News and Press releases

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in late April 2014, electoral engagement in Ukraine remained high, with more than three quarters of respondents saying they would definitely or likely participate in the presidential election. After accounting for those who were not fully certain about their participation, the expected turnout was estimated at around 64 percent, with the highest participation projected in the West, North, and Center of the country, and the lowest in Donbas and the South, where voter activity had declined sharply compared to previous waves.
• In the presidential race, Petro Poroshenko remained the clear frontrunner. Among all respondents, 34.3% were ready to vote for him, compared with 11.1% for Yulia Tymoshenko and 5.7% for Serhiy Tihipko. Mykhailo Dobkin and Anatoliy Hrytsenko followed with around 4% each, while Oleh Liashko, Petro Symonenko, Oleh Tiahnybok, and Olha Bohomolets attracted smaller shares of support. Among likely voters, Poroshenko’s lead was even more pronounced, exceeding 40 percent nationwide, and he was the leading candidate in all regions except Donbas, where Dobkin ranked first amid extremely high levels of indecision and non-participation.
• Voter choice was relatively stable, particularly among supporters of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, and almost half of respondents said they supported their preferred candidate because they genuinely liked them and approved of their program and actions, although a substantial share admitted voting mainly because the alternatives were seen as worse. In all tested second-round scenarios, Poroshenko would defeat his main rivals by wide margins, although turnout in Donbas and parts of the South would drop significantly regardless of the pairing.
• Public willingness to endure economic hardship in exchange for future improvement increased markedly compared to March, especially in the West, North, and Center, while residents of Donbas and the South were much less prepared to accept short-term sacrifices. Attitudes toward oligarch-owned enterprises were divided between those favoring full nationalization and those preferring to return only illegally obtained assets to the state, with radical nationalization most popular among older, lower-income voters and supporters of the Communist Party.
• Most Ukrainians believed that the price paid to Russia for gas was above the market level and strongly supported keeping the gas transit system in state ownership. Support for reducing or completely ending purchases of Russian gas had grown substantially, and a large majority were ready to save gas, heating, or electricity if this would strengthen Ukraine’s position in relations with Russia, although willingness to do so was much lower in Donbas and the South.
• Regarding the protests in eastern Ukraine, a majority of respondents attributed them primarily to Russian special services and the entourage of former President Viktor Yanukovych, while significant shares also pointed to local oligarchs, the Party of Regions, and discontented local residents. Views varied regionally, with residents in the East, South, and especially Donbas more likely to see the protests as driven by local grievances.
• On how the Ukrainian authorities should respond to protesters calling for secession, opinions were split between those favoring negotiations while preserving territorial integrity and those supporting tough measures, including the use of force if necessary. In the event of a Russian military incursion across mainland borders, a majority of Ukrainians supported armed resistance to defend the country, although large minorities in the South, East, and Donbas preferred negotiations. About 44% of respondents said they were personally ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms, with the highest readiness observed in the West, North, and Center, as well as among younger, male, more educated, and higher-income respondents.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in April 2014, one third of Ukrainians reported that they regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while almost half said they do not. Since 2010, the share of those expressing nostalgia for the USSR has declined by nearly one and a half times, while the proportion of those who do not regret its collapse has grown steadily. This shift accelerated over the last year, reflecting a rapid transformation of public attitudes. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union is more widespread in the East, South, and especially in Donbas, while it is significantly lower in the Center of the country. Older people, those with lower levels of education and income, and ethnic Russians are more likely to regret the collapse of the USSR, while among ethnic Ukrainians this sentiment has declined sharply over the past year.
• Public attitudes toward historical and political figures also reveal deep and shifting divisions. Half of respondents expressed a positive view of Peter the Great, although this figure has declined in recent years, while around 30% hold a negative opinion. He is viewed more favorably in the East, South, Donbas, and to a lesser extent in the Center and North, and ethnic Russians tend to evaluate him slightly more positively than ethnic Ukrainians. Ivan Mazepa is viewed positively by 41% of respondents and negatively by 30%, with the strongest support in the West, Center, and North, and a much weaker but still notable level of support in the South and East. Ethnic Ukrainians are far more likely than ethnic Russians to hold positive views of Mazepa, and higher education is associated with more favorable attitudes.
• Joseph Stalin is viewed negatively by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, with only one in five expressing a positive attitude. Negative views of Stalin have grown significantly in recent years, although he retains more support in Donbas and the South, as well as among older, less educated, and lower-income respondents and among ethnic Russians. Stepan Bandera remains a highly polarizing figure: nearly one third of respondents view him positively, while almost half hold negative opinions. However, positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased substantially over the past two years, especially in Western Ukraine, and are more common among younger, more educated respondents and ethnic Ukrainians.
• Vladimir Putin is viewed overwhelmingly negatively, with more than three quarters of respondents expressing unfavorable opinions. This represents a dramatic shift from late 2013, when positive views outnumbered negative ones. Only in Donbas does a majority still hold positive attitudes toward him, while in all other regions negative views dominate, particularly in the Center, North, and West. Ethnic Russians are far more likely to view Putin positively than ethnic Ukrainians, although even among ethnic Russians he no longer enjoys majority support.
• These attitudes form coherent ideological patterns. Those who regret the collapse of the USSR are far more likely to view figures such as Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin positively, while those who do not regret the Soviet collapse are much more likely to hold positive views of Mazepa and Bandera and strongly negative views of Stalin and Putin. At the same time, even among those who admire Peter the Great, attitudes toward Putin have shifted sharply, with many now viewing him more negatively than figures historically associated with Ukrainian independence.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group as part of a joint project with three other leading polling organizations in April 2014, Ukrainians demonstrated a very high level of electoral engagement, with around 85% of voters saying they were definitely or likely to participate in the upcoming election, while only 11% expressed the opposite view. In the presidential election scheduled for May 25, 2014, Petro Poroshenko was the clear frontrunner, supported by 32.9% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko ranked second with 9.5%, followed by Serhiy Tihipko with 5.1%. Mykhailo Dobkin was supported by 4.2% of voters, while Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko received 4%. At the same time, about 22% of respondents said they had not yet decided whom to vote for or would not participate, and 9% stated they were ready to vote “against all.”
• Among those who intended to vote and had already made their choice, the leading candidates were even more clearly defined. Petro Poroshenko would receive 48.4% of the vote, Yulia Tymoshenko 14%, and Serhiy Tihipko 7.4%, while Mykhailo Dobkin and Petro Symonenko would receive 6% and 5.6%, respectively. Respondents were also asked to make their own prediction about who would become the next President of Ukraine regardless of their personal voting intentions. Here again, Petro Poroshenko was seen as the most likely winner, with 38.7% expecting his victory. Only 8.6% predicted a win for Yulia Tymoshenko, and 2.5% for Serhiy Tihipko, while 1.9% believed Mykhailo Dobkin would win. Nearly half of all respondents did not venture a forecast.
