News and Press releases

• According to the latest survey conducted by the Rating Group, around 40% of respondents consider themselves football fans: 9% identify as football fans, 9% as active supporters, and another 22% consider themselves supporters but not active ones. At the same time, almost 60% are not interested in football.
• According to long-term observations, the peak number of football supporters in Ukraine was recorded during the EURO 2012 period. In 2009, about one third of respondents identified themselves as football supporters, while immediately after EURO 2012 almost half of respondents did so. Later, the indicator stabilized at around 40%, confirming the emotional nature of its growth. In 2012, regions that hosted EURO 2012 demonstrated a sharp increase in the number of supporters, while in 2013 the figures stabilized. Overall, hosting EURO 2012 in Ukraine increased public interest in football. Another factor contributing to the growth in the number of supporters (from 33% in 2009 to 40% in 2013) was the success of Ukrainian clubs, the level of the domestic championship and the performance of the national team.
• The most active supporters remain young people and men. Almost one third of men actively follow football, while among women this share is three times lower (around one in ten). Only about 40% of men are not interested in football at all, while among women this share exceeds 70%.
• Among Ukrainian football clubs, Dynamo is the most popular (39%), followed by Shakhtar (25%). Less popular clubs include Metalist (6%), Dnipro (3%), Karpaty (3%) and Chornomorets (3%). Dynamo is most supported in the North, Center and West of the country. Shakhtar is the clear favorite in Donbas and shares leadership with Dynamo in the South. In the East, Metalist is the most popular club, slightly ahead of Shakhtar, Dnipro and Dynamo.
• Around 45% of football supporters in Ukraine do not support the idea of merging the Ukrainian and Russian football championships into a single league, while 37% support the idea and 17% are undecided. Among those not interested in football, only 11% support the idea, around one quarter oppose it, and about two thirds are undecided. The idea is most popular among supporters in the South, while in other regions opponents prevail. Only supporters of Chornomorets and Metalist tend to support the idea more than oppose it. Among supporters of Shakhtar and Dnipro opinions are divided almost equally. At the same time, Dynamo supporters mostly oppose the idea, as do supporters of Karpaty, nearly 90% of whom expressed opposition.

• According to the latest survey by Rating Group, in August 2013, 81% of Ukrainians to some extent consider themselves patriots of their country. In particular, 40% of respondents clearly identify themselves as patriots, while another 41% say “rather yes than no.” At the same time, 13% do not consider themselves patriots, and another 5% were undecided. Thus, over the past year the share of those who consider themselves patriots has remained unchanged (in August 2012, 40% definitely described themselves as patriots and another 42% as rather patriots). If looking at a longer trend, since 2010 the share of people who consider themselves patriots has slightly increased. In September 2010, only 31% clearly described themselves as patriots and another 45% as rather patriots. Overall, the share of respondents who consider themselves patriots of their country increased from 77% to 81%.
• Interestingly, the highest levels of patriotism are reported both among the youngest and the oldest respondents. At the same time, there is a trend showing that the older respondents are, the less they support Ukraine’s independence. This suggests that some respondents who call themselves patriots do not necessarily mean an independent Ukraine, and this is more typical among older people. Overall, 61% of respondents would support the declaration of Ukraine’s Independence if such a choice were presented today, while 28% would not support it and 11% are undecided. Over the past year (since August 2012), these indicators have remained almost unchanged.
• Regionally, almost 90% would support Independence in the West, nearly 70% in the North and Center, while in the East and South fewer than half would support it, and in Donbas only about one third. Donbas is the only region where opponents of Independence outnumber supporters, whereas a year earlier these indicators were nearly equal. At the same time, almost half of Party of Regions supporters would support Independence, while nearly 40% would not. Among Communist Party supporters, opponents of Independence dominate (about two thirds).
• As noted, younger respondents are more likely to support Ukraine’s Independence. Men support Independence more than women. The higher a person’s material well-being, the higher the support for Independence. Almost 80% of respondents whose native language is Ukrainian support Independence. Among those who consider both Russian and Ukrainian as native languages, about half support it, while among those who consider only Russian as their native language, only about one third support it. Nearly 90% of Greek Catholic Church parishioners, more than 70% of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) parishioners, and almost 60% of believers who do not identify with any denomination support Independence. Among Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) parishioners, fewer than half support it, although supporters still outnumber opponents.
• 46% of respondents are ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms if necessary. This is the highest level recorded in the past three years: in 2010 it was 43%, and in 2012 only about one third. At the same time, 43% are not ready to defend territorial integrity with arms, and 11% are undecided. Previously, higher readiness to defend the country with arms was mainly expressed by supporters of Svoboda, but now similar levels are observed among supporters of other opposition parties such as UDAR and Batkivshchyna (about 60%). Another notable point is that in Donbas the number of respondents ready to defend territorial integrity with arms is 1.5 times higher than the number who would support Independence. Almost 60% of men and every third woman are ready to defend the country with arms. The younger the respondents, the higher the declared readiness to defend the country.

The study was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Rating Group from February 23 to March 14, 2013. The fieldwork phase took place from February 27 to March 10, 2013. The survey was conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (across 41 settlements), with a total of 1,060 respondents interviewed. The sample was multi-stage and random. The sampling error, with a 0.95 probability, does not exceed 3.1% (excluding the design effect).

Survey method: face-to-face interviews at respondents’ place of residence.

