiv City Council deputies and the Kyiv City State Administration. At the same time, half of respondents are dissatisfied with the mayor’s work, and two thirds are dissatisfied with the activities of the City Council and the City Administration.
• At the same time, 28% said that their attitude toward Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has improved during his time in office, while 54% said it has worsened. The greatest improvement in attitudes was observed among young people and those with higher levels of education and income.
• If the mayoral elections were held in the near future, Vitali Klitschko would receive the most support – 35% among those who intend to vote and have made up their minds. Boryslav Bereza would be supported by 12%, Volodymyr Bondarenko by 9%, Oleksandr Omelchenko by 8%, Serhii Husovskyi by 5%, and Oleksandr Puzanov by 4%. These results broadly reflect the 2015 local election pattern, though over the past year support for Klitschko and Husovskyi has declined slightly, while support for Bereza has increased. About 40% of Kyiv residents have not yet decided or do not intend to vote.
• Among the city’s problems, utility tariffs worry Kyiv residents the most (77%). About one third are concerned about corruption in city authorities, the work of municipal services, and the quality of roads and public utilities. Almost a quarter worry about chaotic parking and courtyard maintenance, 21% about traffic jams and apartment burglaries, 19% about chaotic urban development, and 13% about the excessive number of small kiosks (MAFs). Only 5% are concerned about the chaotic placement of outdoor advertising, and 4% about its excessive volume.
• Accordingly, nearly two thirds (58%) believe that changing outdoor advertising rules is not a priority for Kyiv’s city authorities, while 29% consider it one of the priorities.
• At the same time, the vast majority of Kyiv residents have not heard that the outdoor advertising industry creates thousands of jobs and that advertising revenues to the city budget in 2015 amounted to 240 million UAH. Those better informed tend to be people with higher education and income, those who are employed, and more often young and middle-aged residents.
• A plurality (44%) are convinced that the fewer changes are made to business rules, the better. 15% believe the government should change business rules every 5–10 years, and another 15% believe this should happen every 1–5 years.
• Almost half (47%) believe that the concept of reforming outdoor advertising should be a compromise between business and authorities. 22% think the reform should be based primarily on the position of city authorities, and 5% primarily on business interests. Entrepreneurs are three times more likely to favor the business position, while older people more often support the authorities’ stance.
• Among different types of outdoor advertising, the most favorable attitudes are toward store and kiosk signs, while the most negative attitudes are toward advertising placed on buildings.
• Supporters of moderate reduction of outdoor advertising outnumber supporters of major reductions. Those favoring moderate reductions are more often people with middle and above-average income, higher education, and youth. About one third believe nothing should be reduced at all. About 40% support a slight reduction of outdoor advertising. Only 14% want citylights removed entirely, and 18% want billboards removed.
• When social advertising is mentioned, respondents become more tolerant toward outdoor advertising: the number of supporters of reductions decreases, while the number of those who prefer no changes increases.
• About one third believe that a major reduction in outdoor advertising could lead to job losses and reduced city budget revenues; almost 20% think it would lead to lower tax revenues; 13% think it would cause small and medium-sized businesses to close or shrink; and 7% fear worsening investment conditions. Only one quarter see no serious risks. Pensioners are most likely to see no risks; youth and entrepreneurs least likely.
• Among causes of road accidents in Kyiv, drivers most often mentioned violation of traffic rules by drivers (56%), road conditions (54%), insufficient driving skills (33%), poor or missing road markings (26%), pedestrian violations (25%), poor street lighting (23%), distraction by advertising (21%), and traffic light problems (10%).
• Two thirds consider Kyiv a comfortable city for tourists, and nearly 90% believe Kyiv has strong potential to become even more attractive.
• The main advantages of Kyiv as a tourist city are architecture and historical landmarks (65%) and Ukrainian cuisine (58%), followed by museums and theaters (44%), parks (42%), city appearance (37%), friendly people (35%), restaurants (33%), and modernity (25%).
• The main disadvantages are low foreign-language skills (33%), safety concerns (32%), high prices (31%), and poor transport infrastructure (26%). About one in five also believe Kyiv is not modern enough, has an unattractive appearance, or that tourist information is hard to access. Only 9% consider available sex services an advantage, and only 6% see illegal sex services as a major disadvantage.
• Almost 35% traveled to Europe in the past five years, and 30% traveled to CIS countries. Young and middle-aged people traveled abroad almost three times more often than older residents, mostly those with higher education and income.
• Those who frequently visited Europe evaluate Kyiv differently: they more often cite parks, low prices, and affordable housing as advantages, and poor foreign-language skills, transport problems, limited festivals, weak nightlife, illegal sex services, and modest cuisine as disadvantages. At the same time, they consider Kyiv safer than do those who traveled abroad once or never.
• About 75% support Kyiv hosting Eurovision 2017, though only one third think the city is ready for it. 83% also support hosting the UEFA Champions League Final in 2018. Support for both events is higher among young people; Eurovision is equally supported by men and women, while the Champions League Final is supported more by men.
• Reference information: The Association of Outdoor Advertising Operators of Ukraine is a nationwide public organization representing the outdoor advertising industry and monitoring the balance between public, governmental, and business interests.
