News and Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had been held at the end of February 2013, about two thirds of voters would have participated.
• The highest level of mobilization was recorded in Western Ukraine, while the lowest was in Donbas and the South of the country, where only about half of voters confirmed their intention to participate.
• If parliamentary elections had been held at the end of February 2013, the Party of Regions would have won. Among those who intended to vote, 24.9% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 19.3% for Batkivshchyna, 18.1% for UDAR, 11.9% for Svoboda, and 8.7% for the Communist Party. Another 1.2% would have supported Nataliia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward!, while less than 1% would have supported the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Our Ukraine. The remaining parties would have received 2.7%, while 11.8% would have remained undecided.
• For a more accurate comparison with election results, undecided voters were redistributed. After redistribution, if elections had been held at the end of February 2013, 28.2% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 22% for Batkivshchyna, 20.4% for UDAR, 13.5% for Svoboda, and 10% for the Communist Party. Other parties would have received about 6%.
• Compared to the parliamentary election results, the following trends are observed. Combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) increased from 50% to 56%, while combined support for parties forming the parliamentary majority (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased from 43% to 38%. New parliamentary parties (UDAR and Svoboda) gained support, while established parties (Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, and the Communist Party) lost support. The Party of Regions remained the clear leader among voters in Donbas, the South, and the East. Batkivshchyna shared first place in Western Ukraine with Svoboda and UDAR, and in the Center and North with UDAR.
• UDAR continued to be supported mainly by younger voters, while the Communist Party was supported mainly by older voters. The most educated electorate was observed among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR, while the least educated electorate was among Communist Party supporters. The electorates of Svoboda and UDAR also had the highest share of employed voters, while the Communist Party electorate was dominated by pensioners. Batkivshchyna had higher support in rural areas, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party had stronger support in cities. As in previous elections, UDAR and Svoboda were more supported by men, while Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party were more supported by women.
• Supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna were predominantly Ukrainian-speaking. Over the previous six months, the share of Ukrainian-speaking voters in the Svoboda electorate decreased from 75% to 68%, while the share of those speaking both Ukrainian and Russian or primarily Russian increased. Among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, more than half were Russian-speaking, about one quarter spoke both languages at home, and another quarter spoke Ukrainian. Among UDAR supporters, about half spoke Ukrainian at home and half spoke Russian or both languages. Among undecided voters, Russian-speaking respondents were more common, which is consistent with the fact that the highest share of undecided voters was recorded in the South, East, and Donbas.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2012, 50% of residents of Mykolaiv region, when choosing between signing an Association Agreement followed by accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, prefer the Customs Union and the CES, while 34% prefer signing the Association Agreement and further accession to the EU. Another 16% were undecided.
• Fifty-four percent of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to be independent but friendly states, with open borders, without visas or customs controls. At the same time, 34% believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas and customs controls. Meanwhile, 7% believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state, and another 5% were undecided.
• Residents of the region are more optimistic about the prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and the CES (51%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (29%). At the same time, 21% do not know which option would be better.
• Respondents evaluated employment prospects slightly differently: 46% believe that employment opportunities would improve if Ukraine joins the CES, while 30% believe employment would improve if Ukraine joins the EU. Another 24% were undecided.
• Fifty-three percent of respondents somewhat or fully agree that Ukraine should introduce the possibility of dual citizenship with other countries, while 28% do not support this idea. Another 13% are neutral, and 7% were undecided. If dual citizenship were allowed, 28% of residents of Mykolaiv region would like to obtain Russian citizenship while retaining Ukrainian citizenship. Seven percent would prefer German citizenship, 3% US citizenship, 3% Italian citizenship, and 2% Canadian citizenship. At the same time, more than one third of respondents (36%) would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents are aware that the authorities are preparing to implement land reform that would allow the free sale and purchase of land. At the same time, 81% of residents of Mykolaiv region have a negative attitude toward this reform, while only 7% have a positive attitude, and 11% were undecided.
• The majority of respondents (68%) support only long-term lease of agricultural land. Ten percent would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land only for Ukrainian citizens, and only 1% would allow it for foreigners. Another 21% were undecided.
• Sixty-three percent of respondents in the region support the idea of resolving a significant share of important issues at both local and national levels through referendums, while 26% do not support this proposal and 11% were undecided.
• Most residents of Mykolaiv region agree that citizens should be able to use local referendums to dismiss the head of the regional state administration or district administration (66%), dismiss the mayor and call new elections (66%), dissolve regional, city, district, settlement and village councils and call new elections (61%), and dismiss the village head (60%).
• Most respondents also agree that Ukrainian citizens should be able to use nationwide referendums to decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political or economic unions (69%), dissolve the Verkhovna Rada (61%), adopt and amend the Constitution (60%), dismiss the Government (60%), and dismiss the President (56%).

