News and Press releases

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from July 19-30, 2015, with an oversample in the Donbas region (
territories controlled by Ukrainian authorities).  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,800 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.3 percent, and the response rate was 65.9 percent. The oversample in Donbas had a randomly selected sample size of 1,284 permanent residents, a 59.7 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.international.
 

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the Government of Canada.
 
English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.
 

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada had taken place in early December, the following parties would have entered parliament:
• Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” – 16.5%
  Batkivshchyna – 12.3%
  Opposition Bloc – 12.2%
  Samopomich – 12.2%
  Radical Party – 7.9%
  Svoboda – 7.8%
  UKROP – 5.1%
• Parties with significant chances of passing the 5% threshold were also Civic Position (4.1%), Vidrodzhennia (Revival) (3.6%), and Nash Krai (Our Land) (3.0%).
  2.7% would have voted for the Communist Party of Ukraine, 2.3% for Right Sector, and 2.1% for Strong Ukraine. 8.2% of respondents would have chosen another party.
• In the West, the electoral leader is PPB Solidarity, followed by Batkivshchyna, with Samopomich and Svoboda tied for third place.
  In the Center, PPB Solidarity also leads, followed by Batkivshchyna, while Svoboda and the Radical Party share third place.
  In the North, PPB Solidarity remains in first place, Batkivshchyna is second, and Samopomich third.
  In the South, East, and Donbas, the Opposition Bloc leads, with PPB Solidarity in second place. Third place in these regions is held by Batkivshchyna (South), Vidrodzhennia (East), and Samopomich (Donbas).
  Notably, the largest share of undecided voters and non-voters is concentrated in the South and Donbas (48% and 55% respectively).

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2015, almost half of respondents (47%) said that New Year is their favorite winter holiday, while 41% named Christmas. Another 5% chose St. Nicholas Day, and 3% mentioned the Old New Year. 2% said they do not like any winter holidays, and 3% were undecided.
  New Year is much more popular in the East, South, and Donbas, while Christmas is preferred mainly in the West. In the Central region, New Year and Christmas are liked almost equally.
  The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more they tend to prefer New Year. It is also more popular among urban residents and Russian-speaking respondents. Christmas, on the other hand, is more popular among rural residents and Ukrainian-speaking respondents.
• 65% of Ukrainians have a tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day, while about a third do not; 1% do not know about this holiday, and 3% were undecided.
  The further southeast one goes, the less widespread this tradition becomes. It is most popular in the West (94%) and least common in Donbas (26%). Women, young people, and Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely to follow this tradition.
• 46% of respondents plan to put up a real Christmas tree for New Year, 28% a fake tree, and 12% will use a New Year decoration instead. 14% do not plan to put up any decoration at all—mostly older people and those with lower incomes.
  Over the past four years, the share of those choosing a real tree has increased by 2%, and a fake tree by 5%, while the number of people using only decorations or none at all has declined slightly.
  Real trees are more common in the West, among rural residents, young people, and those with higher incomes, while fake trees are more popular in Donbas and among urban residents.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (80%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 12% disagree and 8% are undecided.
• It should be noted that over the past two years the number of those who agree that the Holodomor was a genocide has increased significantly (from 66% in 2013 to 80% in 2015). In addition, over the past year the share of undecided respondents on this issue has almost halved. At the same time, the share of those opposing the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide decreased from 25% to 12% during 2010–2015.
• The statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents in all regions without exception, with the highest support observed in the West (98%) and the Center (87%).
• The younger the respondents and the higher their income level, the greater the support for recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 90% support this statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, support stands at 60%.
• Rural residents are more likely to agree with the Holodomor-genocide statement than urban residents (84% vs 79%).

