Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in October 2016, 47% of respondents stated that they use only state-run medical institutions. 26% said that in addition to public health services, they turn to private medicine if their family has extra financial resources. 15% reported that alongside public services they turn to private clinics in cases of serious illness in the family. Only 6% said they primarily prefer private medical institutions over state ones.
• Almost 70% of respondents are dissatisfied with the state medical services they received over the last five years. 24% are satisfied to some degree with the quality of services in public medical institutions. The highest dissatisfaction was recorded in the South (85%). By age and income, dissatisfaction is higher among older people and those with lower incomes.
• 55% stated that over the last two years the overall quality of public healthcare in the country has deteriorated. Only 12% saw improvement. 27% believe nothing has changed, and 6% could not answer.
• At the same time, respondents assessed changes in private medicine quite positively. 25% believe that over the past two years the quality of services in private medical institutions has improved, while only 15% said it has worsened.
• 17% believe no changes occurred, and one third of respondents did not use private medical services at all. The highest share of those who noticed positive changes in private healthcare live in the West, the lowest in the East. By age, younger and middle-aged respondents, mainly those with higher incomes, were most likely to report improvement. Among respondents aged 51 and older, most did not use private medical services at all.
• Only 8% stated that the Ukrainian healthcare system is close to European standards, while 85% believe that the quality of medical care in Ukraine is far from European standards.
• The cost of medical services is one of the key factors when choosing where to seek treatment. 33% said that if money were not an issue, they would turn to private medical institutions, and 31% would go abroad for treatment. At the same time, 27% would still choose state healthcare, even if money were not a constraint.
• Interestingly, younger people are more inclined toward private and foreign healthcare, while older respondents would still entrust their health to state medical institutions, even if they had the money to go private or abroad.
• Among the countries respondents would choose for treatment, Israel (39%), Germany (38%), and Switzerland (21%) lead, followed by the USA (10%) and Belarus (8%). Only 3% would choose Russia.
• 33% of respondents said they consult a doctor or medical specialist less than once a year. 27% do so once a year, 18% at least every six months, 9% at least every three months, and 5% every month.
• 83% believe that treatment for themselves or their family is expensive (39% very expensive). Only 12% consider medical treatment more or less affordable.
• 36% said treatment in state medical institutions is very expensive; 77% in total consider it expensive. Only 16% find public healthcare affordable.
• 86% evaluated the cost of treatment in private clinics as expensive (58% very expensive). Only 3% said the prices are more or less acceptable.
• The perceived cost of treatment is directly linked to how often people seek care. 51% of those who go to doctors monthly say treatment is very expensive, while only one third of those who go once a year say the same. Nevertheless, the vast majority across all groups agree that healthcare in Ukraine is expensive.
• 69% said they were not asked for bribes over the last two years, while 25% reported cases of corruption.
• At the same time, 59% said they felt obliged to give non-cash gifts (alcohol, chocolate, food) to medical staff as a “thank you”. Only one third did not feel such pressure. This feeling was strongest in the West and Center (66%), and weakest in the East (48%). In the South, 42% do not feel any obligation to give such gifts. Women (64%) feel more obligated than men (53%).
• The most common “gratitude” amount demanded was 100–250 UAH (23%). 16% were asked for 250–500 UAH, 14% for 500–1000 UAH, and 16% for more than 1000 UAH. The least common was up to 50 UAH (4%).
• Only 5% said they would refuse to pay any bribe if asked.
• The main sources of information about healthcare are medical workers (67%) and friends and family (45%). About a quarter also rely on the internet, pharmacists, and TV programs.
• Two thirds know who their family doctor or therapist is. Half trust their doctor, 19% do not, and 31% could not answer.
• Trust is highest in the Center (58%) and lowest in the East, where only 38% trust their family doctor and 25% distrust the institution. Trust is higher among older people, women, and rural residents (57%) than urban residents (48%). Every fifth urban resident expresses distrust.
• 83% support childhood vaccination against polio, measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, and others. Only 9% oppose it. 77% believe vaccinations should be mandatory, 12% oppose, 11% were undecided.
• 69% support requiring ambulance drivers to complete medical first-aid training rather than just being drivers; 23% oppose this.
• 64% support the creation of a paramedic service like in Western countries, which provides first emergency care before a patient reaches full hospital treatment; 23% oppose it. Among opponents, 66% say paramedics are not doctors, 29% fear it would destroy the traditional ambulance system, 17% fear higher costs, and 10% fear doctors would lose jobs.
• Only 6% have private health insurance; 94% do not. Even among those earning over 5,000 UAH, only 14% are insured.
• 46% believe that private insurance covering real medical costs would best improve the system. 34% believe making the current system work efficiently would help most. Only 12% prefer a medical voucher system.
• 57% support funding hospitals based on the number of patients rather than number of beds; 21% oppose, 22% were undecided. Support is highest in the West (69%) and lowest in the Center (47%).