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 52% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 34% do not support it and 14% are undecided.
• It should be noted that during 2012 the number of supporters of European integration remained stable, which is slightly lower than in 2010–2011 but higher than in 2009. At the same time, the number of “strong” supporters of EU accession increased each year: while in 2010–2011 about one quarter of Ukrainians definitely supported EU membership, in 2012 at least one third did so.
• The strongest supporters of EU accession are young people, with almost two thirds of respondents aged 18–29 supporting the initiative and only about one quarter opposing it. Older respondents are the most skeptical, with 38% supporting and 43% opposing. The highest support for EU accession is observed in Western Ukraine (77%), followed by the Center (64%), North (54%), and East (51%). At the same time, about half of respondents in the South and Donbas do not support the initiative.
• At the same time, 41% of respondents support the idea of forming a single state consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, while 44% do not support it and 15% are undecided. While in 2010–2011 supporters of a common state consistently outnumbered opponents, in 2012 the trend reversed. Support for a common state with Russia is highest among older respondents (53%) and lowest among youth (32%), and is more common in cities than in rural areas. The initiative consistently receives the highest support in the South (64%), Donbas (57%), and East (54%). Meanwhile, more than half of residents in Central and Northern Ukraine and more than 80% in Western Ukraine do not support forming a single state consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.
• Interestingly, at least one quarter of respondents who support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Considering this, respondents were asked a direct question. According to respondents, signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (40%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (37%), while 23% were undecided. Over the last year, support for signing a Free Trade Agreement with the EU has remained almost unchanged, while the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 37%).
• As a result, Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine show greater support for the agreement with the European Union, while Donbas, the South, and the East show greater support for joining the Customs Union. There is also a relatively higher share of undecided respondents in the East. Youth and people with higher education traditionally show greater support for signing the Free Trade Agreement with the EU, while older respondents are more likely to support joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
• Forty-one percent of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language, while more than half (51%) oppose it and 8% are undecided. Over the past two years, the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been nearly equal. However, in 2012, support for granting Russian state language status sharply declined, especially during the second half of the year. In longer-term dynamics, support decreased from 52–54% in 2009–2010 to 41% in 2012, while opposition increased from 40–41% to 51%.
• Support for bilingualism is highest in Donbas (75%), the South (72%), and the East (53%). Meanwhile, almost 70% of residents of Central and Northern Ukraine and nearly 90% of Western Ukraine do not support the initiative. Granting Russian state language status is more supported by older respondents and less supported by youth, and is more common in cities than in rural areas.
• It can be assumed that the recent strengthening of the legal status of the Russian language in certain territories contributed to a deterioration in attitudes toward granting Russian state language status nationwide. According to a similar survey conducted by Rating Group in July 2012, nearly 80% of respondents had no problems using their native language during the previous year. According to 37% of respondents, the Ukrainian language needs greater legislative protection, while 18% believe Russian needs more protection, and 34% believe both languages are sufficiently protected.
• Only 19% of respondents support Ukraine’s accession to NATO, while nearly two thirds do not support it. Support for NATO accession remained stable throughout 2012, but in longer-term dynamics it slightly declined from 24–26% in 2010 to 19% in 2012. Clear support for NATO accession is observed mainly in Western Ukraine (about half of respondents). Youth show slightly more positive attitudes toward NATO compared to middle-aged and older respondents.
• About one quarter of respondents support recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 51% do not support it and 26% are undecided. Compared to 2010, support increased from 20% to 23%, while opposition decreased from 61% to 51%, and the share of undecided respondents increased. The idea is supported by more than 60% of residents in Western Ukraine and about one quarter of residents in Central and Northern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than half of residents in the East, nearly 70% in Donbas, and the South do not support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for state independence. The idea is more supported in rural areas than in cities. The highest share of undecided respondents on this issue is among youth, while the highest level of opposition is among older respondents.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2012, about 80% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region know who currently serves as the head of the Regional State Administration. At the same time, 3% believe they know who the governor is, but during the survey named a different person. Nearly one in five respondents (17%) do not know or do not remember the governor’s surname.
• A relative majority of respondents were unable to clearly assess the governor’s performance and gave a neutral evaluation (“neither good nor bad”) — 42%. At the same time, almost as many residents of Dnipropetrovsk region (40%) evaluate the governor’s performance positively (7% — very good, 33% — rather good). About every tenth respondent evaluated his work negatively or was undecided.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) believe that the situation in the region has improved since the appointment of the current head of the Regional State Administration (7% — significantly improved, 41% — somewhat improved). About one-third believe that the appointment of the current governor had no impact on the situation in the region (36%). Another 5% reported a deterioration of the situation, and about every tenth respondent could not determine their answer.
• If residents of the region had the opportunity to elect the head of the Regional State Administration, almost every second respondent would vote for the current governor (47%). About 6% would vote for another candidate, and 14% would not participate in such elections. At the same time, about one-third (32.3%) could not decide on their choice.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2012, 45% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region believe that Ukraine should orient its development toward cooperation with Russia and joining the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other countries. At the same time, 28% of respondents believe that Ukraine should focus on joining the European Union, while 19% support maintaining full independence in political and economic decision-making without joining either the EU or the Common Economic Space. Another 8% were undecided on this issue.
• When choosing between signing the Association Agreement with subsequent accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 57% of Dnipropetrovsk region residents prefer the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, while 31% prefer the Association Agreement and subsequent accession to the EU. Another 12% were undecided.
• About 70% of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly states, with open borders, without visas or customs controls. At the same time, 13% believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs controls. Another 13% believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state. Another 5% were undecided.
• Residents of the region assess more optimistically the prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space (50%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (28%). At the same time, 23% do not know which option would be better.
• Opinions differ slightly regarding employment opportunities. About 44% of respondents believe employment prospects would improve if Ukraine joins the Common Economic Space, while 32% believe employment prospects would improve if Ukraine joins the EU. Another 24% were undecided.
• About 60% of respondents are to some extent in favor of introducing dual citizenship with other countries, while 23% do not support this idea. Another 10% are neutral, and 7% are undecided.
• If dual citizenship were allowed in Ukraine, 30% of Dnipropetrovsk region residents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 10% would prefer German citizenship, 5% — US citizenship, 3% — Canadian citizenship, and 2% each — Italian, Israeli, and Polish citizenship. At the same time, about 30% would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• About 83% of respondents are aware that the authorities are preparing a land reform allowing the free sale and purchase of land. At the same time, 70% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region have a generally negative attitude toward this reform, while only 20% have a positive attitude. Another 10% were undecided.
• Most respondents (61%) support only long-term lease of agricultural land. About 25% would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land only to Ukrainian citizens, and less than 3% would allow it to foreigners. Another 11% were undecided.
• About 72% of respondents in the region support the idea that a significant share of important issues, both at the local and national levels, should be decided through referendums, while 17% do not support this idea. Another 11% were undecided.
• Most respondents agree that citizens should have the ability through local referendums to dismiss mayors and call new elections (74%), dismiss heads of regional or district administrations (71%), dismiss village heads (71%), and dissolve regional, city, district, settlement, and village councils and call new elections (67%).
• Most respondents also agree that citizens of Ukraine should have the ability through nationwide referendums to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada (72%), dismiss the Government (68%), dismiss the President (67%), decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political, or economic alliances (70%), and adopt or amend the Constitution (65%).

• According to the consolidated results of surveys conducted by the Rating Group during 2010–2012, most Ukrainians agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people. In October 2012, 59% of respondents agreed with this statement, while 22% disagreed. Another 19% were undecided.
• Public opinion on this issue showed fluctuations over time. In March 2010, 61% agreed with the genocide thesis. In January 2011, this share decreased to 53%, but by April 2011 it increased again to 58%. Throughout 2011–2012, support for this thesis remained close to 60%.
• At the same time, the share of opponents of recognizing the Holodomor as genocide decreased by about one third during 2011–2012 — from 34% to 22%.
• Regionally, the genocide thesis is supported by around 80% of residents in the West, Center, and North, as well as more than half in the South, about one third in the East, and about one quarter in Donbas.
• All age groups show agreement with the thesis, although the largest share of undecided respondents is among young people (about one quarter). Rural residents are more likely to agree with the genocide thesis than urban residents (64% vs 57%).

