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Electoral moods: District 122

20.10.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about three quarters of respondents living in single-member electoral district №122 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
Among them, about 30% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 19% for the People’s Front, 15% for Samopomich, 10% for the Radical Party, 5% for Civic Position, and 4% each for Svoboda and Batkivshchyna. At the same time, 11% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
Regarding candidate ratings, 38% of respondents among those planning to vote would support Volodymyr Parasyuk (independent candidate), 9% — Taras Vozniak (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 7% — Ivan Bokal (independent candidate), more than 4% — Oleksandr Pavliuk (Batkivshchyna), and almost 3% — Iryna Vereshchuk (independent candidate). About 35% of respondents had not decided on their candidate choice.
The most well-known candidate is Volodymyr Parasyuk (70% recognition). He also has the highest positive attitude level in the district (46%). About 40% of respondents are familiar with Taras Vozniak, and less than 30% with Oleksandr Pavliuk.

Electoral moods: District 121

14.10.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 70% of respondents living in constituency No. 121 (Lviv region) said they would definitely take part in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 26.
Among them, about 30% said they were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 16% for Samopomich, 14% for the People’s Front, 12% for the Radical Party, 7% for Batkivshchyna, and 4% each for Svoboda and Civic Position. At the same time, 10% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
Regarding candidate ratings, among those who plan to participate in the elections, 23% said they would support Roman Ilyk (Batkivshchyna), 10% Mykhailo Koval (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 9% each Mykhailo Zadorozhnyi (independent candidate) and Ihor Kurus (Radical Party), almost 9% Ivan Matkovskyi (People’s Front), and 5% Pavlo Barnatskyi (independent candidate). More than 30% of respondents remained undecided.
Roman Ilyk is the most well-known candidate in the constituency (85% are familiar with him) and has the highest positive rating (32%). Around 60% of respondents are familiar with Mykhailo Zadorozhnyi, while about 50% know Pavlo Barnatskyi and Ihor Kurus.

Electoral moods: District 119

14.10.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, three quarters (77%) of respondents in constituency No. 119 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
Among them, about 20% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 13% for the Radical Party, 12% for Samopomich, 11% for the People’s Front, 6% for Svoboda, 4% for Batkivshchyna, and 3% for Hromadianska Pozytsiia. At the same time, 27% of respondents were still undecided.
Regarding candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 13% would have supported Andrii Andrushchenko (Radical Party), 12% Iryna Sekh (Svoboda), and 12% Mykhailo Bondar (People’s Front). In addition, almost 10% would have supported Mykhailo Chumak (Batkivshchyna), 4% Stepan Rak (independent candidate), 3% Nadiia Shostak (independent candidate), and 2% each Vasyl Hrushetskyi and Oleh Matkivskyi. More than 40% of respondents remained undecided.
The most well-known candidate was Iryna Sekh (84% knew her). Mykhailo Chumak was known by 36%, Andrii Andrushchenko by 31%, and Mykhailo Bondar by 25%.

Electoral moods of the population: October 2014

13.10.2014

According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 35% of respondents would definitely participate and another 40% would likely participate. The projected voter turnout compared to June–July decreased from 59% to 55%. The highest level of mobilization is observed in all regions except Donbas and the South. In the territories of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian government, only 13% of respondents definitely intend to vote in parliamentary elections.
If parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held next Sunday, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc would win, supported by 33.5% of respondents who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. 12.8% would support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 8.9% the People’s Front, 7.8% Strong Ukraine, and 6.9% Batkivshchyna. 5.4% would vote for Samopomich, 5.1% for the Opposition Bloc, 4.6% for Civic Position, 4.5% for the Communist Party, and almost 4% for Svoboda. Almost 2% would vote for Right Sector. About 5% would support other parties. In total, the survey covered all 29 parties intending to participate in the elections.
In the regional breakdown, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc is most supported in Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine. In these regions, voters are also more likely to support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Batkivshchyna. In Western Ukraine, higher support is also observed for the People’s Front, Samopomich, Svoboda, and Right Sector. In contrast, in the South Strong Ukraine receives higher support, while in the South and East more voters are ready to support the Opposition Bloc. The Communist Party receives the highest support in Donbas and somewhat less in the South.
In terms of dynamics, over the last two months the People’s Front gained the most support, as well as Samopomich, Strong Ukraine, the Communist Party, and the Opposition Bloc. Batkivshchyna, Civic Position, Svoboda, and especially the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko lost support. In September, compared to August, support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc increased, but in October the growth did not continue.
The highest trust levels among politicians are for Petro Poroshenko (51%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (45%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (42%), and Andrii Sadovyi (40%). Oleh Liashko experienced the largest decline in trust: while 40% trusted him in August, only 28% did in early October.
Regarding second-choice party preferences (respondents were asked which other party they could vote for), the largest share (10%) indicated the People’s Front. Additionally, 8% do not exclude voting for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, more than 4% each for Civic Position and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, almost 4% each for Samopomich and Strong Ukraine, and about 3% each for Svoboda, the Opposition Bloc, and Batkivshchyna.
Thirty-four percent of respondents are fully confident in their political choice, 36% are fairly confident but may change their choice, 15% are uncertain, and 15% are undecided. The most confident voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Opposition Bloc.
For 31% of respondents, the party leader is the most important factor when choosing a party (especially among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Civic Position, the Radical Party, the People’s Front, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc). For 29%, the party list composition is most important, while 27% emphasize party ideology (especially among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party). Thirteen percent are undecided.
The majority of respondents (55%) believe that parliamentary elections in October will be more a competition of leaders, while about half as many (22%) believe it will be a competition of ideas. Eight percent gave other answers, and 15% were undecided.
More than half of respondents (55%) believe that the party they could support should primarily focus on economic issues, 29% on military and defense issues, and 6% on humanitarian or ideological issues, while 10% are undecided. The military direction is most attractive to voters of Right Sector.
Forty-eight percent approve of President Petro Poroshenko’s performance, while 44% disapprove. Forty-five percent are satisfied with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk’s performance, while 48% are dissatisfied. Compared to August survey results, satisfaction with the performance of the new government declined across all officials.
More than one third of respondents (35%) would like to see Arsenii Yatseniuk as Prime Minister after parliamentary elections. Additionally, 9% would prefer Serhii Tihipko, 5% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko, 4% each Yulia Tymoshenko or Andrii Sadovyi, and 3% Vadym Rabinovych.
As a priority for government action in the next year, 35% of respondents consider resolving the Donbas issue most important, 21% economic reforms, 16% restoring national defense capacity, and 11% social protection.
More than half of respondents (52%) believe that controlling price growth and inflation is the top priority for the government, followed by fighting corruption (41%). Other important priorities include lustration of officials, law enforcement, and judges (22%), preventing mass layoffs and unemployment growth (19%), developing the defense industry (19%), ensuring timely payment of wages, pensions, and social benefits (19%), ensuring timely salary and pension payments (18%), developing domestic industrial production (17%), improving relations with Russia (16%) and Western countries (13%).
The biggest fear among Ukrainians is war (77%). Other major fears include significant price increases for food and medicines (31%), hunger (22%), non-payment of wages and pensions (20%), currency devaluation, inflation, and job loss (17% each), heating problems during winter and increases in utility tariffs (16% each). Nearly 10% fear gas supply disruptions to homes and mass electricity outages.

