Press releases

Una studija je odgovor na informacijski center “RATING Pro” based on the results of a national survey by Rating Group. Between May 14 and May 22, 2015, 2,000 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed using face-to-face interviews. Samples je representativo na, gendera, regiones, a tipo de settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%. The study also uses data from Eurobarometer surveys.

Infographics on the topic of the study can be downloaded on the website http://ratingpro.org/

The survey was implemented by RATING Pro, Information and Analytical Center. In this survey the results of surveys implemented by Eurobarometer, International Social Survey Programme, municipal survey of International Republican Institute and specifically made national survey of Rating, Sociological Group, implemented in June 2015 (2,000 respondents) initiated and ordered by RATING Pro, were used.

Infographics related to the research can be downloaded on http://ratingpro.org/

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• According to the survey conducted by Rating Group, among religious leaders Ukrainians express the highest level of trust in Patriarch Filaret at 40% and Pope Francis at 35%. The highest levels of distrust are recorded toward Patriarch Kirill of Moscow at 39% and Metropolitan Onufriy at 25%. More than half of respondents say they do not know Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Metropolitan Makariy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, or Archbishop Sviatoslav of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
• Trust in Patriarch Filaret, Pope Francis, Archbishop Sviatoslav and Metropolitan Makariy is higher among residents of Western Ukraine, rural populations, Ukrainian-speaking respondents and people with higher incomes. In contrast, Metropolitan Onufriy and Patriarch Kirill enjoy greater trust among residents of the South and East, Russian-speaking respondents and those with lower levels of education and income.
• In Western Ukraine the highest trust is recorded for Patriarch Filaret at 66%, Pope Francis at 62% and Archbishop Sviatoslav at 57%. In the Center and the South, Patriarch Filaret is trusted by 38% and 40% respectively, while Pope Francis is trusted by 26% and 37%. In the East, the highest level of trust is also recorded for Patriarch Filaret at 22%.
• Overall, respondents in the West demonstrate the highest level of awareness of all religious leaders included in the survey, while awareness is lowest in the Central region. The East has the largest share of respondents who are undecided about their attitudes toward religious leaders. Women and older respondents are generally more informed and more likely to trust religious leaders.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if Ukraine could become a member of only one international economic union, 51% of respondents believe it should be the European Union, 16% – the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 14% – another option, while 20% are undecided. Since September of the previous year, support for integration with the European Union has decreased from 59% to 51%, while support for integration with the Customs Union has remained unchanged. At the same time, the number of respondents who are undecided or support alternative economic integration options has increased.
• Membership in the EU is traditionally supported more in the West (80%), about 60% in the Center, 40% in the South and about 20% in the East. The further towards the South-East of the country, the higher the support for the Customs Union. Nearly 80% of supporters of the People’s Front, BPP “Solidarity”, Right Sector, Samopomich and Svoboda support EU membership. At the same time, nearly 60% of supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party support integration with the Customs Union.
• If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held, 40% would vote in favor, 32% would vote against, 11% would not participate in voting, and 17% would be undecided. Since November 2014, when support peaked at 51%, there has been a gradual decline in support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO: to 46% in April 2015 and to 40% in June, accompanied by an increase in the share of opponents (from 25% to 32%).
• Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be supported by nearly 70% of residents in the West and about half in the Center. At the same time, about half of residents in the East and South would vote against NATO membership. The higher the level of education and income, and the younger the respondents, the higher the support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO. Support for Euro-Atlantic integration is higher among men than among women, especially regarding NATO membership. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, support for EU and NATO membership is almost three times higher than among those whose native language is Russian.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, no more than 60% of respondents would participate, including only 28% who would definitely vote.
• Despite a slight decline in ratings over the past few months, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” remains the leader in electoral support, with 16% of respondents among those intending to vote ready to support it. About 10% would vote for Samopomich, the Opposition Bloc, and Batkivshchyna. Around 6% support the Radical Party and Civic Position, about 5% support Right Sector, about 4% support Svoboda, and about 3% support the People’s Front and the Communist Party. Nearly 7% would vote for other parties, while every fifth respondent remains undecided.
• In the regional breakdown, Samopomich is the leading political force in Western Ukraine (followed by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with Right Sector and Batkivshchyna sharing third place). In Central Ukraine, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” leads (followed by Batkivshchyna and Samopomich). In the South and East of the country, the Opposition Bloc leads (followed by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and Batkivshchyna). It is important to note that in the South nearly half of respondents either do not intend to vote or are undecided, while in the East this share reaches 60%.
• As of early June, the demographic profile of party electorates is as follows. Men are more likely to support Svoboda, Right Sector, and the People’s Front. Women are more likely to support the Radical Party, the Communist Party, Samopomich, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with the highest share of women observed among Batkivshchyna supporters. Voters with lower incomes are more likely to support the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc. Voters with middle incomes are more likely to support the People’s Front, Civic Position, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity.” In contrast, Samopomich, Svoboda, and Right Sector are more supported by higher-income voters. The core electorate of Right Sector, Samopomich, and the People’s Front consists of younger and middle-aged voters. A significant share of youth is also present among supporters of the Radical Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity.” Older voters are more likely to support the Opposition Bloc and Batkivshchyna, while the oldest voters are more represented among supporters of Civic Position and the Communist Party. Voters with lower levels of education are more likely to support the Communist Party, the Radical Party, and Batkivshchyna, while respondents with higher and vocational education make up the core support base of Samopomich, Right Sector, and the People’s Front.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, one quarter of respondents intending to vote would support P. Poroshenko, 10% would support Y. Tymoshenko, and 7% would support A. Sadovyi. Around 6% would support A. Hrytsenko and Y. Boiko, 5% would support O. Liashko, and 4% would support D. Yarosh. About 2% each would support O. Tiahnybok, Serhiy Tihipko, and A. Yatseniuk. About one in ten would vote for other candidates, while every fifth respondent remains undecided.
• In the regional distribution, P. Poroshenko remains the leader in all regions of the country. Y. Tymoshenko ranks second in the West and Center, while in the South and East the second position is held by Y. Boiko. The further from the West, where Poroshenko’s leadership is more pronounced, the smaller the gap becomes between first and second place in the presidential rating.