• According to the results of the latest survey conducted by Rating Group, if the presidential elections in Ukraine had been held in early October, 26% of decided voters would have supported Petro Poroshenko, 16% would have supported Yulia Tymoshenko, 12% would have supported Yurii Boiko, 9% would have supported Andrii Sadovyi, 7% would have supported Oleh Liashko, 6% would have supported Anatolii Hrytsenko, and more than 4% would have supported Dmytro Yarosh and Oleh Tiahnybok. The remaining voters would have supported other candidates.
• If the second round of the presidential election had included Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 42% would have supported the incumbent President and 31% would have supported the Batkivshchyna leader, while the rest would have remained undecided. If Petro Poroshenko and Andrii Sadovyi had advanced to the second round, 39% would have supported the incumbent President and 34% would have supported the Samopomich leader. If Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko had advanced to the second round, 54% would have supported the incumbent President and 21% would have supported the Opposition Bloc leader.
• If parliamentary elections had been held in early October, 20% of decided voters would have supported the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 15% Batkivshchyna, 14% the Opposition Bloc, 10% Samopomich, and about 6% the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko. In addition, parties with significant chances of entering parliament included Svoboda (5%), Civic Position (4%), the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP (4%), Right Sector (4%), as well as Vidrodzhennia (3%) and Nash Krai (3%). UKROP, Vidrodzhennia, and Nash Krai significantly increased their support over the last month due to intensified local election campaigns and, if the upward trend continues, may claim representation both in local councils and in a new parliament.
• The leaders of the anti-rating are the Opposition Bloc (36%) and the Communist Party (35%). In addition, nearly one quarter of voters would definitely not vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” one fifth would not vote for the People’s Front, and about one sixth would not vote for the Radical Party, Svoboda, or Batkivshchyna. At the same time, so-called “new” parties do not have high anti-ratings, including UKROP (6%), Vidrodzhennia (6%), Nash Krai (5%), and Samopomich (3%).
• One third of voters are fully confident in their choice and would not change it, while another third are fairly confident but admit they could change their choice. The most confident voters are those supporting the Communist Party, the Opposition Bloc, Right Sector, UKROP, and Svoboda. The least confident voters are those supporting Civic Position, Nash Krai, and Strong Ukraine.
• In addition to parliamentary ratings, potential party reserves for local elections were also studied. About 30% of respondents допускають the possibility of voting for Samopomich in local elections, 25% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 23% for Batkivshchyna, and 15% for the Opposition Bloc. More than 10% also допускають the possibility of voting for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Svoboda, UKROP, and Nash Krai, with overall attitudes toward the latter two being less negative. Over the last two months, reserve support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and the Opposition Bloc has remained unchanged, while support reserves for Samopomich, Batkivshchyna, and UKROP have grown, and reserves for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko have decreased.
• Recent electoral trends indicate growing combined support for parties that are in opposition to the current government. While coalition parties were supported by nearly 70% of voters in the last parliamentary elections, today coalition parties are supported by about 45%, with the core of the coalition – the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front – supported by only 21%. This is consistent with satisfaction levels with key government officials: only 22% of respondents are satisfied with the President’s performance, 14% with the Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr Groysman, and 10% with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk. Dissatisfaction levels are 71%, 74%, and 86% respectively.
• Regarding other issues, 28% of respondents believe it is better to tolerate material hardship to preserve order in the country, while the majority (53%) believe that if living conditions significantly worsen, it is better to protest. These indicators are almost identical to those recorded in December 2013 (29% and 50% respectively).
• Over the last six months, support for dissolving parliament and calling new parliamentary elections increased from 34% to 47%, while support for calling new presidential elections increased from 31% to 43%.
• Only 12% of respondents believe that recently adopted budget amendments, which increased the minimum wage and pensions starting September 1, are a real achievement of the government in finding resources during crisis and war conditions. Meanwhile, the majority (77%) believe this was more likely pre-election PR.
• Regarding the detention on September 17 in the Verkhovna Rada of Radical Party MP Ihor Mosiychuk on suspicion of bribery, 28% believe it was enforcement of the law and justice, while 43% believe it was political persecution of the opposition by the authorities.
• Almost 70% of respondents believe that the events of August 31 near the Verkhovna Rada, when a combat grenade explosion during a protest killed law enforcement officers, were planned and organized by someone, while one in ten believes it happened accidentally due to negligence.
• One quarter believe the Svoboda party was behind the grenade attack near the parliament, one fifth believe Russian intelligence services were responsible. In addition, 15% believe Ukrainian radical nationalist organizations were responsible, 13% believe the President was responsible, 13% believe the Security Service of Ukraine was responsible, 12% believe Ukrainian oligarchs were responsible, 7% believe the police were responsible, and 6% believe ATO participants were responsible. Notably, voters of the Opposition Bloc, Communist Party, Vidrodzhennia, and Strong Ukraine tend to blame Svoboda and other Ukrainian nationalists, while voters of Svoboda, Right Sector, as well as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” Batkivshchyna, UKROP, and Samopomich tend to blame Russian intelligence services.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from September 7-21, 2015, with an oversample in the Zakarpattia region.  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 63.9 percent.  The oversample in Zakarpattia had a randomly selected sample size of 633 permanent residents, a 65 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 3.9 percent.international.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

