News and Press releases

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, 36% of respondents believe it is necessary to cancel the ceasefire and complete the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) until full restoration of Ukrainian authority across the entire Donbas.
• 21% support granting broader economic and humanitarian powers to the region.
  Another 17% support granting these territories autonomy or a federal status while keeping them within Ukraine.
  Another 9% support separating these territories from Ukraine.
  17% were undecided.
• Compared to the October survey, support for cancelling the ceasefire and completing the ATO increased (from 22% to 36%), while the share of undecided respondents decreased (from 27% to 17%). Support for cancelling the ceasefire and completing the ATO is highest in Western Ukraine, while support for separating these territories from Ukraine is highest in the Donbas itself.
• 43% of respondents have a positive attitude toward signing a ceasefire with representatives of the so-called DPR and LPR, while about the same share (44%) have a negative attitude. 13% were undecided. Compared to October, support for signing the ceasefire decreased (from 53% to 43%), while opposition increased (from 33% to 44%).
• At the same time, a majority of respondents (71%) do not support the idea of separating territories controlled by the DPR and LPR from Ukraine. Meanwhile, about one in five supports separation, and one in ten is undecided.
• An absolute majority (74%) believe Ukraine should remain a unitary state, while 15% support a federal structure, and 11% are undecided.
• 64% of respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, 17% support joining the Customs Union, and 19% are undecided.
• Since April 2014, support for EU accession has increased (from 55% in April to 64%), while support for the Customs Union has decreased (from 24% in April to 17%). EU accession is supported by a majority in the West, North, Center, East, and South of Ukraine. Only in the Donbas does a majority support joining the Customs Union.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) support abolishing Ukraine’s non-aligned status at the legislative level, while about one-third (28%) oppose it. Another quarter are undecided.
• If a referendum on Ukraine joining NATO were held today, about half of respondents (51%) would vote in favor, 25% would vote against, and about a quarter would be undecided or would not participate.
• Since April of that year, support for NATO accession has steadily increased. In November, the highest level of support was recorded (from 40% in April to 51%), while opposition decreased (from 46% in April to 25%). NATO accession is most strongly supported in Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, support and opposition are roughly equal, while in the South and Donbas there are more opponents.

Election assessment

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, the majority (56%) believe that the parliamentary elections of October 26 were rather free and fair, while 28% believe the elections were rather not free and not fair, and about one in six respondents were undecided.
• Importantly, among those who participated in the elections, an absolute majority (75%) consider them free and fair. Meanwhile, among respondents who did not vote, the majority (60%) believe the elections were rather not free and not fair.
• Almost 60% expect positive changes as a result of the early parliamentary elections (three months before the elections this figure was 46%). Half believe that the newly elected parliament will be more effective than the previous composition of the Verkhovna Rada, one third believe that nothing will change, and only 7% think the new parliament will be less effective than the previous one.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 24.5% of respondents (among those who would participate and had decided) would vote for the People’s Front, 23.5% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 12.7% for the Self-Reliance (Samopomich) union, almost 9% for the Opposition Bloc, 7% for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, and 6.1% for Batkivshchyna. Other parties would not pass the electoral threshold: Svoboda – 4.4%, Communist Party – 3.3%, Strong Ukraine – 2.7%, Right Sector – 2.1%, Civil Position – 1.7%.

Satisfaction with government performance

• 49% approve of President Petro Poroshenko’s performance, while 42% disapprove.
  52% of respondents are satisfied with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk’s performance, while 40% are dissatisfied.
  32% are satisfied with Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr Turchynov’s performance, while 55% are dissatisfied.
• Compared to the October survey, satisfaction with the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament improved (from 45% to 52% and from 27% to 32% respectively), while evaluations of the President’s performance remained almost unchanged.

Coalition formats

• Among possible coalition formats, the highest support is for:
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich – Radical Party – Batkivshchyna” (19%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich” (17%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front” (12%)
• The least supported formats are:
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich – Batkivshchyna” (9%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – Opposition Bloc” (5%)
• Meanwhile, 20% of respondents do not support any of these formats, and about one in six are undecided.
• The majority of respondents (50%) see Arsenii Yatseniuk as Prime Minister of Ukraine after the October 26 elections. Much fewer support other candidates: Yurii Boiko (6%), Andrii Sadovyi (5%), Volodymyr Groysman (4%), Yulia Tymoshenko (4%), Oleh Liashko (3%), Serhii Tihipko (1%).
• As Speaker of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, respondents most often name Oleksandr Turchynov (22%), followed by Volodymyr Groysman (9%) and Volodymyr Lytvyn (8%). Additionally, about 5% each support Oleh Liashko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 4% Yurii Lutsenko, 3% Yurii Boiko, and 2% Hanna Hopko.
• In these elections, a number of young politicians were elected to the Verkhovna Rada for the first time via party lists. Among them, respondents would most like to see in the new government: Tetiana Chornovol (27%), Hanna Hopko (18%), Yehor Soboliev (17%), and Mustafa Nayyem (12%). More than 8% would like to see Viktoriia Siumar in the new government, more than 7% Ihor Lutsenko, 6% Serhii Leshchenko, 5% Svitlana Zalishchuk, 5% Oksana Syroid, about 3% Andrii Lozovyi, Ihor Popov, and Olena Shkrum, and almost 2% others.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in November 2014, the majority of Ukrainians (72%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 15% disagree, and 14% are undecided.