• According to the exit poll “UKRAINE–2012” conducted by Rating Group on October 28, 2012, commissioned by Channel 5, the survey was carried out at the exit of 350 polling stations. A total of 23,800 respondents were interviewed
• . According to the exit poll results, the Party of Regions was supported by almost 29% of respondents, Batkivshchyna by about 24%, UDAR by about 14%, the Communist Party by about 13%, and Svoboda by more than 12%. Deviations above the statistical margin of error were recorded only for Svoboda (-2.2), which, according to the Central Election Commission, received less support than indicated by the exit poll (10.4% vs. 12.6%).
• At the same time, according to official CEC data, the results of the Party of Regions (+1.3%) and Batkivshchyna (+1.6%) were higher than those shown by the Rating Group exit poll. Notably, all exit polls conducted on October 28, 2012 showed higher results for Svoboda than the CEC data, while Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party showed lower results. Regarding the Party of Regions, exit polls demonstrated mixed trends. According to official CEC results, the gap between the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna was 4.5%. The closest estimates were provided by Rating Group (4.8%), the National Exit Poll (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Razumkov Centre, KIIS) at 3.7%, and TNS/SOCIS at 6.6%.
• Compared with the latest Rating Group pre-election surveys (after redistribution of undecided voters), the total support for coalition parties (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased slightly from 44.5% in September to 43.2% on election day, while the combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) increased from 46.4% in September to 49.9% on election day. The data also confirmed demographic voting patterns, including lower turnout among younger voters and higher participation among older age groups, which slightly reduced UDAR’s final result compared to polling expectations.

• According to the exit poll conducted by Rating Group in Single-Member District No. 83 in Ivano-Frankivsk, Oleksandr Sychev of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” won a decisive victory, receiving 59.1% of the vote among all respondents. Oleksandr Shevchenko, running as an independent candidate, placed second with 22.6%, followed by Volodymyr Chornous of the UDAR party with 9.5%. Oleksandr Sychev, running as an independent candidate, received 3.3%, while Oleksandr Kohut of the Party of Regions was supported by 1.6% and Ihor Miglachov of the Communist Party of Ukraine by 1.3%. The remaining candidates each received less than 1%: Taras Bodnar 0.7%, Vasyl Humeniuk 0.5%, Volodymyr Titov 0.4%, and Valentyn Valentiiev 0.1%, while 1.0% of respondents did not indicate their choice.
• The exit poll was conducted at the exits of 25 polling stations, with more than 1,700 respondents interviewed. The sample was representative of the adult population of the district aged 18 and over. Polling stations were selected randomly with proportional coverage, and respondents at each station were chosen using a fixed step sampling procedure.

• According to the exit poll conducted by Rating Group in single-member electoral district No. 120 (Lviv region), Yaroslav Dubnevych, running as an independent candidate, received 42.0% of the vote, while Tetiana Chornovol from the All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna received 40.6%. Andrii Tyndyk of the UDAR party led by Vitalii Klitschko was supported by 5.5% of respondents, Ivan Denkovych, running as an independent, received 2.7%, Ivan Bilak of the Party of Regions and Ivan Kupyak of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists each received 2.5%, Yosyp Halamai of the People’s Party received 1.5%, Leonid Aleksyuk of the Communist Party of Ukraine received 0.5%, and Andrii Petryshyn of the Civic Solidarity party received 0.4%. A total of 1.6% of respondents did not indicate their choice on the questionnaire.

According to the exit poll conducted by Rating Group in single-member electoral district No. 206 (Chernihiv region), the leading candidate was Vladyslav Atroshenko, running as an independent candidate, with 38.1% of the vote. Volodymyr Polishchuk from the All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna received 19.7%, Stanislav Prokopenko from the Party of Regions received 16.8%, Raisa Yasochko from the Communist Party of Ukraine received 8.2%, and Olena Popova from the UDAR party led by Vitalii Klitschko received 6.7%. Other candidates received less than 3% each: Oleh Kupriienko (Radical Party of Oleh Liashko) – 2.2%, Andrii Atroshchenko (independent) – 1.8%, Iryna Eristova (Natalia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward!) – 1.4%, Valerii Riabchenko (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) – 0.8%, Valentyna Suraieva (independent) – 0.6%, Oleksandr Kyrychenko (People’s Party) – 0.5%, Oleh Shevtsov (Ukraine of the Future party) – 0.5%, Vitalii Svyrydenko (independent) – 0.4%, Oleksandr Prokhorskyi (For Human Rights party) – 0.3%, Serhii Mykheievskyi (Fair Ukraine party) – 0.2%. A total of 2.1% of respondents did not indicate their choice in the questionnaire.