‍

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, more than half of respondents (56%) expressed a clear intention to participate in local elections in the city of Ternopil.
• Among those intending to participate in the city council elections, 20.7% would vote for Svoboda, 16.6% for Samopomich, 10.4% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 6.8% for Civic Position, 5.6% for Batkivshchyna, and 4.5% for the Radical Party. About 3.0% would vote for the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP, 2.8% for Narodnyi Kontrol, and 1.6% for the People’s Movement of Ukraine (NRU). About 4% would choose another party, while about one quarter remain undecided.
• Among those intending to participate in the mayoral election, nearly 60% would vote for S. Nahal. About 9% would vote for T. Pastukh, 5% for P. Landiak, 3.3% for M. Ratushniak, 2.8% for V. Blikhar, and 2.5% for I. Vons. About 4% would choose another candidate, while about 15% remain undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, 41% of respondents support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 38% do not support this idea. Another 21% are undecided on this issue.
• During 2014–2015, the number of supporters of recognizing the OUN-UPA increased from 27% to 41%, while the number of opponents significantly decreased (from 52% to 38%). Thus, for the first time over the years of studying this issue, the number of supporters of recognizing the OUN-UPA in Ukraine exceeded the number of opponents.
• Support for recognizing the OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence is highest in Western Ukraine (76%) and lowest in the South (27%) and East (23%).
• The younger the respondents, and the higher their level of education and income, the more likely they are to support recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence. Relatively higher support is also observed among men and among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, one third of respondents (31%) regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while more than half (56%) do not, and 14% are undecided.
• The trend shows that the number of Ukrainians who regret the collapse of the USSR has been decreasing each year: in 2010, this share was 46%, in 2013 it was 41%, in 2014 it was 33%, and in 2015 it declined to 31%.
• Almost half of residents in the South (49%), 39% of residents in the East, and about one quarter of residents in Central Ukraine regret the collapse of the USSR.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education and income, the more likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. Women are relatively more likely to regret the collapse of the USSR. The share of respondents who regret the collapse of the USSR among Russian-speaking respondents is twice as high as among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from July 16-30, 2015, with an oversample in the Odesa region.  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 62.8 percent.  The oversample in Odesa had a randomly selected sample size of 665 permanent residents, a 61.8 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 3.8 percent.international.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

‍

The study was conducted Information and analytical center “RATING Pro”according to the results of the survey of the Sociological Group “Rating” in Kyiv. On July 15-21, 2015, 1200 respondents were interviewed (face-to-face personal interview) aged 18 years and older. The sample is representative by age, gender. Error: not more than 2.8%.
As part of the general monitoring of Ukrainians' attitude towards reforms, the Information and Analysis Center “RATING Pro” investigated the attitudes and expectations of the new Patrol Police in Kyiv.

• According to the results of the survey, 82% of Kyiv residents support the creation of a new Patrol Police in the city. Not supported — only 8%.
• 69% expect that due to the creation of the new Patrol Police, the level of security in the city will improve, 19% believe that everything will remain at the same level, 2% — will deteriorate.
• At the same time, 82% of respondents expect improved security in the city among those who support the creation of the police, and among those who do not support the opinion that nothing will change (66%) dominates.
• 42% expect that due to the creation of the new Patrol Police, the level of fighting corruption will improve, 38% believe that everything will remain at the same level, 4% - will get worse 
• At the same time, among those who support the creation of the police, 51% of respondents expect improvement in the fight against corruption, and among those who do not support it, the opinion that nothing will change (61%) dominates.
• According to the majority, the main merit in the creation of the Kiev Patrol Police belongs to Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Eki Zguladze (39%). 14% believe that this is the merit of President Petro Poroshenko, 8% - Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, 6% - Mayor of Kyiv Vitaly Klitschko, 2% - Prime Minister Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. A third did not decide on the answer.
  

