News and Press releases

Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI released its second in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion.  The poll, conducted February 17 – March 7, 2012, is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape. 

Among the findings in the poll, 13 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction.  The percentage remained the same since IRI’s last national poll conducted in December 2011.  However, since December, the number of people who believe the country is moving in the wrong direction increased from 71 percent to 73 percent.  The three most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment, low industrial production and corruption within the state bodies.  Seventy-four percent of Ukrainians do not support giving away part or Ukraine’s entire gas transportation system to Russia if it were to result in a reduction in the price Ukraine pays for imported gas from Russia. 

Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people.  The randomly collected sample of 1,201 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide. The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group under the supervision of IRI. The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent with a response rate of 56 percent.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority supports the introduction in Ukraine of the state emergency assistance system “112,” while at the same time citizens are poorly informed that such a system exists.
• Only 8% of respondents are well informed about the introduction in Ukraine of the state emergency assistance system “112,” a single and free phone number for calling emergency services; 29% know about it in general terms, and another 26% have heard something but very little. At the same time, 37% know nothing about it at all.
• Residents of Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine are the best informed about the introduction of the “112” system; the worst informed are those in Donbas and the South. Urban residents are more informed than rural residents, and men more than women. The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the better informed they are about the introduction of the “112” system in Ukraine.
• An absolute majority of respondents (72%) support the introduction in Ukraine of the state emergency assistance system “112.” Only 10% do not support it, and another 18% are undecided.
• A clear relationship is observed: the better respondents are informed about the introduction of the “112” emergency system, the more they support it.
• Most respondents insist on the urgent introduction of the state emergency assistance system “112” in Ukraine. About half believe that implementation of the “112” system should be completed already in 2012, including 28% who say urgently, before EURO-2012, and 19% who say by the end of 2012.
• At the same time, 9% believe that work on implementing the “112” emergency system can be completed in 2013–2014, and 17% are convinced that this issue can be postponed even longer. 27% were unable to decide.
• The better respondents are informed about the “112” system in Ukraine, the more of them insist on its urgency: 90% of those who are well informed believe that the implementation of “112” should be completed during 2012.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of respondents will celebrate Easter (Pascha) this year, and most will go to church: some to attend the service, others simply to bless their Easter basket. And although far from everyone observes the Great Lent, understanding of its meaning already exists, at least among those who do fast.
• 91% of respondents know that Easter means the Resurrection of Jesus Christ; the rest (9%) do not know, including 3% who believe it is the Birth of Jesus Christ, and 1% who believe it is the Baptism.
• 96% of respondents plan to celebrate Easter this year, including 82% who will definitely celebrate and another 14% who will most likely do so.
• Easter is one of the most mass celebrations in Ukraine and carries a clear unifying effect: it will be celebrated by both older people and youth; in both the West and the East; by believers of both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kyiv Patriarchate; and by supporters of both the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna.
• Thus, 77% of respondents plan to go to church on Easter, including 38% who primarily plan to attend the church service, and 39% who plan to bless their Easter basket. In the West, people will go to church primarily to attend the service. In the North and Donbas, nearly equal numbers will go both to attend the service and simply to bless the basket. Meanwhile, in the Center, South, and East, people will go to church primarily to bless their Easter basket.
• Those who primarily plan to attend the Easter service are older people, pensioners, especially residents of villages, and more women than men. The overwhelming majority of Greek Catholics, almost half of believers of the UOC-KP, and one third of believers of the UOC-MP will go to church primarily to attend the service.
• 7% of respondents observe the Great Lent for the entire period, another 11% only on certain days. 15% try to fast but do not always succeed, another 5% would like to but cannot for health reasons. 60% definitely do not observe the Fast.
• The highest level of fasting is in the West (15% for the whole period, 28% only on certain days), which corresponds to Greek Catholics. The lowest is in the East. Believers of the UOC-KP fast somewhat more often than believers of the UOC-MP.
• Believers who do not associate themselves with any confession and non-believers practically do not observe fasting.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education, the more they observe fasting. Fasting is practiced mainly by women and rural residents. Among older people there are also the most who would like to fast but cannot because of health.
• The main purpose of fasting is spiritual purification (59%). Less often people fast for physical cleansing (15%) or weight loss (3%). Another one in six fasts simply because it is customary.
• 80% of those who strictly observe the fast do so for spiritual purification. Among those who only try, a large share fast because it is customary.
• During Lent, respondents are most willing to give up food of animal origin (70%), less willing to give up alcohol and cigarettes (58%), entertainment and celebrations (50%), and swearing (40%). They are practically not ready to give up watching entertainment TV programs (20%) and intimate relations (19%).

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, the topic of intellectual property protection in Ukraine is full of contradictions. Ukrainians seem to understand the importance of intellectual property rights, and at the same time are completely unwilling to comply with them, shifting all responsibility onto the authorities. The average Ukrainian is ready to selflessly defend their own intellectual rights and with the same selflessness violate the intellectual rights of others.
• Understanding the importance of intellectual property protection
• Almost 80% of respondents believe that intellectual property rights must be protected (including 58% who believe they must always be protected and 21% who believe they must be protected but not always). Only 4% hold the opposite opinion. Another 17% could not decide on this issue.
• Only 13% of respondents believe that the actions of the authorities to protect intellectual property rights in Ukraine are effective, while 60% believe they are ineffective. Another 27% could not assess this.
• Respect for intellectual property rights in practice
• If a person has the choice to buy a copy of a book reprinted from the original at a lower price than the original and of nearly the same quality, only 13% would refuse the cheap copy and buy the original. Meanwhile, 32% would buy the cheap copy, and 26% would try to obtain it for free (for example, by downloading it from the internet). 30% of respondents could not decide, mainly older people.
• If a person has the choice to buy a copied music, movie, or software disc at a lower price than the original and of nearly the same quality, only 12% would refuse the cheap copy and buy the original. Meanwhile, 25% would buy the cheap copy, and 31% would try to obtain it for free (for example, by downloading it from the internet). 32% of respondents could not decide.
• If a person has the choice to buy clothing counterfeited to imitate a famous global brand at a lower price than the original and of nearly the same quality, only 15% would refuse the cheap copy and buy the original. Meanwhile, 58% would buy the cheap copy. 28% could not decide.
• Thus, nearly 60% of Ukrainians are ready to violate intellectual property rights when buying clothing, books, music, films, or software.
• Clear trends are observed. The younger respondents are, the more often they use the internet, and the higher their education, the more likely they are to reject the original in favor of a cheap copy or a free version. Almost 50% of respondents aged 18–29 would try to download music, films, or software for free, another quarter would buy a cheap copy, and only one in ten would buy the original.
• Responsibility for violating intellectual property rights
• Despite the fact that the absolute majority of respondents are not ready to comply with intellectual property rights in practice, most of them indirectly understand that responsibility for violations should exist.
• Respondents were asked to imagine that they had written a book or music, developed software, or made an invention, and then learned that someone was using it for free and they were receiving nothing.
• After that, 18% agreed that the person should be punished and that criminal liability should apply; 27% believe there should be administrative liability (for example, a fine); another 18% said that a warning is enough the first time, and punishment should apply only if it happens again.
• That is, almost two thirds of respondents would prefer to punish a person who violates their intellectual property rights.
• Only 18% would not support punishment: 11% said they would allow free use as long as authorship is acknowledged, and only 7% said they would actually be happy that others use their invention and no payment is needed. Another 19% could not decide.
• Support for tougher liability is higher among men, middle-aged people, and those with secondary education. Notably, internet users also support tougher liability when their own intellectual property rights are violated.
• The paradox is that nearly 60% of respondents who admitted they would buy pirated discs or try to download music, films, or software for free, also believe that if their own intellectual property rights were violated, responsibility should apply, including 16% who support criminal liability.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group in March 2012, a slight weakening of protest moods among citizens is recorded. As before, social issues are capable of provoking protests much more strongly than ideological ones.

READINESS FOR PROTESTS

• 36% of respondents are ready to personally defend their rights and interests by participating in protest actions, including 13% who are definitely ready. For comparison, in April of last year, those ready to personally defend their rights in protest actions were somewhat higher – 40%, including 17% who were definitely ready to do so.
• At the same time, 55% are not ready to participate in protests (in April it was 51%). Another 10% could not answer the question.
• Traditionally, the highest readiness for protests is in the West (54%). Significantly fewer are ready for protests in the North (36%), South (33%), and Center (32%) of Ukraine. Even fewer – in the Donbas (28%) and in the East (24%).
• Compared to April of last year, the level of protest activity increased only in the West and South of the country.
• Among voters, the highest readiness for protests is among supporters of Svoboda (65%), as well as Batkivshchyna (52%), UDAR (49%), and Front for Change (48%). The lowest is among supporters of Civic Position, the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and among the “undecided.”
• It should be noted that the highest readiness for protests is observed among working citizens, people with medium incomes and secondary education. A slight weakening of protest moods is observed among citizens with higher incomes and higher levels of education.
• As a rule, these are people of a wide age range. Protest moods are most widespread among students, workers, and the unemployed, slightly less among entrepreneurs. These are more often men than women, and more often rural residents.