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) September 28 to October 7, 2016. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 66,9%. Additionally, 1,156 respondents were surveyed in Kharkiv oblast. The margin of error does not exceed 2,8%. Average response rate was 64,1%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

• According to the survey data, 35% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Mayor of Kyiv, which is three times higher than satisfaction with the work of the Kyiv City Council deputies and the Kyiv City State Administration. At the same time, half of respondents are dissatisfied with the mayor’s work, and two thirds are dissatisfied with the activities of the City Council and the City Administration.
• At the same time, 28% said that their attitude toward Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has improved during his time in office, while 54% said it has worsened. The greatest improvement in attitudes was observed among young people and those with higher levels of education and income.
• If the mayoral elections were held in the near future, Vitali Klitschko would receive the most support – 35% among those who intend to vote and have made up their minds. Boryslav Bereza would be supported by 12%, Volodymyr Bondarenko by 9%, Oleksandr Omelchenko by 8%, Serhii Husovskyi by 5%, and Oleksandr Puzanov by 4%. These results broadly reflect the 2015 local election pattern, though over the past year support for Klitschko and Husovskyi has declined slightly, while support for Bereza has increased. About 40% of Kyiv residents have not yet decided or do not intend to vote.
• Among the city’s problems, utility tariffs worry Kyiv residents the most (77%). About one third are concerned about corruption in city authorities, the work of municipal services, and the quality of roads and public utilities. Almost a quarter worry about chaotic parking and courtyard maintenance, 21% about traffic jams and apartment burglaries, 19% about chaotic urban development, and 13% about the excessive number of small kiosks (MAFs). Only 5% are concerned about the chaotic placement of outdoor advertising, and 4% about its excessive volume.
• Accordingly, nearly two thirds (58%) believe that changing outdoor advertising rules is not a priority for Kyiv’s city authorities, while 29% consider it one of the priorities.
• At the same time, the vast majority of Kyiv residents have not heard that the outdoor advertising industry creates thousands of jobs and that advertising revenues to the city budget in 2015 amounted to 240 million UAH. Those better informed tend to be people with higher education and income, those who are employed, and more often young and middle-aged residents.
• A plurality (44%) are convinced that the fewer changes are made to business rules, the better. 15% believe the government should change business rules every 5–10 years, and another 15% believe this should happen every 1–5 years.
• Almost half (47%) believe that the concept of reforming outdoor advertising should be a compromise between business and authorities. 22% think the reform should be based primarily on the position of city authorities, and 5% primarily on business interests. Entrepreneurs are three times more likely to favor the business position, while older people more often support the authorities’ stance.
• Among different types of outdoor advertising, the most favorable attitudes are toward store and kiosk signs, while the most negative attitudes are toward advertising placed on buildings.
• Supporters of moderate reduction of outdoor advertising outnumber supporters of major reductions. Those favoring moderate reductions are more often people with middle and above-average income, higher education, and youth. About one third believe nothing should be reduced at all. About 40% support a slight reduction of outdoor advertising. Only 14% want citylights removed entirely, and 18% want billboards removed.
• When social advertising is mentioned, respondents become more tolerant toward outdoor advertising: the number of supporters of reductions decreases, while the number of those who prefer no changes increases.
• About one third believe that a major reduction in outdoor advertising could lead to job losses and reduced city budget revenues; almost 20% think it would lead to lower tax revenues; 13% think it would cause small and medium-sized businesses to close or shrink; and 7% fear worsening investment conditions. Only one quarter see no serious risks. Pensioners are most likely to see no risks; youth and entrepreneurs least likely.
• Among causes of road accidents in Kyiv, drivers most often mentioned violation of traffic rules by drivers (56%), road conditions (54%), insufficient driving skills (33%), poor or missing road markings (26%), pedestrian violations (25%), poor street lighting (23%), distraction by advertising (21%), and traffic light problems (10%).
• Two thirds consider Kyiv a comfortable city for tourists, and nearly 90% believe Kyiv has strong potential to become even more attractive.
• The main advantages of Kyiv as a tourist city are architecture and historical landmarks (65%) and Ukrainian cuisine (58%), followed by museums and theaters (44%), parks (42%), city appearance (37%), friendly people (35%), restaurants (33%), and modernity (25%).
• The main disadvantages are low foreign-language skills (33%), safety concerns (32%), high prices (31%), and poor transport infrastructure (26%). About one in five also believe Kyiv is not modern enough, has an unattractive appearance, or that tourist information is hard to access. Only 9% consider available sex services an advantage, and only 6% see illegal sex services as a major disadvantage.
• Almost 35% traveled to Europe in the past five years, and 30% traveled to CIS countries. Young and middle-aged people traveled abroad almost three times more often than older residents, mostly those with higher education and income.
• Those who frequently visited Europe evaluate Kyiv differently: they more often cite parks, low prices, and affordable housing as advantages, and poor foreign-language skills, transport problems, limited festivals, weak nightlife, illegal sex services, and modest cuisine as disadvantages. At the same time, they consider Kyiv safer than do those who traveled abroad once or never.
• About 75% support Kyiv hosting Eurovision 2017, though only one third think the city is ready for it. 83% also support hosting the UEFA Champions League Final in 2018. Support for both events is higher among young people; Eurovision is equally supported by men and women, while the Champions League Final is supported more by men.