  Rating Group was founded in 2008 as an independent research organization operating under ESOMAR and WAPOR standards.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, 30% of Ukrainians said they would rather like to move abroad permanently (almost 65% would rather not), while 40% would like to work abroad. A stronger desire to move or work abroad is shown by residents of Western and Central Ukraine, men, younger people, and those with higher education and income.
• The main reasons for wanting to move abroad permanently are better living conditions (53%), ensuring a better future for children (41%), and the lack of decent jobs in Ukraine (32%). Among respondents who have children under 16, ensuring a better future for their children is the main motive (52%).
• Other motives for permanent emigration include better self-realization (13%), feeling unsafe in Ukraine (8%), better education or healthcare (7%), and better conditions for doing business abroad (5%).
• Among those who would like to work abroad, only one quarter consider their chances of getting a job abroad to be high; about half assess their chances as low; 12% believe they have no chance at all, and one in ten are undecided. More optimistic assessments are typical of Western Ukrainians, youth, men, and people with higher education and income. Those who have already worked abroad or have seriously explored the issue are much more optimistic about their chances.
• Overall, one quarter of Ukrainians have already looked into job opportunities abroad. Among visa center visitors who want to work abroad, almost 70% have already explored such opportunities.
• One in ten Ukrainians has work experience abroad; this is far more common in Western Ukraine (23%) than elsewhere (6–8%). Such experience is more typical of men, middle-aged people, and those with higher education and income.
• Among those who want to work abroad, over 20% have already worked abroad; among visa center visitors who want to work abroad, nearly 40% have such experience (in Lviv and Zhytomyr, this share is twice as high as in Kharkiv).
• Nearly 40% of those who want to work abroad are willing to stay 1–5 years, while most visa center visitors plan to stay less than one year. Older people, supporters of the Customs Union, and those without foreign work experience are more oriented toward short-term stays. Young people, supporters of European integration, and those with work experience abroad are more willing to stay three years or longer or even move permanently.
• One third are interested in working in their existing profession, one in five is ready to retrain, and 40% would accept any job. Visa center visitors are more focused on working in their profession (42%) and less willing to retrain (14%). Professional or retraining-based work is more attractive to Eastern and Southern residents, urban dwellers, youth, and those with higher education and income, while “any job” is more common among Western Ukrainians, rural residents, lower-income groups, and the unemployed.
• Nearly 80% of visa center visitors who want to work abroad need information about the foreign employer, almost 70% need health insurance and legal protection, and two thirds need help with housing, employer search, and legal advice. About half need a full guidebook for people going abroad to work. Visa assistance is the least demanded. Those with prior work experience abroad see less need for such support.
• Among mandatory requirements for employment agencies, 90% require a contract with a foreign employer and state registration, and nearly 80% require a license from the Ministry of Social Policy, correct office address, and a real physical office.
• The most important factors when using such agencies are signing a service contract (90%) and receiving full information about the employer, job duties, salary, housing, and insurance (86%). Less important are requests for a worker’s experience and skills (58%) and the option of cashless payment (44%), though these are more important for those with foreign work experience.
• Two thirds of visa center visitors believe that insurance provides medical and social protection abroad; 20% think it is wasted money, and 15% are undecided. Those who have worked abroad consider insurance less important than others.
• Two thirds of Ukrainians say that if they had a permanent job abroad, they would eventually return to Ukraine; 15% would not. Among those who want to work abroad, 57% would return; among visa center visitors, 52%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, 35% of respondents regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while half do not, and 15% are undecided. The dynamics show that this year the share of those who regret the collapse of the USSR slightly increased compared to 2014 and 2015: 35% in 2016 versus 33% in 2014 and 31% in 2015.
• In the South, East, and Center of the country, about 40% of respondents regret the collapse of the USSR, while in the West this share is about half as high (18%).
• The strongest nostalgia for the USSR is observed among those who would currently vote for Yuriy Boyko (68%), Vadym Rabinovych (52%), and Nadiya Savchenko (44%) in presidential elections. Around one third of supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleh Liashko, and one quarter of supporters of Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko, also express such nostalgia. The lowest levels of regret are found among supporters of Andriy Sadovyi (9%) and Oleh Tiahnybok (8%), mainly because their core electorate is concentrated in Western Ukraine.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education and income, the more likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. Women express nostalgia for the USSR somewhat more often than men. Among non-working respondents, 42% regret the collapse of the USSR, compared to 28% among those who are employed.
• The highest level of nostalgia is found among those who believe that the Russian language should become the state language (58%) or an official language in certain regions (44%).
• Similarly, among supporters of Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, a majority (71%) regret the collapse of the USSR, while among supporters of EU and NATO membership, more than 70% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union.