• It should be noted that over the past five years the highest share of respondents who consider the Holodomor to be genocide has been recorded. According to Rating Group surveys, this share was 61% in 2010, 58% in 2011, 59% in 2012, 66% in 2013, and 72% in 2014. At the same time, the share of those who do not recognize the Holodomor as genocide decreased from 25% to 15% between 2010 and 2013.
• Currently, the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents across all regions, including Donbas. However, it should be noted that previous national studies on this topic included Crimea and parts of Donbas that are currently not controlled by the Ukrainian government.
• All age groups support this statement, and the higher the level of education and income, the higher the level of support. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, nearly 90% support this statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, about half support it.

• The exit poll was organized by four partners: the Government of Canada, Rating Group (Ukraine), Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization (Lithuania), with support from the International Republican Institute (IRI). The survey was conducted at the exits of 330 polling stations across all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea. More than 25,000 respondents were interviewed.
• According to the International Exit Poll results, the voting activity of different age groups during the October 26 election day varied significantly. In particular, older voters were much more active in the first half of the day, while young people and middle-aged voters were more active in the second half of the day and closer to polling station closing time. As of 10:00, older voters (aged 50 and above) accounted for more than 60% of those who had voted by that time; as of 14:00, this share decreased to about 50%, and by the end of the day it dropped to only 25%. Conversely, while voters under 30 accounted for only 9% of those who had voted by 10:00, by the end of the day their share increased to 25%. Similarly, voters aged 30–39 accounted for only 12% in the morning, but nearly 30% during the final hours of voting.
• Looking at the entire voting day, the most active group, as in the 2012 parliamentary elections, were voters aged 50–59 (turnout exceeded 65%). The least active group was youth aged 18–24, with only about one in three coming to vote.
• Compared to the previous parliamentary elections, overall voter turnout, according to Central Election Commission data, decreased from 58% to 52%. A comparison of Rating Group exit polls from 2012 and 2014 indicates that the largest declines in turnout occurred among the youngest age group (18–24) and the oldest group (60+), geographically concentrated in the South and East of Ukraine. At the same time, middle-aged voters were more active than in the 2012 elections.
• It is worth noting that young voters in these elections were more likely to support parties such as Right Sector and Samopomich. In contrast, older voters were more represented among supporters of the Communist Party and the Opposition Bloc. The electorate of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc was somewhat older than that of the People’s Front; as a result, the Poroshenko Bloc had stronger support among older voters, while the People’s Front had stronger support among younger and middle-aged voters.
• Men were more represented among supporters of parties such as Right Sector, Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, while women were more represented among supporters of the Opposition Bloc, Zastup, People’s Front, Batkivshchyna, and Strong Ukraine.
• Rural residents were most represented among supporters of Zastup, the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Batkivshchyna, and the People’s Front. Urban residents were more represented among supporters of Right Sector, Samopomich, Civic Position, and the Opposition Bloc.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 80% of respondents living in single-member electoral district №118 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 30% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 20% for Samopomich, 13% for the People’s Front, 10% for the Radical Party, 5% each for Civic Position and Batkivshchyna, and 3% for Svoboda. At the same time, 12% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, 34% of respondents among those planning to vote would support Bohdan Dubnevych (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), almost 7% — Olha Shvets (People’s Front), 5% — Danylo Lubkivskyi (independent candidate), and almost 4% — Andrii Tkachuk (Radical Party). About 42% of respondents had not decided on their candidate choice.
• The most well-known candidate is Bohdan Dubnevych (90% recognition). He also has the highest positive attitude level in the district (40%). Slightly more than 20% of respondents are familiar with Danylo Lubkivskyi and Olha Shvets.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about three quarters of respondents living in single-member electoral district №122 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 30% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 19% for the People’s Front, 15% for Samopomich, 10% for the Radical Party, 5% for Civic Position, and 4% each for Svoboda and Batkivshchyna. At the same time, 11% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, 38% of respondents among those planning to vote would support Volodymyr Parasyuk (independent candidate), 9% — Taras Vozniak (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 7% — Ivan Bokal (independent candidate), more than 4% — Oleksandr Pavliuk (Batkivshchyna), and almost 3% — Iryna Vereshchuk (independent candidate). About 35% of respondents had not decided on their candidate choice.
• The most well-known candidate is Volodymyr Parasyuk (70% recognition). He also has the highest positive attitude level in the district (46%). About 40% of respondents are familiar with Taras Vozniak, and less than 30% with Oleksandr Pavliuk.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 70% of respondents living in constituency No. 121 (Lviv region) said they would definitely take part in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 26.
• Among them, about 30% said they were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 16% for Samopomich, 14% for the People’s Front, 12% for the Radical Party, 7% for Batkivshchyna, and 4% each for Svoboda and Civic Position. At the same time, 10% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, among those who plan to participate in the elections, 23% said they would support Roman Ilyk (Batkivshchyna), 10% Mykhailo Koval (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 9% each Mykhailo Zadorozhnyi (independent candidate) and Ihor Kurus (Radical Party), almost 9% Ivan Matkovskyi (People’s Front), and 5% Pavlo Barnatskyi (independent candidate). More than 30% of respondents remained undecided.