• The survey also explored attitudes toward language policy, state structure, and foreign relations. A plurality of respondents supported Ukrainian as the only state language with Russian allowed as an official language, while others favored granting Russian official status in certain regions or making both languages state languages. A strong majority of Ukrainians supported the unitary form of the state, while fewer than one in five favored a federal system. In relations with Russia, most respondents preferred friendly relations with open borders and no visas or customs while maintaining independence, whereas about one third favored a relationship similar to that with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs. Only a small minority supported unification with Russia.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre in late March and early April 2014, most Ukrainians expressed clear preferences regarding the country’s future institutional, linguistic, and geopolitical orientation. If a referendum were to be held on key issues such as the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the territorial structure of the state, and Ukraine’s integration choices, 82.7% of voters said they would definitely or likely participate. Among those willing to take part, 71.4% would vote for a unitary state, while only 17.1% would support federalization. Nearly 60% would support Ukrainian as the only state language, while 36.5% would oppose this. A similar share would vote in favor of joining the European Union, compared to about a quarter who would prefer accession to the Customs Union, while support for NATO membership would be notably weaker, with less than 40% in favor and nearly half opposed.
• When calculated among all respondents rather than only likely participants, the results show a similarly strong preference for a unitary system with decentralization, supported by more than two thirds, while fewer than one in five would vote for a federal structure. On language policy, a majority would support Ukrainian as the sole state language with free use of Russian, while a substantial minority would favor both Ukrainian and Russian as state languages. In terms of Ukraine’s integration path, a majority would support joining the European Union, whereas less than one quarter would favor the Customs Union. NATO membership would be backed by just over one third of respondents, while almost half would oppose it.
• Public opinion was also tested on a range of concrete policy options for Ukraine’s future. Support for signing the Association Agreement with the European Union and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was high, with around 60% in favor. In contrast, ideas of political or state integration with Russia were overwhelmingly rejected: only one fifth supported a union state with Russia and Belarus, fewer than one in ten supported Ukraine becoming part of the Russian Federation, and a similar share favored their own region joining Russia. Joining the CIS Collective Security Treaty was supported by less than one in five, while a clear majority opposed it. Nearly half of respondents favored maintaining Ukraine’s non-aligned status, and most opposed introducing a visa regime with Russia. Opinions on withdrawing from the CIS were divided almost evenly.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre in late March and early April 2014, public attitudes toward key state institutions and political leaders were highly differentiated. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov received full support from 21.1% of respondents, while 32.8% said they supported some of his actions and 38.5% did not support his activities. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was viewed more favorably: 30.8% fully supported his work, 28.0% supported some of his actions, and 35.5% did not support him. The Cabinet of Ministers as a whole was fully supported by 20.6% of respondents, partially supported by 33.9%, and not supported by 36.8%, while the Verkhovna Rada received full support from 15.6%, partial support from 38.7%, and no support from 38.0%.
• Support for the security institutions was the highest it had been in several years. The Armed Forces were fully supported by 37.6% of respondents and partially supported by another 30.9%, with only 22.8% expressing no support. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was fully supported by 17.5% and partially supported by 32.3%, while 34.7% did not support its activities. The police were fully supported by 13.6% and partially supported by 32.5%, while 42.2% expressed no support. Levels of support for state institutions were significantly higher in the Western and Central regions than in the South and East. For example, only 15.5% in the West and 24.1% in the Center did not support the acting president, compared with 46.7% in the South and 64.2% in the East.
• Electoral mobilization was very high: 85.4% of respondents said they intended to participate in the early presidential election, including 62.2% who were fully certain and another 23.2% who said they were likely to vote. If the election had taken place in the days of the survey, Petro Poroshenko would have received the support of 28.2% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko followed with 13.0%, Serhiy Tihipko with 6.1%, Olha Bohomolets and Oleh Liashko with 3.7% each, Mykhailo Dobkin with 3.6%, Petro Symonenko with 3.2%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko with 3.0%, Oleh Tiahnybok with 1.6%, Dmytro Yarosh with 1.2%, Renat Kuzmin with 0.2%, and Vadym Rabinovych with 0.1%.
• Compared with the previous joint survey conducted by four polling organizations in mid-March 2014, when Vitali Klitschko was still included in the list of candidates, electoral support increased for Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Serhiy Tihipko.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group, a clear majority of Ukrainians believe that the top priorities for reform are fighting corruption and reforming the economy. Sixty-three percent of respondents named anti-corruption reform as the most urgent task, while 61% pointed to the economy. At the same time, 42% believe reforms are needed in the army and defense sector, and 33% emphasized the importance of ensuring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Health care reform was mentioned by 35% of respondents, social protection by 30%, industry by 28%, agriculture by 25%, and the police by 21%. Regional differences are evident: in Western Ukraine the strongest demand is for reforms of the army and territorial integrity, in the East and Donbas for economic and industrial reform, in the South for agriculture, and in the Center for health care, although across all regions fighting corruption remains the top priority.
• When asked about the key criteria for lustration in Ukraine, more than half of respondents named involvement in corruption schemes as the main basis for applying lustration. Far fewer pointed to political corruption, changes in political orientation, adherence to certain ideologies seen as harmful to the country, or involvement in human rights violations during recent protests. At the same time, one in ten respondents opposed lustration altogether, arguing that it could further destabilize the country, while another 12% were undecided. A strong majority believe that lustration should apply to all individuals involved in corruption and illegal actions regardless of their political affiliation or the period in which they were in power, while smaller groups favor limiting it to specific political periods such as 2010–2014 or 2005–2009.
• Most Ukrainians also support the idea of forming a coalition government that would include representatives of all major political forces from all regions of the country. This idea is particularly popular in the West, North, and East of Ukraine. There is also broad public support for the entry of new leaders into politics, especially through participation in parliamentary and presidential elections. Around four in ten respondents fully support this idea, and another third are rather supportive than opposed. Support for new leaders is slightly stronger with regard to parliamentary elections than presidential ones, while only about one in ten respondents are against it, and one in six remain undecided. Support for new presidential candidates is highest in the West and North and lowest in Donbas, the East, and the Center of the country.
• In choosing a candidate to vote for, the most important criterion for voters is an untainted reputation free of corruption, followed by the personal qualities of the politician, the candidate’s political program, and a consistent, stable political position. Regarding Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation, 38% of respondents believe the Association Agreement with the European Union and the free trade area should be signed as soon as possible, with support particularly high in Western Ukraine. Another 21% favor signing the agreement once Ukraine is ready, while nearly a third do not support signing it at all. Support for NATO membership is more divided: 28% favor submitting an application as soon as possible, another 14% support doing so once a societal consensus is reached, and 44% oppose NATO membership altogether. In contrast, only a minority support joining the Customs Union, while a majority are against it.
• The data also show that supporters of new political leaders are significantly more likely to back European integration and NATO membership than those who oppose new leaders, while the opposite pattern is observed with regard to the Customs Union.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, more than half of Kyiv residents definitely planned to participate in the Kyiv mayoral and Kyiv City Council elections scheduled for May 25, 2014, while nearly another 30% answered “rather yes than no.” It is important to note that the survey was conducted on March 22–28, before it became known that Vitalii Klitschko withdrew from the presidential race and decided to run for Kyiv mayor.
