News and Press releases

The survey was conducted by Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine) on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research.

This annual survey provides an extensive look at citizen attitudes about local governance and municipal services.

Polling was conducted in the 24 regional capitals of Ukraine not under the control of Russian or Russian-backed forces, including Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk in the Donbas region. The survey is based on a sample size of 19,196 respondents.

The margin of error for each city does not exceed ±3.5 points. Average response rate is 65%.

Ratings of Ukrainian cities: seventh municipal survey by IRI from Rating Group

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group on 2–4 September 2021, over the past five months the share of respondents who are aware of the diplomatic initiative “Crimea Platform” has increased by one and a half times (from 45% in April to 66% in September).
• The share of those who evaluate this initiative positively has also increased (from 38% in April to 50% in September). Among respondents who are well informed about the substance of the Crimea Platform, nearly 80% have a positive attitude toward it.
• Respondents are generally well informed about the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany bypassing Ukraine: 50% know about it, 31% have heard something about it, and only 18% know nothing. 41% believe that Ukraine had no real ability to stop the construction of this pipeline. At the same time, 20% place responsibility on Poroshenko, 3% on Zelenskyy, and about a quarter on both presidents.
• Among key global leaders, Ukrainians have the most positive attitudes toward German Chancellor Angela Merkel (73% positive, 19% negative) and U.S. President Joseph Biden (64% positive, 19% negative). Over the past few months, attitudes toward the U.S. President have slightly improved, while attitudes toward the German Chancellor have slightly worsened.
• French President Emmanuel Macron is viewed positively by 57% and negatively by 19%, while 23% could not assess him or do not know him. Polish President Andrzej Duda is viewed positively by 54%, negatively by 10%, while 37% could not assess him or do not know him.
• In contrast, attitudes toward the leaders of Belarus and Russia are predominantly negative. Alexander Lukashenko is viewed negatively by 59% of respondents and positively by 34%. Over the past year, positive attitudes toward the President of Belarus have declined from 45% to 34%, and over the past two years they have fallen by half (from 67% to 34%).
• Attitudes toward Vladimir Putin are overwhelmingly negative: 81% view him negatively, while only 15% view him positively.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group between 2 and 4 September 2021 show that one third of respondents (34%) assess the country’s current direction as correct, while 58% consider it incorrect and 8% were unable to answer. Compared to July 2021, the share of those who view the direction of development as correct has increased (from 26%). This assessment is relatively more common among young people as well as residents of Western and Central Ukraine.
• The trust rating of politicians is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi: 50% of respondents trust him, while 48% do not, meaning that he has regained a positive balance of trust, similar to the one he had during his first year in office. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 29% and not trusted by 32%, while 33% say they do not know him. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 26% and not trusted by 71%. Yuliia Tymoshenko has the same level of trust (26%) with 72% distrusting her. Yurii Boiko is trusted by 23%, not trusted by 58%, and unknown to 16%. Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 17%, not trusted by 46%, while 30% have not heard of him. Viktor Medvedchuk is trusted by 15% and not trusted by 71% of respondents.
• If a presidential election were held in the near future, 31.1% of decided voters who intend to vote would support Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Compared to early August, his support increased from 27% to 31%. Petro Poroshenko would receive 13.3% of the vote, Yurii Boiko 10.9%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 9.2%, Ihor Smeshko 6.1%, Volodymyr Groysman 5.7%, Yevhenii Murayev 5.7%, Oleh Liashko 4.1%, Dmytro Razumkov 3.7%, and Arsenii Yatseniuk 3.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed 2%.
• Petro Poroshenko leads the negative rating: 45% of respondents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Similarly, 38% would not vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, 35% for Yurii Boiko, 25% for Oleh Liashko, and 24% for Volodymyr Zelenskyi. About one in six or seven respondents say they would never vote for Arsenii Yatseniuk, Oleh Tiahnybok, or Yevhenii Murayev.
• In the parliamentary race, the Servant of the People party remains in first place with 25.8% support among decided voters. European Solidarity would receive 14.1%, Opposition Platform – For Life 12.4%, and Batkivshchyna 10.6%. Other parties have significantly lower ratings: Strength and Honor is supported by 4.9%, Murayev’s Our Party by 4.7%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman by 4.5%, the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko by 4.2%, Sharii’s Party by 3.6%, UDAR of Vitalii Klitschko by 3.4%, and a hypothetical Prytula party by 3.2%. Support for other political forces does not exceed 3%.
• Among official Independence Day events, respondents rated the military parade in Kyiv most positively, with 44% expressing a positive assessment. The short film “DNA of Ukraine” received positive evaluations from 38% of respondents, President Zelenskyi’s speech at the parade from 36%, and the festive concert at the Olympic Stadium in Kyiv from 29%. Among those who actually watched these events, the short film “DNA of Ukraine” received the highest ratings, with 67% positive responses.
• Finally, 48% of respondents consider President Zelenskyi’s visit to the United States to have been successful, while 28% view it as unsuccessful. Another 17% said they were unaware of the visit or found it difficult to assess.

• Over the 30 years of Ukraine’s Independence, a generation has emerged whose views, ideas, values and aspirations differ markedly from other demographic groups. In sociological measurements of recent years, ideological and regional differences have become less significant, giving way to the age factor. Young people who were born and raised in the new conditions of a globalized world, without the barriers of the Soviet era, are now setting new life trends, breaking stereotypes and traditions, and forming new societal demands. This is the Independence Generation.
• To mark the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence, Rating Group conducted the first large-scale sociological study with a total sample of 20,000 respondents. Its purpose was to explore the thinking and lifestyle of the new generation of Ukrainians — their value systems, motivations, and their assessments of themselves and of Ukraine. The results are presented across age, gender, regional (by oblast), economic and psychological dimensions. The survey was conducted from July 20 to August 9, 2021, through telephone interviews; 20,000 respondents from all regions of the country were interviewed, excluding the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas.

Identity

• In terms of identity, 80% of respondents stated they would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence today. Only 15% would not support it, and 5% were uncertain. The highest level of support comes from those born after 1991 (87%). Support is also higher among residents of western and central regions and among more affluent respondents. Despite some variations, no fewer than two-thirds of respondents in every demographic group would support Independence today.
• When describing their self-identification, 75% of respondents said they consider themselves citizens of Ukraine, while 11% do not. At the same time, 26% identify as Europeans, and 21% still describe themselves as “Soviet people.” Among the Independence Generation, 86% identify as citizens of Ukraine and 40% as Europeans. Older respondents are far less likely to see themselves as Europeans and more likely to identify with the Soviet past. Regionally, western oblasts and Kyiv feel more European than Soviet, while eastern regions show the opposite tendency. Those who travel more within the country feel a stronger civic connection to Ukraine.

