Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost two thirds of respondents (59%) are dissatisfied with state medical services over the past five years. The number of those who are satisfied is twice as low (32%). The level of satisfaction with this type of service is somewhat higher among rural residents than among urban residents. At the same time, district centers show the lowest level of satisfaction.
• 23% of respondents believe that over the past two years the overall quality of public medical services in the region has improved; the same share noted an improvement in the quality of services they personally received. At the same time, 38–39% did not observe any changes. People in villages are more likely to report positive changes than city residents (with the lowest ratings in district centers).
• The quality of medical care in public healthcare institutions is evaluated negatively by 52% of respondents, while 40% give positive assessments. More negative evaluations come from urban residents compared to rural residents (56% vs. 48%), and from those who visit doctors rarely compared to those who do so frequently (63% vs. 54%). Youth, people with minor children, and low-income groups are the most critical.
• At the same time, the quality of care in private medical institutions is evaluated positively by more than 52%, 12% evaluate it negatively, and more than a third could not give an assessment. Younger and middle-aged people, wealthier respondents, and those who visit doctors more often are more inclined to rate private medicine positively.
• 40% confirmed (and nearly the same share did not) that they had witnessed hospital renovations or repairs over the past two years. Such updates were mentioned much more often in villages than in cities (50% vs. 30%).
• 22% consult a doctor or medical specialist less than once a year, 27% once a year, a quarter every six months, 15% every three months, and only 7% do so monthly. Urban residents, middle-aged and older people, women, and poorer groups tend to consult doctors more frequently.
• A large majority (67%) know who their family doctor or therapist is. Awareness is higher among rural residents, women, middle-aged and older people, and people with children. 54% fully or partially trust their family doctor. Among those who know their doctor, 74% trust them.
• 91% believe it is necessary to consult a doctor before starting treatment. Half usually understand the treatment scheme provided, and one third partially understand it. Respondents with higher education and higher income tend to understand prescriptions better.
• Most respondents fully (40%) or partially (31%) follow doctors’ prescriptions; 7% decide independently, and 14% consult another doctor. Women are more likely to follow prescriptions. Those who know and trust their doctor follow prescriptions far more often.
• 87% trust medical professionals’ recommendations, 71% trust pharmacists, 70% trust relatives and acquaintances. Much fewer trust TV (28%), the Internet (26%), the press (22%) or radio (19%). 15% trust folk healers, especially older people.
• When choosing a medical facility, 58% value doctors’ professionalism, 48% trust in doctors, 39% good attitudes toward patients, and 29% modern equipment. Comfort, benefits, and speed of service are less important. Villagers and younger and wealthier respondents value professionalism and attitudes more; equipment matters more to youth; comfort matters more to urban and wealthier groups; benefits matter more to poorer and older people; speed matters more to wealthier groups.
• Blood pressure is measured daily by 15%, monthly by 26%, quarterly or semi-annually by 29%, yearly by 10%, and less often by 16%.
• One third never had blood-pressure problems, while others experience them with varying frequency, more often among women, older people, poorer respondents, and those under stress.
• Body weight is measured daily by 14%, monthly by 24%, quarterly or semi-annually by 30%, yearly by 13%, and less often by 16%.
• ECGs are done less than once a year by 35%, annually by 35%, semi-annually by 16%, more often by small shares, more often by women and older people.
• Blood sugar is checked less than annually by 35%, yearly by 25%, more often by women and older people.
• Cholesterol is checked less than annually by 37%, yearly by 19%, more often by women and older people.
• 45% never sought cardiovascular care; those who did recently are more often urban, female, older, and poorer.
• More than half do not take blood-pressure medication; among those with regular pressure problems, two thirds do.
• When pressure problems occur, one third self-medicate, one third follow doctors’ prescriptions, others seek doctors or folk remedies.
• 79% walk outdoors daily.
• 43% eat fresh fruits and vegetables daily.
• About one third eat meat daily.
• One third eat sweets daily.
• 18% eat fried/fatty food daily.
• 10% drink soda daily.
• 47% drink alcohol monthly or less; 22% never drink.
• 14% exercise daily; 28% never exercise.
• 74% do not smoke.
• Stress is experienced daily by 7%, weekly by nearly 20%, monthly by 43%, never by one third.
• 28% rate cardiovascular care in their locality positively, 25% negatively. District centers have the worst ratings.
• About one quarter rate oblast-level care positively.
• One third go to local hospitals, 16% to the Rivne regional hospital, 11% to the Polischuk center, 9% to family doctors.
• Nearly half believe there are not enough cardiovascular facilities in their area.
• 91% agree excess weight affects cardiovascular disease; 63% know 140/90 is high blood pressure.
• Most agree that not smoking, moderate alcohol, healthy diet, weight control, sports, and checkups are important.
• 79% get medical information from doctors; 39% from family; one third from pharmacists.
• Most do not know about the World Bank–MoH project; 73% consider it important.
• Half believe the project will improve the situation.
• 47% believe healthcare will improve in the next 1–2 years.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, 60% of respondents said that they are employed, while 40% are not. Among those who do not work, 32% are pensioners, 27% are engaged in household work and childcare, 13% are studying, 21% are unemployed but looking for a job, and 6% are unemployed and not looking for work.
• The highest share of employed people is in the East (67%), slightly lower in the West (57%). The higher the level of education, the larger the share of those who are employed.
• When assessing working conditions, most working respondents report the absence of vibration, noise, and air pollution, low physical strain, and comfortable lighting and temperature. At the same time, about half of respondents report very high nervous stress.
• Relations with management and co-workers are mostly assessed as friendly and comfortable.
• 88% of those who work are wage employees, while 12% are self-employed (entrepreneurs, those working in family businesses, etc.).
• An absolute majority (89%) work full time, while 11% work part-time. 30% work in shifts, and 70% do not. 22% work at night, while 78% do not.
• Women, rural residents, and low-income respondents are more likely to work part-time. Older, low-income, and respondents with secondary education more often work in shifts. The higher the level of education and income, the fewer those who work at night. Among men, the share of those working at night is twice as high as among women.
• Among nearly half (47%) of employed respondents, their pay depends on their own effort and productivity; for almost the same share (46%) it does not, and 7% could not answer.
• 12% have additional employment besides their main job, while 88% do not. 17% have other employees under their supervision, while 83% do not.
• The younger the respondents and the higher their income, the more likely they are to believe that their pay depends on their own effort and productivity.
• Among the least well-off, the share of those who have additional jobs is the highest.
• In the West and Center, the highest shares of respondents have people under their supervision (19% and 20% respectively), while in the East this share is twice as low (11%).
• 39% work overtime; among them almost two thirds (62%) receive additional pay, while 38% do not. The wealthier the respondents, the more often they work overtime. Men work overtime more often than women.
• 52% of respondents believe they have achieved a balance between work and personal life; 37% say they lack time for personal life; 4% lack time for professional self-realization; and 7% could not answer.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, the lowest daily levels of stress among respondents are caused by family relations, professional activity, and the external environment, while the highest stress levels are caused by the war and military threat, socio-political instability in the country, corruption, and respondents’ own financial situation.
• Half of respondents assess the material situation of their family as satisfactory. Only 15% believe they have more or less enough money to live on. At the same time, one third report that they consider themselves poor. Those who consider themselves poor are more numerous in the East, among older people, rural residents, respondents with poor health, and those with low education.
• Slightly less than half of respondents assess their housing and living conditions as average, more than a third as comfortable, and one in five as poor.
• The worst housing conditions are more often reported by residents of the East and South. The higher the education and income of respondents, the better they assess their housing conditions.
• 42% of respondents believe that they fully control their lives and are free in their decisions, and approximately the same share say they partially control their lives. At the same time, 19% state that they have almost no control over their own fate. The highest share of those who report no control over their lives is in the East, among people over 50, the poor, and respondents with poor health.
• Only 18% of respondents assess their social status as high. Half consider themselves to be of middle status, while a quarter believe they belong to the lower social strata. The latter group is most common in the East, among older and poor respondents.
