Press releases

• According to the survey conducted by the Rating Group in September 2017, the majority of the respondents (77%) agree with the statement that the 1932-33 Holodomor was the genocide of the Ukrainian people, 13% do not agree with this, 11% - have not decided.
• It should be noted that the number of those who perceive the Holodomor as the genocide has increased as compared to the last year (from 72% to 77%), while this number is slightly lower than in 2015 (80%).
• The statement that the 1932-33 Holodomor was the genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the vast majority of the citizens of the West (91%), the majority of the respondents of the Center (84%), two-thirds of the South (65%) and more than a half of the East (56%)
• The rural residents are more likely to agree with the thesis on the Holodomor-genocide as compared to the urban residents (79% vs 76%). Among the respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 85% do support this thesis, while among those who consider their native language to be Russian - 57%.
• In terms of the age cut, the number of those who support the Holodomor-genocide thesis varies from 72% to 80% in different categories (the strongest support among the middle-aged people). At the same time, there is a difference in the number of the opponents of this thesis in the various age groups: the older the respondents, the more they disapprove the thesis. In the context of education level, the number of those who support the Holodomor-genocide thesis ranges from 74% to 79% in different categories.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017 on behalf of the Ukrainian Partnership Forum among employees of research institutions in Dnipro, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Kharkiv, 64% of respondents said that the situation in Ukrainian science is deteriorating. About 23% described the situation as stable, while only 8% reported an improvement. The most negative assessments were given by Doctors of Science and those with more than 20 years of experience in research.
• Almost half of the surveyed scientists (46%) stated that conditions at their own research institutions are worsening. Thirty percent reported stability and only 18% saw improvements. In this case, deterioration was more often reported by Candidates of Science and those with more than 10 years of scientific experience.
• With regard to the media that cover science and innovation, 41% said the situation is stable, 29% believed it has worsened, and 12% thought it has improved. Again, the most critical views were expressed by Doctors of Science and researchers with more than 20 years of experience.
• Scientists were most optimistic about their own professional development: 40% reported improvement, 37% stability, and only 10% deterioration, while 13% could not assess their situation. Less optimistic views were more common among those with the highest academic degrees and the longest research careers.
• When asked who contributes most to the development of science in Ukraine today, 47% named individual scientists, inventors, and specialists. Research institutes were mentioned by 35%, higher education institutions by 33%, and the National Academy of Sciences by 28%. Only 16% said the Ministry of Education and Science plays this role, and the same share pointed to civil society organizations, foundations, innovation hubs, and coworking centers. Business structures and science-related media were mentioned by 8% each, while general secondary schools by only 4%.
• At the same time, 74% of respondents believe that the Ministry of Education and Science should be the main driver of scientific development in Ukraine, and 65% pointed to the National Academy of Sciences. Research institutes were named by 37%, universities by 28%, business by 14%, and media or civil society organizations by around 9–10%. Only 6% believed that schools or individual scientists and inventors should play this role.
• Two thirds of surveyed scientists (66%) agreed that the state, private sector, and civil society should promote vocational and technical education among young people instead of higher education. Twenty-three percent disagreed, and 11% were undecided. Support for this idea was strongest among Doctors of Science and the most experienced researchers.
• More than half (52%) believe there is demand from international corporations for the work of Ukrainian scientists and inventors, while 32% disagreed. In contrast, a majority believe that domestic businesses and especially state authorities show little demand for Ukrainian scientific developments. Only about one third disagreed with this view. Regarding media and civil society foundations, about a quarter believe such demand exists, while around half believe it does not.
• Looking ahead, 60% of respondents said Ukraine most urgently needs innovation in medicine. Around half also highlighted energy and agriculture, and 46% pointed to electronics, programming, and telecommunications. About one third named aviation and space, the defense industry, and mechanical engineering. Smaller shares pointed to chemicals (22%), metallurgy, heavy industry, and transport (18–19%), and even fewer mentioned automotive manufacturing, construction, light industry, and mining.
• As for scientific fields that should become strategic priorities for Ukraine in the near future, technical sciences (engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, etc.) were named by 75% of respondents. About half identified medical and physical-mathematical sciences as priorities. Biological, agricultural, and chemical sciences were supported by 40–45%. Military sciences were named by 19%, while economics, public administration, and pedagogy were mentioned by 11–13%. Psychology, political science, history, law, philosophy, philology, and arts were mentioned by fewer than 10%.