• Rating Group continues the special project “People’s TOP,” which consists of a series of studies aimed at identifying the best of the best. The key feature of the methodology is that respondents are not provided with any lists or prompts, and express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions.
• This time respondents were asked: “Name the three most outstanding Ukrainians of all time.”
• According to the survey results, the majority of respondents named Taras Shevchenko (62.9%) among the most outstanding Ukrainians of all time. The top four leaders are complemented by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (23.5%), Lesya Ukrainka (19.0%), and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (12.7%).
• The top ten also includes Ivan Franko (9.4%), Ivan Mazepa (9.3%), Stepan Bandera (8.3%), Viacheslav Chornovil (7.6%), Hryhorii Skovoroda (4.7%), and Yaroslav the Wise (4.4%).
• The second ten includes Volodymyr the Great (3.4%), Vitalii Klitschko (3.0%), Mykola Hohol (2.6%), Mykola Amosov (2.2%), Leonid Kuchma (1.6%), Bohdan Stupka (1.6%), Leonid Kravchuk (1.4%), Borys Paton (1.2%), Lina Kostenko (1.2%), and Roman Shukhevych (1.0%).
• The third ten includes Nestor Makhno (1.0%), Yulia Tymoshenko (1.0%), Sofia Rotaru (1.0%), Andrii Shevchenko (1.0%), Leonid Brezhnev (1.0%), Nadiia Savchenko (0.9%), Serhii Korolov (0.9%), Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi (0.8%), Oleksandr Dovzhenko (0.8%), and Petro Poroshenko (0.8%).
• In total, respondents named 174 different individuals. At the same time, 16% of respondents were unable to name (recall) any outstanding Ukrainian.