READINESS FOR PROTESTS BY TOPIC

• It should be emphasized immediately that social issues are capable of mobilizing people for protests much more than political or ideological ones.
• Thus, people are most ready to personally go out to protests in the event of delays in salary or pension payments (44%) and sharp price increases and inflation (43%). At the same time, even on these issues, the number of those ready to protest is smaller than those not ready (48%).
• Somewhat fewer people are ready to go out to protests in the event of increases in utility tariffs (37% ready and 54% not ready), mass persecution of ordinary citizens by law enforcement agencies (31% ready and 56% not ready), falsification of parliamentary election results (30% ready and 62% not ready), transfer of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Russia (26% ready and 64% not ready), and a decision on the free sale of agricultural land in Ukraine (28% ready and 65% not ready).
• Only 20% of respondents are ready to go out to protests in the event of granting the Russian language the status of a second state language, while 72% are not ready. Conversely, only 16% are ready to go out to protests in the event of banning the use of the Russian language in state institutions, while 75% are not ready.
• On most of these topics, residents of the West are significantly more protest-oriented than other regions. This applies both to socio-economic and ideological issues. The greatest difference compared to other regions is observed in the topics of possible election falsifications, transfer of the gas transit system to Russia, and the issue of the Russian language. At the same time, residents of the South are much more ready to defend the rights of the Russian language in protest actions (even more than in the East and Donbas).
• The second region in terms of protest moods is the North.
• There are also other regional specifics. For example, the topic of possible persecution of ordinary people by law enforcement agencies can mobilize residents of the Center more; the free sale of agricultural land – the South; increases in utility tariffs – the East.
• As already noted, supporters of Svoboda are much more ready for protests than others. This applies both to socio-economic and ideological issues. The greatest protests among Svoboda supporters can be expected in the case of delays in salary and pension payments, as well as transfer of the gas transit system to Russia or oppression of the Ukrainian language. In general, Svoboda supporters are ready for protests in other cases as well.
• Supporters of Batkivshchyna and UDAR are also relatively easy to mobilize, especially in the case of price increases and inflation, as well as utility tariff increases, election falsifications, and possible persecution of ordinary people by law enforcement agencies. Supporters of Batkivshchyna may also be mobilized by the decision on the free sale of agricultural land.
• Supporters of the Party of Regions are known to be more likely to go out to protests in the case of price increases and utility tariff hikes, and delays in salary and pension payments, than in the case of oppression of the Russian language.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012, 45% of respondents would definitely take part, and another 32% would probably take part.
• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012, 21.7% of respondents (among those who would take part in the election) would vote for Viktor Yanukovych, 19.8% for Yulia Tymoshenko, 10.8% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 7.9% for Vitali Klitschko, 6.2% for Petro Symonenko, 3.8% for Serhiy Tihipko, 3.6% for Oleh Tyahnybok, 3.1% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko, 1.4% for Nataliya Korolevska, 1.3% for Volodymyr Lytvyn, and 0.7% for Viktor Yushchenko. Other candidates were supported by 3.4%, 3.8% would not support any candidate, and 12.5% were undecided.

TRENDS:
Compared with February, the number of the undecided decreased (from 14.1% to 12.5%) and the number of “against all” also decreased (from 6% to 3.8%).

• Unlike Yulia Tymoshenko, whose rating remained almost unchanged (19.4% in February versus 19.9% in March), the rating of Viktor Yanukovych increased (from 19.7% to 21.7%), which allowed him to widen the gap from the Batkivshchyna leader to almost 2%.
• At the same time, Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s rating declined (from 12.8% to 10.8%), repeating the dynamics of the Front for Change party, while Vitali Klitschko’s rating increased (from 6.5% to 7.9%).
• The positions of Petro Symonenko, Oleh Tyahnybok, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Nataliya Korolevska improved slightly.
• Despite the fact that in the “first-round rating” Viktor Yanukovych is currently leading, in a conditional “second-round” contest the incumbent president would be defeated by Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Vitali Klitschko. Moreover, over the past six months, the lead in favor of opposition candidates has increased. As six months ago, Arseniy Yatsenyuk shows the largest lead against Viktor Yanukovych (despite the fact that in the first-round personal rating he trails both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko by about half).

YANUKOVYCH vs. TYMOSHENKO

• According to the Sociological Group “Rating,” if the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko reached the second round, then 30% of respondents (among those who intend to vote) would support the incumbent president, 36.6% would support the former prime minister, 23.7% would support neither candidate, and 9.8% would be undecided.
• It should be recalled that in the last presidential election Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the second round (49% to 45%).
• Yanukovych is most supported in the South (52%) and Donbas (44%), and somewhat less in the East (41%). Tymoshenko, in turn, is most supported in the West (68%), the Center (41%), and the North (46%). Among supporters of other potential candidates, Yanukovych in a contest against Tymoshenko is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (33%) and Symonenko’s supporters (29%).
• The leader of Batkivshchyna is supported by Yatsenyuk’s supporters (54%), Tyahnybok’s (51%), Klitschko’s (40%), and Hrytsenko’s (36%). It should be noted that over the past six months Tymoshenko increased her support among supporters of Yatsenyuk, Tyahnybok, and Klitschko, which raised her second-round rating from 31% to 37%.

YANUKOVYCH vs. YATSENYUK

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached the second round, then 29% of respondents would support the incumbent president, 38.1% would support the leader of Front for Change, 21.5% would support neither candidate, and 11.4% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Yatsenyuk increased his second-round rating from 35% to 37%, partly due to growing support among supporters of Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Klitschko.
• Yanukovych is most supported against Yatsenyuk in the South (51%), Donbas (44%), and East (40%). Yatsenyuk is most supported in the West (69%), the North (48%), and the Center (37%). Among voters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (36%), although this support has declined noticeably, and by Symonenko’s supporters (29%).

YANUKOVYCH vs. TYAHNYBOK

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Oleh Tyahnybok reached the second round, 31.2% would support the incumbent president, 24.4% would support the Svoboda leader, 31.5% would support neither candidate, and 12.9% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Tyahnybok increased his second-round rating from 17% to 24%, especially in the West (up to 61%) and the North (up to 32%). This growth can be partly attributed to opposition unification, since support for Tyahnybok in the second round rose among Batkivshchyna supporters from 30% to 48%, and among Front for Change supporters from 26% to 44%.
• Yanukovych has his highest second-round rating in a contest against Tyahnybok, especially in the South (53%), Donbas (47%), and East (41%). The Center most rejects the Yanukovych–Tyahnybok pairing, where almost half oppose both candidates. At least one third of voters in the South, Donbas, East, and North also oppose both candidates.

YANUKOVYCH vs. KLITSCHKO

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Vitali Klitschko reached the second round, 28.1% would support the incumbent president, 36.6% would support the UDAR leader, 21.4% would support neither candidate, and 13.9% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Klitschko increased his second-round rating from 28% to 37%, partly due to growing support among supporters of Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yatsenyuk.
• Yanukovych is most supported in the South (47%), Donbas (44%), and East (38%). Klitschko is most supported in the West (66%), North (54%), and Center (57%), as well as in the East (23%).
• Among supporters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (35%) and Symonenko’s (27%). Klitschko is supported by Tyahnybok’s supporters (64%), Tymoshenko’s (62%), Yatsenyuk’s (58%), Hrytsenko’s (46%), and also by one quarter of the undecided.

GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL POLITICIANS

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in March 2012, among national politicians, residents of Ivano-Frankivsk trust Vitali Klitschko the most (64%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk (58%), Oleh Tyahnybok (51%), Yulia Tymoshenko (50%), and Anatoliy Hrytsenko (48%).
• Much fewer people trust Viktor Yushchenko (14%), Serhiy Tihipko (14%), and Viktor Yanukovych (5%).
• In terms of full trust (“fully trust”), Yulia Tymoshenko (23%) and Oleh Tyahnybok (22%) are the leaders.
• The leaders of distrust are Viktor Yanukovych (86%), Viktor Yushchenko (79%), and Serhiy Tihipko (77%).

