Press releases

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from May 28-June 14, 2016. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 63,9%. Additionally, 1,185 respondents were surveyed in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. The margin of error does not exceed 2,8%. Average response rate was 62,7%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, the highest levels of trust in Lviv Oblast are held by Nadiia Savchenko, Andrii Sadovyi, and Mikheil Saakashvili. A similar picture is observed in the city of Lviv, where Anatolii Hrytsenko also enjoys a high level of trust. The lowest levels of trust are recorded for Yurii Boiko and Arsenii Yatseniuk. Over the past year, Sadovyi, Petro Poroshenko, and Yatseniuk have lost the most trust, while Yuliia Tymoshenko’s indicators have improved. Overall, politicians enjoy slightly higher levels of trust in the oblast than in the city of Lviv.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, the following parties would cross the 5% threshold in Lviv Oblast: Samopomich (22.8%), Batkivshchyna (12.6%), Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (9.8%), as well as Civic Position (6.7%), Svoboda (6.1%), and the Radical Party (5.9%). Mikheil Saakashvili’s party “Movement for Purification” would receive 4.2%, and Dmytro Yarosh’s National Movement 3.1%. 17% of respondents were undecided. In the oblast overall, Batkivshchyna, BPP Solidarity, and the Radical Party have stronger support, whereas in the city of Lviv, Samopomich, Civic Position, and Saakashvili’s party perform better. Young people and respondents with higher education are more likely to support Samopomich, while older and less educated respondents are more inclined toward Batkivshchyna.
• More than 40% of respondents support snap parliamentary elections and new presidential elections, about the same share oppose these initiatives, and 15% are undecided. Support for early elections is strongest among residents of Lviv and among voters of Batkivshchyna and Civic Position.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, Andrii Sadovyi would receive 15.9%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 10.5%, Petro Poroshenko 10%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko 9.8%. Oleh Liashko would get 5.2%, Dmytro Yarosh 5.1%, and Oleh Tiahnybok 3.8%. 22.6% remain undecided. Over the past year, Sadovyi and Tymoshenko have gained support, while Poroshenko has lost the most, and Hrytsenko’s rating has also slightly declined.
• More than 40% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Lviv Mayor Andrii Sadovyi, while 56% are dissatisfied. 21% are satisfied with the work of Lviv Oblast Governor Oleh Syniutka, 41% are dissatisfied, and almost 40% are undecided. Only 10% are satisfied with the work of Lviv Oblast Council Head Oleksandr Hannushchyn, 30% are dissatisfied, and nearly two thirds cannot assess his performance. Although Sadovyi still has the highest approval, support for his work has fallen sharply over the past year, from 70% to 41%.
• Only 19% of respondents believe that Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while about two thirds think it is moving in the wrong direction. Assessments of the situation in Lviv Oblast are somewhat better: 28% say it is moving in the right direction and 48% in the wrong one, with nearly a quarter undecided.
• More than half (53%) of respondents believe that fighting corruption in local government should be a top priority, followed by solving the landfill and waste problem (42%), reducing unemployment (40%), and restraining growth in utility tariffs (38%). Over the past year, the importance of waste management, healthcare support, and environmental issues has increased. In Lviv, waste management, healthcare, and crime are more acute concerns, while in other cities of the oblast road repairs and support for vulnerable groups are more pressing.
• Regarding the Hrybovychi landfill tragedy, 30% place primary blame on the Lviv city authorities, 23% on the oblast authorities, 16% on the central government, 4% on the Hrybovychi village authorities, 14% on others, and 15% are undecided.
• An overwhelming 85% believe that waste processing is the best solution for Lviv’s garbage problem, compared to 9% who favor incineration. 90% support building a waste-processing plant as the solution, 3% favor modernizing the existing landfill in Hrybovychi, 1% support opening a new landfill near Lviv, and 5% are undecided.

Dear colleagues,

We invite you to take part in a press conference on the topic “Socio-political attitudes in Lviv Oblast.”

Speaker:
Oleksii Antypovych, Head of the Rating Group.

During the press conference, the results of a special study will be presented on the following topics:
level of trust in national politicians,
presidential ratings,
party ratings,
attitudes toward the idea of snap elections,
satisfaction with the work of local authorities,
issues that concern citizens,
the Hrybovychi tragedy.

The press conference will take place on Tuesday, July 5, 2016, starting at 11:00 a.m.,
at the following address: 11 T. Shevchenko Avenue, 2nd floor, Press Club.