• In the Kyiv City Council elections, party ratings were as follows: 19% of those intending to vote would support Batkivshchyna, 16% UDAR, 10% the European Party, 7% the Radical Party, 6% each Svoboda and Civic Position, 3% each Right Sector, Democratic Alliance and the Party of Regions, and 2% the Communist Party. Almost 20% were undecided. If the Solidarity party (Petro Poroshenko) had been included on the list, the ratings would have been as follows: 25% for Solidarity, 14% for Batkivshchyna, 11% for UDAR, 8% for the European Party, 5% each for Svoboda and the Radical Party, 4% for Civic Position, 3% for Right Sector, and 2% each for the Party of Regions, Democratic Alliance and the Communist Party. Almost 17% would have been undecided. The largest vote transfers to Solidarity would have come from UDAR and Batkivshchyna.
• Among proposed candidates for the position of Kyiv mayor, the leaders of electoral preferences were Mykola Katerynchuk (12% among those intending to vote), followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko (11%), Oleh Liashko (8%), Volodymyr Bondarenko (8%), and Yurii Lutsenko (8%). About 5% were ready to support Volodymyr Makeienko, about 4% each Vyacheslav Kyrylenko and Lesia Orobets, about 3% Andrii Illienko, 2% Tetiana Montian, and 1% Ihor Lutsenko. Every tenth respondent would choose another candidate for mayor, and nearly 24% were undecided. The idea of holding mayoral elections in two rounds was supported by 44% of Kyiv residents, while almost the same share (42%) opposed it, and 14% were undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in March 2014, a clear majority of respondents consider a unitary state to be the most optimal form of government for Ukraine. Sixty-one percent support a unitary system, while 24% prefer a federal structure, and 15% remain undecided. Compared to 2011, support for a unitary state increased substantially from 50% to 61%, while support for federalization remained almost unchanged.
• The unitary model is supported in most regions of the country, with the exception of Donbas, where a majority favors a federal system. At the same time, only a small minority of Ukrainians believe that Crimea should be separated and transferred to Russia. Most respondents support either maintaining Crimea’s autonomy within Ukraine or granting it the status of a regular oblast. Over the past three years, support for autonomy within Ukraine increased markedly, while support for granting Crimea the status of a regular region declined, and the share of those favoring separation remained marginal and largely unchanged. Those who support transferring Crimea to Russia are concentrated mainly in the South of the country.
• When asked directly about the separation of Crimea from Ukraine, an overwhelming majority oppose this idea, and only a small minority support it. A similar pattern is observed regarding the possible separation of Donbas or Galicia, with the vast majority of respondents rejecting these scenarios. Although support for territorial separation has increased slightly over the previous two years, these attitudes have grown primarily in Crimea and Donbas and do not dominate in any region. Even among Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian respondents, no more than a quarter support the separation of Crimea or Donbas, while roughly 70% are opposed.

• According to surveys conducted by Rating Group in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa, an absolute majority of residents are satisfied with living in their cities. The highest levels of satisfaction were recorded in Kharkiv, where 90% of respondents said they like living in their city, as well as in Odesa, Lviv, and Kyiv. The lowest shares were found in Dnipropetrovsk (80%) and Donetsk (78%), where only about one third of residents reported being very satisfied.
• Kyiv is most commonly perceived by its residents as a green city with a large share of young people, a rich history, and many monuments, making it one of the most attractive cities in Ukraine for tourists. Kyiv is also seen as the city offering the greatest opportunities for children’s development and for work and income generation. At the same time, Kyiv residents are the least likely among all surveyed cities to say that people in their city know how to work well.
• Lviv is viewed by most of its residents as an attractive tourist city with a rich history, beautiful architecture, many monuments, and a strong café culture. Compared to other cities, Lviv is most often described as religious and spiritual, quiet, cozy, and safe. However, it is also perceived as providing the fewest opportunities for work and income, as well as for children’s development, which is reflected in the lowest assessment of education quality. Residents are also dissatisfied with the number of shopping and entertainment centers and with the convenience of transportation.
• For Kharkiv residents, their city is a green urban environment with many shopping and entertainment centers and a large share of young people. Many respondents also highlight its architecture, monuments, and numerous cafés. Kharkiv is perceived as quiet, tidy, and environmentally clean, which distinguishes it from other cities. It also receives the highest ratings for education, roads, and healthcare, making it a city of significant opportunities combined with a relatively low cost of living.
• In Dnipropetrovsk, the most distinctive feature for residents is the large number of young people. The city is seen as industrial but with many shopping and entertainment centers, cafés, and restaurants. Dnipropetrovsk is regarded as the most politically active city and one that plays an important role in the country’s development. At the same time, it is not perceived as environmentally clean, quiet, or tidy, nor as attractive for tourists, and residents frequently point to poor roads.
• Donetsk is perceived by its residents as an industrial city with many parks, squares, and shopping and entertainment centers. More than half of respondents highlighted its particularly interesting sports life, making Donetsk a clear leader among Ukrainian cities on this indicator. Cultural life, historical heritage, architecture, spirituality, and respect for traditions are mentioned much less often. Donetsk also scores lowest on education quality and on opportunities for children’s development, work, and income.
• Most residents of Odesa consider their city to have a rich history, beautiful architecture, and many monuments. It is viewed as highly attractive for tourists due to its traditions, the most interesting cultural life, and good food. Odesa also stands out for having friendly and pleasant people who know how to enjoy life. However, it receives the lowest ratings for road and healthcare quality and for affordability of living, and it is perceived as one of the least politically active cities.
• Young people tend to see their hometown primarily as a center of leisure, with many cafés, attractive people, and an interesting sports life. Middle-aged residents are more likely to emphasize cultural life, job opportunities, and affordability. Older respondents place greater importance on spirituality, history, monuments, cleanliness, and coziness.
• Most respondents believe that developments in their own cities are moving in the right direction, especially in Donetsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Lviv, while Kyiv residents are the most critical, and a large share of Dnipropetrovsk residents remain undecided. At the national level, however, respondents generally believe that Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction, particularly in Odesa and Kyiv, while Donetsk and Kharkiv show more optimism. Residents of all cities except Kyiv tend to evaluate past changes in their cities positively, with Kharkiv and Lviv being the most optimistic. Nearly one third of Kyiv residents assess past changes negatively. Expectations for the coming year are most positive in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, while Kyiv shows the highest level of negative expectations, and residents of Odesa and Donetsk generally expect no major changes.
• Most respondents identify Kharkiv and Kyiv as the country’s leading cities. About one in eight respondents classify their city as average compared to other regional centers. Residents of Donetsk, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk are more modest in their assessments, with about one third placing their cities among the average. Lviv residents are the most reserved, with roughly half calling their city a leader and about 40% describing it as average.

• Rating Group continues the “People’s TOP” project, which consists of a series of studies aimed at identifying the best of the best. The special feature of the methodology is that respondents are given no lists or prompts and express their opinions only through open-ended questions, naming their own options. This time the question was: “Name your THREE favorite songs.”
• Determining Ukrainians’ favorite songs turned out to be quite difficult. During the survey, respondents named around 800 songs, while one quarter were unable to name a favorite song. In order to compile a ranking from the 800 named songs, a TOP-30 of the most popular songs was identified and the weight of each song within the TOP-30 structure was calculated.