• About one third of respondents are completely satisfied with their lives, about half are rather satisfied, and one quarter are not satisfied. In the East, the share of dissatisfied reaches almost 40%. Dissatisfaction with life is higher among those over 50 and among respondents with low income.
• 82% of respondents believe that, if necessary, they can receive emotional support from others; 9% believe they cannot, and 9% could not answer. 77% said they could receive physical assistance, 13% said they could not, and 10% were undecided. Slightly fewer (69%) expect financial support, while 20% believe they would not receive it and 11% could not answer. The younger the respondents and the higher their income, the more often they believe they could receive emotional, physical, and financial support.
• Few respondents reported participating in civic organizations. Only 7% said they are members of religious organizations, 5% belong to professional clubs, 3% to artistic or civic NGOs, and 2% are members of political parties.
• Almost a third of respondents believe that household duties are shared equally, 24% perform most of the duties themselves, 20% say another family member performs most of them, 14% say all duties fall on them, and only 5% say all duties fall on another family member. Among those who perform most household duties, there are four times more women than men.
• About one third of respondents believe that their profession has high prestige, about half say it has medium prestige, and one quarter believe it has low prestige.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group among those who have worked abroad during the last five years, the majority (77%) went for seasonal work, only 15% worked on a permanent basis, and 7% had other types of employment.
• One third of respondents worked abroad this year, one quarter last year, while one in five did so five years ago.
• Almost one third (31%) stayed abroad for work for about half a year, 21% for several months, 15% for more than one year, 14% for up to one year, 14% for several years, and 5% did not answer this question.
• Among those who worked in EU countries, there were slightly more people working on a permanent basis than among those who worked in Russia. Women and respondents with higher education also more often worked on a permanent basis.
• Most respondents worked in Poland (36%), followed by Russia (25%), 5% worked in Czechia and Germany, 3% in Italy, while the rest worked in other countries, mainly in Western Europe. Almost 30% refused to answer this question.
• Among residents of the West and Center, most worked in Poland, while in the South and especially the East, most worked in Russia.
• Among those who worked abroad, almost half worked in construction and repairs (43%), about half as many (23%) in agriculture, 10% in household work, and 3% each in IT, childcare, and the restaurant business (cooks, waiters, cleaners). 2% each worked in the hotel business, as office workers, and as medical staff. 1% each reported working as cleaners and in personal services (hairdressers, masseurs, technicians).
• Most people who worked in construction did so in Russia, while those who worked in EU countries were more often employed in agriculture and domestic work.
• Most respondents were satisfied with their earnings while working abroad (19% very satisfied, 62% rather satisfied). Dissatisfaction with earnings was highest in the East of the country.
• 18% of respondents personally encountered fraud in Ukraine when arranging official documents for employment abroad, 78% did not, and 4% were undecided.
• 31% personally experienced a mismatch between promised employment conditions and the actual conditions received at their workplace abroad, 58% did not, and 11% did not answer.
• 35% worked abroad officially, 61% unofficially, and 4% did not answer.
• The largest share of officially employed workers abroad was among migrants from the East (44%), and the smallest from the South (27%). Among those who worked in the EU, there were twice as many officially employed (36%) as among those who worked in Russia. Older respondents and those with higher education were more often officially employed.
• More people who experienced a mismatch between promised and actual working conditions were found among men, older respondents, and those who worked in EU countries.
• Among the problems most often encountered while working abroad, respondents mentioned the language barrier and a sense of being treated as second-class (both 27%). 22% reported lack of a contract with the employer, 18% each mentioned poor living conditions and problems with medical care. 13% reported unpaid overtime, 11% experienced refusal of payment, 8% faced nationality-based discrimination, 6% had problems with law enforcement, and 2% encountered extortion or crime. At the same time, more than a third (38%) said they had no problems while working abroad.
• A sense of being second-class (33%), language barrier (39%), and problems with medical care (30%) were the most common problems among those who worked in the EU, while among those who worked in Russia, the main problem was poor living conditions (30%), followed by lack of a contract (27%). More than half of those who worked in Russia had no problems, while among those who worked in the EU, only 30% reported having no problems.
• The majority (71%) of migrant workers would like to work abroad again in the future, 11% would rather not, 5% would definitely not, and 13% were undecided.
• The largest number of respondents would like to work in Germany (23%) and Poland (22%), about 10% in Italy, the USA, and the UK, 6–7% in Czechia and Russia, and 18% were undecided.
• Respondents most often need help with finding a job (32%), obtaining a visa (28%), and medical care (25%). Less urgent needs include adaptation to living conditions in another country (20%), protection of human rights abroad (18%), legal consultations (15%), negotiations with potential employers (13%), finding housing (13%), assistance with arrival at the place of residence or work (12%), and insurance (10%). 9% said they need no assistance, and 7% were undecided.
• Among those who worked in EU countries, more people would need help with obtaining a visa, adapting to living conditions, and legal consultations. Among those who worked in Russia, more people would need help with medical care and insurance.
• Among those who worked unofficially, relatively more people would need help with finding a job and negotiating with employers, while among those who worked officially, more would need help with medical care and legal consultations.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, two thirds of respondents know who their family doctor or therapist is, while the other third do not. The older the respondents, the higher their awareness of their family doctor. Women are better informed about this than men.
• 53% of respondents trust their family doctor, 21% do not, and 26% were unable to assess their level of trust. Trust is directly related to how often respondents visit doctors and how well they know their family doctor – among those who know their doctor, almost 80% trust him or her. Women and older people trust doctors more than men and younger respondents.
• Almost half (48%) say that their family doctor has given them advice on disease prevention or recommendations for a healthy lifestyle, while the same share say they have not received such recommendations. Among those who received this advice, 82% trust their family doctor.
• 37% of respondents consult a doctor or another medical professional about their health or medical advice less than once a year. A quarter do so once a year, 17% at least every six months, 10% every three months, and 5% monthly. Women consult medical professionals more often than men, and older people do so more often than younger ones.
• 42% of respondents report having one to three illnesses that currently bother them. 17% say they suffer from more than four illnesses, while one third report no current health problems. Health status depends on age: the older the respondent, the more likely they are to have health concerns. Men complain about their health less often than women.
• 27% of respondents checked their heart and blood vessels this year, 16% did so last year, 20% more than two years ago, 12% more than four years ago, and 18% have never checked their cardiovascular system. The highest share of people who were tested this year was in the South (31%) and the East (40%). In contrast, one quarter of respondents in the West have never undergone such examinations. Older people and women are more likely to have undergone cardiovascular check-ups this year.
• Two thirds of respondents do not take medications or vitamins to treat or prevent heart disease, while one third do. 42% of women take heart-related medicines, compared to 22% of men. Half of those aged 51+ take such medication. Among those who frequently visit doctors or who underwent cardiovascular examinations this year, almost two thirds take these medicines.
• 39% of respondents trust television news about changes in the healthcare sector, while 56% do not. 36% trust similar information from the Internet, 39% do not, and 26% cannot assess their level of trust. 29% trust such information in the print media, while 56% do not; 27% trust medical news on the radio, while 52% do not. Residents of the West are most likely to trust healthcare news across all media types, while residents of the East are least likely. Young people trust online sources more, while older people trust television. Women trust healthcare news on television slightly more than men.
• 76% of respondents trust the fire and rescue service in their region, while 14% do not. 74% trust the ambulance service, 22% do not. 57% trust medical institutions (polyclinics and hospitals), 36% do not; 55% trust pharmacies, 38% do not; 48% trust the police, 45% do not.
• This creates a situation where people, on the one hand, are dissatisfied with the state of healthcare and believe that the overall quality of public medical services is deteriorating or not improving, while on the other hand they continue to trust medical institutions and doctors.
• Among recent government initiatives to reform healthcare, respondents most strongly support reimbursement of patients’ costs for medicines for diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular diseases (84%) and the introduction of mandatory health insurance (64%). The establishment of Public Health Centers is supported by 58%, opposed by 21%, and 22% are undecided. Standardized treatment protocols are supported by 57%, opposed by 12%, and 30% are undecided. Adoption of a public health development concept is supported by 57%, opposed by 22%, with the same share undecided. The introduction of a contract-based system that would increase doctors’ salaries is supported by 44%, opposed by 35%, with 21% not answering. Contracts with a guaranteed treatment price are supported by 38%, opposed by 42%, and 20% are undecided. The creation of hospital districts is supported by 36%, opposed by 44%, and 20% are undecided.