The survey was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS, kiis.com.ua) jointly with the Rating Sociological Group (ratinggroup.ua) in April 2016.

Almost all residents of Kirovohrad are aware that the city is to be renamed as part of the “decommunization” process. The vast majority of city residents (67%) do not support the renaming, including 43% who are категорically opposed. Only about one in four residents (28%) view it positively.

A majority of residents (57%) most strongly support keeping the current name “Kirovohrad.” About one third (31%) would prefer the name “Yelysavethrad.” Only 4% support the name “Kropyvnytskyi.” If the option “Kirovohrad” is excluded from the list of proposed names, a majority (55%) choose “Yelysavethrad.” In that case, “Kropyvnytskyi” ranks second with 8% support.

An overwhelming majority of the population (82%) do not support the decision of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Building, Regional Policy, and Local Self-Government to rename the city “Kropyvnytskyi.” Only 14% support this decision. Among those who oppose the renaming to “Kropyvnytskyi,” one quarter say they would be willing to take part in protests against it.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute. 

The survey was conducted throughout all Ukraine territory (except for occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) from 18 February till 4 March 2016. Survey method - face-to-face interview at the respondent’s residence.

Total sample – 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older, who have the right to vote. The sample is representative by sex, age, region, and settlement size. Additionally, 1,000 respondents were surveyed in Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. For sampling there were used multistage probabilistic sampling method, for respondents’ selection procedure - random route and ‘last birthday’ rule. 

The margin of error does not exceed 2.0%.

Average response rate – 63.0%.

The survey was financed by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The survey was conducted by Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine) on behalf of the International Republican Institute. 

The data was collected in 24 cities of Ukraine (Kyiv and all oblast centers; in Donetsk oblast – Mariupol, in Luhansk oblast – Sievierodonetsk) between January 20, 2016 and February 8, 2016, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes.

The sample consisted of 19,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older. It is representative for the general population by age, education and sex. To ensure representativeness, the sample was split in accordance with division of cities into electoral districts, which were provided by the Central Electoral Committee. At least 50 polling sites (50 previously selected sites) were covered in each city. They were selected at random, using the curtain step method. The random route and ‘next birthday’ rule were used for respondents’ selection procedures.

For reference, the previous municipal survey was conducted in 22 cities between March 2, 2015 to March 20, 2015. The sample size consisted of 17,600 respondents.

The margin of error for each city does not exceed ±3.5 percent.

The average response rate is 62.8 percent.

Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

The survey was funded by the Government of Canada.