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in March 2012, the Svoboda party would win in Ivano-Frankivsk. About 55% of voters would definitely take part in the elections, and another about 30% would probably take part.
• Thus, Svoboda would be supported by 25.7% of voters (among those who intend to vote), Batkivshchyna by 21.9%, Front for Change by 14.5%, UDAR by 8.2%, Civic Position by 4.8%, the Party of Regions by 3.5%, and Our Ukraine by 2.6%.
• Other parties would receive over 10%, and 13% of voters would be undecided.
• Over the past six months, the ratings of the leaders — Svoboda and Batkivshchyna — have not changed: in July of last year they were supported by 26% and 22% respectively. At the same time, UDAR increased significantly (from 3% to 8%), while the ratings of Front for Change (from 18% to 15%) and Strong Ukraine (from 3% to 1%) declined. It can be assumed that these parties lost their voters to UDAR.

DISTRICT

• If the parliamentary elections in the single-member district that includes Ivano-Frankivsk were held in March 2012, the winner would be the Svoboda candidate, the head of the regional council Oleksandr Sych (30.4%). His closest competitors would be the incumbent mayor, Volodymyr Anushkevychus from the Ukrainian People’s Party (16.1%), and Yuriy Solovey from UDAR (15.5%), who would share second and third place.
• Other possible candidates would be supported by far fewer voters: Ihor Prokopiv (8.8%), Roman Tereshko (8.5%), Zynoviy Shkutyak (6%), Ihor Zvarych (3.5%). 4.5% would support other candidates, and 6.7% would be undecided.
• Oleksandr Sych is supported by over 80% of Svoboda supporters, almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Civic Position, and one in ten supporters of UDAR and Front for Change.
• Yuriy Solovey is supported by over 70% of UDAR supporters and almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change.
• Volodymyr Anushkevychus is supported by almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, and almost one third of Our Ukraine supporters.
• At the same time, for the possible Front for Change candidate Ihor Prokopiv, currently no more than half of his party’s supporters are ready to vote. For the possible Batkivshchyna candidate Roman Tereshko, only one third of his party’s supporters are ready to vote.

ELECTORAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF CANDIDATES

• Besides direct ratings, the electoral attractiveness of potential single-member district candidates was also studied.
• For Oleksandr Sych, 25% of voters would definitely vote for him, and another 31% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 56%. Another 19% have a positive attitude toward him, but not enough to vote.
• For Yuriy Solovey, 10% would definitely vote for him, and another 35% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 45%. Another 21% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Volodymyr Anushkevychus, 12% would definitely vote for him, and another 28% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 40%. Another 22% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• As we can see, all three candidates have significant reserves to improve their positions. Oleksandr Sych’s starting position is somewhat better: the number of his “hard” supporters (i.e., Svoboda voters) is at least twice as large as that of the others.
• Other candidates also have good, though more hypothetical, prospects.
• For Ihor Prokopiv, 5% would definitely vote for him, another 31% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 36%. Another 25% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Zynoviy Shkutyak, 5% would definitely vote, another 20% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 25%. Another 25% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Roman Tereshko, 6% would definitely vote, another 14% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 20%. Another 20% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• Finally, Ihor Zvarych could receive up to 11%. Another 13% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• Oleksandr Sych can mobilize over 90% of Svoboda supporters. Yuriy Solovey over 80% of UDAR supporters, Ihor Prokopiv up to 70% of Front for Change supporters, and Roman Tereshko up to 50% of Batkivshchyna supporters.

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURES OF ELECTORATES

• Traditionally, UDAR has the youngest electorate. Batkivshchyna and Svoboda also have relatively young electorates.
• Noteworthy is the unusual “rejuvenation” of Batkivshchyna’s electorate, which may be the result of attracting young people on the wave of protest sentiment caused by the conviction of Yulia Tymoshenko. This choice cannot yet be considered stable.
• Among single-member district candidates, young people most support Yuriy Solovey, Volodymyr Anushkevychus, and Roman Tereshko.
• Men support Svoboda, UDAR, and Civic Position more. Women support Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and Front for Change more.
• Relatively more people with higher education are among supporters of UDAR and Front for Change, as well as Batkivshchyna and Svoboda. Among candidates: supporters of Roman Tereshko, Zynoviy Shkutyak, Volodymyr Anushkevychus, and Ihor Prokopiv.
• There are more employed people among supporters of Civic Position and Front for Change. Voters of Front for Change and the Party of Regions also have relatively higher incomes; accordingly, these are more supporters of Ihor Prokopiv and Ihor Zvarych.

CRITERIA OF CHOICE

• The key trait that, in respondents’ opinion, a parliamentary candidate from the district should have is keeping promises (58%).
• The candidate should also be able to bring change (30%), have a regional development program (22%), understand economics (21%), have management experience (18%), be a strong leader (21%), and be a patriot (16%).
• Less important for people is that the candidate be young and energetic (13%), honest (12%), able to find compromises (12%), care about ordinary people (10%), be reliable (11%), be religious (10%), understand legal issues (9%), speak clearly (8%), care about family values (7%), engage in charity (7%), have political experience (5%), care about traditions and culture (4%), and have legislative experience (4%).

LOCAL PROBLEMS

• According to city residents, the main regional problems are poor road conditions (57%), unemployment (56%), rising prices and inflation (46%), and poverty (42%).
• Other important problems are alcoholism and drug addiction (33%), rising utility tariffs (32%), declining industry (30%), mass migration abroad (29%), and corruption in local authorities (29%).
• Less important problems include homeless animals (21%), lack of attention to youth issues (20%), waste collection and disposal (19%), lack of playgrounds (19%), rising crime (18%), poor healthcare (18%), neglected agriculture (15%), poor ecology (15%), pressure on small and medium business (14%), and lack of government transparency (13%).
• Even less important problems are violations of democracy, human rights and freedoms (9%), poor water supply and drainage (8%), poor housing development (7%), poor development of sports and football (7%), poor public transport (7%), poor education (6%), and suppression of national culture and language (6%).

