News and Press releases

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the leader of electoral preferences in multi-member electoral district #124 is VO Batkivshchyna. This political alliance would be supported, if elections were held in the near future, by 47.0% of respondents who intend to participate in the elections (84% in the district).
  20.3% would vote for UDAR, 19.0% for VO Svoboda. The ratings of other parties are much lower: the Party of Regions – 2.1%, Our Ukraine – 2.0%, “Ukraine – Forward!” – 1.7%, CPU – 0.7%. Other parties would be supported by 1.1% of respondents. 6.2% have not decided on their party preference.
• In the territorial breakdown, although the top three remain unchanged, some differences are visible. In particular, the rating of VO Batkivshchyna in the districts is one-fifth higher than in Chervonohrad (52% vs. 39%).
  In addition, UDAR enjoys significantly stronger support in Chervonohrad — here a quarter of respondents would vote for it, while in the districts UDAR’s rating is 17%.
  The rating of Svoboda is almost independent of territory and fluctuates between 18–20%. About 4% of respondents in Chervonohrad support the Party of Regions, while in villages this figure is much lower (1%). The share of the undecided does not depend on the area.
• The youngest electorate belongs to UDAR — half are under 40. Among the United Opposition, almost half are over 50.
  There are more men among supporters of Klychko’s party, more women among supporters of Batkivshchyna. UDAR also has more respondents who are employed. Two-thirds of Batkivshchyna supporters do not work.
  70% of UDAR supporters and 62% of Svoboda supporters live in cities, while Batkivshchyna has approximately equal numbers of urban and rural voters.

CANDIDATE RATINGS

• The leader of electoral preferences in the single-member district is S. Kurpil, whom 30.4% of respondents who intend to vote would support if elections were held in the near future.
  21.0% would vote for M. Kryshtopa, 12.5% for V. Viazivskyi, 7.0% for A. Seniuk. Other candidates have ratings below 2%. 22.7% remain undecided.
• S. Kurpil mobilizes almost half of Batkivshchyna supporters and a quarter of Svoboda supporters.
  However, UDAR supporters back him much less — only 9%.
• The closest competitor of S. Kurpil, M. Kryshtopa, mobilizes a quarter of UDAR supporters, every fifth undecided voter, and 16% of Svoboda supporters.
  A. Seniuk is popular mainly among one third of UDAR supporters.
• By territory, the candidate ratings look as follows. Support for S. Kurpil is slightly higher in the districts (33%), while in Chervonohrad 26% would vote for him.
  M. Kryshtopa is supported more in the city (25%), and less in the districts (18%).
  V. Viazivskyi is supported by 12–13% equally across territories.
  A. Seniuk is supported by 10% of respondents in Chervonohrad and only 5% in the districts.
• The youngest electorate is that of A. Seniuk — one third under 30. The oldest electorates belong to S. Kurpil and M. Kryshtopa — about 40% aged over 50.
  One third of UDAR’s candidate supporters have higher education, while among M. Kryshtopa’s supporters those with general or vocational secondary education clearly dominate.
  There are more men among A. Seniuk’s electorate, while women dominate among S. Kurpil’s supporters.
  Half of Kurpil’s electorate lives in villages, while among the other leading candidates two thirds of supporters live mainly in cities.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, Ukrainians are satisfied that EURO-2012 took place in Ukraine, they highly evaluated the quality of the Championship’s organization and primarily see image and reputational gains for the country. At the same time, Ukrainians acknowledge that EURO was “too expensive” for Ukraine, and that massive misappropriation of public funds occurred during its organization.
• Thus, 21% of respondents believe that the organization and hosting of EURO-2012 in Ukraine were carried out at a high level, another 54% say it was at a normal level, although it could have been better. Only 8% of respondents assessed the organization and hosting of EURO in the country as low.
• 77% of respondents believe that foreign fans must have been satisfied with their stay in Ukraine during EURO-2012. Only 8% hold the opposite view.
• The most positive assessments of the quality of organization and hosting of EURO came from residents of the East, from younger people, and more often men. Less positive assessments were given in the West and South.
• 78% of respondents are convinced that EURO gave Ukraine an opportunity to show itself in a better light to Europe; only 10% think otherwise. This statement is supported equally by residents of both the West and the East.
• At the same time, almost as many (75%) agree that hosting the Championship was too expensive a pleasure for the country. Interestingly, this thesis is also supported almost equally by residents of both the West and the East, and most strongly by supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party.
• Almost 60% of respondents believe that hosting EURO-2012 in Ukraine gave a boost to the country’s development; a quarter disagree. This opinion is more common among supporters of the Party of Regions and among the undecided. However, it is interesting that in the West more respondents share this view than in the East and especially in the South.
• At the same time, almost 70% of respondents believe that during preparations for the Championship there was large-scale embezzlement of public funds, and only 7% disagree. This view is most common in the West, Center and South of the country, and least common in the East. About half of supporters of the Party of Regions, around 70% of supporters of the Communist Party, Svoboda and UDAR, and over 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters share this opinion.
• Despite all this, 73% of respondents (especially in the West and among UDAR supporters) are convinced that it is very good that the Championship took place in Ukraine. Only 16% agree with the statement that Ukraine should have отказed to host the Championship, most of them in the Center and among supporters of Svoboda and the Communist Party.
• EURO ASSESSMENTS FROM THE FOOTBALL ITSELF
• Almost 30% of respondents followed most matches of the Championship, from the group stage through the final; another 20% followed only the quarter-finals, semi-finals and final, and every tenth watched only the final. Thus, in one way or another, almost 60% of Ukrainians followed EURO-2012.
• It is worth adding that according to a Sociological Group “Rating” survey conducted before EURO (in May), almost half of Ukrainians intended to follow the matches of the Championship — already more than World Cup-2010, which attracted less than 40%. During the Championship itself, interest in EURO increased further (from 50% to 60%), mainly due to the growth of the audience for the final matches. Audience growth occurred across all age groups, and women also joined the audience in large numbers. A certain “EURO fashion” emerged.
• Almost half (48%) are satisfied with the performance of the Ukrainian national team at EURO-2012, although only 12% are definitely satisfied. Among active fans, two-thirds are satisfied with the team’s performance, and a quarter are definitely satisfied.
• There are also clear emotional effects here, since more than half of respondents who watched only the quarter-finals, semi-finals and final (where the Ukrainian team no longer played) also expressed satisfaction with Ukraine’s performance. This suggests that these assessments were influenced by the general positive mood created by EURO-2012 as an event.
• About one quarter are dissatisfied with the team’s performance (among active fans — almost 30%).
• The Championship significantly increased interest in football: compared to 2009, the share of respondents who consider themselves football fans rose from 33% to 48%. This phenomenon is likely situational, since the number of hard-core fans did not change (6%), the number of active fans increased slightly (from 10% to 14%), and the number of so-called inactive fans rose sharply (from 18% to 29%).
• Every fifth woman classified herself as an inactive fan (only 7% as active). Among men, one-third consider themselves active fans, and almost 40% — inactive fans.
• The most active fans remain young people and city residents. In the West, football attracts significantly more interest than in the South. A direct relationship is observed: regions that did not host EURO matches increased their football fan base the least.
• The fewest football fans are found among supporters of the Communist Party (mostly older people), the party “Ukraine – Forward!” (mostly women), and among the undecided. Interest in football is higher among supporters of UDAR, the Party of Regions, and Batkivshchyna.