• According to the survey results, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (74%) identify themselves as Orthodox, 8% as Greek Catholic, and 1% each as Roman Catholic and Protestant or Evangelical church members. Nearly 9% consider themselves simply Christians, while 6% do not associate themselves with any religious denomination.
• In the regional breakdown, Orthodoxy is the most widespread denomination in all regions except Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv regions, where more than half of the population adheres to Greek Catholicism. In addition, nearly 20% of Zakarpattia residents identify themselves as Greek Catholic. Roman Catholicism is also more common in Zakarpattia compared to other regions (7%).
• Among those who consider themselves Orthodox, a relative majority (38%) identify with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 20% with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1% with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and 39% consider themselves simply Orthodox without specific jurisdictional affiliation.
• The Kyiv Patriarchate is most commonly supported in Western and Central Ukraine, while the Moscow Patriarchate is more common in the South and Donbas. Nevertheless, even in southern and eastern regions, except Donbas and Odesa region, supporters of the Kyiv Patriarchate outnumber supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the same time, the further south and east, the more respondents tend to identify themselves simply as Orthodox without associating with a specific Orthodox jurisdiction. The highest shares of such respondents are observed in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Odesa, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, the majority of respondents (71%) consider themselves happy, including 28% who consider themselves definitely happy. At the same time, 18% consider themselves unhappy, and 11% are undecided. Over the past years, a slight decline in this indicator has been recorded. The highest level was observed in 2011 (74%), while the lowest was in 2010 (67%). Younger respondents, those with higher education and income levels, and those who are employed are more likely to consider themselves happy.
• In response to the question “What brings you the most joy in life?”, 68% of respondents mentioned family, 56% mentioned children, and 44% mentioned friends. Next in the “joy ranking” are money and receiving gifts (25% each), work and watching television (24% each), giving gifts (23%), communicating with nature (20%), music (19%), household chores (18%), and travel and the internet (16% each).
• The next positions in the joy ranking include pets (15%), books and food (14% each), birthdays (13%), sex and cinema (12%), shopping, vacation/holidays, and prayer (church) (11% each). Less common sources of joy include singing and sports (9% each), dancing and solitude (6% each), favorite team victories and studying (5% each), theatre (4%), alcohol (3%), and gambling (2%). Three percent were undecided, and 4% stated that nothing brings them joy.
• Over the past five years, Ukrainians have increasingly reported family, children, friends, receiving and giving gifts, work, music, household activities, and the internet as sources of joy. Shopping, prayer (church), theatre, books, singing, and sports have also become more joyful. At the same time, money, watching television, and vacation/holidays have become less associated with joy.
• The more sources of joy a person has, the happier they tend to feel. However, there are certain things that bring equal joy to both happy and unhappy people, and sometimes even more joy to unhappy people. These were defined as “unhappy joys,” including money, watching television, household chores, food, church, solitude, and alcohol.
• Younger respondents tend to find more joy in friends, money, receiving gifts, music, travel, the internet, birthdays, sex, cinema, shopping, vacation/holidays, sports, dancing, favorite team victories, and studying. With increasing age, people tend to find more joy in watching television, household chores, prayer (church), and singing.
• Men tend to find more joy in friends, money, work, the internet, sex, food, sports, favorite team victories, alcohol, and gambling. Women tend to find more joy in family, children, receiving and giving gifts, household chores, shopping, pets, books, prayer (church), birthdays, singing, and dancing. In the male ranking of joy, sex ranks 12th and shopping 30th, while among women the positions are reversed, with shopping ranked 12th and sex ranked 25th.
• An interesting result was found through grouping types of joy. Factor analysis identified the following types of joy: “material” (gifts, shopping, birthdays, travel), “entertainment” (dancing, singing, theatre, books, music, cinema), “youth-related” (studying, vacation/holidays, friends), “unhappy” (watching television, food, money), “family-related” (family, children), “destructive” (light drugs, gambling, alcohol), “solitude-related” (prayer/church, household chores, nature communication, solitude), and “male-associated” (favorite team victories, sports, work, internet, sex).