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• According to a study conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 63% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, and 58% toward Angela Merkel. A positive attitude is also expressed by 51% toward Dalia Grybauskaitė, 49% toward Andrzej Duda and Barack Obama. François Hollande is viewed positively by 40% of respondents, and Nursultan Nazarbayev by 37%. The worst attitudes are toward Vladimir Putin – only 10% have a positive view of him.
• The negative-attitude ranking is led by V. Putin (80%). About one third have a negative view of B. Obama; about one quarter of F. Hollande, N. Nazarbayev, and A. Merkel. One in five have a negative view of A. Lukashenko, and one in six of D. Grybauskaitė.
• Residents of Western and Central Ukraine are more favorable toward A. Merkel and B. Obama, while those in the South and East are more positive toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev. At the same time, in the South there are also positive attitudes toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, A. Duda, and F. Hollande. A relatively positive attitude toward V. Putin is found only in the East, primarily in Donbas.
• Older respondents show more positive attitudes toward A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev, and V. Putin, while younger people are more supportive of A. Merkel, B. Obama, and F. Hollande. The higher the respondents’ level of education and material well-being, the more positive their attitudes toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, B. Obama, A. Duda, and F. Hollande, and correspondingly more negative toward A. Lukashenko and V. Putin.
• Among supporters of EU and NATO membership, the most positive attitudes are toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, B. Obama, A. Duda, and F. Hollande. A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev have the most supporters among advocates of joining the Customs Union. Interestingly, A. Lukashenko enjoys a high level of support both among supporters of European integration and among Customs Union supporters.
• Over the last four years, the positive attitude toward V. Putin has deteriorated sharply, from 53% to 10%. Attitudes toward A. Merkel have fluctuated: they improved from 56% in 2012 to 61% in late 2013, declined to 51% in 2014, and then rose again to 57% in 2016. The positive view of B. Obama remained almost unchanged in 2012–2014 but declined from 54% in 2014 to 49% in 2016.
• The greatest increase in positive attitudes was recorded toward D. Grybauskaitė (from 36% to 51%) and F. Hollande (from 32% to 40%). At the same time, the share of those with negative attitudes toward these politicians also grew: from 11% to 15% for D. Grybauskaitė, and from 18% to 27% for F. Hollande. Attitudes toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev remained unchanged.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the politicians with the highest level of public trust are Andriy Sadovyi and Mikheil Saakashvili, with about one in three respondents trusting each of them. One in four respondents trusts Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko. One in five expresses trust in Yuliia Tymoshenko, Rinat Akhmetov, and Oleh Liashko.
• Among the “young and new” politicians, the highest levels of trust are recorded for Yehor Soboliev (29%), Tetiana Chornovol (22%), Mustafa Nayyem (21%), Hanna Hopko (15%), and Dmytro Dobrodomov (13%). The remaining politicians are largely unknown to most respondents.
• Twenty-one percent of respondents are satisfied with the performance of the President, 14% with the Chair of Parliament, and only 8% with the Prime Minister. Almost 70% support the resignation of Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk, up from 60% in October 2015. Support has also grown for dissolving parliament and holding new parliamentary elections (from 47% to 50%), as well as for early presidential elections (from 43% to 48%).
• When asked whom they would like to see as Prime Minister in 2016, 11% named Mikheil Saakashvili, 7% Yuliia Tymoshenko, 6% Yurii Boiko, 5% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 4% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3% Serhii Tihipko and Oleh Liashko each, and 2% Oleh Tiahnybok and Nataliia Yaresko each. All other candidates received 1% or less. One quarter of respondents would not want any of the proposed candidates to become Prime Minister, and one in six could not decide.
• If parliamentary elections had been held in January, the parties that would have entered parliament are Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (16.3%), Opposition Bloc (13.8%), Samopomich (13.5%), Batkivshchyna (12.9%), Svoboda (8.3%), the Radical Party (6.5%), and UKROP (5.2%). Civic Position, with 3.8%, would also have had notable chances of passing the 5% threshold. More than 2% would have voted for Vidrodzhennia, Nash Krai, Right Sector, and Narodnyi Kontrol.
• If a Saakashvili Bloc had taken part in the elections, the party ratings would have been as follows: Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” 14.3%, Opposition Bloc 13.5%, Samopomich 11.7%, Saakashvili Bloc 11.6%, Batkivshchyna 11.6%, Svoboda 6.9%, Radical Party 5.5%, and UKROP 4.7%.
• Respondents see the central government as relatively more successful in ensuring local elections (43%), police reform (42%), strengthening national defense (35%), and progress toward a visa-free regime with the EU (31%). Some successes are also seen in decentralization and energy independence. At the same time, around 90% or more see little or no success in economic growth, currency stability, social protection, anti-corruption efforts, limiting oligarchic influence, healthcare, housing and utilities, and judicial reform.
• Two thirds of respondents support the creation of the National Police, while 16% do not; 5% have not heard of the reform, and 14% are undecided.
• Regarding the “Korban case,” 44% consider it more of a political persecution, while one quarter see it as the enforcement of the law and justice.
• Nearly one in five respondents personally gave a bribe or a gift in the past year to resolve a personal issue, down from 27% three years earlier. At the same time, 43% believe corruption in their region has increased over the past year. For 54%, corruption is a disease that hinders social development, while 40% believe it is a mechanism without which Ukrainian society can no longer function. Attitudes are nevertheless changing: in 2013 more than a third justified bribery in important personal matters, whereas in 2016 only 13% did so.
• If a referendum were held, 59% would support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and 22% would oppose it. Sixteen percent would support joining the Customs Union, while 62% would oppose. Forty-seven percent would support joining NATO, 31% would oppose, and the rest would abstain or be undecided.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from July 19-30, 2015, with an oversample in the Donbas region (
territories controlled by Ukrainian authorities).  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,800 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.3 percent, and the response rate was 65.9 percent. The oversample in Donbas had a randomly selected sample size of 1,284 permanent residents, a 59.7 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.international.
 

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the Government of Canada.
 
English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.
 