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group ahead of the by-elections in single-member constituency No. 205, if parliamentary party elections had been held simultaneously in July, the leaders of electoral preferences in the constituency would have been the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, supported by 31.6% among those who decided and would participate in voting, and the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP, supported by 17.7%.
• In addition, 13.5% would have voted for Samopomich Union, 9.2% for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 7.5% for Batkivshchyna, 4.9% for Svoboda, 4.6% for Civic Position, 3.4% for the Opposition Bloc, 2.7% for Right Sector, and almost 5% for other parties. Thus, party ratings largely correspond to the level of support for candidates running in the constituency, especially the race leaders Serhii Berezenko and Hennadii Korban. Accordingly, their participation in the elections significantly strengthened the positions of their respective parties.
• Older voters more often prefer the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, the Radical Party, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the Opposition Bloc. Middle-aged voters more often support Civic Position, while younger voters more often support UKROP and Right Sector. Samopomich has relatively equal support across all age groups. Women more often support the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and Batkivshchyna, while men more often support the Radical Party, UKROP, Svoboda, and Right Sector. Supporters of the Radical Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” tend to have relatively lower levels of education, while UKROP supporters tend to have higher levels of education. UKROP, Right Sector, and Civic Position are more often supported by wealthier voters, while Batkivshchyna, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc are more often supported by lower-income voters.

Una studija je odgovor na informacijski center “RATING Pro” based on the results of a national survey by Rating Group. Between May 14 and May 22, 2015, 2,000 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed using face-to-face interviews. Samples je representativo na, gendera, regiones, a tipo de settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%. The study also uses data from Eurobarometer surveys.

Infographics on the topic of the study can be downloaded on the website http://ratingpro.org/

The survey was implemented by RATING Pro, Information and Analytical Center. In this survey the results of surveys implemented by Eurobarometer, International Social Survey Programme, municipal survey of International Republican Institute and specifically made national survey of Rating, Sociological Group, implemented in June 2015 (2,000 respondents) initiated and ordered by RATING Pro, were used.