• Support for the creation of a paramedic service to provide first aid in traumatic situations increased from 64% in October to 69% in December. Support for abolishing Order No. 33, under which public funding was allocated to medical institutions based on the number of hospital beds, remained virtually unchanged at 58%.
• 64% support the use of competitive and transparent tenders for government procurement of certain medicines, while 17% do not.
• Only 27% believe that introducing patient-doctor contracts with at least a 30% increase in doctors’ salaries would improve healthcare quality. 36% believe it would have no effect, and 16% think it would worsen quality. 21% could not answer. Support is highest in the West (33%) and lowest in the East (17%), where the largest share of undecided respondents (37%) is also found. Those who visit doctors more often are more supportive of this initiative.
• 77% support vaccination of children against diseases such as polio, measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, and others. 12% oppose vaccination, and 11% are undecided. Support is somewhat higher among urban residents, women, older people, and those who trust medical institutions.
• 71% support mandatory childhood vaccinations against diseases that threaten public health, 13% oppose them, and 16% are undecided. Again, support is higher among urban residents, women, and those who trust medical institutions.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, 45% of working-age Ukrainians (men aged 18–65 and women aged 18–60) rate their health as good or very good, 43% as satisfactory, and 12% as poor or very poor. The highest share of those who consider their health good or very good is in the West (49%), while the lowest is in the East (37%). Rural residents rate their health more positively than urban residents (47% vs. 43%). The younger the respondents, the higher their education and income, the better they rate their health. Men more often consider their health good or very good than women (49% vs. 39%).
• Just under a third (29%) of Ukrainians report having chronic illnesses, while 71% say they do not. Among those with chronic conditions, 58% have one illness, 29% have two, and 13% have three or more. Urban residents report chronic illnesses more often than rural residents. Older people, those with poorer self-rated health, lower income, and women are more likely to report having chronic conditions.
• 38% of respondents visited a doctor in the past year, while 62% did not. Among those who did, one third visited once, 28% twice, 16% three times, 10% four times, and 15% five times or more. Older people, women, and urban residents visited doctors more often. Those who do not exercise are also more likely to visit doctors. Interestingly, non-smokers and those who do not drink alcohol also report more frequent doctor visits.
• 11% were hospitalized in the past year, while 89% were not. Among those hospitalized, 44% stayed for one day, 24% for 2–7 days, and 32% for more than 8 days.
• 38% of respondents smoke, while 62% do not. Among non-smokers, 23% are former smokers and 77% have never smoked. Smoking is most common in the East (43%) and least common in the West (31%). People aged 51+ smoke less than younger groups. Men smoke three times more often than women. Smoking is most prevalent among the lowest-income group.
• Only 2% drink alcohol (including beer) almost daily, 12% several times a week, 36% several times a month, 34% several times a year, and 16% do not drink at all. Drinking at least several times a month is most common in the Center and least common in the West. Men drink nearly twice as often as women. Those who report better health are more likely to drink alcohol. Both the lowest-income and highest-income groups drink more often than those with middle incomes.
• Only 9% exercise almost daily, 15% several times a week, 14% several times a month, and 12% several times a year, while 50% do not exercise at all. The share of people who exercise is highest in the Center and lowest in the East. People with better health exercise more often. Younger, wealthier, and more educated respondents exercise more frequently, and men exercise more than women.
• Over the past month, 8% felt sad or hopeless almost every day, 23% several times a week, and 44% several times a month, while about one quarter did not feel sadness or despair recently.
• During the same period, 5% felt lonely almost daily, 12% several times a week, 28% several times a month, while 54% did not feel lonely at all.
• The older respondents are, the worse their health and the lower their income, the more often they experienced sadness, hopelessness, and low mood. The same pattern is observed among those with lower social status, weaker feelings of control over their lives, and lower life satisfaction.
• Residents of the South felt loneliness more often than people in other regions. Older age, poorer health, and lower income are associated with more frequent feelings of loneliness. Women feel lonely more often than men. Lower social status, weaker sense of control over one’s life, and lower life satisfaction are also linked to more frequent loneliness.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, the greatest achievements among the events of 2016, in the view of respondents, were Jamala’s victory at the Eurovision Song Contest and the performance of the Ukrainian Paralympic team at the Rio de Janeiro Paralympic Games.
• Among the year’s achievements respondents also named the government’s initiative to raise the minimum wage to 3,200 UAH, the introduction of electronic income declarations for officials, the performance of Ukraine’s national team at the Olympic Games in Brazil, and the release of Nadiia Savchenko from Russian captivity. Respondents also viewed as relatively successful the launch of public procurement through the Prozorro electronic system, the reduction of excise duties on imported used cars, the increase in the army’s combat capability, the introduction of competitive selection for civil servants, and the entry into force of the EU–Ukraine Free Trade Area Agreement.
• Mixed assessments were given to the decentralization reform, the performance of Ukraine’s national football team at EURO-2016, the introduction of quotas for Ukrainian-language songs on radio, and the process of decommunization.
• Respondents considered the EU visa-free negotiations, the talks on resolving the situation in Donbas, and the investigation into the killings on Kyiv’s Independence Square in February 2014 to be failures. The lowest ratings on the “success–failure” scale were given to the fight against corruption, the situation with utility tariffs, the exchange rate, and prices for basic food products and services.
• Among areas of public policy in 2016, respondents rated national defense policy the most positively. 41% considered the government’s policy in this area successful, while nearly 50% held the opposite view. Compared with the beginning of 2016, the share of those seeing positive developments in defense increased (in January it was 34%).
• Police reform was considered successful by 28%, and unsuccessful by 65%. The share of those evaluating this area positively declined by one and a half times over the year.
• Decentralization was considered successful by 22%, while 62% did not see positive results. Compared with the beginning of the year, the number of those who rated this reform positively increased by more than one and a half times.
• Negotiations with the European Union on visa-free travel were rated positively by 18% and negatively by 74%. Over six months, the share of those who consider this policy unsuccessful increased (in January it was 54%).
• Social protection policy was considered successful by only 9% and unsuccessful by 87%. A slight positive trend was recorded over the year (from 5% to 9%).
• Support for small and medium-sized businesses was seen as successful by 9% and unsuccessful by 77%; the fight against corruption as successful by 8% and unsuccessful by 89%; judicial reform by 8% and 84%; healthcare policy by 7% and 89%; and limiting the influence of oligarchs by 6% and 89% respectively. At the same time, compared to the previous year respondents noted slight progress in anti-corruption efforts, judicial reform, SME support, and healthcare.
• More than 90% of respondents considered government performance unsuccessful in ensuring currency stability, utility services, and economic growth.
• Only 16% were satisfied with the performance of President Petro Poroshenko, while 82% were dissatisfied. A similar situation was observed for Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman: 16% satisfied, 78% dissatisfied. Speaker of Parliament Andriy Parubiy received 11% approval and 82% disapproval.
• Parliamentary opposition performance was approved by 12% and disapproved by 78%, while evaluations of the governing coalition were even worse: only 6% satisfied and 86% dissatisfied.
• The leader in party electoral preferences is Batkivshchyna. If elections were held soon, 16.0% of likely voters who had decided would vote for it. 11.8% would support BPP Solidarity, 11.7% the Opposition Bloc, 8.5% the Radical Party, 8.6% Samopomich, 6.7% Civic Position, 5.9% For Life, the same share Svoboda, 2.7% UKROP, and 2.5% the Saakashvili New Forces Movement. Other parties had ratings below 2%.