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 52% of surveyed Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. 34% do not support it. Another 15% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past year the number of supporters of European integration has declined to the level of 2009. Thus, in October 2009, accession of Ukraine to the European Union was supported by 51% of respondents; in April 2010 — 52%; in September 2010 — 57%; in January 2011 — 56%; in April 2011 — 51%; and again 52% in February 2012. Thus, the peak of support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union occurred in late 2010 – early 2011.
• Among the strongest supporters of European integration are residents of the West (78%), somewhat fewer in the Center (59%) and North (55%). Accordingly, this includes over 80% of Svoboda supporters, about 70% of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, UDAR, Civic Position, as well as Strong Ukraine. Among the strongest opponents are CPU voters, two thirds of whom do not support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Party of Regions supporters are almost evenly split on this issue: about 40% support European integration, while 45% do not.
• The higher the respondents’ level of education and the younger they are, the more they support Ukraine’s accession to the EU and the less they support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus and granting Russian the status of a second state language.
• At the same time, 47% of respondents support the formation of a single state of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. 42% do not support it. Another 11% are undecided. Importantly, about 30% of those who support the formation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
• Compared to April of last year, the number of such people decreased by a quarter (in April it was almost 40%), which indicates an increase in polarization of society along ideological lines. This is especially visible in regional terms: the “pro-Russian” vector is gaining popularity in Donbas, the South, and the East, while the “pro-Western” vector is strengthening in Western Ukraine. This is also confirmed by the fact that for most markers the number of unambiguous supporters and unambiguous opponents is increasing.
• Taking these features of the responses into account, respondents were asked a direct question. Thus, according to those surveyed, for Ukraine signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial (39%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (36%). 26% were unable to decide. Compared to October of last year, the number of supporters of the Free Trade Agreement with the EU did not decrease; instead, the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 36%).
• As a result, the West, North, and Center of Ukraine are more supportive of the Agreement with the EU, while Donbas, the South, and the East support joining the Customs Union. However, about 20% of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters support joining the Customs Union, just as about 20% of Party of Regions supporters support the Agreement with the EU. Strong Ukraine supporters are split almost evenly: 40% for the EU Agreement and 41% for the Customs Union with Russia.
• 46% of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language. Almost the same number (45%) oppose this. Another 8% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past two years the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been almost equal. However, compared to 2009, support for granting Russian state language status has decreased (in 2009 it was over 50%).
• Among the strongest supporters of bilingualism are residents of Donbas (84%), the East (71%), and the South (65%). Accordingly, these are CPU supporters (72%), Party of Regions (71%), People’s Party (58%), and Strong Ukraine (53%). Among the strongest opponents are Svoboda voters, 100% of whom oppose granting Russian state language status.
• Public attitudes toward Ukraine’s accession to NATO have worsened somewhat: from 26% in September 2010 to 24% in January 2011, 22% in April 2011, and down to 20% in February 2012. More than 68% of respondents do not support Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Another 13% are undecided. Strong support for joining the North Atlantic Alliance exists only in the West of the country (about half of respondents). Among party supporters, NATO accession is traditionally advocated primarily by supporters of Svoboda and Civic Position.
• Meanwhile, against the backdrop of intensified gas negotiations, the number of supporters of extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has significantly decreased. Over the year, the number of supporters fell from 42% to 33%, while the number of opponents rose from 42% to 49%. 18% were undecided. The initiative lost support not only in the Center and North, but also in the East, South, and Donbas, where no more than half of respondents support it.
• Recently, attitudes toward the idea of creating a trilateral “gas” consortium to divide ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system among Russia, the EU, and Ukraine have improved. Over the past year (since January 2011), support for the initiative increased from 30% to 35%, while the number of opponents decreased from 42% to 37%. Accordingly, attitudes toward the consortium have returned to the 2009 level, when 36% supported it and 35% opposed it.
• Given the ambiguity of the initiative and difficulties in understanding it (almost 30% were undecided), respondents were asked a clarifying question: “Do you support the idea of transferring control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system to Russia?” Thus, the absolute majority (78%) do not support transferring control of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Russia. Only 8% support it. 14% were undecided. The strongest support for transferring control to Russia comes from residents of the South (22%) and CPU supporters (17%). At the same time, over 70% of Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine supporters oppose it, over 80% of UDAR, almost 90% of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change, and almost 100% of Svoboda oppose it.
• 24% of respondents support recognizing OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 57% do not support it. Another 19% are undecided. Public attitudes toward this issue fluctuate from year to year: after support rose from 20% to 27% in 2011, it declined again in 2012 to 24%, which is less than last year but more than the year before. More than 90% of Svoboda supporters support recognition of OUN-UPA, while about the same share of CPU supporters oppose it. Among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Civic Position, and UDAR, the number of supporters and opponents is almost equal. The idea is opposed by the vast majority of supporters of the Party of Regions (83%), Strong Ukraine (63%), People’s Party (67%), and those who vote “against all” (68%).
• 59% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was genocide of the Ukrainian people. 26% disagreed, and 16% were undecided. It is important to note fluctuations in public opinion on this issue: in March 2010, 61% agreed; in January 2011 this fell to 53%; in April 2011 it rose again to 58%; and finally stabilized at 59% in February 2012. Almost 90% of residents of the West, over 70% of the North and Center, and about 40% of the East and South share the genocide thesis. About 40% of Party of Regions and CPU supporters also share this view.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority of surveyed citizens do not support (91%) the idea of abolishing the March 8 holiday. Only 5% support it. Another 4% could not decide on this issue.
• 86% of respondents will celebrate March 8 this year, 14% will not.
  The least likely to celebrate March 8 are older people and pensioners (72%), residents of Western Ukraine (74%), supporters of Svoboda (74%), and rural residents (81%).
• The age-old question of whom men should congratulate first on March 8 produced the following results.
  In the opinion of 42% of women and 52% of men, men should first congratulate their wife or beloved woman.
  At the same time, 36% of women and 32% of men believe that the mother should be congratulated first, about 2% – the mother-in-law.
• At the same time, 18% of women and 12% of men believe that it does not matter whom men congratulate first on March 8.
• Thus, there are more men who would like to congratulate their wives first than women who want this themselves. Therefore, we can assume that wives place their mothers first in the “hierarchy of women” more often than men themselves, who are often accused of this.
• The tradition of congratulating one’s mother first is more typical of cities, residents of the North, and young people, while congratulating one’s wife or beloved woman first is more typical of residents of the Center and West and people of middle age.
• In the opinion of 46% of women and 41% of men, men should prepare breakfast on March 8.
  A quarter of both men and women believe that both the man and the woman together should prepare the festive breakfast.
• At the same time, for almost 20% of women and men it does not matter who prepares breakfast on March 8, and 9% of women and 13% of men believe that the woman should do it.
• 36% of men and only 23% of women believe that having sex on March 8 is a mandatory attribute of the holiday.
• At the same time, for 41% of women and only 31% of men, having sex on March 8 is not a mandatory attribute of the holiday.
  At least another third of respondents could not decide on this question.
• Thus, another study by the Sociological Group “Rating” confirmed that sex is more important for Ukrainian men than for women, especially on March 8! :))
• Most often, sex as a mandatory attribute of March 8 was indicated by respondents aged 30–39 (40%), 16–29 (38%), and 40–49 (30%).
• Supporters of Svoboda and UDAR most often supported “mandatory sex” on March 8, probably because these parties have many men and young people among their supporters.
  Least often – supporters of the Communist Party, the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Batkivshchyna, as well as “against all” and “undecided” respondents.
• The average amount women expect to receive as a gift on March 8 is 182 UAH.
  The maximum amount named by women was 4000 UAH.
• At the same time, the average amount men plan to spend on a gift for their beloved woman is almost 290 UAH, which is more than one and a half times more than women expect.
  The maximum amount named by men was 8000 UAH.
• 21% of women believe that their men will not buy anything for this holiday.
  At the same time, only 9% of men admitted that they will buy nothing.
• Almost another quarter of surveyed women and men did not answer this question.
• Thus, either women think very poorly of their men and their expectations are clearly understated, or, on the contrary, men are ready to impress their women more and grow in their eyes. We also cannot rule out the version that not all men’s gifts reach the “addressees” who expect them :))
• In any case, the study confirmed that men are ready for the holiday! And that is pleasing!
  Perhaps women should also prepare better for it, because men also have their own expectations (see above). Then the number of unexpected “addressees” will decrease, then deputies will not have to worry about low birth rates, and March 8 will become a shared holiday of the total victory of love and spring, and then every woman will receive an unexpected but desired gift!

Happy holiday to you, dear, beloved, and desired women!!!

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in February 2012, 42% of respondents would definitely take part in them, and another 33% would rather take part.
• Compared with previous months, voter mobilization has slightly decreased. As in December last year, the most mobilized voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the Communist Party. The highest level of mobilization is in the West, North, and East, and the lowest in the Center and South.

RESULTS

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in February 2012, 19.6% of respondents (among those who would participate in the elections) would vote for Batkivshchyna, 18.2% for the Party of Regions, 11.2% for Front for Change, 7% for the Communist Party, 6.5% for UDAR of V. Klitschko, 4.3% for Svoboda.
  Another 2.9% would support Strong Ukraine, 2.1% Civic Position, 1.6% the People’s Party.
  All other parties are supported by less than 1% each, together about 5%.
  7.9% would not support any party (“against all”), 13.9% are undecided.
• Because of changes in the election law, the “against all” category was asked an additional question:
  “According to the new law, voters in the 2012 parliamentary elections will not have the option to vote ‘against all’. How will you vote then?”
• According to the results, the answers were distributed as follows:
  16% of those who previously chose “against all” will vote for specific parties (relatively more for UDAR, Front for Change, and Batkivshchyna),
  48% are undecided,
  36% will not take part in the elections.
• Thus, the “against all” responses were redistributed, the likely turnout was clarified downward, and final party ratings were calculated.
• Accordingly, Batkivshchyna is supported by 20.3%, the Party of Regions by 18.8%, Front for Change by 11.7%, the Communist Party by 7.2%, UDAR by 6.9%, Svoboda by 4.5%, Strong Ukraine by 3.1%, Civic Position by 2.2%, the People’s Party by 1.6%.
  Other parties together — more than 5%.
  18.2% of voters are undecided.
• Thus, only the share of the undecided increased significantly (from 14% to 18%), while party indicators and their positions in the ranking practically did not change.
• If presidential elections in Ukraine were held in February 2012, 19.7% of respondents (among those who would participate) would vote for V. Yanukovych, 19.4% for Y. Tymoshenko, 12.8% for A. Yatsenyuk, 6.5% for V. Klitschko, 5.6% for P. Symonenko, 3.7% for S. Tihipko, 3% for O. Tyahnybok, 2.7% for A. Hrytsenko, 1.5% for V. Lytvyn, 0.7% for N. Korolevska, 0.6% for V. Yushchenko.
  Almost 4% would support other candidates, 6% would support none, 14.1% are undecided.