• Reference information: The Association of Outdoor Advertising Operators of Ukraine is a nationwide public organization representing the outdoor advertising industry and monitoring the balance between public, governmental, and business interests.
  Rating Group was founded in 2008 as an independent research organization operating under ESOMAR and WAPOR standards.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, 30% of Ukrainians said they would rather like to move abroad permanently (almost 65% would rather not), while 40% would like to work abroad. A stronger desire to move or work abroad is shown by residents of Western and Central Ukraine, men, younger people, and those with higher education and income.
• The main reasons for wanting to move abroad permanently are better living conditions (53%), ensuring a better future for children (41%), and the lack of decent jobs in Ukraine (32%). Among respondents who have children under 16, ensuring a better future for their children is the main motive (52%).
• Other motives for permanent emigration include better self-realization (13%), feeling unsafe in Ukraine (8%), better education or healthcare (7%), and better conditions for doing business abroad (5%).
• Among those who would like to work abroad, only one quarter consider their chances of getting a job abroad to be high; about half assess their chances as low; 12% believe they have no chance at all, and one in ten are undecided. More optimistic assessments are typical of Western Ukrainians, youth, men, and people with higher education and income. Those who have already worked abroad or have seriously explored the issue are much more optimistic about their chances.
• Overall, one quarter of Ukrainians have already looked into job opportunities abroad. Among visa center visitors who want to work abroad, almost 70% have already explored such opportunities.
• One in ten Ukrainians has work experience abroad; this is far more common in Western Ukraine (23%) than elsewhere (6–8%). Such experience is more typical of men, middle-aged people, and those with higher education and income.
• Among those who want to work abroad, over 20% have already worked abroad; among visa center visitors who want to work abroad, nearly 40% have such experience (in Lviv and Zhytomyr, this share is twice as high as in Kharkiv).
• Nearly 40% of those who want to work abroad are willing to stay 1–5 years, while most visa center visitors plan to stay less than one year. Older people, supporters of the Customs Union, and those without foreign work experience are more oriented toward short-term stays. Young people, supporters of European integration, and those with work experience abroad are more willing to stay three years or longer or even move permanently.
• One third are interested in working in their existing profession, one in five is ready to retrain, and 40% would accept any job. Visa center visitors are more focused on working in their profession (42%) and less willing to retrain (14%). Professional or retraining-based work is more attractive to Eastern and Southern residents, urban dwellers, youth, and those with higher education and income, while “any job” is more common among Western Ukrainians, rural residents, lower-income groups, and the unemployed.
• Nearly 80% of visa center visitors who want to work abroad need information about the foreign employer, almost 70% need health insurance and legal protection, and two thirds need help with housing, employer search, and legal advice. About half need a full guidebook for people going abroad to work. Visa assistance is the least demanded. Those with prior work experience abroad see less need for such support.
• Among mandatory requirements for employment agencies, 90% require a contract with a foreign employer and state registration, and nearly 80% require a license from the Ministry of Social Policy, correct office address, and a real physical office.
• The most important factors when using such agencies are signing a service contract (90%) and receiving full information about the employer, job duties, salary, housing, and insurance (86%). Less important are requests for a worker’s experience and skills (58%) and the option of cashless payment (44%), though these are more important for those with foreign work experience.
• Two thirds of visa center visitors believe that insurance provides medical and social protection abroad; 20% think it is wasted money, and 15% are undecided. Those who have worked abroad consider insurance less important than others.
• Two thirds of Ukrainians say that if they had a permanent job abroad, they would eventually return to Ukraine; 15% would not. Among those who want to work abroad, 57% would return; among visa center visitors, 52%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, 35% of respondents regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while half do not, and 15% are undecided. The dynamics show that this year the share of those who regret the collapse of the USSR slightly increased compared to 2014 and 2015: 35% in 2016 versus 33% in 2014 and 31% in 2015.
• In the South, East, and Center of the country, about 40% of respondents regret the collapse of the USSR, while in the West this share is about half as high (18%).
• The strongest nostalgia for the USSR is observed among those who would currently vote for Yuriy Boyko (68%), Vadym Rabinovych (52%), and Nadiya Savchenko (44%) in presidential elections. Around one third of supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleh Liashko, and one quarter of supporters of Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko, also express such nostalgia. The lowest levels of regret are found among supporters of Andriy Sadovyi (9%) and Oleh Tiahnybok (8%), mainly because their core electorate is concentrated in Western Ukraine.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education and income, the more likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. Women express nostalgia for the USSR somewhat more often than men. Among non-working respondents, 42% regret the collapse of the USSR, compared to 28% among those who are employed.
• The highest level of nostalgia is found among those who believe that the Russian language should become the state language (58%) or an official language in certain regions (44%).
• Similarly, among supporters of Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, a majority (71%) regret the collapse of the USSR, while among supporters of EU and NATO membership, more than 70% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union.