• In the presidential race, Yuliya Tymoshenko remains the leader with 17.7% of decided voters. Petro Poroshenko would receive 13.5%, Yuriy Boyko 10.4%, Oleh Liashko 8.8%, Andriy Sadovyi 8.4%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 8.1%, Vadym Rabinovych 7.3%, Oleh Tiahnybok 4.9%, Dmytro Yarosh 3.5%, Nadiia Savchenko 1.8%, and Andrii Biletskyi 0.9%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, 64% of Ukrainians have a tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day. At the same time, one third do not have such a tradition, 2% do not know this holiday, and 3% were unable to give an answer. The highest support for this tradition is in the West (83%), somewhat lower in the Center (67%). In the South and East, about half of respondents give gifts on St. Nicholas Day. Women, younger people, wealthier Ukrainians, and those who have children under 18 are more inclined to support this tradition.
• More than one third of respondents (37%) believe in St. Nicholas. At the same time, 53% said they do not believe in him, 8% were undecided, and 2% do not know who he is. The largest share of believers is in the West (45%), and the smallest in the East (27%). The younger and more financially secure the respondents are, the more likely they are to believe in St. Nicholas. There are also more believers among women, urban residents, and those who have children under 18.
• In turn, 22% of Ukrainians believe in Father Frost (Did Moroz). 70% do not believe, 7% were undecided, and 1% do not know who he is. The highest share of those who believe in Father Frost is in the Center and the East (27% and 25%, respectively). In the South the figure is 20%, and in the West only 15%. Those who believe in Father Frost belong to the same social groups as those who believe in St. Nicholas: younger people, wealthier respondents, city residents, and those who have children under 18.
• New Year and Christmas are the most loved winter holidays for most Ukrainians (43% like New Year the most, 42% prefer Christmas). Another 5% named St. Nicholas Day as their favorite holiday, and 3% chose the Old New Year. 5% do not like any of these holidays, and 3% were undecided.
• In the East, South, and Center, New Year is more popular than Christmas, while in the West the situation is reversed and Christmas is the most loved holiday. The younger and wealthier the respondents are, the stronger their preference for New Year. New Year is more popular in cities, while Christmas is preferred more in rural areas. Men like New Year slightly more than women.

The sociological study “Socio-political situation in Ukraine” was conducted by two sociological services: the Center for Social and Marketing Research SOCIS and the Rating Group.

• At the end of 2016, 69.9% of respondents described the current situation in Ukraine as tense, while another 23.2% considered it explosive. Only 5.2% said the situation in the country was stable, and 1.9% could not give a clear answer.
• 54.3% of respondents identified the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine as the main problem requiring immediate resolution. Another 37.9% pointed to rising prices for basic goods and inflation. 37.8% said low wages and pensions need urgent attention, 33.9% pointed to utility tariffs, 27.5% to corruption in the central government, 26.9% to lack of jobs and unemployment, and 19.7% to the high cost and low quality of medical services. Smaller shares mentioned social inequality and the gap between rich and poor (12.8%), corruption in courts, police and the prosecutor’s office (12.0%), insufficient social protection (10.6%), and crime and public safety (7.5%). Only small minorities named unfavorable conditions for small and medium business (4.3%), low quality of education (2.8%), and lack of freedom and democracy (2.2%) as urgent problems.
• Respondents showed relatively high readiness to take part in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. 37.8% said they were fully certain they would vote, and another 34.0% said they were likely to come to the polling stations. At the same time, 25.4% stated that they would definitely not participate, and 2.9% could not answer.
• Among all respondents, the leaders of the presidential rating were Petro Poroshenko with 9.6% and Yuliia Tymoshenko with 9.4%. Yurii Boiko was supported by 6.3%, Vadym Rabinovych by 6.0%, Oleh Liashko by 5.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 5.2%, and Andrii Sadovyi by 4.3%. Other candidates listed in the survey were supported by less than 3%. There was a strong demand for a hypothetical “other candidate”, with 12.1% saying they would likely support someone not listed in the questionnaire. 12.7% could not decide or refused to answer, while 21.6% said they would not participate in the elections at all.
• A simulated presidential election based only on those who intended to vote and had made a choice produced the following results. Petro Poroshenko would receive 14.7%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 14.6%, Yurii Boiko 10.0%, Vadym Rabinovych 9.2%, Oleh Liashko 9.2%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.8%, Andrii Sadovyi 6.8%, Oleh Tiahnybok 3.1%, Nadiia Savchenko 2.4%, Dmytro Yarosh 2.4%, Arsenii Yatseniuk 1.1%, and Viktor Medvedchuk 1.0%. 17.7% would vote for other candidates not listed.
• 47.2% of respondents supported holding early parliamentary elections, while 44.9% opposed this idea and 8.0% were undecided.
• 36.3% said they were fully ready to participate in parliamentary elections if they were held next Sunday, and 34.5% said they were rather ready to vote. 25.2% were not confident they would participate, and 4.0% could not answer or refused to respond.
• Among all respondents, 10.0% would vote for Batkivshchyna, 9.3% for Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, 7.3% for the Opposition Bloc, 6.4% for Samopomich, 5.8% for Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, 5.7% for For Life, 4.8% for Civic Position, 3.2% for Svoboda, and 2.8% for the Movement of New Forces. Other parties had less than 2%. 12.3% were undecided or refused to answer, and 22.4% said they would not vote at all.
• A simulated parliamentary election among those who intended to vote and had chosen a party gave the following results. Batkivshchyna would receive 15.5%, Petro Poroshenko Bloc 14.1%, Opposition Bloc 11.2%, Samopomich 9.8%, Radical Party 9.1%, For Life 8.8%, Civic Position 7.1%, Svoboda 4.9%, and the Movement of New Forces 4.1%. Other parties would receive less than 2%.
• 20.1% of respondents named Yurii Boiko as the leader of the current opposition, 14.5% named Yuliia Tymoshenko, 11.5% Oleh Liashko, 7.7% Vadym Rabinovych, 7.5% Mikheil Saakashvili, 4.1% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 4.0% Andrii Sadovyi, and 2.2% Oleh Tiahnybok. 25.1% could not answer or refused to respond.
• 60.7% said they would vote in favor of joining the European Union if a referendum were held soon, 23.8% would vote against, 9.2% would not participate, and 6.3% were undecided.
• If a referendum on joining NATO were held, 47.2% would vote in favor, 33.6% against, 11.0% would not participate, and 8.3% were undecided.
• When asked whether they would support the Maidan today, 10.2% said they would regularly participate, 21.8% would not participate personally but would morally support the protesters, 13.5% would occasionally join protests, and 9.2% would support financially without participating. At the same time, 31.9% said they were against the Maidan, 6.7% were indifferent, and 6.8% could not answer.
• 16.9% believe another Maidan is highly likely in the near future, 38.3% consider it quite likely, 27.8% think it is unlikely, and 9.5% see it as almost impossible, while 7.6% were undecided.
• At the same time, 44.1% do not support the idea of a new Maidan, 16.2% would support it and personally participate, 30.8% would support it without personal participation, and 8.9% were undecided.
• 59.5% consider participation in elections the most acceptable way to defend their position. 21.1% would turn to protests, 9.5% to civil disobedience actions, 3.8% would defend their position with weapons, and 3.8% would do so by joining an opposition party. 18.0% said none of these forms suited them, and 6.6% could not answer.
• 46.3% believe the November protests in Kyiv were organized and paid for by political forces, 33.7% think they were genuine protests of ordinary people, and 20.1% could not evaluate them.
• 47.0% consider continued diplomatic efforts the best way to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 20.8% favor a referendum on the status of the occupied territories, 12.7% support isolating the territories and freezing the conflict, 9.8% support military mobilization to regain them, 2.1% propose other solutions, and 7.7% were undecided.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, the leader of electoral support among political parties is Batkivshchyna. 17.4% of respondents who intend to vote and have decided on their preferences would vote for this party. 12.6% would support BPP Solidarity, 11.1% the Opposition Bloc, 8.4% the Radical Party, 7.4% Samopomich, 6.2% the party “For Life”, 6.1% Svoboda, 5.6% Civic Position, 3.1% the Saakashvili Party, and about 3% would support Yarosh’s Movement and the UKROP party.