• Roman Ilyk is the most well-known candidate in the constituency (85% are familiar with him) and has the highest positive rating (32%). Around 60% of respondents are familiar with Mykhailo Zadorozhnyi, while about 50% know Pavlo Barnatskyi and Ihor Kurus.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, three quarters (77%) of respondents in constituency No. 119 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 20% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 13% for the Radical Party, 12% for Samopomich, 11% for the People’s Front, 6% for Svoboda, 4% for Batkivshchyna, and 3% for Hromadianska Pozytsiia. At the same time, 27% of respondents were still undecided.
• Regarding candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 13% would have supported Andrii Andrushchenko (Radical Party), 12% Iryna Sekh (Svoboda), and 12% Mykhailo Bondar (People’s Front). In addition, almost 10% would have supported Mykhailo Chumak (Batkivshchyna), 4% Stepan Rak (independent candidate), 3% Nadiia Shostak (independent candidate), and 2% each Vasyl Hrushetskyi and Oleh Matkivskyi. More than 40% of respondents remained undecided.
• The most well-known candidate was Iryna Sekh (84% knew her). Mykhailo Chumak was known by 36%, Andrii Andrushchenko by 31%, and Mykhailo Bondar by 25%.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 35% of respondents would definitely participate and another 40% would likely participate. The projected voter turnout compared to June–July decreased from 59% to 55%. The highest level of mobilization is observed in all regions except Donbas and the South. In the territories of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian government, only 13% of respondents definitely intend to vote in parliamentary elections.
• If parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held next Sunday, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc would win, supported by 33.5% of respondents who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. 12.8% would support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 8.9% the People’s Front, 7.8% Strong Ukraine, and 6.9% Batkivshchyna. 5.4% would vote for Samopomich, 5.1% for the Opposition Bloc, 4.6% for Civic Position, 4.5% for the Communist Party, and almost 4% for Svoboda. Almost 2% would vote for Right Sector. About 5% would support other parties. In total, the survey covered all 29 parties intending to participate in the elections.
• In the regional breakdown, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc is most supported in Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine. In these regions, voters are also more likely to support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Batkivshchyna. In Western Ukraine, higher support is also observed for the People’s Front, Samopomich, Svoboda, and Right Sector. In contrast, in the South Strong Ukraine receives higher support, while in the South and East more voters are ready to support the Opposition Bloc. The Communist Party receives the highest support in Donbas and somewhat less in the South.
• In terms of dynamics, over the last two months the People’s Front gained the most support, as well as Samopomich, Strong Ukraine, the Communist Party, and the Opposition Bloc. Batkivshchyna, Civic Position, Svoboda, and especially the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko lost support. In September, compared to August, support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc increased, but in October the growth did not continue.
• The highest trust levels among politicians are for Petro Poroshenko (51%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (45%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (42%), and Andrii Sadovyi (40%). Oleh Liashko experienced the largest decline in trust: while 40% trusted him in August, only 28% did in early October.
• Regarding second-choice party preferences (respondents were asked which other party they could vote for), the largest share (10%) indicated the People’s Front. Additionally, 8% do not exclude voting for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, more than 4% each for Civic Position and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, almost 4% each for Samopomich and Strong Ukraine, and about 3% each for Svoboda, the Opposition Bloc, and Batkivshchyna.
• Thirty-four percent of respondents are fully confident in their political choice, 36% are fairly confident but may change their choice, 15% are uncertain, and 15% are undecided. The most confident voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Opposition Bloc.
• For 31% of respondents, the party leader is the most important factor when choosing a party (especially among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Civic Position, the Radical Party, the People’s Front, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc). For 29%, the party list composition is most important, while 27% emphasize party ideology (especially among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party). Thirteen percent are undecided.
• The majority of respondents (55%) believe that parliamentary elections in October will be more a competition of leaders, while about half as many (22%) believe it will be a competition of ideas. Eight percent gave other answers, and 15% were undecided.
• More than half of respondents (55%) believe that the party they could support should primarily focus on economic issues, 29% on military and defense issues, and 6% on humanitarian or ideological issues, while 10% are undecided. The military direction is most attractive to voters of Right Sector.
• Forty-eight percent approve of President Petro Poroshenko’s performance, while 44% disapprove. Forty-five percent are satisfied with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk’s performance, while 48% are dissatisfied. Compared to August survey results, satisfaction with the performance of the new government declined across all officials.
• More than one third of respondents (35%) would like to see Arsenii Yatseniuk as Prime Minister after parliamentary elections. Additionally, 9% would prefer Serhii Tihipko, 5% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko, 4% each Yulia Tymoshenko or Andrii Sadovyi, and 3% Vadym Rabinovych.
• As a priority for government action in the next year, 35% of respondents consider resolving the Donbas issue most important, 21% economic reforms, 16% restoring national defense capacity, and 11% social protection.