Electoral moods: District 22

09.10.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 68% of respondents in constituency No. 22 (Lutsk) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
Among them, about 19% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, and the same share (19%) for the People’s Front. Another 12% were ready to vote for the Radical Party, and 11% for Samopomich. Close to these were Batkivshchyna with 8% support, Svoboda – 7%, and Hromadianska Pozytsiia – 7%. About 4% would have voted for Right Sector. At the same time, 9% of respondents were still undecided.
Regarding second choice (which other party respondents could vote for), 15% would have voted for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 12% for the People’s Front, 8% for the Radical Party, 8% for Samopomich, 7% for Batkivshchyna, 5% for Hromadianska Pozytsiia, and 5% for Svoboda.
As for candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 28% would have supported Ihor Lapin (People’s Front), 13% Roman Ivaniuk (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 8% Hryhorii Pustovit (Batkivshchyna), and 7% Iryna Konstankevych (independent candidate). About 30% of respondents remained undecided.
It is worth noting that candidates running in the constituency had relatively low name recognition at that time. About half of respondents knew Hryhorii Pustovit and Ihor Lapin, around 40% knew Hennadii Kozhevnikov, and about one third knew Roman Ivaniuk. Only about one in five respondents knew Kostiantyn Petrochuk.
The most positive attitude was recorded toward Ihor Lapin (32%). 17% had a positive attitude toward Hryhorii Pustovit (while 16% expressed a negative attitude toward him). 14% had a positive attitude toward Roman Ivaniuk. The most negative attitude was recorded toward Hennadii Kozhevnikov (21%).

Electoral moods: District 66

09.10.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 50% of respondents in constituency No. 66 (Zhytomyr region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
Among them, about 20% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 13% for the People’s Front, 13% for the Radical Party, 10% for Batkivshchyna, and 7% for Samopomich. At the same time, about a quarter of respondents were still undecided.
Regarding the second choice question (which other party respondents could vote for), 10% would give their vote to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 6% to the People’s Front, and 4% to the Radical Party. Almost 70% could not determine their second party choice.
As for candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 15% would have supported Pavlo Dziublyk (People’s Front), 13% Vitalii Zhuravskyi (independent candidate), 9% Mykhailo Pukhtaievych (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 8% Viktor Dubas (Radical Party), and 7% Petro Riabenko (Batkivshchyna). Around 40% of respondents remained undecided.
The most well-known candidate was Vitalii Zhuravskyi (88% recognized him). Vitalii Zhuravskyi and Ivan Lytvyn had the highest negative attitudes in the constituency — 46% and 38% respectively. Other candidates were relatively unknown among voters, which explains the high share of undecided respondents.

Countries where Ukrainians would like to be born and live

25.09.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 60% of respondents said they would like to have been born in Ukraine.
Compared to data from April of the previous year, the share of those who would like to be born in Ukraine increased by 12%. At the same time, Russia became less attractive (declining from 9% to 4%), as did Germany (from 5% to 3%) and the United States (from 4% to 2%).
Additionally, 13% of respondents said they would personally like to live in Russia (78% would not), while 20% said they would like to live in Belarus (70% would not). Meanwhile, 46% said they would like to live in Europe (43% would not).
Compared to a similar survey conducted in March of the previous year, the share of respondents who would like to live in Russia decreased significantly (from 30% to 13%), while interest in Belarus remained unchanged (20%). At the same time, the share of those who would like to live in Europe increased from 43% to 46%.
Living in Russia or Belarus was more often preferred by residents of Donbas, Eastern and Southern regions, as well as people with lower material status. In contrast, Europe was more often chosen by residents of Western, Northern, and Central regions. In general, younger respondents, those with higher education levels, and those with higher income were more likely to prefer living in European countries.
Among respondents who had a positive attitude toward Angela Merkel, 56% would prefer to live in Europe, 14% in Belarus, and 4% in Russia. Among those who had a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, 28% would choose Belarus, 15% Russia, while a relative majority (40%) would still choose Europe.
Among respondents who had a positive attitude toward Vladimir Putin, about half said they would prefer to live in Russia, 43% in Belarus, and 15% in European countries.