Self-assessment

• Regarding self-assessment, Ukrainians evaluate their personal situation at a moderate level, while their assessment of the country is somewhat lower. When asked to place themselves on a seven-step ladder — from the lowest to the highest social standing — 22% placed themselves on the bottom two rungs, 66% on the middle rungs (third to fifth), and 9% on the top two (sixth and seventh). Looking ten years ahead, only 18% expect their situation to be poor, 31% see it as average, and 32% believe they will be on the highest rungs of the social ladder.
• The current situation of Ukraine is perceived more pessimistically: 36% placed the country on the bottom two steps, 55% on the middle ones (with 27% specifically placing it on the third step), and only 4% placed the country at the top. Expectations for the future of Ukraine, however, are more optimistic: 44% hope the country will be on the highest rungs, 34% expect it to be at the middle level (more than half of these on the fifth step), and 18% doubt its positive prospects. Younger respondents give higher assessments both to their own status and to the country’s. Men tend to rate their personal situation higher, while women tend to be more optimistic about Ukraine’s future. The highest self-evaluations and assessments of the country come from supporters of Zelensky. Their expectations for Ukraine’s future are even more positive than their expectations for their own lives ten years from now. Supporters of Poroshenko and Groysman also show relatively positive assessments. In contrast, supporters of Boyko and Murayev are the most pessimistic about both themselves and the state. Western and central regions evaluate themselves and the country more positively, while in the east and south the assessments are lower, and expectations for the future — more restrained.

Emotions

• In terms of emotions, the two main feelings people experience when thinking about Ukraine are sadness (37%) and pride (34%). Interest is reported by 20%, joy and shame by 18% each, fear by 16%, and only 5% express indifference or anger. Regarding themselves personally, 37% feel interest, 34% feel joy, 22–24% feel sadness and pride, 14% feel fear, 6% feel shame, and 3–4% feel anger or indifference. Nearly half of young people feel pride and interest when thinking about the country, and one-third feel joy. They are considerably more positive about themselves and Ukraine than older respondents. Regionally, emotional perception moves from pride in the West toward more negative emotions, such as sadness, in the East.
• The strongest feelings of pride for the country are found among supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko, who also report far less shame either for themselves or for Ukraine. Their perceptions of both themselves and the country are significantly more optimistic than those of supporters of other candidates. Conversely, voters of Boyko — and especially Murayev — demonstrate the most negative emotional background. They rarely feel pride in themselves or in Ukraine, and when thinking about the country they mostly experience sadness or even shame.

Values and motivations

• Across the value spectrum of Ukrainians, the dominant priorities are universalism, benevolence, conformity and security. The lowest scores are associated with wealth and stimulation, while self-direction, hedonism and achievement remain at mid-level. In the age breakdown, the youngest group is most inclined toward hedonism, autonomy and stimulation. Young people and those of middle age also converge in their emphasis on achievement. Older respondents, by contrast, lean more strongly toward tradition and place the least importance on wealth. The group aged 16–24 stands out in particular: they are the most open to change and most driven by self-assertion, and they are the only cohort whose openness to change exceeds their conservatism. Women in all age groups show a stronger orientation than men toward self-transcendence values (benevolence and universalism). Income-based analysis reveals that the value of wealth is almost insignificant for poorer respondents.
• Electoral preferences also reveal three broad clusters of voters: the conditionally positive and change-oriented (supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko); those with moderate emotional attitudes toward the country and more conservative value structures (supporters of Tymoshenko, Lyashko, Groysman and Smeshko); and the strongly conservative segment (supporters of Murayev and Boyko).
• A relative majority of respondents (57%) report being satisfied with their lives overall, 21% are dissatisfied and 23% give a neutral assessment. Satisfaction grows with younger age and higher income. Notably, even among poorer groups within the 16–24 cohort, life satisfaction remains relatively high.
• Motivational orientations divide society almost evenly: half (49%) want to live “no worse than others,” while slightly fewer (45%) want to live “better than others” and achieve success. The drive to “live better than others” appears more often among the Independence Generation and middle-aged groups. Among respondents aged 51 and older, the opposite tendency dominates—they prioritise living “no worse than others.” The aspiration for a better life is most common in Kyiv, among more affluent respondents, and among women. Among young women aged 16–24, the motivation to “live better than others” reaches particularly high levels.
• If faced with a sharp decline in income, 60% would rather seek additional earnings, while 36% would cut expenses. Younger and more affluent respondents, as well as those who place greater value on wealth, are more inclined to look for new income sources. The Independence Generation—especially those aged 16–24—show the strongest readiness to pursue opportunities: more than 80% of them would not cut their spending but would instead seek additional income.
• Sixty-one percent believe they can influence their income levels, whereas 38% think it does not depend on them. Younger, more affluent, more satisfied and success-oriented respondents express the highest sense of control over their earnings.
• When reflecting on their life trajectory, 41% believe their best years are still ahead; 24% feel they are living them now; and 31% think their best years are already behind them. Only a third of those aged 25–50 believe they are currently in their best period. Optimism about the future is strongest among young and middle-aged respondents and those with higher incomes. Among the oldest respondents, more than 70% believe their best years have passed.
• When choosing a desirable job, the most important criterion is salary (75%), followed by social benefits (31%), workplace relationships (26%) and work schedule (22%). The least important factors are career prospects (14%) and prestige or social status (10%). The Independence Generation is the only age group that shows heightened interest in career advancement. A flexible schedule matters more to those under 40, homemakers, the unemployed and students. For people aged 40–60, neither schedule nor career advancement is of major importance. For pensioners, only salary and social guarantees matter. Manual workers prioritise salary as well, while office workers place notable importance on workplace atmosphere. As income rises, so do expectations toward employers: wealthier respondents value nearly all criteria—from guarantees to career development—while poorer respondents focus primarily on salary as a means of meeting basic needs.

Tolerance 

• The analysis of values shows an interesting contrast: although Ukrainians readily declare the importance of universalism and benevolence, these ideals do not fully translate into tolerance. Forty-seven percent express negative attitudes toward the LGBT community, and 42% feel negatively about people who choose to be childfree; around half are neutral toward these groups, and only 7–8% express positive views. Attitudes toward people who do not believe in God are noticeably more tolerant: only 28% reject them, while 63% are generally neutral and 8% view them positively.
• Young women aged 16–24 form a distinct trend of heightened tolerance: one in three holds positive views of LGBT people and the childfree, whereas among men of the same age, the share is three times smaller. Overall, the Independence Generation—especially the 16–24 cohort—stands out as the most tolerant group. Across all three categories, their views tend to be predominantly neutral (60–70%), with roughly one-fifth expressing positive attitudes and up to one-fifth negative ones. Tolerance declines steadily with age, reaching its lowest levels among those aged 61 and older, where negative attitudes dominate—66% toward the childfree and 65% toward LGBT people.
• Regionally, Kyiv is the most tolerant. The East and West are similar in their conservatism, though with different emphases: the more religious West is less tolerant of non-believers, while Donbas shows the strongest rejection of LGBT people. The least accepting of pro-Western values are the voters of Boyko and Murayev. In contrast, supporters of Zelensky and Poroshenko display comparatively higher levels of tolerance across all categories, most often expressing neutral views.
• Religious belief remains widespread: 60% of the population believe in God without doubt, 17% believe but have doubts, and 14% believe in higher powers generally. Only 7% identify as atheists. Faith intensifies with age and exceeds 60% after age 50. Religiosity is highest in Halychyna and the western regions more broadly, while Kyiv and the youngest cohort (16–24) have the lowest share of believers—less than half. Among those who firmly believe in God, 40% express negative attitudes toward atheists. This group is also less tolerant toward LGBT people (55% negative) and toward the childfree (49% negative).
• Support for restoring the death penalty in Ukraine is split: 51% support the idea, while 45% oppose it. Support is strongest among older, poorer and less educated respondents, among men, and among people who experience negative emotions toward themselves—such as shame, anger, sadness, indifference or fear.