• More than half of respondents (52%) believe that controlling price growth and inflation is the top priority for the government, followed by fighting corruption (41%). Other important priorities include lustration of officials, law enforcement, and judges (22%), preventing mass layoffs and unemployment growth (19%), developing the defense industry (19%), ensuring timely payment of wages, pensions, and social benefits (19%), ensuring timely salary and pension payments (18%), developing domestic industrial production (17%), improving relations with Russia (16%) and Western countries (13%).
• The biggest fear among Ukrainians is war (77%). Other major fears include significant price increases for food and medicines (31%), hunger (22%), non-payment of wages and pensions (20%), currency devaluation, inflation, and job loss (17% each), heating problems during winter and increases in utility tariffs (16% each). Nearly 10% fear gas supply disruptions to homes and mass electricity outages.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 68% of respondents in constituency No. 22 (Lutsk) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 19% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, and the same share (19%) for the People’s Front. Another 12% were ready to vote for the Radical Party, and 11% for Samopomich. Close to these were Batkivshchyna with 8% support, Svoboda – 7%, and Hromadianska Pozytsiia – 7%. About 4% would have voted for Right Sector. At the same time, 9% of respondents were still undecided.
• Regarding second choice (which other party respondents could vote for), 15% would have voted for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 12% for the People’s Front, 8% for the Radical Party, 8% for Samopomich, 7% for Batkivshchyna, 5% for Hromadianska Pozytsiia, and 5% for Svoboda.
• As for candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 28% would have supported Ihor Lapin (People’s Front), 13% Roman Ivaniuk (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 8% Hryhorii Pustovit (Batkivshchyna), and 7% Iryna Konstankevych (independent candidate). About 30% of respondents remained undecided.
• It is worth noting that candidates running in the constituency had relatively low name recognition at that time. About half of respondents knew Hryhorii Pustovit and Ihor Lapin, around 40% knew Hennadii Kozhevnikov, and about one third knew Roman Ivaniuk. Only about one in five respondents knew Kostiantyn Petrochuk.
• The most positive attitude was recorded toward Ihor Lapin (32%). 17% had a positive attitude toward Hryhorii Pustovit (while 16% expressed a negative attitude toward him). 14% had a positive attitude toward Roman Ivaniuk. The most negative attitude was recorded toward Hennadii Kozhevnikov (21%).

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 50% of respondents in constituency No. 66 (Zhytomyr region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 20% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 13% for the People’s Front, 13% for the Radical Party, 10% for Batkivshchyna, and 7% for Samopomich. At the same time, about a quarter of respondents were still undecided.
• Regarding the second choice question (which other party respondents could vote for), 10% would give their vote to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 6% to the People’s Front, and 4% to the Radical Party. Almost 70% could not determine their second party choice.
• As for candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 15% would have supported Pavlo Dziublyk (People’s Front), 13% Vitalii Zhuravskyi (independent candidate), 9% Mykhailo Pukhtaievych (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 8% Viktor Dubas (Radical Party), and 7% Petro Riabenko (Batkivshchyna). Around 40% of respondents remained undecided.
• The most well-known candidate was Vitalii Zhuravskyi (88% recognized him). Vitalii Zhuravskyi and Ivan Lytvyn had the highest negative attitudes in the constituency — 46% and 38% respectively. Other candidates were relatively unknown among voters, which explains the high share of undecided respondents.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 60% of respondents said they would like to have been born in Ukraine.
• Compared to data from April of the previous year, the share of those who would like to be born in Ukraine increased by 12%. At the same time, Russia became less attractive (declining from 9% to 4%), as did Germany (from 5% to 3%) and the United States (from 4% to 2%).
• Additionally, 13% of respondents said they would personally like to live in Russia (78% would not), while 20% said they would like to live in Belarus (70% would not). Meanwhile, 46% said they would like to live in Europe (43% would not).
• Compared to a similar survey conducted in March of the previous year, the share of respondents who would like to live in Russia decreased significantly (from 30% to 13%), while interest in Belarus remained unchanged (20%). At the same time, the share of those who would like to live in Europe increased from 43% to 46%.
• Living in Russia or Belarus was more often preferred by residents of Donbas, Eastern and Southern regions, as well as people with lower material status. In contrast, Europe was more often chosen by residents of Western, Northern, and Central regions. In general, younger respondents, those with higher education levels, and those with higher income were more likely to prefer living in European countries.
• Among respondents who had a positive attitude toward Angela Merkel, 56% would prefer to live in Europe, 14% in Belarus, and 4% in Russia. Among those who had a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, 28% would choose Belarus, 15% Russia, while a relative majority (40%) would still choose Europe.
• Among respondents who had a positive attitude toward Vladimir Putin, about half said they would prefer to live in Russia, 43% in Belarus, and 15% in European countries.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 62% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, 54% toward Barack Obama, and 51% toward Angela Merkel. In addition, 45% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Bronisław Komorowski, 39% toward José Manuel Barroso, 36% toward Dalia Grybauskaitė, and 16% toward Vladimir Putin.
• The ranking of negative attitudes is led by V. Putin (75%). 32% of respondents have a negative attitude toward A. Merkel, 31% toward B. Obama, 26% toward A. Lukashenko, and 25% toward N. Nazarbayev.