Attitude of Ukrainians to world leaders

23.09.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 62% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, 54% toward Barack Obama, and 51% toward Angela Merkel. In addition, 45% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Bronisław Komorowski, 39% toward José Manuel Barroso, 36% toward Dalia Grybauskaitė, and 16% toward Vladimir Putin.
The ranking of negative attitudes is led by V. Putin (75%). 32% of respondents have a negative attitude toward A. Merkel, 31% toward B. Obama, 26% toward A. Lukashenko, and 25% toward N. Nazarbayev.
Residents of the western, central, and northern regions are more favorable toward B. Obama, A. Merkel, B. Komorowski, J. M. Barroso, D. Grybauskaitė, and F. Hollande. Meanwhile, residents of the South and East have a more positive attitude toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev. At the same time, in the South there is also a positive attitude toward A. Merkel. Relatively positive attitudes toward V. Putin are recorded only in Donbas. Older people tend to have a more positive attitude toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev, while young people more often support B. Obama and A. Merkel.
The higher the education level of respondents and the higher their material status, the more positive their attitudes are toward B. Obama, B. Komorowski, J. M. Barroso, D. Grybauskaitė, and F. Hollande. Accordingly, attitudes toward A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev, and V. Putin are more negative in these groups.
Compared with a similar survey conducted in October of the previous year, the level of positive attitude toward V. Putin decreased from 47% to 16%, and toward A. Merkel from 61% to 51%. At the same time, attitudes toward B. Obama improved from 51% to 54%. It should also be noted that the number of respondents with negative attitudes toward politicians increased simultaneously: negative attitudes toward V. Putin rose from 40% to 75%, toward A. Merkel from 13% to 32%, and toward B. Obama from 25% to 31%.
It is worth noting that Ukrainians are generally very tolerant in their attitudes toward citizens of other countries. At the same time, attitudes toward foreign citizens are much better than toward the leaders of those same countries.
Ukrainians have the most positive attitude toward Belarusians (53% definitely positive; 41% rather positive), and the least positive toward Russians (39% definitely positive; 33% rather positive).
Overall, about 90% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Europeans, Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, and French; about 80% toward Americans; and about 70% toward Russians.

Dynamics of patriotic moods

15.08.2014

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 86% of Ukrainians consider themselves patriots of their country. At the same time, 50% definitely characterize themselves as patriots, and another 36% say they are rather patriots than not. Only 6% do not consider themselves patriots, while 8% were unable to determine their position.
Over the past year, the share of those who consider themselves patriots increased from 81% to 86%, and compared to 2010 it increased from 76% to 86%. At the same time, the share of those who do not consider themselves patriots more than halved (from 15% in 2010 to 6% in 2014). Residents of the West, North and Center, people with higher income and higher education levels, as well as Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely to consider themselves patriots.
Overall, 76% of respondents would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence if they faced such a choice today. At the same time, 12% would not support it, and another 12% were undecided. Over the past year, there has been a significant increase in supporters of Independence (from 61% to 76%), while the number of opponents almost halved. The vast majority of respondents in all regions support Ukraine’s Independence, except in Donbas, where supporters and opponents are equal at 34% each, while almost a third (31%) were undecided.
The younger the respondents, the more they support Ukraine’s Independence. Support is also higher among respondents with higher education and higher income. More than 90% of respondents who consider Ukrainian their native language would vote for Independence. Among those who consider both Russian and Ukrainian native languages, more than 70% would support Independence. Among those who consider Russian their native language, 45% would support Ukraine’s Independence today, while only 30% would vote against it. The higher the level of patriotism among respondents, the more likely they are to support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence.
Regionally, the dynamics of readiness to vote for Independence are positive: support increased significantly in all regions, including in the South (from 48% to 64%) and in the East (from 44% to 70%). As a year earlier, about one third of Donbas residents support Ukraine’s Independence, while the number of opponents decreased (from 57% to 34%) and the number of undecided increased (from 11% to 31%).
An absolute majority of respondents (64%) primarily identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Half as many identify themselves as residents of their region, city or village (30%). 21% would identify themselves by nationality, and 17% would simply say “a human being.” 8% consider themselves Europeans, and the same share would identify themselves by their family role. 4% identify themselves as “a Soviet person” and 4% as “a citizen of the world.” About 3% would identify themselves by profession or religion.
Over the past four years, identification as citizens of Ukraine and as Europeans has increased. At the same time, fewer respondents identify themselves as simply “a human being,” “a Soviet person,” or primarily through family role. “Citizen of Ukraine” is the dominant identity marker in all regions except Donbas, where the main identity marker remains “resident of one’s region, city or village.” Younger respondents and those with higher education are more likely to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Rural residents are more likely to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine or by nationality, while urban residents are more likely to say “resident of a region/city” or simply “a human being.” Identification as “European” is highest in the West and lowest in Donbas, and is more typical for younger and more educated respondents. Identification through family role is more typical in the Central region and among people with lower education. Identification as a “Soviet person” is more typical for residents of Donbas and the East, older people and those with lower education.
The main sources of pride in their country and people are the place where respondents were born and raised (35%), the land and territory where they live (35%), their state (29%) and outstanding people of their nationality (28%). Hard work and ability to manage households were mentioned by 26%, language of their people by 23%, history and past by 22%, moral qualities of the people by 21%, songs, holidays and traditions by 19%. Slightly fewer mentioned the flag, coat of arms and anthem (14%), native nature (14%), religion and faith (14%), graves of ancestors and memory of them (12%), literature and arts (8%), sports victories (6%) and military strength of the state (2%).
In recent years, Ukrainians have started to feel more pride in their land and territory, their state, their language and national symbols, while pride related to nature, traditions and sports victories decreased. Men are more likely to feel pride related to land, state and sports achievements. Women are more likely to feel pride related to people’s work ethic, traditions, literature and arts. Respondents with higher education more often feel pride in the state, people’s moral qualities and culture, while those with lower education more often mention history, traditions, religion and memory of ancestors. Urban residents more often mention people’s moral qualities, traditions, nature, literature and arts, while rural residents more often mention the state, language, work ethic, national symbols and religion.