• 69% of Ukrainians believe that, overall, affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, while only 16% believe they are moving in the right direction. Another 16% were unable to determine their opinion on this issue.
• It is worth noting that compared to similar studies conducted in 2011–2012, evaluations have changed very little. The only exception was September 2012, when a quarter believed that affairs in Ukraine were moving in the right direction, while almost 60% believed they were moving in the wrong direction. This indicates that ahead of the parliamentary elections, public expectations improved (an emotional component was added), but six months later the indicators returned to the levels recorded in 2011–2012.
• Most respondents believe that the most important problems for Ukraine are unemployment (53%), corruption in government bodies (51%), and low production levels (45%). In addition, respondents noted control over price growth (26%), social protection for the poor (25%), government incompetence (22%), political instability (21%), and crime (15%).
• Compared to September of the previous year, the most noticeable increase occurred among those who identified corruption in government bodies (from 37% to 51%), low production levels (from 40% to 45%), government incompetence (from 13% to 22%), and political instability (from 16% to 21%) as key national problems.
• Among problems that personally concern citizens, respondents highlighted price control (54%), unemployment (50%), and social protection for the poor (37%). Citizens are also personally concerned about corruption in government bodies (27%), low production levels (22%), and delays in salary or pension payments (21%).
• Far fewer citizens are currently concerned about crime (12%), government incompetence (12%), shortages or possible shutdowns of gas, electricity, or water supply (10%), depreciation of the hryvnia (9%), political instability (9%), and land ownership issues (7%).
• Compared to September of the previous year, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of respondents who identified corruption in government bodies (from 23% to 27%) and government incompetence (from 6% to 12%) as key personal problems. Changes in other indicators were minimal.
• Thus, the survey shows that the main problems worrying Ukrainians are primarily economic. At the same time, citizens clearly distinguish between problems that affect them personally and those that are important for the country overall. Specifically, respondents consider price control, delays in salary or pension payments, social protection for the poor, depreciation of the hryvnia, and risks of utility shutdowns to be more important personally than nationally. In contrast, low production levels, corruption, political instability, and government incompetence are viewed as more important for the country than for individuals personally. Unemployment is considered equally important both personally and nationally.
• Regional differences are also notable. Unemployment and government incompetence are more important problems for residents of Western Ukraine; price growth control, corruption, and relations with Russia are more important for residents of the South and East; social protection for the poor is more important for residents of Central Ukraine.
• Women more acutely feel the impact of rising prices and social protection issues, while men more often highlight corruption, low production levels, unemployment, and crime. Young people are more sensitive to corruption, government incompetence, and political instability; middle-aged people to unemployment and low production levels; older people to price growth and social protection for low-income groups.
• Respondents did not note significant positive changes in most spheres of the country’s life. For example, 73% believe that price levels worsened over the past two years, 24% believe they did not change, and only 2% believe they improved.
• More than half of respondents noted deterioration over the past two years in healthcare, employment opportunities, political stability, professionalism of authorities, agricultural development, overall economic development, and anti-corruption efforts. More than 40% noted deterioration in small and medium business development, social protection, and housing and utility services.
• Relatively more positive assessments were given to changes in European integration, language issues, salary and pension payments, hryvnia stability, and relations with Russia.
• 72% of respondents would support, in a referendum, constitutional and legal provisions allowing citizens to dismiss officials, MPs, judges, and law enforcement leaders at all levels. Only 8% would oppose such a proposal, 10% were undecided, and 11% would not participate in such a referendum.
• 43% of respondents would support Ukraine joining the European Union, while 26% would oppose it. 19% were undecided, and 11% would not participate.
• 40% would support Ukraine joining the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, while 33% would oppose it. 16% were undecided, and 11% would not participate.
• 36% would support electing the President of Ukraine in a single round, while 37% would oppose it. 17% were undecided, and 10% would not participate.
• 33% would support introducing a purely majoritarian electoral system for parliamentary elections, about a quarter would oppose it, nearly 30% were undecided, and 14% would not participate.
• Only 16% would support introducing a bicameral parliament, about one third would oppose it, one third were undecided, and 16% would not participate.

Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI today released its survey of Ukraine public opinion (PDF).  The poll indicates that the top issues that worry Ukrainians involve the economy, with more than 50 percent of respondents citing unemployment and corruption within state bodies as the top challenges facing Ukraine, followed closely by low industry production, control over price growth and social protection for the poor.  Unemployment and state corruption remain the top concerns for Ukrainians, regardless of gender, age group or region.  Ukrainians also continue to be pessimistic about the direction their country is going in, with 69 percent responding that Ukraine is heading in the wrong direction.
Another interesting finding involves the Ukrainian public’s views on Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the European Union.  The agreement, which is expected to be signed in July, is the result of joint negotiations that aims to strengthen ties and enhance cooperation between the European Union and Ukraine.  When asked if the agreement will be useful or harmful to Ukraine, a slight majority of 51 percent of respondents believes it will be useful, including 65 percent of Ukrainian youth aged 18-29.

This survey was conducted May 14 – 28, 2013.  The randomly selected sample consists of 1,200 Ukrainian residents older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote and is representative of the general population by age, gender and education.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.  The National Endowment for Democracy-funded survey was conducted by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of IRI, and the fieldwork was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine.