TRENDS

• Compared with December last year, the strongest growth is shown by UDAR, whose position improved from 5% to 6.5%. As a result, UDAR has come very close in the ranking to the Communist Party (7%), and V. Klitschko has regained fourth place in the presidential rating.
• The ratings of the leaders have hardly changed: Batkivshchyna, as in December, slightly exceeds the Party of Regions (19.6% vs 18.2%), while in the presidential rating their positions have become equal (19.7% for Yanukovych vs 19.4% for Tymoshenko). At the same time, Yanukovych’s position improved slightly compared to December, while that of the Party of Regions worsened.
• The ratings of Front for Change (11.2%) and A. Yatsenyuk (12.8%) are completely stable.
• The Communists failed to confirm the dynamic growth recorded in December (over 8%), but even this result is sufficient to enter parliament.
• The position of Svoboda has not changed (4.4%); the party remains close to overcoming the 5% electoral threshold.
• At the same time, Strong Ukraine (2.9%) and Civic Position (2.1%) have significantly smaller chances of overcoming the threshold under the current version of the election law.
• All data are presented among respondents who intend to take part in the elections.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, none of the tested versions of joint party lists currently produces a cumulative effect — accordingly, parties running “separately” produce better final results than running together.
• The only form of unification that almost achieves a cumulative effect is a JOINT LIST OF BATKIVSHCHYNA AND FRONT FOR CHANGE. This alliance would currently be supported by 30% of voters, while the parties running separately could obtain 31%.
  Only in the West does such a union produce a gain: 51% separately vs 53% together.
• The main problem is that supporters of Front for Change perceive such a union worse (only 75% of its supporters are ready to vote for a joint list) than supporters of Batkivshchyna (90%).
  At the same time, the losses from Front for Change are compensated by flows from Svoboda, Civic Position, the European Party, and Our Ukraine. Up to 10% of the undecided and “against all” are also ready to support this union.
• It is interesting that adding Svoboda to this alliance does not increase its electoral weight. A JOINT LIST of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda would also be supported by 30%, while running separately these parties could obtain up to 35%.
• Only about 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 70% of Front for Change supporters, and 70% of Svoboda supporters are ready to back such a three-party union.
  Importantly, both Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters are more cautious about a three-party union than about a two-party one. Losses are compensated by small inflows from Our Ukraine and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (up to 15%), Civic Position and the European Party (10%), up to 10% of the undecided and 6% of “against all”.
• Only in the West does the three-party union gain more (56%) than the two-party one (53%).
  In the North they are equal (37%).
  In the Center, however, there are heavy losses: Batkivshchyna + Front for Change = 31%, but Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda = only 25%.
• Thus, adding Svoboda is perceived most painfully in the Center, and the degree of rejection grows directly with the degree of Svoboda’s radicalism.
• Batkivshchyna supporters perceive any coalition better than the supporters of its potential allies. A certain sense of insecurity, caused by the absence of a leader, is noticeable — therefore, unification is also seen as a form of protection.
• A cumulative effect is also not achieved by a union of pro-government parties. A JOINT LIST of the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Strong Ukraine would be supported by 21%, while running separately they could receive 23%.
• Supporters of the Party of Regions feel most confident (almost 90% ready to support a joint list).
  This is not the case for People’s Party (52%) or Strong Ukraine (64%).
  Up to 10% of the undecided are also ready to vote for this list.
  Supporters of the Communist Party are almost inactive — only 5% would vote for such a list.
  This format is most promising in the East and Donbas.
• It should be emphasized that in all formats most voters who do not support their party joining do not switch sides — they move into the “undecided” category.

BELIEF IN UNIFICATION IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS

• When choosing whom to vote for in 2012:
  52% will vote against the course of President Yanukovych,
  22% will vote in support of his course,
  26% are undecided.
• In Donbas, more than one third will vote in support of Yanukovych’s course, and almost 30% against.
  In all other regions, opposition voting dominates, especially in the West (74%), North (69%), and Center (56%).
• Over 90% of Party of Regions supporters, nearly half of Strong Ukraine, and one quarter of Communists will vote in support of Yanukovych.
  About 90% of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and Front for Change supporters will vote against Yanukovych.
  Half of “against all” and over one third of the undecided share this stance.
• Despite strong public demand for opposition unity, belief that it will happen is weak.
  Voters believe pro-government parties are more likely to unite (53% yes, 24% no) than the opposition (44% yes, 36% no).
• Only about half of residents of the West and North believe in opposition unity.
  Nearly 60% of Western Ukrainians believe in unity of pro-government parties.
  The East is most convinced of government unity (almost 70%).
  The South mostly believes in neither.
• Batkivshchyna supporters believe most in opposition unity; Party of Regions supporters believe most in government unity.
  Among opposition voters, UDAR supporters believe the least in unity; among government voters — Communists.

SUPPORT FOR SINGLE CANDIDATES

• Despite weak belief in unity, support for unified opposition candidates is high:
• 43% would vote for a single opposition candidate in a single-member district,
  34% would not,
  23% are undecided.
• Almost 90% of Batkivshchyna, over 70% of Front for Change and Svoboda, almost 60% of UDAR and Civic Position could support such candidates.
  Support is highest in the West (64%), North (56%), Center (46%), lower in the East and Donbas.
• For a single pro-government candidate:
  32% would support,
  46% would not,
  23% undecided.
• Support for pro-government candidates reaches 40% in the East and Donbas, about one third in the South and Center, and about one quarter in the North and West.
  Over 90% of Party of Regions, about 70% of Strong Ukraine and People’s Party, and only one third of Communists would support such candidates.

 Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI today released its first in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion. 

The poll, conducted October 30 – November 11, 2011 (PDF), is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape. 

Among the findings in the poll, 13 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction, while 71 percent believe it is moving in the wrong direction.  The three most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment, corruption within the state bodies and low industrial production. 

Additionally, 81 percent support the international community freezing the international assets of and suspending visas for Ukrainian officials, including judges, engaged in corrupt practices, while only six percent oppose such actions.

Finally, representative of the general mood in the country, three percent believe that the 2012 parliamentary elections will be absolutely free and fair, while 15 percent believe the elections will be somewhat free and fair.  These numbers contrast with 39 percent of respondents who believe that the elections will be somewhat not free and fair and 26 percent who believe the elections will be absolutely not free and fair

Most recently, IRI conducted two public opinion surveys on the Crimean peninsula (November 2011 and December 2009).  Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people. 

The randomly collected sample of 2,016 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide.  The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group under the supervision of IRI.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.2 percent.

• Ukrainians tend to feel unsafe rather than safe. The further east, the less safe citizens feel and the less satisfied they are with their lives. City residents, women, and older people feel especially unprotected.
  The key security problems that citizens see are not so much crime as poverty, corruption, and economic crises.
  Among possible crimes, Ukrainians fear most becoming victims of financial fraud and scams, hooligan attacks on the street, and robbery. Almost half of young women fear becoming victims of sex-related crimes.
• Despite the fact that citizens relatively rarely contact law-enforcement agencies, Ukrainians in general have a negative attitude toward them; courts are trusted the least. Only 12% contacted the police during the year. Two thirds of respondents did not have to observe any actions by law-enforcement officers in the current year in which human rights were violated.
• Importantly, the level of trust in law-enforcement agencies at the local level is significantly higher than at the central level. Similarly, Ukrainians evaluate the level of security in their own locality much better than the level of security in the country as a whole. In addition, people who contacted law-enforcement agencies and obtained a positive result have a significantly better attitude toward them afterward.
• The key problems of the Ukrainian police are corruption, public distrust, low morality of officers, high dependence on higher authorities, and low level of professional training. At the same time, according to the majority, these problems are not new and arose either during the Soviet period or in the early years of independence. More than 80% emphasize that the Ukrainian law-enforcement system needs reforms, including 51% who say they are urgent.
• An absolute majority of respondents (65%) believe that control over compliance with the law in the country is a shared responsibility of citizens and law-enforcement agencies.
• Almost 70% of respondents expressed readiness to help police officers in the performance of their professional duties, but only 14% under any circumstances, while about half would do so only if it does not harm their own interests or those of their relatives. Notably, in regions where local police are trusted most (the West), the highest readiness to help was also recorded. In contrast, in the East and South fewer people were willing to help.
• Only every third witness of offenses committed by others during the past year, and only every sixth witness of bribery, abuse of state funds and property, reported this to the relevant authorities. People usually do not contact law-enforcement agencies because of lack of faith that criminals will be punished, fear that the police will not protect witnesses from criminals, and fear of being turned from a witness into a suspect.
• Almost 60% of respondents believe that the Ukrainian police will cope with maintaining public order during EURO-2012 next year.
• Only 21% of respondents have a positive attitude toward the idea of renaming the militia to police, 43% have a negative attitude, and 36% are undecided.
• According to the results of a study conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” at the end of December 2011, 42% of Ukrainians are satisfied with their lives (only 10% fully satisfied), while 54% are not satisfied (including 20% fully dissatisfied). Another 4% were undecided.
  Residents of Western Ukraine are the most satisfied with their lives, residents of Southern and Eastern Ukraine less so. The younger the respondents, the more satisfied they are with their lives. City residents are more optimistic; likewise, men feel more satisfied than women.
• According to the latest Eurobarometer data published in October 2011, on average 81% of EU residents are satisfied with their lives (one quarter fully satisfied) and only 18% are dissatisfied. By this indicator Ukraine is behind every EU country, most of all Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, and Ireland. At the same time, Ukraine is closest in life-satisfaction levels to Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Portugal, Lithuania, and Latvia. Starting from Estonia, the gap increases sharply to Ukraine’s disadvantage.