• According to a study conducted by Rating Group in September 2017 on behalf of the Ukrainian Partnership Forum, among researchers working in scientific institutions in Dnipro, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Kharkiv, 86% believe that scientists should engage in science communication and public outreach, such as giving public lectures, publishing in non-academic outlets, providing media commentary, and participating in television programs. Only 5% expressed the opposite view, while 9% were unable to answer.
• At the same time, 45% said they personally engage in science popularization, including 21% on a regular basis and 24% occasionally, while more than half do not. The longer a respondent’s scientific career and the higher their academic degree, the more likely they are to engage in outreach.
• Among those who have experience in science popularization, 85% said they did so on a voluntary basis, and only 6% received financial compensation. However, 41% of all surveyed scientists believe this work should be paid, 37% think it should remain voluntary, and 22% were undecided.
• Half of respondents said their scientific institution encourages them to take part in science popularization, while 35% said it does not and 14% were unsure.
• More than half of respondents (55%) believe it is difficult for scientists to communicate information about their inventions through the media, while 26% think it is not difficult and 19% were undecided. The longer a person’s scientific career, the more likely they are to see this as a problem. The main obstacles named were the media’s preference for entertainment over science (59%), lack of government funding for science communication (56%), the absence of a culture of science popularization in Ukraine (42%), the need to pay to access media outlets (35%), and the complexity of scientific information for most people (36%). About one fifth said that the public is simply not interested in scientific innovations, and only 4% believed there are no serious barriers.
• Universities received the highest ratings for effectiveness in science popularization, with 57% saying they are effective and 35% ineffective. Research institutes were rated effective by 48% and ineffective by 42%, the National Academy of Sciences by 43% and 48% respectively, and the media by 32% effective versus 54% ineffective. The Ministry of Education and Science was rated effective by only 28% and ineffective by 63%, the worst among all institutions assessed. NGOs, business structures, and secondary schools were also more often rated ineffective than effective.
• Nearly 90% support the idea of creating a national center in Ukraine dedicated to science popularization and support for domestic research, providing technical assistance to scientists and startups, shaping a positive image of scientists and science-based entrepreneurs, and disseminating news about science and innovation. Only 7% oppose this idea and 4% were undecided.
• The most desired services from such a center include lectures by prominent scientists, startup founders, and science communicators (60%), foreign language courses (46%), roundtables, workshops, and master classes (42%), interactive exhibitions of innovations (30%), help in preparing professional project presentations (23%), science media museums and video production (22%), professional support with press releases and articles (21%), science journalism training (14%), coworking spaces and press briefings (13% each), and hackathons (7%).
• As additional infrastructure, 56% would like access to modern presentation equipment, 47% to computer workstations with internet access, 31% to a mini-printing facility, 21% to 3D installations, 13% to a professional video studio, and 9% to a dedicated rapid-recording area.
• Fifty-seven percent of respondents collaborate with foreign colleagues, while 37% do not. International cooperation is most common in Kyiv and Odesa, and among doctors of science and those with long scientific careers.
• Only 2% say their research is adequately funded, 55% say it is partially funded, and 35% say it is not funded at all. Funding conditions are relatively better in Kyiv, among doctors of science, and among those with more than 20 years of experience, and worse among respondents in Dnipro, those without an academic degree, and those with shorter careers.
• More than half (54%) have additional employment beyond their scientific work, and 72% of them say this work is related to their main job. Researchers without an academic degree more often report that their additional work is unrelated to their scientific activity.
• Only 28% are considering leaving the scientific profession, while 55% are not and 17% are undecided. Such intentions are more common in Lviv, among researchers without an academic degree, and among those with five to ten years of experience. Among those who want to leave, the main reasons are low pay (87%), insufficient funding of research (57%), disappointment in the development of Ukrainian science (41%), a desire to work in another field (19%), and the perceived irrelevance of their research (10%).
• At present, 60% say the main thing they get from their scientific work is satisfaction from doing what they love, while 14% cite scientific recognition, 10% practical implementation of results, and only 5% financial reward. In contrast, when asked what they would like to receive in the near future, 46% said financial compensation, 24% practical implementation of their results, 13% scientific recognition, and only 9% satisfaction from their work.
• More than half (56%) do not consider moving abroad for scientific work, while 26% do and 18% were undecided. Among those who consider “scientific emigration,” the main expected benefit is financial reward (43%), followed by practical implementation of results (28%), scientific recognition (14%), and moral satisfaction (10%).