Relations between the state and business

24.07.2014

According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 37% of respondents believe that representatives of big business should not be present in parliament under any circumstances, while another 33% believe they may be present only if they sell their businesses. Meanwhile, 18% see nothing wrong with big business representatives being present in parliament, and 12% were undecided.
More loyal attitudes toward the presence of big business representatives in parliament are observed among people with higher levels of education and higher incomes.
The majority of respondents (58%) believe that political parties should finance parliamentary election campaigns from the income and savings of party leaders. At the same time, 24% believe campaigns should be financed through voters’ contributions to party campaign funds, 22% — through sponsorship from big business, 9% — through state funding, 3% suggested other options, and 12% were undecided.
According to 81% of respondents, the state should conclude an agreement with big business on returning part of capital to state ownership. Only 5% disagree with this idea, while 14% were undecided. Support for such an agreement is highest in Kyiv, the Center, the North, Galicia, and the West, and lowest in Kharkiv region.
When asked what the state should do with large enterprises owned by oligarchs, 45% supported conducting objective investigations and returning only illegally obtained enterprises to state ownership, 36% supported nationalizing all large enterprises owned by oligarchs, 11% supported allowing owners to compensate for illegally obtained assets while retaining ownership, and only 2% supported taking no action. Another 6% were undecided.
Over the past three months, the share of respondents supporting full nationalization of large enterprises decreased (from 44% to 36%), while support increased for investigations and the return of only illegally obtained enterprises (from 36% to 45%).
Most respondents believe that both high-ranking officials and representatives of big business convicted of embezzlement of state property should receive maximum prison sentences. This position is supported by 68% regarding high-ranking officials and 62% regarding big business representatives. Providing at least minimum prison sentences is supported by 12% (for officials) and 15% (for business representatives). Approximately equal shares support suspended sentences combined with bans on holding public office (8% and 9% respectively). Only 1% support no punishment, and about 5% were undecided.
About 30% of respondents would like to start their own business, while 55% would not. Only 3% stated they already own a business, and 12% were undecided. Over the past year, the share of those willing to engage in entrepreneurship increased slightly (from 27% to 30%), while the share of those unwilling decreased. At the same time, the share of those already running a business decreased (from 5% to 3%).
Entrepreneurial aspirations are highest among residents of Kyiv, the West, Galicia, and the Center, as well as among men and younger people.
47% of respondents positively assess their chances of starting a business within the next one to two years, 46% believe they have no such chances, and 6% were undecided. Compared to the previous year, the share of those optimistic about entrepreneurial prospects decreased (from 54% to 47%), while skepticism increased.
Regarding the idea of free sale of agricultural land, the majority of respondents (74%) have a negative attitude, 13% support the idea, and 12% were undecided. Over the past two years, there has been a slight increase in support for free agricultural land sales (from 9% in 2012, 11% in 2013, to 13% in 2014).

Electoral moods of the population: July 2014

23.07.2014

According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held in early July 2014, about 60% of voters would have taken part in them. The highest level of mobilization was recorded in Galicia, Kyiv, the Center, and the West (around 80%). The lowest level was recorded in Donbas (27%) and in the South of the country (37%).
If parliamentary elections had taken place in early July 2014, the Solidarity party would have won. Thus, 23% of respondents (among those who would have participated in the elections) would have voted for Solidarity, 13% for the Radical Party, 11% for Batkivshchyna, 7% for UDAR, and 5% for Civic Position. Around 4% of voters were ready to vote for Svoboda and the Communist Party. Around 3% would have been received by Strong Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and Front for Change. The party of O. Bohomolets would have received slightly less than 2%, while Right Sector and Self-Reliance (A. Sadovyi) would have received around 1%. About 4% of voters would have supported other parties, and 16% were undecided.
Slightly more than one third of respondents (38%) were completely confident in their party choice. One third (32%) admitted they could change their choice, and nearly the same share (30%) were not confident in their choice or had not decided.
Voters of the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, the Radical Party, UDAR, and Solidarity were the most confident in their choice compared to others.
At the same time, an absolute majority of respondents believed that the new parliament should have fewer Members of Parliament than currently. Thus, 84% of respondents considered 300–350 MPs to be the optimal number. Only 4% believed there should be 450 MPs as at present, while 12% were undecided.
The only politicians with a positive balance of trust versus distrust were P. Poroshenko, A. Yatsenyuk, and A. Hrytsenko. A significant level of trust was also recorded for V. Klitschko, O. Liashko, and O. Bohomolets. Respondents expressed the highest levels of distrust toward M. Dobkin, R. Akhmetov, and S. Tihipko.