Electoral sympathies

• The presidential ranking is led by Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who would receive 27.2% of the vote if elections were held in the near future (among those who intend to vote and have made their choice). He is followed by Petro Poroshenko with 14.9%, Yurii Boiko with 10.5%, Yuliia Tymoshenko with 9.7%, Ihor Smeshko with 6.6%, Yevhenii Murayev with 5.6%, and Volodymyr Hroisman with 5.1%. Support for other candidates does not exceed four percent.
• Zelenskyi leads in 17 regions of the country. In Kyiv, as well as in Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts, he shares the top position with Poroshenko, while in Kharkiv oblast he shares the lead with Boiko. Only in Lviv oblast does Poroshenko take first place, in Vinnytsia oblast the leader is Hroisman, and in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts Boiko comes out on top.
• Among the Independence Generation, every second respondent who intends to vote and has made a choice supports Zelenskyi. Within this group, his result is more than four times higher than Poroshenko’s. Zelenskyi also records very high support among the youngest respondents who are not yet eligible to vote (aged 16–17): more than half choose him overall, and almost 70% among those who hypothetically would vote and have chosen a candidate.

Foreign policy vectors

• The dominant foreign policy direction in Ukraine remains European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Across all questions related to Ukraine’s future on the international stage, at least half of respondents expressed pro-Western aspirations. Support for joining the European Union stands at 64%, while 54% favour joining NATO. These attitudes are strongest among the youngest cohort (ages 16–24): 66% support NATO membership and 75% support EU membership. Even among the oldest respondents, at least half remain oriented toward the West.
• EU membership, although influenced by regional differences—with support decreasing from West to East—does not divide society as sharply as the question of NATO accession. Overall, the youngest generation (16–24) demonstrates the clearest consolidation around a pro-European vision for Ukraine’s future. Even in the East, where the majority opposes EU membership, a majority of young people (58%) support the country’s European course.
• At the same time, the most stable alternative to European integration is not a pro-Russian orientation, but rather a preference for equal distance from both the West and Russia. This option is chosen by 35% of respondents. Among those who oppose EU membership, only a quarter advocate movement toward Russia; most prefer an independent trajectory. By age, the strongest supporters of this “equidistant” model are those between 25 and 50. In the eastern regions, this preference dominates over the pro-European direction, while in the western regions it dominates over the pro-Russian one.
• Interestingly, this vision of Ukraine’s future does not reveal sharp regional divides. With the exception of Halychyna, where support for equidistance is around 20%, levels of support in all other macro-regions range from 30% to 45%.

Nostalgia for the USSR

• Sixty-one percent of respondents do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, while 32% do. Regret is most common in the southeastern regions, among older and less affluent people. Nostalgia is also widespread among those who would not support Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence today and among individuals who believe their best years are already behind them. Attitudes in Ukraine and Russia differ fundamentally: over the past decade, nostalgia for the USSR has steadily declined in Ukraine, while in Russia it has increased.
• When assessing the overall impact of the Soviet period on Ukraine’s development, 52% describe it as neutral, 23% as negative, and 18% as positive. The strongest polarisation appears among older generations, who are more likely to provide both highly negative and highly positive assessments. The youngest cohort predominantly chooses a neutral evaluation, as the USSR for them is not a lived experience but a chapter in history textbooks.
• Areas where modern Ukraine is viewed as clearly outperforming the Soviet period include freedom of speech (77%) and opportunities for self-realisation (64%). Perceptions of living standards are evenly split: 43% believe life was better in the USSR, and 43% believe it is better today. Younger people tend to prefer the present, while older respondents lean toward the Soviet past. In evaluations of healthcare and education, modern Ukraine still “loses” to Soviet-era perceptions—only those born after 1991 believe these services are better today, while older generations consistently rate current systems as worse.
• Despite divided views on living standards, only 27% support a return to a planned economy, while two-thirds support market relations. The dividing line here is not age but income: the wealthier the respondent, the more likely they are to support a free market.
• Migration attitudes reflect similar generational divides. Thirty-two percent would like to work abroad, while 65% would not. Among the youngest respondents, the desire to leave reaches 54%, compared to only 18% among those aged 61+. In Donbas, interest in working abroad is roughly half the level recorded in western regions (20–23% versus around 40%).
• Higher wages (71%) and better living conditions (57%) are the primary motives for wanting to work abroad. Around one in five also cite better working conditions and more opportunities for self-realisation, though the latter is notably more important for the Generation of Independence than for older age groups.

Images of youth

• In the eyes of most Ukrainians, today’s youth is patriotic and moral: around 60% share this view, while roughly a third disagree. Importantly, the survey did not define the age boundaries of “youth,” so each respondent interpreted the term individually. At the same time, opinions on the educational level of young people are more critical: 56% consider youth poorly educated, and only 38% believe they are well educated. Other assessments split almost evenly — half describe youth as hardworking, the other half as lazy; similarly, 45% consider them responsible, while 50% perceive them as irresponsible.
• Young respondents themselves view their generation more favorably, especially when compared with perceptions held by those aged 31–50 — the age group that could be considered their “parent generation.” Older Ukrainians tend to rate the diligence of youth higher than other groups do. Women generally assess young people more positively than men, and wealthier respondents also express more favorable opinions.
• Perceptions of youth strongly depend on regional context. In the West, Halychyna, Central regions and Kyiv, young people are seen as more patriotic, responsible, hardworking and moral. On the Donbas, in the South and East, evaluations are noticeably more negative: youth are viewed as less patriotic, less educated, lazier, less responsible and less moral. These perceptions also correlate with emotional attitudes toward the country itself. The more pride and joy respondents feel about Ukraine, the more positively they assess its youth.
• Electoral preferences reinforce this divide. Supporters of Zelenskyy and Poroshenko give youth the highest evaluations: roughly 70% of them describe young people as patriotic and moral, and 50–60% consider them responsible and hardworking. The most negative assessments come from voters of Murayev, who rate the education, patriotism and responsibility of youth very low.
• Despite the presence of some critical views, the majority of Ukrainians agree that youth development should be a national priority. Notably, this opinion is shared equally across all age groups — older generations view investment in young people as just as important as the Generation of Independence does.