• In six-month dynamics, the top five parties remain almost unchanged. Batkivshchyna’s rating is stable (16–18%), while BPP Solidarity has gradually grown after its summer decline (from 9% to 13%). The decline of the Opposition Bloc (from 17% to 11%) is primarily linked to the emergence of the For Life party, which has a similar electorate. Samopomich (from 12% to 7%) and the Radical Party (from 11% to 8%) have also declined. Ratings of Civic Position, Svoboda, the Saakashvili Party, and UKROP remain stable.
• Regionally, Batkivshchyna leads in the West and the Center, with BPP Solidarity in second place, coming close to the leader in the West. In the South and East, the Opposition Bloc leads, while Batkivshchyna and BPP Solidarity share second and third places.
• The leader in presidential electoral preferences is Yuliya Tymoshenko — 17.7% of those ready to vote and who have decided on their preferences would vote for her. Petro Poroshenko is supported by 14.3%, Yuriy Boyko by 10.2%, Oleh Liashko by 9.9%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko by 8.2%, Vadym Rabinovych by 7.5%, Andriy Sadovyi by 7.3%, Oleh Tiahnybok by 4.5%, and Dmytro Yarosh by 2.4%. Compared to September, no significant changes occurred. Over six months, Tymoshenko’s support rose from 15% to 18%, and Poroshenko’s from 12% to 14%. Boyko declined (from 14% to 10%), Sadovyi fell (from 10% to 7%), and Nadiya Savchenko lost almost all support (from 10% to 2%).
• In the West, Poroshenko narrowly leads, with Tymoshenko second. In the Center, Tymoshenko leads and Poroshenko is second. In the South and East, Boyko narrowly leads, followed by Tymoshenko (South) and Poroshenko (East).
• 11% believe that Tymoshenko would win if elections were held soon, 9% believe Poroshenko would win, while half could not decide. Among Batkivshchyna supporters, 68% believe in Tymoshenko’s victory; among BPP supporters, 60% believe Poroshenko would win.
• In a second-round simulation, between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, 16% would support Poroshenko, 27% Tymoshenko, 45% would not vote, and 12% are undecided. Tymoshenko has stronger support in all regions and among supporters of other candidates.
• Between Poroshenko and Liashko, support is almost equal (20% vs 19%), with 47% not voting.
• Between Poroshenko and Boyko, 23% would support Poroshenko and 17% Boyko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Boyko, 33% would vote for Tymoshenko and 15% for Boyko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Liashko, 28% would vote for Tymoshenko and 13% for Liashko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Sadovyi, 25% would vote for Tymoshenko and 20% for Sadovyi.
• Thus, Poroshenko beats Boyko and sometimes Liashko, while Tymoshenko leads in all pairings.
• 14% believe Tymoshenko represents ordinary people, 12% Vakarchuk, 11% Liashko, and 42% say no politician represents them.
• 45% support dissolving parliament and holding new elections. 46% support early presidential elections.
• Only 11% think Ukraine is on the right track; 78% think it is on the wrong one. 89% say the socio-economic situation has worsened.
• Two thirds blame corruption at the top, followed by war in Donbas, oligarchs, and self-interest of officials.
• 69% hold President Poroshenko responsible for the current situation.
• 27% think the President can lead Ukraine out of crisis; 32% think he can stop the war.
• 43% receive utility subsidies; 70% support raising the minimum wage to 3,200 UAH, though only 38% expect it to improve their family finances.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, the majority of respondents (72%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people; 14% do not agree, and 14% were undecided.
• Despite the fact that the share of those who recognize the Holodomor as genocide slightly declined compared to the previous year (from 80% to 72%), it remains at the same level as in 2014 and is higher than in 2010–2012 (about 60%).
• The statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is shared by virtually all residents of the West (97%), the majority of respondents in the Center (78%), nearly two thirds in the South (57%), and slightly less than half in the East (48%).
• Residents of rural areas agree with the genocide thesis more often than urban residents (79% vs 68%). Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 83% support the statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, only 47% do. By age groups, support for the genocide thesis ranges from 70% to 75%, but the share of those who oppose it increases with age.
• Among supporters of European integration, 86% agree that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide, compared to only 48% among opponents. A similar pattern exists regarding NATO membership (91% vs 53%). In contrast, respondents who support joining the Customs Union are much less inclined to recognize the Holodomor as genocide (only 38%).
• Interestingly, nostalgia for the USSR does not decisively determine attitudes toward recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. Among those who regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 59% still agree that the Holodomor was a genocide (25% disagree). Among those who do not regret the collapse, 85% agree.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 55% of Ukrainians said they followed the U.S. presidential election. Interest was highest in Western Ukraine (67%) and lowest in the East (48%). The elections were followed more often by men, middle-aged and older people, and those with higher levels of education and income. The lowest interest was observed among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Radical Party.
• 39% of Ukrainians sympathized with Hillary Clinton, one in ten with Donald Trump, while 42% sympathized with neither candidate. Among those who followed the elections, 62% supported Clinton and 15% supported Trump.
• Support for Clinton was strongest among respondents with higher education and income, more often in cities, and especially in Western and Central Ukraine. In the East and South, most respondents did not sympathize with either candidate.
• Clinton’s support was relatively higher among women, while Trump had relatively more support among men. However, overall, both genders tended to favor the Democratic candidate.
• Among supporters of Ukrainian political parties, Clinton was most often supported by voters of BPP Solidarity, Civic Position, Svoboda, Wave (Saakashvili’s party), Batkivshchyna, and Samopomich. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc, by contrast, were more likely to sympathize with Trump.
• A plurality (42%) expect no changes in U.S.–Ukraine relations following Donald Trump’s victory. At the same time, one quarter believe relations will deteriorate, especially in Central and Southern Ukraine. Only 7% believe relations will improve.

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Ukrainians’ interest and expectations of the elections results in the USA from Ratinggroup

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, almost half of respondents (48%) support the ban of communist ideology in Ukraine, 36% are against it, and 16% are undecided. Over the past two years, the share of those supporting the ban has not changed. A majority of residents in the West (78%), half of residents in the Center, and one third of residents in the South support banning communist ideology, while in the East only 18% support it. The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more likely they are to support the ban of communist ideology. Men support the ban somewhat more than women. Rural residents support the ban more than urban residents. Support for banning communist ideology is strongest among supporters of patriotic parties, such as Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 80%). The strongest opposition comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (about 70%).
• One third of respondents support a ban on nationalist ideology, while 40% are against it and one quarter are undecided. Over the past two years, support for banning nationalist ideology has declined from 40% to 35%. Nearly half of residents in the South, 40% in the East, and one third in the Center support such a ban, while in the West only 20% do. The older the respondents and the lower their income, the more likely they are to support banning nationalist ideology. Women support the ban more than men. Urban residents are more supportive than rural residents (38% vs 28%). In terms of party preferences, attitudes toward banning nationalist ideology are the exact opposite of those toward banning communist ideology. The strongest support for banning nationalism comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (over 55%), while the lowest support is among voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s Movement.
• 41% of respondents support the initiative to dismantle all Lenin monuments in Ukraine, while nearly half (48%) are against it and 11% are undecided. Support is highest in the West (72%), about 41% in the Center, 26% in the South, and only 18% in the East. The younger the respondents and the higher their education, the more likely they are to support dismantling Lenin monuments. Rural residents are more supportive than city dwellers. Men support this initiative more than women. The strongest supporters are voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 75%). Among voters of BPP, Samopomich, and Civic Position, supporters outnumber opponents roughly two to one (about 60% vs 30%). Among supporters of the Radical Party and Batkivshchyna, supporters and opponents are roughly equal. Voters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc are overwhelmingly against dismantling Lenin monuments.
• Attitudes toward the renaming of Soviet-era city and street names are mixed. Overall, more people oppose (57%) than support (35%) this initiative. However, when selective renaming is considered, support rises and supporters outnumber opponents (49% vs 44%). 34% believe that only names honoring Soviet political figures who committed crimes against the Ukrainian people should be changed, and 15% believe that all such names should be changed. At the same time, 44% oppose any renaming at all, and 7% are undecided. Support for renaming is highest in the West, while in the East and South it is predominantly negative. The higher the level of education, the greater the support for renaming. Men support it more than women. The lowest support is among the 60+ age group. Rural residents are more supportive than urban residents. Among party supporters, the pattern is similar to attitudes toward dismantling Lenin monuments, though opponents are relatively more numerous.