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, 36% of respondents believe it is necessary to cancel the ceasefire and complete the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) until full restoration of Ukrainian authority across the entire Donbas.
• 21% support granting broader economic and humanitarian powers to the region.
  Another 17% support granting these territories autonomy or a federal status while keeping them within Ukraine.
  Another 9% support separating these territories from Ukraine.
  17% were undecided.
• Compared to the October survey, support for cancelling the ceasefire and completing the ATO increased (from 22% to 36%), while the share of undecided respondents decreased (from 27% to 17%). Support for cancelling the ceasefire and completing the ATO is highest in Western Ukraine, while support for separating these territories from Ukraine is highest in the Donbas itself.
• 43% of respondents have a positive attitude toward signing a ceasefire with representatives of the so-called DPR and LPR, while about the same share (44%) have a negative attitude. 13% were undecided. Compared to October, support for signing the ceasefire decreased (from 53% to 43%), while opposition increased (from 33% to 44%).
• At the same time, a majority of respondents (71%) do not support the idea of separating territories controlled by the DPR and LPR from Ukraine. Meanwhile, about one in five supports separation, and one in ten is undecided.
• An absolute majority (74%) believe Ukraine should remain a unitary state, while 15% support a federal structure, and 11% are undecided.
• 64% of respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, 17% support joining the Customs Union, and 19% are undecided.
• Since April 2014, support for EU accession has increased (from 55% in April to 64%), while support for the Customs Union has decreased (from 24% in April to 17%). EU accession is supported by a majority in the West, North, Center, East, and South of Ukraine. Only in the Donbas does a majority support joining the Customs Union.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) support abolishing Ukraine’s non-aligned status at the legislative level, while about one-third (28%) oppose it. Another quarter are undecided.
• If a referendum on Ukraine joining NATO were held today, about half of respondents (51%) would vote in favor, 25% would vote against, and about a quarter would be undecided or would not participate.
• Since April of that year, support for NATO accession has steadily increased. In November, the highest level of support was recorded (from 40% in April to 51%), while opposition decreased (from 46% in April to 25%). NATO accession is most strongly supported in Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, support and opposition are roughly equal, while in the South and Donbas there are more opponents.

Election assessment

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, the majority (56%) believe that the parliamentary elections of October 26 were rather free and fair, while 28% believe the elections were rather not free and not fair, and about one in six respondents were undecided.
• Importantly, among those who participated in the elections, an absolute majority (75%) consider them free and fair. Meanwhile, among respondents who did not vote, the majority (60%) believe the elections were rather not free and not fair.
• Almost 60% expect positive changes as a result of the early parliamentary elections (three months before the elections this figure was 46%). Half believe that the newly elected parliament will be more effective than the previous composition of the Verkhovna Rada, one third believe that nothing will change, and only 7% think the new parliament will be less effective than the previous one.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 24.5% of respondents (among those who would participate and had decided) would vote for the People’s Front, 23.5% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 12.7% for the Self-Reliance (Samopomich) union, almost 9% for the Opposition Bloc, 7% for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, and 6.1% for Batkivshchyna. Other parties would not pass the electoral threshold: Svoboda – 4.4%, Communist Party – 3.3%, Strong Ukraine – 2.7%, Right Sector – 2.1%, Civil Position – 1.7%.

Satisfaction with government performance

• 49% approve of President Petro Poroshenko’s performance, while 42% disapprove.
  52% of respondents are satisfied with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk’s performance, while 40% are dissatisfied.
  32% are satisfied with Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr Turchynov’s performance, while 55% are dissatisfied.
• Compared to the October survey, satisfaction with the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament improved (from 45% to 52% and from 27% to 32% respectively), while evaluations of the President’s performance remained almost unchanged.