• According to the majority of Ukrainians, the image of a “REAL MAN” is best embodied by the Klitschko brothers and Vladimir Putin, and to a lesser extent by Viktor Yanukovych, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and footballer Andriy Shevchenko.
  At the same time, the image of a “REAL WOMAN,” in the opinion of respondents, is best embodied by Yulia Tymoshenko and Sofia Rotaru, and to a lesser extent by Ani Lorak, Angela Merkel, Alla Pugacheva, and Margaret Thatcher.
• The Sociological Group “Rating” continues its special project “People’s TOP,” which consists of a series of studies identifying the best of the best. The special feature of the methodology is that respondents do not receive any lists or prompts — people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions, naming three of their own choices. In October, we present the issue “Real Men and Women.”
• Thus, according to the study results, the majority of surveyed Ukrainians would name Vitalii Klitschko (30.1%) as a “real man” among famous people in Ukraine or abroad, as well as his brother Wladimir Klitschko (9.9%) and the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin (9.5%).
  Somewhat fewer named the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych (6.3%), opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk (5.3%), and footballer Andriy Shevchenko (5.1%).
• The top ten also included Ukrainian politicians Serhiy Tihipko (2.9%) and Oleh Tyahnybok (2.6%), as well as the presidents of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko (2.5%) and the United States Barack Obama (2.4%).
• The TOP-25 also included: Anatolii Hrytsenko (2%), Petro Symonenko (2%), Mykola Katerynchuk (1.9%), Yurii Lutsenko (1.7%), Mykhailo Poplavskyi (1.7%), Dmitry Medvedev (1.7%), Vasyl Virastyuk (1.6%), Petro Poroshenko (1.6%), Bohdan Stupka (1.4%), Mykola Azarov (1.3%), Rinat Akhmetov (1.3%), Volodymyr Lytvyn (1.1%), Iosif Kobzon (1%), Oleh Blokhin (1%), Viktor Yushchenko (1%).
• The Top-50 (with results between 0.4–0.9%) also included Savik Shuster, Yuri Gagarin, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Taras Shevchenko, Serhii Bubka, Viacheslav Chornovil, Viktor Pinchuk, Vlad Yama, Oleksandr Ponomaryov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Serhii Sobolev, Nikolai Baskov, Ihor Kondratiuk, Stas Mikhailov, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Lev Leshchenko, Valerii Meladze, Pavlo Zibrov, Georgy Zhukov, Maksim Galkin, Bruce Willis, Grigory Leps, Brad Pitt, Nicolas Sarkozy.
• In total, 323 men were named by respondents. At the same time, about 32% of respondents were unable to answer the question.
• According to the study results, the majority of surveyed Ukrainians would name former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (24%) as a “real woman” among famous people in Ukraine or abroad, as well as singer Sofia Rotaru (10.4%).
  Somewhat fewer named singer Ani Lorak (6.2%), German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel (5.2%), singer Alla Pugacheva (4.2%), and former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (4.2%).
• The top ten also included Ukrainian public figures Natalia Korolevska (3.4%), Taisia Povaliy (3.2%), Anna Herman (2.5%), and Oksana Marchenko (2.3%).
• The TOP-25 also included: Inna Bohoslovska (1.9%), Yana Klochkova (1.7%), Ruslana Lyzhychko (1.7%), Valentina Tereshkova (1.6%), Natalia Mohylevska (1.6%), Angelina Jolie (1.5%), Oleksandra Kuzhel (1.5%), Iryna Herashchenko (1.4%), Tina Karol (1.4%), Nina Matviienko (1.2%), Natalia Vitrenko (1.1%), Iryna Bilyk (1.1%), Olha Sumska (1%), Oksana Bilozir (0.9%), Raisa Bohatyriova (0.9%).
• The Top-50 (with results between 0.3–0.9%) also included Liliya Podkopayeva, Alla Mazur, Irina Allegrova, Madonna, Elizabeth II, Hillary Clinton, Svitlana Loboda, Iryna Akimova, Edita Piekha, Lina Kostenko, Ada Rohovtseva, Nina Karpachova, Vera Brezhneva, Ruslana Pysanka, Natalia Koroleva, Whitney Houston, Lolita Milyavskaya, Lyudmila Zykina, Lesya Ukrainka, Nadiya Kadyshova, Nastya Kamenskikh, Yevheniya Tymoshenko, Valeriya, Tamara Gverdtsiteli, Nadiya Babkina.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, conducted in September 2012, two thirds of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi: 12% are completely satisfied and another 48% are rather satisfied than dissatisfied.
• Compared to May, the level of satisfaction with the Lviv mayor’s performance increased from 54% to 60%. Accordingly, the share of those dissatisfied with his work decreased from 38% in May to 29% in September.
• Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Head of the Lviv Regional State Administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, is growing. Compared to the previous survey, the number of dissatisfied respondents increased from 47% to 51%. Only 13% are satisfied with his work.
• More than half of respondents were unable to give an assessment of the performance of the Head of the Lviv Regional Council. Compared to May, the level of dissatisfaction with his performance decreased from 41% to 34%. At the same time, the share of those who evaluate his work positively also declined — from 20% to 15%.
• In terms of party supporters, two thirds of supporters of the “passing” opposition parties and slightly more than half of Party of Regions sympathizers, as well as those who are undecided, are satisfied with the work of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi.
  The work of the Head of the Regional Council is positively assessed by one quarter of Svoboda supporters and the same share of Party of Regions supporters, every sixth Batkivshchyna supporter, every tenth UDAR supporter, and every tenth undecided voter.
• The work of the Head of the Lviv Regional State Administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, is approved by one third of Party of Regions supporters, 12–13% of supporters of the “passing” opposition parties, and every tenth among the undecided.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group showed that since the beginning of the year, electoral preferences in electoral district No. 163 have been distributed among three political forces.
  The rating is led by VO Batkivshchyna with 27.6%. Almost the same number of supporters among those who intend to take part in the elections (87% in the district) is held by VO Svoboda – 26.0%.
  UDAR is supported by 20.1% of respondents.
  The rating of other parties is below 3%, including “Ukraine – Forward!” – 2.7%, Party of Regions – 2.6%, Our Ukraine and CPU – about 2% each.
  Those who have not yet decided – 14.9%.
• Despite Batkivshchyna being in first place, the dynamics of growth in the number of its supporters since the beginning of the year are negative.
  Thus, supporters of the parties that now make up this alliance at the end of 2011 accounted for about 50% of respondents (Batkivshchyna – 26%, Front for Change – 16%).
  Meanwhile, the rating of the current alliance has essentially remained at the level that Batkivshchyna alone had a year ago.
  At the same time, the rating of UDAR has increased significantly (from 5% to 20%), as well as VO Svoboda (from 19% to 26%).
• The youngest electorate belongs to UDAR – more than a third are under 30 years old.
  Among supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, more than a third are voters aged 50 and older.
  There are somewhat more supporters with higher education among UDAR’s electorate.
  Those with secondary education are more numerous among Svoboda’s supporters.
  There are more working people among supporters of V. Klitschko’s party.
  Also, among them there are noticeably more people with relatively high incomes.
  Among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR there is gender parity.
  At the same time, women dominate among supporters of Batkivshchyna.
• The leaders of the trust rating among respondents are V. Klitschko (trusted by 62%, not trusted by 31%), A. Yatseniuk (trusted by 58%, not trusted by 36%) and O. Tyahnybok (trusted by 57%, not trusted by 38%).
  O. Tyahnybok and V. Klitschko are the leaders of absolute trust — every fifth respondent fully trusts them.
  Y. Tymoshenko is trusted by 45%, and distrusted by the same share.
• The leaders of distrust are P. Symonenko, V. Yanukovych, M. Azarov and V. Lytvyn, whom about 90% of respondents do not trust.
  N. Korolevska is trusted by 11%, and distrusted by almost 80%.

RATINGS OF LOCAL POLITICIANS

• The leader of electoral sympathies among candidates in the single-member district is O. Kaida.
  45.0% of respondents who intend to vote are ready to give him their votes.
  The rating of his closest competitor V. Maksymov is twice as low – 21.2%.
  M. Ratushniak is supported by 6.5%, T. Pastukh by 4.2%, and Y. Oliinyk by 3.5%.
  The rating of other candidates is below 3%.
  Those undecided – 10.8%.
• O. Kaida mobilizes 91% of VO Svoboda supporters and half of those who support VO Batkivshchyna.
  V. Maksymov is supported by two thirds of UDAR voters and one third of the undecided.
• The youngest electorate belongs to T. Pastukh (almost half under 30) and V. Maksymov.
  Among supporters of M. Ratushniak and O. Kaida there are more older voters.
  Two thirds of supporters of the UDAR candidate are employed.
  Among supporters of O. Kaida and M. Ratushniak there is gender parity.
  Women are more likely to support T. Pastukh.