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held in the near future, one third of respondents would definitely take part, and six parties would enter parliament: Batkivshchyna (18.3% among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice), Opposition Bloc (12.6%), Samopomich (11.0%), Radical Party (11.0%), Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (9.1%), and Svoboda (5.6%). 4.8% would support the party Civic Position, 3.1% the party of Mikheil Saakashvili, while Revival and UKROP would each receive about 2%. It should be noted that among all respondents almost one in five had not yet decided on their party choice.
• If presidential elections were held in the near future, one third of respondents would definitely participate. Among those who intend to vote and have decided, Yuliya Tymoshenko would receive 17.7%, Yuriy Boyko 11.5%, Petro Poroshenko 10.7%, Oleh Liashko 9.8%, Andriy Sadovyi 8.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.5%, Nadiya Savchenko 5.6%, and Oleh Tiahnybok 4.3%. More than 2% would vote for Dmytro Yarosh and Serhiy Tihipko.
• During 2016, Poroshenko’s rating fell by half (from 23% to 11%), while support for Tymoshenko increased (from 13% to 18%) and for Liashko (from 8% to 10%). Over the last two months, Savchenko’s rating fell from 10% to 6%, while Tymoshenko’s rose from 15% to 18%.
• About a quarter of respondents trust Sadovyi (25%), Hrytsenko (23%), and Savchenko (22%). The highest level of distrust is toward Arseniy Yatsenyuk (90%). Over the last two months, trust in Savchenko halved (from 41% to 22%), while distrust rose (from 41% to 63%); 14% are undecided. The most favorable attitudes toward Savchenko remain in the West and Center, in rural areas, and among women.
• 15% of respondents are well informed about Savchenko’s controversial political statements, 50% have heard something, 31% are not familiar, and 4% are undecided. Among those who are informed or have heard about them, half do not support her statements, 36% support them, and 15% are undecided. Support is highest in the East and South.
• Among Savchenko’s statements, the one that receives the highest support is: “Western provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine could lead the planet to a third world war” (48% support, 34% do not). The least supported are: “All participants of the LPR and DPR should be granted amnesty except their leaders” and “Maidan and Anti-Maidan stood for the same values” (28% support, 55% do not), and “Ukrainians will have to ask forgiveness for their sons, husbands, and fathers who died in Donbas” (33% support, 53% do not).
• 34% believe that Savchenko would be most useful to Ukraine as a military pilot, 17% support her leading an international committee on the release of Ukrainian POWs and political prisoners, and 17% support her work as a member of parliament. 4% support her entering the presidential race, 2% see her as Minister of Defense, 3% as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, 9% choose other roles, and 13% are undecided.
• Over the last two months, support for Savchenko returning to the army as a military pilot increased (from 24% to 34%), while support declined for her heading the international committee (from 20% to 17%), running for President (from 9% to 4%), and serving as Minister of Defense (from 4% to 2%). Among those who trust Savchenko, her greatest usefulness is seen in parliamentary or international humanitarian roles or in presidential politics. Those who do not trust her mainly support her return to the army.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in the city of Ternopil, 74% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, only 11% believe they are moving in the right direction, and 15% are undecided. Even among supporters of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP), more people think the country is moving in the wrong direction than in the right one. The highest level of pessimism is found among supporters of the Radical Party and Svoboda.
• At the same time, 54% believe that the situation in Ternopil is moving in the right direction, 22% say it is moving in the wrong direction, and 24% are undecided. Two thirds of supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and BPP believe that the city is developing in the right direction. Among Samopomich and Radical Party supporters, about half hold this view.