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada had taken place in early December, the following parties would have entered parliament:
• Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” – 16.5%
  Batkivshchyna – 12.3%
  Opposition Bloc – 12.2%
  Samopomich – 12.2%
  Radical Party – 7.9%
  Svoboda – 7.8%
  UKROP – 5.1%
• Parties with significant chances of passing the 5% threshold were also Civic Position (4.1%), Vidrodzhennia (Revival) (3.6%), and Nash Krai (Our Land) (3.0%).
  2.7% would have voted for the Communist Party of Ukraine, 2.3% for Right Sector, and 2.1% for Strong Ukraine. 8.2% of respondents would have chosen another party.
• In the West, the electoral leader is PPB Solidarity, followed by Batkivshchyna, with Samopomich and Svoboda tied for third place.
  In the Center, PPB Solidarity also leads, followed by Batkivshchyna, while Svoboda and the Radical Party share third place.
  In the North, PPB Solidarity remains in first place, Batkivshchyna is second, and Samopomich third.
  In the South, East, and Donbas, the Opposition Bloc leads, with PPB Solidarity in second place. Third place in these regions is held by Batkivshchyna (South), Vidrodzhennia (East), and Samopomich (Donbas).
  Notably, the largest share of undecided voters and non-voters is concentrated in the South and Donbas (48% and 55% respectively).

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2015, almost half of respondents (47%) said that New Year is their favorite winter holiday, while 41% named Christmas. Another 5% chose St. Nicholas Day, and 3% mentioned the Old New Year. 2% said they do not like any winter holidays, and 3% were undecided.
  New Year is much more popular in the East, South, and Donbas, while Christmas is preferred mainly in the West. In the Central region, New Year and Christmas are liked almost equally.
  The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more they tend to prefer New Year. It is also more popular among urban residents and Russian-speaking respondents. Christmas, on the other hand, is more popular among rural residents and Ukrainian-speaking respondents.
• 65% of Ukrainians have a tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day, while about a third do not; 1% do not know about this holiday, and 3% were undecided.
  The further southeast one goes, the less widespread this tradition becomes. It is most popular in the West (94%) and least common in Donbas (26%). Women, young people, and Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely to follow this tradition.
• 46% of respondents plan to put up a real Christmas tree for New Year, 28% a fake tree, and 12% will use a New Year decoration instead. 14% do not plan to put up any decoration at all—mostly older people and those with lower incomes.
  Over the past four years, the share of those choosing a real tree has increased by 2%, and a fake tree by 5%, while the number of people using only decorations or none at all has declined slightly.
  Real trees are more common in the West, among rural residents, young people, and those with higher incomes, while fake trees are more popular in Donbas and among urban residents.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (80%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 12% disagree and 8% are undecided.
• It should be noted that over the past two years the number of those who agree that the Holodomor was a genocide has increased significantly (from 66% in 2013 to 80% in 2015). In addition, over the past year the share of undecided respondents on this issue has almost halved. At the same time, the share of those opposing the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide decreased from 25% to 12% during 2010–2015.
• The statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents in all regions without exception, with the highest support observed in the West (98%) and the Center (87%).
• The younger the respondents and the higher their income level, the greater the support for recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 90% support this statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, support stands at 60%.
• Rural residents are more likely to agree with the Holodomor-genocide statement than urban residents (84% vs 79%).