• Residents of the western, central, and northern regions are more favorable toward B. Obama, A. Merkel, B. Komorowski, J. M. Barroso, D. Grybauskaitė, and F. Hollande. Meanwhile, residents of the South and East have a more positive attitude toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev. At the same time, in the South there is also a positive attitude toward A. Merkel. Relatively positive attitudes toward V. Putin are recorded only in Donbas. Older people tend to have a more positive attitude toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev, while young people more often support B. Obama and A. Merkel.
• The higher the education level of respondents and the higher their material status, the more positive their attitudes are toward B. Obama, B. Komorowski, J. M. Barroso, D. Grybauskaitė, and F. Hollande. Accordingly, attitudes toward A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev, and V. Putin are more negative in these groups.
• Compared with a similar survey conducted in October of the previous year, the level of positive attitude toward V. Putin decreased from 47% to 16%, and toward A. Merkel from 61% to 51%. At the same time, attitudes toward B. Obama improved from 51% to 54%. It should also be noted that the number of respondents with negative attitudes toward politicians increased simultaneously: negative attitudes toward V. Putin rose from 40% to 75%, toward A. Merkel from 13% to 32%, and toward B. Obama from 25% to 31%.
• It is worth noting that Ukrainians are generally very tolerant in their attitudes toward citizens of other countries. At the same time, attitudes toward foreign citizens are much better than toward the leaders of those same countries.
• Ukrainians have the most positive attitude toward Belarusians (53% definitely positive; 41% rather positive), and the least positive toward Russians (39% definitely positive; 33% rather positive).
• Overall, about 90% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Europeans, Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, and French; about 80% toward Americans; and about 70% toward Russians.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 86% of Ukrainians consider themselves patriots of their country. At the same time, 50% definitely characterize themselves as patriots, and another 36% say they are rather patriots than not. Only 6% do not consider themselves patriots, while 8% were unable to determine their position.
• Over the past year, the share of those who consider themselves patriots increased from 81% to 86%, and compared to 2010 it increased from 76% to 86%. At the same time, the share of those who do not consider themselves patriots more than halved (from 15% in 2010 to 6% in 2014). Residents of the West, North and Center, people with higher income and higher education levels, as well as Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely to consider themselves patriots.
• Overall, 76% of respondents would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence if they faced such a choice today. At the same time, 12% would not support it, and another 12% were undecided. Over the past year, there has been a significant increase in supporters of Independence (from 61% to 76%), while the number of opponents almost halved. The vast majority of respondents in all regions support Ukraine’s Independence, except in Donbas, where supporters and opponents are equal at 34% each, while almost a third (31%) were undecided.
• The younger the respondents, the more they support Ukraine’s Independence. Support is also higher among respondents with higher education and higher income. More than 90% of respondents who consider Ukrainian their native language would vote for Independence. Among those who consider both Russian and Ukrainian native languages, more than 70% would support Independence. Among those who consider Russian their native language, 45% would support Ukraine’s Independence today, while only 30% would vote against it. The higher the level of patriotism among respondents, the more likely they are to support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence.
• Regionally, the dynamics of readiness to vote for Independence are positive: support increased significantly in all regions, including in the South (from 48% to 64%) and in the East (from 44% to 70%). As a year earlier, about one third of Donbas residents support Ukraine’s Independence, while the number of opponents decreased (from 57% to 34%) and the number of undecided increased (from 11% to 31%).
• An absolute majority of respondents (64%) primarily identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Half as many identify themselves as residents of their region, city or village (30%). 21% would identify themselves by nationality, and 17% would simply say “a human being.” 8% consider themselves Europeans, and the same share would identify themselves by their family role. 4% identify themselves as “a Soviet person” and 4% as “a citizen of the world.” About 3% would identify themselves by profession or religion.
• Over the past four years, identification as citizens of Ukraine and as Europeans has increased. At the same time, fewer respondents identify themselves as simply “a human being,” “a Soviet person,” or primarily through family role. “Citizen of Ukraine” is the dominant identity marker in all regions except Donbas, where the main identity marker remains “resident of one’s region, city or village.” Younger respondents and those with higher education are more likely to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Rural residents are more likely to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine or by nationality, while urban residents are more likely to say “resident of a region/city” or simply “a human being.” Identification as “European” is highest in the West and lowest in Donbas, and is more typical for younger and more educated respondents. Identification through family role is more typical in the Central region and among people with lower education. Identification as a “Soviet person” is more typical for residents of Donbas and the East, older people and those with lower education.
• The main sources of pride in their country and people are the place where respondents were born and raised (35%), the land and territory where they live (35%), their state (29%) and outstanding people of their nationality (28%). Hard work and ability to manage households were mentioned by 26%, language of their people by 23%, history and past by 22%, moral qualities of the people by 21%, songs, holidays and traditions by 19%. Slightly fewer mentioned the flag, coat of arms and anthem (14%), native nature (14%), religion and faith (14%), graves of ancestors and memory of them (12%), literature and arts (8%), sports victories (6%) and military strength of the state (2%).