• Regarding the Ternopil oblast, 37% believe affairs are moving in the right direction, 31% say in the wrong direction, and 32% are undecided. The most positive assessments come from BPP and Svoboda supporters, while the most negative come from Radical Party supporters.
• More than 80% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Ternopil’s mayor, Serhiy Nadal. 14% are dissatisfied. The head of the Ternopil Regional State Administration, Stepan Barna, is approved by 38% and disapproved by 35%, while 27% could not assess his performance. The head of the Ternopil Regional Council, Viktor Ovcharuk, is approved by 19%, disapproved by 27%, and 55% could not give an assessment.
• Compared with October 2015, satisfaction with Nadal’s performance increased by 11 percentage points, and with Barna’s by 8 points. Meanwhile, positive assessments of Ovcharuk fell by 9 points, while the share of those unable to assess him almost tripled, indicating low public awareness of his activities.
• Support for Governor Barna is highest among BPP supporters (66%) and lowest among Samopomich and Civic Position supporters (about one third). Ovcharuk also receives his highest approval among BPP supporters (34%) and the lowest among Samopomich and Civic Position voters (16–17%). Nadal, by contrast, enjoys very high approval across all party electorates.
• The most trusted national politician in Ternopil is Nadiya Savchenko: 57% trust her, 36% do not. She is the only politician whose trust level exceeds distrust.
  Oleh Tiahnybok is trusted by 44% and distrusted by 51%; Andriy Sadovyi by 35% vs 57%; Mikheil Saakashvili 34% vs 58%; Anatolii Hrytsenko 34% vs 54%; Yuliya Tymoshenko 30% vs 66%; Oleh Liashko 29% vs 66%; Andriy Parubiy 26% vs 67%; Petro Poroshenko 20% vs 77%; Volodymyr Groysman 17% vs 77%. Arseniy Yatsenyuk has the highest level of distrust among Ternopil residents.
• Compared to October 2015, trust has increased for Tiahnybok (+15 pp), Tymoshenko (+13 pp), Liashko (+5 pp), and Yuriy Boyko (+4 pp). Trust has declined for Hrytsenko (−9 pp), Yatsenyuk (−10 pp), and Poroshenko (−14 pp). Trust in Sadovyi remained unchanged.
• The leader of the presidential race in Ternopil is Yuliya Tymoshenko (17% among those who intend to vote), followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko (15%), Oleh Tiahnybok (11%), Oleh Liashko (8%), Petro Poroshenko (7%), Andriy Sadovyi (6%), Dmytro Yarosh (5%), and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2%). 12% would vote for another candidate, and 18% are undecided. 45% say they would definitely participate in the election.
• The leading party in Ternopil is Svoboda (18%), followed by Batkivshchyna (16%), Samopomich (10%), and BPP, Civic Position, and the Radical Party (8% each). Other parties score below 3%. 12% are undecided. 40% would definitely vote.
• In the single-member constituency, the leaders are Stepan Barna and Volodymyr Staiura (12% each), followed by Vasyl Derevlyanyi (7%), Petro Landiak (6%), Volodymyr Blikhar (6%), Taras Pastukh (5%), and Roman Zastavnyi, Vasyl Lyl, and Mykhailo Ratushniak (4% each). 9% would vote for another candidate, and almost 30% are undecided.
• The clear leader in the mayoral race is incumbent mayor Serhiy Nadal, supported by 67% of those who would vote. All other candidates score below 4%. 7% are undecided. Nearly 50% would definitely vote in mayoral and city council elections.
• In elections to the city council, Svoboda leads with 26%, followed by Batkivshchyna (13%), Samopomich (7%), Radical Party (7%), BPP (5%), and Movement for Purification (4%). Other parties score below 3%. 16% are undecided.