Source: The International Republican Institute

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, about one third of Kyiv residents plan to spend the summer at home, and at least one in ten will not have a vacation at all this summer. Another 14% have not yet decided on their summer vacation plans.
• Among those who plan to leave the city this summer, the most popular option is vacationing at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov (18%). At the same time, 13% plan to spend their summer vacation abroad, and 7% — in another city or village in Ukraine. Every sixth Kyiv resident plans to spend their vacation at a country house.
• The overwhelming majority of elderly people will stay in Kyiv this summer, choosing their home or country house as a place for vacation. The younger the respondents, the more likely they are to leave the city for vacation. Almost every fifth respondent aged 18–39 plans a trip abroad.
• As respondents’ education level increases, the share of those planning to leave the city also increases. Only one quarter of people with higher or incomplete higher education will spend their vacation at home, and 10% will not have a vacation at all. At the same time, every fifth respondent with a higher education diploma plans to vacation at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov, while slightly fewer (15%) plan to vacation abroad.
• More than half of women will spend the summer at home, at a country house, or at work. Men are more mobile, especially regarding trips abroad. At the same time, 16% of men have not yet decided where they will spend their vacation this year. Among women, this share is lower.
• In the context of summer vacations, the electoral aspect is also notable. The most “stable” voters (people who consistently participate in elections) are more likely to spend the summer at home or at a country house. At the same time, some electoral groups could experience significant losses. In particular, supporters of V. Klitschko and M. Katerynchuk could be in a less favorable position, as at least one third of their supporters plan foreign trips or vacations at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov, while some plan trips across cities and villages of Ukraine. Meanwhile, P. Poroshenko and O. Popov would be in a more favorable position, as their supporters are mostly older people who plan to spend the summer at home or at a country house.
• Among political parties, the most vulnerable situation is for UDAR, which is supported mainly by young people. At the same time, the largest share of those staying at home is among supporters of the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, and the Party of Regions.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 59% of respondents believe that Ukraine rather lacks a “strong hand” than “democracy” (26%). Every sixth respondent was undecided on this issue.
• At the same time, 42% of respondents believe that Ukraine rather lacks “greater freedom of speech” than “greater censorship” (26%). Every third respondent was undecided.
• Half of respondents believe that Ukraine “needs to develop market relations,” while 31% believe it should “return to a planned economy.” Every fifth respondent was undecided.
• It is noteworthy that one third of supporters of a “strong hand” simultaneously support increasing freedom of speech in the country, and 40% support further development of the market economy.
• Support for a “strong hand” ranges from about 70% of respondents in the South and Donbas to about 50% in the West and North of the country; from about 80% among supporters of the Communist Party and 70% among supporters of the Party of Regions to about half among supporters of UDAR, Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• At the same time, clear correlations are observed: the younger the respondents and the higher their education level, the more likely they are to support deepening democracy, increasing freedom of speech and developing market relations.
• In addition, Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely than Russian-speaking respondents to believe that the country lacks democracy and freedom of speech. Similar patterns are observed by nationality: ethnic Russians are more likely than ethnic Ukrainians to support a “strong hand,” increased censorship and a return to a planned economy.
• Interestingly, women support a “strong hand,” increased censorship and a return to a planned economy more often than men.
• Clear support for the idea of increasing censorship in Ukraine is recorded only in Donbas. The same applies to returning to a planned economy.
• At the same time, equal shares of respondents in the South and East support both increased censorship and increased freedom of speech. Meanwhile, in the Center, and especially in the North and West of the country, there is clear support for increasing freedom of speech and deepening market relations.
• 44% of Ukrainians do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while 41% do regret it. Every sixth respondent was undecided.
• Compared to a previous survey conducted at the end of 2010, the share of those who regret the USSR decreased from 46% to 41%, while the share of those who do not regret it increased from 36% to 44%. Thus, over the past 2.5 years, nostalgia for the USSR has declined, primarily due to demographic changes, as older people remain the main supporters of the Soviet Union.
• Other patterns are also present. For example, women regret the USSR more often than men. Russian-speaking respondents and ethnic Russians also regret the USSR more often than ethnic Ukrainians. The higher the education level of respondents, the lower the level of nostalgia for the USSR.
• Among those who regret the USSR, 75% believe Ukraine lacks a “strong hand,” half would like to return to a planned economy, and 40% support increasing censorship in the country. At the same time, about one quarter support deepening market relations and increasing freedom of speech.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the opposition political rally “Ukraine, Rise Up!”, which took place on May 18 in Kyiv, received more support among Kyiv residents than the Party of Regions rally “To Europe Without Fascists.”
• About one third of surveyed Kyiv residents evaluated the opposition rally positively, one quarter — neutrally, while about one fifth — negatively. About the same share had not heard about the rally at all.
• In contrast, only about one tenth of respondents evaluated the Party of Regions rally positively, about one fifth — neutrally, while more than 40% evaluated it negatively. About one quarter had not heard about this rally.
• The most positive evaluation of the “Ukraine, Rise Up!” rally was among supporters of Svoboda (57%). Supporters of Batkivshchyna evaluated it more positively (49%) than supporters of UDAR (36%). About 40% of supporters of the Communist Party and Party of Regions evaluated the opposition rally negatively.
• The rally “To Europe Without Fascists” was evaluated relatively positively mainly by Party of Regions supporters (51%). The most negative attitudes toward this rally were among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna (about 70%).
• Older respondents were the most informed about the May 18 rallies. At the same time, about one third of young people had not heard about the opposition rally, and more than 40% had not heard about the Party of Regions rally. Support for both rallies was also generally higher among older respondents.
• Men supported the opposition rally more than women (40% vs 26%), and evaluated the Party of Regions rally more negatively (50% vs 40% among women).
• Most respondents believed that participants of the rallies received payment for participation. Regarding the Party of Regions rally, 51% believed all participants were paid, 17% believed only some were paid, and only 7% believed no one was paid. Regarding the opposition rally, 35% believed all participants were paid, 21% believed some were paid, and 16% believed no one was paid.
• There is a trend: the younger the respondents, the more likely they were to believe rallies were paid, which may partly explain lower support among youth.
• About 38% believed more Kyiv residents attended the opposition rally, 8% believed more attended the Party of Regions rally. Another 7% believed participants of both rallies were mostly non-Kyiv residents, 9% believed mostly Kyiv residents attended both. About 38% could not answer.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in May 2013, about 60% of voters would have participated.
• Among those intending to vote, 35.9% would have supported Vitalii Klitschko, 17.1% Oleksandr Popov, and more than 11% Petro Poroshenko.
• More than 5% would have supported Mykola Tomenko, about 4% Andrii Illienko, about 3% Mykola Katerynchuk, and about 2% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko. Around 3% would have voted for other candidates, while about one in six remained undecided.
• Compared to March 2013, support increased for V. Klitschko (from 31% to 36%), P. Poroshenko (from 7% to 11%), and M. Katerynchuk (from 1% to 3%). Meanwhile, support for O. Popov declined (from 20% to 17%). The share of undecided voters also decreased (from 25% to 15%). Due to the dominance of opposition sentiment in Kyiv, most undecided voters shifted toward candidates associated with the opposition. Popov also partially lost support to Poroshenko, as their electorates were similar and oriented mainly toward older voters. Klitschko and Katerynchuk, meanwhile, were more youth-oriented candidates.
• Women showed higher support for Katerynchuk, Poroshenko, and Popov, and there were also more undecided voters among women. Men showed higher support for Hrytsenko, Illienko, and Klitschko.
• If the mayoral election had been held in two rounds and the runoff had included Oleksandr Popov and Vitalii Klitschko, about 25% would have supported Popov and more than 70% Klitschko, while about 5% would have remained undecided.
• If the runoff had been Popov vs. Poroshenko, about one third would have supported Popov, 57% Poroshenko, and about 10% would have remained undecided.
• If the runoff had been Popov vs. Katerynchuk, about 40% would have supported Popov, 47% Katerynchuk, and 16% would have remained undecided.
• If Kyiv City Council elections had been held at that time, among those intending to vote: 27.5% would have supported UDAR, 14.2% Batkivshchyna, 13.6% Svoboda, and almost 10% the Party of Regions. Other parties would have received less than 5% each. Nearly one quarter remained undecided.
• Compared to March 2013, the most significant growth was recorded for Svoboda (from 11% to 14%). Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party slightly strengthened their positions, and support for the European Party also increased. UDAR’s support remained largely unchanged.