• On October 28, 2012, commissioned by Channel 5, Rating Group conducted the “UKRAINE-2012” exit poll. The survey was carried out at the exits of 350 polling stations. A total of 23,800 respondents were interviewed. The margin of error for values close to 10% does not exceed 1%, and for values close to 20–30% it does not exceed 1.5–2%.
• According to the exit poll results, the Party of Regions was supported by nearly 29% of respondents, Batkivshchyna by about 24%, UDAR by about 14%, the Communist Party by about 13%, and Svoboda by more than 12%.
• Deviations above the level of statistical margin of error were recorded only for Svoboda (-2.2), which, according to Central Election Commission data, received less support than indicated by the exit poll (10.4% vs 12.6%). At the same time, according to CEC data, the results of the Party of Regions (+1.3%) and Batkivshchyna (+1.6%) were higher than those recorded in the Rating Group exit poll. It is notable that all exit polls conducted on October 28, 2012, showed higher results for Svoboda than the CEC results, while Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party showed lower results. For the Party of Regions, exit polls showed mixed trends, with some companies reporting lower results than the CEC and others higher.
• According to official CEC data, the gap between the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna was 4.5%. The closest figures to this were shown by the Rating Group exit poll (4.8%), the National Exit Poll (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Razumkov Centre, KIIS) at 3.7%, and TNS / SOCIS at 6.6%.
• Comparing election results with the latest Rating Group surveys (after redistribution of undecided voters) allows the following conclusions. Since September, the combined support for ruling coalition parties (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased from 44.5% to 43.2%, and remained unchanged since early October (43.2% in the election results). At the same time, combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) grew dynamically from 46.4% in September to 48.8% in early October and to 49.9% in the October 28 election. Party ratings recorded by Rating Group in September were largely consistent with the results recorded by the CEC on October 28, except for Svoboda, whose support doubled compared to September and increased by one third compared to early October. Support for the Party of Regions slightly decreased (-1.5%), similar to Batkivshchyna (-1.6%), while support for UDAR and the Communist Party remained largely unchanged. At the same time, at the beginning of October, support for UDAR increased sharply, bringing it to second place for the first time, overtaking Batkivshchyna. Support for the Communist Party also increased while support for the Party of Regions declined. However, the peak of emotional voting observed in early October was not confirmed by more pragmatic voting behavior on October 28, and party support returned to September levels.
• Demographic characteristics of voting behavior show that youth were active in these elections only in Western Ukraine, while in the rest of the country youth demonstrated the lowest activity. This had been predicted by most sociologists, including Rating Group, as these trends repeat from election to election. In the structure of the electorate, youth aged 18–29 make up about one quarter, but among those who actually voted, youth aged 18–29 accounted for only 18%. Similarly, the share of voters aged 30–39 decreased from 18% to 15%. At the same time, there was a shift toward older age groups: the share of voters aged 50–59 increased from 17% to 21%, and those aged 60 and older increased from 25% to 28%. More detailed analysis showed the largest shifts occurred in the 55–64 age group (increase) and the 18–24 age group (decrease).
• The youngest electorates were observed among supporters of UDAR (32% aged 18–29 or 18% aged 18–24), Ukraine – Forward! (29% aged 18–29 or 17% aged 18–24), and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (23% aged 18–29 or 15% aged 18–24). UDAR was the leader among the youngest age groups. Analysis of age differences between all voters and those who actually voted on October 28 indicates an age imbalance that resulted in UDAR receiving 1.5–2% less support in the election than indicated by general support levels. In addition, primarily young voters supported the Green Party of Ukraine, the Greens, Green Planet, and Ukraine of the Future, which together received more than 1% support.
• The oldest electorate was observed in the Communist Party (23% aged 50–59 and 44% aged 60 and older). Primarily older voters also supported the Party of Pensioners of Ukraine. A significant share of older voters was also present among supporters of the Party of Regions (21% aged 50–59 and 33% aged 60 and older) and Batkivshchyna (25% aged 50–59 and 28% aged 60 and older). Svoboda and Our Ukraine were more supported by middle-aged voters.
• Women dominated among supporters of the Party of Regions (59%), Ukraine – Forward! (58%), and Batkivshchyna (58%). Men dominated among supporters of Svoboda (56%), UDAR (53%), and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (53%). Our Ukraine and the Communist Party had relatively balanced gender structures.

• According to Rating Group, commissioned by Channel 5, the nationwide exit poll “UKRAINE–2012” was conducted on the day of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine on October 28, 2012. The survey was carried out at the exit of 350 polling stations, with more than 20,000 respondents interviewed. The sample was representative of the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 and over by region and type of settlement. Polling stations were selected randomly following the principle of equal distribution, and respondents at polling stations were selected according to a fixed interval applied consistently throughout election day.
• More than 700 interviewers were involved in conducting the “UKRAINE–2012” exit poll, with an additional 100 people responsible for organization, supervision, data collection, and data processing. The survey was anonymous: respondents completed the questionnaires themselves and placed them into specially prepared ballot boxes. The survey measured party choice, based on the question “Which party did you just vote for in the parliamentary elections of Ukraine?”, along with several socio-demographic characteristics of voters.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2012 in single-member constituency No. 126, Batkivshchyna was the clear leader in party support among voters who intended to take part in the election, who accounted for around 90% of all respondents in the district. Almost 40% said they would vote for Batkivshchyna, while 27.8% supported UDAR and 16.9% Svoboda. All other parties were supported by less than 1.5% each, and about one in ten voters remained undecided. Compared with two months earlier, support for Batkivshchyna declined by about five percentage points, with the sharpest drop recorded in Stryi district, while UDAR’s rating grew by nearly ten points, especially in Stryi and Zhydachiv districts. Support for Svoboda also increased, mainly due to a recovery in Stryi district. The share of undecided voters remained within the margin of error.
• The social profiles of party electorates differed markedly. UDAR had the youngest voter base, with about one third under the age of 30, while among Batkivshchyna supporters around one third were pensioners. Men were more prevalent among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR, while women dominated Batkivshchyna’s electorate. Among UDAR and Svoboda voters, the proportions of working and non-working respondents were similar, whereas Batkivshchyna supporters were more likely to be unemployed. Nearly two thirds of Batkivshchyna’s electorate lived in rural areas.
• In the majoritarian race, Oleh Kanivets was the frontrunner, supported by 40.5% of respondents, followed by Andriy Kota with 29.8%, Ihor Ostash with 7.8%, and Ihor Teniukh with 3.9%, while around 15% of voters were still undecided. Kanivets was backed by about two thirds of Batkivshchyna supporters and nearly half of Svoboda voters, but only a small share of UDAR’s electorate. In contrast, almost three quarters of UDAR supporters intended to vote for Kota. Mobilization of Batkivshchyna and UDAR voters in support of their respective candidates increased by about 15 percentage points compared with previous measurements.
• Kanivets remained the leading candidate in Stryi district, where his support was roughly double that of his closest rival, and in Zhydachiv district he had nearly caught up with Kota. Across the entire constituency, Kanivets’s personal rating rose by seven points despite the decline in Batkivshchyna’s party support, although in the city of Stryi his popularity fell. Kota’s rating also increased, though less than that of UDAR, with gains concentrated in Stryi and losses in Zhydachiv. Ostash experienced the largest decline, particularly in Stryi.
• Younger voters were most strongly represented among Kota’s supporters, while pensioners were more common among the electorates of Kanivets, Ostash, and Teniukh. Women were slightly more prevalent among Kanivets’s supporters, whereas men dominated Ostash’s electorate. Kanivets’s voters were more likely to live in rural areas, while Ostash’s and Teniukh’s supporters were predominantly urban.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the leaders of electoral preferences among political parties in the constituency are Batkivshchyna, which 29.3% of respondents who intend to vote (88% in the constituency) are ready to support, and the UDAR party with 27.0%. Svoboda is supported by 23.9% of respondents. The ratings of other parties are much lower: the Party of Regions is supported by 2.8%, Nasha Ukraina by 1.4%, “Ukraine – Forward!” by 1.4%, and the Communist Party by 0.5%. Those who are still undecided amount to 1.1%.
• Compared to last month, the rating of Batkivshchyna has slightly decreased — by 3%. At the same time, UDAR has grown significantly — by 11%. The rating of Svoboda remains unchanged.
  The number of those who cannot decide has decreased by 6%.
• The largest share of young people is among UDAR supporters — 35%. Meanwhile, the largest share of older voters (50+) is among Batkivshchyna supporters — 47%. Among Party of Regions supporters, the largest share of people with higher education — 44%.
• There are more men among UDAR voters, while women significantly dominate the Batkivshchyna electorate.

ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL POLITICIANS

• B. Dubnevych is known to 88% of respondents, Yu. Mykhalchyshyn to 75%, and T. Mandziuk to only 39%.
• The leaders in the positive attitude rating are Yu. Mykhalchyshyn and B. Dubnevych. 35–36% of respondents have a positive opinion of them. Only 15% have a positive opinion of T. Mandziuk.
• A quarter of respondents have a negative opinion of B. Dubnevych. At the same time, only 6–9% have a negative opinion of his opponents.
• Yu. Mykhalchyshyn is the clear favorite in the positive-attitude ranking among Svoboda supporters — 72%. A third of UDAR and Batkivshchyna voters also view him positively, as well as one in five of the undecided.
• B. Dubnevych is viewed positively by half of Batkivshchyna supporters, 43% of Party of Regions supporters, and one third of UDAR, Svoboda, and the undecided.
• T. Mandziuk is viewed positively mainly by UDAR supporters.

CANDIDATE RATINGS

• The leaders of electoral support among candidates in the single-member district are B. Dubnevych (31.3%) and Yu. Mykhalchyshyn (30.2%).
  T. Mandziuk is supported by 12.9%. The ratings of other candidates do not exceed 1.5%. The share of those who are undecided is 22.5%.
• Compared to the previous survey, there are some changes in the candidates’ ratings. The rating of B. Dubnevych has remained virtually unchanged, Yu. Mykhalchyshyn has fallen by 5%, while T. Mandziuk’s popularity has increased (by almost 5%). There is also a slight decrease in the number of undecided voters.
• B. Dubnevych is supported by 46% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 35% of Party of Regions, 28% of UDAR, 18% of Svoboda, and one quarter of the undecided.
• Yu. Mykhalchyshyn is supported by two thirds of Svoboda supporters, one quarter of Batkivshchyna, 14% of UDAR, and 12% of the undecided.
• T. Mandziuk is supported by 40% of UDAR supporters. In other electorates, his support is low.
• The youngest electorate belongs to T. Mandziuk — 33% are young people. The largest share of older voters is among Yu. Mykhalchyshyn’s supporters — half are 50+.
• Among B. Dubnevych’s supporters, only one quarter have higher education, compared with 34% among Yu. Mykhalchyshyn’s supporters and 43% among T. Mandziuk’s.
• Women dominate among B. Dubnevych’s supporters, while men slightly dominate among T. Mandziuk’s electorate.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, the leaders in the ranking of political forces in single-member electoral district No. 115 of the city of Lviv are the UDAR party, which 29.6% of respondents intend to vote for, and Batkivshchyna, supported by 27.6%. The data are presented among those who stated that they intend to take part in the elections — such respondents make up 82% in the district. Svoboda also has significant support — 18.2%. The ratings of other parties are much lower — about 3% of respondents intend to vote for Nasha Ukraina, the Party of Regions, or the party “Ukraine – Forward!”. Other political forces are supported by no more than 1% of respondents. The share of those undecided is 14.1%.
• Over the past month, the popularity of the UDAR party has increased by almost 10%, allowing it to take the leading position in the ranking. The popularity of Batkivshchyna has fallen by 6%, and that of Svoboda by 3%. No significant changes are observed in the ratings of other parties or in the number of the undecided.
• The largest share of young people is among UDAR supporters. In contrast, more than half of Batkivshchyna supporters are over 50 years old. Among Svoboda voters, more than 40% are older.
• More than half of UDAR and Svoboda supporters have higher education. Among Batkivshchyna voters, this share is one third, while 40% of this party’s supporters have secondary specialized education. In Batkivshchyna’s electorate, two thirds are women. Among UDAR supporters, 56% are women, while among Svoboda supporters the gender balance is equal.
• ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL POLITICIANS
• The politicians whose names were included in the questionnaire are well known in the district: D. Dobrodomov is known by 78% of respondents, R. Fedyshyn by 71%, and M. Khmil by 68%.
• The highest positive rating belongs to D. Dobrodomov — 47% of respondents have a positive opinion of him (a quarter say their attitude is definitely positive).
• M. Khmil evokes positive emotions in 35% of respondents, and R. Fedyshyn in 27% (8% have a negative opinion of him).
• D. Dobrodomov is the favorite among UDAR supporters — three quarters of them have a positive attitude toward him. Among supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, 48% hold a positive opinion of him.
• M. Khmil is viewed positively by two thirds of Batkivshchyna supporters, half of Svoboda supporters, and only 28% of UDAR supporters.
• R. Fedyshyn is viewed positively by 35% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 29% of UDAR, and 28% of Svoboda supporters.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS
• Among the candidates in the district, two leaders of electoral support remain. Against the backdrop of the growing rating of UDAR, D. Dobrodomov, with 32.6%, has taken the leading position. M. Khmil, against the background of declining ratings of Batkivshchyna, with 27%, has fallen to second place. R. Fedyshyn is supported by 9.8%. Other candidates have virtually no chance of interfering in the fight for victory. One quarter of respondents remain undecided.
• D. Dobrodomov mobilizes 71% of UDAR supporters, 17–18% of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda supporters, and 15% of those undecided about their party choice.
• M. Khmil is supported by 58% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 44% of Svoboda, and only 4% of UDAR supporters.
• Almost every tenth supporter of the most popular parties intends to vote for R. Fedyshyn.
• Over the past month, Dobrodomov’s rating has increased by 4%; Khmil’s decline is within the statistical margin of error. Meanwhile, Fedyshyn’s popularity has tripled.
• There is a gradual decline in the share of those undecided about a candidate — from 33.3% to 24.1%.
• The youngest electorate is that of R. Fedyshyn — one third are under 30 years old. The largest share of older voters is among M. Khmil’s supporters — half are over 50.
• The highest share of people with higher education is among Dobrodomov’s supporters and among those undecided about candidates.
• Women dominate among supporters of R. Fedyshyn and D. Dobrodomov, while among M. Khmil’s supporters there is gender parity.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, if the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early October 2012, 50% of respondents would definitely take part in them and another 31% would probably take part. The highest level of mobilization is recorded in the Center, East, and West of the country. Among party supporters, the greatest willingness to vote is expressed by supporters of the Party of Regions and Svoboda. The lowest readiness is among the undecided and supporters of Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”.