Attitude to the situation in the East of Ukraine

22.07.2014

According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, more than half of respondents (58%) believe that Russian intelligence services are behind the armed confrontations in Eastern Ukraine, while half (49%) believe that the entourage of former President V. Yanukovych is involved. Another quarter place responsibility on the Party of Regions (28%) and local oligarchs (24%). Every fifth respondent (18%) believes the confrontations are driven by local residents dissatisfied with the policies of the new government; 15% attribute them to radical nationalist organizations, 11% to Western intelligence services, and 6% to Ukrainian intelligence services. Four percent chose another option, and 11% were undecided.
Compared to the April survey, the number of those who consider the entourage of former President Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and Western and Ukrainian intelligence services to be involved in the confrontations in the East has increased. At the same time, the share of those who believe local residents dissatisfied with the new government are responsible has decreased.
Regionally, in Western and Central Ukraine, more respondents began to believe that the former President’s entourage is involved, while in the South fewer respondents hold this view. The Party of Regions is also blamed more often in the West, North, and Center. Compared to the previous survey, local residents dissatisfied with the new government are mentioned more often in the West, but less often in the East, South, and Donbas.
In Donbas, more respondents began blaming Russian intelligence services and radical nationalist organizations. In this region, as well as in the South, there has been an increase in the number of those who believe local oligarchs and Western intelligence services are involved in the confrontations in Eastern Ukraine.
When asked, “How would you assess the current state of relations between Ukraine and Russia?”, the majority (57%) described it as a war, 19% as a political conflict, 8% as a temporary misunderstanding, 6% as an economic conflict, 1% chose another option, and 9% were undecided. In most regions, respondents described relations as a war, except in Donbas and Kharkiv, where respondents were more likely to describe them as a political conflict.
More than half of respondents (58%) believe Ukraine should completely close its border with Russia, 34% oppose this, and 8% are undecided. Border closure is supported in most regions except the South, Kharkiv, and Donbas.
At the same time, half of respondents (49%) believe that a visa regime with Russia should be introduced, 41% oppose it, and 10% are undecided. Opposition to a visa regime is strongest in the South, Kharkiv, and Donbas.
A large majority of respondents (75%) support a unitary state structure for Ukraine, 12% support a federal structure, and 13% are undecided. Over the previous three months, support for a unitary state increased (from 69% in April to 75% in July). Support for a unitary system is lowest in Donbas, among urban residents, and among Russian-speaking respondents. Donbas is the only region where a relative plurality (40%) supports a federal structure (29% unitary, 31% undecided). In all other regions, support for a unitary state prevails.
Separation of Galicia from Ukraine is rather supported by 9% of respondents, rather opposed by 81%, and 10% are undecided. Over the previous two years, support for separation of Galicia increased from 5% in 2012 to 10% in 2014. Support for this idea is highest in Donbas, Kharkiv, the South, and Dnipro, as well as among supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine.
Separation of Donbas is supported by 11%, opposed by 81%, and 8% are undecided. Over the past two years, support for separation increased from 2% in 2012 to 11% in 2014. The highest support is in Donbas itself (37%), about 10% in the South, Kharkiv region, Galicia, and Dnipro, and among supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine.
Regarding integration choices, 61% of respondents support joining the European Union, 20% support joining the Customs Union, and 19% are undecided. Since April, support for EU integration has increased while support for the Customs Union has decreased. The highest support for the Customs Union is in Donbas (58%), Kharkiv region (42%), and the South (29%).
If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held today, 44% would support joining, 35% would oppose it, and 22% would be undecided. Over the previous three months, support for NATO membership increased slightly, while opposition decreased by 11%. At the same time, the share of undecided respondents increased by 7%. Support for NATO membership is highest in Galicia (88%) and lowest in Donbas, Kharkiv region, and the South, where most respondents oppose joining NATO. Support for NATO membership is higher among men and people with higher education.

Who do Ukrainians cheer for at the 2014 FIFA World Cup

28.06.2014

According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the 2014 FIFA World Cup generated less interest than the 2010 World Cup and significantly less than EURO 2012. Most fans supported Brazil and Germany, which were also considered the main favorites of the tournament, while Brazil’s chances of winning were assessed as twice as high.
About one third of the adult population followed the events of the 2014 World Cup. In particular, 14% followed or intended to follow most matches, 9% followed the playoff matches and the final, and another 9% followed only the final. Meanwhile, 65% were not interested in the tournament at all. The highest level of interest was observed in the North, Center, and West of Ukraine. The decrease in overall interest was largely explained by the difficult situation in Eastern Ukraine: while in 2010 the Donbas region showed significant interest in the tournament, in 2014, due to objective circumstances, interest there was the lowest.
56% of Ukrainian men and 13% of women followed the World Cup. In 2010, nearly two thirds of men and almost every fifth woman followed World Cup matches. Most fans were young and middle-aged people. Additionally, the higher the level of education and income, the higher the interest in the tournament.
One third of fans supported Brazil, while 27% supported Germany. The Netherlands were supported by 15%, France by 12%, Argentina by 9%, Portugal by 8%, Belgium by 3%, Uruguay by 2%, and Mexico by 1%. Notably, a significant share of Ukrainians supported teams that did not advance from the group stage: Spain (21%), Italy (15%), England (13%), Portugal (8%), Russia (6%), and Croatia (4%). It is likely that after these teams were eliminated, overall interest in the tournament declined.
While during EURO 2012 about one quarter of Ukrainian fans supported Russia, during the 2014 World Cup only 6% did so.
According to respondents, the highest chances of winning were attributed to Brazil (23%), Germany (14%), and the Netherlands (7%). France and Argentina were each named by 3% as potential winners.
It is also worth noting that in 2012 Ukrainians accurately predicted the winner of the European Football Championship: nearly one third predicted Spain, which ultimately won EURO 2012.