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held in the near future, one third of respondents would definitely take part, and six parties would enter parliament: Batkivshchyna (18.3% among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice), Opposition Bloc (12.6%), Samopomich (11.0%), Radical Party (11.0%), Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (9.1%), and Svoboda (5.6%). 4.8% would support the party Civic Position, 3.1% the party of Mikheil Saakashvili, while Revival and UKROP would each receive about 2%. It should be noted that among all respondents almost one in five had not yet decided on their party choice.
• If presidential elections were held in the near future, one third of respondents would definitely participate. Among those who intend to vote and have decided, Yuliya Tymoshenko would receive 17.7%, Yuriy Boyko 11.5%, Petro Poroshenko 10.7%, Oleh Liashko 9.8%, Andriy Sadovyi 8.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.5%, Nadiya Savchenko 5.6%, and Oleh Tiahnybok 4.3%. More than 2% would vote for Dmytro Yarosh and Serhiy Tihipko.
• During 2016, Poroshenko’s rating fell by half (from 23% to 11%), while support for Tymoshenko increased (from 13% to 18%) and for Liashko (from 8% to 10%). Over the last two months, Savchenko’s rating fell from 10% to 6%, while Tymoshenko’s rose from 15% to 18%.
• About a quarter of respondents trust Sadovyi (25%), Hrytsenko (23%), and Savchenko (22%). The highest level of distrust is toward Arseniy Yatsenyuk (90%). Over the last two months, trust in Savchenko halved (from 41% to 22%), while distrust rose (from 41% to 63%); 14% are undecided. The most favorable attitudes toward Savchenko remain in the West and Center, in rural areas, and among women.
• 15% of respondents are well informed about Savchenko’s controversial political statements, 50% have heard something, 31% are not familiar, and 4% are undecided. Among those who are informed or have heard about them, half do not support her statements, 36% support them, and 15% are undecided. Support is highest in the East and South.
• Among Savchenko’s statements, the one that receives the highest support is: “Western provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine could lead the planet to a third world war” (48% support, 34% do not). The least supported are: “All participants of the LPR and DPR should be granted amnesty except their leaders” and “Maidan and Anti-Maidan stood for the same values” (28% support, 55% do not), and “Ukrainians will have to ask forgiveness for their sons, husbands, and fathers who died in Donbas” (33% support, 53% do not).
• 34% believe that Savchenko would be most useful to Ukraine as a military pilot, 17% support her leading an international committee on the release of Ukrainian POWs and political prisoners, and 17% support her work as a member of parliament. 4% support her entering the presidential race, 2% see her as Minister of Defense, 3% as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, 9% choose other roles, and 13% are undecided.
• Over the last two months, support for Savchenko returning to the army as a military pilot increased (from 24% to 34%), while support declined for her heading the international committee (from 20% to 17%), running for President (from 9% to 4%), and serving as Minister of Defense (from 4% to 2%). Among those who trust Savchenko, her greatest usefulness is seen in parliamentary or international humanitarian roles or in presidential politics. Those who do not trust her mainly support her return to the army.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in the city of Ternopil, 74% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, only 11% believe they are moving in the right direction, and 15% are undecided. Even among supporters of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP), more people think the country is moving in the wrong direction than in the right one. The highest level of pessimism is found among supporters of the Radical Party and Svoboda.
• At the same time, 54% believe that the situation in Ternopil is moving in the right direction, 22% say it is moving in the wrong direction, and 24% are undecided. Two thirds of supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and BPP believe that the city is developing in the right direction. Among Samopomich and Radical Party supporters, about half hold this view.
• Regarding the Ternopil oblast, 37% believe affairs are moving in the right direction, 31% say in the wrong direction, and 32% are undecided. The most positive assessments come from BPP and Svoboda supporters, while the most negative come from Radical Party supporters.
• More than 80% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Ternopil’s mayor, Serhiy Nadal. 14% are dissatisfied. The head of the Ternopil Regional State Administration, Stepan Barna, is approved by 38% and disapproved by 35%, while 27% could not assess his performance. The head of the Ternopil Regional Council, Viktor Ovcharuk, is approved by 19%, disapproved by 27%, and 55% could not give an assessment.
• Compared with October 2015, satisfaction with Nadal’s performance increased by 11 percentage points, and with Barna’s by 8 points. Meanwhile, positive assessments of Ovcharuk fell by 9 points, while the share of those unable to assess him almost tripled, indicating low public awareness of his activities.
• Support for Governor Barna is highest among BPP supporters (66%) and lowest among Samopomich and Civic Position supporters (about one third). Ovcharuk also receives his highest approval among BPP supporters (34%) and the lowest among Samopomich and Civic Position voters (16–17%). Nadal, by contrast, enjoys very high approval across all party electorates.
• The most trusted national politician in Ternopil is Nadiya Savchenko: 57% trust her, 36% do not. She is the only politician whose trust level exceeds distrust.
  Oleh Tiahnybok is trusted by 44% and distrusted by 51%; Andriy Sadovyi by 35% vs 57%; Mikheil Saakashvili 34% vs 58%; Anatolii Hrytsenko 34% vs 54%; Yuliya Tymoshenko 30% vs 66%; Oleh Liashko 29% vs 66%; Andriy Parubiy 26% vs 67%; Petro Poroshenko 20% vs 77%; Volodymyr Groysman 17% vs 77%. Arseniy Yatsenyuk has the highest level of distrust among Ternopil residents.
• Compared to October 2015, trust has increased for Tiahnybok (+15 pp), Tymoshenko (+13 pp), Liashko (+5 pp), and Yuriy Boyko (+4 pp). Trust has declined for Hrytsenko (−9 pp), Yatsenyuk (−10 pp), and Poroshenko (−14 pp). Trust in Sadovyi remained unchanged.