• According to the results of the latest survey conducted by Rating Group, if the presidential elections in Ukraine had been held in early October, 26% of decided voters would have supported Petro Poroshenko, 16% would have supported Yulia Tymoshenko, 12% would have supported Yurii Boiko, 9% would have supported Andrii Sadovyi, 7% would have supported Oleh Liashko, 6% would have supported Anatolii Hrytsenko, and more than 4% would have supported Dmytro Yarosh and Oleh Tiahnybok. The remaining voters would have supported other candidates.
• If the second round of the presidential election had included Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 42% would have supported the incumbent President and 31% would have supported the Batkivshchyna leader, while the rest would have remained undecided. If Petro Poroshenko and Andrii Sadovyi had advanced to the second round, 39% would have supported the incumbent President and 34% would have supported the Samopomich leader. If Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko had advanced to the second round, 54% would have supported the incumbent President and 21% would have supported the Opposition Bloc leader.
• If parliamentary elections had been held in early October, 20% of decided voters would have supported the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 15% Batkivshchyna, 14% the Opposition Bloc, 10% Samopomich, and about 6% the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko. In addition, parties with significant chances of entering parliament included Svoboda (5%), Civic Position (4%), the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP (4%), Right Sector (4%), as well as Vidrodzhennia (3%) and Nash Krai (3%). UKROP, Vidrodzhennia, and Nash Krai significantly increased their support over the last month due to intensified local election campaigns and, if the upward trend continues, may claim representation both in local councils and in a new parliament.
• The leaders of the anti-rating are the Opposition Bloc (36%) and the Communist Party (35%). In addition, nearly one quarter of voters would definitely not vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” one fifth would not vote for the People’s Front, and about one sixth would not vote for the Radical Party, Svoboda, or Batkivshchyna. At the same time, so-called “new” parties do not have high anti-ratings, including UKROP (6%), Vidrodzhennia (6%), Nash Krai (5%), and Samopomich (3%).
• One third of voters are fully confident in their choice and would not change it, while another third are fairly confident but admit they could change their choice. The most confident voters are those supporting the Communist Party, the Opposition Bloc, Right Sector, UKROP, and Svoboda. The least confident voters are those supporting Civic Position, Nash Krai, and Strong Ukraine.
• In addition to parliamentary ratings, potential party reserves for local elections were also studied. About 30% of respondents допускають the possibility of voting for Samopomich in local elections, 25% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 23% for Batkivshchyna, and 15% for the Opposition Bloc. More than 10% also допускають the possibility of voting for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Svoboda, UKROP, and Nash Krai, with overall attitudes toward the latter two being less negative. Over the last two months, reserve support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and the Opposition Bloc has remained unchanged, while support reserves for Samopomich, Batkivshchyna, and UKROP have grown, and reserves for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko have decreased.
• Recent electoral trends indicate growing combined support for parties that are in opposition to the current government. While coalition parties were supported by nearly 70% of voters in the last parliamentary elections, today coalition parties are supported by about 45%, with the core of the coalition – the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front – supported by only 21%. This is consistent with satisfaction levels with key government officials: only 22% of respondents are satisfied with the President’s performance, 14% with the Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr Groysman, and 10% with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk. Dissatisfaction levels are 71%, 74%, and 86% respectively.
• Regarding other issues, 28% of respondents believe it is better to tolerate material hardship to preserve order in the country, while the majority (53%) believe that if living conditions significantly worsen, it is better to protest. These indicators are almost identical to those recorded in December 2013 (29% and 50% respectively).
• Over the last six months, support for dissolving parliament and calling new parliamentary elections increased from 34% to 47%, while support for calling new presidential elections increased from 31% to 43%.
• Only 12% of respondents believe that recently adopted budget amendments, which increased the minimum wage and pensions starting September 1, are a real achievement of the government in finding resources during crisis and war conditions. Meanwhile, the majority (77%) believe this was more likely pre-election PR.
• Regarding the detention on September 17 in the Verkhovna Rada of Radical Party MP Ihor Mosiychuk on suspicion of bribery, 28% believe it was enforcement of the law and justice, while 43% believe it was political persecution of the opposition by the authorities.
• Almost 70% of respondents believe that the events of August 31 near the Verkhovna Rada, when a combat grenade explosion during a protest killed law enforcement officers, were planned and organized by someone, while one in ten believes it happened accidentally due to negligence.
• One quarter believe the Svoboda party was behind the grenade attack near the parliament, one fifth believe Russian intelligence services were responsible. In addition, 15% believe Ukrainian radical nationalist organizations were responsible, 13% believe the President was responsible, 13% believe the Security Service of Ukraine was responsible, 12% believe Ukrainian oligarchs were responsible, 7% believe the police were responsible, and 6% believe ATO participants were responsible. Notably, voters of the Opposition Bloc, Communist Party, Vidrodzhennia, and Strong Ukraine tend to blame Svoboda and other Ukrainian nationalists, while voters of Svoboda, Right Sector, as well as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” Batkivshchyna, UKROP, and Samopomich tend to blame Russian intelligence services.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from September 7-21, 2015, with an oversample in the Zakarpattia region.  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 63.9 percent.  The oversample in Zakarpattia had a randomly selected sample size of 633 permanent residents, a 65 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 3.9 percent.international.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, more than half of respondents (56%) expressed a clear intention to participate in local elections in the city of Ternopil.
• Among those intending to participate in the city council elections, 20.7% would vote for Svoboda, 16.6% for Samopomich, 10.4% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 6.8% for Civic Position, 5.6% for Batkivshchyna, and 4.5% for the Radical Party. About 3.0% would vote for the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP, 2.8% for Narodnyi Kontrol, and 1.6% for the People’s Movement of Ukraine (NRU). About 4% would choose another party, while about one quarter remain undecided.
• Among those intending to participate in the mayoral election, nearly 60% would vote for S. Nahal. About 9% would vote for T. Pastukh, 5% for P. Landiak, 3.3% for M. Ratushniak, 2.8% for V. Blikhar, and 2.5% for I. Vons. About 4% would choose another candidate, while about 15% remain undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, 41% of respondents support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 38% do not support this idea. Another 21% are undecided on this issue.
• During 2014–2015, the number of supporters of recognizing the OUN-UPA increased from 27% to 41%, while the number of opponents significantly decreased (from 52% to 38%). Thus, for the first time over the years of studying this issue, the number of supporters of recognizing the OUN-UPA in Ukraine exceeded the number of opponents.
• Support for recognizing the OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence is highest in Western Ukraine (76%) and lowest in the South (27%) and East (23%).
• The younger the respondents, and the higher their level of education and income, the more likely they are to support recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence. Relatively higher support is also observed among men and among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, one third of respondents (31%) regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while more than half (56%) do not, and 14% are undecided.
• The trend shows that the number of Ukrainians who regret the collapse of the USSR has been decreasing each year: in 2010, this share was 46%, in 2013 it was 41%, in 2014 it was 33%, and in 2015 it declined to 31%.
• Almost half of residents in the South (49%), 39% of residents in the East, and about one quarter of residents in Central Ukraine regret the collapse of the USSR.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education and income, the more likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. Women are relatively more likely to regret the collapse of the USSR. The share of respondents who regret the collapse of the USSR among Russian-speaking respondents is twice as high as among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from July 16-30, 2015, with an oversample in the Odesa region.  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 62.8 percent.  The oversample in Odesa had a randomly selected sample size of 665 permanent residents, a 61.8 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 3.8 percent.international.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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The study was conducted Information and analytical center “RATING Pro”according to the results of the survey of the Sociological Group “Rating” in Kyiv. On July 15-21, 2015, 1200 respondents were interviewed (face-to-face personal interview) aged 18 years and older. The sample is representative by age, gender. Error: not more than 2.8%.
As part of the general monitoring of Ukrainians' attitude towards reforms, the Information and Analysis Center “RATING Pro” investigated the attitudes and expectations of the new Patrol Police in Kyiv.