• Among local politicians, Serhiy Nadal has the highest positive rating: 70% view him positively, 11% negatively. Stepan Barna, Mykhailo Holovko, and Ihor Huda also have positive balances, although more than 40% of residents do not know Holovko and Huda. The most negative attitudes are toward Roman Zastavnyi and Oleksandr Muts, with 45% and 48% negative evaluations respectively.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from May 28-June 14, 2016. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 63,9%. Additionally, 1,185 respondents were surveyed in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. The margin of error does not exceed 2,8%. Average response rate was 62,7%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, the highest levels of trust in Lviv Oblast are held by Nadiia Savchenko, Andrii Sadovyi, and Mikheil Saakashvili. A similar picture is observed in the city of Lviv, where Anatolii Hrytsenko also enjoys a high level of trust. The lowest levels of trust are recorded for Yurii Boiko and Arsenii Yatseniuk. Over the past year, Sadovyi, Petro Poroshenko, and Yatseniuk have lost the most trust, while Yuliia Tymoshenko’s indicators have improved. Overall, politicians enjoy slightly higher levels of trust in the oblast than in the city of Lviv.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, the following parties would cross the 5% threshold in Lviv Oblast: Samopomich (22.8%), Batkivshchyna (12.6%), Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (9.8%), as well as Civic Position (6.7%), Svoboda (6.1%), and the Radical Party (5.9%). Mikheil Saakashvili’s party “Movement for Purification” would receive 4.2%, and Dmytro Yarosh’s National Movement 3.1%. 17% of respondents were undecided. In the oblast overall, Batkivshchyna, BPP Solidarity, and the Radical Party have stronger support, whereas in the city of Lviv, Samopomich, Civic Position, and Saakashvili’s party perform better. Young people and respondents with higher education are more likely to support Samopomich, while older and less educated respondents are more inclined toward Batkivshchyna.
• More than 40% of respondents support snap parliamentary elections and new presidential elections, about the same share oppose these initiatives, and 15% are undecided. Support for early elections is strongest among residents of Lviv and among voters of Batkivshchyna and Civic Position.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, Andrii Sadovyi would receive 15.9%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 10.5%, Petro Poroshenko 10%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko 9.8%. Oleh Liashko would get 5.2%, Dmytro Yarosh 5.1%, and Oleh Tiahnybok 3.8%. 22.6% remain undecided. Over the past year, Sadovyi and Tymoshenko have gained support, while Poroshenko has lost the most, and Hrytsenko’s rating has also slightly declined.
• More than 40% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Lviv Mayor Andrii Sadovyi, while 56% are dissatisfied. 21% are satisfied with the work of Lviv Oblast Governor Oleh Syniutka, 41% are dissatisfied, and almost 40% are undecided. Only 10% are satisfied with the work of Lviv Oblast Council Head Oleksandr Hannushchyn, 30% are dissatisfied, and nearly two thirds cannot assess his performance. Although Sadovyi still has the highest approval, support for his work has fallen sharply over the past year, from 70% to 41%.
• Only 19% of respondents believe that Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while about two thirds think it is moving in the wrong direction. Assessments of the situation in Lviv Oblast are somewhat better: 28% say it is moving in the right direction and 48% in the wrong one, with nearly a quarter undecided.
• More than half (53%) of respondents believe that fighting corruption in local government should be a top priority, followed by solving the landfill and waste problem (42%), reducing unemployment (40%), and restraining growth in utility tariffs (38%). Over the past year, the importance of waste management, healthcare support, and environmental issues has increased. In Lviv, waste management, healthcare, and crime are more acute concerns, while in other cities of the oblast road repairs and support for vulnerable groups are more pressing.
• Regarding the Hrybovychi landfill tragedy, 30% place primary blame on the Lviv city authorities, 23% on the oblast authorities, 16% on the central government, 4% on the Hrybovychi village authorities, 14% on others, and 15% are undecided.
• An overwhelming 85% believe that waste processing is the best solution for Lviv’s garbage problem, compared to 9% who favor incineration. 90% support building a waste-processing plant as the solution, 3% favor modernizing the existing landfill in Hrybovychi, 1% support opening a new landfill near Lviv, and 5% are undecided.