Socio-political moods of the population: May 2014

20.05.2014

According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with two other leading polling organizations in mid-May 2014, just one week before the presidential election, Ukrainians demonstrated a very high level of electoral engagement. About 82% of voters said they were definitely or likely to participate in the vote, while 12% said they would not and 6% were undecided. In the presidential election scheduled for May 25, Petro Poroshenko remained the clear frontrunner, supported by 34% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko ranked second with 6.5%, followed by Serhiy Tihipko with 5.8%. Oleh Liashko and Anatoliy Hrytsenko each received just over 4% support, Mykhailo Dobkin 3.5%, and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko 2.2%, while all other candidates polled below 2%. At the same time, nearly 23% of respondents said they had not yet decided whom to vote for, and about 12% stated they would not take part in the election.
Among those who intended to vote and had already made their choice, Poroshenko’s lead was even more pronounced, with 53.2% support, compared with 10.1% for Tymoshenko and 8.8% for Tihipko, while Liashko and Hrytsenko would each receive just over 6%. When asked to predict the likely winner regardless of their own voting intentions, nearly half of respondents named Poroshenko, while only small shares expected Tymoshenko or Tihipko to win, and more than a third declined to make a forecast.
The survey also measured views on key political and social issues. A plurality of respondents supported Ukrainian as the sole state language with Russian allowed official use, while others favored granting Russian official status in certain regions or making both Ukrainian and Russian state languages. An overwhelming majority supported Ukraine’s unitary form of government, with fewer than one in six favoring a federal system. Developments in the southeast of the country were most often seen as a form of covert Russian aggression, although significant minorities interpreted them as either a popular uprising or as terrorist acts.

PEOPLE'S TOP “Favorite films of Ukrainians”

15.05.2014

According to a nationwide study conducted by Rating Group in April 2014 as part of its “People’s TOP” project, which relies exclusively on open-ended questions without any prompted lists, respondents were asked to name their three favorite films. More than 600 different films and television series were mentioned, and only 16% of respondents were unable to name a favorite. The most frequently cited titles included The Magnificent Century: Roxolana, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, The Diamond Arm, The Irony of Fate, Love and Doves, Office Romance, and Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, along with a number of other iconic Soviet and post-Soviet productions.
Clear regional patterns emerged in cultural preferences. In Western Ukraine, Roxolana, Power, Brigade, The Engagement Ring, and Angelika were mentioned more often than elsewhere. In the Center, respondents more frequently named Gentlemen of Fortune, Cops, Wedding in Malynivka, Twilight, and The Matrix. In the North, favorites included Interns, Operation “Y”, Titanic, The Fifth Element, and Doctor House. In the East, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, Office Romance, Seventeen Moments of Spring, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, and The Caucasian Captive were particularly popular. In Donbas, the most frequently mentioned films were The Diamond Arm, Love and Doves, Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, White Sun of the Desert, and Gone with the Wind, while in the South viewers preferred The Irony of Fate, Girls, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, The Three Musketeers, and the series Glukhar.
Gender and age differences were also pronounced. Men tended to prefer adventure films, comedies, action movies, historical films, and crime dramas such as The Diamond Arm, Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, Operation “Y”, Cops, Brigade, Glukhar, 9th Company, Die Hard, Brother, and Star Wars. Women more often chose melodramas and comedies, including Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, The Irony of Fate, Office Romance, Love and Doves, Girls, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, Titanic, Pretty Woman, as well as the television series Roxolana and Power. Older respondents showed a stronger preference for classic Soviet films and for Roxolana, while younger people were more inclined toward contemporary international cinema such as Titanic, Avatar, Pretty Woman, and Die Hard, and middle-aged respondents gravitated more toward series such as Brigade and Cops.
Language and place of residence also shaped preferences. Ukrainian-speaking respondents more often named Roxolana, Power, Gentlemen of Fortune, and For Two Hares, while bilingual respondents favored The Irony of Fate, Girls, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, Matchmakers, and Twilight. Russian-speaking respondents more frequently chose Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, Office Romance, Love and Doves, and The Caucasian Captive. Urban residents preferred The Irony of Fate, The Diamond Arm, The Caucasian Captive, Office Romance, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, Gentlemen of Fortune, Avatar, and Titanic, while rural residents more often cited Roxolana, Power, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, Cops, Matchmakers, The Dawns Here Are Quiet, Die Hard, and 9th Company.
When classified by country of origin, the majority of favorite films were of Soviet origin, accounting for about 40% of all mentions, while one third were foreign productions, around one fifth were Russian, and only 5% were Ukrainian. Foreign films were most popular in the West and in the Northern and Central regions, while Soviet films dominated in the East, South, and Donbas. Russian films were mentioned least often both in the West and in Donbas. Soviet films were more popular among women, older people, urban residents, and those with lower incomes, while Russian films were more often favored by men. Ukrainian films were more frequently chosen by rural residents and older, lower-income groups, whereas younger, more affluent, Ukrainian-speaking respondents tended to prefer foreign cinema.
Two thirds of all favorite titles mentioned were feature films and one third were television series. Feature films were especially dominant in Donbas, while series were most popular in the West. Preference for feature films increased with higher levels of education and income and was more common among men and Russian-speaking urban residents, whereas series were more often favored by women, Ukrainian-speaking rural residents, and people with lower incomes.