EXPECTATIONS FROM THE FUTURE VERKHOVNA RADA

• 96% of respondents believe that elections to the Verkhovna Rada should change the situation in the country for the better.
  At the same time, only half believe that this will actually happen after the October elections.
• The most disillusioned are among the undecided (52%) and supporters of T. Pastukh.
  The least disillusioned are among supporters of VO Svoboda and O. Kaida.
• 92% believe that the composition of the Ukrainian parliament must be renewed.
  However, only slightly more than half believe this will really happen.
• Belief in renewal is strongest among supporters of VO Svoboda and VO Batkivshchyna (two thirds of supporters), as well as O. Kaida.
  The lowest share is among the undecided.
• Ideological issues concern respondents no less than economic or social ones.
  Half of respondents primarily expect the future Verkhovna Rada to protect the Ukrainian language and culture.
  42–44% expect economic growth and higher wages and pensions.
  One third expect job creation and overcoming corruption.
  Every fifth expects impeachment of President Yanukovych, release of Yulia Tymoshenko and Y. Lutsenko, better health care, lower taxes, freedom of speech, and better relations with the EU.
  15% expect support for small and medium-sized businesses, 12% — better education.
  Only one in ten expects greater local self-government powers, unity of East and West, or support for sports.
  Only 2% expect better relations with Russia.
  10% expect nothing at all from the new Verkhovna Rada.
• 52% believe their single-member district MP should deal equally with local issues and national issues.
  36% think the MP should focus only on local problems.
  Only 6% think the MP should be primarily a national statesman.

DISTRICT PROBLEMS

• Two thirds of respondents are concerned about poor road conditions and employment problems — these are the key city problems in voters’ eyes.
  Half are concerned about high utility tariffs, and 42% about poor health care.
  One third see problems in drinking water quality, housing maintenance, and sanitation.
  Every fifth is worried about stray animals, chaotic construction, drug addiction and alcoholism.
  15% are concerned about lack of business conditions, 11–12% about shortages of schools and kindergartens, playgrounds, and environmental conditions.
  Only 5–6% worry about lack of public transport, sports facilities, street trading, parking, or crime.
  Only 3% are concerned about lack of greenery.

ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

• Two thirds of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor S. Nadal and Regional Council Chairman O. Kaida; one quarter are dissatisfied.
  At the same time, 67% are dissatisfied with the performance of Regional State Administration Head V. Hoptyan, and only 18% are satisfied.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in September, the level of political activity among residents of Lviv has slightly increased compared to May of this year: 51% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and another 32% would rather take part than not. Voter mobilization among supporters of parties that have the highest chances of entering parliament is extremely high, with more than 90% of their supporters intending to vote.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held in September 2012, 31.9% of Lviv residents would support Batkivshchyna, among those who intend to participate in the elections. Second place would go to Svoboda with 21.3%, and third to the UDAR party with 20.6%. The Party of Regions would be supported by 4.5% of voters, while all other political forces score below 3%. In particular, 2.2% would vote for Nataliya Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, 2.2% for Our Ukraine, and 1.5% for the Communist Party. Other parties would receive 2.3%, and 13.7% of voters remain undecided.
• Compared with May, Batkivshchyna’s rating has slightly decreased from 34% to 32%, while there is a clear upward trend in support for Svoboda, reflecting a recovery of positions lost in 2011. UDAR’s rating has nearly doubled since May, rising from 11% to 21%. The Party of Regions remains stable at 4%, and Our Ukraine stands at 2%.
• In District 115, which includes the Sykhivskyi District and part of the Lychakivskyi District, Batkivshchyna leads among political parties, supported by about one-third of voters who intend to vote. UDAR is supported by 23.4% of respondents and Svoboda by 20.9%. The Party of Regions would receive 2.9%, Our Ukraine 2.4%, Ukraine – Forward! 2.0%, and the Communist Party 1.4%, while all other parties have less than 1%. Twelve percent of voters are undecided. In the majoritarian race, two clear leaders have emerged: Mykhailo Khmil with 29.1% and Dmytro Dobrodomov with 28.3%. Other candidates trail far behind, and about one-third of voters remain undecided. Both leading candidates have strong electoral reserves and could mobilize up to three-quarters of their own party supporters, as well as about one-third of Svoboda voters. Modeling a two-candidate race shows no clear leader, with both candidates supported by about 33% each.
• In District 116, which includes the Railway District and part of the Shevchenkivskyi District, Batkivshchyna leads with 30%, while Svoboda and UDAR each have 22.4%. The Party of Regions stands at 4.6%, Ukraine – Forward! at 1.9%, and Our Ukraine at 1.5%, with other parties below 1% and 13.6% undecided. In the majoritarian contest, Iryna Farion is the clear leader with 38.2%, far ahead of her closest rival Andrii Bereziuk at 17.4%. Modeling a two-candidate race confirms Farion’s strong advantage.
• In District 117, covering the Frankivskyi and Halytskyi districts, Batkivshchyna leads with 33.3%, followed by Svoboda at 20.2% and UDAR at 18.3%. The Party of Regions has 6.4%, the Communist Party 2.9%, and Ukraine – Forward! 1.9%, with 13.3% undecided. The leading majoritarian candidate is Ihor Vasyunyk with 30.8%, followed by Taras Stetskiv and Olha Yuryntets. Vasyunyk has the strongest electoral reserves and is the clear favorite, particularly among Batkivshchyna supporters.
• In District 118, which includes Pustomyty District and parts of the Lychakivskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts, Batkivshchyna leads with 32.1%, followed by Svoboda with 24.0% and UDAR with 16.3%. Among majoritarian candidates, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn has taken the lead with 35.7%, overtaking Bohdan Dubnevych, whose support is 30.5%. Mykhalchyshyn’s support has tripled since May, and modeling two-candidate races confirms his clear advantage over his rivals.
• Most respondents, 83%, believe elections should bring positive change and renew parliament, although only about half believe this will actually happen. Almost half of respondents expect the new parliament to ensure economic growth, unite eastern and western Ukraine, and protect the Ukrainian language and culture. Other expectations include better healthcare, impeachment of President Yanukovych, protection of free speech, and tackling corruption, although support for small and medium-sized businesses and job creation remains low.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had taken place in early September 2012, 40% of respondents would definitely have participated, and another 34% would probably have taken part. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded in the western and central regions of the country. Among party supporters, the greatest willingness to vote was expressed by sympathizers of Svoboda, the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, and the Communist Party. The lowest readiness to participate was found among undecided voters and supporters of Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in early September 2012, the Party of Regions would have won with 26.3% of the vote among those who intended to participate. Slightly fewer respondents, 22.6%, would have voted for Batkivshchyna. A total of 12% would have supported UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, 10.8% the Communist Party, 4.1% Svoboda, and 3.7% Natalia Korolevska’s “Ukraine – Forward!”. About 1% would have voted for Our Ukraine, and 0.6% for Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party. More than 2% would have supported other parties, while 16.6% were undecided.
• Over the last several months the Party of Regions had been steadily gaining support, rising from 20% in July to 25% in August and 26% in September. UDAR and the Communist Party also showed slight growth. In contrast, Batkivshchyna, whose ratings had been stable during this period, declined in September from 26% to 23%. Svoboda and “Ukraine – Forward!” did not demonstrate any upward trends. Over the past month the number of undecided voters increased slightly from 15% to 17%. As a result, whereas in August the gap between the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna was two percentage points in favor of the opposition, in September it shifted to three points in favor of the Party of Regions.
• Around 40% of voters in western Ukraine were ready to vote for the United Opposition Batkivshchyna, about a quarter in the central region, and roughly one in ten in the east and south. The Party of Regions had the strongest support in the east and south, where it was backed by more than 40% of voters; about one in five supported it in the center and about one in ten in the west. The Communists almost doubled their support in the central region, where one in ten voters backed them, while their strongest support remained in the south and east, where nearly one in five voters supported the party. UDAR was most popular in the west and center, and it also gained support in the south and east. Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!” was consistently more popular in the central region, while Svoboda was strongest in the west. Undecided voters were most numerous in the east, which was also the region with the lowest willingness to vote in the October 28, 2012 election.
• If a presidential election had taken place in early September 2012, Viktor Yanukovych would have won the first round with 25.9% of the vote among likely voters. Yuliia Tymoshenko would have received 14%, Vitalii Klitschko 9.6%, Arsenii Yatseniuk 8.5%, Petro Symonenko 7.8%, Natalia Korolevska 3%, Oleh Tiahnybok 2.9%, Serhii Tihipko 2.1%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 1.9%, Viktor Yushchenko 1.1%, and Volodymyr Lytvyn 0.9%. More than 2% would have supported another candidate, almost 6% would not have supported any of the candidates, and 14.1% were undecided.