Coalition formats

• Among possible coalition formats, the highest support is for:
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich – Radical Party – Batkivshchyna” (19%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich” (17%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front” (12%)
• The least supported formats are:
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – People’s Front – Samopomich – Batkivshchyna” (9%)
  — “Poroshenko Bloc – Opposition Bloc” (5%)
• Meanwhile, 20% of respondents do not support any of these formats, and about one in six are undecided.
• The majority of respondents (50%) see Arsenii Yatseniuk as Prime Minister of Ukraine after the October 26 elections. Much fewer support other candidates: Yurii Boiko (6%), Andrii Sadovyi (5%), Volodymyr Groysman (4%), Yulia Tymoshenko (4%), Oleh Liashko (3%), Serhii Tihipko (1%).
• As Speaker of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, respondents most often name Oleksandr Turchynov (22%), followed by Volodymyr Groysman (9%) and Volodymyr Lytvyn (8%). Additionally, about 5% each support Oleh Liashko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 4% Yurii Lutsenko, 3% Yurii Boiko, and 2% Hanna Hopko.
• In these elections, a number of young politicians were elected to the Verkhovna Rada for the first time via party lists. Among them, respondents would most like to see in the new government: Tetiana Chornovol (27%), Hanna Hopko (18%), Yehor Soboliev (17%), and Mustafa Nayyem (12%). More than 8% would like to see Viktoriia Siumar in the new government, more than 7% Ihor Lutsenko, 6% Serhii Leshchenko, 5% Svitlana Zalishchuk, 5% Oksana Syroid, about 3% Andrii Lozovyi, Ihor Popov, and Olena Shkrum, and almost 2% others.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in November 2014, the majority of Ukrainians (72%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 15% disagree, and 14% are undecided.
• It should be noted that over the past five years the highest share of respondents who consider the Holodomor to be genocide has been recorded. According to Rating Group surveys, this share was 61% in 2010, 58% in 2011, 59% in 2012, 66% in 2013, and 72% in 2014. At the same time, the share of those who do not recognize the Holodomor as genocide decreased from 25% to 15% between 2010 and 2013.
• Currently, the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents across all regions, including Donbas. However, it should be noted that previous national studies on this topic included Crimea and parts of Donbas that are currently not controlled by the Ukrainian government.
• All age groups support this statement, and the higher the level of education and income, the higher the level of support. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, nearly 90% support this statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, about half support it.