Infographics related to the research can be downloaded on http://ratingpro.org/

‍

• According to the survey conducted by Rating Group, among religious leaders Ukrainians express the highest level of trust in Patriarch Filaret at 40% and Pope Francis at 35%. The highest levels of distrust are recorded toward Patriarch Kirill of Moscow at 39% and Metropolitan Onufriy at 25%. More than half of respondents say they do not know Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Metropolitan Makariy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, or Archbishop Sviatoslav of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
• Trust in Patriarch Filaret, Pope Francis, Archbishop Sviatoslav and Metropolitan Makariy is higher among residents of Western Ukraine, rural populations, Ukrainian-speaking respondents and people with higher incomes. In contrast, Metropolitan Onufriy and Patriarch Kirill enjoy greater trust among residents of the South and East, Russian-speaking respondents and those with lower levels of education and income.
• In Western Ukraine the highest trust is recorded for Patriarch Filaret at 66%, Pope Francis at 62% and Archbishop Sviatoslav at 57%. In the Center and the South, Patriarch Filaret is trusted by 38% and 40% respectively, while Pope Francis is trusted by 26% and 37%. In the East, the highest level of trust is also recorded for Patriarch Filaret at 22%.
• Overall, respondents in the West demonstrate the highest level of awareness of all religious leaders included in the survey, while awareness is lowest in the Central region. The East has the largest share of respondents who are undecided about their attitudes toward religious leaders. Women and older respondents are generally more informed and more likely to trust religious leaders.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if Ukraine could become a member of only one international economic union, 51% of respondents believe it should be the European Union, 16% – the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 14% – another option, while 20% are undecided. Since September of the previous year, support for integration with the European Union has decreased from 59% to 51%, while support for integration with the Customs Union has remained unchanged. At the same time, the number of respondents who are undecided or support alternative economic integration options has increased.
• Membership in the EU is traditionally supported more in the West (80%), about 60% in the Center, 40% in the South and about 20% in the East. The further towards the South-East of the country, the higher the support for the Customs Union. Nearly 80% of supporters of the People’s Front, BPP “Solidarity”, Right Sector, Samopomich and Svoboda support EU membership. At the same time, nearly 60% of supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party support integration with the Customs Union.
• If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held, 40% would vote in favor, 32% would vote against, 11% would not participate in voting, and 17% would be undecided. Since November 2014, when support peaked at 51%, there has been a gradual decline in support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO: to 46% in April 2015 and to 40% in June, accompanied by an increase in the share of opponents (from 25% to 32%).
• Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be supported by nearly 70% of residents in the West and about half in the Center. At the same time, about half of residents in the East and South would vote against NATO membership. The higher the level of education and income, and the younger the respondents, the higher the support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO. Support for Euro-Atlantic integration is higher among men than among women, especially regarding NATO membership. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, support for EU and NATO membership is almost three times higher than among those whose native language is Russian.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, no more than 60% of respondents would participate, including only 28% who would definitely vote.
• Despite a slight decline in ratings over the past few months, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” remains the leader in electoral support, with 16% of respondents among those intending to vote ready to support it. About 10% would vote for Samopomich, the Opposition Bloc, and Batkivshchyna. Around 6% support the Radical Party and Civic Position, about 5% support Right Sector, about 4% support Svoboda, and about 3% support the People’s Front and the Communist Party. Nearly 7% would vote for other parties, while every fifth respondent remains undecided.
• In the regional breakdown, Samopomich is the leading political force in Western Ukraine (followed by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with Right Sector and Batkivshchyna sharing third place). In Central Ukraine, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” leads (followed by Batkivshchyna and Samopomich). In the South and East of the country, the Opposition Bloc leads (followed by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and Batkivshchyna). It is important to note that in the South nearly half of respondents either do not intend to vote or are undecided, while in the East this share reaches 60%.
• As of early June, the demographic profile of party electorates is as follows. Men are more likely to support Svoboda, Right Sector, and the People’s Front. Women are more likely to support the Radical Party, the Communist Party, Samopomich, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with the highest share of women observed among Batkivshchyna supporters. Voters with lower incomes are more likely to support the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc. Voters with middle incomes are more likely to support the People’s Front, Civic Position, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity.” In contrast, Samopomich, Svoboda, and Right Sector are more supported by higher-income voters. The core electorate of Right Sector, Samopomich, and the People’s Front consists of younger and middle-aged voters. A significant share of youth is also present among supporters of the Radical Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity.” Older voters are more likely to support the Opposition Bloc and Batkivshchyna, while the oldest voters are more represented among supporters of Civic Position and the Communist Party. Voters with lower levels of education are more likely to support the Communist Party, the Radical Party, and Batkivshchyna, while respondents with higher and vocational education make up the core support base of Samopomich, Right Sector, and the People’s Front.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, one quarter of respondents intending to vote would support P. Poroshenko, 10% would support Y. Tymoshenko, and 7% would support A. Sadovyi. Around 6% would support A. Hrytsenko and Y. Boiko, 5% would support O. Liashko, and 4% would support D. Yarosh. About 2% each would support O. Tiahnybok, Serhiy Tihipko, and A. Yatseniuk. About one in ten would vote for other candidates, while every fifth respondent remains undecided.
• In the regional distribution, P. Poroshenko remains the leader in all regions of the country. Y. Tymoshenko ranks second in the West and Center, while in the South and East the second position is held by Y. Boiko. The further from the West, where Poroshenko’s leadership is more pronounced, the smaller the gap becomes between first and second place in the presidential rating.

• Rating Group continues the special project “People’s TOP,” which consists of a series of studies aimed at identifying the best of the best. The key feature of the methodology is that respondents are not provided with any lists or prompts, and express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions.
• This time respondents were asked: “Name the three most outstanding Ukrainians of all time.”
• According to the survey results, the majority of respondents named Taras Shevchenko (62.9%) among the most outstanding Ukrainians of all time. The top four leaders are complemented by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (23.5%), Lesya Ukrainka (19.0%), and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (12.7%).
• The top ten also includes Ivan Franko (9.4%), Ivan Mazepa (9.3%), Stepan Bandera (8.3%), Viacheslav Chornovil (7.6%), Hryhorii Skovoroda (4.7%), and Yaroslav the Wise (4.4%).
• The second ten includes Volodymyr the Great (3.4%), Vitalii Klitschko (3.0%), Mykola Hohol (2.6%), Mykola Amosov (2.2%), Leonid Kuchma (1.6%), Bohdan Stupka (1.6%), Leonid Kravchuk (1.4%), Borys Paton (1.2%), Lina Kostenko (1.2%), and Roman Shukhevych (1.0%).
• The third ten includes Nestor Makhno (1.0%), Yulia Tymoshenko (1.0%), Sofia Rotaru (1.0%), Andrii Shevchenko (1.0%), Leonid Brezhnev (1.0%), Nadiia Savchenko (0.9%), Serhii Korolov (0.9%), Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi (0.8%), Oleksandr Dovzhenko (0.8%), and Petro Poroshenko (0.8%).
• In total, respondents named 174 different individuals. At the same time, 16% of respondents were unable to name (recall) any outstanding Ukrainian.