• 72% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude toward Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 8% a negative one. About half evaluate Ivan Mazepa (52%) and Peter I (50%) positively, although negative attitudes toward Peter I are somewhat higher (29% vs 22%). 36% have a positive view of Fidel Castro, 22% a negative one, and 42% are unsure or do not know him. 35% view Stepan Bandera positively, 46% negatively, and 18% are undecided. 26% have a positive view of Symon Petliura, while 45% have a negative view. Nearly one quarter are undecided. 25% view Ronald Reagan positively, 24% negatively, while half are unsure or do not know him. Stalin and Lenin have the worst ratings: only 22% and 25%, respectively, view them positively, and about two thirds view Stalin negatively, while almost 60% view Lenin negatively.
• Dynamics show that the share of Stalin supporters has remained almost unchanged in recent years (20–24%). Positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased significantly compared to 2012 (35% vs 22%) and slightly compared to 2014 (31%). This year, positive views of Peter I declined compared to 2012, but remained at the same level as in 2014 (50%). Positive views of Mazepa increased to 50%, compared to 44% in 2012 and 41% in 2014.
• In the West, there is a positive attitude toward Ukrainian historical figures—Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura—while in the East there is a stronger positive attitude toward Russian historical figures—Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin. The higher the level of education, the more positive respondents are toward Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Petliura, and Reagan. The lower the education, the more positive they are toward Lenin and Stalin. Rural residents view Hrushevsky and Bandera more positively and Peter I, Castro, Lenin, and Stalin more negatively.
• Supporters of Svoboda have the most positive views of Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera. BPP supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura positively. Samopomich supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera positively. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc most positively evaluate Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in October 2016, 47% of respondents stated that they use only state-run medical institutions. 26% said that in addition to public health services, they turn to private medicine if their family has extra financial resources. 15% reported that alongside public services they turn to private clinics in cases of serious illness in the family. Only 6% said they primarily prefer private medical institutions over state ones.
• Almost 70% of respondents are dissatisfied with the state medical services they received over the last five years. 24% are satisfied to some degree with the quality of services in public medical institutions. The highest dissatisfaction was recorded in the South (85%). By age and income, dissatisfaction is higher among older people and those with lower incomes.
• 55% stated that over the last two years the overall quality of public healthcare in the country has deteriorated. Only 12% saw improvement. 27% believe nothing has changed, and 6% could not answer.
• At the same time, respondents assessed changes in private medicine quite positively. 25% believe that over the past two years the quality of services in private medical institutions has improved, while only 15% said it has worsened.
• 17% believe no changes occurred, and one third of respondents did not use private medical services at all. The highest share of those who noticed positive changes in private healthcare live in the West, the lowest in the East. By age, younger and middle-aged respondents, mainly those with higher incomes, were most likely to report improvement. Among respondents aged 51 and older, most did not use private medical services at all.
• Only 8% stated that the Ukrainian healthcare system is close to European standards, while 85% believe that the quality of medical care in Ukraine is far from European standards.
• The cost of medical services is one of the key factors when choosing where to seek treatment. 33% said that if money were not an issue, they would turn to private medical institutions, and 31% would go abroad for treatment. At the same time, 27% would still choose state healthcare, even if money were not a constraint.
• Interestingly, younger people are more inclined toward private and foreign healthcare, while older respondents would still entrust their health to state medical institutions, even if they had the money to go private or abroad.
• Among the countries respondents would choose for treatment, Israel (39%), Germany (38%), and Switzerland (21%) lead, followed by the USA (10%) and Belarus (8%). Only 3% would choose Russia.
• 33% of respondents said they consult a doctor or medical specialist less than once a year. 27% do so once a year, 18% at least every six months, 9% at least every three months, and 5% every month.
• 83% believe that treatment for themselves or their family is expensive (39% very expensive). Only 12% consider medical treatment more or less affordable.
• 36% said treatment in state medical institutions is very expensive; 77% in total consider it expensive. Only 16% find public healthcare affordable.
• 86% evaluated the cost of treatment in private clinics as expensive (58% very expensive). Only 3% said the prices are more or less acceptable.
• The perceived cost of treatment is directly linked to how often people seek care. 51% of those who go to doctors monthly say treatment is very expensive, while only one third of those who go once a year say the same. Nevertheless, the vast majority across all groups agree that healthcare in Ukraine is expensive.
• 69% said they were not asked for bribes over the last two years, while 25% reported cases of corruption.
• At the same time, 59% said they felt obliged to give non-cash gifts (alcohol, chocolate, food) to medical staff as a “thank you”. Only one third did not feel such pressure. This feeling was strongest in the West and Center (66%), and weakest in the East (48%). In the South, 42% do not feel any obligation to give such gifts. Women (64%) feel more obligated than men (53%).
• The most common “gratitude” amount demanded was 100–250 UAH (23%). 16% were asked for 250–500 UAH, 14% for 500–1000 UAH, and 16% for more than 1000 UAH. The least common was up to 50 UAH (4%).
• Only 5% said they would refuse to pay any bribe if asked.
• The main sources of information about healthcare are medical workers (67%) and friends and family (45%). About a quarter also rely on the internet, pharmacists, and TV programs.
• Two thirds know who their family doctor or therapist is. Half trust their doctor, 19% do not, and 31% could not answer.
• Trust is highest in the Center (58%) and lowest in the East, where only 38% trust their family doctor and 25% distrust the institution. Trust is higher among older people, women, and rural residents (57%) than urban residents (48%). Every fifth urban resident expresses distrust.
• 83% support childhood vaccination against polio, measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, and others. Only 9% oppose it. 77% believe vaccinations should be mandatory, 12% oppose, 11% were undecided.
• 69% support requiring ambulance drivers to complete medical first-aid training rather than just being drivers; 23% oppose this.
• 64% support the creation of a paramedic service like in Western countries, which provides first emergency care before a patient reaches full hospital treatment; 23% oppose it. Among opponents, 66% say paramedics are not doctors, 29% fear it would destroy the traditional ambulance system, 17% fear higher costs, and 10% fear doctors would lose jobs.
• Only 6% have private health insurance; 94% do not. Even among those earning over 5,000 UAH, only 14% are insured.
• 46% believe that private insurance covering real medical costs would best improve the system. 34% believe making the current system work efficiently would help most. Only 12% prefer a medical voucher system.
• 57% support funding hospitals based on the number of patients rather than number of beds; 21% oppose, 22% were undecided. Support is highest in the West (69%) and lowest in the Center (47%).

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) September 28 to October 7, 2016. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 66,9%. Additionally, 1,156 respondents were surveyed in Kharkiv oblast. The margin of error does not exceed 2,8%. Average response rate was 64,1%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

• According to the survey data, 35% of Kyiv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Mayor of Kyiv, which is three times higher than satisfaction with the work of the Kyiv City Council deputies and the Kyiv City State Administration. At the same time, half of respondents are dissatisfied with the mayor’s work, and two thirds are dissatisfied with the activities of the City Council and the City Administration.
• At the same time, 28% said that their attitude toward Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has improved during his time in office, while 54% said it has worsened. The greatest improvement in attitudes was observed among young people and those with higher levels of education and income.
• If the mayoral elections were held in the near future, Vitali Klitschko would receive the most support – 35% among those who intend to vote and have made up their minds. Boryslav Bereza would be supported by 12%, Volodymyr Bondarenko by 9%, Oleksandr Omelchenko by 8%, Serhii Husovskyi by 5%, and Oleksandr Puzanov by 4%. These results broadly reflect the 2015 local election pattern, though over the past year support for Klitschko and Husovskyi has declined slightly, while support for Bereza has increased. About 40% of Kyiv residents have not yet decided or do not intend to vote.
• Among the city’s problems, utility tariffs worry Kyiv residents the most (77%). About one third are concerned about corruption in city authorities, the work of municipal services, and the quality of roads and public utilities. Almost a quarter worry about chaotic parking and courtyard maintenance, 21% about traffic jams and apartment burglaries, 19% about chaotic urban development, and 13% about the excessive number of small kiosks (MAFs). Only 5% are concerned about the chaotic placement of outdoor advertising, and 4% about its excessive volume.