RESULTS:

• If the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early October 2012, the Party of Regions would win, supported by 23% of respondents who intend to vote. Approximately equal numbers of voters would support UDAR (17.9%) and Batkivshchyna (16.5%).
  12.8% would vote for the Communist Party, 6% for Svoboda.
  Another 3.1% would support Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”.
  About 1% would support Nasha Ukraina.
  Other parties would receive over 2%, and 17.2% would be undecided.

TRENDS:

• Over the past month, support for the Party of Regions has slightly decreased (from 26% to 23%), while support for the Communist Party has increased (from 11% to 13%). The Party of Regions has the strongest support in Donbas (almost 50%) and in the South (almost 40%), while the Communist Party is strongest in the South and East. Interestingly, over the past month the presidential rating of Viktor Yanukovych has practically not changed (25%).
• The party that gained the most is UDAR (from 12% to 18%), while support for Batkivshchyna fell (from 23% to 17%).
• It should be noted that while UDAR increased its ratings in the West and Center, it also expanded support in the East, South, and Donbas. Batkivshchyna, despite significant losses, remains the leader in the West, but in the Center and North it has been caught up with and sometimes overtaken by UDAR.
• Svoboda has also increased its rating, crossing the electoral threshold with 6%. The party grew in the West and North, including Kyiv.
• It should be noted that UDAR, Batkivshchyna, and Svoboda together are supported by over 40% of voters, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party together have 36%. Since all of these parties exceed the electoral threshold as of early October, the pro-opposition parties would receive 119 seats in the new Verkhovna Rada, while the current coalition parties would receive 106.
• It is also noteworthy that over the past several months the combined support for pro-government and pro-opposition parties has hardly changed; shifts occur within the groups. Thus, the decline in Batkivshchyna has been accompanied by growth of UDAR and Svoboda. Similarly, the decline of the Party of Regions has been accompanied by rising support for the Communists. At the same time, over a longer period, against the background of stable pro-opposition support (about 40%), the ratings of pro-government parties have strengthened (from 25–28% at the beginning of the year to 36% in October).
• More than 50% of respondents, when deciding which party to vote for in the 2012 parliamentary elections, are more likely to vote against the course of President Viktor Yanukovych; one quarter would vote in support of the President’s course, and another quarter are undecided. These indicators have remained stable throughout the past year. More than half of Communist Party supporters and almost 40% of the undecided intend to vote against the President’s course.
• Despite this, only 37% of respondents believe that after the 2012 elections a parliamentary majority will be formed by parties opposed to the President, while the same share (36%) believe the majority will be formed by pro-presidential parties.
• The share of the undecided remains stable (17%), with the highest concentration in the East, Center, North, and South. Donbas is gradually mobilizing, primarily in favor of the Party of Regions.
• About 13% of the undecided believe UDAR has the greatest chance to win their vote, 12% name the Party of Regions, 9% Batkivshchyna, and 7% the Communist Party. At the same time, half of the undecided do not yet see any party capable of winning their support.
• Meanwhile, 22% of the undecided would under no circumstances support the Party of Regions, 19% Nasha Ukraina, 18% the Communist Party, 17% Batkivshchyna, 13% each the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Svoboda, and 9% the party “Ukraine – Forward!”. Only 3% of the undecided would never support UDAR. Almost half of the undecided have no antipathy toward any party.
• Almost 40% of voters have already made their final choice, another 27% believe their choice is unlikely to change. Nearly one quarter admit it could change. Voters in Donbas, the East, and the South are the most confident in their choice.
• Among party supporters, the most confident are voters of the Party of Regions, Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and the Communist Party. Supporters of UDAR and “Ukraine – Forward!” are less confident — nearly 30% of them admit they may change their preference.
• It was also interesting to examine the effect of Yuliya Tymoshenko’s absence from the Batkivshchyna list. One quarter of respondents would be more likely to vote for Batkivshchyna if Tymoshenko were free and headed the party list, which is significantly higher than the party’s current rating. Under such conditions, only about 3% of opposition supporters would abandon the party, while one third of Svoboda supporters, over a quarter of UDAR and “Ukraine – Forward!” supporters, and one in ten undecided would switch to Batkivshchyna.
• It should be added that one in ten of Tymoshenko’s voters supports UDAR in parliamentary elections, and only 2% of Vitali Klitschko’s voters support Batkivshchyna.
• 56% of respondents expect that the October 28, 2012 parliamentary elections will bring positive changes, while 34% do not. Two years earlier, 49% expected positive changes from the 2010 local elections.
• 52% expect that the new parliament will be significantly renewed, while 35% do not. Two years earlier, 41% expected similar renewal after the 2010 local elections.
• 37% expect MPs to become more accountable to voters, while 48% do not. In 2010, only 29% expected such changes.
• The highest hopes for the elections are in the North and West.
• At the same time, 36% expect major fraud that would significantly affect the results; another 29% expect minor fraud that would not affect the outcome. Only 17% do not expect fraud. In 2010, 31% expected major fraud and 29% minor fraud.
• Supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda fear fraud the most, while Party of Regions supporters fear it the least. Accordingly, over half of those who expect fraud believe it will mainly be committed by the Party of Regions. Emotions play a large role: half of Party of Regions voters expect fraud from Batkivshchyna, while 84% of Batkivshchyna voters expect it from the Party of Regions.
• Only one quarter of respondents are ready to take part in protests if there is major fraud on October 28, 2012 (only 6% are definitely ready). Almost 70% are not ready.
• Almost half of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna supporters, about 40% of “Ukraine – Forward!”, and one third of UDAR supporters are ready to protest.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the leader of electoral preferences in district #121 (Drohobych) is the Batkivshchyna party, which would be supported by 41.5% of respondents who intend to take part in the elections (85% in total).
  UDAR is supported by 21.3%, and almost the same number support Svoboda (20.9%).
  The ratings of other parties are significantly lower. About 2% are ready to vote for Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions. Every tenth respondent has not yet decided on party preferences.
• VO Batkivshchyna enjoys greater support in villages (45%) than in cities (40%). Our Ukraine also has higher support in villages. Svoboda and UDAR, on the contrary, are more strongly supported in cities.
  UDAR is supported much more by young people, while Batkivshchyna is supported more by older voters. Svoboda has a fairly even age structure. There are also more older people among the undecided.
  Among supporters of UDAR and Svoboda there are more employed people and those with higher education. UDAR and Svoboda are supported more by men, while Batkivshchyna is supported more by women.