• In recent years, Ukrainians have started to feel more pride in their land and territory, their state, their language and national symbols, while pride related to nature, traditions and sports victories decreased. Men are more likely to feel pride related to land, state and sports achievements. Women are more likely to feel pride related to people’s work ethic, traditions, literature and arts. Respondents with higher education more often feel pride in the state, people’s moral qualities and culture, while those with lower education more often mention history, traditions, religion and memory of ancestors. Urban residents more often mention people’s moral qualities, traditions, nature, literature and arts, while rural residents more often mention the state, language, work ethic, national symbols and religion.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 37% of respondents believe that representatives of big business should not be present in parliament under any circumstances, while another 33% believe they may be present only if they sell their businesses. Meanwhile, 18% see nothing wrong with big business representatives being present in parliament, and 12% were undecided.
• More loyal attitudes toward the presence of big business representatives in parliament are observed among people with higher levels of education and higher incomes.
• The majority of respondents (58%) believe that political parties should finance parliamentary election campaigns from the income and savings of party leaders. At the same time, 24% believe campaigns should be financed through voters’ contributions to party campaign funds, 22% — through sponsorship from big business, 9% — through state funding, 3% suggested other options, and 12% were undecided.
• According to 81% of respondents, the state should conclude an agreement with big business on returning part of capital to state ownership. Only 5% disagree with this idea, while 14% were undecided. Support for such an agreement is highest in Kyiv, the Center, the North, Galicia, and the West, and lowest in Kharkiv region.
• When asked what the state should do with large enterprises owned by oligarchs, 45% supported conducting objective investigations and returning only illegally obtained enterprises to state ownership, 36% supported nationalizing all large enterprises owned by oligarchs, 11% supported allowing owners to compensate for illegally obtained assets while retaining ownership, and only 2% supported taking no action. Another 6% were undecided.
• Over the past three months, the share of respondents supporting full nationalization of large enterprises decreased (from 44% to 36%), while support increased for investigations and the return of only illegally obtained enterprises (from 36% to 45%).
• Most respondents believe that both high-ranking officials and representatives of big business convicted of embezzlement of state property should receive maximum prison sentences. This position is supported by 68% regarding high-ranking officials and 62% regarding big business representatives. Providing at least minimum prison sentences is supported by 12% (for officials) and 15% (for business representatives). Approximately equal shares support suspended sentences combined with bans on holding public office (8% and 9% respectively). Only 1% support no punishment, and about 5% were undecided.
• About 30% of respondents would like to start their own business, while 55% would not. Only 3% stated they already own a business, and 12% were undecided. Over the past year, the share of those willing to engage in entrepreneurship increased slightly (from 27% to 30%), while the share of those unwilling decreased. At the same time, the share of those already running a business decreased (from 5% to 3%).
• Entrepreneurial aspirations are highest among residents of Kyiv, the West, Galicia, and the Center, as well as among men and younger people.
• 47% of respondents positively assess their chances of starting a business within the next one to two years, 46% believe they have no such chances, and 6% were undecided. Compared to the previous year, the share of those optimistic about entrepreneurial prospects decreased (from 54% to 47%), while skepticism increased.
• Regarding the idea of free sale of agricultural land, the majority of respondents (74%) have a negative attitude, 13% support the idea, and 12% were undecided. Over the past two years, there has been a slight increase in support for free agricultural land sales (from 9% in 2012, 11% in 2013, to 13% in 2014).

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held in early July 2014, about 60% of voters would have taken part in them. The highest level of mobilization was recorded in Galicia, Kyiv, the Center, and the West (around 80%). The lowest level was recorded in Donbas (27%) and in the South of the country (37%).
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in early July 2014, the Solidarity party would have won. Thus, 23% of respondents (among those who would have participated in the elections) would have voted for Solidarity, 13% for the Radical Party, 11% for Batkivshchyna, 7% for UDAR, and 5% for Civic Position. Around 4% of voters were ready to vote for Svoboda and the Communist Party. Around 3% would have been received by Strong Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and Front for Change. The party of O. Bohomolets would have received slightly less than 2%, while Right Sector and Self-Reliance (A. Sadovyi) would have received around 1%. About 4% of voters would have supported other parties, and 16% were undecided.
• Slightly more than one third of respondents (38%) were completely confident in their party choice. One third (32%) admitted they could change their choice, and nearly the same share (30%) were not confident in their choice or had not decided.
• Voters of the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, the Radical Party, UDAR, and Solidarity were the most confident in their choice compared to others.
• At the same time, an absolute majority of respondents believed that the new parliament should have fewer Members of Parliament than currently. Thus, 84% of respondents considered 300–350 MPs to be the optimal number. Only 4% believed there should be 450 MPs as at present, while 12% were undecided.
• The only politicians with a positive balance of trust versus distrust were P. Poroshenko, A. Yatsenyuk, and A. Hrytsenko. A significant level of trust was also recorded for V. Klitschko, O. Liashko, and O. Bohomolets. Respondents expressed the highest levels of distrust toward M. Dobkin, R. Akhmetov, and S. Tihipko.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, more than half of respondents (58%) believe that Russian intelligence services are behind the armed confrontations in Eastern Ukraine, while half (49%) believe that the entourage of former President V. Yanukovych is involved. Another quarter place responsibility on the Party of Regions (28%) and local oligarchs (24%). Every fifth respondent (18%) believes the confrontations are driven by local residents dissatisfied with the policies of the new government; 15% attribute them to radical nationalist organizations, 11% to Western intelligence services, and 6% to Ukrainian intelligence services. Four percent chose another option, and 11% were undecided.