Dear colleagues,

We invite you to take part in a press conference on the topic “Socio-political attitudes in Lviv Oblast.”

Speaker:
Oleksii Antypovych, Head of the Rating Group.

During the press conference, the results of a special study will be presented on the following topics:
level of trust in national politicians,
presidential ratings,
party ratings,
attitudes toward the idea of snap elections,
satisfaction with the work of local authorities,
issues that concern citizens,
the Hrybovychi tragedy.

The press conference will take place on Tuesday, July 5, 2016, starting at 11:00 a.m.,
at the following address: 11 T. Shevchenko Avenue, 2nd floor, Press Club.

The survey was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS, kiis.com.ua) jointly with the Rating Sociological Group (ratinggroup.ua) in April 2016.

Almost all residents of Kirovohrad are aware that the city is to be renamed as part of the “decommunization” process. The vast majority of city residents (67%) do not support the renaming, including 43% who are категорically opposed. Only about one in four residents (28%) view it positively.

A majority of residents (57%) most strongly support keeping the current name “Kirovohrad.” About one third (31%) would prefer the name “Yelysavethrad.” Only 4% support the name “Kropyvnytskyi.” If the option “Kirovohrad” is excluded from the list of proposed names, a majority (55%) choose “Yelysavethrad.” In that case, “Kropyvnytskyi” ranks second with 8% support.

An overwhelming majority of the population (82%) do not support the decision of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Building, Regional Policy, and Local Self-Government to rename the city “Kropyvnytskyi.” Only 14% support this decision. Among those who oppose the renaming to “Kropyvnytskyi,” one quarter say they would be willing to take part in protests against it.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute. 

The survey was conducted throughout all Ukraine territory (except for occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) from 18 February till 4 March 2016. Survey method - face-to-face interview at the respondent’s residence.

Total sample – 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older, who have the right to vote. The sample is representative by sex, age, region, and settlement size. Additionally, 1,000 respondents were surveyed in Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. For sampling there were used multistage probabilistic sampling method, for respondents’ selection procedure - random route and ‘last birthday’ rule. 

The margin of error does not exceed 2.0%.

Average response rate – 63.0%.

The survey was financed by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The survey was conducted by Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine) on behalf of the International Republican Institute. 

The data was collected in 24 cities of Ukraine (Kyiv and all oblast centers; in Donetsk oblast – Mariupol, in Luhansk oblast – Sievierodonetsk) between January 20, 2016 and February 8, 2016, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes.

The sample consisted of 19,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older. It is representative for the general population by age, education and sex. To ensure representativeness, the sample was split in accordance with division of cities into electoral districts, which were provided by the Central Electoral Committee. At least 50 polling sites (50 previously selected sites) were covered in each city. They were selected at random, using the curtain step method. The random route and ‘next birthday’ rule were used for respondents’ selection procedures.

For reference, the previous municipal survey was conducted in 22 cities between March 2, 2015 to March 20, 2015. The sample size consisted of 17,600 respondents.

The margin of error for each city does not exceed ±3.5 percent.

The average response rate is 62.8 percent.

Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

The survey was funded by the Government of Canada.