• Accordingly, nearly two thirds (58%) believe that changing outdoor advertising rules is not a priority for Kyiv’s city authorities, while 29% consider it one of the priorities.
• At the same time, the vast majority of Kyiv residents have not heard that the outdoor advertising industry creates thousands of jobs and that advertising revenues to the city budget in 2015 amounted to 240 million UAH. Those better informed tend to be people with higher education and income, those who are employed, and more often young and middle-aged residents.
• A plurality (44%) are convinced that the fewer changes are made to business rules, the better. 15% believe the government should change business rules every 5–10 years, and another 15% believe this should happen every 1–5 years.
• Almost half (47%) believe that the concept of reforming outdoor advertising should be a compromise between business and authorities. 22% think the reform should be based primarily on the position of city authorities, and 5% primarily on business interests. Entrepreneurs are three times more likely to favor the business position, while older people more often support the authorities’ stance.
• Among different types of outdoor advertising, the most favorable attitudes are toward store and kiosk signs, while the most negative attitudes are toward advertising placed on buildings.
• Supporters of moderate reduction of outdoor advertising outnumber supporters of major reductions. Those favoring moderate reductions are more often people with middle and above-average income, higher education, and youth. About one third believe nothing should be reduced at all. About 40% support a slight reduction of outdoor advertising. Only 14% want citylights removed entirely, and 18% want billboards removed.
• When social advertising is mentioned, respondents become more tolerant toward outdoor advertising: the number of supporters of reductions decreases, while the number of those who prefer no changes increases.
• About one third believe that a major reduction in outdoor advertising could lead to job losses and reduced city budget revenues; almost 20% think it would lead to lower tax revenues; 13% think it would cause small and medium-sized businesses to close or shrink; and 7% fear worsening investment conditions. Only one quarter see no serious risks. Pensioners are most likely to see no risks; youth and entrepreneurs least likely.
• Among causes of road accidents in Kyiv, drivers most often mentioned violation of traffic rules by drivers (56%), road conditions (54%), insufficient driving skills (33%), poor or missing road markings (26%), pedestrian violations (25%), poor street lighting (23%), distraction by advertising (21%), and traffic light problems (10%).
• Two thirds consider Kyiv a comfortable city for tourists, and nearly 90% believe Kyiv has strong potential to become even more attractive.
• The main advantages of Kyiv as a tourist city are architecture and historical landmarks (65%) and Ukrainian cuisine (58%), followed by museums and theaters (44%), parks (42%), city appearance (37%), friendly people (35%), restaurants (33%), and modernity (25%).
• The main disadvantages are low foreign-language skills (33%), safety concerns (32%), high prices (31%), and poor transport infrastructure (26%). About one in five also believe Kyiv is not modern enough, has an unattractive appearance, or that tourist information is hard to access. Only 9% consider available sex services an advantage, and only 6% see illegal sex services as a major disadvantage.
• Almost 35% traveled to Europe in the past five years, and 30% traveled to CIS countries. Young and middle-aged people traveled abroad almost three times more often than older residents, mostly those with higher education and income.
• Those who frequently visited Europe evaluate Kyiv differently: they more often cite parks, low prices, and affordable housing as advantages, and poor foreign-language skills, transport problems, limited festivals, weak nightlife, illegal sex services, and modest cuisine as disadvantages. At the same time, they consider Kyiv safer than do those who traveled abroad once or never.
• About 75% support Kyiv hosting Eurovision 2017, though only one third think the city is ready for it. 83% also support hosting the UEFA Champions League Final in 2018. Support for both events is higher among young people; Eurovision is equally supported by men and women, while the Champions League Final is supported more by men.
• Reference information: The Association of Outdoor Advertising Operators of Ukraine is a nationwide public organization representing the outdoor advertising industry and monitoring the balance between public, governmental, and business interests.
  Rating Group was founded in 2008 as an independent research organization operating under ESOMAR and WAPOR standards.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, 30% of Ukrainians said they would rather like to move abroad permanently (almost 65% would rather not), while 40% would like to work abroad. A stronger desire to move or work abroad is shown by residents of Western and Central Ukraine, men, younger people, and those with higher education and income.
• The main reasons for wanting to move abroad permanently are better living conditions (53%), ensuring a better future for children (41%), and the lack of decent jobs in Ukraine (32%). Among respondents who have children under 16, ensuring a better future for their children is the main motive (52%).
• Other motives for permanent emigration include better self-realization (13%), feeling unsafe in Ukraine (8%), better education or healthcare (7%), and better conditions for doing business abroad (5%).
• Among those who would like to work abroad, only one quarter consider their chances of getting a job abroad to be high; about half assess their chances as low; 12% believe they have no chance at all, and one in ten are undecided. More optimistic assessments are typical of Western Ukrainians, youth, men, and people with higher education and income. Those who have already worked abroad or have seriously explored the issue are much more optimistic about their chances.
• Overall, one quarter of Ukrainians have already looked into job opportunities abroad. Among visa center visitors who want to work abroad, almost 70% have already explored such opportunities.
• One in ten Ukrainians has work experience abroad; this is far more common in Western Ukraine (23%) than elsewhere (6–8%). Such experience is more typical of men, middle-aged people, and those with higher education and income.
• Among those who want to work abroad, over 20% have already worked abroad; among visa center visitors who want to work abroad, nearly 40% have such experience (in Lviv and Zhytomyr, this share is twice as high as in Kharkiv).
• Nearly 40% of those who want to work abroad are willing to stay 1–5 years, while most visa center visitors plan to stay less than one year. Older people, supporters of the Customs Union, and those without foreign work experience are more oriented toward short-term stays. Young people, supporters of European integration, and those with work experience abroad are more willing to stay three years or longer or even move permanently.
• One third are interested in working in their existing profession, one in five is ready to retrain, and 40% would accept any job. Visa center visitors are more focused on working in their profession (42%) and less willing to retrain (14%). Professional or retraining-based work is more attractive to Eastern and Southern residents, urban dwellers, youth, and those with higher education and income, while “any job” is more common among Western Ukrainians, rural residents, lower-income groups, and the unemployed.
• Nearly 80% of visa center visitors who want to work abroad need information about the foreign employer, almost 70% need health insurance and legal protection, and two thirds need help with housing, employer search, and legal advice. About half need a full guidebook for people going abroad to work. Visa assistance is the least demanded. Those with prior work experience abroad see less need for such support.
• Among mandatory requirements for employment agencies, 90% require a contract with a foreign employer and state registration, and nearly 80% require a license from the Ministry of Social Policy, correct office address, and a real physical office.
• The most important factors when using such agencies are signing a service contract (90%) and receiving full information about the employer, job duties, salary, housing, and insurance (86%). Less important are requests for a worker’s experience and skills (58%) and the option of cashless payment (44%), though these are more important for those with foreign work experience.
• Two thirds of visa center visitors believe that insurance provides medical and social protection abroad; 20% think it is wasted money, and 15% are undecided. Those who have worked abroad consider insurance less important than others.
• Two thirds of Ukrainians say that if they had a permanent job abroad, they would eventually return to Ukraine; 15% would not. Among those who want to work abroad, 57% would return; among visa center visitors, 52%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, 35% of respondents regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while half do not, and 15% are undecided. The dynamics show that this year the share of those who regret the collapse of the USSR slightly increased compared to 2014 and 2015: 35% in 2016 versus 33% in 2014 and 31% in 2015.
• In the South, East, and Center of the country, about 40% of respondents regret the collapse of the USSR, while in the West this share is about half as high (18%).
• The strongest nostalgia for the USSR is observed among those who would currently vote for Yuriy Boyko (68%), Vadym Rabinovych (52%), and Nadiya Savchenko (44%) in presidential elections. Around one third of supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleh Liashko, and one quarter of supporters of Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko, also express such nostalgia. The lowest levels of regret are found among supporters of Andriy Sadovyi (9%) and Oleh Tiahnybok (8%), mainly because their core electorate is concentrated in Western Ukraine.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education and income, the more likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. Women express nostalgia for the USSR somewhat more often than men. Among non-working respondents, 42% regret the collapse of the USSR, compared to 28% among those who are employed.