Lifestyle

• Ukrainians today are most interested in travel, sports, a healthy lifestyle, music, and self-development — these areas were chosen by a quarter to a third of respondents. The least interest is shown in fashion (only 3%), while religion, history, and politics also attract relatively little attention (8–9%). Ecology, cooking, technology, economics, and cinema generate moderate interest (12–19%).
• The Independence Generation is most interested in sports, travel, music, and self-development. Notably, music is especially appealing to young people aged 16–24. As age increases, the importance of a healthy lifestyle rises: among those aged 40+, around 40% selected it. For the oldest group (61+), politics and economics are more interesting (18%), while these topics hardly interest the youngest (only 4–10%). After age 50, religion also becomes more relevant (12%). Interest in ecology also grows with age — 20–26% among people 50+. Conversely, interest in technology sharply declines after 50.
• Almost everyone is interested in travel, except for the oldest respondents. Interest in sports and self-development decreases after age 40: only 21% of the oldest group chose sports, compared to 50% among those aged 16–24.
• Men are more interested in sports (48%), while women are more interested in travel (39%), cooking (26%), and a healthy lifestyle (36%). Women also appear to take better care of their health, as they undergo preventive medical check-ups more often than men (most frequently women aged 23–30). Overall, however, half of Ukrainians say they do not attend medical check-ups unless they feel unwell.
• Sixteen percent of Ukrainians have not left their locality in the past five years — most of them poorer, older, or rural residents. One-third have visited another city/village once or a few times, while half travel around Ukraine frequently.
• In the past five years, twice as many Ukrainians visited European countries compared to trips to Egypt, Turkey, and similar resorts: 9% traveled to Europe many times, 21% several times, and 70% never. In contrast, trips to such resorts amount to 3%, 13%, and 84% respectively. Visits to CIS countries are also rare — 87% have never been there.
• The Independence Generation travels most actively: for example, half of those aged 25–30 and over one-third of those aged 16–24 have visited Europe. They also travel frequently within Ukraine — over 60%. Yet even among them, more than 70% have never been to popular foreign resorts, and over 80% have never visited CIS countries.
• Residents of Kyiv travel abroad and domestically more often than others. Western Ukrainians, especially Zakarpattia residents, also travel frequently to Europe: 62% reported visiting EU countries. Trips to CIS states are most common among residents of Odesa and regions bordering Russia — Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Sumy.
• Only 15% of Ukrainians in the smartphone era write messages more often than they make phone calls. However, within the Independence Generation, communication increasingly shifts toward messaging. Among respondents aged 16–17, the majority — nearly 70% — primarily use messages rather than phone calls.

Dreams

• Ukrainians dream primarily of having strong health (58%). Good physical condition is one of a person’s basic needs, and the pandemic — as a threat to health — likely contributed to the heightened relevance of this aspiration. In second place is an increase in salaries and pensions (41%). For low-income Ukrainians, this is dream number one and is even slightly more important than health.
• The dream of having children and grandchildren ranks third (40%). It is equally relevant across age groups, except for the youngest (under 24), for whom it matters less. The stereotype that the desire for children is stronger among women is not confirmed: dreams about children and grandchildren show no significant gender differences.
• Between 16–17% dream of a large house or of traveling. As with spheres of interest, women — especially up to age 40 — dream of traveling more often. The dream of owning a large house is also more important to women than to men.
• Only 10% of Ukrainians dream about a career. This aspiration is most common among young women aged 16–24 (45%). By ages 25–30, this share decreases by half (21%) as dreams about family and children emerge. Young men aged 16–24 are more oriented toward running their own business (38%) than toward a career, and more so than women of the same age (28%).
• Fourteen percent dream of happy love, and for men this dream is more important. For example, among those aged 25–40, only 14% of women dream about love, compared to 22–24% of men. Even after age 60, one in ten men still dreams of happy love, whereas almost no women at that age continue to dream about it.
• The dream of strong health is more popular among women than men: from age 25 onward, about 60% of women prioritize this aspiration. Among men, it becomes significant only after age 50.
• Among those who want to work abroad, only one in ten dreams of permanently moving there. At the same time, they more often dream of travel, career opportunities, and running their own business.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group on 23–25 July 2021 shows that one quarter of respondents (25%) believe the country is moving in the right direction, while 67% see the direction as wrong and 8% were unable to answer. Younger respondents are somewhat more likely to view the country’s trajectory positively.
• Volodymyr Zelensky remains the most trusted political figure: 45% trust him and 52% do not. Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 31% and distrusted by 68%; Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 57%. Petro Poroshenko receives 26% trust and 72% distrust. Viktor Medvedchuk is trusted by 18% and distrusted by 70%. Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 16%, distrusted by 51%, and 28% say they have not heard of him.
• If a presidential election were held soon, 27.7% of those who intend to vote and have made their choice would support Zelensky. Poroshenko would receive 13.4%, Tymoshenko 11.4%, Boyko 10.1%, Ihor Smeshko 7.8%, Volodymyr Groysman 6.1%, Yevhen Murayev 6%, and Dmytro Razumkov 4.1%. Support for all other candidates is below 3%.
• Poroshenko holds the highest anti-rating: 46% would not vote for him under any circumstances. Tymoshenko’s anti-rating is 36%, Boyko’s is 34%, Zelensky’s is 29%, and Oleh Lyashko’s is 26%. About one in five respondents say they would never vote for Arseniy Yatsenyuk or Oleh Tyahnybok.
• In parliamentary preferences, Servant of the People leads with 24.1% among decided voters. European Solidarity follows with 14.3%, Batkivshchyna with 12.8%, and Opposition Platform – For Life with 12.4%. Support for other forces is significantly lower: Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman polls at 5%, and both the Radical Party and Murayev’s “Nashi” receive 4.8%. UDAR has 4.3%, Strength and Honour 4.1%, and Svoboda 3.4%, while all remaining parties poll below 3%.
• Support for granting the Tomos of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine stands at 45%, while 19% do not support it and 31% are indifferent. The highest support is observed in the West and Centre, among older respondents, and among those who identify as Greek Catholics or members of the OCU. Opposition Platform voters, as well as supporters of Murayev and Shariy, tend to view the Tomos negatively.
• Three-quarters of respondents (75%) consider Ukraine the successor to Kyivan Rus. Only 8% believe Russia is the successor, while 9% do not assign that status to either country. Although Ukraine is seen as the rightful successor across all age groups and most electorates, fewer than half of respondents in the East—and fewer than half of voters for Opposition Platform, Murayev, or Shariy—share this view.
• A majority of respondents (55%) disagree with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people who belong to a single historical and spiritual space,” while 41% agree. Agreement with this statement exceeds 60% in the East and among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. In contrast, over 70% of residents of Western Ukraine reject this idea. More than 80% of voters for Opposition Platform, Murayev, and Shariy accept the notion of “one people.”