• The leader of the presidential race in Ternopil is Yuliya Tymoshenko (17% among those who intend to vote), followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko (15%), Oleh Tiahnybok (11%), Oleh Liashko (8%), Petro Poroshenko (7%), Andriy Sadovyi (6%), Dmytro Yarosh (5%), and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2%). 12% would vote for another candidate, and 18% are undecided. 45% say they would definitely participate in the election.
• The leading party in Ternopil is Svoboda (18%), followed by Batkivshchyna (16%), Samopomich (10%), and BPP, Civic Position, and the Radical Party (8% each). Other parties score below 3%. 12% are undecided. 40% would definitely vote.
• In the single-member constituency, the leaders are Stepan Barna and Volodymyr Staiura (12% each), followed by Vasyl Derevlyanyi (7%), Petro Landiak (6%), Volodymyr Blikhar (6%), Taras Pastukh (5%), and Roman Zastavnyi, Vasyl Lyl, and Mykhailo Ratushniak (4% each). 9% would vote for another candidate, and almost 30% are undecided.
• The clear leader in the mayoral race is incumbent mayor Serhiy Nadal, supported by 67% of those who would vote. All other candidates score below 4%. 7% are undecided. Nearly 50% would definitely vote in mayoral and city council elections.
• In elections to the city council, Svoboda leads with 26%, followed by Batkivshchyna (13%), Samopomich (7%), Radical Party (7%), BPP (5%), and Movement for Purification (4%). Other parties score below 3%. 16% are undecided.
• Among local politicians, Serhiy Nadal has the highest positive rating: 70% view him positively, 11% negatively. Stepan Barna, Mykhailo Holovko, and Ihor Huda also have positive balances, although more than 40% of residents do not know Holovko and Huda. The most negative attitudes are toward Roman Zastavnyi and Oleksandr Muts, with 45% and 48% negative evaluations respectively.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from May 28-June 14, 2016. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 63,9%. Additionally, 1,185 respondents were surveyed in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. The margin of error does not exceed 2,8%. Average response rate was 62,7%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, the highest levels of trust in Lviv Oblast are held by Nadiia Savchenko, Andrii Sadovyi, and Mikheil Saakashvili. A similar picture is observed in the city of Lviv, where Anatolii Hrytsenko also enjoys a high level of trust. The lowest levels of trust are recorded for Yurii Boiko and Arsenii Yatseniuk. Over the past year, Sadovyi, Petro Poroshenko, and Yatseniuk have lost the most trust, while Yuliia Tymoshenko’s indicators have improved. Overall, politicians enjoy slightly higher levels of trust in the oblast than in the city of Lviv.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, the following parties would cross the 5% threshold in Lviv Oblast: Samopomich (22.8%), Batkivshchyna (12.6%), Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (9.8%), as well as Civic Position (6.7%), Svoboda (6.1%), and the Radical Party (5.9%). Mikheil Saakashvili’s party “Movement for Purification” would receive 4.2%, and Dmytro Yarosh’s National Movement 3.1%. 17% of respondents were undecided. In the oblast overall, Batkivshchyna, BPP Solidarity, and the Radical Party have stronger support, whereas in the city of Lviv, Samopomich, Civic Position, and Saakashvili’s party perform better. Young people and respondents with higher education are more likely to support Samopomich, while older and less educated respondents are more inclined toward Batkivshchyna.
• More than 40% of respondents support snap parliamentary elections and new presidential elections, about the same share oppose these initiatives, and 15% are undecided. Support for early elections is strongest among residents of Lviv and among voters of Batkivshchyna and Civic Position.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, Andrii Sadovyi would receive 15.9%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 10.5%, Petro Poroshenko 10%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko 9.8%. Oleh Liashko would get 5.2%, Dmytro Yarosh 5.1%, and Oleh Tiahnybok 3.8%. 22.6% remain undecided. Over the past year, Sadovyi and Tymoshenko have gained support, while Poroshenko has lost the most, and Hrytsenko’s rating has also slightly declined.
• More than 40% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Lviv Mayor Andrii Sadovyi, while 56% are dissatisfied. 21% are satisfied with the work of Lviv Oblast Governor Oleh Syniutka, 41% are dissatisfied, and almost 40% are undecided. Only 10% are satisfied with the work of Lviv Oblast Council Head Oleksandr Hannushchyn, 30% are dissatisfied, and nearly two thirds cannot assess his performance. Although Sadovyi still has the highest approval, support for his work has fallen sharply over the past year, from 70% to 41%.
• Only 19% of respondents believe that Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while about two thirds think it is moving in the wrong direction. Assessments of the situation in Lviv Oblast are somewhat better: 28% say it is moving in the right direction and 48% in the wrong one, with nearly a quarter undecided.
• More than half (53%) of respondents believe that fighting corruption in local government should be a top priority, followed by solving the landfill and waste problem (42%), reducing unemployment (40%), and restraining growth in utility tariffs (38%). Over the past year, the importance of waste management, healthcare support, and environmental issues has increased. In Lviv, waste management, healthcare, and crime are more acute concerns, while in other cities of the oblast road repairs and support for vulnerable groups are more pressing.
• Regarding the Hrybovychi landfill tragedy, 30% place primary blame on the Lviv city authorities, 23% on the oblast authorities, 16% on the central government, 4% on the Hrybovychi village authorities, 14% on others, and 15% are undecided.
• An overwhelming 85% believe that waste processing is the best solution for Lviv’s garbage problem, compared to 9% who favor incineration. 90% support building a waste-processing plant as the solution, 3% favor modernizing the existing landfill in Hrybovychi, 1% support opening a new landfill near Lviv, and 5% are undecided.