• Thus, according to the results of the study, the most favorite song of Ukrainians is “Chervona Ruta” (its share in the TOP-30 is 14.3%). Other favorite songs include “Chornobryvtsi” (5%), “Odna Kalyna” (4.3%), “Nese Halia Vodu” (4.1%), “Oi, Smereko” (3.9%), “Million Alykh Roz,” “Khutorianka,” “Ridna Maty Moia,” and “Katyusha” (3.6% each), “Aisberg” and “Den Pobedy” (3.3% each), “O Bozhe, Kakoi Muzhchina” (3.2%), “Cheremshyna” and “Oi, na hori dva dubky” (3% each).
• Based on the named favorite songs, a TOP-30 of the most popular performers was also identified and the weight of each within the TOP-30 structure calculated. Thus, the most popular performers are Sofia Rotaru (share in the TOP-30 14.3%) and Alla Pugacheva (11.2%). In Sofia Rotaru’s repertoire the most popular song is “Chervona Ruta,” while among Alla Pugacheva’s songs the most popular are “Million Alykh Roz” and “Aisberg.”
• Also included in the TOP-30 of popular performers are Stas Mikhailov (8.4%), Okean Elzy (4.7%), Grigory Leps (4.2%), Ani Lorak (4.1%), Taisia Povaliy (3.6%), Mikhail Krug and the group Lyube (3.5% each), Nikolai Baskov (3.2%), and Mykola Hnatiuk (3.1%).
• In the West, songs more popular than in other regions include “Chervona Ruta,” “Khutorianka,” “Oi, Smereko,” “Oi, na hori dva dubky,” and “Vodohrai.” Among performers: Sofia Rotaru, Okean Elzy, Mykola Hnatiuk, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, and Nazar Yaremchuk.
  In the Center: “Ridna Maty Moia,” “Nese Halia Vodu,” “Vsyo dlia tebya,” and “Rozpriahaitе, khloptsi, koni.” Among performers: Grigory Leps, Elena Vaenga, Oksana Bilozir, and Oleg Gazmanov.
  In the North, more favorite songs are “Oi, u vyshnevomu sadu,” “Nich yaka misyachna,” “Cheremshyna,” “Nadezhda,” and “Belye rozy.” Among performers: Okean Elzy, Nina Matviyenko, TIK, Alisa, and Madonna.
  Residents of the East and Donbas more often chose “Katyusha,” “Oi, moroz, moroz,” “Smuglyanka,” “Ah, kakaya zhenshchina,” and “Den Pobedy.” More popular performers in the East are Alla Pugacheva, Stas Mikhailov, Ani Lorak, Nikolai Baskov, and Sergey Trofimov. In Donbas — Mikhail Krug, Mikhail Shufutinsky, and Mikhail Boyarsky.
  In the South, favorite songs include “Aisberg,” “Lavanda,” and “A belyi lebed na prudu.” Among performers, Taisia Povaliy, Lyube, and Maya Kristalinskaya are more popular.
• Men more often prefer songs such as “Oi, Smereko,” “Den Pobedy,” “Rozpriahaitе, khloptsi, koni,” “Smuglyanka,” “Oi, chyi to kin stoit,” “Sharmanka,” and “Ryumka vodki na stole.” Their favorite performers are Lyube, Okean Elzy, Mikhail Krug, and Vladimir Vysotsky.
  Women prefer “Chervona Ruta,” “Odna Kalyna,” “Chornobryvtsi,” “O Bozhe, kakoi muzhchina,” “Aisberg,” “Million Alykh Roz,” and “Lavanda.” Among women, the most popular performers are Sofia Rotaru, Alla Pugacheva, Stas Mikhailov, Ani Lorak, Taisia Povaliy, and Natalie.
• With age, the popularity of songs such as “Chervona Ruta,” “Katyusha,” “Odna Kalyna,” and “Oi, moroz, moroz” increases. Modern songs such as “O Bozhe, kakoi muzhchina,” “Belye rozy,” “Sharmanka,” and “Vsyo dlia tebya” are favorites among young people and those of middle age.
• Those who consider Ukrainian their native language prefer “Chervona Ruta,” “Nese Halia Vodu,” “Oi, Smereko,” “Ridna Maty Moia,” “Oi, na hori dva dubky,” and “Oi, chyi to kin stoit.”
  Those who consider both languages native prefer “Odna Kalyna,” “Chornobryvtsi,” “Nich yaka misyachna,” “Aisberg,” and “Rozpriahaitе, khloptsi, koni.”
  Russian-speaking respondents more often chose “Katyusha,” “Oi, moroz, moroz,” “Smuglyanka,” “Den Pobedy,” “Million Alykh Roz,” and “Ah, kakaya zhenshchina.”
• Favorite songs of urban residents include “Million Alykh Roz,” “Katyusha,” “O Bozhe, kakoi muzhchina,” “Smuglyanka,” “Belye rozy,” “A belyi lebed na prudu,” “Nadezhda,” and “Oi, u vyshnevomu sadu.”
  Among rural residents, dominant favorites are “Chervona Ruta,” “Nese Halia Vodu,” “Oi, Smereko,” “Cheremshyna,” “Oi, na hori dva dubky,” “Odna Kalyna,” “Ridna Maty Moia,” and “Sharmanka.”
• Respondents’ answers were also grouped by period of creation (before and after the 1990s), language of performance, and musical style.
• In the structure of favorite songs, 51% are from the post-1990s period, while 49% were created before the 1990s.
  Modern songs are more popular in Donbas (57%) and the East (55%), especially among men, Russian-speaking urban residents, youth, people with higher education and higher incomes. Supporters of “older” songs are more common in the West (57%) and Center (51%), more often women, older people with lower education and income.
• In the structure of favorite songs, 53% are Russian-language, 39% Ukrainian-language, and 8% foreign.
  Russian-language songs are more popular in Donbas (65%), the South (63%), the East (62%), and the North (53%).
  Ukrainian-language songs are most popular in the West (65%) and Center (43%).
  Foreign songs appear more often among favorites in Donbas (11%) and the North (10%), and least often in the West (5%).
  Russian-language songs are more loved by Russian-speaking urban residents, while Ukrainian songs are more popular among women, Ukrainian speakers, rural residents, older people, and those with lower education and income.
  Foreign songs are more often chosen by men, young people with higher education, and those with higher incomes.
• In terms of musical style, 48% of favorite songs are pop, 16% folk, 11% rock, 10% chanson. Patriotic songs and romances account for 5% each, bard songs 2%, and club/electronic and classical music 1% each.
• Pop music is much more popular among women.
  Folk songs are more popular in the West (27%), North (16%), and Center (17%); their fans are mainly women, Ukrainian-speaking rural residents, and older people with lower education and income.
  Rock music is more popular in the North (15%) and South (12%), mainly among men, urban residents, youth, people with higher education and income.
  Chanson is most popular in Donbas (16%), the South and East (11% each), and is chosen by men, Russian-speaking urban residents, and middle-aged people with higher incomes.
  Patriotic songs are also more widespread in the East and Donbas (around 8%), and in the North and South (5% each); their listeners are mainly Russian-speaking urban residents of older age with lower education and income.
  Romances are more popular in the East (7%), mainly among Russian-speakers.

• According to the results of a study conducted in December 2013 by the Center for Social and Marketing Research “SOCIS” and the Rating Group, 49.1% of respondents would vote in a referendum for Ukraine joining the European Union, while 29.6% would vote against. Another 21.3% were undecided or would not participate in such a referendum. Among those who had decided, the share of EU supporters would be 62.4%.