• A survey conducted by Rating Group from 10 to 14 July 2021 among Kyiv residents shows that Vitali Klitschko enjoys the highest level of trust in the city: 53% trust him and 42% do not. Volodymyr Zelensky is trusted by 42% and not trusted by 51%. Volodymyr Groysman receives 32% trust and 56% distrust. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 28% and not trusted by 66%. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 28%, distrusted by 44%, and 23% of respondents do not know him. Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 21% and not trusted by 74%. Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 14%, distrusted by 62%, and another 14% say they do not know him.
• Sixty-five percent of respondents expressed a clear willingness to participate in parliamentary elections if they were held soon. Twelve percent are undecided, four percent might participate, and eighteen percent consider it unlikely. Older respondents report a higher level of electoral readiness.
• In terms of parliamentary preferences within Kyiv, Servant of the People leads with 24.5% among those who intend to vote and have chosen a party. European Solidarity follows with 19.7%, UDAR with 10.8%, and Batkivshchyna with 9.5%. Opposition Platform – For Life receives 8%. Support for other political forces is considerably lower: Strength and Honour polls at 4.4%, and Groysman’s Ukrainian Strategy at 4.3%, while all remaining parties fall below 3%.
• If mayoral elections in Kyiv were held in the near future, Vitali Klitschko would win convincingly, supported by 50.5% of those who have made their choice and intend to vote. Oleksandr Popov would receive 8.9%, Serhiy Prytula 7.6%, Oleksandr Omelchenko 6.3%, and Oleksiy Kucherenko 5%, with all other candidates receiving lower levels of support.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group from July 10 to 14, 2021, among residents of Kyiv shows that people in the capital assess the local situation more favorably than developments in the country overall. Only 29% believe Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while 57% think the opposite. At the same time, 38% consider the direction of the city to be correct, whereas 52% evaluate it negatively.
• Half of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Vitali Klitschko, while 44% are dissatisfied. President Zelensky receives lower evaluations: 36% are satisfied with his work and 57% are dissatisfied. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal’s performance is viewed even more critically, with only 16% expressing satisfaction and 66% dissatisfaction.
• The survey reveals strong support for tighter regulation of small retail structures (MAFs). More than 80% approve of banning the sale of tobacco products in kiosks located near schools and kindergartens, and 69% support banning alcohol sales in such kiosks. Opposition to these measures is relatively low. Seventy-four percent support the introduction of a unified architectural standard for MAFs, and 65% agree that the right to install them should be allocated to entrepreneurs through competitive procedures in the Prozorro system. Only about 13–14% oppose these initiatives.
• More than half of respondents support prohibiting the installation of MAFs along main transport arteries, as well as banning kiosks within 200 meters of metro exits. Around one-third do not support such restrictions. There is near-unanimous agreement—over 90%—that entrepreneurs must be responsible for waste removal and for maintaining cleanliness around their kiosks, and that the city should revoke permits in cases of unsanitary conditions.
• Kyivans also demonstrate a strong negative perception of how MAFs affect the city’s aesthetics: 70% believe that kiosks spoil the architectural appearance of the capital, while 23% disagree. The recent removal of 28 kiosks from underground pedestrian crossings is viewed positively by 73% of respondents, with 14% expressing neutrality and only 9% reacting negatively.

• According to the survey conducted by Rating Group from July 3–11, 2021 among residents of Kharkiv, respondents rated the local situation significantly better than the general situation in the country. Fifty-four percent of city residents believe that things in Kharkiv are moving in the right direction, while 30% hold the opposite view. Regarding the country as a whole, only 17% think the situation is developing correctly, whereas 69% believe it is not.
• Most respondents — 54% — said they had not noticed any changes in the local situation over the past six months. Twenty-six percent believe conditions have improved, while 16% say they have worsened. The cost of utilities is the most pressing issue for Kharkiv residents, mentioned by 73%. Forty-two percent consider the condition of roads and the state of residential buildings and entrances to be major problems. One in three highlights crime and issues with courtyard and surrounding infrastructure, while one in four points to problems with water supply, and one in five to heating.
• Among local politicians, the highest trust rating belongs to Ihor Terekhov: 54% trust him, while 36% do not. Yuliia Svitlychna is trusted by 38% and not trusted by 44%. Mykhailo Dobkin is trusted by 35% and not trusted by 57%. Oleksandr Feldman receives 31% trust and 58% distrust. Yevhen Murayev is trusted by 29%, distrusted by 39%, and 31% do not know him.
• Sixty-two percent expressed clear readiness to participate in the Kharkiv mayoral election scheduled for October 31, 2021. Nineteen percent are unsure, 7% might participate, and 12% say it is unlikely. Older respondents demonstrate higher readiness to vote. Among the candidates, Ihor Terekhov leads with the support of 42.9% of those who have made a choice and intend to vote. He is followed by Mykhailo Dobkin with 17.8%, Yuliia Svitlychna with 11.3%, Yevhen Murayev with 10.9%, and Oleksandr Feldman with 6.9%. Support for all other candidates is below 3%.
• Dobkin also has the highest negative rating: 34% of respondents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Feldman’s anti-rating stands at 27%, Kucher’s at 26%, and Abramichev’s at 22%. For other candidates, the share of respondents unwilling to vote for them ranges from 13% to 16%. Sixty-one percent of Kharkiv residents believe that Ihor Terekhov will win the mayoral election, while 14% expect Mykhailo Dobkin to be the winner. Fewer than 4% believe any other candidate has a chance.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group from June 30 to July 3, 2021, shows that only a quarter of respondents (26%) believe the country is moving in the right direction, while 64% view the direction as wrong and 11% were unable to answer. Positive assessments of Ukraine’s trajectory are more common among younger respondents and residents of the West and Centre.
• In terms of trust in political figures, Volodymyr Zelensky leads the rankings: 46% trust him and 52% do not. Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 30% and not trusted by 68%; Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 58%; Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 24% and not trusted by 75%. Viktor Medvedchuk receives 16% trust and 70% distrust. Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 16%, distrusted by 52%, and 28% said they had not heard of him.
• Parliamentary preferences are headed by Servant of the People, supported by 24.9% of those who intend to vote and have decided on a party. European Solidarity receives 13.5%, Opposition Platform – For Life 12.8%, and Batkivshchyna 12.3%. Support for other political forces is significantly lower: Strength and Honour stands at 4.8%, the Radical Party at 4.7%, Groysman’s Ukrainian Strategy at 4.5%, Murayev’s Nashi at 4.3%, UDAR at 4.1%, and the Shariy Party at 3.7%. No other party reaches 3%.
• If presidential elections were held in the near future, Zelensky would receive 29.1% among those intending to vote and who have made their choice. Poroshenko would receive 13.4%, Boyko 12.5%, Tymoshenko 11.3%, Smeshko 8.7%, Murayev 5.5%, Groysman 4.6%, and Lyashko 3.4%. Support for all others falls below 3%.
• Looking ahead to the 2024 presidential race, Zelensky and Tymoshenko are the most desired candidates to appear on the ballot, supported by 34% and 22% respectively. Boyko is named by 20%, Poroshenko by 18%, Groysman by 15%, Smeshko by 14%, and 10% would like to see Murayev in the candidate list.
• Poroshenko has the highest anti-rating: 45% say they would never vote for him under any circumstances. Boyko’s anti-rating is 36%, Tymoshenko’s 32%, Zelensky’s 27%, and Lyashko’s 24%. Around one in six would never vote for Yatsenyuk, Tyahnybok, or Murayev.
• Second-round presidential simulations show Zelensky defeating all major competitors. In a Zelensky–Poroshenko matchup, the result would be 65% versus 35% among those who intend to vote and have chosen a candidate. Against Tymoshenko, Zelensky would win 61% to 39%, and against Boyko 66% to 34%.