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• According to a study conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 63% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, and 58% toward Angela Merkel. A positive attitude is also expressed by 51% toward Dalia Grybauskaitė, 49% toward Andrzej Duda and Barack Obama. François Hollande is viewed positively by 40% of respondents, and Nursultan Nazarbayev by 37%. The worst attitudes are toward Vladimir Putin – only 10% have a positive view of him.
• The negative-attitude ranking is led by V. Putin (80%). About one third have a negative view of B. Obama; about one quarter of F. Hollande, N. Nazarbayev, and A. Merkel. One in five have a negative view of A. Lukashenko, and one in six of D. Grybauskaitė.
• Residents of Western and Central Ukraine are more favorable toward A. Merkel and B. Obama, while those in the South and East are more positive toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev. At the same time, in the South there are also positive attitudes toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, A. Duda, and F. Hollande. A relatively positive attitude toward V. Putin is found only in the East, primarily in Donbas.
• Older respondents show more positive attitudes toward A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev, and V. Putin, while younger people are more supportive of A. Merkel, B. Obama, and F. Hollande. The higher the respondents’ level of education and material well-being, the more positive their attitudes toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, B. Obama, A. Duda, and F. Hollande, and correspondingly more negative toward A. Lukashenko and V. Putin.
• Among supporters of EU and NATO membership, the most positive attitudes are toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, B. Obama, A. Duda, and F. Hollande. A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev have the most supporters among advocates of joining the Customs Union. Interestingly, A. Lukashenko enjoys a high level of support both among supporters of European integration and among Customs Union supporters.
• Over the last four years, the positive attitude toward V. Putin has deteriorated sharply, from 53% to 10%. Attitudes toward A. Merkel have fluctuated: they improved from 56% in 2012 to 61% in late 2013, declined to 51% in 2014, and then rose again to 57% in 2016. The positive view of B. Obama remained almost unchanged in 2012–2014 but declined from 54% in 2014 to 49% in 2016.
• The greatest increase in positive attitudes was recorded toward D. Grybauskaitė (from 36% to 51%) and F. Hollande (from 32% to 40%). At the same time, the share of those with negative attitudes toward these politicians also grew: from 11% to 15% for D. Grybauskaitė, and from 18% to 27% for F. Hollande. Attitudes toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev remained unchanged.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the politicians with the highest level of public trust are Andriy Sadovyi and Mikheil Saakashvili, with about one in three respondents trusting each of them. One in four respondents trusts Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko. One in five expresses trust in Yuliia Tymoshenko, Rinat Akhmetov, and Oleh Liashko.
• Among the “young and new” politicians, the highest levels of trust are recorded for Yehor Soboliev (29%), Tetiana Chornovol (22%), Mustafa Nayyem (21%), Hanna Hopko (15%), and Dmytro Dobrodomov (13%). The remaining politicians are largely unknown to most respondents.
• Twenty-one percent of respondents are satisfied with the performance of the President, 14% with the Chair of Parliament, and only 8% with the Prime Minister. Almost 70% support the resignation of Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk, up from 60% in October 2015. Support has also grown for dissolving parliament and holding new parliamentary elections (from 47% to 50%), as well as for early presidential elections (from 43% to 48%).
• When asked whom they would like to see as Prime Minister in 2016, 11% named Mikheil Saakashvili, 7% Yuliia Tymoshenko, 6% Yurii Boiko, 5% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 4% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3% Serhii Tihipko and Oleh Liashko each, and 2% Oleh Tiahnybok and Nataliia Yaresko each. All other candidates received 1% or less. One quarter of respondents would not want any of the proposed candidates to become Prime Minister, and one in six could not decide.
• If parliamentary elections had been held in January, the parties that would have entered parliament are Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (16.3%), Opposition Bloc (13.8%), Samopomich (13.5%), Batkivshchyna (12.9%), Svoboda (8.3%), the Radical Party (6.5%), and UKROP (5.2%). Civic Position, with 3.8%, would also have had notable chances of passing the 5% threshold. More than 2% would have voted for Vidrodzhennia, Nash Krai, Right Sector, and Narodnyi Kontrol.
• If a Saakashvili Bloc had taken part in the elections, the party ratings would have been as follows: Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” 14.3%, Opposition Bloc 13.5%, Samopomich 11.7%, Saakashvili Bloc 11.6%, Batkivshchyna 11.6%, Svoboda 6.9%, Radical Party 5.5%, and UKROP 4.7%.
• Respondents see the central government as relatively more successful in ensuring local elections (43%), police reform (42%), strengthening national defense (35%), and progress toward a visa-free regime with the EU (31%). Some successes are also seen in decentralization and energy independence. At the same time, around 90% or more see little or no success in economic growth, currency stability, social protection, anti-corruption efforts, limiting oligarchic influence, healthcare, housing and utilities, and judicial reform.
• Two thirds of respondents support the creation of the National Police, while 16% do not; 5% have not heard of the reform, and 14% are undecided.
• Regarding the “Korban case,” 44% consider it more of a political persecution, while one quarter see it as the enforcement of the law and justice.
• Nearly one in five respondents personally gave a bribe or a gift in the past year to resolve a personal issue, down from 27% three years earlier. At the same time, 43% believe corruption in their region has increased over the past year. For 54%, corruption is a disease that hinders social development, while 40% believe it is a mechanism without which Ukrainian society can no longer function. Attitudes are nevertheless changing: in 2013 more than a third justified bribery in important personal matters, whereas in 2016 only 13% did so.
• If a referendum were held, 59% would support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and 22% would oppose it. Sixteen percent would support joining the Customs Union, while 62% would oppose. Forty-seven percent would support joining NATO, 31% would oppose, and the rest would abstain or be undecided.