CANDIDATE RATINGS

• The leader of electoral preferences in the district among candidates is R. Ilyk. If elections were held in the near future, 31.5% of respondents who intend to vote would support him.
  12.6% would vote for M. Zadorozhnyi, 8.9% for O. Starovoit, 8.1% for I. Kurus. About 4% are ready to support V. Vozniak. More than 12% would support other candidates. About 22% remain undecided.
• R. Ilyk mobilizes 60% of Batkivshchyna supporters and almost 30% of Svoboda supporters.
  At the same time, almost a quarter of Svoboda supporters back M. Zadorozhnyi.
  Supporters of UDAR are largely uninterested in these candidates: almost 40% of them are ready to vote for O. Starovoit, one quarter are undecided, and only 7% each would vote for R. Ilyk or M. Zadorozhnyi.
• O. Starovoit and V. Vozniak are supported more by young people; one quarter of voters aged under 29 are also found among the undecided. R. Ilyk and M. Zadorozhnyi are supported more by older people.
  Men support O. Starovoit and V. Vozniak more, while women more often support the Batkivshchyna candidate R. Ilyk.
  Among R. Ilyk’s supporters, the non-employed dominate, as well as among O. Starovoit’s supporters — in the first case due to a high share of older people and women, and in the second due to a large share of youth.
  Among supporters of I. Kurus and V. Vozniak, the employed predominate.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the clear leader of electoral preferences in the multi-member constituency No. 125 is Batkivshchyna. If elections were held in the near future, 42.2% of respondents who intend to vote (88% overall) would support this political force.
• Svoboda is supported by 18.8%, UDAR – 17.8%. The ratings of other parties are significantly lower. Thus, Our Ukraine would receive 2.8%, the party “Ukraine – Forward!” – 2.1%, the Party of Regions – 1.5%, and the Communist Party (CPU) – 0.6%. Other parties together receive 3.2%. Every ninth respondent has not yet decided on a party preference.
• Among all respondents / Among those who intend to vote
  
  • Batkivshchyna – 38.1 / 42.2
  • Svoboda – 17.0 / 18.8
  • UDAR – 16.4 / 17.8
  • Our Ukraine – 2.6 / 2.8
  • Ukraine – Forward! – 2.0 / 2.1
  • Party of Regions – 1.4 / 1.5
  • CPU – 0.7 / 0.6
  • Other party – 2.8 / 3.2
  • Will not vote – 7.2 / –
  • Hard to say – 11.9 / 11.0
• In terms of districts, Batkivshchyna is the leader in all parts of the constituency. Its highest support is in Starosambir district (49%), and the lowest in Skole and Turka districts (37–38%). Svoboda’s rating is highest in Sambir and Skole district, slightly lower in the other two districts (17–18%). UDAR is supported by 19–20% in Sambir, Skole district, and Turka district (where it ranks second). In Starosambir district, however, support for V. Klychko’s party is somewhat lower – 15.0%.
• In Skole and Turka districts, 5–6% support Our Ukraine.
• No significant territorial differences are observed in the level of respondents’ certainty.
• One-third of UDAR’s electorate consists of young people under 30. In contrast, supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda are mostly over 50 years old.
• The largest share of respondents with higher education is again among UDAR’s supporters, while the smallest is among Batkivshchyna’s. In Batkivshchyna’s electorate, women clearly outnumber men, while in other parties there is gender parity.
• 42% of UDAR’s supporters live in cities. The electorates of the other viable parties are at least two-thirds rural.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS
• The leader of electoral preferences in the constituency among single-mandate candidates is A. Lopushanskyi. 31.2% of respondents who intend to vote would support him.
• M. Hychka would receive 17.9%, A. Tyahnybok – 15.4%, I. Pukshyn – 13.9%. Other candidates are far behind: D. Shchykitka – 4.8%, A. Deineka – 3.3%, the rest – below 1%.
  11.0% remain undecided.
• A. Lopushanskyi mobilizes 38% of Batkivshchyna supporters, one-third of Svoboda supporters, one-quarter of UDAR supporters, and 16% of those undecided about parties.
• M. Hychka is supported by one-fifth of Batkivshchyna and UDAR voters, 17% of the party-undecided, and only 8% of Svoboda supporters.
  A. Tyahnybok is mainly supported by Svoboda voters (49%) and every tenth Batkivshchyna supporter. Among UDAR supporters, he has little support.
• I. Pukshyn mobilizes 17% of Batkivshchyna voters, 16% of the undecided, and 13% of UDAR supporters. Among Svoboda voters, his support is negligible.
• D. Shchykitka is supported only by one-fifth of UDAR supporters.
• The highest support for A. Lopushanskyi is in Starosambir district (36%), and the lowest in Skole district (25%).
• M. Hychka’s rating is high only in Starosambir district (31%). In Sambir it is 13%, and in Skole and Turka districts – 9% each.
• A. Tyahnybok is most supported in Sambir (26%) and Skole district (21%). In the other districts his support is lower (10–11%).
• I. Pukshyn has a high rating only in Turka district (32%). In other areas, his support ranges from 5% (Sambir) to 13% (Skole district).
• In A. Lopushanskyi’s electorate, almost one-third are under 30, while one-quarter are pensioners.
  A. Tyahnybok has the oldest electorate – one-third are pensioners.
• Men are most numerous among A. Tyahnybok’s voters, while women dominate among M. Hychka’s.
• Among Svoboda’s candidate, the share of employed voters is the highest (48%). In contrast, I. Pukshyn has the largest share of unemployed voters (two-thirds).
• The electorates of A. Tyahnybok and D. Shchykitka are half urban, while for the other candidates they are predominantly rural (for I. Pukshyn – 80%).