• According to the survey conducted by Rating Group, 45% of respondents consider themselves football fans, while 54% do not. The share of those who identify as fans is higher among residents of Western Ukraine, older generations, and men. More than half of Ukrainians — 54% — watch matches of EURO 2020, with 14% following all games and 40% watching selected ones. Forty-six percent do not watch the tournament at all. Active interest in the Championship is more common among people in the West, older respondents, and men. Among football fans, almost everyone follows EURO 2020: about one-third watch every match, and two-thirds watch individual games.
• When asked about their expectations for the winner of the European Championship, 36% believe that Ukraine will become the champion. Eighteen percent think the winner will be England, 15% choose Italy, 10% Spain, 7% Belgium, 2% Denmark, and 1% each name Switzerland or the Czech Republic. Notably, belief in the victory of the Ukrainian national team is stronger among young people and women.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group between 22 and 29 May 2021 among residents of single-mandate electoral district No.197, respondents evaluated the local situation more positively than the situation in the region or in the country overall. Forty-six percent of residents believe that things in their localities are moving in the right direction, while the same share holds the opposite view. With regard to the oblast, 33% think it is developing in the right direction and 50% disagree. At the national level, 26% consider the direction to be right and 64% consider it wrong. Over the last three months, assessments of the country’s direction have improved at all levels.
• Sixty-five percent of respondents expressed a definite willingness to participate in the by-election for a Member of Parliament in the district on 31 October 2021. Fourteen percent were unsure, five percent said they would possibly take part, and six percent considered it unlikely. Higher turnout readiness is observed among older respondents and residents of rural areas.
• Among the candidates, Vladyslav Holub holds the lead, supported by 30.4% of those who have decided and would participate in the vote. Yevhen Kurbet receives 13.1%, Mykola Tomenko 12.0%, Valeriia Bondarenko 11.9%, Andrii Illienko 5.6%, Roman Sushchenko 4.8%, Volodymyr Domanskyi 4.6%, and Leonid Datsenko 3.2%. Support for other candidates is below 2%, while around 15% of voters remain undecided.
• When asked who they believe would win the election, 19.5% predicted the victory of Vladyslav Holub, 10.9% were confident that Valeriia Bondarenko would win, 8.7% named Yevhen Kurbet, and 5.4% pointed to Mykola Tomenko. Fewer than 3% believed in the victory of any other candidate, and over a third of respondents could not give an answer.
• Regarding the pandemic, 23% perceive COVID-19 as a high threat to their own health and lives, 42% view the threat as moderate, and 31% as low. Higher levels of concern are reported among older respondents, women, and those with lower income.
• When asked about vaccination, 32% said they would like to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, while 64% said they would not. Vaccine hesitancy is particularly common among younger people and rural residents.

The survey was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the Centre for Analysis and Sociological Research of the International Republican Institute throughout Ukraine (excluding the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) between 13 and 21 March 2021.  

The methodology was based on personal interviews at the respondents' place of residence, with a total sample size of 2,400 residents aged 18 and older.  The results were weighted by region, age and gender distribution based on data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine as of 1 January 2019.  The margin of error at a 95% confidence level does not exceed 2%.  The reach coefficient is 54%. The survey was conducted with financial support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
 