• The exit poll was organized by four partners: the Government of Canada, Rating Group (Ukraine), Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization (Lithuania), with support from the International Republican Institute (IRI). The survey was conducted at the exits of 330 polling stations across all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea. More than 25,000 respondents were interviewed.
• According to the International Exit Poll results, the voting activity of different age groups during the October 26 election day varied significantly. In particular, older voters were much more active in the first half of the day, while young people and middle-aged voters were more active in the second half of the day and closer to polling station closing time. As of 10:00, older voters (aged 50 and above) accounted for more than 60% of those who had voted by that time; as of 14:00, this share decreased to about 50%, and by the end of the day it dropped to only 25%. Conversely, while voters under 30 accounted for only 9% of those who had voted by 10:00, by the end of the day their share increased to 25%. Similarly, voters aged 30–39 accounted for only 12% in the morning, but nearly 30% during the final hours of voting.
• Looking at the entire voting day, the most active group, as in the 2012 parliamentary elections, were voters aged 50–59 (turnout exceeded 65%). The least active group was youth aged 18–24, with only about one in three coming to vote.
• Compared to the previous parliamentary elections, overall voter turnout, according to Central Election Commission data, decreased from 58% to 52%. A comparison of Rating Group exit polls from 2012 and 2014 indicates that the largest declines in turnout occurred among the youngest age group (18–24) and the oldest group (60+), geographically concentrated in the South and East of Ukraine. At the same time, middle-aged voters were more active than in the 2012 elections.
• It is worth noting that young voters in these elections were more likely to support parties such as Right Sector and Samopomich. In contrast, older voters were more represented among supporters of the Communist Party and the Opposition Bloc. The electorate of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc was somewhat older than that of the People’s Front; as a result, the Poroshenko Bloc had stronger support among older voters, while the People’s Front had stronger support among younger and middle-aged voters.
• Men were more represented among supporters of parties such as Right Sector, Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, while women were more represented among supporters of the Opposition Bloc, Zastup, People’s Front, Batkivshchyna, and Strong Ukraine.
• Rural residents were most represented among supporters of Zastup, the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Batkivshchyna, and the People’s Front. Urban residents were more represented among supporters of Right Sector, Samopomich, Civic Position, and the Opposition Bloc.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 80% of respondents living in single-member electoral district №118 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 30% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 20% for Samopomich, 13% for the People’s Front, 10% for the Radical Party, 5% each for Civic Position and Batkivshchyna, and 3% for Svoboda. At the same time, 12% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, 34% of respondents among those planning to vote would support Bohdan Dubnevych (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), almost 7% — Olha Shvets (People’s Front), 5% — Danylo Lubkivskyi (independent candidate), and almost 4% — Andrii Tkachuk (Radical Party). About 42% of respondents had not decided on their candidate choice.
• The most well-known candidate is Bohdan Dubnevych (90% recognition). He also has the highest positive attitude level in the district (40%). Slightly more than 20% of respondents are familiar with Danylo Lubkivskyi and Olha Shvets.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about three quarters of respondents living in single-member electoral district №122 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 30% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 19% for the People’s Front, 15% for Samopomich, 10% for the Radical Party, 5% for Civic Position, and 4% each for Svoboda and Batkivshchyna. At the same time, 11% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, 38% of respondents among those planning to vote would support Volodymyr Parasyuk (independent candidate), 9% — Taras Vozniak (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 7% — Ivan Bokal (independent candidate), more than 4% — Oleksandr Pavliuk (Batkivshchyna), and almost 3% — Iryna Vereshchuk (independent candidate). About 35% of respondents had not decided on their candidate choice.
• The most well-known candidate is Volodymyr Parasyuk (70% recognition). He also has the highest positive attitude level in the district (46%). About 40% of respondents are familiar with Taras Vozniak, and less than 30% with Oleksandr Pavliuk.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 70% of respondents living in constituency No. 121 (Lviv region) said they would definitely take part in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 26.
• Among them, about 30% said they were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 16% for Samopomich, 14% for the People’s Front, 12% for the Radical Party, 7% for Batkivshchyna, and 4% each for Svoboda and Civic Position. At the same time, 10% of respondents had not yet decided on their choice.
• Regarding candidate ratings, among those who plan to participate in the elections, 23% said they would support Roman Ilyk (Batkivshchyna), 10% Mykhailo Koval (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 9% each Mykhailo Zadorozhnyi (independent candidate) and Ihor Kurus (Radical Party), almost 9% Ivan Matkovskyi (People’s Front), and 5% Pavlo Barnatskyi (independent candidate). More than 30% of respondents remained undecided.
• Roman Ilyk is the most well-known candidate in the constituency (85% are familiar with him) and has the highest positive rating (32%). Around 60% of respondents are familiar with Mykhailo Zadorozhnyi, while about 50% know Pavlo Barnatskyi and Ihor Kurus.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, three quarters (77%) of respondents in constituency No. 119 (Lviv region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 20% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 13% for the Radical Party, 12% for Samopomich, 11% for the People’s Front, 6% for Svoboda, 4% for Batkivshchyna, and 3% for Hromadianska Pozytsiia. At the same time, 27% of respondents were still undecided.
• Regarding candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 13% would have supported Andrii Andrushchenko (Radical Party), 12% Iryna Sekh (Svoboda), and 12% Mykhailo Bondar (People’s Front). In addition, almost 10% would have supported Mykhailo Chumak (Batkivshchyna), 4% Stepan Rak (independent candidate), 3% Nadiia Shostak (independent candidate), and 2% each Vasyl Hrushetskyi and Oleh Matkivskyi. More than 40% of respondents remained undecided.
• The most well-known candidate was Iryna Sekh (84% knew her). Mykhailo Chumak was known by 36%, Andrii Andrushchenko by 31%, and Mykhailo Bondar by 25%.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 35% of respondents would definitely participate and another 40% would likely participate. The projected voter turnout compared to June–July decreased from 59% to 55%. The highest level of mobilization is observed in all regions except Donbas and the South. In the territories of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian government, only 13% of respondents definitely intend to vote in parliamentary elections.