SENSE OF PERSONAL SAFETY

• Only 7% of Ukrainians feel completely safe, and 31% feel rather safe walking alone after dark in their neighborhood. At the same time, 54% feel unsafe, and 8% are undecided.
  By this indicator, Ukraine also trails all EU countries, most of all Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Slovenia, while being closest to Bulgaria and Lithuania.
• Residents of villages feel much safer than city residents. Older people and women feel the least protected.
  People feel safest in Western Ukraine, and least protected in the South and especially the East, where only one quarter feel rather safe, while 60% feel rather unsafe walking alone after dark.
• Only 4% believe that the level of safety in their locality improved over the past year, 61% say it stayed the same, and 28% say it worsened.
  Only 6% believe road safety improved, 51% say it did not change, and 37% say it worsened.
  Only 2% think overall safety in the country improved, 41% say it did not change, and 48% say it worsened.
• Two thirds of those who feel completely safe are satisfied with their lives, while 60% of those who feel unsafe are dissatisfied.

FACTORS OF INSECURITY

• The most important security problems for Ukrainians are poverty (66%), corruption (53%), economic and financial crises (40%), street crime (35%), and environmental degradation (23%).
  Less important are organized crime (14%), natural disasters and technological catastrophes (10%), civil conflicts (6%), cybercrime (6%), terrorism (4%), nuclear disasters (4%), religious and national extremism (3%), illegal immigration (3%), and border insecurity (2%).
• Eurobarometer data (November 2011) show that for EU citizens the main threats are economic and financial crises (33%), terrorism (25%), poverty (24%), organized crime (22%), and corruption (18%).
  Compared with the EU, Ukrainians rate poverty (66 vs 24%) and corruption (53 vs 18%) much higher as threats. They also rate street crime as a bigger threat, while they fear organized crime, cybercrime, terrorism, religious extremism, and illegal immigration less.
• 63% fear becoming victims of financial fraud, 61% fear hooligan attacks, 60% fear home or car robbery, and 57% fear street robbery.
  About 30% fear sexual crimes. Almost half fear being convicted for a crime they did not commit.
  Women fear all these threats more than men, especially sexual crimes (almost 50%). Fear is higher in cities, in the East and South, and among middle-aged and older people. Youth fear sexual crimes the most.

TRUST IN LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

• About a third could not assess the Security Service of Ukraine, customs, and tax authorities; a quarter could not assess the prosecutor’s office; one sixth could not assess courts and traffic police; and only one tenth could not assess the militia.
  Overall, attitudes toward law-enforcement are more negative than positive.
• Among law-enforcement agencies, the Security Service of Ukraine is trusted the most (16% fully trust it), while courts are trusted the least (only 8% fully trust them).
  Compared with a similar survey in Russia (Levada Center, autumn 2011), trust in law-enforcement is higher in Russia than in Ukraine, but in both countries courts are trusted least.
• Trust in local police is higher than in national police. 29% completely distrust local police, but 41% completely distrust the police overall.
  Two thirds did not observe any police actions violating human rights during the year. Among those who did: 17% saw rudeness, 13% abuse of office, 12% bribery, 7% cruelty, 7% falsification of cases, 4% refusal to accept complaints.
• Only 12% contacted law-enforcement during the year; only half resolved their issue. 10% contacted traffic police; about 70% of those resolved their issue.
  Those who received positive outcomes trust police more.
• PROBLEMS OF THE UKRAINIAN POLICE
• Main obstacles: corruption (64%), public distrust (39%), low morality (39%), dependence on higher authorities (34%), low professional training (31%).
  Over 80% say reforms are needed; 51% say urgently.

COOPERATION WITH LAW-ENFORCEMENT

• 65% believe law enforcement is a shared responsibility of citizens and authorities.
  70% are ready to help police, but mostly only if it does not harm their interests.
• Only one third of witnesses to crimes and one sixth of witnesses to corruption reported them. Main reasons: lack of faith in punishment (56%), fear of reprisals (48%), and fear of becoming a suspect (47%).
• OTHER QUESTIONS
• Almost 60% believe police will ensure order during EURO-2012.
  Only 21% support renaming militia to police; 43% oppose; 36% undecided.
  30% agree that Ukraine is becoming a “police state”, 36% disagree, 34% undecided.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, conducted at the end of December 2011, the level of political activity of Lviv residents remains at a relatively high level: 50% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 28% would rather take part than not.
  The highest level of voter mobilization is among Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held at the end of December 2011, 20.7% of Lviv residents would support the Batkivshchyna party (data are given among those who intend to take part in the elections).
  Somewhat fewer Lviv residents would support Svoboda (17.1%) and Front for Change (16%).
  The UDAR party would be supported by 6.2% of voters, Civic Position by 4.5%, the Party of Regions by 3.9%, Our Ukraine by 3.3%, the Communist Party and For Ukraine! by 1% each.
  Other parties would be supported by about 4.8% of voters.
  10% of voters would not support any party, 11.6% are undecided.
• Compared to November, the changes are minimal. Due to growth in support compared to September, Batkivshchyna continues to hold leadership in the rankings in Lviv. The ratings of Svoboda, Front for Change, and UDAR did not change in December. At the same time, the number of the “undecided” continued to grow (from 7% in September, 11% in November to 12% in December) and “against all” (from 6% in September, 8% in November to 10% in December).
• The signing in early December of the Law on the Election of People’s Deputies gave a formal start to election campaigns in single-member districts, including in Lviv. In this connection, during December four “signal” surveys were conducted in four electoral districts of Lviv in order to understand whom Lviv residents remember from previous elections, whom they trust among new politicians, etc.
• Key methodological points that were taken into account in preparing and conducting the study:
• When forming the list of potential candidates, primarily the experience of politicians running in the respective districts was taken into account. In isolated cases, information from experts and the media was used. In addition, the list ensured maximum representation of candidates from the main parties.
• In each district, both the rating and the electoral attractiveness of potential candidates were measured. The latter indicator was calculated using a separate scale, which made it possible to identify both “core” supporters and “potential” supporters who may vote for a candidate. This also made it possible to show the overall positive and negative attitudes toward local politicians.
• In each Lviv district, its own list of candidates was studied. At the same time, in order to more fully study public opinion, the electoral attractiveness of three “universal” candidates — opinion leaders representing different socio-political groups — was also measured in each district: the incumbent mayor Andriy Sadovyi, who conducts active political activity but is not clearly aligned with any party and has not declared any intention to run; the leader of Svoboda Oleh Tyahnybok, who conducts active political activity clearly aimed at parliamentary elections; and the rector of Lviv National University Ivan Vakarchuk, who is not actively involved in politics but enjoys a high level of public trust.

DISTRICT #1 (Sykhiv, part of Lychakiv district)

• Currently there are two leaders of electoral sympathy in the district: Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (Svoboda) – 15% and Andrii Shkil (Batkivshchyna) – 13%.
  Somewhat fewer voters are currently ready to vote for Taras Chornovil (7%), Oleksandr Sheika (6%), Andrii Parubii (6%), and Dmytro Dobrodomov (5%).
  Even fewer would support Volodymyr Hirniak (3%), Ihor Rudnytskyi (2%), Volodymyr Zahorskyi (2%), and Oleh Matsekh (2%).
  Other candidates would be supported by about 12% of district voters, 15% would not support anyone, and 15% are undecided.
• For Mykhalchyshyn, with a rating of 15%, 8% are firmly ready to vote and 14% could consider voting for him, meaning his total potential is 22%.
  For Shkil, with 13%, 8% are firm supporters and 19% are potential, giving him a total of 27%, meaning he may overtake Mykhalchyshyn.
• Several other politicians have high electoral attractiveness: Parubii can grow from 6% to 15%, Dobrodomov from 5% to 15%, and Sheika from 6% to 12%.
  The leader of the anti-rating is Taras Chornovil (almost 60% would not vote for him under any circumstances).
• In the 2002 parliamentary elections in this district, Chornovil won decisively with 66%.
  Recent electoral experience includes Sheika (Front for Change) who received 9% in 2010 regional elections, Zahorskyi (Party of Regions) with 7%, and Pavlo Sobol (Pora) with 4%, none of whom retained their results.