• Ninety-three percent believe it is important that the results of their research have practical application. Forty-seven percent said their work has already been applied in practice, while 38% said it has not. Practical application is most common among doctors of science and those with more than 20 years of experience.
• The main reason for the lack of practical implementation is lack of funding (48%), followed by the theoretical nature of research (27%), lack of interest from institutional leadership, or lack of relevance to current realities (7–9%). Very few cited fear of mistakes, lack of media support, or lack of public interest.
• Two thirds of respondents have not applied for government or international research grants over the past five years, while about one third have. More than 80% have not applied for grants from civic initiatives. About one fifth received grants from the state or international organizations, while only 3% received grants from civic initiatives. Among those who applied, more than half succeeded in obtaining state or international grants, compared to 36% for civic grants. Success rates are highest in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv and among senior researchers.
• International grant programs are seen as the most transparent, while government and civic grants are viewed as much less transparent.
• When choosing a grant program, respondents say the most important factors are relevance to their research topic, opportunities to find investors, and the size of funding. Fewer prioritize the opportunity to popularize their research, and very few see emigration as a key motive.
• Nearly half believe it is difficult to win international grants, and even more think it is difficult to win government grants. Those who have applied for grants are twice as likely to say it is easy.
• Three quarters receive information about science and innovation from specialized websites and journals, over half from colleagues, and many from events, social networks, and lectures. Most use the internet daily, with Facebook being the most common social network. Most prefer to receive information in text or visual form rather than audio. Finally, 76% would like to receive more information about innovation and new opportunities for scientists in Ukraine.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017, 54% of respondents said they would be ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms if such a threat arose, almost twice as many as in 2012. In the Central and Western regions, this share reaches about two thirds, while in the South it is around half. In the East, however, 52% said they would not be ready to defend the country with weapons (26% said they would, and 22% were undecided). Patriotic attitudes are more common among men, Ukrainian-speakers, and people with higher incomes.
• Fifty-nine percent of respondents support establishing Defenders of Ukraine Day on October 14, and nearly the same share (56%) do not support abolishing the celebration of February 23, the former Soviet Army and Navy Day. Support for October 14 is stronger in the West, while opposition to abolishing February 23 is more widespread in the South and East. Notably, support for October 14 is equally strong among men and women, and there are also no gender differences in opposition to abolishing February 23. Almost half (45%) of those who support October 14 as Defenders of Ukraine Day nevertheless do not support canceling the Soviet-era holiday.
• Nearly half of respondents (49%) support recognizing the OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence, while 29% oppose this idea; about one quarter were undecided. Compared with 2015, support for recognition has increased (from 41% to 49%), and since 2010 it has grown by a factor of 2.5.
• Support for recognition is highest in the West (80%), while about half of respondents in the Center also support it. At the same time, nearly half of residents of the East and South oppose recognizing the nationalist insurgent movement. Men, younger people, rural residents, people with higher education, and Ukrainian-speakers are more likely than others to support recognition of the OUN and UPA.
• A majority of respondents (56%) have a positive attitude toward the idea of reconciliation between soldiers of the Soviet Army and the OUN-UPA, up from 44% in 2012. In the West, support is more than twice as high as in the East (75% versus 34%). Support for reconciliation is also stronger among people with higher education, rural residents, and Ukrainian-speakers, and is almost twice as high among those who support recognition of the OUN-UPA compared with those who do not.
• An overwhelming majority (90%) agree that soldiers of the Soviet Army defended their homeland during World War II, while 53% also agree that fighters of the OUN-UPA defended their homeland during the war. Support for the latter view has increased by about one and a half times since 2012. Those most likely to support the idea that OUN-UPA fighters defended their country are young people, men, rural residents, Ukrainian-speakers, and residents of Western Ukraine.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017, 61% of respondents said they would not like to move abroad permanently, while 35% said they would like to do so and 4% were undecided. Compared with the previous year, the share of those wishing to emigrate increased slightly, from 30% to 35%. The highest proportion of potential emigrants is found in Western Ukraine (41%). In the South the figure is 34%, in the Center 33%, and in the East 33%. Among young people aged 18–35, as many as 54% would like to move abroad permanently, compared with only 19% among older respondents. The desire to emigrate is somewhat more common among people with higher education and higher incomes. At the same time, those who have already worked abroad are less likely to want to emigrate than those who are only planning to look for a job abroad.