• UDAR was mainly supported by younger voters, while older voters were more represented among Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and undecided voters. Men showed greater support for Svoboda and UDAR. Women were more represented among undecided voters and supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Party of Regions. Compared to March, the share of men among Svoboda supporters increased, while it decreased among UDAR supporters.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 50% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 37% do not support it, and another 13% are undecided. At the same time, 42% of respondents support the creation of a single state including Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, while 47% do not support this idea and 11% are undecided. Notably, one in four Ukrainians who support the creation of a single state with Russia simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
• Given these response patterns, respondents were asked a direct question. According to respondents, signing the Association Agreement and Free Trade Area with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (41%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (38%), while 20% could not decide. Compared to 2010–2012, there is a trend toward growth in support for both integration options, while the share of undecided respondents has decreased from 27% to 20% over the last two years.
• Traditionally, Western, Northern, and Central regions of Ukraine show higher support for the Agreement with the European Union, while Donbas, Southern, and Eastern regions show higher support for joining the Customs Union. At the same time, the East and the Center remain transitional regions without a strong dominance of one integration vector over the other, and they also show the highest share of respondents who simultaneously support both integration options. Younger people and those with higher education levels traditionally show higher support for signing the EU Association Agreement, while older respondents are more likely to support joining the Customs Union.
• According to respondents, closer ties with the European Union would bring key benefits such as more travel opportunities (55%), better job opportunities (53%), increased investment in Ukraine (51%), development of democracy (41%), better education opportunities (41%), poverty reduction (39%), and reduced corruption (39%). In turn, closer ties with Russia would bring key benefits such as lower gas prices (55%), closer ties between peoples (53%), support for domestic industry (51%), and support for domestic agriculture (41%). The same share of respondents (21%) believe that closer ties with either the EU or Russia would provide better protection of Ukraine’s borders, while 15% believe neither option would bring advantages.
• Forty percent of respondents believe that joining the Customs Union would increase Ukrainians’ well-being (39% disagree). At the same time, 46% believe that joining the EU would increase Ukrainians’ well-being (34% disagree). Forty-six percent believe joining the Customs Union would stimulate industry and agriculture in Ukraine (36% disagree), while 55% believe EU accession would provide a development boost for Ukraine (30% disagree). Forty-three percent believe that Ukraine will always be treated as a second-class country by Russia, and 58% believe the same about Europe. As a result, 70% believe Ukraine should first establish internal order before joining any international integration project, while only 16% disagree.
• Half of respondents believe the European Union will remain largely stable over the next 5–10 years. Among them, 28% believe the EU composition will mostly remain unchanged (possibly with minor membership changes), and 22% believe the number of EU member states will definitely grow. Another 16% believe only a few powerful states will remain in the EU, while only 9% believe the EU will cease to exist within 5–10 years. More than half of respondents believe Ukraine will eventually join the EU, including 4% who believe this could happen within 1–2 years, 12% within 3–5 years, 18% within 5–10 years, and 23% who see it as a distant перспектива. At the same time, one quarter believe Ukraine will never join the EU, and one fifth are undecided.
• There is a direct relationship between belief in Ukraine’s chances of EU membership, belief in the EU’s long-term stability, and support for Ukraine signing the EU Association Agreement. When evaluating perceptions of countries, respondents were asked to choose statements reflecting their views of Europe, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Overall, associations with Belarus are more positive than with Russia, associations with Russia are more positive than with Ukraine, and the most positive associations are linked to Europe.
• The most common associations with Europe include a developed economy (61%), a large number of migrants (59%), high education standards (58%), prosperity (56%), active citizens defending their rights (54%), new technologies (54%), confidence in the future (52%), fair courts (52%), safety (52%), developed democracy (51%), law-abiding citizens (49%), freedom of speech (48%), stability (46%), gender equality (45%), strong business opportunities (45%), and accessible healthcare (37%). Russia is also associated with migrants, though at about half the level of Europe. Belarus is associated with stability, law-abiding citizens, and accessible education at levels close to Europe. Russia is associated with high education standards and confidence in the future, but significantly less than Europe.
• Ukraine scores worse than Belarus, Russia, and especially Europe across most of these associations. The only areas where Ukraine outperforms Russia and Belarus (while still lagging behind Europe) are freedom of speech and gender equality. Ukrainians tend to associate Ukraine strongly with unemployment, poverty, corruption, and inequality (70–80%), economic crisis (about 60%), and degradation (about 40%). However, economic crisis is also associated with Europe (32%) and Russia (30%), and to a lesser extent Belarus (17%). Shared associations for Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia include shared culture, language, and history. Unlike Europe and Belarus, Ukraine (39%) and especially Russia (69%) are associated with large natural resources. Ukraine is rarely associated with strong government (2%) or strong military (2%), while more than 40% associate these with Russia and Belarus, and about a quarter with Europe. Ukraine is also less associated with censorship (12%) compared to Russia (about 25%) and Belarus (about one third).
• Only 3% of respondents could not name any associations with Europe, compared to 2% for Ukraine and Russia and 5% for Belarus. Only 12% of respondents had visited EU countries within the last five years, while about one quarter had visited CIS countries. Despite this, more respondents would prefer to live in Europe (43% would like to live there, 45% would not), compared to Russia (30% would like to live there, 61% would not) and Belarus (21% would like to live there, 67% would not). The desire to live in Russia is strongly regionally divided, while the desire to live in Europe is shared across regions. There is also a direct relationship between frequency of visits to Europe and the desire to live there, as well as support for Ukraine’s EU accession.
• Finally, almost half of respondents believe their children or grandchildren would have a better future in Ukraine integrated with Europe, while one third believe this would be in Ukraine integrated with Russia or the CIS, and almost one quarter remain undecided. At the same time, only about 70% of Customs Union supporters believe their children would have a better future through integration with Russia, while every sixth sees a better future through integration with Europe. Among undecided respondents, one third also see a better future through integration with Europe, while only 16% see it through integration with Russia, and about half remain undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 60% of respondents support the view that some professions are purely “male” and some are “female”. 36% disagree with this statement, and another 5% are undecided.
• Respondents were asked to assess who typical professions are more suitable for: men, women, or equally for both. According to respondents, professions such as “police officer”, “politician”, “businessman”, and “scientist” are perceived as more typical for men. At the same time, professions such as “salesperson” and “secretary” are perceived as more typical for women. Meanwhile, “manager”, “journalist”, and “doctor” are considered equally suitable for both men and women.
• In particular, 56% of women and 63% of men agreed that the profession of “police officer” is more typical for men. At the same time, 56% of women and 64% of men agreed that the profession of “secretary” is more typical for women. Similarly, 34% of women and 43% of men agreed that “salesperson” is more of a female profession.
• In other cases, responses were less categorical. For example, 30% of men and 22% of women agreed that “politician” is more of a male profession, while nearly 70% of men and 80% of women believe that this profession is equally suitable for both genders. Similarly, 25% of men and 19% of women believe that “businessman” is more of a male profession, while nearly 70% of men and 80% of women believe it is suitable for both. Regarding the profession of “scientist”, 21% of men and 13% of women considered it more male, while nearly 80% of both men and women believe it is equally suitable.
• From 80% to 90% of both men and women believe that professions such as “manager”, “journalist”, and “doctor” are equally suitable for both genders.
• Among respondents, 14% of women and 8% of men reported that they had at some point wanted to master a profession traditionally considered typical for the opposite gender. This was more common among younger respondents and those with higher education. At the same time, 80% of women and almost 90% of men said they had never had such a desire.
• Almost every tenth surveyed woman reported being refused employment because of her gender. Such responses were more common among middle-aged respondents with higher education. At the same time, 6% of men also reported being refused employment because of gender.
• About 29% of respondents support banning the indication of candidate gender in job advertisements, while 28% do not support it. At the same time, 33% are indifferent and 10% are undecided. Older respondents are the most indifferent to this issue. Support for such a ban is higher among people with higher education. Men and women generally have similar attitudes toward this issue, although women who personally experienced gender-based refusal support the ban significantly more.