Dear colleagues,

We invite you to take part in a press conference on the topic “Socio-political attitudes in Lviv Oblast.”

Speaker:
Oleksii Antypovych, Head of the Rating Group.

During the press conference, the results of a special study will be presented on the following topics:
level of trust in national politicians,
presidential ratings,
party ratings,
attitudes toward the idea of snap elections,
satisfaction with the work of local authorities,
issues that concern citizens,
the Hrybovychi tragedy.

The press conference will take place on Tuesday, July 5, 2016, starting at 11:00 a.m.,
at the following address: 11 T. Shevchenko Avenue, 2nd floor, Press Club.

The survey was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS, kiis.com.ua) jointly with the Rating Sociological Group (ratinggroup.ua) in April 2016.

Almost all residents of Kirovohrad are aware that the city is to be renamed as part of the “decommunization” process. The vast majority of city residents (67%) do not support the renaming, including 43% who are категорically opposed. Only about one in four residents (28%) view it positively.

A majority of residents (57%) most strongly support keeping the current name “Kirovohrad.” About one third (31%) would prefer the name “Yelysavethrad.” Only 4% support the name “Kropyvnytskyi.” If the option “Kirovohrad” is excluded from the list of proposed names, a majority (55%) choose “Yelysavethrad.” In that case, “Kropyvnytskyi” ranks second with 8% support.

An overwhelming majority of the population (82%) do not support the decision of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Building, Regional Policy, and Local Self-Government to rename the city “Kropyvnytskyi.” Only 14% support this decision. Among those who oppose the renaming to “Kropyvnytskyi,” one quarter say they would be willing to take part in protests against it.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute. 

The survey was conducted throughout all Ukraine territory (except for occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) from 18 February till 4 March 2016. Survey method - face-to-face interview at the respondent’s residence.

Total sample – 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older, who have the right to vote. The sample is representative by sex, age, region, and settlement size. Additionally, 1,000 respondents were surveyed in Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. For sampling there were used multistage probabilistic sampling method, for respondents’ selection procedure - random route and ‘last birthday’ rule. 

The margin of error does not exceed 2.0%.

Average response rate – 63.0%.

The survey was financed by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The survey was conducted by Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine) on behalf of the International Republican Institute. 

The data was collected in 24 cities of Ukraine (Kyiv and all oblast centers; in Donetsk oblast – Mariupol, in Luhansk oblast – Sievierodonetsk) between January 20, 2016 and February 8, 2016, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes.

The sample consisted of 19,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older. It is representative for the general population by age, education and sex. To ensure representativeness, the sample was split in accordance with division of cities into electoral districts, which were provided by the Central Electoral Committee. At least 50 polling sites (50 previously selected sites) were covered in each city. They were selected at random, using the curtain step method. The random route and ‘next birthday’ rule were used for respondents’ selection procedures.

For reference, the previous municipal survey was conducted in 22 cities between March 2, 2015 to March 20, 2015. The sample size consisted of 17,600 respondents.

The margin of error for each city does not exceed ±3.5 percent.

The average response rate is 62.8 percent.

Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

The survey was funded by the Government of Canada.

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• According to a study conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, 63% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, and 58% toward Angela Merkel. A positive attitude is also expressed by 51% toward Dalia Grybauskaitė, 49% toward Andrzej Duda and Barack Obama. François Hollande is viewed positively by 40% of respondents, and Nursultan Nazarbayev by 37%. The worst attitudes are toward Vladimir Putin – only 10% have a positive view of him.
• The negative-attitude ranking is led by V. Putin (80%). About one third have a negative view of B. Obama; about one quarter of F. Hollande, N. Nazarbayev, and A. Merkel. One in five have a negative view of A. Lukashenko, and one in six of D. Grybauskaitė.
• Residents of Western and Central Ukraine are more favorable toward A. Merkel and B. Obama, while those in the South and East are more positive toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev. At the same time, in the South there are also positive attitudes toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, A. Duda, and F. Hollande. A relatively positive attitude toward V. Putin is found only in the East, primarily in Donbas.
• Older respondents show more positive attitudes toward A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev, and V. Putin, while younger people are more supportive of A. Merkel, B. Obama, and F. Hollande. The higher the respondents’ level of education and material well-being, the more positive their attitudes toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, B. Obama, A. Duda, and F. Hollande, and correspondingly more negative toward A. Lukashenko and V. Putin.
• Among supporters of EU and NATO membership, the most positive attitudes are toward A. Merkel, D. Grybauskaitė, B. Obama, A. Duda, and F. Hollande. A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev have the most supporters among advocates of joining the Customs Union. Interestingly, A. Lukashenko enjoys a high level of support both among supporters of European integration and among Customs Union supporters.
• Over the last four years, the positive attitude toward V. Putin has deteriorated sharply, from 53% to 10%. Attitudes toward A. Merkel have fluctuated: they improved from 56% in 2012 to 61% in late 2013, declined to 51% in 2014, and then rose again to 57% in 2016. The positive view of B. Obama remained almost unchanged in 2012–2014 but declined from 54% in 2014 to 49% in 2016.
• The greatest increase in positive attitudes was recorded toward D. Grybauskaitė (from 36% to 51%) and F. Hollande (from 32% to 40%). At the same time, the share of those with negative attitudes toward these politicians also grew: from 11% to 15% for D. Grybauskaitė, and from 18% to 27% for F. Hollande. Attitudes toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev remained unchanged.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the politicians with the highest level of public trust are Andriy Sadovyi and Mikheil Saakashvili, with about one in three respondents trusting each of them. One in four respondents trusts Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko. One in five expresses trust in Yuliia Tymoshenko, Rinat Akhmetov, and Oleh Liashko.
• Among the “young and new” politicians, the highest levels of trust are recorded for Yehor Soboliev (29%), Tetiana Chornovol (22%), Mustafa Nayyem (21%), Hanna Hopko (15%), and Dmytro Dobrodomov (13%). The remaining politicians are largely unknown to most respondents.
• Twenty-one percent of respondents are satisfied with the performance of the President, 14% with the Chair of Parliament, and only 8% with the Prime Minister. Almost 70% support the resignation of Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk, up from 60% in October 2015. Support has also grown for dissolving parliament and holding new parliamentary elections (from 47% to 50%), as well as for early presidential elections (from 43% to 48%).
• When asked whom they would like to see as Prime Minister in 2016, 11% named Mikheil Saakashvili, 7% Yuliia Tymoshenko, 6% Yurii Boiko, 5% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 4% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3% Serhii Tihipko and Oleh Liashko each, and 2% Oleh Tiahnybok and Nataliia Yaresko each. All other candidates received 1% or less. One quarter of respondents would not want any of the proposed candidates to become Prime Minister, and one in six could not decide.
• If parliamentary elections had been held in January, the parties that would have entered parliament are Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (16.3%), Opposition Bloc (13.8%), Samopomich (13.5%), Batkivshchyna (12.9%), Svoboda (8.3%), the Radical Party (6.5%), and UKROP (5.2%). Civic Position, with 3.8%, would also have had notable chances of passing the 5% threshold. More than 2% would have voted for Vidrodzhennia, Nash Krai, Right Sector, and Narodnyi Kontrol.
• If a Saakashvili Bloc had taken part in the elections, the party ratings would have been as follows: Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” 14.3%, Opposition Bloc 13.5%, Samopomich 11.7%, Saakashvili Bloc 11.6%, Batkivshchyna 11.6%, Svoboda 6.9%, Radical Party 5.5%, and UKROP 4.7%.
• Respondents see the central government as relatively more successful in ensuring local elections (43%), police reform (42%), strengthening national defense (35%), and progress toward a visa-free regime with the EU (31%). Some successes are also seen in decentralization and energy independence. At the same time, around 90% or more see little or no success in economic growth, currency stability, social protection, anti-corruption efforts, limiting oligarchic influence, healthcare, housing and utilities, and judicial reform.
• Two thirds of respondents support the creation of the National Police, while 16% do not; 5% have not heard of the reform, and 14% are undecided.
• Regarding the “Korban case,” 44% consider it more of a political persecution, while one quarter see it as the enforcement of the law and justice.
• Nearly one in five respondents personally gave a bribe or a gift in the past year to resolve a personal issue, down from 27% three years earlier. At the same time, 43% believe corruption in their region has increased over the past year. For 54%, corruption is a disease that hinders social development, while 40% believe it is a mechanism without which Ukrainian society can no longer function. Attitudes are nevertheless changing: in 2013 more than a third justified bribery in important personal matters, whereas in 2016 only 13% did so.
• If a referendum were held, 59% would support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and 22% would oppose it. Sixteen percent would support joining the Customs Union, while 62% would oppose. Forty-seven percent would support joining NATO, 31% would oppose, and the rest would abstain or be undecided.