Political moods of the population: April 2014

07.05.2014

According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in late April 2014, electoral engagement in Ukraine remained high, with more than three quarters of respondents saying they would definitely or likely participate in the presidential election. After accounting for those who were not fully certain about their participation, the expected turnout was estimated at around 64 percent, with the highest participation projected in the West, North, and Center of the country, and the lowest in Donbas and the South, where voter activity had declined sharply compared to previous waves.
In the presidential race, Petro Poroshenko remained the clear frontrunner. Among all respondents, 34.3% were ready to vote for him, compared with 11.1% for Yulia Tymoshenko and 5.7% for Serhiy Tihipko. Mykhailo Dobkin and Anatoliy Hrytsenko followed with around 4% each, while Oleh Liashko, Petro Symonenko, Oleh Tiahnybok, and Olha Bohomolets attracted smaller shares of support. Among likely voters, Poroshenko’s lead was even more pronounced, exceeding 40 percent nationwide, and he was the leading candidate in all regions except Donbas, where Dobkin ranked first amid extremely high levels of indecision and non-participation.
Voter choice was relatively stable, particularly among supporters of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, and almost half of respondents said they supported their preferred candidate because they genuinely liked them and approved of their program and actions, although a substantial share admitted voting mainly because the alternatives were seen as worse. In all tested second-round scenarios, Poroshenko would defeat his main rivals by wide margins, although turnout in Donbas and parts of the South would drop significantly regardless of the pairing.
Public willingness to endure economic hardship in exchange for future improvement increased markedly compared to March, especially in the West, North, and Center, while residents of Donbas and the South were much less prepared to accept short-term sacrifices. Attitudes toward oligarch-owned enterprises were divided between those favoring full nationalization and those preferring to return only illegally obtained assets to the state, with radical nationalization most popular among older, lower-income voters and supporters of the Communist Party.
Most Ukrainians believed that the price paid to Russia for gas was above the market level and strongly supported keeping the gas transit system in state ownership. Support for reducing or completely ending purchases of Russian gas had grown substantially, and a large majority were ready to save gas, heating, or electricity if this would strengthen Ukraine’s position in relations with Russia, although willingness to do so was much lower in Donbas and the South.
Regarding the protests in eastern Ukraine, a majority of respondents attributed them primarily to Russian special services and the entourage of former President Viktor Yanukovych, while significant shares also pointed to local oligarchs, the Party of Regions, and discontented local residents. Views varied regionally, with residents in the East, South, and especially Donbas more likely to see the protests as driven by local grievances.
On how the Ukrainian authorities should respond to protesters calling for secession, opinions were split between those favoring negotiations while preserving territorial integrity and those supporting tough measures, including the use of force if necessary. In the event of a Russian military incursion across mainland borders, a majority of Ukrainians supported armed resistance to defend the country, although large minorities in the South, East, and Donbas preferred negotiations. About 44% of respondents said they were personally ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms, with the highest readiness observed in the West, North, and Center, as well as among younger, male, more educated, and higher-income respondents.

Nostalgia for the USSR and the attitude towards the individual sexes

05.05.2014

According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in April 2014, one third of Ukrainians reported that they regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while almost half said they do not. Since 2010, the share of those expressing nostalgia for the USSR has declined by nearly one and a half times, while the proportion of those who do not regret its collapse has grown steadily. This shift accelerated over the last year, reflecting a rapid transformation of public attitudes. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union is more widespread in the East, South, and especially in Donbas, while it is significantly lower in the Center of the country. Older people, those with lower levels of education and income, and ethnic Russians are more likely to regret the collapse of the USSR, while among ethnic Ukrainians this sentiment has declined sharply over the past year.
Public attitudes toward historical and political figures also reveal deep and shifting divisions. Half of respondents expressed a positive view of Peter the Great, although this figure has declined in recent years, while around 30% hold a negative opinion. He is viewed more favorably in the East, South, Donbas, and to a lesser extent in the Center and North, and ethnic Russians tend to evaluate him slightly more positively than ethnic Ukrainians. Ivan Mazepa is viewed positively by 41% of respondents and negatively by 30%, with the strongest support in the West, Center, and North, and a much weaker but still notable level of support in the South and East. Ethnic Ukrainians are far more likely than ethnic Russians to hold positive views of Mazepa, and higher education is associated with more favorable attitudes.
Joseph Stalin is viewed negatively by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, with only one in five expressing a positive attitude. Negative views of Stalin have grown significantly in recent years, although he retains more support in Donbas and the South, as well as among older, less educated, and lower-income respondents and among ethnic Russians. Stepan Bandera remains a highly polarizing figure: nearly one third of respondents view him positively, while almost half hold negative opinions. However, positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased substantially over the past two years, especially in Western Ukraine, and are more common among younger, more educated respondents and ethnic Ukrainians.
Vladimir Putin is viewed overwhelmingly negatively, with more than three quarters of respondents expressing unfavorable opinions. This represents a dramatic shift from late 2013, when positive views outnumbered negative ones. Only in Donbas does a majority still hold positive attitudes toward him, while in all other regions negative views dominate, particularly in the Center, North, and West. Ethnic Russians are far more likely to view Putin positively than ethnic Ukrainians, although even among ethnic Russians he no longer enjoys majority support.
These attitudes form coherent ideological patterns. Those who regret the collapse of the USSR are far more likely to view figures such as Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin positively, while those who do not regret the Soviet collapse are much more likely to hold positive views of Mazepa and Bandera and strongly negative views of Stalin and Putin. At the same time, even among those who admire Peter the Great, attitudes toward Putin have shifted sharply, with many now viewing him more negatively than figures historically associated with Ukrainian independence.