• Compared to the April survey, the number of those who consider the entourage of former President Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and Western and Ukrainian intelligence services to be involved in the confrontations in the East has increased. At the same time, the share of those who believe local residents dissatisfied with the new government are responsible has decreased.
• Regionally, in Western and Central Ukraine, more respondents began to believe that the former President’s entourage is involved, while in the South fewer respondents hold this view. The Party of Regions is also blamed more often in the West, North, and Center. Compared to the previous survey, local residents dissatisfied with the new government are mentioned more often in the West, but less often in the East, South, and Donbas.
• In Donbas, more respondents began blaming Russian intelligence services and radical nationalist organizations. In this region, as well as in the South, there has been an increase in the number of those who believe local oligarchs and Western intelligence services are involved in the confrontations in Eastern Ukraine.
• When asked, “How would you assess the current state of relations between Ukraine and Russia?”, the majority (57%) described it as a war, 19% as a political conflict, 8% as a temporary misunderstanding, 6% as an economic conflict, 1% chose another option, and 9% were undecided. In most regions, respondents described relations as a war, except in Donbas and Kharkiv, where respondents were more likely to describe them as a political conflict.
• More than half of respondents (58%) believe Ukraine should completely close its border with Russia, 34% oppose this, and 8% are undecided. Border closure is supported in most regions except the South, Kharkiv, and Donbas.
• At the same time, half of respondents (49%) believe that a visa regime with Russia should be introduced, 41% oppose it, and 10% are undecided. Opposition to a visa regime is strongest in the South, Kharkiv, and Donbas.
• A large majority of respondents (75%) support a unitary state structure for Ukraine, 12% support a federal structure, and 13% are undecided. Over the previous three months, support for a unitary state increased (from 69% in April to 75% in July). Support for a unitary system is lowest in Donbas, among urban residents, and among Russian-speaking respondents. Donbas is the only region where a relative plurality (40%) supports a federal structure (29% unitary, 31% undecided). In all other regions, support for a unitary state prevails.
• Separation of Galicia from Ukraine is rather supported by 9% of respondents, rather opposed by 81%, and 10% are undecided. Over the previous two years, support for separation of Galicia increased from 5% in 2012 to 10% in 2014. Support for this idea is highest in Donbas, Kharkiv, the South, and Dnipro, as well as among supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine.
• Separation of Donbas is supported by 11%, opposed by 81%, and 8% are undecided. Over the past two years, support for separation increased from 2% in 2012 to 11% in 2014. The highest support is in Donbas itself (37%), about 10% in the South, Kharkiv region, Galicia, and Dnipro, and among supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine.
• Regarding integration choices, 61% of respondents support joining the European Union, 20% support joining the Customs Union, and 19% are undecided. Since April, support for EU integration has increased while support for the Customs Union has decreased. The highest support for the Customs Union is in Donbas (58%), Kharkiv region (42%), and the South (29%).
• If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held today, 44% would support joining, 35% would oppose it, and 22% would be undecided. Over the previous three months, support for NATO membership increased slightly, while opposition decreased by 11%. At the same time, the share of undecided respondents increased by 7%. Support for NATO membership is highest in Galicia (88%) and lowest in Donbas, Kharkiv region, and the South, where most respondents oppose joining NATO. Support for NATO membership is higher among men and people with higher education.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the 2014 FIFA World Cup generated less interest than the 2010 World Cup and significantly less than EURO 2012. Most fans supported Brazil and Germany, which were also considered the main favorites of the tournament, while Brazil’s chances of winning were assessed as twice as high.
• About one third of the adult population followed the events of the 2014 World Cup. In particular, 14% followed or intended to follow most matches, 9% followed the playoff matches and the final, and another 9% followed only the final. Meanwhile, 65% were not interested in the tournament at all. The highest level of interest was observed in the North, Center, and West of Ukraine. The decrease in overall interest was largely explained by the difficult situation in Eastern Ukraine: while in 2010 the Donbas region showed significant interest in the tournament, in 2014, due to objective circumstances, interest there was the lowest.
• 56% of Ukrainian men and 13% of women followed the World Cup. In 2010, nearly two thirds of men and almost every fifth woman followed World Cup matches. Most fans were young and middle-aged people. Additionally, the higher the level of education and income, the higher the interest in the tournament.
• One third of fans supported Brazil, while 27% supported Germany. The Netherlands were supported by 15%, France by 12%, Argentina by 9%, Portugal by 8%, Belgium by 3%, Uruguay by 2%, and Mexico by 1%. Notably, a significant share of Ukrainians supported teams that did not advance from the group stage: Spain (21%), Italy (15%), England (13%), Portugal (8%), Russia (6%), and Croatia (4%). It is likely that after these teams were eliminated, overall interest in the tournament declined.
• While during EURO 2012 about one quarter of Ukrainian fans supported Russia, during the 2014 World Cup only 6% did so.
• According to respondents, the highest chances of winning were attributed to Brazil (23%), Germany (14%), and the Netherlands (7%). France and Argentina were each named by 3% as potential winners.