DISTRICT #2 (Zaliznychnyi, part of Shevchenkivskyi district)

• Currently there is one clear leader of electoral sympathies in the district: Iryna Farion (Svoboda) – 21%.
• Significantly fewer voters are currently ready to support Vasyl Kuibida (7%), Yurii Pidlisnyi (6%), Roman Ilyk (6%), and Yaroslav Hinka (5%).
• Even fewer are ready to vote for Petro Khobzei (3%), Mykola Kniazhytskyi (2%), Oleh Sorochkin (2%), and Petro Kachura (2%).
  Other candidates would be supported by about 6% of district voters, 11% would not support anyone, and 31% are undecided.For Farion, with a rating of 21%, 12% are firmly ready to vote and 14% may consider voting for her, meaning she has a potential of 26%.
• For Kuibida, with 7%, 4% are firm supporters and 12% are potential, giving him 16% total.
• The remaining politicians have much weaker chances: Ilyk and Pidlisnyi can increase from 6% to 9%, Hinka from 5% to 8%.Thus, Farion, who won the 2010 regional council elections in single-member district No. 2 with 31%, can currently confirm her leadership in parliamentary elections as well.
• Kuibida’s potential corresponds to his 16% result in the 2010 local elections.
• Pidlisnyi (Front for Change), who received 8% in 2010, and Khobzei (Our Ukraine), who received about 5%, have also confirmed their potential.At the same time, Petro Kachura, who won this district in the 2002 parliamentary elections with 41%, is currently supported by only 2%.
• Mykola Kniazhytskyi, who had 14% in 2002, now also has only 2%.
• Andrii Senyshyn, who had 13% in 2002, now has 1%.
• Since these politicians do not have either strong positive or strong negative images, voters have simply forgotten them.Among party supporters, the greatest chances to attract voters have Hinka (electorally attractive to 92% of UDAR supporters), Farion (77%), Pidlisnyi (47% among Front for Change) and Khobzei (47% among Our Ukraine).
• Farion and Kuibida can attract the largest share of undecided voters — 15% and 12% respectively.
• Kuibida can also attract about one quarter of Front for Change and Batkivshchyna supporters.
  ‍

DISTRICT #3 (Frankivskyi and Halytskyi districts)There is no clearly expressed leader here; instead, there is a tight group of contenders — a true “group of death.”Six candidates have roughly equal support:

• Stepan Kubiv (9%), Petro Pylypenko (8%), Stepan Kurpil (7%), Petro Pysarchuk (7%), Taras Stetskiv (7%), and Viktor Pynzenyk (6%).Less support goes to Vira Liaskovska (4%), Petro Adamyk (2%), and Yaroslav Kendzor (2%).
• About 10% support other candidates, 16% would support none, and 24% are undecided.Potential growth:It is notable that Pylypenko, who won the 2010 regional election with 27%, now has only 8%.
• Stetskiv (34% in 2002) and Kurpil (21% in 2002) are now both at 7%.
• Pynzenyk, who won the district in 1998 with 47%, now has 6%.
• Although Stetskiv and Pynzenyk have the highest positive image, voters say this is no longer enough to vote for them.Party transfer potential:
  • Pysarchuk is attractive to 70% of Party of Regions supporters
  • Kubiv to 56% of Front for Change
  • Pylypenko to 51% of Svoboda
  • Stetskiv and Pynzenyk attract many undecided voters
  ‍

DISTRICT #4 (Pustomyty district, parts of Lychakiv and Shevchenkivskyi)

• Two clear leaders:
  Bohdan Dubnevych – 21% and Oleh Hudyma – 13%.
  Then Yaroslav Mudryi (Svoboda) – 8%, Mykhailo Kadykalo (Front for Change) – 6%.Dubnevych has the strongest core: 17% firm + 14% potential = 31%.
  Hudyma: 13% → 21%,
  Mudryi: 8% → 16%,
  Kadykalo: 6% → 11%.

SINGLE OPPOSITION CANDIDATE

• 63% support the idea of a unified opposition candidate.
• Highest in District #2, lowest in #3.34% would vote for a candidate backed by Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda.
• 37% would decide depending on the person.
• Support for a UDAR + Civic Position candidate is smaller but has growth potential.

PUBLIC FIGURE POTENTIAL

• Support potential:
  • Andriy Sadovyi – 31–37%
  • Oleh Tyahnybok – 23–35%
  • Ivan Vakarchuk – 28–32%
  Only Dubnevych, Farion, and Shkil approach these levels.

• Kubiv from 9% to 17%
• Pylypenko from 8% to 14%
• Kurpil from 7% to 13%
• Pysarchuk from 7% to 11%
• Stetskiv from 7% to 13%
• Pynzenyk from 6% to 14%
• Liaskovska from 4% to 13%

