Press releases

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from September 7-21, 2015, with an oversample in the Zakarpattia region.  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 63.9 percent.  The oversample in Zakarpattia had a randomly selected sample size of 633 permanent residents, a 65 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 3.9 percent.international.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, more than half of respondents (56%) expressed a clear intention to participate in local elections in the city of Ternopil.
• Among those intending to participate in the city council elections, 20.7% would vote for Svoboda, 16.6% for Samopomich, 10.4% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 6.8% for Civic Position, 5.6% for Batkivshchyna, and 4.5% for the Radical Party. About 3.0% would vote for the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP, 2.8% for Narodnyi Kontrol, and 1.6% for the People’s Movement of Ukraine (NRU). About 4% would choose another party, while about one quarter remain undecided.
• Among those intending to participate in the mayoral election, nearly 60% would vote for S. Nahal. About 9% would vote for T. Pastukh, 5% for P. Landiak, 3.3% for M. Ratushniak, 2.8% for V. Blikhar, and 2.5% for I. Vons. About 4% would choose another candidate, while about 15% remain undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, 41% of respondents support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 38% do not support this idea. Another 21% are undecided on this issue.
• During 2014–2015, the number of supporters of recognizing the OUN-UPA increased from 27% to 41%, while the number of opponents significantly decreased (from 52% to 38%). Thus, for the first time over the years of studying this issue, the number of supporters of recognizing the OUN-UPA in Ukraine exceeded the number of opponents.
• Support for recognizing the OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence is highest in Western Ukraine (76%) and lowest in the South (27%) and East (23%).
• The younger the respondents, and the higher their level of education and income, the more likely they are to support recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence. Relatively higher support is also observed among men and among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, one third of respondents (31%) regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while more than half (56%) do not, and 14% are undecided.
• The trend shows that the number of Ukrainians who regret the collapse of the USSR has been decreasing each year: in 2010, this share was 46%, in 2013 it was 41%, in 2014 it was 33%, and in 2015 it declined to 31%.
• Almost half of residents in the South (49%), 39% of residents in the East, and about one quarter of residents in Central Ukraine regret the collapse of the USSR.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education and income, the more likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. Women are relatively more likely to regret the collapse of the USSR. The share of respondents who regret the collapse of the USSR among Russian-speaking respondents is twice as high as among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from July 16-30, 2015, with an oversample in the Odesa region.  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent, and the response rate was 62.8 percent.  The oversample in Odesa had a randomly selected sample size of 665 permanent residents, a 61.8 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 3.8 percent.international.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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The study was conducted Information and analytical center “RATING Pro”according to the results of the survey of the Sociological Group “Rating” in Kyiv. On July 15-21, 2015, 1200 respondents were interviewed (face-to-face personal interview) aged 18 years and older. The sample is representative by age, gender. Error: not more than 2.8%.
As part of the general monitoring of Ukrainians' attitude towards reforms, the Information and Analysis Center “RATING Pro” investigated the attitudes and expectations of the new Patrol Police in Kyiv.

• According to the results of the survey, 82% of Kyiv residents support the creation of a new Patrol Police in the city. Not supported — only 8%.
• 69% expect that due to the creation of the new Patrol Police, the level of security in the city will improve, 19% believe that everything will remain at the same level, 2% — will deteriorate.
• At the same time, 82% of respondents expect improved security in the city among those who support the creation of the police, and among those who do not support the opinion that nothing will change (66%) dominates.
• 42% expect that due to the creation of the new Patrol Police, the level of fighting corruption will improve, 38% believe that everything will remain at the same level, 4% - will get worse 
• At the same time, among those who support the creation of the police, 51% of respondents expect improvement in the fight against corruption, and among those who do not support it, the opinion that nothing will change (61%) dominates.
• According to the majority, the main merit in the creation of the Kiev Patrol Police belongs to Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Eki Zguladze (39%). 14% believe that this is the merit of President Petro Poroshenko, 8% - Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, 6% - Mayor of Kyiv Vitaly Klitschko, 2% - Prime Minister Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. A third did not decide on the answer.
  