• If parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held next Sunday, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc would win, supported by 33.5% of respondents who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. 12.8% would support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 8.9% the People’s Front, 7.8% Strong Ukraine, and 6.9% Batkivshchyna. 5.4% would vote for Samopomich, 5.1% for the Opposition Bloc, 4.6% for Civic Position, 4.5% for the Communist Party, and almost 4% for Svoboda. Almost 2% would vote for Right Sector. About 5% would support other parties. In total, the survey covered all 29 parties intending to participate in the elections.
• In the regional breakdown, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc is most supported in Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine. In these regions, voters are also more likely to support the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Batkivshchyna. In Western Ukraine, higher support is also observed for the People’s Front, Samopomich, Svoboda, and Right Sector. In contrast, in the South Strong Ukraine receives higher support, while in the South and East more voters are ready to support the Opposition Bloc. The Communist Party receives the highest support in Donbas and somewhat less in the South.
• In terms of dynamics, over the last two months the People’s Front gained the most support, as well as Samopomich, Strong Ukraine, the Communist Party, and the Opposition Bloc. Batkivshchyna, Civic Position, Svoboda, and especially the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko lost support. In September, compared to August, support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc increased, but in October the growth did not continue.
• The highest trust levels among politicians are for Petro Poroshenko (51%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (45%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (42%), and Andrii Sadovyi (40%). Oleh Liashko experienced the largest decline in trust: while 40% trusted him in August, only 28% did in early October.
• Regarding second-choice party preferences (respondents were asked which other party they could vote for), the largest share (10%) indicated the People’s Front. Additionally, 8% do not exclude voting for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, more than 4% each for Civic Position and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, almost 4% each for Samopomich and Strong Ukraine, and about 3% each for Svoboda, the Opposition Bloc, and Batkivshchyna.
• Thirty-four percent of respondents are fully confident in their political choice, 36% are fairly confident but may change their choice, 15% are uncertain, and 15% are undecided. The most confident voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Opposition Bloc.
• For 31% of respondents, the party leader is the most important factor when choosing a party (especially among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Civic Position, the Radical Party, the People’s Front, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc). For 29%, the party list composition is most important, while 27% emphasize party ideology (especially among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party). Thirteen percent are undecided.
• The majority of respondents (55%) believe that parliamentary elections in October will be more a competition of leaders, while about half as many (22%) believe it will be a competition of ideas. Eight percent gave other answers, and 15% were undecided.
• More than half of respondents (55%) believe that the party they could support should primarily focus on economic issues, 29% on military and defense issues, and 6% on humanitarian or ideological issues, while 10% are undecided. The military direction is most attractive to voters of Right Sector.
• Forty-eight percent approve of President Petro Poroshenko’s performance, while 44% disapprove. Forty-five percent are satisfied with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk’s performance, while 48% are dissatisfied. Compared to August survey results, satisfaction with the performance of the new government declined across all officials.
• More than one third of respondents (35%) would like to see Arsenii Yatseniuk as Prime Minister after parliamentary elections. Additionally, 9% would prefer Serhii Tihipko, 5% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko, 4% each Yulia Tymoshenko or Andrii Sadovyi, and 3% Vadym Rabinovych.
• As a priority for government action in the next year, 35% of respondents consider resolving the Donbas issue most important, 21% economic reforms, 16% restoring national defense capacity, and 11% social protection.
• More than half of respondents (52%) believe that controlling price growth and inflation is the top priority for the government, followed by fighting corruption (41%). Other important priorities include lustration of officials, law enforcement, and judges (22%), preventing mass layoffs and unemployment growth (19%), developing the defense industry (19%), ensuring timely payment of wages, pensions, and social benefits (19%), ensuring timely salary and pension payments (18%), developing domestic industrial production (17%), improving relations with Russia (16%) and Western countries (13%).
• The biggest fear among Ukrainians is war (77%). Other major fears include significant price increases for food and medicines (31%), hunger (22%), non-payment of wages and pensions (20%), currency devaluation, inflation, and job loss (17% each), heating problems during winter and increases in utility tariffs (16% each). Nearly 10% fear gas supply disruptions to homes and mass electricity outages.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 68% of respondents in constituency No. 22 (Lutsk) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 19% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, and the same share (19%) for the People’s Front. Another 12% were ready to vote for the Radical Party, and 11% for Samopomich. Close to these were Batkivshchyna with 8% support, Svoboda – 7%, and Hromadianska Pozytsiia – 7%. About 4% would have voted for Right Sector. At the same time, 9% of respondents were still undecided.
• Regarding second choice (which other party respondents could vote for), 15% would have voted for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 12% for the People’s Front, 8% for the Radical Party, 8% for Samopomich, 7% for Batkivshchyna, 5% for Hromadianska Pozytsiia, and 5% for Svoboda.
• As for candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 28% would have supported Ihor Lapin (People’s Front), 13% Roman Ivaniuk (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 8% Hryhorii Pustovit (Batkivshchyna), and 7% Iryna Konstankevych (independent candidate). About 30% of respondents remained undecided.
• It is worth noting that candidates running in the constituency had relatively low name recognition at that time. About half of respondents knew Hryhorii Pustovit and Ihor Lapin, around 40% knew Hennadii Kozhevnikov, and about one third knew Roman Ivaniuk. Only about one in five respondents knew Kostiantyn Petrochuk.
• The most positive attitude was recorded toward Ihor Lapin (32%). 17% had a positive attitude toward Hryhorii Pustovit (while 16% expressed a negative attitude toward him). 14% had a positive attitude toward Roman Ivaniuk. The most negative attitude was recorded toward Hennadii Kozhevnikov (21%).