• It is also worth noting that in 2012 Ukrainians accurately predicted the winner of the European Football Championship: nearly one third predicted Spain, which ultimately won EURO 2012.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with two other leading polling organizations in mid-May 2014, just one week before the presidential election, Ukrainians demonstrated a very high level of electoral engagement. About 82% of voters said they were definitely or likely to participate in the vote, while 12% said they would not and 6% were undecided. In the presidential election scheduled for May 25, Petro Poroshenko remained the clear frontrunner, supported by 34% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko ranked second with 6.5%, followed by Serhiy Tihipko with 5.8%. Oleh Liashko and Anatoliy Hrytsenko each received just over 4% support, Mykhailo Dobkin 3.5%, and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko 2.2%, while all other candidates polled below 2%. At the same time, nearly 23% of respondents said they had not yet decided whom to vote for, and about 12% stated they would not take part in the election.
• Among those who intended to vote and had already made their choice, Poroshenko’s lead was even more pronounced, with 53.2% support, compared with 10.1% for Tymoshenko and 8.8% for Tihipko, while Liashko and Hrytsenko would each receive just over 6%. When asked to predict the likely winner regardless of their own voting intentions, nearly half of respondents named Poroshenko, while only small shares expected Tymoshenko or Tihipko to win, and more than a third declined to make a forecast.
• The survey also measured views on key political and social issues. A plurality of respondents supported Ukrainian as the sole state language with Russian allowed official use, while others favored granting Russian official status in certain regions or making both Ukrainian and Russian state languages. An overwhelming majority supported Ukraine’s unitary form of government, with fewer than one in six favoring a federal system. Developments in the southeast of the country were most often seen as a form of covert Russian aggression, although significant minorities interpreted them as either a popular uprising or as terrorist acts.

• According to a nationwide study conducted by Rating Group in April 2014 as part of its “People’s TOP” project, which relies exclusively on open-ended questions without any prompted lists, respondents were asked to name their three favorite films. More than 600 different films and television series were mentioned, and only 16% of respondents were unable to name a favorite. The most frequently cited titles included The Magnificent Century: Roxolana, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, The Diamond Arm, The Irony of Fate, Love and Doves, Office Romance, and Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, along with a number of other iconic Soviet and post-Soviet productions.
• Clear regional patterns emerged in cultural preferences. In Western Ukraine, Roxolana, Power, Brigade, The Engagement Ring, and Angelika were mentioned more often than elsewhere. In the Center, respondents more frequently named Gentlemen of Fortune, Cops, Wedding in Malynivka, Twilight, and The Matrix. In the North, favorites included Interns, Operation “Y”, Titanic, The Fifth Element, and Doctor House. In the East, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, Office Romance, Seventeen Moments of Spring, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, and The Caucasian Captive were particularly popular. In Donbas, the most frequently mentioned films were The Diamond Arm, Love and Doves, Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, White Sun of the Desert, and Gone with the Wind, while in the South viewers preferred The Irony of Fate, Girls, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, The Three Musketeers, and the series Glukhar.
• Gender and age differences were also pronounced. Men tended to prefer adventure films, comedies, action movies, historical films, and crime dramas such as The Diamond Arm, Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, Operation “Y”, Cops, Brigade, Glukhar, 9th Company, Die Hard, Brother, and Star Wars. Women more often chose melodramas and comedies, including Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, The Irony of Fate, Office Romance, Love and Doves, Girls, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, Titanic, Pretty Woman, as well as the television series Roxolana and Power. Older respondents showed a stronger preference for classic Soviet films and for Roxolana, while younger people were more inclined toward contemporary international cinema such as Titanic, Avatar, Pretty Woman, and Die Hard, and middle-aged respondents gravitated more toward series such as Brigade and Cops.
• Language and place of residence also shaped preferences. Ukrainian-speaking respondents more often named Roxolana, Power, Gentlemen of Fortune, and For Two Hares, while bilingual respondents favored The Irony of Fate, Girls, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, Matchmakers, and Twilight. Russian-speaking respondents more frequently chose Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, Office Romance, Love and Doves, and The Caucasian Captive. Urban residents preferred The Irony of Fate, The Diamond Arm, The Caucasian Captive, Office Romance, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, Gentlemen of Fortune, Avatar, and Titanic, while rural residents more often cited Roxolana, Power, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, Cops, Matchmakers, The Dawns Here Are Quiet, Die Hard, and 9th Company.
• When classified by country of origin, the majority of favorite films were of Soviet origin, accounting for about 40% of all mentions, while one third were foreign productions, around one fifth were Russian, and only 5% were Ukrainian. Foreign films were most popular in the West and in the Northern and Central regions, while Soviet films dominated in the East, South, and Donbas. Russian films were mentioned least often both in the West and in Donbas. Soviet films were more popular among women, older people, urban residents, and those with lower incomes, while Russian films were more often favored by men. Ukrainian films were more frequently chosen by rural residents and older, lower-income groups, whereas younger, more affluent, Ukrainian-speaking respondents tended to prefer foreign cinema.
• Two thirds of all favorite titles mentioned were feature films and one third were television series. Feature films were especially dominant in Donbas, while series were most popular in the West. Preference for feature films increased with higher levels of education and income and was more common among men and Russian-speaking urban residents, whereas series were more often favored by women, Ukrainian-speaking rural residents, and people with lower incomes.