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group ahead of the by-elections in single-member constituency No. 205, if parliamentary party elections had been held simultaneously in July, the leaders of electoral preferences in the constituency would have been the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, supported by 31.6% among those who decided and would participate in voting, and the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP, supported by 17.7%.
• In addition, 13.5% would have voted for Samopomich Union, 9.2% for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 7.5% for Batkivshchyna, 4.9% for Svoboda, 4.6% for Civic Position, 3.4% for the Opposition Bloc, 2.7% for Right Sector, and almost 5% for other parties. Thus, party ratings largely correspond to the level of support for candidates running in the constituency, especially the race leaders Serhii Berezenko and Hennadii Korban. Accordingly, their participation in the elections significantly strengthened the positions of their respective parties.
• Older voters more often prefer the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, the Radical Party, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the Opposition Bloc. Middle-aged voters more often support Civic Position, while younger voters more often support UKROP and Right Sector. Samopomich has relatively equal support across all age groups. Women more often support the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and Batkivshchyna, while men more often support the Radical Party, UKROP, Svoboda, and Right Sector. Supporters of the Radical Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” tend to have relatively lower levels of education, while UKROP supporters tend to have higher levels of education. UKROP, Right Sector, and Civic Position are more often supported by wealthier voters, while Batkivshchyna, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc are more often supported by lower-income voters.

Una studija je odgovor na informacijski center “RATING Pro” based on the results of a national survey by Rating Group. Between May 14 and May 22, 2015, 2,000 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed using face-to-face interviews. Samples je representativo na, gendera, regiones, a tipo de settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%. The study also uses data from Eurobarometer surveys.

Infographics on the topic of the study can be downloaded on the website http://ratingpro.org/

The survey was implemented by RATING Pro, Information and Analytical Center. In this survey the results of surveys implemented by Eurobarometer, International Social Survey Programme, municipal survey of International Republican Institute and specifically made national survey of Rating, Sociological Group, implemented in June 2015 (2,000 respondents) initiated and ordered by RATING Pro, were used.