• Rating Group continues its special project “People’s TOP”, which consists of a series of studies identifying the best of the best. The key feature of the methodology is that respondents are not given any lists or prompts; people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions, naming their own options. In April, we present the issue “The Country Where One Would Like to Be Born.”
• According to the study results, almost half of respondents (48%), if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose Ukraine. About 9% of respondents would choose Russia, 5% — Germany, 4% — the United States, 2% each — the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, and France, and 1% each — Poland, Canada, Sweden, and Belarus. At the same time, 2% would choose the USSR, and about 4% — other countries. About 16% of respondents were unable to answer the question.
• Overall, 15% of respondents, if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose EU countries, and another 4% — the United States. Meanwhile, about 10% would choose Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan, and another 2% would choose the USSR.
• Russia was most often chosen in Donbas (18%), as well as in the South (13%) and East (13%) of the country. Germany, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom were more often chosen in the West and North of the country. At the same time, in the Center of the country, Ukraine was most often chosen.
• The younger the respondents, the smaller the share of those who would like to be born in Ukraine: only about 40% of young people would choose Ukraine, while among older people this share is about 1.5 times higher. About every tenth young Ukrainian would like to be born in the United States, slightly fewer — in Germany and the United Kingdom. Women are more attached to Ukraine than men. Men more often chose Russia, Germany, and the United States.
• Interestingly, every tenth voter of the Communist Party of Ukraine would like to be born in the USSR. Every sixth voter of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party would like to be born in Russia. Meanwhile, every sixth voter of UDAR would choose Germany. The most loyal to the country turned out to be voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda — almost 60% of them, if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose Ukraine.