• Recent polling data over the past three months shows a stable positive trend in public assessments of the country’s direction, along with rising levels of trust and electoral support for President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. According to a survey conducted by Rating Group between 16–18 May 2021, one quarter of Ukrainians believe the country is moving in the right direction, while two thirds hold the opposite view; another 9% were unsure. Younger respondents and supporters of “Servant of the People” and “Holos” tend to assess the situation more positively.
• Among all individuals who have held the office of President of Ukraine, the highest trust rating belongs to the incumbent, Volodymyr Zelenskyi: 46% trust him and 51% do not. Trust in Leonid Kuchma stands at 36% (with 58% expressing distrust), the same level of trust is observed for Leonid Kravchuk, although distrust is slightly lower at 53%. Viktor Yushchenko is trusted by 29% and distrusted by 66%. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 24% and distrusted by 75%. Viktor Yanukovych has the lowest trust indicators: 15% trust him, while 82% do not. Compared to Poroshenko and Yanukovych at the same point in their presidencies, Zelenskyi’s trust/distrust balance is significantly more favorable.
• Parliamentary preferences are led by “Servant of the People,” supported by 24.8% of those who intend to vote and have made their choice. “European Solidarity” receives 13.5%, “Opposition Platform – For Life” 13.2%, and “Batkivshchyna” 11.8%. Support for other parties is substantially lower, with none exceeding 5%.
• If presidential elections were held soon, 30.2% of decided voters would support Zelenskyi. Petro Poroshenko would receive 12.8%, Yurii Boiko 11.9%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 11.1%, Ihor Smeshko 7.6%, and Yevhen Murayev 5.1%. Support for other candidates is below 5%. In all simulated second-round scenarios, Zelenskyi would win convincingly: he would defeat Poroshenko by 68% to 32%, Tymoshenko by 62% to 38%, and Boiko by 69% to 31%.
• When asked who they consider the best president of independent Ukraine, respondents most often named Leonid Kuchma (23%). Eighteen percent consider Zelenskyi the best, 14% point to Poroshenko, 13% to Yanukovych, and 12% to Kravchuk. Only 7% believe Viktor Yushchenko was the best. Nine percent said that none of the presidents were the best, and 5% were undecided.
• A quarter of respondents rate Zelenskyi’s second year in office as excellent or good, 34% as satisfactory, and 42% as poor or terrible. More positive evaluations come from residents of the West and Centre, younger respondents, and Zelenskyi’s own supporters. Among government initiatives, the highest ratings were given to the “State in a Smartphone” program, the “Big Construction” initiative, the release of prisoners and hostages, strengthening national defence, foreign policy, and efforts to unify the country. Mid-range assessments were given to the COVID-19 response, education reform, personnel renewal in public administration, the Donbas ceasefire, and social protection. The most negatively evaluated areas were healthcare reform, economic development, land reform, reducing oligarchic influence on politics, and combating corruption.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group on 15–16 May 2021 among Kyiv residents, using telephone interviews, shows that city dwellers assess the local situation more positively than the national one. According to the results, 32% believe the country is moving in the right direction while 58% disagree. In contrast, 42% rate the situation in Kyiv as moving in the right direction, whereas 51% see it as moving in the wrong one.
• In terms of personal trust, Vitali Klitschko enjoys the highest confidence: 51% trust him and 48% do not. President Zelensky is trusted by 45% and not trusted by 51%. Volodymyr Groysman is trusted by 33% and distrusted by 58%. Dmytro Razumkov receives 32% trust, 36% distrust, and 26% say they do not know him. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 30% and distrusted by 68%; Yulia Tymoshenko by 21% and distrusted by 76%; Yuriy Boyko by 17% and distrusted by 65%, while 15% do not know him. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 13%, distrusted by 58%, and 22% say they have not heard of him.
• Job performance evaluations follow a similar pattern. Fifty-three percent of respondents are satisfied with Klitschko’s work as mayor, while 46% are dissatisfied. Forty percent are satisfied with President Zelensky’s performance and 58% are dissatisfied. Only 16% are satisfied with Prime Minister Shmyhal’s work, while 69% are dissatisfied.
• A majority of residents—54%—do not support the idea of the central government appointing someone other than the elected mayor to head the Kyiv City State Administration; 37% support such an appointment.
• Perceptions of the COVID-19 situation in Kyiv improved significantly over the previous month. Now, 39% say the situation has improved (compared to just 6% in April). Forty-five percent believe nothing has changed (30% in April), and only 10% say the situation has worsened (down from 62% in April).
• Forty-eight percent of respondents believe that Mayor Klitschko is responding effectively to the coronavirus threat in the city, while 46% disagree. Thirty-five percent consider the President’s actions in this area effective, and 57% disagree. As for the Prime Minister, only 23% view his actions as effective, while 63% consider them ineffective.
• Thirty-nine percent report having already had COVID-19. Among them, 60% had a positive test result, while 39% say they had symptoms but did not get tested. Fifty-eight percent report they have not contracted the virus.
• Looking ahead, almost half of respondents (47%) express willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccination, while 50% are not ready to be vaccinated.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group shows that, in the view of respondents, the top priority for government action in the healthcare sector should be providing free medications for patients with serious illnesses. This issue was named by 54%. Other important priorities include purchasing new medical equipment for hospitals, which 29% singled out, and addressing flaws in the implemented healthcare reform, noted by 25%. Insurance-based medicine, improving doctors’ qualifications, and increasing medical workers’ salaries were highlighted by one in five respondents. Less frequently mentioned were hospital renovations, improving the quality of medical education at universities, and introducing official payments for medical services.
• An overwhelming majority supports the introduction of state programs aimed at assisting and protecting doctors who suffered from COVID-19, with support reaching 94%. Similarly, 87% back programs for post-COVID rehabilitation of vulnerable populations.
• Three-quarters of respondents—75%—support the introduction of health insurance in Ukraine, while only 17% oppose it. A relative majority, 55%, believe that the Minister of Health should not be replaced at this moment, whereas 25% would support appointing a new minister.
• Nearly half of respondents, 49%, think that political criticism of the government’s efforts to combat the pandemic does more harm than good. Twenty-six percent disagree. When thinking about personal risks linked to the epidemic, half say they are more afraid of the economic consequences for their families than of the virus itself. A third, however, fears the illness more than financial difficulties. Fifteen percent say they are not afraid of either—almost double the share recorded the previous November.
• Support for domestic vaccine production is strong: 61% believe Ukraine should manufacture all vaccines domestically, even if they cost more than imported ones. Additionally, 74% think Ukraine should begin developing its own COVID-19 vaccine, while 21% disagree.
• Twenty-five percent report having contracted COVID-19, and 69% say they have not. Among those who were ill, 64% sought medical help from state healthcare institutions, while 36% did not. Of those who used the public healthcare system during their illness, 52% rated the quality of consultations or treatment as good or excellent, 26% rated it as satisfactory, and 22% evaluated it as poor or very poor.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 65% of Ukrainians believe the country is moving in the wrong direction, while 22% think it is moving in the right direction and 13% are undecided. Younger respondents aged 18–29, residents of regional centers, and supporters of the Servant of the People party assess the country’s trajectory somewhat more positively.
• Two thirds of respondents are aware of the opening of the agricultural land market on 1 July 2021: 46% say they have heard a lot about it, and 32% have heard something. Another 22% know nothing about this reform, particularly the youngest respondents, city residents, and individuals who do not own land shares.
• A third of Ukrainians believe that the President and the Parliament had the greatest influence on the decision to introduce the agricultural land market. Only 12% attribute the decision to the Government.
• Seventy-seven percent of respondents think the decision to introduce a land market in Ukraine should be made through a national referendum, while 16% oppose this idea. If such a referendum were held, 58% say they would definitely participate, 17% would likely take part, and 20% would not. Among those who would participate and have decided on their vote, 64% would vote against launching the agricultural land market, and 36% would support it.
• An overwhelming majority—79%—oppose granting foreigners the right to purchase agricultural land in Ukraine, while only 15% support this idea.
• Sixty-five percent believe the Government should be staffed by specialists with prior experience in public administration, whereas 23% support the idea of bringing in so-called “new faces.”
• In parliamentary preferences, the Servant of the People party leads with 22.8% among those who have decided and intend to vote. European Solidarity receives 14.4%, Opposition Platform – For Life 13.7%, and Batkivshchyna 12.2%. Support for all other parties is significantly lower: the Radical Party has 3.7%, the Shariy Party 3.6%, Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman 3.5%, Svoboda 3.4%, Strength and Honor 3.2%, and For the Future 3.0%. Support for all remaining political forces is below 3%.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 66% of Ukrainians consume alcoholic beverages. One third drink less than once a month, 26% drink several times a month, 7% drink several times a week, and 1% consume alcohol daily. Despite this, 32% report that they do not drink alcohol at all. Alcohol consumption is more common among men, younger and middle-aged respondents, and people with higher incomes.
• Across all gender and age groups, men consume alcohol more frequently than women, and young people drink more often regardless of whether they live in cities or rural areas. In urban areas, younger and middle-aged respondents consume alcohol at similar rates.
• Among those who drink, wine (36%) and beer (29%) are the most popular beverages. Vodka is consumed by 20%, cognac by 17%, homemade wines and infusions by 14%, sparkling wines by 12%, whiskey by 7%, and samohon by 6%. Drinks such as cider, rum, vermouth, cocktails, gin or liqueurs are consumed by only 1–2%.
• Wine is more widely consumed in the western and central regions. Western regions also show higher consumption of homemade wines, infusions and samohon, while vodka is more common in the East. Young people prefer beer and wine, whereas older adults are more inclined toward vodka, cognac, homemade beverages and samohon. Wine, however, remains popular across all age categories. Women consume wine twice as often as men, and also drink homemade and sparkling wines more frequently. Men most often choose beer (40%) and vodka (31%), and they also consume more cognac, whiskey and samohon.
• Within gender-age groups, beer consumption is highest among young men, while vodka consumption peaks among older men. Among women, beer is likewise most popular among younger age groups. Stronger drinks such as vodka and cognac, along with homemade beverages, are more common among middle-aged and older respondents. Interestingly, older men and older women consume cognac at similar rates.
• People most often drink alcohol to mark a holiday or special occasion (67%). Thirty percent drink to enjoy time with close ones, and 24% to relax or lift their mood. Less common reasons include enjoying the taste (9%), pairing with food (8%), perceived health benefits (7%), or help with falling asleep (4%).
• A majority of respondents (54%) believe that safe, non-harmful doses of alcohol exist, while 45% disagree. Men are more likely to believe in the existence of safe doses. One in three respondents considers wine the least harmful alcoholic drink, and one in five believes homemade wines are less harmful. Only 10% consider vodka less harmful, 8% say beer, and 6–7% name cognac or samohon. A quarter of respondents are convinced that all alcoholic beverages are harmful, a view more common among younger people. Women most often name wine and homemade infusions as less harmful, while men more frequently point to vodka, beer and samohon.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group on 10–11 April 2021 among Kyiv residents via telephone interviews showed that people in the capital assess the local situation more positively than the overall state of affairs in the country. Thirty percent believe Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while 62% think the opposite. At the same time, 41% consider the situation in Kyiv to be on the right track, with 51% disagreeing. Younger and more affluent respondents tend to give more optimistic assessments than other groups.
• Sixty-six percent of residents say they frequently follow news about the coronavirus, 18% do so occasionally, and 10% rarely. Only 5% are not interested in such information at all. Nearly half of respondents view the actions of local authorities in managing the pandemic as optimal, while 30% believe the measures are too soft and 16% consider them too strict. In contrast, 38% view the actions of the central government as too soft, 36% as adequate, and 13% as overly strict.
• Forty-nine percent think Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klychko responds effectively to the coronavirus threat, while 47% disagree. Only 29% consider the President’s actions effective in this area, compared to 65% who consider them ineffective. For the Prime Minister, the balance is even less favourable: only 18% rate his pandemic response positively, and 69% negatively.
• A strong majority—72%—support the city administration’s decision to impose a strict lockdown from 5 to 16 April. Twenty-eight percent oppose it, with the highest opposition among younger and less affluent respondents. Fifty-six percent believe the lockdown will help reduce the spread of COVID-19 in Kyiv, while 41% think it will not. Sixty-nine percent say they would support extending the lockdown until the end of April if the situation worsened, while 30% oppose further restrictions. More than half—55%—support limiting public transport to special permits during the lockdown, while 44% are against such measures.
• Personal health concerns remain significant: 52% fear contracting the virus, while 47% do not. Worries for the health of relatives are even stronger, with 83% expressing concern. Anxiety is highest among older respondents and women.
• Thirty-seven percent say they have already had COVID-19, of whom 64% reported a positive test and 35% experienced symptoms but were never tested. Among those who fell ill, 42% had a mild course, another 42% had a moderate course, and 9% suffered a severe form of the disease. Sixty percent say they have not been ill. Sixty percent personally know people currently sick with COVID-19, and 42% know individuals who died from the virus.
• Over the past month, the share of Kyiv residents willing to be vaccinated has nearly doubled, rising from 27% to 50%, while 48% still do not plan to get vaccinated. Rejection of vaccination is highest among young people.
• Trust indicators show that Vitaliy Klychko is trusted by 56% of respondents and not trusted by 43%. President Volodymyr Zelensky is trusted by 43% and distrusted by 54%. Volodymyr Groysman receives 34% trust and 54% distrust. Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 33% and distrusted by 64%. Dmytro Razumkov is trusted by 33%, distrusted by 38%, with 25% saying they do not know him. Yuliya Tymoshenko is trusted by 21% and distrusted by 77%. Yuriy Boyko is trusted by 15%, distrusted by 66%, and 16% do not know him. Denys Shmyhal is trusted by 14%, distrusted by 48%, and 24% say they are unfamiliar with him.