• The highest level of nostalgia is found among those who believe that the Russian language should become the state language (58%) or an official language in certain regions (44%).
• Similarly, among supporters of Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, a majority (71%) regret the collapse of the USSR, while among supporters of EU and NATO membership, more than 70% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union.

• According to a survey by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held in the near future, one third of respondents would definitely take part, and six parties would enter parliament: Batkivshchyna (18.3% among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice), Opposition Bloc (12.6%), Samopomich (11.0%), Radical Party (11.0%), Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (9.1%), and Svoboda (5.6%). 4.8% would support the party Civic Position, 3.1% the party of Mikheil Saakashvili, while Revival and UKROP would each receive about 2%. It should be noted that among all respondents almost one in five had not yet decided on their party choice.
• If presidential elections were held in the near future, one third of respondents would definitely participate. Among those who intend to vote and have decided, Yuliya Tymoshenko would receive 17.7%, Yuriy Boyko 11.5%, Petro Poroshenko 10.7%, Oleh Liashko 9.8%, Andriy Sadovyi 8.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.5%, Nadiya Savchenko 5.6%, and Oleh Tiahnybok 4.3%. More than 2% would vote for Dmytro Yarosh and Serhiy Tihipko.
• During 2016, Poroshenko’s rating fell by half (from 23% to 11%), while support for Tymoshenko increased (from 13% to 18%) and for Liashko (from 8% to 10%). Over the last two months, Savchenko’s rating fell from 10% to 6%, while Tymoshenko’s rose from 15% to 18%.
• About a quarter of respondents trust Sadovyi (25%), Hrytsenko (23%), and Savchenko (22%). The highest level of distrust is toward Arseniy Yatsenyuk (90%). Over the last two months, trust in Savchenko halved (from 41% to 22%), while distrust rose (from 41% to 63%); 14% are undecided. The most favorable attitudes toward Savchenko remain in the West and Center, in rural areas, and among women.
• 15% of respondents are well informed about Savchenko’s controversial political statements, 50% have heard something, 31% are not familiar, and 4% are undecided. Among those who are informed or have heard about them, half do not support her statements, 36% support them, and 15% are undecided. Support is highest in the East and South.
• Among Savchenko’s statements, the one that receives the highest support is: “Western provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine could lead the planet to a third world war” (48% support, 34% do not). The least supported are: “All participants of the LPR and DPR should be granted amnesty except their leaders” and “Maidan and Anti-Maidan stood for the same values” (28% support, 55% do not), and “Ukrainians will have to ask forgiveness for their sons, husbands, and fathers who died in Donbas” (33% support, 53% do not).
• 34% believe that Savchenko would be most useful to Ukraine as a military pilot, 17% support her leading an international committee on the release of Ukrainian POWs and political prisoners, and 17% support her work as a member of parliament. 4% support her entering the presidential race, 2% see her as Minister of Defense, 3% as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, 9% choose other roles, and 13% are undecided.
• Over the last two months, support for Savchenko returning to the army as a military pilot increased (from 24% to 34%), while support declined for her heading the international committee (from 20% to 17%), running for President (from 9% to 4%), and serving as Minister of Defense (from 4% to 2%). Among those who trust Savchenko, her greatest usefulness is seen in parliamentary or international humanitarian roles or in presidential politics. Those who do not trust her mainly support her return to the army.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in the city of Ternopil, 74% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, only 11% believe they are moving in the right direction, and 15% are undecided. Even among supporters of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP), more people think the country is moving in the wrong direction than in the right one. The highest level of pessimism is found among supporters of the Radical Party and Svoboda.
• At the same time, 54% believe that the situation in Ternopil is moving in the right direction, 22% say it is moving in the wrong direction, and 24% are undecided. Two thirds of supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and BPP believe that the city is developing in the right direction. Among Samopomich and Radical Party supporters, about half hold this view.
• Regarding the Ternopil oblast, 37% believe affairs are moving in the right direction, 31% say in the wrong direction, and 32% are undecided. The most positive assessments come from BPP and Svoboda supporters, while the most negative come from Radical Party supporters.
• More than 80% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Ternopil’s mayor, Serhiy Nadal. 14% are dissatisfied. The head of the Ternopil Regional State Administration, Stepan Barna, is approved by 38% and disapproved by 35%, while 27% could not assess his performance. The head of the Ternopil Regional Council, Viktor Ovcharuk, is approved by 19%, disapproved by 27%, and 55% could not give an assessment.
• Compared with October 2015, satisfaction with Nadal’s performance increased by 11 percentage points, and with Barna’s by 8 points. Meanwhile, positive assessments of Ovcharuk fell by 9 points, while the share of those unable to assess him almost tripled, indicating low public awareness of his activities.
• Support for Governor Barna is highest among BPP supporters (66%) and lowest among Samopomich and Civic Position supporters (about one third). Ovcharuk also receives his highest approval among BPP supporters (34%) and the lowest among Samopomich and Civic Position voters (16–17%). Nadal, by contrast, enjoys very high approval across all party electorates.
• The most trusted national politician in Ternopil is Nadiya Savchenko: 57% trust her, 36% do not. She is the only politician whose trust level exceeds distrust.
  Oleh Tiahnybok is trusted by 44% and distrusted by 51%; Andriy Sadovyi by 35% vs 57%; Mikheil Saakashvili 34% vs 58%; Anatolii Hrytsenko 34% vs 54%; Yuliya Tymoshenko 30% vs 66%; Oleh Liashko 29% vs 66%; Andriy Parubiy 26% vs 67%; Petro Poroshenko 20% vs 77%; Volodymyr Groysman 17% vs 77%. Arseniy Yatsenyuk has the highest level of distrust among Ternopil residents.
• Compared to October 2015, trust has increased for Tiahnybok (+15 pp), Tymoshenko (+13 pp), Liashko (+5 pp), and Yuriy Boyko (+4 pp). Trust has declined for Hrytsenko (−9 pp), Yatsenyuk (−10 pp), and Poroshenko (−14 pp). Trust in Sadovyi remained unchanged.
• The leader of the presidential race in Ternopil is Yuliya Tymoshenko (17% among those who intend to vote), followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko (15%), Oleh Tiahnybok (11%), Oleh Liashko (8%), Petro Poroshenko (7%), Andriy Sadovyi (6%), Dmytro Yarosh (5%), and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2%). 12% would vote for another candidate, and 18% are undecided. 45% say they would definitely participate in the election.
• The leading party in Ternopil is Svoboda (18%), followed by Batkivshchyna (16%), Samopomich (10%), and BPP, Civic Position, and the Radical Party (8% each). Other parties score below 3%. 12% are undecided. 40% would definitely vote.
• In the single-member constituency, the leaders are Stepan Barna and Volodymyr Staiura (12% each), followed by Vasyl Derevlyanyi (7%), Petro Landiak (6%), Volodymyr Blikhar (6%), Taras Pastukh (5%), and Roman Zastavnyi, Vasyl Lyl, and Mykhailo Ratushniak (4% each). 9% would vote for another candidate, and almost 30% are undecided.
• The clear leader in the mayoral race is incumbent mayor Serhiy Nadal, supported by 67% of those who would vote. All other candidates score below 4%. 7% are undecided. Nearly 50% would definitely vote in mayoral and city council elections.
• In elections to the city council, Svoboda leads with 26%, followed by Batkivshchyna (13%), Samopomich (7%), Radical Party (7%), BPP (5%), and Movement for Purification (4%). Other parties score below 3%. 16% are undecided.
• Among local politicians, Serhiy Nadal has the highest positive rating: 70% view him positively, 11% negatively. Stepan Barna, Mykhailo Holovko, and Ihor Huda also have positive balances, although more than 40% of residents do not know Holovko and Huda. The most negative attitudes are toward Roman Zastavnyi and Oleksandr Muts, with 45% and 48% negative evaluations respectively.