• If a referendum on Ukraine joining the Customs Union were held in the near future, 32.5% of Ukrainian citizens would support such a union, while 41.9% would vote against. Another 25.6% were undecided or would not participate.
• When asked to choose between two main foreign policy directions (“Imagine that a referendum is being held now on whether Ukraine should join the European Union or the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. What would be your choice?”), respondents answered as follows: 46.9% would support joining the EU, while 28.9% would vote for joining the Customs Union. Another 24.2% were undecided or would not participate.
• After Ukraine did not sign the EU Association Agreement at the end of November, attitudes toward President Viktor Yanukovych worsened among 45.7% of respondents. At the same time, 15.7% said their attitude improved. For 36.4% attitudes did not change. Another 3.1% were undecided.
• Only 1.8% of respondents assessed the current political situation in Ukraine as “stable”. At the same time, 46.1% described it as “tense”, and 49.4% as “explosive”.
• Half of Ukrainians (49.7%) said they would be ready to go out and protest if living conditions significantly worsened. Meanwhile, 28.5% said they would be ready to tolerate material and other hardships for the sake of maintaining order in the country. Another 21.8% were undecided.
• According to most respondents, civic activity (the Maidan) could influence the current situation in Ukraine: 41.3% said to a large extent, and 29.8% to a small extent. At the same time, almost one in five respondents (18%) believed civic activity would not influence the situation at all. Another 11% were undecided.
• 42% of respondents had a positive attitude toward the fact that after the EU Association Agreement was not signed, people in Kyiv and many other Ukrainian cities went out into the streets and organized protests. 35.6% had a negative attitude, 15.4% were neutral, and 7% were undecided or indifferent.
• 44.7% had a negative attitude toward the blocking of administrative buildings during protests (Presidential Administration, Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, Kyiv City State Administration, etc.). 24.9% had a positive attitude, 15.4% were neutral, and 11.8% were undecided or indifferent.
• At the same time, the overwhelming majority of respondents (73.6%) had a negative attitude toward the dispersal of the rally in Kyiv by the Berkut special police unit on the night of November 30. Only 9% viewed it positively, 11.2% neutrally, and 6.2% were undecided or indifferent.
• At the time of the survey, 0.5% of respondents had participated in events supporting the government, and another 3.5% were ready to participate. Additionally, 12% said they supported pro-government rallies but were not ready to participate. Meanwhile, 75.8% did not support such events. Another 8.1% were undecided.
• On the other hand, 5.7% of respondents had participated in protests against the current government. Another 17.5% were ready to participate. One in five respondents (21.6%) supported such protests but were not ready to participate. At the same time, almost half (47.6%) did not support these actions. Another 7.7% were undecided.
• Attitudes toward the main demands of the opposition and Euromaidan toward the authorities were generally positive.
  
  • 53.3% supported the resignation of Interior Minister Vitalii Zakharchenko, 30.8% did not support it, and 15.9% were undecided.
  • 50.9% supported the resignation of the government led by Mykola Azarov, 37.9% did not support it, and 11.3% were undecided.
  • 46% supported early presidential elections, 42% opposed them, and 12% were undecided.
  • 46.1% supported early parliamentary elections, 40.8% opposed them, and 13.2% were undecided.
• Responsibility for resolving the political crisis was primarily assigned to the President (41.5%), civil society (32.6%), and opposition parties (29.3%). Another 19.1% said new leaders should be the main driving force, 17.3% named the Verkhovna Rada, and 7% named journalists and media representatives. 10.4% were undecided.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents (72.6%) supported the idea of a round table and negotiations between the government and opposition to resolve political contradictions and the crisis. 13.9% did not support negotiations, and 13.4% were undecided.

Electoral preferences of Ukrainian residents

• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 20.2% (among all respondents) would support Viktor Yanukovych, 18.6% Vitalii Klitschko, 9.4% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 7.1% Petro Poroshenko, 5.1% Oleh Tyahnybok, 4.5% Petro Symonenko, and 0.9% Viktor Medvedchuk. Other candidates would receive 4.7%. 14.7% would not participate, and 14.9% were undecided.
• If Yulia Tymoshenko were able to participate, support would be: Yanukovych – 20.1%, Tymoshenko – 16.6%, Klitschko – 16.2%, Poroshenko – 5.7%, Symonenko – 4.5%, Tyahnybok – 3.9%, Medvedchuk – 0.9%. Others – 3.6%. 14.7% would not vote, and 13.9% were undecided.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Klitschko, 25.2% (among all respondents) would vote for Yanukovych and 42.7% for Klitschko. 19.6% would not participate and 12.5% would be undecided. Among those who would vote and had decided, the result would be 63.3% vs. 36.7% in favor of Klitschko.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Yatseniuk, 25.8% would vote for Yanukovych and 35% for Yatseniuk. 24.4% would not participate and 14.8% would be undecided. The result would be 58.2% vs. 41.8% in favor of Yatseniuk.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Poroshenko, 25% would vote for Yanukovych and 33% for Poroshenko. 25.7% would not participate and 16.3% would be undecided. The result would be 57.5% vs. 42.5% in favor of Poroshenko.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, 26.6% would vote for Yanukovych and 32.1% for Tymoshenko. 25.8% would not participate and 15.5% would be undecided. The result would be 55.8% vs. 44.2% in favor of Tymoshenko.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Tyahnybok, 27.1% would vote for Yanukovych and 28.8% for Tyahnybok. 27.6% would not participate and 16.5% would be undecided. The result would be 52.9% vs. 47.1% in favor of Tyahnybok.
• If parliamentary elections were held soon, party support would be: Party of Regions – 20.2% (among all respondents), Batkivshchyna – 17%, UDAR – 15.9%, Svoboda – 5.6%, Communist Party – 5.5%, Solidarity – 3.6%. Ukrainian Choice – 0.9%, Radical Party of Oleh Liashko – 0.7%, Our Ukraine – 0.3%. Other parties – 2.1%. 15.5% would not vote, and 12.6% were undecided.

• Rating Group continues its People’s TOP project, a series of studies aimed at identifying “the best of the best.” The distinctive feature of the methodology is that respondents are not provided with any lists or prompts and give their answers exclusively through open-ended questions, naming their own options. In this wave, respondents were asked to name their three favorite dishes, regardless of the cuisine of origin. The results show that borshch is by far the most popular dish among Ukrainians, chosen by 44% of respondents. It is followed by varenyky at 18%, especially those filled with cottage cheese, potatoes, and cherries, as well as shashlik at 10%, kholodets at 7%, cutlets at 6%, and pork chops at 5%. Other meat dishes together account for 14%, with sausage, French-style meat, and fried or stewed meat being the most frequently mentioned. About 7% named plov as their favorite dish and 4% roast, while only 4% of respondents chose salo as their top dish. Dumplings were mentioned by 10%, various potato dishes such as mashed potatoes at 11% and fried potatoes at 8% were also very common, while salads were highly popular, including Olivier at 11%, “Shuba” at 4%, and other salads at 10%, such as vegetable, vinaigrette, Greek, crab, meat, and Caesar salads. Fish dishes were named by 10% of respondents, with preferences for fried, stuffed, or jellied fish, herring, and seafood. Around 9% of respondents selected baked goods and desserts such as syrnyky, pies, ice cream, cottage cheese casserole, and fruit, while pancakes were chosen by 4%, mainly with cottage cheese filling. Other soups besides borshch were mentioned by 10%, including okroshka, solyanka, green borshch, broth, cabbage soup, kharcho, pea soup, and rassolnik, while various cereals were mentioned by 4%, mainly buckwheat, milk porridge, oatmeal, and kulish.