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, about 50% of respondents in constituency No. 66 (Zhytomyr region) stated that they would definitely participate in the Verkhovna Rada elections on October 26.
• Among them, about 20% were ready to vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 13% for the People’s Front, 13% for the Radical Party, 10% for Batkivshchyna, and 7% for Samopomich. At the same time, about a quarter of respondents were still undecided.
• Regarding the second choice question (which other party respondents could vote for), 10% would give their vote to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, 6% to the People’s Front, and 4% to the Radical Party. Almost 70% could not determine their second party choice.
• As for candidate ratings, among those intending to vote, 15% would have supported Pavlo Dziublyk (People’s Front), 13% Vitalii Zhuravskyi (independent candidate), 9% Mykhailo Pukhtaievych (Petro Poroshenko Bloc), 8% Viktor Dubas (Radical Party), and 7% Petro Riabenko (Batkivshchyna). Around 40% of respondents remained undecided.
• The most well-known candidate was Vitalii Zhuravskyi (88% recognized him). Vitalii Zhuravskyi and Ivan Lytvyn had the highest negative attitudes in the constituency — 46% and 38% respectively. Other candidates were relatively unknown among voters, which explains the high share of undecided respondents.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 60% of respondents said they would like to have been born in Ukraine.
• Compared to data from April of the previous year, the share of those who would like to be born in Ukraine increased by 12%. At the same time, Russia became less attractive (declining from 9% to 4%), as did Germany (from 5% to 3%) and the United States (from 4% to 2%).
• Additionally, 13% of respondents said they would personally like to live in Russia (78% would not), while 20% said they would like to live in Belarus (70% would not). Meanwhile, 46% said they would like to live in Europe (43% would not).
• Compared to a similar survey conducted in March of the previous year, the share of respondents who would like to live in Russia decreased significantly (from 30% to 13%), while interest in Belarus remained unchanged (20%). At the same time, the share of those who would like to live in Europe increased from 43% to 46%.
• Living in Russia or Belarus was more often preferred by residents of Donbas, Eastern and Southern regions, as well as people with lower material status. In contrast, Europe was more often chosen by residents of Western, Northern, and Central regions. In general, younger respondents, those with higher education levels, and those with higher income were more likely to prefer living in European countries.
• Among respondents who had a positive attitude toward Angela Merkel, 56% would prefer to live in Europe, 14% in Belarus, and 4% in Russia. Among those who had a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, 28% would choose Belarus, 15% Russia, while a relative majority (40%) would still choose Europe.
• Among respondents who had a positive attitude toward Vladimir Putin, about half said they would prefer to live in Russia, 43% in Belarus, and 15% in European countries.