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2011, for 48% of respondents the most favorite winter holiday is New Year, while for 41% it is Christmas. Another 5% prefer St. Nicholas Day the most, and 2% – Old New Year. Only 1% of respondents do not like any of the winter holidays, and 2% were unable to determine which holiday they prefer.
• Regionally, Christmas is significantly more popular in the West of the country (66%). In the Center, New Year and Christmas are equally popular, while in the North, South, Donbas and East New Year is the most favorite holiday, as noted by up to 60% of respondents. The older the respondents are, the more they value Christmas; younger respondents prefer New Year. Men tend to prefer New Year, while women prefer Christmas. Religious respondents are much more likely to look forward to Christmas than New Year, especially Greek Catholics (73%), followed by Orthodox believers of the Moscow Patriarchate (49%) and the Kyiv Patriarchate (42%). Believers who do not associate themselves with any denomination (58%) and non-believers (73%) are much more likely to prefer New Year.
• 44% of respondents plan to put up a real Christmas tree at home for New Year, about a quarter plan to use an artificial tree, 15% will limit themselves to New Year decorative compositions, and 18% will most likely have neither a tree nor a decoration. The latter category is mostly represented by older people: almost 40% of respondents aged over 60 do not plan to decorate their homes for the winter holidays. At the same time, almost 60% of respondents aged 18–39 plan to put up a real tree, while almost 40% will use an artificial tree or a decorative composition. The tradition of installing a real tree is most widespread in the West, South and Donbas, while artificial trees are most common in the North (especially Kyiv) and in the Center. New Year decorative compositions are most popular in the East, where a large share of the population lives in urban areas.
• Respondents were also asked what they would wish for the Ukrainian state in 2012. The most common wishes were citizens’ welfare (68%), economic growth (62%) and stability (53%). Other frequently mentioned wishes included reducing corruption (46%), peace (45%), improving public health (44%) and responsible government (43%). 29% wished for fair elections, almost the same share wished for a qualitatively new government (29%) and national unity (28%). 24% wished for improvements in culture and education, and 21% wished for successful hosting of EURO 2012. Effective socio-economic reforms and new political leadership were equally important wishes, each receiving 20%. Smaller shares mentioned repayment of external debt (17%), democratic development (16%), stronger international reputation (14%), strengthening independence (14%), higher birth rates (14%), responsible citizens (13%), sports achievements (12%), a qualitatively new opposition (11%) and secure borders (9%).
• Age differences in responses were minimal, but regional differences were observed. Residents of the East and Donbas more often wished for welfare, economic growth, stability, reduced corruption and improved public health. Residents of the Center more often wished for peace. Residents of the North more often wished for external debt repayment, higher birth rates, sports achievements, new political leaders and a qualitatively new opposition. Donbas residents more often wished for a qualitatively new and responsible government. Residents of the West more often wished for national unity, spiritual development, democratic development, stronger international reputation and stronger independence. Residents of the East more often wished for effective socio-economic reforms. At the same time, respondents from the West, North and East were united by the wish to improve culture and education. Respondents from the East and West were united by the wish for successful hosting of EURO 2012. The wish for fair elections united respondents across all regions of the country.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had taken place in December 2011, 36% of respondents would have definitely participated and another 37% would have rather participated. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and the Communist Party of Ukraine.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in December 2011, 20.3% of respondents (among those who intended to vote) would have supported Batkivshchyna, 19.4% – the Party of Regions, 11.3% – Front for Change, 8.1% – the Communist Party, 5% – UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, and 4.4% – Svoboda. Another 2.3% would have supported Civic Position, 1.2% – the People’s Party, and 1% – Our Ukraine. Other parties would have received 3.5%. Around 9.4% would have voted against all parties, and 14% were undecided.
• At the same time, respondents most wanted to see Front for Change (33%), Batkivshchyna (28%), the Party of Regions (21%), UDAR (21%), Svoboda (16%), the Communist Party (15%) and Civic Position (15%) represented in the next parliament. Fewer than 10% wanted to see other political forces represented. The highest perceived chances of passing the 5% electoral threshold were attributed to the Party of Regions (56%), Batkivshchyna (45%), Front for Change (41%), the Communist Party (23%), Svoboda (17%) and UDAR (14%). Only 7% believed Civic Position could pass the threshold, although twice as many respondents wanted to see it in parliament.
• Regional preferences differed. Residents of Western Ukraine most wanted to see Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and Svoboda in parliament. Residents of the Center and North preferred Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and UDAR. Residents of the South preferred the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, while residents of the East preferred Front for Change and the Party of Regions. In Donbas, respondents most wanted to see the Party of Regions, the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party.
• About 31% expected that the next parliament would form a pro-presidential majority, while 39% expected an opposition majority, and 30% were undecided. Pro-presidential majority expectations were more common in the East and Donbas, while opposition majority expectations dominated in the West, North and Center.
• If presidential elections had taken place in December 2011, 18.9% would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 18.9% – Yulia Tymoshenko, 12.8% – Arsenii Yatseniuk, 6% – Petro Symonenko, 5.5% – Vitalii Klitschko, 3.9% – Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3.7% – Oleh Tyahnybok and 2.7% – Serhii Tihipko. Around 5% would have supported other candidates, 7.8% would have voted against all candidates, and 14.5% were undecided.
• The key trend of the month was the growth of support for the Communist Party (from 5% in November to 8% in December), primarily in the East, Donbas and the Center. At the same time, with Batkivshchyna remaining stable (around 20%), the Party of Regions lost its leading position mainly due to voter shifts toward the Communist Party. There were also signs of gradual fragmentation of support among traditional political leaders, with moderate growth recorded for Front for Change and Svoboda, while UDAR remained close to the electoral threshold. The personal rating of Anatolii Hrytsenko also increased, although it remained significantly higher than the rating of his party, Civic Position.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2011, two thirds of Ukrainian families have a tradition of giving presents on St. Nicholas Day. At the same time, 29% do not follow this tradition, while 1% are not familiar with this holiday. Another 6% of respondents were unable to say whether such a tradition exists in their families.
• The tradition is most widespread in Western Ukraine, where it is practiced by 90% of families. It is less common in the North (67%) and the Center (62%), and even less so in the South (56%), the East (52%), and the Donbas (51%).
• The custom of giving presents on St. Nicholas Day is more prevalent among religious people, especially Greek Catholics (92%), as well as among Orthodox believers of the Kyiv Patriarchate (73%) and the Moscow Patriarchate (58%). Almost half of non-believers do not observe this tradition.
• Women, young people, and respondents of middle age are more likely than others to maintain the tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in late November and early December 2011, political engagement in Lviv remained relatively high. Almost half of residents said they would definitely participate in parliamentary elections and another 30% said they were likely to do so. Voter mobilization was strongest among supporters of Svoboda, the Party of Regions, and Batkivshchyna, while supporters of Front for Change, UDAR, and Civic Position were somewhat less mobilized.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place at that time, Batkivshchyna would have received the largest share of support among likely voters in Lviv, followed closely by Svoboda and Front for Change. Civic Position, UDAR, the Party of Regions, Our Ukraine, and the Communist Party would have attracted smaller shares, while a notable proportion of voters were either undecided or said they would not support any party. In a hypothetical presidential election held at the beginning of December, Yulia Tymoshenko would have led with 20% of the vote among likely voters, narrowly ahead of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, followed by Oleh Tiahnybok, Vitali Klitschko, and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, while Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko trailed far behind.
• Among national politicians, Vitali Klitschko enjoyed the highest level of trust in Lviv, and his trust rating had increased over the previous month. Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko were also viewed relatively positively, with Hrytsenko’s trust growing enough to surpass that of Oleh Tiahnybok, whose ratings remained stable. Attitudes toward Yulia Tymoshenko continued to improve, with distrust declining substantially over the previous six months, although her trust was still lower than that of Klitschko and Yatsenyuk. Viktor Yushchenko recorded a historically low level of trust and a record-high level of distrust, while Serhiy Tihipko and Viktor Yanukovych also faced overwhelming distrust, with Yanukovych’s negative ratings remaining stable over the year.
• The data pointed to several important trends. In November, Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna regained leadership in the ratings, driven in part by improving public attitudes toward the former prime minister. At the same time, the steady growth of Front for Change stalled for the first time in a year and a half, and Yatsenyuk lost his lead in the presidential ranking. Support for Klitschko and Hrytsenko continued to rise, increasingly at the expense of Yatsenyuk. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions gained some support by absorbing former Tihipko voters, while Tihipko’s own ratings continued to fall. Growing dissatisfaction with Viktor Yushchenko also contributed to the decline of Our Ukraine. The share of undecided voters and those who would vote “against all” also increased over the month.
• At the local level, a majority of Lviv residents were satisfied with the performance of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, and dissatisfaction had declined slightly over the month. The head of the regional council, Oleh Pankevych, remained poorly known, with more than 40% unable to evaluate his performance, and a similar pattern was observed for the newly appointed head of the regional state administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, whose work most respondents could not yet assess.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in early November 2011, 45% of respondents felt that freedom of speech in Ukraine had been curtailed since the presidential election, while 32% said they did not perceive such restrictions and 22% were undecided. This was the worst indicator recorded over the previous two years: only about one third of Ukrainians did not sense a deterioration in freedom of speech, and just 9% of them were fully confident in that view. After a temporary improvement at the beginning of 2011, perceptions clearly worsened again toward the end of the year. For comparison, in April 2010 nearly two thirds of citizens did not feel any rollback of freedom of speech, meaning that within a year and a half this share had fallen by half.
• Negative trends were more often reported by middle-aged respondents and by those with relatively higher levels of education, and men were more sensitive to the issue than women. Over the preceding six months, the sharpest increase in concern about freedom of speech was recorded in the North of the country, particularly in Kyiv. In the North, West, Center, and South, the number of people who perceived restrictions on freedom of speech exceeded the number of those who did not, a pattern especially visible among supporters of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, UDAR, and the Front for Change. By contrast, in the East and in Donbas, most respondents did not perceive a rollback of freedom of speech, a view that was particularly common among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party.

• Rating Group was inspired to conduct this study by the results of a reader survey carried out by the American magazine Motor Trend on the most irritating factors on the road. Of course, these studies are different, primarily because of their different methodologies, and therefore they are not directly comparable, but for identifying certain trends such a comparison is possible.
• According to the results of the study by the Sociological Group “Rating”, less than one third of Ukraine’s adult population aged 18 and over drive a car; among them, less than one quarter are active drivers. The remaining respondents (about 70%) do not drive at all. In the structure of Ukrainian drivers, men dominate significantly (over 80%) as well as middle-aged people aged 30–49 (about 50%). By occupation, the largest groups are office employees (23%) and workers (32%), with equal shares of people with higher education (40%) and secondary specialized education (40%).
• Thus, drivers are most irritated on the road by those fellow drivers who cut in front of others (63%), park in a way that obstructs traffic (51%), do not use turn signals when turning or changing lanes (46%), and blind others with high beams at night (42%).
• Drivers are also irritated by those who drive in the middle of the road or between lanes (35%), refuse to let other cars pass (35%), exceed the speed limit (34%), talk on a mobile phone while driving (25%), are aggressive and swear or gesture behind the wheel (24%), and do not turn on red when a green arrow is allowed (22%).
• Ukrainian drivers are much less irritated by slow drivers (13%), drivers who play loud music in their cars (14%), those who drive dirty cars in good weather (9%), smoke while driving (9%), or constantly let other cars go ahead of them (5%). Only 3% of Ukrainian drivers say that nothing and no one irritates them on the road.
• Compared to the results of the Motor Trend survey, American and Ukrainian drivers are equally irritated by drivers who talk on a mobile phone while driving.
• At the same time, Ukrainian drivers are much more irritated by those who cut in, do not use turn signals, and do not turn on red when a green arrow is allowed, and are much less irritated by slow drivers. Thus, the origin and mental roots of the saying “The slower you go, the farther you’ll get” appear quite logical.
• A few more interesting points. Drivers who speed, talk on mobile phones, smoke, and play loud music irritate passengers more than drivers. At the same time, passengers are almost not irritated at all by slow drivers. Passengers are also more than three times less irritated by drivers who cut in front of others. Obviously, passengers simply do not fully understand this problem as such.