• Overall, Ukrainians’ top favorite dishes are borshch, varenyky, and meat-based dishes, with meat clearly preferred over potatoes and far more than fish. The culture of soups and desserts is well developed, and various salads are also relatively popular, even though most of them are not traditionally Ukrainian. Newer dishes such as pizza, chosen by 4%, and sushi, chosen by 2%, are gaining popularity. Ukrainians are generally very willing to share their food preferences, with only 4% unable to name a favorite dish. Regional differences are pronounced: in the West, cabbage rolls, varenyky, and potato pancakes are especially popular; in the Center, fish dishes, kholodets, and salo; in the North, potatoes, soups, and pork chops; in the South, dumplings, fried potatoes, and plov; and in the East and Donbas, salads and meat dishes such as Olivier and shashlik, as well as okroshka and “Shuba” salad.
• Age, education, and gender also shape culinary tastes. With increasing age and lower levels of education, respondents more often choose traditional Ukrainian dishes such as borshch, varenyky, and potatoes. Younger people prefer Olivier salad, shashlik, and fried or baked potatoes, while higher education is associated with a stronger preference for salads, shashlik, and pork chops. Non-traditional dishes such as pizza and sushi are especially popular among young people and those with higher education. Men gravitate toward heavier dishes like varenyky, shashlik, dumplings, fried or baked potatoes, and salo, and they also choose borshch more often than women. Women’s menus are lighter and more diverse, including salads, mashed potatoes, fish dishes, stewed or grilled vegetables, cabbage rolls, cereals, sushi, and desserts. Borshch and Olivier are particularly popular among lower-income respondents. Urban residents more often choose fish dishes, salads, roast, sushi, cakes, and pizza, while rural residents favor traditional foods such as borshch, varenyky, mashed potatoes, and kholodets. Preferences also vary by native language: Ukrainian-speaking respondents more often name borshch, varenyky, kholodets, cabbage rolls, and potatoes; Russian-speaking respondents prefer Olivier, other salads, plov, okroshka, pizza, and shashlik; and those who consider both languages native more often choose cutlets, fried potatoes, and “Shuba” salad.

• On December 15, 2013, on the day of the repeat elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Rating Group conducted an exit poll at four constituencies: 132, 194, 197 and 223. The survey was conducted at the exits of 125 polling stations and lasted from 8:00 to 17:00 (in rural areas) and until 18:30 (in cities). The total number of respondents exceeded 7,300. Polling stations were selected randomly in accordance with the principle of uniform coverage. Respondents at polling stations were selected according to a fixed sampling interval. The survey was anonymous: respondents filled out questionnaires (ballots) themselves and placed them into specially prepared boxes.
• Several important observations were recorded. On December 15, 2013, a record number of refusals to participate in the exit poll was observed compared to previous elections in these constituencies, despite the methodology remaining unchanged. In constituencies 132, 194 and 223, the number of refusals was several times higher than in constituency 197. According to interviewers’ observations, older respondents and groups of people entering and leaving polling stations together were more likely to refuse participation. It was also noted that refusals were more frequent in the first half of the day than in the second, and many respondents refused without providing any explanation.
• As a result, the exit poll may not have captured the voting behavior of a portion of voters, primarily those who, for various reasons, did not want to re-report their voting choice. This may be the main reason why exit poll results differed from Central Election Commission results beyond the statistical margin of error (2.5–3%).
• Exit polls do not cover special polling stations (such as prisons, detention centers, or medical institutions). At the same time, in special polling stations within constituencies 132, 194 and 223, voter turnout was significantly higher and voting results differed substantially from overall constituency results. In addition, exit polls cannot capture results from home voting, as this information is not available to sociologists.
• For example, in constituency 132, candidate M. Kruglov received at special polling stations about 0.8 thousand votes (more than 1% of voters) more than A. Kornatskyi, while the total official margin between the candidates was 1.7 thousand votes. In constituency 194, candidate M. Poplavskyi received at special polling stations 2.8 thousand votes (almost 4% of voters) more than M. Bulatetskyi. In constituency 223, candidate V. Pylypyshyn received at special polling stations 1.6 thousand votes (more than 2% of voters) more than Yu. Levchenko, while the total official margin between the candidates was 3.3 thousand votes.
• Unfortunately, in some polling stations interviewers were directly obstructed by third parties. For example, at one polling station in Pervomaisk (constituency 132), unidentified individuals attempted to confiscate questionnaires and disrupted vote counting. At one polling station in Kyiv (constituency 223), the exit poll was temporarily suspended due to a provocation and a false police call. At several polling stations in Kyiv (constituency 223), interviewers’ work was obstructed by representatives of candidates, including representatives of Yu. Levchenko, who attempted to gain access to results, as well as by unidentified individuals of a “sports-type” appearance.
• Exit poll results changed throughout the day following similar trends: voters supported opposition candidates more actively in the second half of the day, which is partly explained by demographic voting patterns that will be analyzed and published after processing all original questionnaires. If the hypothesis is confirmed that older voters were more likely to support “independent” candidates and were also more likely to refuse participation in the exit poll, then the record level of refusals could be the main explanation for deviations between exit poll results and official Central Election Commission results. The underlying reasons for refusals, however, remain a separate topic for discussion beyond sociology.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2013, a clear majority of Ukrainians, 66%, agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 22% disagreed and 12% were undecided. This represented the highest level of agreement recorded over the previous four years: in 2010, 61% held this view, in 2011 it stood at 58%, in 2012 at 59%, and in 2013 it increased to 66%. Over the same period, the share of those opposing recognition of the Holodomor as genocide declined from 25% to 22%. Support for the genocide thesis exceeded 80% in the West, Center, and North of the country, more than half in the East, and about 40% in the South and in Donbas. The indicator increased in all regions except the South.
• The belief that the Holodomor was a genocide was shared by around 90% of voters of Oleh Tiahnybok, Yuliia Tymoshenko, and Arsenii Yatseniuk, about 80% of voters of Vitalii Klychko and Petro Poroshenko, roughly half of Viktor Yanukovych’s voters, and over 40% of Petro Symonenko’s voters. Importantly, in the electorate of no presidential candidate did opponents of this view outnumber supporters. Agreement with the genocide thesis was found across all age groups, education levels, and among both men and women, although the share of those undecided was highest among younger respondents. Rural residents were more likely than urban residents to agree with the statement, at 79% versus 60%. Nearly 90% of respondents who considered Ukrainian their native language agreed that the Holodomor was a genocide, compared to about 60% among those who considered both Ukrainian and Russian their native languages and only around 40% among those who considered Russian their sole native language.

IRI today released its national survey of Ukraine public opinion. The poll indicates that 48 percent of Ukrainians believe that if the Association Agreement with the European Union were to be signed in November, it would impact Ukraine positively.  Additionally, 48 percent believe that signing the Association Agreement will increase the standard of living of citizens.