Foreign policy

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February–March 2013, 58% of residents of Odesa region, when choosing between signing the Association Agreement and subsequent accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, chose the Customs Union and CES, while 25% preferred the Association Agreement and subsequent EU accession. Another 18% were undecided.
• About 56% of Odesa region residents would prefer Ukraine not to become an EU member and instead maintain open borders with Russia — without visas and customs controls — while having closed borders with the EU — with visas and customs controls. Meanwhile, 27% would prefer Ukraine to sign a political association agreement and a Free Trade Agreement and, after becoming an EU member, have closed borders with Russia — with visas and customs controls — while maintaining open borders and a visa-free regime with EU countries. Another 17% found it difficult to answer.
• About 68% of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly states with open borders, without visas and customs controls. About 11% believe relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs controls. At the same time, 19% believe Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state. Another 2% were undecided.
• Residents of the region more optimistically assess prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and CES (56%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (22%). About 23% were unsure.
• Similarly, respondents evaluated employment prospects: 49% believe employment opportunities would improve if Ukraine joined the CES, while 25% believe they would improve if Ukraine joined the EU. About 26% were undecided.

Dual citizenship

• About 58% of Odesa region residents generally agree that Ukraine should introduce the possibility of dual citizenship with other countries, while 21% do not support this idea. About 15% are neutral, and 6% are undecided.
• If dual citizenship were allowed in Ukraine, 31% of Odesa region residents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 7% would choose German citizenship, 4% — U.S. citizenship, and 3% — Italian or Canadian citizenship. At the same time, less than one-third of respondents (27%) would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• About 53% of respondents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship (26.3% definitely would, 26.4% probably would). About 39% would not want Russian citizenship (23.3% definitely would not, 15.2% probably would not). About 9% were undecided.
• The share of those who would like to obtain EU citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship is lower than the share of those who would like Russian citizenship — about 44% (17.7% definitely would, 24.8% probably would). The same share (44%) would not want EU citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 14% were undecided.

Forecasts

• About one-third of Odesa region residents (33%) believe that if Ukraine faced a difficult situation requiring significant non-repayable financial assistance, Russia would be the first to provide support. About 10% believe it would be the European Union, 5% — the International Monetary Fund, and 4% — international humanitarian organizations such as the UN. About 35% believe no one would help Ukraine, and 9% were undecided.
• About 36% of respondents believe Ukraine will eventually be accepted into the European Union (9% are certain, 26% think it is likely). However, more respondents — about 50% — believe Ukraine will never become an EU member (20% are certain, 30% think it is unlikely). About 15% were undecided.

Status of the russian language

• About 52% of Odesa region residents believe the Russian language should become the second state language throughout Ukraine. About 42% believe Russian should become a regional language in areas where the majority of the population supports this. About 5% believe Russian should be excluded from official communication across Ukraine. About 2% were undecided or refused to answer.

State structure

• About 40% of respondents believe a federal system suits Ukraine better, while 38% believe a unitary system is more appropriate. About 22% have not formed an opinion.

Land reform

• About 72% of Odesa region residents are aware that the authorities are preparing land reform allowing the free sale and purchase of land. About 65% view this reform negatively (39% negatively, 26% rather negatively), while 21% view it positively (8% positively, 14% rather positively). About 14% were undecided.
• Most respondents (52%) support only long-term leasing of agricultural land. About 28% would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land but only to Ukrainian citizens, and only 6% would allow it to foreigners. About 15% were undecided.

Attitudes toward referendums

• About 73% of respondents support the idea of resolving a significant share of important issues at both local and national levels through referendums, while 16% do not support this. About 12% were undecided.
• Most respondents agree that citizens should be able, via local referendums, to dismiss heads of regional or district administrations (73%), dismiss mayors and call new elections (75%), dissolve local councils and call new elections (70%), and dismiss village heads (73%).
• Most respondents also agree that citizens should be able, via nationwide referendums, to decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political, or economic alliances (72%), dissolve Parliament (67%), adopt and amend the Constitution (71%), and dismiss the Government (66%).