Infographics related to the research can be downloaded on http://ratingpro.org/

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• According to the survey conducted by Rating Group, among religious leaders Ukrainians express the highest level of trust in Patriarch Filaret at 40% and Pope Francis at 35%. The highest levels of distrust are recorded toward Patriarch Kirill of Moscow at 39% and Metropolitan Onufriy at 25%. More than half of respondents say they do not know Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Metropolitan Makariy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, or Archbishop Sviatoslav of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
• Trust in Patriarch Filaret, Pope Francis, Archbishop Sviatoslav and Metropolitan Makariy is higher among residents of Western Ukraine, rural populations, Ukrainian-speaking respondents and people with higher incomes. In contrast, Metropolitan Onufriy and Patriarch Kirill enjoy greater trust among residents of the South and East, Russian-speaking respondents and those with lower levels of education and income.
• In Western Ukraine the highest trust is recorded for Patriarch Filaret at 66%, Pope Francis at 62% and Archbishop Sviatoslav at 57%. In the Center and the South, Patriarch Filaret is trusted by 38% and 40% respectively, while Pope Francis is trusted by 26% and 37%. In the East, the highest level of trust is also recorded for Patriarch Filaret at 22%.
• Overall, respondents in the West demonstrate the highest level of awareness of all religious leaders included in the survey, while awareness is lowest in the Central region. The East has the largest share of respondents who are undecided about their attitudes toward religious leaders. Women and older respondents are generally more informed and more likely to trust religious leaders.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if Ukraine could become a member of only one international economic union, 51% of respondents believe it should be the European Union, 16% – the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 14% – another option, while 20% are undecided. Since September of the previous year, support for integration with the European Union has decreased from 59% to 51%, while support for integration with the Customs Union has remained unchanged. At the same time, the number of respondents who are undecided or support alternative economic integration options has increased.
• Membership in the EU is traditionally supported more in the West (80%), about 60% in the Center, 40% in the South and about 20% in the East. The further towards the South-East of the country, the higher the support for the Customs Union. Nearly 80% of supporters of the People’s Front, BPP “Solidarity”, Right Sector, Samopomich and Svoboda support EU membership. At the same time, nearly 60% of supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party support integration with the Customs Union.
• If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held, 40% would vote in favor, 32% would vote against, 11% would not participate in voting, and 17% would be undecided. Since November 2014, when support peaked at 51%, there has been a gradual decline in support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO: to 46% in April 2015 and to 40% in June, accompanied by an increase in the share of opponents (from 25% to 32%).
• Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be supported by nearly 70% of residents in the West and about half in the Center. At the same time, about half of residents in the East and South would vote against NATO membership. The higher the level of education and income, and the younger the respondents, the higher the support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO. Support for Euro-Atlantic integration is higher among men than among women, especially regarding NATO membership. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, support for EU and NATO membership is almost three times higher than among those whose native language is Russian.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, no more than 60% of respondents would participate, including only 28% who would definitely vote.
• Despite a slight decline in ratings over the past few months, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” remains the leader in electoral support, with 16% of respondents among those intending to vote ready to support it. About 10% would vote for Samopomich, the Opposition Bloc, and Batkivshchyna. Around 6% support the Radical Party and Civic Position, about 5% support Right Sector, about 4% support Svoboda, and about 3% support the People’s Front and the Communist Party. Nearly 7% would vote for other parties, while every fifth respondent remains undecided.
• In the regional breakdown, Samopomich is the leading political force in Western Ukraine (followed by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with Right Sector and Batkivshchyna sharing third place). In Central Ukraine, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” leads (followed by Batkivshchyna and Samopomich). In the South and East of the country, the Opposition Bloc leads (followed by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and Batkivshchyna). It is important to note that in the South nearly half of respondents either do not intend to vote or are undecided, while in the East this share reaches 60%.
• As of early June, the demographic profile of party electorates is as follows. Men are more likely to support Svoboda, Right Sector, and the People’s Front. Women are more likely to support the Radical Party, the Communist Party, Samopomich, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with the highest share of women observed among Batkivshchyna supporters. Voters with lower incomes are more likely to support the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc. Voters with middle incomes are more likely to support the People’s Front, Civic Position, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity.” In contrast, Samopomich, Svoboda, and Right Sector are more supported by higher-income voters. The core electorate of Right Sector, Samopomich, and the People’s Front consists of younger and middle-aged voters. A significant share of youth is also present among supporters of the Radical Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity.” Older voters are more likely to support the Opposition Bloc and Batkivshchyna, while the oldest voters are more represented among supporters of Civic Position and the Communist Party. Voters with lower levels of education are more likely to support the Communist Party, the Radical Party, and Batkivshchyna, while respondents with higher and vocational education make up the core support base of Samopomich, Right Sector, and the People’s Front.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, one quarter of respondents intending to vote would support P. Poroshenko, 10% would support Y. Tymoshenko, and 7% would support A. Sadovyi. Around 6% would support A. Hrytsenko and Y. Boiko, 5% would support O. Liashko, and 4% would support D. Yarosh. About 2% each would support O. Tiahnybok, Serhiy Tihipko, and A. Yatseniuk. About one in ten would vote for other candidates, while every fifth respondent remains undecided.
• In the regional distribution, P. Poroshenko remains the leader in all regions of the country. Y. Tymoshenko ranks second in the West and Center, while in the South and East the second position is held by Y. Boiko. The further from the West, where Poroshenko’s leadership is more pronounced, the smaller the gap becomes between first and second place in the presidential rating.

• Rating Group continues the special project “People’s TOP,” which consists of a series of studies aimed at identifying the best of the best. The key feature of the methodology is that respondents are not provided with any lists or prompts, and express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions.
• This time respondents were asked: “Name the three most outstanding Ukrainians of all time.”
• According to the survey results, the majority of respondents named Taras Shevchenko (62.9%) among the most outstanding Ukrainians of all time. The top four leaders are complemented by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (23.5%), Lesya Ukrainka (19.0%), and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (12.7%).
• The top ten also includes Ivan Franko (9.4%), Ivan Mazepa (9.3%), Stepan Bandera (8.3%), Viacheslav Chornovil (7.6%), Hryhorii Skovoroda (4.7%), and Yaroslav the Wise (4.4%).
• The second ten includes Volodymyr the Great (3.4%), Vitalii Klitschko (3.0%), Mykola Hohol (2.6%), Mykola Amosov (2.2%), Leonid Kuchma (1.6%), Bohdan Stupka (1.6%), Leonid Kravchuk (1.4%), Borys Paton (1.2%), Lina Kostenko (1.2%), and Roman Shukhevych (1.0%).
• The third ten includes Nestor Makhno (1.0%), Yulia Tymoshenko (1.0%), Sofia Rotaru (1.0%), Andrii Shevchenko (1.0%), Leonid Brezhnev (1.0%), Nadiia Savchenko (0.9%), Serhii Korolov (0.9%), Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi (0.8%), Oleksandr Dovzhenko (0.8%), and Petro Poroshenko (0.8%).
• In total, respondents named 174 different individuals. At the same time, 16% of respondents were unable to name (recall) any outstanding Ukrainian.