 The poll also found that reform of the economy, healthcare system and social services are the main reforms the government needs to undertake, with two-thirds of respondents believing the government needs to initiate economic reforms, 48 percent healthcare reforms and 36 percent social service reforms.

This survey was conducted August 27 – September 9, 2013. 

The randomly selected sample consists of 1,200 Ukrainian residents older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote and is representative of the general population by age, gender and education.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.  The United States Agency for International Development-funded survey was conducted by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of IRI, and the fieldwork was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had taken place in early October 2013, about 70% of voters would have participated. At the same time, if presidential elections had taken place in early October, turnout would have been about 73%. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded in Western Ukraine (around 80%), while the lowest was in the Donbas and Southern regions (around 50%).
• If parliamentary elections had been held in early October 2013, the Party of Regions would have won. Among those who intended to participate in the elections, 23% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 22% for Batkivshchyna, 18% for UDAR, 9% for the Communist Party, and 7% for Svoboda. About 6% would have supported other parties, while 14% were undecided. After redistribution of undecided voters, support would have been 27% for the Party of Regions, 26% for Batkivshchyna, 21% for UDAR, 10% for the Communist Party, and 9% for Svoboda, with other parties receiving about 7%. Compared to previous parliamentary election results, total support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda) increased from 50% to 56%, while total support for parties forming the parliamentary majority (Party of Regions and the Communist Party) decreased from 43% to 37%. Regional patterns showed the Party of Regions leading in the Donbas, South and East, while Batkivshchyna led in the West, Center and North. UDAR outperformed Batkivshchyna in the East and Svoboda in the West. The highest share of undecided voters was recorded in the Donbas (25%).
• If presidential elections had taken place in early October 2013 and Yulia Tymoshenko had participated, Viktor Yanukovych would have received 24% of support among those intending to vote, Yulia Tymoshenko 21%, Vitalii Klitschko 19%, Petro Symonenko 7%, Oleh Tyahnybok 6%, and Petro Poroshenko 2%. Other candidates would have received about 5%, about 4% would not support any candidate, and 11% would have been undecided. If Tymoshenko had not participated and Arsenii Yatseniuk had run instead, Yanukovych would have received 24%, Klitschko 20%, and Yatseniuk 17%, while Tyahnybok and Symonenko would each have received about 7%, and Poroshenko about 3%. Yanukovych remained the leading candidate in the Donbas, South and East, while Tymoshenko led in the West, Center and North, closely followed by Klitschko. In hypothetical second-round scenarios, Klitschko would have defeated Yanukovych with 37% versus 22%, while Yatseniuk would have received 30% against 23% for Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko 28% against 24% for Yanukovych.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 53% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 35% do not support it and another 12% are undecided. At the same time, a plurality believes that signing the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (47%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (34%), while 19% could not decide. Over the previous three years, the share of respondents who consider signing the EU Agreement more beneficial increased from 39% to 47%, reaching the highest level recorded during that period. Western and Northern regions show significantly higher support for the EU Agreement, while the South and Donbas are more supportive of joining the Customs Union. The Center and East act as transitional regions where support for both integration directions is roughly balanced, with slightly more support for the EU Agreement in the Center and for the Customs Union in the East.
• Support for integration options differs significantly by electoral preferences. The absolute majority of Petro Symonenko’s voters (82%) support the Customs Union, while voters of Oleh Tyahnybok (85%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (75%), Yulia Tymoshenko (73%) and Vitalii Klitschko (72%) support signing the EU Agreement. Among Viktor Yanukovych’s voters, support for EU accession (42%) and opposition to it (45%) are almost equal. At the same time, about half of his voters consider joining the Customs Union more beneficial for Ukraine, while about one quarter support signing the EU Agreement.
• Almost half of respondents (49%) expected that Ukraine and the European Union would sign the Association Agreement in November 2013, while about one quarter did not believe this would happen. Over the previous month, the share of those expecting the Agreement to be signed increased from 39% to 49%, including a significant increase among opponents of European integration. Most respondents (38%) believed that signing the Agreement would be the result of joint efforts by Ukraine and the EU, while 13% attributed it mainly to Ukraine’s efforts and 26% to the EU’s efforts. For the European Union, potential signing of the Agreement would be seen more as a victory (49%) than a defeat (3%), while 30% believed it would mean neither. For Ukraine, it would also be seen more as a victory (45%) than a defeat (16%), while 22% believed it would mean neither. For Russia, however, signing the Agreement would more likely be seen as a defeat (52%) than a victory (2%), while 29% believed it would mean neither. A majority of respondents (56%) expected that if the Agreement were signed, Russia would increase pressure on Ukraine, while 10% expected a decrease in pressure and 19% believed nothing would change.
• At the same time, 38% of respondents support the creation of a unified state including Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, while 50% oppose this idea and 12% are undecided. Over the previous three years, the share of supporters reached its lowest level, while the share of opponents reached its highest. The share of respondents who simultaneously supported both EU accession and a unified state with Russia declined from about 40% in 2011 to about 20% in October 2013. Regarding language policy, 43% support granting Russian the status of a state language, while 51% oppose it and 5% are undecided. Support for bilingualism was higher than opposition in 2009, equal in 2010–2011, and since mid-2012 opposition has consistently exceeded support. The strongest support for bilingualism is recorded in the Donbas (85%), South (69%) and East (57%).
• Only 20% of respondents support Ukraine joining NATO, while about two thirds oppose it and 15% are undecided. Relatively higher support for NATO membership is recorded only in Western Ukraine and among voters of Tyahnybok and Klitschko, which is partly explained by a higher share of men among their supporters, as men traditionally show higher support for NATO membership than women. Additionally, 27% of respondents support recognizing OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukrainian state independence, while 52% oppose this and 20% are undecided. Public opinion on this issue remains unstable and fluctuates yearly. Support is highest among voters of Tyahnybok and Tymoshenko and lowest among voters of Yanukovych and Symonenko. Only about 5–6% of residents in the Donbas and South support such recognition, while in Western Ukraine support exceeds 70%.

View the report.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, when speaking about the country overall, the majority of city residents believe that Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction (68%), while only 19% believe the country is moving in the right direction. Another 13% were undecided. At the same time, when assessing the situation in the city, 42% of respondents believe that Ternopil is moving in the right direction, while the same share (41%) believe it is moving in the wrong direction, and 17% are undecided. Most respondents (57%) believe that the situation in the city over the past 12 months has significantly or somewhat improved, about a quarter believe it has not changed, and only 18% believe that changes were mostly negative. Looking ahead, 51% expect the situation in the city to improve over the next 12 months, 28% do not expect changes, and 17% expect deterioration. When comparing Ternopil with other regional centers of Ukraine, an absolute majority (68%) would classify the city as average, while 4% consider it a leader and 20% an outsider.
• Among the key local problems, residents are most concerned about poor road conditions (73%), employment problems (55%), high utility tariffs (48%), poor quality healthcare services (46%), poor drinking water quality (41%), and poor performance of housing maintenance services (35%). In addition, respondents mention the sanitary condition of the city (28%) and chaotic urban development (24%). Compared to the previous year, the number of residents concerned about road conditions increased (from 64% to 73%), poor healthcare quality (from 42% to 46%), poor drinking water quality (from 35% to 41%), chaotic construction (from 18% to 24%), and insufficient parking infrastructure (from 5% to 11%). At the same time, concern about employment decreased (from 68% to 55%) and about the sanitary condition of the city (from 34% to 28%), while other issues remained at approximately the same level.