The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from July 19-30, 2015, with an oversample in the Donbas region (
territories controlled by Ukrainian authorities).  The national survey had a randomly selected sample of 1,800 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote.  The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.3 percent, and the response rate was 65.9 percent. The oversample in Donbas had a randomly selected sample size of 1,284 permanent residents, a 59.7 percent response rate and a margin of error that does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.international.
 

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine for International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by the Government of Canada.
 
English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.
 

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada had taken place in early December, the following parties would have entered parliament:
• Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” – 16.5%
  Batkivshchyna – 12.3%
  Opposition Bloc – 12.2%
  Samopomich – 12.2%
  Radical Party – 7.9%
  Svoboda – 7.8%
  UKROP – 5.1%
• Parties with significant chances of passing the 5% threshold were also Civic Position (4.1%), Vidrodzhennia (Revival) (3.6%), and Nash Krai (Our Land) (3.0%).
  2.7% would have voted for the Communist Party of Ukraine, 2.3% for Right Sector, and 2.1% for Strong Ukraine. 8.2% of respondents would have chosen another party.
• In the West, the electoral leader is PPB Solidarity, followed by Batkivshchyna, with Samopomich and Svoboda tied for third place.
  In the Center, PPB Solidarity also leads, followed by Batkivshchyna, while Svoboda and the Radical Party share third place.
  In the North, PPB Solidarity remains in first place, Batkivshchyna is second, and Samopomich third.
  In the South, East, and Donbas, the Opposition Bloc leads, with PPB Solidarity in second place. Third place in these regions is held by Batkivshchyna (South), Vidrodzhennia (East), and Samopomich (Donbas).
  Notably, the largest share of undecided voters and non-voters is concentrated in the South and Donbas (48% and 55% respectively).

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2015, almost half of respondents (47%) said that New Year is their favorite winter holiday, while 41% named Christmas. Another 5% chose St. Nicholas Day, and 3% mentioned the Old New Year. 2% said they do not like any winter holidays, and 3% were undecided.
  New Year is much more popular in the East, South, and Donbas, while Christmas is preferred mainly in the West. In the Central region, New Year and Christmas are liked almost equally.
  The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more they tend to prefer New Year. It is also more popular among urban residents and Russian-speaking respondents. Christmas, on the other hand, is more popular among rural residents and Ukrainian-speaking respondents.
• 65% of Ukrainians have a tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day, while about a third do not; 1% do not know about this holiday, and 3% were undecided.
  The further southeast one goes, the less widespread this tradition becomes. It is most popular in the West (94%) and least common in Donbas (26%). Women, young people, and Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely to follow this tradition.
• 46% of respondents plan to put up a real Christmas tree for New Year, 28% a fake tree, and 12% will use a New Year decoration instead. 14% do not plan to put up any decoration at all—mostly older people and those with lower incomes.
  Over the past four years, the share of those choosing a real tree has increased by 2%, and a fake tree by 5%, while the number of people using only decorations or none at all has declined slightly.
  Real trees are more common in the West, among rural residents, young people, and those with higher incomes, while fake trees are more popular in Donbas and among urban residents.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2015, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (80%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 12% disagree and 8% are undecided.
• It should be noted that over the past two years the number of those who agree that the Holodomor was a genocide has increased significantly (from 66% in 2013 to 80% in 2015). In addition, over the past year the share of undecided respondents on this issue has almost halved. At the same time, the share of those opposing the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide decreased from 25% to 12% during 2010–2015.
• The statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents in all regions without exception, with the highest support observed in the West (98%) and the Center (87%).
• The younger the respondents and the higher their income level, the greater the support for recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 90% support this statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, support stands at 60%.
• Rural residents are more likely to agree with the Holodomor-genocide statement than urban residents (84% vs 79%).