• According to the survey results, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (74%) identify themselves as Orthodox, 8% as Greek Catholic, and 1% each as Roman Catholic and Protestant or Evangelical church members. Nearly 9% consider themselves simply Christians, while 6% do not associate themselves with any religious denomination.
• In the regional breakdown, Orthodoxy is the most widespread denomination in all regions except Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv regions, where more than half of the population adheres to Greek Catholicism. In addition, nearly 20% of Zakarpattia residents identify themselves as Greek Catholic. Roman Catholicism is also more common in Zakarpattia compared to other regions (7%).
• Among those who consider themselves Orthodox, a relative majority (38%) identify with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 20% with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1% with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and 39% consider themselves simply Orthodox without specific jurisdictional affiliation.
• The Kyiv Patriarchate is most commonly supported in Western and Central Ukraine, while the Moscow Patriarchate is more common in the South and Donbas. Nevertheless, even in southern and eastern regions, except Donbas and Odesa region, supporters of the Kyiv Patriarchate outnumber supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the same time, the further south and east, the more respondents tend to identify themselves simply as Orthodox without associating with a specific Orthodox jurisdiction. The highest shares of such respondents are observed in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Odesa, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, the majority of respondents (71%) consider themselves happy, including 28% who consider themselves definitely happy. At the same time, 18% consider themselves unhappy, and 11% are undecided. Over the past years, a slight decline in this indicator has been recorded. The highest level was observed in 2011 (74%), while the lowest was in 2010 (67%). Younger respondents, those with higher education and income levels, and those who are employed are more likely to consider themselves happy.
• In response to the question “What brings you the most joy in life?”, 68% of respondents mentioned family, 56% mentioned children, and 44% mentioned friends. Next in the “joy ranking” are money and receiving gifts (25% each), work and watching television (24% each), giving gifts (23%), communicating with nature (20%), music (19%), household chores (18%), and travel and the internet (16% each).
• The next positions in the joy ranking include pets (15%), books and food (14% each), birthdays (13%), sex and cinema (12%), shopping, vacation/holidays, and prayer (church) (11% each). Less common sources of joy include singing and sports (9% each), dancing and solitude (6% each), favorite team victories and studying (5% each), theatre (4%), alcohol (3%), and gambling (2%). Three percent were undecided, and 4% stated that nothing brings them joy.
• Over the past five years, Ukrainians have increasingly reported family, children, friends, receiving and giving gifts, work, music, household activities, and the internet as sources of joy. Shopping, prayer (church), theatre, books, singing, and sports have also become more joyful. At the same time, money, watching television, and vacation/holidays have become less associated with joy.
• The more sources of joy a person has, the happier they tend to feel. However, there are certain things that bring equal joy to both happy and unhappy people, and sometimes even more joy to unhappy people. These were defined as “unhappy joys,” including money, watching television, household chores, food, church, solitude, and alcohol.
• Younger respondents tend to find more joy in friends, money, receiving gifts, music, travel, the internet, birthdays, sex, cinema, shopping, vacation/holidays, sports, dancing, favorite team victories, and studying. With increasing age, people tend to find more joy in watching television, household chores, prayer (church), and singing.
• Men tend to find more joy in friends, money, work, the internet, sex, food, sports, favorite team victories, alcohol, and gambling. Women tend to find more joy in family, children, receiving and giving gifts, household chores, shopping, pets, books, prayer (church), birthdays, singing, and dancing. In the male ranking of joy, sex ranks 12th and shopping 30th, while among women the positions are reversed, with shopping ranked 12th and sex ranked 25th.
• An interesting result was found through grouping types of joy. Factor analysis identified the following types of joy: “material” (gifts, shopping, birthdays, travel), “entertainment” (dancing, singing, theatre, books, music, cinema), “youth-related” (studying, vacation/holidays, friends), “unhappy” (watching television, food, money), “family-related” (family, children), “destructive” (light drugs, gambling, alcohol), “solitude-related” (prayer/church, household chores, nature communication, solitude), and “male-associated” (favorite team victories, sports, work, internet, sex).