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the clear leader of electoral preferences in the multi-member constituency No. 126 (Stryi) is Batkivshchyna. If elections were held, 44.4% of respondents who intend to vote (89% in the constituency) would support this political force.
• UDAR would receive 18.6%, Svoboda – 13.1%. Our Ukraine would gain 2.9%, the Party of Regions – 2.8%, and “Ukraine – Forward!” – 2.1%. The ratings of other parties are below 2%. 13.4% of respondents remain undecided.
• Batkivshchyna leads the party ratings in all territories of the constituency. However, the share of its supporters differs significantly by district. Thus, in Stryi district it is supported by 52%, in Zhydachiv district – 42%, and in the city of Stryi – only 39%. In Stryi city, the highest share of undecided voters is recorded (20%).
• UDAR is most strongly supported in Zhydachiv district – 24% of respondents. In Stryi district, 17% would vote for this party, and in Stryi city – 14%. In the city of Stryi, UDAR ranks third, behind Svoboda, which here is supported by 15%. A high level of support for Svoboda is also observed in Zhydachiv district (15%), while in Stryi district its popularity is noticeably lower (9%).
• In Zhydachiv district, Our Ukraine also enjoys relatively higher support (5%).
• The youngest electorate traditionally belongs to UDAR (one-third of its voters are under 30). In contrast, one-third of Batkivshchyna’s and Svoboda’s supporters are pensioners. Svoboda has the largest share of voters with higher education. Men are most numerous among Svoboda’s supporters, while women dominate among Batkivshchyna’s supporters. The latter’s electorate mostly lives in rural areas. Half of UDAR’s voters are concentrated in Zhydachiv district.
• A high concentration of Svoboda supporters is also observed there. Meanwhile, Batkivshchyna has noticeably more supporters in Stryi district.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS.
  O. Kanivets is the leader in the single-member district. 32.8% of respondents who intend to vote would support him.
  A. Kit would receive 24.0%, I. Ostash – 13.2%, I. Teniukh – 4.6%, S. Kanivets – 3.7%. The ratings of other candidates are below 2%. 17.7% remain undecided.
• A. Kit is supported by nearly two-thirds of UDAR’s supporters in the district. In turn, O. Kanivets is supported by slightly less than half of Batkivshchyna’s supporters. 15% of Batkivshchyna voters would vote for A. Kit, and 13% for I. Ostash. It is I. Ostash who may most strongly split Batkivshchyna’s vote.
• At the same time, O. Kanivets has a solid reserve of support among Svoboda’s voters – every third of them is ready to vote for him. Every fifth Svoboda supporter would vote for one of the other two candidates. Among the undecided, one quarter support O. Kanivets, and one in ten support I. Ostash or A. Kit.
• By territory, O. Kanivets has the highest rating in Stryi city (42%) and Stryi district (34%). In Zhydachiv district, his support is somewhat lower (25%).
• A. Kit is the clear leader in Zhydachiv district (45%). In Stryi district, his support is much lower: 15% in the district and only 7% in Stryi city.
• I. Ostash is best supported in Stryi city (21%). In Stryi district, 15% would vote for him, while in Zhydachiv district – only 6%.
• The largest share of undecided voters is in Stryi district – 18–21%. In Zhydachiv district, their share is slightly lower (15%).
• One quarter of the electorates of O. Kanivets and A. Kit are young people under 30. At the same time, among A. Kit’s supporters, one quarter are pensioners, while for O. Kanivets this group accounts for one in five.
• Among supporters of I. Teniukh and I. Ostash, men prevail, while among O. Kanivets’ supporters, women dominate.
• Among O. Kanivets’ supporters, the share of employed people is the highest (65%), while it is the lowest among A. Kit’s electorate (41%).
• The largest share of urban residents is found among I. Ostash’s supporters, and the smallest among A. Kit’s. Three-quarters of A. Kit’s supporters live in Zhydachiv district.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the clear leader of electoral preferences in the multi-member constituency #122 is VO Batkivshchyna. If elections were held, 43.3% of respondents who intend to take part in them (more than 90% of the district) would vote for this political formation.
• UDAR would receive 20.8% of the vote, VO Svoboda – 18.0%. Nasha Ukraina would gain 3.3%, “Ukraine – Forward!” – 1.3%, and the Party of Regions – 1.2%. The ratings of other parties are below 1%. 10.4% of respondents have not yet decided.
• There are certain territorial differences in party popularity. Thus, the rating of Batkivshchyna is higher in Yavoriv district (48%) than in Zhovkva district (38%).
• For VO Svoboda, the rating is one third higher in Zhovkva district (21%) than in Yavoriv district (14%). In contrast, UDAR is more popular in Yavoriv (23% vs. 19%). There are no significant differences in the ratings of other political forces by district.
• The level of indecision is higher in Zhovkva district (14% vs. 7%).
• The largest share of young voters is among UDAR supporters (40% aged under 30). Accordingly, people with higher education are also more numerous in this electoral group (35%). Women dominate among supporters of Batkivshchyna, while men dominate among supporters of UDAR. In the electorates of all the most popular parties, rural residents prevail, especially among supporters of Batkivshchyna.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS
• The leader of electoral preferences in the single-member constituency is T. Kozak. If elections were held in the near future, 47% of voters would be ready to vote for him. V. Pazyniak would be supported by 26.8%. The ratings of other candidates are significantly lower: I. Samardak – 3.4%, H. Babii – 1.7%, I. Kozak – 1.4%. 17% of respondents have not yet decided.
• T. Kozak mobilizes 58% of UDAR supporters, 47% of VO Batkivshchyna supporters, 37% of VO Svoboda voters, and 39% of those undecided about party choice.
• V. Pazyniak is supported by 40% of Svoboda supporters and 35% of Batkivshchyna supporters. Among UDAR voters, only 10% support this candidate.
• I. Samardak is supported only by 15% of UDAR voters.
• By district, candidate popularity differs somewhat from the overall district ranking. Thus, T. Kozak’s popularity is higher in Zhovkva district (55%), while in Yavoriv district 40% of respondents are ready to support him. There, his main competitor is V. Pazyniak, whose rating is 34%. In Zhovkva district, however, V. Pazyniak has significantly fewer supporters – 19%.
• I. Samardak is supported equally in both districts at 3–4% (with 3–5% potential reserve).
• The share of undecided voters does not differ greatly across locations and amounts to 16–18%.
• The highest share of young people is among I. Samardak supporters (39%). One quarter of V. Pazyniak’s voters and every fifth voter of T. Kozak are pensioners.
• Among supporters of the UDAR candidate, men prevail. Among supporters of T. Kozak and V. Pazyniak, the gender distribution does not differ from the overall demographics – 45% men and 55% women.