• According to the survey results, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (74%) identify themselves as Orthodox, 8% as Greek Catholic, and 1% each as Roman Catholic and Protestant or Evangelical church members. Nearly 9% consider themselves simply Christians, while 6% do not associate themselves with any religious denomination.
• In the regional breakdown, Orthodoxy is the most widespread denomination in all regions except Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv regions, where more than half of the population adheres to Greek Catholicism. In addition, nearly 20% of Zakarpattia residents identify themselves as Greek Catholic. Roman Catholicism is also more common in Zakarpattia compared to other regions (7%).
• Among those who consider themselves Orthodox, a relative majority (38%) identify with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 20% with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1% with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and 39% consider themselves simply Orthodox without specific jurisdictional affiliation.
• The Kyiv Patriarchate is most commonly supported in Western and Central Ukraine, while the Moscow Patriarchate is more common in the South and Donbas. Nevertheless, even in southern and eastern regions, except Donbas and Odesa region, supporters of the Kyiv Patriarchate outnumber supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the same time, the further south and east, the more respondents tend to identify themselves simply as Orthodox without associating with a specific Orthodox jurisdiction. The highest shares of such respondents are observed in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Odesa, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, the majority of respondents (71%) consider themselves happy, including 28% who consider themselves definitely happy. At the same time, 18% consider themselves unhappy, and 11% are undecided. Over the past years, a slight decline in this indicator has been recorded. The highest level was observed in 2011 (74%), while the lowest was in 2010 (67%). Younger respondents, those with higher education and income levels, and those who are employed are more likely to consider themselves happy.
• In response to the question “What brings you the most joy in life?”, 68% of respondents mentioned family, 56% mentioned children, and 44% mentioned friends. Next in the “joy ranking” are money and receiving gifts (25% each), work and watching television (24% each), giving gifts (23%), communicating with nature (20%), music (19%), household chores (18%), and travel and the internet (16% each).
• The next positions in the joy ranking include pets (15%), books and food (14% each), birthdays (13%), sex and cinema (12%), shopping, vacation/holidays, and prayer (church) (11% each). Less common sources of joy include singing and sports (9% each), dancing and solitude (6% each), favorite team victories and studying (5% each), theatre (4%), alcohol (3%), and gambling (2%). Three percent were undecided, and 4% stated that nothing brings them joy.
• Over the past five years, Ukrainians have increasingly reported family, children, friends, receiving and giving gifts, work, music, household activities, and the internet as sources of joy. Shopping, prayer (church), theatre, books, singing, and sports have also become more joyful. At the same time, money, watching television, and vacation/holidays have become less associated with joy.
• The more sources of joy a person has, the happier they tend to feel. However, there are certain things that bring equal joy to both happy and unhappy people, and sometimes even more joy to unhappy people. These were defined as “unhappy joys,” including money, watching television, household chores, food, church, solitude, and alcohol.
• Younger respondents tend to find more joy in friends, money, receiving gifts, music, travel, the internet, birthdays, sex, cinema, shopping, vacation/holidays, sports, dancing, favorite team victories, and studying. With increasing age, people tend to find more joy in watching television, household chores, prayer (church), and singing.
• Men tend to find more joy in friends, money, work, the internet, sex, food, sports, favorite team victories, alcohol, and gambling. Women tend to find more joy in family, children, receiving and giving gifts, household chores, shopping, pets, books, prayer (church), birthdays, singing, and dancing. In the male ranking of joy, sex ranks 12th and shopping 30th, while among women the positions are reversed, with shopping ranked 12th and sex ranked 25th.
• An interesting result was found through grouping types of joy. Factor analysis identified the following types of joy: “material” (gifts, shopping, birthdays, travel), “entertainment” (dancing, singing, theatre, books, music, cinema), “youth-related” (studying, vacation/holidays, friends), “unhappy” (watching television, food, money), “family-related” (family, children), “destructive” (light drugs, gambling, alcohol), “solitude-related” (prayer/church, household chores, nature communication, solitude), and “male-associated” (favorite team victories, sports, work, internet, sex).