• A survey conducted by the Sociological Group Rating shows that Ukrainians identify the country’s key problems as the military conflict in eastern Ukraine (47%), unemployment and lack of jobs (37%), and the coronavirus epidemic (35%). Twenty-seven percent consider low wages and pensions a major issue, while 21% point to bribery and corruption in government, and 19% each to government incompetence and rising utility tariffs. Sixteen percent highlight the inability to access quality medical care. Compared with July 2020, the share of those who view the coronavirus epidemic as a major national problem has doubled.
• On a personal level, respondents most often describe low wages and pensions (38%) and rising utility tariffs (35%) as their key difficulties. A quarter see the coronavirus epidemic as a personal problem; 24% point to the military conflict in the East; 23% cite rising prices for essential goods and services, and the same proportion name unemployment. Sixteen percent cannot obtain quality medical care, 14% face corruption, and 13% note government incompetence. Compared with July 2020, significantly more people now view rising utility prices and the pandemic as personal challenges.
• Roughly a third believe that state funds this year should primarily be directed toward fighting the coronavirus and increasing social benefits and pensions. Only 10% favor raising salaries for medical workers as a priority, 8% support spending on road construction, and 4% on increasing teachers’ wages.
• Forty-six percent rate the professionalism and competence of Ukrainian doctors as high, while 42% disagree. Since July 2020, the share of those who assess medical competence positively has grown.
• Over the past six months, 47% sought medical care in public health institutions; 53% did not. Those who did not are more often younger adults (18–29) and men. Among those who received care, 43% rated the services as good or excellent, 33% as satisfactory, and 23% as poor or terrible. Negative evaluations are especially common among older respondents (60+), urban residents, lower-income individuals, and men.
• Health Minister Maksym Stepanov is trusted by 19% and not trusted by 37%, while 34% do not know who he is. Former minister Ulana Suprun is trusted by 14%, distrusted by 61%, and unknown to 17%. Nearly half of respondents do not know former ministers Illia Yemets and Zoriana Skaletska; 8–9% trust them, and about a third distrust them.
• Around 30% believe President Zelensky and the Ministry of Health are responding effectively to the coronavirus threat, while more than half believe their response is ineffective. Only 18% view the actions of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada as effective, while more than 60% evaluate them negatively. Compared to November 2020, positive assessments of the central government’s response have somewhat declined.
• The main reason given for rising coronavirus cases in March is citizens’ failure to follow quarantine rules (46%). Other explanations include seasonal increases in respiratory illnesses (32%), ineffective governmental actions (28%), and the emergence of new variants of the virus (17%).
• A majority (63%) support Ukraine’s decision not to use Russia’s Sputnik-V vaccine, while 23% disagree. The highest opposition to this stance is found in the South and East.

• A survey conducted by Rating Group on 8–13 April 2021 among residents of single-mandate district No. 87 shows that people in the district assess the situation in their local communities more positively than the overall situation in the country. Forty-three percent believe things in their locality are moving in the right direction, while 42% disagree. In contrast, only 17% think the country is headed in the right direction, with 70% holding the opposite view. Younger and more affluent respondents tend to give more optimistic assessments at all levels.
• Trust in national political figures is limited: President Volodymyr Zelensky is trusted by 35% and not trusted by 57%; Petro Poroshenko is trusted by 25% and not trusted by 68%. At the regional level, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Council enjoys a relatively higher level of trust—43% trust it, while 24% do not, and a notable 33% were unable to evaluate it. The head of the regional administration, Andriy Boychuk, remains unfamiliar to most respondents: 60% say they do not know him, 14% trust him, and 20% do not.
• Among local political figures and candidates, Oleksandr Shevchenko shows the strongest trust rating, with 55% expressing trust and 35% distrust. Ruslan Koshulynskyi is trusted by 40% and not trusted by 42%. Vasyl Virastiuk is trusted by 30% and distrusted by 56%, while Marusia Zvirobiy-Bilenka is trusted by 20% and distrusted by 48%, with 23% saying they do not know her. Over the past month, distrust has increased toward Virastiuk, Koshulynskyi, and Zvirobiy.
• In the parliamentary party ranking within the district, the leading positions belong to Svoboda (supported by 22.8% of those who have decided and intend to vote) and Za Maybutnie (21.2%). Servant of the People receives 16.6%, European Solidarity 12.5%, and Batkivshchyna 11.8%. Support for all other parties falls below 3%. About 17% of respondents remain undecided.
• When asked about reasons that prevented them from voting in the 28 March election, respondents most often mentioned health issues (17%), lack of interest (15%), absence from their residence on election day (13%), uncertainty about whom to support (12%), and work obligations (10%).
• In terms of perceptions of who actually won the election, 38% believe Oleksandr Shevchenko was the real winner, 25% think it was Vasyl Virastiuk, and 10% point to Ruslan Koshulynskyi; one quarter could not give an answer. Perceptions of electoral integrity are also divided: 33% believe the election involved significant falsifications, 16% believe there were minor ones, 23% think there were none, and 28% are unsure. Thirty percent believe the falsifications benefited Virastiuk, while 16% say they benefited Shevchenko; only 1–3% believe other candidates were favored.
• Nearly half the respondents—49%—support cancelling the election results in the district and holding a repeat vote, while 40% oppose this. Opposition is strongest among supporters of Servant of the People and Virastiuk.
• If repeat elections were held next Sunday, 43.3% of decided voters would support Oleksandr Shevchenko, 26.7% would vote for Ruslan Koshulynskyi, and 23.9% for Vasyl Virastiuk. All other candidates who participated in the 28 March election would receive under 2%.