• According to the latest survey conducted by the Rating Group in August 2012, an increase in the level of patriotism was recorded in Ukraine. Compared to two years earlier, the share of respondents who consider themselves patriots of their country increased from 77% to 82%, and compared to six months earlier it rose even more sharply, from 73% to 82%. In particular, 40% of respondents clearly identify themselves as patriots of their country, while another 42% say they are rather patriots than not. Only 10% do not consider themselves patriots, and 8% were unable to decide.
• The most noticeable growth in patriotic sentiment was recorded in the East of the country, in Donbas, as well as in the West and the North. In the South, by contrast, opposite trends were observed. This means that patriotism increased most strongly in regions where EURO-2012 matches were held, which suggests that this growth may largely be connected to that event. Traditionally, older people are the most likely to consider themselves patriots. At the same time, patriotic attitudes have also grown among young people, and a particularly strong increase has been recorded among women. These trends further indirectly point to a link between EURO-2012 and the rise of patriotism, and one can even speak of the emergence of a certain “fashion for patriotism.”
• The strongest feelings of patriotism are observed among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna, but a significant increase in such attitudes is also recorded among supporters of the Party of Regions. The lowest levels of self-declared patriotism are found among supporters of UDAR and Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, primarily because of the large share of young people in their supporter base.
• Ukrainians most often name as sources of pride in their country and people the place where they were born and grew up (34%), the land and territory where they live (29%), national songs, holidays and traditions (27%), native nature (26%), the country’s past and history (25%), Ukrainian diligence and ability to run a хозяйство (25%), and great people of their nationality (24%). In addition, people also take pride in the emotional qualities of their people (22%), the state in which they live (21%), and their native language (19%). Somewhat fewer respondents mention faith and religion (12%), sporting victories (12%), literature and art (11%), and the graves of ancestors and memory of them (11%). National symbols such as the flag, coat of arms and anthem evoke pride for only 4%, while military power inspires the least pride of all, at just 1%.
• The place where one was born and grew up evokes the greatest pride in the South, the East and Donbas, and more often among supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!” and the Party of Regions. Ukrainian songs and traditions are especially valued among supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party, while Ukrainian diligence is most often mentioned by supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!”. Great Ukrainians are admired most in the East, North and West, among both opposition supporters and those of the Party of Regions. Pride in history and the past is strongest in the North, Center and Donbas, especially among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions. Pride in the state, as well as in the language and religion of one’s people, is highest in the West. Sporting victories are most often mentioned in the Center, particularly by UDAR voters. Emotional qualities of the people are emphasized in the East, literature and art in the North, and respect for ancestors’ graves in the South.
• An absolute majority of respondents, 61%, answered the question “Who am I?” by saying “a citizen of Ukraine.” About half as many identified themselves primarily as residents of their region, city or village (29%) or simply as “a human being” (24%). Another 19% would name their nationality, almost one in ten would mention their family role or describe themselves as a Soviet person. Only 6% would call themselves Europeans, 5% would mention their profession, and about 3% would say they are a “citizen of the world” or refer to their religious beliefs.
• Those most likely to identify primarily as citizens of Ukraine live in the West and Center and are mainly supporters of Svoboda and the united opposition Batkivshchyna. Saying simply “a human being” is more common in the East and West, especially among supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!” and UDAR. Naming one’s nationality is most common in the West and North, especially among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna. About one third of Communist Party supporters and nearly one sixth of Party of Regions supporters consider themselves Soviet people. These views are most common among older people and pensioners, particularly in the South and East. Identifying as a European is most typical for young people and is most widespread among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR. The idea of being a “citizen of the world” is most common among supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!” and UDAR.
• Over the last two years, certain changes have occurred in how patriotism, national pride and self-identification are understood. Ukrainians have become more proud of their country through national songs, holidays and traditions, through native nature, and through national diligence and хозяйственность. At the same time, pride in national heroes, the state, ancestors’ graves, religion, and national symbols such as the flag, coat of arms and anthem has declined. Although the number of people identifying as citizens of Ukraine has grown, the share of those who would name their nationality has decreased.
• Based on correlations between answers to the questions “What makes you proud of your country and people?”, “Who am I?”, and “Do you consider yourself a patriot of your country?”, the study identifies markers of stronger and weaker patriotism. In the question about sources of pride, the most patriotic markers are “the flag, coat of arms and anthem,” “the state in which I live,” “great people of my nationality,” “the language of my people,” and “our literature and art.” In the question “Who am I?”, the most patriotic answers are “a citizen of Ukraine” and “naming one’s nationality.”
• This creates a paradoxical situation: overall patriotism seems to have increased, yet most key patriotic markers have declined. Moreover, over the past two years the share of people ready to defend their country with arms has fallen from 43% to 33%, while the share of those not ready to do so has risen from 38% to 54%. The more a person feels like a patriot, the more willing they are to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with weapons. This suggests that the growth of patriotism contains a strong emotional and possibly situational component. Readiness to defend the country is highest in the West, especially among supporters of Svoboda, and lowest in the South and among Communist Party supporters. Almost half of men and one in five women say they are ready to defend their country with arms.
• If Ukrainians had to decide today whether to support independence, 61% would support it, 26% would oppose it, and 13% would be undecided. Support for independence is nearly 90% in the West and around 70% in the North and Center, but less than half in the East, South and Donbas. Importantly, in every region supporters of independence still outnumber opponents. Independence is supported most strongly by young people and least by older people, even though older people tend to see themselves as more patriotic. Some older respondents consider themselves patriots while at the same time not recognizing independence and identifying as Soviet people.
• An overwhelming majority of respondents oppose the secession of Galicia (84%), Crimea (90%) or Donbas (90%). Only 5% support the separation of Galicia, less than 1% in the West but over 10% in Donbas and the South. Only 3% support the separation of Crimea, less than 1% in the West, 4% in Donbas, and about 10% in the South. Only 2% support the separation of Donbas, about 2% in the West and 8% in Donbas itself. Thus, residents of Galicia themselves categorically oppose separation, while some support for it exists in Donbas and the South, primarily among Communist Party supporters and to a lesser extent among Party of Regions supporters. In the West, Center, North and East, separation of any territories is not supported. In Crimea and Donbas there is some support for separation of their own territories, but these views are far from dominant, and the absolute majority emphasize the need to preserve the territorial integrity of the country.