• In September 2012, the majority (51%) of Ternopil residents expected positive changes following parliamentary elections. One year later, only 6% reported that these expectations were met, while the expectations of the majority (79%) were not met. Currently, the biggest expectations from the newly elected Parliament relate to increasing salaries and pensions (53%), creating new jobs (39%), ensuring economic growth (36%), fighting corruption (34%), and protecting the Ukrainian language and culture (33%). Compared to expectations before the elections, ideological expectations have decreased, while socio-economic expectations have increased. In particular, expectations related to salary and pension growth increased (from 44% to 53%), job creation (from 36% to 39%), healthcare quality improvement (from 21% to 25%), and education quality improvement (from 12% to 19%). At the same time, expectations related to protecting Ukrainian language and culture decreased (from 52% to 33%), the release of Yulia Tymoshenko (from 21% to 17%), freedom of speech (from 19% to 16%), and initiating impeachment of President Yanukovych (from 23% to 13%).
• If elections to the Ternopil City Council were held next Sunday, more than 75% of residents would participate. The highest support would be for Svoboda (34%), followed by UDAR (26%) and Batkivshchyna (23%). Around 3% would vote for the Party of Regions, 2% for Our Ukraine, more than 3% for other parties, and 9% are undecided. Among candidates for mayor, the highest support would be for incumbent mayor Serhiy Nadal (48%), followed by Vitaliy Maksymov (11%) and Roman Zastavnyy (about 10%). More than 4% would support Ihor Huda, about 4% each would support Vasyl Lylo and Mykhailo Ratushnyak, nearly 3% would support Petro Landyak, nearly 8% would support other candidates, and 9% are undecided. The most well-known local politicians are Serhiy Nadal, Roman Zastavnyy, and Oleh Kayda, who are known by almost all respondents. Around 80% also know Vasyl Lylo, Mykhailo Ratushnyak, and Vitaliy Maksymov. The most positive attitudes are recorded toward Serhiy Nadal (56%), Oleh Kayda (42%), Roman Zastavnyy (31%), and Vitaliy Maksymov (26%). The most negative attitudes are recorded toward Roman Zastavnyy (33%) and Petro Hoch (31%). The highest satisfaction among residents is with the work of the mayor (68%), while satisfaction with the acting head of the regional council (23%) and the head of the regional state administration (23%) is significantly lower.
• Among national politicians, local residents trust Vitaliy Klitschko the most (69%), followed by Oleh Tyahnybok (59%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk (59%), and Yulia Tymoshenko (49%). The highest levels of distrust are toward Viktor Yushchenko (80%), Viktor Yanukovych (87%), Mykola Azarov (89%), and Petro Symonenko (89%). Over the past year, trust in Tyahnybok and Yatsenyuk has remained stable, while trust in Tymoshenko and Klitschko has increased. If presidential elections were held next Sunday, more than 80% of residents would participate. Vitaliy Klitschko would receive the highest support (31%), followed by Yulia Tymoshenko (21%), Oleh Tyahnybok (14%), and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (13%). Around 4% would vote for Petro Poroshenko, around 2% each for Viktor Yanukovych and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, more than 4% for other candidates, 2% would vote against all candidates, and 8% are undecided. If Tymoshenko did not participate, Klitschko would receive 36%, Yatsenyuk 23%, and Tyahnybok 16%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in Lviv, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Khmelnytskyi, an absolute majority of residents like living in their cities. The highest share of residents satisfied with living in their city is recorded in Ternopil (91%), while the lowest is in Khmelnytskyi and Ivano-Frankivsk (80%). Residents of these two cities also demonstrated the highest share of dissatisfaction, although such respondents account for only about 2%.
• Lviv, according to most of its residents, is an attractive tourist city (61%) with rich history and beautiful architecture, many monuments, as well as numerous cafes and coffee shops. Lviv residents are also more likely than others to believe that their city plays an important role in the country’s development (21%) and is a politically active center (19%). At the same time, Lviv is least often perceived by its residents as a quiet and cozy city (13%), a clean and well-maintained city (9%), and as having convenient transport infrastructure.
• For Ternopil residents, their city is primarily quiet, cozy and green (59%), with a large youth population. A significant share of respondents (42%) highlight the city’s spirituality and religiosity. About one-third of residents consider the city clean, well-maintained and environmentally friendly, which distinguishes it from other cities. The least frequently mentioned characteristics of Ternopil are quality of healthcare and education (3%), availability of large opportunities (3%), and opportunities to work and earn income (7%). Among all cities studied, Ternopil is least often perceived as playing an important role in the country’s development.
• For residents of Chernivtsi, the most important characteristics of their city are beautiful architecture (63%) and the presence of parks and green areas (56%), combined with rich historical heritage. Chernivtsi is also perceived as a spiritual and religious city (49%), with friendly and pleasant residents (46%). More than in other cities, residents highlight employment and income opportunities (20%), opportunities for child development (19%), as well as education quality (15%) and healthcare quality (13%). At the same time, residents least often mention low cost of living.
• For Ivano-Frankivsk residents, their city is primarily quiet and cozy (39%), with a religious character, a large youth population, and friendly residents. Around one quarter consider the city safe and traditional. Ivano-Frankivsk, like Lviv, is also perceived as a politically active city (17%). The least mentioned characteristics are vibrant cultural and sports life, availability of major opportunities (5%), and quality of education and healthcare.
• For residents of Khmelnytskyi, the city is perceived as quiet and cozy (around 40%), with many parks, cafes and coffee shops, and a large youth population. Around 15% note relatively low cost of living, which is the highest among all cities studied. At the same time, residents least often mention religiosity and preservation of traditions. Khmelnytskyi is also least often perceived as a tourist destination (7%), reflected in low indicators of architectural beauty, monuments and historical heritage.
• Among youth, their hometown is primarily associated with leisure opportunities, cafes and coffee shops, youth population, attractive people, and cultural and sports life. Middle-aged residents emphasize monuments, parks and green areas, environmental quality, cleanliness, as well as opportunities for work, recreation and child development. Older generations emphasize spirituality and religiosity, historical heritage and safety.
• If respondents were forced to move abroad permanently, most residents of Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk would choose the United States, Canada and Germany as the most attractive destinations. For residents of Chernivtsi and Khmelnytskyi, Germany would be the top destination, followed by the United States. Residents of these two cities also show the highest share of potential migration to Russia. Interestingly, migration to Italy and the United Kingdom is more common than to neighboring Poland, although Poland remains one of the most attractive destinations for residents of Khmelnytskyi and Lviv.
• If respondents were forced to move to another location within Ukraine, residents of Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Khmelnytskyi would primarily choose Western Ukraine and the Kyiv region. Residents of Chernivtsi are most attracted to the capital region, followed by Western and Southern Ukraine. Lviv residents are equally likely to consider moving either to Kyiv or to Western Ukraine. At the same time, among those who have decided on a potential relocation destination, most would prefer to move abroad rather than within Ukraine.