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, 36% of respondents believe it is necessary to cancel the ceasefire and complete the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) until full restoration of Ukrainian authority across the entire Donbas.
• 21% support granting broader economic and humanitarian powers to the region.
  Another 17% support granting these territories autonomy or a federal status while keeping them within Ukraine.
  Another 9% support separating these territories from Ukraine.
  17% were undecided.
• Compared to the October survey, support for cancelling the ceasefire and completing the ATO increased (from 22% to 36%), while the share of undecided respondents decreased (from 27% to 17%). Support for cancelling the ceasefire and completing the ATO is highest in Western Ukraine, while support for separating these territories from Ukraine is highest in the Donbas itself.
• 43% of respondents have a positive attitude toward signing a ceasefire with representatives of the so-called DPR and LPR, while about the same share (44%) have a negative attitude. 13% were undecided. Compared to October, support for signing the ceasefire decreased (from 53% to 43%), while opposition increased (from 33% to 44%).
• At the same time, a majority of respondents (71%) do not support the idea of separating territories controlled by the DPR and LPR from Ukraine. Meanwhile, about one in five supports separation, and one in ten is undecided.
• An absolute majority (74%) believe Ukraine should remain a unitary state, while 15% support a federal structure, and 11% are undecided.
• 64% of respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, 17% support joining the Customs Union, and 19% are undecided.
• Since April 2014, support for EU accession has increased (from 55% in April to 64%), while support for the Customs Union has decreased (from 24% in April to 17%). EU accession is supported by a majority in the West, North, Center, East, and South of Ukraine. Only in the Donbas does a majority support joining the Customs Union.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) support abolishing Ukraine’s non-aligned status at the legislative level, while about one-third (28%) oppose it. Another quarter are undecided.
• If a referendum on Ukraine joining NATO were held today, about half of respondents (51%) would vote in favor, 25% would vote against, and about a quarter would be undecided or would not participate.
• Since April of that year, support for NATO accession has steadily increased. In November, the highest level of support was recorded (from 40% in April to 51%), while opposition decreased (from 46% in April to 25%). NATO accession is most strongly supported in Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, support and opposition are roughly equal, while in the South and Donbas there are more opponents.

Election assessment

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, the majority (56%) believe that the parliamentary elections of October 26 were rather free and fair, while 28% believe the elections were rather not free and not fair, and about one in six respondents were undecided.
• Importantly, among those who participated in the elections, an absolute majority (75%) consider them free and fair. Meanwhile, among respondents who did not vote, the majority (60%) believe the elections were rather not free and not fair.
• Almost 60% expect positive changes as a result of the early parliamentary elections (three months before the elections this figure was 46%). Half believe that the newly elected parliament will be more effective than the previous composition of the Verkhovna Rada, one third believe that nothing will change, and only 7% think the new parliament will be less effective than the previous one.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 24.5% of respondents (among those who would participate and had decided) would vote for the People’s Front, 23.5% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 12.7% for the Self-Reliance (Samopomich) union, almost 9% for the Opposition Bloc, 7% for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, and 6.1% for Batkivshchyna. Other parties would not pass the electoral threshold: Svoboda – 4.4%, Communist Party – 3.3%, Strong Ukraine – 2.7%, Right Sector – 2.1%, Civil Position – 1.7%.

Satisfaction with government performance

• 49% approve of President Petro Poroshenko’s performance, while 42% disapprove.
  52% of respondents are satisfied with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk’s performance, while 40% are dissatisfied.
  32% are satisfied with Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr Turchynov’s performance, while 55% are dissatisfied.
• Compared to the October survey, satisfaction with the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament improved (from 45% to 52% and from 27% to 32% respectively), while evaluations of the President’s performance remained almost unchanged.