Internet use

• About every second resident of Odesa region (51%) has access to the internet at home, at work, at their place of study, or via a mobile device. Almost all of them (49% of residents) have experience using the internet. Monthly internet audience reaches 47% of residents (used at least once in the 30 days before the survey), weekly — 44%, daily — 35%.
• About 32% of respondents used social networks such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki during the month before the survey. About 11% used Facebook, 3% — Twitter, and 2% — LiveJournal.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority of surveyed Kyiv residents (78%) do not support the initiative to move all supermarkets and hypermarkets at least 5 km outside the city. Only 14% have a positive attitude toward this idea. At the same time, 5% are indifferent to it, and 3% are undecided.
• It is characteristic that the younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the less they support the initiative to move hypermarkets outside the city. In particular, more than 80% of young people do not support this idea. Women also support the idea less than men.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the majority of surveyed Kyiv residents (58%) do not support the idea of banning second-hand clothing sales, while only 20% support it. At the same time, 18% are indifferent to this issue, and 4% are undecided.
• Interestingly, the younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the less they support the idea of banning second-hand sales. For example, almost 70% of young people do not support the idea, while among pensioners this share is slightly more than half.
• Women also support the idea less than men.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, more than half of Kyiv residents support the idea of nominating a single opposition candidate in the Kyiv mayoral election, while only 15% do not support it. At the same time, 18% are indifferent to this issue and 14% are undecided.
• The idea is positively perceived by more than 70% of supporters of V. Klychko, A. Hrytsenko, A. Illienko, P. Poroshenko, and O. Kuzhel, as well as by about half of those who have not yet decided on their preferred candidate. Only supporters of O. Popov and the Party of Regions are skeptical about this initiative.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in early March 2013, about 55% of voters would have definitely participated.
• If the Kyiv mayoral election had been held in early March 2013, among those intending to vote, 31% would have supported Vitalii Klychko, 20.3% — Oleksandr Popov, and almost 7% — Petro Poroshenko.
• About 4% of voters would have supported Andrii Illienko and Oleksandra Kuzhel each, about 2% — Anatolii Hrytsenko. More than 1% — Oleh Liashko, Oleksandr Omelchenko, and Mykola Katerynchuk. About 3% would have voted for other candidates, while one quarter were undecided.
• Clear trends are observed: the younger the respondents, the more often they support Vitalii Klychko; the older the respondents, the more often they support Oleksandr Popov and Petro Poroshenko.
• If the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in two rounds and Oleksandr Popov and Vitalii Klychko had advanced to the second round, 26.5% of respondents (among those intending to vote) would have supported the incumbent city head, 60.4% — the UDAR party leader, and 13.1% would have been undecided.
• If the second round had been between Oleksandr Popov and Petro Poroshenko, 36.6% would have supported the incumbent city head, 41.5% — Petro Poroshenko, and 21.9% would have been undecided.
• If the second round had been between Oleksandr Popov and Mykola Katerynchuk, 41.2% would have supported the incumbent city head, 35% — the leader of the European Party, and 23.9% would have been undecided.
• Interestingly, 35% of Kyiv residents would have liked to see Vitalii Klychko as the Mayor of Kyiv and almost as many (37%) — as the leader of the UDAR faction in the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, 15% would not have wanted to see him in either role, and 13% were undecided.
• It is characteristic that two-thirds of Klychko’s own voters would have preferred to see him specifically as Mayor of Kyiv, and only one in five — as leader of the UDAR faction in parliament. Among supporters of Oleksandra Kuzhel, half supported Klychko as mayor and half — in parliament. Supporters of other candidates would have preferred to see Klychko mainly in parliament.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of respondents (81%) support the adoption of a Law of Ukraine on the Recall of Members of Parliament. Only 13% do not support it, and 6% are undecided.
• The initiative is popular across all regions and among voters of different parties. The only slightly lower support is observed in Donbas and among voters of the Party of Regions, where the share of undecided respondents is the highest.
• According to the majority of respondents (61%), a member of parliament should be recalled by voters.
  14% believe this should be done by voters but initiated by the party, and another 14% believe it should be exclusively the prerogative of the party that nominated the candidate.
  Another 12% believe recall should be carried out by a court: 7% think the court should decide independently, while 5% think it should be done at the initiative of the parliamentary majority.
• Additionally, 5% believe only parliament should recall a deputy, and another 5% believe this should be done by the President.
  10% were undecided on this issue.
• As with the previous question, opinions among respondents from different regions and supporters of different parties are largely similar.
• More than half of respondents believe deputies should be recalled for corruption offenses and for failing to fulfill campaign promises.
  Nearly 40% believe deputies should be recalled for betraying state interests and failing to fulfill obligations declared in the oath.
• About one third support recall for systematic absence from plenary sessions and committee meetings, and the same share supports recall for failing to uphold publicly declared ideological commitments.
  26% believe deputies should be recalled if they switch to another faction, and 22% — for non-personal voting.
  Only 4% were undecided on this issue.
• Recall for corruption offenses is most strongly supported by voters of the Communist Party and UDAR.
  Recall for failing to uphold ideological promises is most supported by voters of the Party of Regions.
  Recall for switching factions is most supported by voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda.
  The strictest punishment for systematic absence from parliamentary work is most supported by Communist Party voters.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, for the absolute majority of respondents (71%), March 8 is a good occasion to do something pleasant for women close to them. At the same time, for 11% the March 8 holiday symbolizes women’s struggle for their rights, for 9% it is a political holiday from the Soviet past, and for 6% it is just an ordinary day.
• The younger the respondents, the more often they associate March 8 with a good occasion to do something nice for women close to them, while older respondents more often describe March 8 as a political holiday from the Soviet past.
• Only 7% of men say that March 8 symbolizes women’s struggle for their rights, while among women this share is twice as high.
• Married and unmarried respondents have similar attitudes toward the holiday.
• The highest share of those who associate March 8 with women’s struggle for rights is among supporters of the Communist Party, while those who consider it an ordinary day are more common among supporters of Svoboda.
• For comparison, respondents were also asked to evaluate their attitudes toward February 23.
• Thus, only 41% of respondents consider February 23 a good occasion to do something pleasant for men close to them (this is more often stated by women). For 39%, it is a holiday for men who are or were related to the military (this is more often stated by men themselves). Only 12% consider it a political holiday from the Soviet past, and 7% consider it an ordinary day.
• Overall, the majority in one way or another perceive February 23 as a holiday. The younger the respondents, the more often they associate February 23 with a good occasion to do something nice for men close to them, while older respondents more often associate it with a holiday for men connected to the military or a political holiday from the Soviet past.
• The highest share of those who associate February 23 with a military-related men’s holiday is among supporters of the Communist Party, while those who consider it an ordinary day are more common among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• Thus, there is a visible trend: young people increasingly move March 8 and February 23 outside the political context — the holidays acquire new associations and traditions, while the political component is gradually fading.
• It is worth noting that gifts are given more often on March 8 and February 23 than on Valentine’s Day (February 14), which remains a more youth-oriented holiday. About 40% of both men and women received gifts on Valentine’s Day this year. At the same time, 70% of men received gifts on February 23, and the same share of women expect to receive gifts on March 8.
• However, as last year, we observe something interesting and somewhat illogical regarding “women’s and men’s” holidays. This February 23, the number of men who received gifts was higher than the number of women who gave them. Possibly for this mysterious reason, we observe another interesting trend: the number of men planning to give gifts on March 8 is higher than the number of women who expect to receive gifts.
• Sociologists now have a new research question: do women underestimate men, or do men overestimate their “gift-giving” intentions? Or are there other, third factors? We will definitely find out.
• For now, we will believe that men will be able to pleasantly surprise women on this holiday and improve their ratings — and we wish the same to everyone!
• Happy holiday to you, our best women on the planet!
  May spring bloom in your soul!