• If parliamentary elections were held in the near future, the largest share of votes among those who intend to participate would be received by Batkivshchyna, supported by 26.2% of likely voters, and the Party of Regions with 24.6%. The UDAR party led by Vitalii Klychko would receive 11.8%, while the Communist Party of Ukraine would gain 9.4%. Close to the 5% electoral threshold are also Natalia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward with 4.3% and the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda with 4.2%. At the same time, 15.4% of those who plan to vote had not yet decided which party to support.
• Batkivshchyna and UDAR are more often supported by voters in the Western and Central regions, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party are more popular in the East and South, and Svoboda finds most of its support in the West of the country. Among respondents who had already decided which party they would vote for, confidence in their choice was quite high, with 48.9% being fully confident and a further 43.5% rather confident.
• The main reason respondents gave for choosing a party was its perceived ability to solve the country’s problems, cited by 51.5% of those intending to vote for a party. Other frequently mentioned reasons included the presence of a strong and decisive leader at the head of the party, mentioned by 41.7%, the belief that the party could improve the life of people like the respondent, cited by 31.2%, the closeness of the party’s ideological positions to the respondent’s own views and beliefs at 29.5%, the party’s ability to carry out reforms and positive changes in society at 24.8%, its capacity to ensure stability in the state at 24.0%, and the presence in the party leadership of people who command the respondent’s respect at 23.5%.
• These reasons were common across all regions, but some regional differences were also observed. In the South and East, respondents more often pointed out that although the chosen political force had shortcomings, other parties were even worse. In the Western region, voters more frequently mentioned that a party defends the Ukrainian language as the sole state language and protects Ukrainian culture, traditions and values.
• Overall, the pre-election situation was characterized by a low level of public optimism. Nearly two thirds of respondents, 63%, believed that events in Ukraine were moving in the wrong direction, a view shared by majorities in all regions, ranging from 54% in the South to 74% in the West.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 45% of respondents feel that freedom of speech is being curtailed in Ukraine. Almost the same share (39%) do not feel a decline in freedom of speech. Thus, Ukrainians are almost evenly divided on this issue. Another one in six respondents is undecided.
• It should be noted that during 2011–2012, nearly half of respondents (from 43% to 46%) consistently felt that freedom of speech in Ukraine was being curtailed. At the same time, compared to the previous survey conducted in November of the previous year, the share of respondents who do not feel deterioration in this sphere increased from 35% to 39%.
• More than 60% of respondents in the West, about half in the North, and more than 40% in the Center and East feel that freedom of speech is being curtailed in Ukraine. At the same time, more than 50% of respondents in Donbas, more than 40% in the South and East, and about one third in the North and Center do not feel deterioration in this sphere.
• More than 70% of supporters of Svoboda and the United Opposition, as well as nearly 60% of UDAR supporters, feel that freedom of speech is being curtailed in Ukraine. At the same time, nearly 70% of supporters of the Party of Regions, slightly less than half of Communist Party supporters, and undecided voters do not feel such a threat.

• According to a survey conducted in July 2012, the five most serious threats facing the country are rising unemployment, mentioned by 44% of respondents, economic decline at 41%, abuse of power by the authorities at 25%, social degradation at 20%, and deterioration of medical care, also at 20%. These are followed by environmental disasters at 17%, rising crime at 16%, devaluation of the hryvnia at 15%, a potential split of the country at 13%, possible loss of independence at 11%, and mass migration of Ukrainians abroad at 10%. Fewer than one in ten respondents see threats such as a decline in education, a demographic crisis, an unconstitutional coup, the risk of civil war, or loss of control over Ukraine’s gas transit system. Only about 3% perceive a military threat from Russia or terrorism, and just 1% fear a military threat from the West. Only 3% of Ukrainians say they do not feel any of the listed threats at all.
• Compared with the previous survey conducted in March 2011, concerns about economic risks have declined noticeably. The share of those who see economic decline as a threat has fallen from 53% to 41% across all regions, while fears of unemployment have also decreased slightly from 47% to 44%, although they have risen in the Center and in Donbas. Concerns about devaluation of the hryvnia have dropped from 23% to 15% in all regions except the West. At the same time, anxiety about deteriorating medical services has increased from 15% to 20%, especially in the Center, South and Donbas. Worries about environmental disasters, rising crime, abuse of power, and social degradation have also grown. Over the past year, fears of a possible split of the country have increased by about one and a half times, rising from 9% to 13%, with particularly sharp growth both in the West and in the East. Concerns about the possible loss of independence have also risen, especially in both Western and Eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, fears of civil war have declined, while concerns about an unconstitutional coup have increased.
• Political affiliations also shape perceptions of threats. Supporters of Ukraine – Forward! and undecided voters are most worried about unemployment, while voters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party are most concerned about economic decline. Abuse of power worries supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, social degradation concerns Svoboda and Communist Party voters, and deterioration of medical services worries supporters of the Party of Regions and Ukraine – Forward!. Environmental disasters are most often cited by Party of Regions voters, while devaluation of the hryvnia and mass migration abroad are key concerns among UDAR supporters. Every third supporter of Svoboda believes Ukraine faces the threat of losing independence, every sixth sees a risk of civil war or an unconstitutional coup, and one in ten perceives a military threat from Russia. Terrorism is most often mentioned by supporters of Ukraine – Forward!, while one in ten supporters of the Party of Regions believes that Ukraine faces no threats at all.

IRI today released its third in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion (PDF).  The poll, conducted May 11 – June 2, 2012, is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape.
 
Among the findings in the poll, 14 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction, almost the same as in IRI’s last national poll conducted in March 2012.  However, since March, the number of people who believe the country is moving in the wrong direction decreased from 73 percent to 66 percent.  The two most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment and corruption within state bodies.  Only 19 percent of Ukrainians believe that the upcoming October 2012 parliamentary elections will be free and fair.  This number has not changed significantly from IRI November 2011 poll or the IRI March 2012 poll.

Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people.  The randomly collected sample of 1,200 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide.  The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group Ukraine under the supervision of IRI.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent with a response rate of 48 percent.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, UEFA EURO 2012 generated substantial interest among Ukrainians. Almost everyone who plans to follow the tournament intends to support the national team, even though its chances of winning are rated lower than those of Spain and Germany, which most respondents consider the main favorites of the championship.
• About half of Ukraine’s adult population aged 18 and over planned to follow the course of EURO 2012. In particular, 31 percent intended to watch most matches from the group stage through to the final, 9 percent planned to follow only the playoff matches and the final, and another 9 percent planned to watch only the final. At the same time, 46 percent were not interested in the tournament at all, while 5 percent had not yet decided.
• For obvious reasons, EURO 2012 attracted much greater interest among Ukrainians than the previous FIFA World Cup. According to Rating’s 2010 survey, the World Cup attracted the attention of fewer than 40 percent of Ukrainians.
• Interest in EURO 2012 was highest in Western Ukraine, Donbas, the North, and the East, and lowest in the Center and the South, regions that did not host any matches.
• Seventy-five percent of Ukrainian men and fewer than 30 percent of women planned to follow the tournament. More than half of men intended to watch most matches from the group stage to the final. In 2010, almost two-thirds of men and only about one-fifth of women followed the World Cup, which means that the greatest growth in interest since then occurred among women.
• Interest in EURO 2012 increased with younger age, higher levels of education, and higher income. Among internet users, the share of football fans was about one and a half times higher than among those who did not use the internet.
• Besides the Ukrainian national team, which was supported by 92 percent of fans, many respondents also planned to support Russia (23 percent), Germany (15 percent), England (15 percent), Spain (15 percent), and Italy (12 percent). Smaller shares said they would support France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. Every team participating in EURO 2012 had some supporters among Ukrainians, and only 3 percent of those who planned to watch the tournament had not yet decided whom to support.
• Compared to two years earlier, Ukrainian fans had become noticeably less supportive of Italy and France, most likely due to the weak performances of those teams at the previous World Cup. At the same time, Germany, England, and Spain continued to enjoy strong support, especially among the most devoted football fans, typically middle-aged men who planned to follow all matches and had a strong interest in football.
• It is worth recalling that neither Ukraine nor Russia participated in the final stage of the previous World Cup. Support for Ukraine’s national team was strongest in the West, Donbas, the North, and the Center, and weakest in the South. Support for Russia was highest in the East, South, and Donbas, much lower in the Center, and almost absent in the West. Germany and Spain were more strongly supported in the South and East, France in the East, and England in the Center.
• Respondents considered Spain and Germany the most likely winners of EURO 2012, followed by England and Italy. At the same time, nearly a quarter of Ukrainians believed that the Ukrainian national team also had a chance of winning. Far fewer respondents believed in the chances of the Netherlands, France, Portugal, or Russia, while about a quarter of respondents were unable to evaluate the chances of the participating teams.
• More experienced football fans tended to bet on Spain, Germany, and England, reflecting the preferences of men who planned to watch all tournament matches. Ukrainian women, by contrast, were more inclined to believe in the success of Ukraine’s national team and were also more likely than men to believe in Russia’s chances. Belief in Italy’s and Portugal’s chances was roughly similar among men and women.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, residents of Lviv are generally satisfied with the level of preparation of their city for hosting the UEFA EURO 2012 European Football Championship. The highest ratings were given to the readiness of Lviv residents themselves to welcome visitors: 5% rated it as “excellent,” 47% as “good,” and another 28% as “satisfactory,” while only 8% rated it as “unsatisfactory.”
• The quality of catering services was assessed as follows: 5% rated it “excellent,” 36% “good,” 25% “satisfactory,” and 11% “unsatisfactory.” The comfort of the Arena Lviv stadium was rated “excellent” by 8%, “good” by 32%, “satisfactory” by 24%, and “unsatisfactory” by 8%. The preparedness of government services (police, customs, hospitals, etc.) was rated “excellent” by 3%, “good” by 29%, “satisfactory” by 32%, and “unsatisfactory” by 16%. The comfort of tourist accommodation in the city was rated “excellent” by 3%, “good” by 31%, “satisfactory” by 29%, and “unsatisfactory” by 13%.
• The most negative evaluations were given to transport connections, with 41% rating them “unsatisfactory,” and the condition of roads, which 37% rated “unsatisfactory.” At the same time, transport preparation was rated “excellent” by 2%, “good” by 20%, and “satisfactory” by 32%, while road conditions were rated “excellent” by 2%, “good” by 20%, and “satisfactory” by 38%.
• Residents of the Frankivskyi district rated the readiness of Lviv residents to welcome guests, the quality of catering, accommodation conditions, and the stadium higher than residents of other districts. Meanwhile, satisfaction with transport connections is lowest in the Halytskyi district and in Sykhiv, and highest in the Zaliznychnyi district. The condition of roads is rated worst in the Halytskyi district and best in the Zaliznychnyi district.
• Young people are the most satisfied with the city’s preparations for the Championship, followed by middle-aged residents, while pensioners are the least satisfied. Men are naturally more satisfied with the stadium.
• Respondents who are satisfied with the work of the city authorities tend to give better assessments of the city’s readiness for EURO-2012. However, attitudes toward the city government are not decisive: regardless of their views on the city hall, Lviv residents in general positively assess their city’s readiness to host the Championship.
• Fifty-nine percent of Lviv residents will support Ukraine at EURO-2012. Considering that one third of residents do not follow football at all, practically every football fan in Lviv will support the national team. The highest level of support for Ukraine is in the Lychakiv district (67%) and the Halytskyi district (64%), slightly lower in Sykhivskyi and Shevchenkivskyi (59% each), lower still in Frankivskyi (57%) and Zaliznychnyi (53%).
• Germany is second in popularity among Lviv residents (12%), followed by England (9%), Spain (9%), Italy (7%), Poland (6%), the Netherlands and Portugal (4% each), France (3%), and Russia (2%). Support for Germany is highest in Sykhiv (20%) and lowest in the Lychakiv district (7%). Spain and England are most supported in the Sykhiv and Frankivskyi districts.
• Only 11% of respondents believe Ukraine will win the Championship. The strongest belief is in Germany’s victory (21%), followed by Spain (15%) and England (12%). Much fewer Lviv residents believe in Italy (7%), the Netherlands (5%), France (4%), Portugal (3%), or Poland (1%).
• Belief in Ukraine’s victory is highest in the Shevchenkivskyi district (16%) and lowest in the Halytskyi district (6%), where belief in Germany’s victory is the strongest (27%). Belief in Spain is highest in Sykhiv (18%) and in the Halytskyi district (17%), while belief in England is highest in Sykhiv and the Zaliznychnyi district (14% each).
• By age, young people most often support Ukraine (69%), although they are more likely than others to believe that Germany or Spain will win the tournament.
• Thus, among those who support the “blue and yellow” national team, only 19% believe it will win the Championship. The main favorites among supporters of Ukraine are Germany (31%) and Spain (23%).
• Among Lviv residents who support Germany, two thirds are fully convinced it will win EURO-2012, while one in four believes Spain could win, and one in five predicts England. Among supporters of England, only half are convinced of England’s victory, and Germany is seen as the main competitor (37%). By contrast, Lviv residents who support Spain are 100% convinced of its victory.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in May 2012, the level of political engagement among residents of Lviv has slightly decreased over the past six months, but it remains relatively high. Forty-six percent said they would definitely take part in parliamentary elections, and another 31% said they would probably participate rather than not.
• The highest voter mobilization is among supporters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and the Front for Change (the latter two were surveyed as a single list). If parliamentary elections had taken place in May 2012, 33.5% of Lviv voters would have supported the joint list of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change (among those intending to vote). Svoboda would have taken second place with 19.7%, and UDAR would have ranked third with 10.7%.
• The Party of Regions would have been supported by 4.6% of voters, Our Ukraine by 3.2%, Civic Position by 3.0%, Nataliia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!” by 2.4%, the European Party by 1.9%, and the Communist Party by 1.6%. Other parties would have received 5.7%. A further 13.7% were undecided.
• Compared to December of the previous year, Batkivshchyna had 21% support and Front for Change 16%, while by May nearly 34% were ready to vote for their united list. Civic Position lost support, declining from 6% in October–November to 5% in December and down to 3% in May. UDAR continued to grow, rising from 3% to 7% by the end of the previous year and reaching 11% in May. Svoboda also improved its position, rising from 17% to 20%. Support for the Party of Regions (5%) and Our Ukraine (3%) remained stable.
• The most trusted politicians among Lviv residents are Vitalii Klitschko (57%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (56%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (46%), Oleh Tiahnybok (42%), and Anatolii Hrytsenko (35%). Much lower trust is given to Nataliia Korolevska (13%), Viktor Yushchenko (12%), Serhii Tihipko (12%), Volodymyr Lytvyn (9%), Mykola Azarov (8%), and Viktor Yanukovych (6%). These figures are also the leaders in distrust: Korolevska is distrusted by 70%, Tihipko by 81%, Yushchenko by 82%, Azarov by 84%, Lytvyn by 85%, and Yanukovych by 88%.
• Over the last six months, trust in Yuliia Tymoshenko rose significantly from 37% to 46%, giving her, for the first time in three years, a positive trust balance in Lviv. Trust also increased for Arsenii Yatseniuk (from 47% to 56%), Vitalii Klitschko (from 51% to 57%), and Oleh Tiahnybok (from 40% to 42%). In contrast, trust in Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych continued to decline, reaching their lowest levels in three years.
• In single-member district No. 115 (Sykhiv and part of the Lychakiv district), the current leaders are Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (18.4%), Dmytro Dobrodomov (12.9%), Andrii Parubii (11.7%), and Mykhailo Khmil (8.5%). If Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda nominated a single candidate, support for Mykhalchyshyn would rise to 26%, for Khmil to 23%, and for Parubii to 20%, putting them far ahead of Dobrodomov. The greatest boost from unification would go to Khmil, whose rating would triple.
• In district No. 116 (Railway District and part of Shevchenkivskyi District), the leader remains Iryna Farion (18.9%), followed by Vasyl Kuibida (13.2%) and Yaroslav Hinka (7.2%). A united opposition candidate would significantly increase Farion’s support to 29% and Kuibida’s to 20%.
• In district No. 117 (Frankivskyi and Halytskyi Districts), there is no clear leader. The top contenders are Petro Pysarchuk (12.9%) and Ihor Vasiunyk (12.1%), followed by Taras Stetskiv (9.1%), Viktoriia Liaskovska (7.2%), and Oksana Yurynec (5.7%). If the opposition nominated a single candidate, Vasiunyk’s support would rise to 24% and Stetskiv’s to 23%, giving them a clear lead.
• In district No. 118 (Pustomyty District and parts of Lychakiv and Shevchenkivskyi Districts), Bohdan Dubnevych remains the clear leader with 31.8%, far ahead of Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (11.9%) and Yurii Hudyma (8.1%). However, a united opposition candidate could significantly narrow the gap, bringing Mykhalchyshyn up to 25% or Parubii up to 21%.
• According to respondents, the key qualities a candidate for parliament should have are the ability to keep promises (52%), honesty (36%), and the ability to bring change (30%). Voters also expect candidates to care about ordinary people, understand economics, be patriotic, reliable, and have a development program for the region.
• Most respondents believe a candidate should focus more on solving local issues in the constituency rather than national politics. Many also prefer experienced politicians over businesspeople, new faces over former MPs, and candidates in opposition rather than those supporting President Yanukovych. Party affiliation matters for some voters, but for many, the candidate’s personality is more important than party label.