• According to the results of the latest survey conducted by Rating Group, if the presidential elections in Ukraine had been held in early October, 26% of decided voters would have supported Petro Poroshenko, 16% would have supported Yulia Tymoshenko, 12% would have supported Yurii Boiko, 9% would have supported Andrii Sadovyi, 7% would have supported Oleh Liashko, 6% would have supported Anatolii Hrytsenko, and more than 4% would have supported Dmytro Yarosh and Oleh Tiahnybok. The remaining voters would have supported other candidates.
• If the second round of the presidential election had included Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, 42% would have supported the incumbent President and 31% would have supported the Batkivshchyna leader, while the rest would have remained undecided. If Petro Poroshenko and Andrii Sadovyi had advanced to the second round, 39% would have supported the incumbent President and 34% would have supported the Samopomich leader. If Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko had advanced to the second round, 54% would have supported the incumbent President and 21% would have supported the Opposition Bloc leader.
• If parliamentary elections had been held in early October, 20% of decided voters would have supported the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 15% Batkivshchyna, 14% the Opposition Bloc, 10% Samopomich, and about 6% the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko. In addition, parties with significant chances of entering parliament included Svoboda (5%), Civic Position (4%), the Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP (4%), Right Sector (4%), as well as Vidrodzhennia (3%) and Nash Krai (3%). UKROP, Vidrodzhennia, and Nash Krai significantly increased their support over the last month due to intensified local election campaigns and, if the upward trend continues, may claim representation both in local councils and in a new parliament.
• The leaders of the anti-rating are the Opposition Bloc (36%) and the Communist Party (35%). In addition, nearly one quarter of voters would definitely not vote for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” one fifth would not vote for the People’s Front, and about one sixth would not vote for the Radical Party, Svoboda, or Batkivshchyna. At the same time, so-called “new” parties do not have high anti-ratings, including UKROP (6%), Vidrodzhennia (6%), Nash Krai (5%), and Samopomich (3%).
• One third of voters are fully confident in their choice and would not change it, while another third are fairly confident but admit they could change their choice. The most confident voters are those supporting the Communist Party, the Opposition Bloc, Right Sector, UKROP, and Svoboda. The least confident voters are those supporting Civic Position, Nash Krai, and Strong Ukraine.
• In addition to parliamentary ratings, potential party reserves for local elections were also studied. About 30% of respondents допускають the possibility of voting for Samopomich in local elections, 25% for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 23% for Batkivshchyna, and 15% for the Opposition Bloc. More than 10% also допускають the possibility of voting for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, Svoboda, UKROP, and Nash Krai, with overall attitudes toward the latter two being less negative. Over the last two months, reserve support for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and the Opposition Bloc has remained unchanged, while support reserves for Samopomich, Batkivshchyna, and UKROP have grown, and reserves for the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko have decreased.
• Recent electoral trends indicate growing combined support for parties that are in opposition to the current government. While coalition parties were supported by nearly 70% of voters in the last parliamentary elections, today coalition parties are supported by about 45%, with the core of the coalition – the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front – supported by only 21%. This is consistent with satisfaction levels with key government officials: only 22% of respondents are satisfied with the President’s performance, 14% with the Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr Groysman, and 10% with Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk. Dissatisfaction levels are 71%, 74%, and 86% respectively.
• Regarding other issues, 28% of respondents believe it is better to tolerate material hardship to preserve order in the country, while the majority (53%) believe that if living conditions significantly worsen, it is better to protest. These indicators are almost identical to those recorded in December 2013 (29% and 50% respectively).
• Over the last six months, support for dissolving parliament and calling new parliamentary elections increased from 34% to 47%, while support for calling new presidential elections increased from 31% to 43%.
• Only 12% of respondents believe that recently adopted budget amendments, which increased the minimum wage and pensions starting September 1, are a real achievement of the government in finding resources during crisis and war conditions. Meanwhile, the majority (77%) believe this was more likely pre-election PR.
• Regarding the detention on September 17 in the Verkhovna Rada of Radical Party MP Ihor Mosiychuk on suspicion of bribery, 28% believe it was enforcement of the law and justice, while 43% believe it was political persecution of the opposition by the authorities.
• Almost 70% of respondents believe that the events of August 31 near the Verkhovna Rada, when a combat grenade explosion during a protest killed law enforcement officers, were planned and organized by someone, while one in ten believes it happened accidentally due to negligence.
• One quarter believe the Svoboda party was behind the grenade attack near the parliament, one fifth believe Russian intelligence services were responsible. In addition, 15% believe Ukrainian radical nationalist organizations were responsible, 13% believe the President was responsible, 13% believe the Security Service of Ukraine was responsible, 12% believe Ukrainian oligarchs were responsible, 7% believe the police were responsible, and 6% believe ATO participants were responsible. Notably, voters of the Opposition Bloc, Communist Party, Vidrodzhennia, and Strong Ukraine tend to blame Svoboda and other Ukrainian nationalists, while voters of Svoboda, Right Sector, as well as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” Batkivshchyna, UKROP, and Samopomich tend to blame Russian intelligence services.