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Presidential elections in Ukraine had taken place at the end of February 2013, about 70% of voters would have participated.

In particular, among those who intended to vote:

• 25.1% would support Viktor Yanukovych
• 15.1% – Vitalii Klitschko
• 13.9% – Yulia Tymoshenko
• 7.9% – Oleh Tyahnybok
• 7.7% – Petro Symonenko
• 7.4% – Arsenii Yatseniuk

Support for other politicians was significantly lower:

• 1.7% – Anatolii Hrytsenko
• 1.5% – Serhii Tihipko
• 1.2% – Petro Poroshenko
• 1.1% – Nataliia Korolevska
• Other politicians – 4%
• Undecided – 11.1%
• “Against all” – 2.3%

If Yulia Tymoshenko did not participate in the election, the top three would look as follows:

• Viktor Yanukovych – 25.1%
• Vitalii Klitschko – 16.8%
• Arsenii Yatseniuk – 15.1%

Additionally:

• 8.9% would support Oleh Tyahnybok
• 7.7% – Petro Symonenko
• 2.2% – Anatolii Hrytsenko
• 1.7% – Serhii Tihipko
• 1.4% – Petro Poroshenko
• 1.4% – Nataliia Korolevska
• Other politicians – over 4%
• Undecided – 12.6%
• “Against all” – 2.3%

If Tymoshenko did not run, nearly 60% of her voters would support Yatseniuk in the first round, about 10% would support Klitschko, about 10% Tyahnybok, and about one sixth would be undecided or vote “against all”.

Thus, if Presidential elections had taken place at the end of February 2013, Yanukovych would likely face Klitschko or Yatseniuk (or Tymoshenko) in the second round.

Since opposition forces collectively had higher overall support, Yanukovych risked losing the second round to almost any opposition leader represented in parliament. Klitschko had the strongest chances at that moment, followed by Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko, with slightly lower chances for Tyahnybok.

Second-round scenarios:

Yanukovych vs Klitschko:

• Yanukovych – 30.2%
• Klitschko – 49%
• Against both – 11.6%
• Undecided – 9.2%

Yanukovych vs Yatseniuk:

• Yanukovych – 33%
• Yatseniuk – 40%
• Against both – 18.4%
• Undecided – 8.6%

Yanukovych vs Tymoshenko:

• Yanukovych – 33.2%
• Tymoshenko – 36.4%
• Against both – 22.4%
• Undecided – 8%

Yanukovych vs Tyahnybok:

• Yanukovych – 33.5%
• Tyahnybok – 32.3%
• Against both – 23.4%
• Undecided – 10.8%

Over the year, second-round ratings increased notably for Klitschko (from 37% to 49%) and Tyahnybok (from 24% to 32%). Yatseniuk also increased (from 38% to 40%). The incumbent President also increased slightly, but less significantly.

Although Yatseniuk trailed Tymoshenko in first-round ratings, he attracted broader second-round support. Klitschko voters were less likely to support Yatseniuk or Tymoshenko in the second round than vice versa. Yatseniuk voters were also less likely to support Tyahnybok or Tymoshenko. However, if Yatseniuk reached the second round, he would receive support from nearly 90% of Tymoshenko voters, 75% of Klitschko voters, and 60% of Tyahnybok voters.

Supporters of Symonenko and Tihipko were more likely to vote for Yanukovych, while supporters of Hrytsenko and Poroshenko were more likely to vote against him.

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