• The most outstanding Ukrainians of all time are considered to be Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The Rating Group presents a special project entitled “People’s TOP,” which will consist of a series of surveys aimed at identifying the very best of the best. A distinctive feature of the methodology is that respondents are not given any lists or prompts; people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions.
• In May, we present the issue “Outstanding Ukrainians of All Time.” According to the survey results, an overwhelming majority of respondents named Taras Shevchenko as one of the greatest Ukrainians of all time (58.7%). Completing the top three are Lesya Ukrainka (22.5%) and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (20.1%).
• The rest of the top ten includes Ivan Franko (12.7%), Vitali Klitschko (10.8%), Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (7.7%), Hryhorii Skovoroda (5.7%), Ivan Mazepa (5.6%), Stepan Bandera (4.3%), and Yaroslav the Wise (3.8%). The second ten includes Mykola Amosov (3.7%), Viacheslav Chornovil (3.5%), Andrii Shevchenko (3.0%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (2.8%), Volodymyr Klitschko (2.8%), Mykola Hohol (2.4%), Serhii Koroliov (2.1%), Sofia Rotaru (1.9%), Borys Paton (1.8%), and Serhii Bubka (1.6%).
• The third ten consists of Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi (1.6%), Lina Kostenko (1.4%), Volodymyr the Great (1.4%), and three presidents of modern Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych (1.4%), Leonid Kuchma (1.1%), and Leonid Kravchuk (1.1%), as well as Oleksandr Dovzhenko (1.1%), Valerii Lobanovskyi (1.1%), Bohdan Stupka (0.9%), and Pavlo Tychyna (0.9%).
• The top 50 also includes, with scores between 0.5% and 0.8%, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, Ivan Skoropadskyi, Sydir Kovpak, Taras Bulba, Ivan Kotliarevskyi, Yana Klochkova, Princess Olha, Oleh Blokhin, Petro Symonenko, Danylo Halytskyi, Petro Sahaidachnyi, Vasyl Stus, Pylyp Orlyk, Nestor Makhno, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Roman Shukhevych, Liliia Podkopaieva, Volodymyr Vernadskyi, Viktor Yushchenko, Ivan Kozhedub, Mykola Pyrohov, and Andrii Sheptytskyi.
• In total, respondents named 224 different individuals. At the same time, about 15% of respondents were unable to name or recall any outstanding Ukrainians, with the highest share on the Donbas (27%) and the lowest in Central Ukraine (9%).
• The figure of Taras Shevchenko is recognized equally across all age groups and both in villages and cities, and he is mentioned most frequently in Western Ukraine and more often by women. Lesya Ukrainka is more often named in villages, in the West, North, and East, and more often by women. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi is more often mentioned in cities and more often by men; his figure is more widely recognized in Central, Northern, and Eastern Ukraine and least in the West. Ivan Franko is mentioned most frequently in Western Ukraine, more often in villages, and more often by older people than by the young.
• Vitali Klitschko is seen as an outstanding Ukrainian mainly by young people, much more often by men, and more often in villages. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Hryhorii Skovoroda, and Ivan Mazepa are more often named in cities, primarily by middle-aged and older people. Hrushevskyi is mentioned more in Central Ukraine, Skovoroda in the North, and Mazepa in the West.
• Stepan Bandera is named mainly in Western Ukraine, where he ranks among the top five most outstanding Ukrainians of all time. Viacheslav Chornovil is also named relatively more often in the West. In Central Ukraine, Yuliia Tymoshenko is named more often; in the South, Mykola Amosov, Serhii Koroliov, Mykola Hohol, Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, as well as Leonid Kuchma and Volodymyr Klitschko; in the East, Yaroslav the Wise, Volodymyr the Great, as well as Sofia Rotaru and Valerii Lobanovskyi; in the Donbas, Serhii Bubka; and in the North, Borys Paton and Oleksandr Dovzhenko.

• According to the aggregated results of surveys conducted by the Rating Group in 2012, 50% of respondents consider Ukrainian to be their native language, 29% consider Russian. At the same time, 20% consider both Ukrainian and Russian equally their native language. Another 1% consider another language to be their native one.
• In the West (96%), Center (75%), and North (58%), Ukrainian is predominantly considered the native language. At the same time, in the East (36%), South (56%), and Donbas (67%), Russian predominates.
  Ukrainian is more often considered the native language by rural residents and older people.
• 45% of respondents usually speak Ukrainian at home, 39% speak Russian, and 15% speak both Ukrainian and Russian equally.
  In the West (91%), Center (73%), and North (51%), people mainly communicate at home in Ukrainian; in the East (65%), South (67%), and Donbas (83%), in Russian.
  Ukrainian is more often spoken by people of middle and older age, and much more in rural areas.
• Thus, Ukrainian is spoken by fewer people than those who consider it their native language. Conversely, Russian is spoken by more people than those who consider it their native language.
• On the issue of granting Russian the status of a state language, there is complete parity: 46% of respondents are against, and the same share (45%) are in favor. Another 8% are undecided.
  It should be noted that over the past two years, the number of opponents and supporters of bilingualism has been almost equal. However, compared with 2009, support for granting Russian the status of a state language has declined (from 54% to 46%), while the number of opponents has increased from 40% to 45%.
• The strongest supporters of bilingualism are residents of the Donbas (84%), the East (71%), and the South (65%). Opponents are concentrated in the Center (58%), the North (68%), and the West (89%).
  Granting Russian the status of a state language is mainly supported by voters of the Communist Party of Ukraine (72%) and the Party of Regions (71%).
  Mostly opposed are supporters of UDAR (59%), Civic Position (66%), Batkivshchyna (69%), Front for Change (70%), and 100% of Svoboda voters.
• Despite the fact that Ukrainian is spoken more often by older people, young people are more opposed to bilingualism.
• Another important feature: among respondents who support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, the vast majority (72%) support granting Russian the status of a state language. At the same time, among those who support signing a free trade agreement with the European Union, the vast majority (72%) are against bilingualism. As is known, young people also more strongly support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.

• The full report can also be viewed and downloaded on our Facebook page.
• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating”, if the Presidential elections of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, only 35% of respondents would definitely take part, and another 38% would rather take part.
• If the Presidential elections of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, 21.9% of respondents (among those who would participate in the election) would vote for Viktor Yanukovych, 16% for Yulia Tymoshenko, 9.6% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 8.8% for Vitali Klitschko, 6.9% for Petro Symonenko, 4.1% for Nataliya Korolevska, 3.6% for Oleh Tyahnybok, 2.7% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko, 2.5% for Serhiy Tihipko, and 0.8% for Volodymyr Lytvyn. Other candidates were supported by 2.7%, 3.7% would not support any candidate, and 16.8% were undecided.