Socio-political moods of the population: April 2014

23.04.2014

According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group as part of a joint project with three other leading polling organizations in April 2014, Ukrainians demonstrated a very high level of electoral engagement, with around 85% of voters saying they were definitely or likely to participate in the upcoming election, while only 11% expressed the opposite view. In the presidential election scheduled for May 25, 2014, Petro Poroshenko was the clear frontrunner, supported by 32.9% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko ranked second with 9.5%, followed by Serhiy Tihipko with 5.1%. Mykhailo Dobkin was supported by 4.2% of voters, while Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko received 4%. At the same time, about 22% of respondents said they had not yet decided whom to vote for or would not participate, and 9% stated they were ready to vote “against all.”
Among those who intended to vote and had already made their choice, the leading candidates were even more clearly defined. Petro Poroshenko would receive 48.4% of the vote, Yulia Tymoshenko 14%, and Serhiy Tihipko 7.4%, while Mykhailo Dobkin and Petro Symonenko would receive 6% and 5.6%, respectively. Respondents were also asked to make their own prediction about who would become the next President of Ukraine regardless of their personal voting intentions. Here again, Petro Poroshenko was seen as the most likely winner, with 38.7% expecting his victory. Only 8.6% predicted a win for Yulia Tymoshenko, and 2.5% for Serhiy Tihipko, while 1.9% believed Mykhailo Dobkin would win. Nearly half of all respondents did not venture a forecast.
The survey also explored attitudes toward language policy, state structure, and foreign relations. A plurality of respondents supported Ukrainian as the only state language with Russian allowed as an official language, while others favored granting Russian official status in certain regions or making both languages state languages. A strong majority of Ukrainians supported the unitary form of the state, while fewer than one in five favored a federal system. In relations with Russia, most respondents preferred friendly relations with open borders and no visas or customs while maintaining independence, whereas about one third favored a relationship similar to that with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs. Only a small minority supported unification with Russia.

Ideological markers: attitudes towards possible referendums

22.04.2014

According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre in late March and early April 2014, most Ukrainians expressed clear preferences regarding the country’s future institutional, linguistic, and geopolitical orientation. If a referendum were to be held on key issues such as the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the territorial structure of the state, and Ukraine’s integration choices, 82.7% of voters said they would definitely or likely participate. Among those willing to take part, 71.4% would vote for a unitary state, while only 17.1% would support federalization. Nearly 60% would support Ukrainian as the only state language, while 36.5% would oppose this. A similar share would vote in favor of joining the European Union, compared to about a quarter who would prefer accession to the Customs Union, while support for NATO membership would be notably weaker, with less than 40% in favor and nearly half opposed.
When calculated among all respondents rather than only likely participants, the results show a similarly strong preference for a unitary system with decentralization, supported by more than two thirds, while fewer than one in five would vote for a federal structure. On language policy, a majority would support Ukrainian as the sole state language with free use of Russian, while a substantial minority would favor both Ukrainian and Russian as state languages. In terms of Ukraine’s integration path, a majority would support joining the European Union, whereas less than one quarter would favor the Customs Union. NATO membership would be backed by just over one third of respondents, while almost half would oppose it.
Public opinion was also tested on a range of concrete policy options for Ukraine’s future. Support for signing the Association Agreement with the European Union and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was high, with around 60% in favor. In contrast, ideas of political or state integration with Russia were overwhelmingly rejected: only one fifth supported a union state with Russia and Belarus, fewer than one in ten supported Ukraine becoming part of the Russian Federation, and a similar share favored their own region joining Russia. Joining the CIS Collective Security Treaty was supported by less than one in five, while a clear majority opposed it. Nearly half of respondents favored maintaining Ukraine’s non-aligned status, and most opposed introducing a visa regime with Russia. Opinions on withdrawing from the CIS were divided almost evenly.

Support of the activities of state institutions and the electoral orientation of citizens

08.04.2014

According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre in late March and early April 2014, public attitudes toward key state institutions and political leaders were highly differentiated. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov received full support from 21.1% of respondents, while 32.8% said they supported some of his actions and 38.5% did not support his activities. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was viewed more favorably: 30.8% fully supported his work, 28.0% supported some of his actions, and 35.5% did not support him. The Cabinet of Ministers as a whole was fully supported by 20.6% of respondents, partially supported by 33.9%, and not supported by 36.8%, while the Verkhovna Rada received full support from 15.6%, partial support from 38.7%, and no support from 38.0%.
Support for the security institutions was the highest it had been in several years. The Armed Forces were fully supported by 37.6% of respondents and partially supported by another 30.9%, with only 22.8% expressing no support. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was fully supported by 17.5% and partially supported by 32.3%, while 34.7% did not support its activities. The police were fully supported by 13.6% and partially supported by 32.5%, while 42.2% expressed no support. Levels of support for state institutions were significantly higher in the Western and Central regions than in the South and East. For example, only 15.5% in the West and 24.1% in the Center did not support the acting president, compared with 46.7% in the South and 64.2% in the East.
Electoral mobilization was very high: 85.4% of respondents said they intended to participate in the early presidential election, including 62.2% who were fully certain and another 23.2% who said they were likely to vote. If the election had taken place in the days of the survey, Petro Poroshenko would have received the support of 28.2% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko followed with 13.0%, Serhiy Tihipko with 6.1%, Olha Bohomolets and Oleh Liashko with 3.7% each, Mykhailo Dobkin with 3.6%, Petro Symonenko with 3.2%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko with 3.0%, Oleh Tiahnybok with 1.6%, Dmytro Yarosh with 1.2%, Renat Kuzmin with 0.2%, and Vadym Rabinovych with 0.1%.
Compared with the previous joint survey conducted by four polling organizations in mid-March 2014, when Vitali Klitschko was still included in the list of candidates, electoral support increased for Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Serhiy Tihipko.

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