• According to the results of the survey, 82% of Kyiv residents support the creation of a new Patrol Police in the city. Not supported — only 8%.
• 69% expect that due to the creation of the new Patrol Police, the level of security in the city will improve, 19% believe that everything will remain at the same level, 2% — will deteriorate.
• At the same time, 82% of respondents expect improved security in the city among those who support the creation of the police, and among those who do not support the opinion that nothing will change (66%) dominates.
• 42% expect that due to the creation of the new Patrol Police, the level of fighting corruption will improve, 38% believe that everything will remain at the same level, 4% - will get worse 
• At the same time, among those who support the creation of the police, 51% of respondents expect improvement in the fight against corruption, and among those who do not support it, the opinion that nothing will change (61%) dominates.
• According to the majority, the main merit in the creation of the Kiev Patrol Police belongs to Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Eki Zguladze (39%). 14% believe that this is the merit of President Petro Poroshenko, 8% - Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, 6% - Mayor of Kyiv Vitaly Klitschko, 2% - Prime Minister Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. A third did not decide on the answer.
  

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group ahead of the by-elections in single-member constituency No. 205, if parliamentary party elections had been held simultaneously in July, the leaders of electoral preferences in the constituency would have been the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, supported by 31.6% among those who decided and would participate in voting, and the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP, supported by 17.7%.
• In addition, 13.5% would have voted for Samopomich Union, 9.2% for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 7.5% for Batkivshchyna, 4.9% for Svoboda, 4.6% for Civic Position, 3.4% for the Opposition Bloc, 2.7% for Right Sector, and almost 5% for other parties. Thus, party ratings largely correspond to the level of support for candidates running in the constituency, especially the race leaders Serhii Berezenko and Hennadii Korban. Accordingly, their participation in the elections significantly strengthened the positions of their respective parties.
• Older voters more often prefer the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, the Radical Party, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the Opposition Bloc. Middle-aged voters more often support Civic Position, while younger voters more often support UKROP and Right Sector. Samopomich has relatively equal support across all age groups. Women more often support the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and Batkivshchyna, while men more often support the Radical Party, UKROP, Svoboda, and Right Sector. Supporters of the Radical Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” tend to have relatively lower levels of education, while UKROP supporters tend to have higher levels of education. UKROP, Right Sector, and Civic Position are more often supported by wealthier voters, while Batkivshchyna, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc are more often supported by lower-income voters.