TRENDS:

• Compared with March, citizens’ willingness to participate in the elections has decreased. In particular, the share of respondents who would definitely participate in the presidential elections fell from 45% to 35%.
• Over the past two months, Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating has declined most noticeably (from 19.8% to 16%), which was accompanied by an increase in support for Nataliya Korolevska (from 1.4% to 4.1%). The latter has overtaken Serhiy Tihipko, Oleh Tyahnybok, and Anatoliy Hrytsenko in the rankings.
• A slight decline in Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s figures was accompanied by a similar rise for Vitali Klitschko.
• Viktor Yanukovych’s rating has remained almost unchanged over the past several months; however, compared with December of last year, it has increased slightly (from 18.9% to 21.9%). Against the background of declining support for the leader of Batkivshchyna, the gap between Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych has widened in favor of the latter.
• Oleh Tyahnybok shows stable positions, with his personal rating traditionally somewhat lower than that of the Svoboda party. Petro Symonenko also demonstrates stable results, likewise lagging behind the rating of the Communist Party.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, 34% of respondents would definitely take part in them, and another 34% would rather take part. The highest level of voter mobilization is recorded in the West, and the lowest in the South, East and Donbas of the country. The highest mobilization is among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU).
• RESULTS:
  If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, the joint list of Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes would win. Thus, 25.6% of respondents (among those who would take part in the elections) would vote for the unified list of Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes, 22% for the Party of Regions, 9.2% for UDAR of V. Klychko, 7.6% for the Communist Party, and 4.4% for Svoboda. Another 3.8% of voters would support N. Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, 2.4% would support Civic Position. All other parties together – over 6%, undecided – 19%.
• The full report can be viewed and downloaded on our Facebook page.
• TRENDS:
  Over the past two months, citizens’ willingness to participate in elections has decreased. In particular, the share of respondents who would definitely take part in parliamentary elections fell from 45% to 34%. After the merger of Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes, the number of undecided voters also slightly increased (from 17.7% to 19%).
• The largest losses were suffered by Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes, whose combined rating fell from 30% to 25.6% since February. Most of these losses occurred in Batkivshchyna’s electorate, primarily in favor of N. Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, whose rating increased from 1% to 3.8%.
• The rating of the Party of Regions has practically not changed over the last two months.
• UDAR also gained support – from 7.2% to 9.2%, as a result of which it took third place in the rating, overtaking the Communist Party. The positions of the Communists themselves remain stable, showing slight growth trends.
• The Svoboda party continues to demonstrate its traditional stability – over the past six months its rating has not fallen below 4% and has not risen above 5%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens support the President’s social initiatives and are ready to significantly improve their attitude toward the Head of State if these initiatives are successfully implemented. However, far fewer believe in their successful implementation, while the majority consider the social initiatives to be populism for which the state has no money.
• Awareness of the President’s social initiatives
  58% of respondents are well informed about the social initiatives announced by the President in early March, 23% know about them in general terms, 10% have heard something but very little, and 9% know nothing at all.
  People of older age with a relatively higher level of education are the best informed about the President’s social initiatives, especially in Donbas, the Center, and the East of the country. Interestingly, supporters of Svoboda and the Communist Party are more informed about the President’s social initiatives than supporters of the Party of Regions. The least interested are citizens who are undecided in their choice and those who do not plan to vote.
• Support for individual social initiatives of the President
  The absolute majority (from 84% to 94%) of respondents support the President’s social initiatives.
• Thus, state stimulation of the creation of new jobs for young people and people of pre-retirement age is supported by 94% of respondents, including 74% who fully support it and 20% who rather support it.
  Stabilizing prices for essential medicines for elderly people is supported by 93% of respondents, including 69% who fully support it and 24% who rather support it.
  Doubling the one-time Victory Day payment to war invalids is supported by 93% of respondents, including 66% who fully support it and 27% who rather support it.
  Increasing pensions for almost 9 million pensioners by at least 100 hryvnias is supported by 92% of respondents, including 64% who fully support it and 28% who rather support it.
  Paying compensation of 1,000 hryvnias for devalued savings of the former USSR Savings Bank to more than 5 million citizens who did not receive them in 2008–2009 is supported by 89% of respondents, including 62% who fully support it and 27% who rather support it.
  Introducing a wealth tax, in particular taxing apartments over 200 m², houses over 400 m², cars with engine volumes over 3.4 liters, etc., is supported by 89% of respondents, including 65% who fully support it and 24% who rather support it.
  Introducing mortgage loans at 2–3% for certain categories of citizens is supported by 84% of respondents, including 58% who fully support it and 26% who rather support it.
• Social initiatives are supported almost equally in different regions of the country. At the same time, there are certain differences depending on political sympathies.
  Thus, the introduction of mortgage loans at 2–3% is more supported by supporters of the Party of Regions and Front for Change, and least supported by supporters of Batkivshchyna.
  The wealth tax is more supported by supporters of the Communist Party, and least by supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda.
  Compensation payments for devalued USSR Savings Bank deposits are equally supported by supporters of the Communist Party, Svoboda, and the Party of Regions, and least by UDAR and Front for Change.
  State stimulation of job creation for young people and those of pre-retirement age is more supported by supporters of the Communist Party, Party of Regions, and Front for Change, and least by Svoboda. Doubling the Victory Day payment to war invalids and stabilizing medicine prices for the elderly are more supported by supporters of the Communist Party.
  As we can see, the President’s social initiatives were liked most by supporters of the Communist Party.
• Belief in the implementation of the President’s social initiatives is two to three times lower than their level of support.
  Thus, respondents most believe in the implementation of the initiative to double the one-time Victory Day payment to war invalids (52% believe, 36% do not), as well as raising pensions by at least 100 hryvnias (47% believe, 42% do not), and paying compensation of 1,000 hryvnias for devalued USSR Savings Bank deposits (41% believe, 47% do not).
  Least believed in are initiatives to stabilize medicine prices (32% believe, 56% do not), create new jobs (27% believe, 59% do not), introduce cheap mortgages (27% believe, 55% do not), and introduce a wealth tax (28% believe, 60% do not).
  People in the West and Donbas believe the least in the implementation of the President’s social initiatives. Significantly more believe in the South, Center, and North.
  Only supporters of the Party of Regions believe in the implementation of social initiatives (from 55% to 80%) more than they disbelieve. Supporters of the Communist Party also believe in their implementation (from 30% to 65% depending on the initiative). Among supporters of opposition parties, relatively more belief is shown by supporters of UDAR, Svoboda, and Front for Change.
• Attitudes toward the social initiatives
  35% of respondents believe that the state has the necessary funds to implement the President’s social initiatives, 47% believe that there is no money for them, and 18% could not answer.
  Those who believe that such funds exist are primarily supporters of the Party of Regions, and to a lesser extent the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, and UDAR.
  Interestingly, those who believe that the necessary funds exist are twice as likely to believe in successful implementation.
• 75% of respondents believe that President Viktor Yanukovych’s social initiatives are rather pre-election populism, and only 14% consider them rather care for people. Relatively more people who consider the initiatives care for people live in the South of the country.
  Half of Party of Regions supporters consider the initiatives care for people, while one third consider them pre-election populism. Supporters of all other political forces overwhelmingly consider the initiatives pre-election populism, even Communist Party supporters, who liked them the most.
  Interestingly, those who consider the social initiatives to be care for people are three times more likely to believe in their successful implementation.
  90% of respondents who believe that there is no money for the initiatives and 60% of those who believe that there is money consider them pre-election populism.
• Despite the fact that most respondents consider the President’s social initiatives to be pre-election populism, a significant share are ready to improve their attitude toward Viktor Yanukovych if they are successfully implemented.
  Thus, 19% of respondents said their attitude toward President Viktor Yanukovych would definitely improve if the initiatives are implemented, and another 23% said it would rather improve. 46% think their attitude will not change, only 3% think it will worsen, and 9% could not answer.
• Thus, more than 40% of respondents could improve their attitude toward the Head of State if he fulfills his social promises — almost twice the current level of trust in Viktor Yanukovych.
  Those most ready to improve their attitude toward Yanukovych are residents of the South, East, and Center of the country; more often older people and youth; more often city residents than rural; more often women than men.
  An absolute majority of Party of Regions supporters, at least half of Communist Party supporters, about 40% of the undecided and those who do not plan to vote are ready to improve their attitude toward the President if the initiatives are fulfilled.
  The most steadfast are supporters of Svoboda and Civic Position, although even among them about a quarter could improve their attitude toward Yanukovych if the initiatives are implemented.
  Notably, among those who consider the initiatives pre-election populism, almost one third are ready to improve their attitude toward Yanukovych if they are fulfilled. At the same time, almost 90% of those who consider the initiatives care for people are ready to improve their attitude toward him.