Coalition formats

• Among possible coalition formats, the highest support is for:
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich – Radical Party – Batkivshchyna” (19%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich” (17%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front” (12%)
• The least supported formats are:
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich – Batkivshchyna” (9%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – Opposition Bloc” (5%)
• Meanwhile, 20% of respondents do not support any of these formats, and about one in six are undecided.
• The majority of respondents (50%) see Arsenii Yatseniuk as Prime Minister of Ukraine after the October 26 elections. Much fewer support other candidates: Yurii Boiko (6%), Andrii Sadovyi (5%), Volodymyr Groysman (4%), Yulia Tymoshenko (4%), Oleh Liashko (3%), Serhii Tihipko (1%).
• As Speaker of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, respondents most often name Oleksandr Turchynov (22%), followed by Volodymyr Groysman (9%) and Volodymyr Lytvyn (8%). Additionally, about 5% each support Oleh Liashko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 4% Yurii Lutsenko, 3% Yurii Boiko, and 2% Hanna Hopko.
• In these elections, a number of young politicians were elected to the Verkhovna Rada for the first time via party lists. Among them, respondents would most like to see in the new government: Tetiana Chornovol (27%), Hanna Hopko (18%), Yehor Soboliev (17%), and Mustafa Nayyem (12%). More than 8% would like to see Viktoriia Siumar in the new government, more than 7% Ihor Lutsenko, 6% Serhii Leshchenko, 5% Svitlana Zalishchuk, 5% Oksana Syroid, about 3% Andrii Lozovyi, Ihor Popov, and Olena Shkrum, and almost 2% others.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in November 2014, the majority of Ukrainians (72%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 15% disagree, and 14% are undecided.
• It should be noted that over the past five years the highest share of respondents who consider the Holodomor to be genocide has been recorded. According to Rating Group surveys, this share was 61% in 2010, 58% in 2011, 59% in 2012, 66% in 2013, and 72% in 2014. At the same time, the share of those who do not recognize the Holodomor as genocide decreased from 25% to 15% between 2010 and 2013.
• Currently, the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents across all regions, including Donbas. However, it should be noted that previous national studies on this topic included Crimea and parts of Donbas that are currently not controlled by the Ukrainian government.
• All age groups support this statement, and the higher the level of education and income, the higher the level of support. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, nearly 90% support this statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, about half support it.

• The exit poll was organized by four partners: the Government of Canada, Rating Group (Ukraine), Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization (Lithuania), with support from the International Republican Institute (IRI). The survey was conducted at the exits of 330 polling stations across all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea. More than 25,000 respondents were interviewed.
• According to the International Exit Poll results, the voting activity of different age groups during the October 26 election day varied significantly. In particular, older voters were much more active in the first half of the day, while young people and middle-aged voters were more active in the second half of the day and closer to polling station closing time. As of 10:00, older voters (aged 50 and above) accounted for more than 60% of those who had voted by that time; as of 14:00, this share decreased to about 50%, and by the end of the day it dropped to only 25%. Conversely, while voters under 30 accounted for only 9% of those who had voted by 10:00, by the end of the day their share increased to 25%. Similarly, voters aged 30–39 accounted for only 12% in the morning, but nearly 30% during the final hours of voting.
• Looking at the entire voting day, the most active group, as in the 2012 parliamentary elections, were voters aged 50–59 (turnout exceeded 65%). The least active group was youth aged 18–24, with only about one in three coming to vote.
• Compared to the previous parliamentary elections, overall voter turnout, according to Central Election Commission data, decreased from 58% to 52%. A comparison of Rating Group exit polls from 2012 and 2014 indicates that the largest declines in turnout occurred among the youngest age group (18–24) and the oldest group (60+), geographically concentrated in the South and East of Ukraine. At the same time, middle-aged voters were more active than in the 2012 elections.
• It is worth noting that young voters in these elections were more likely to support parties such as Right Sector and Samopomich. In contrast, older voters were more represented among supporters of the Communist Party and the Opposition Bloc. The electorate of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc was somewhat older than that of the People’s Front; as a result, the Poroshenko Bloc had stronger support among older voters, while the People’s Front had stronger support among younger and middle-aged voters.
• Men were more represented among supporters of parties such as Right Sector, Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, while women were more represented among supporters of the Opposition Bloc, Zastup, People’s Front, Batkivshchyna, and Strong Ukraine.
• Rural residents were most represented among supporters of Zastup, the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Batkivshchyna, and the People’s Front. Urban residents were more represented among supporters of Right Sector, Samopomich, Civic Position, and the Opposition Bloc.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 80% of respondents living in single-member electoral district №118 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 30% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 20% for Samopomich, 13% for the People’s Front, 10% for the Radical Party, 5% each for Civic Position and Batkivshchyna, and 3% for Svoboda. At the same time, 12% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, 34% of respondents among those planning to vote would support Bohdan Dubnevych (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), almost 7% — Olha Shvets (People’s Front), 5% — Danylo Lubkivskyi (independent candidate), and almost 4% — Andrii Tkachuk (Radical Party). About 42% of respondents had not decided on their candidate choice.
• The most well-known candidate is Bohdan Dubnevych (90% recognition). He also has the highest positive attitude level in the district (40%). Slightly more than 20% of respondents are familiar with Danylo Lubkivskyi and Olha Shvets.