• The most common reason for considering emigration is the hope of better living conditions (64%). A better future for children was mentioned by 34%, lack of decent jobs in Ukraine by 23%, and the desire to obtain better education by 12%. Fewer than 10% cited insecurity in Ukraine, better healthcare, better business conditions, personal self-realization, or family circumstances. Value conflicts and political persecution were mentioned by no more than 1%. Better living conditions were most often cited in the East, securing children’s future in the South, and lack of decent jobs in the West. Young people more often mentioned lack of jobs and opportunities for self-realization, while the oldest respondents more often pointed to insecurity and healthcare.
• Overall, 44% of respondents would like to work abroad. Regional differences on this issue are small, but age differences are significant: 68% of young people want to work abroad, compared to 52% among middle-aged respondents and only 20% among the oldest.
• The main motivation for working abroad is higher wages (72%). Between 16% and 20% also mentioned better working conditions, earning money for housing, children’s education or relatives’ treatment, professional self-realization, and better social protection. About 7% cited the opportunity to start a business or to gain experience in international companies.
• Young people more often want to work abroad in order to develop professionally and gain experience in international companies, while older people are more motivated by better social protection. Those who only plan to work abroad more often cite wages as their main motivation, whereas those who have already worked abroad more often point to better working conditions.
• Among preferred destination countries for work, Germany was named most often (37%), followed by Poland (26%), the United States (22%), Canada (21%), Czech Republic (16%), Italy (15%), the United Kingdom (14%), France and Sweden (12% each), Israel (11%), Spain (9%), the Netherlands (7%), and Russia (6%). Less than 5% named other countries. Germany, the United States, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom were chosen more often in the West, while Russia was chosen more often in the East.
• Forty-four percent of respondents said they have no chance at all of working abroad in the future, 30% assessed their chances as low, and 17% as high. Young people are the most optimistic: 32% see high chances and another 41% see low chances. Among middle-aged respondents, 15% see high chances and 37% low chances. The oldest group is the least optimistic (5% and 17% respectively).
• Only 14% of respondents had previously worked abroad, while 86% had not. Such experience is most common in the West, among people with higher education, higher incomes, the self-employed, and those working in the private sector.
• If they had a permanent job abroad, 65% said they would definitely or probably return to Ukraine, while 23% would not and 12% were undecided. The share who would not return is lowest in the West (17%) and highest in the East and South (27% each).
• One third of respondents (33%) have already looked into employment opportunities abroad, while 67% have not. Interest is highest in the West, among people with higher education, young people, those working in the private sector, the self-employed, and higher-income groups.
• Among those who looked for such information, 64% received it from relatives, friends, or colleagues; 40% from the Internet; 37% through acquaintances; 12% from media advertisements; and 13% from overseas employment agencies.
• Overall, 46% believe there is enough information about working abroad, while 37% think it is insufficient. Western residents, young people, those who have worked abroad, and higher-income respondents are more likely to say information is sufficient.
• More than half (52%) would like to receive more information about working abroad, while 40% would not. This desire is more common among young people, residents of the Center and West, urban residents, those who want to work abroad, the higher educated, and the better-off.
• More than half (55%) said they know people whose children study abroad. This is more common in the West, in cities, and among young respondents.
• Seventy percent would like their children or grandchildren to study abroad, while 20% would not. Support for this is over 70% in the West, Center, and South, and 59% in the East. Support rises with younger age, higher education, and higher income. The most preferred countries for children’s education are Germany (34%), the United Kingdom (29%), the United States (25%), Poland (24%), Canada (17%), France (12%), the Czech Republic and Sweden (10% each), Italy (7%), the Netherlands and Spain (5% each), and Russia (4%).
• More than half (55%) said they are personally interested in the introduction of the visa-free regime with the EU, while 38% are not. Interest is highest in the West (72%) and lowest in the East (40%). Young people, the higher educated, and wealthier respondents are more interested.
• Fifty-two percent believe visa-free travel will have positive effects for Ukraine, 17% think it will have no effect, and 18% expect negative consequences. Optimism is highest in the West (68%), followed by the Center (53%) and around 40% in the East and South.
• At the same time, 80% believe visa-free travel will lead to increased emigration of Ukraine’s working-age population.
• Nearly three quarters also believe that Poland and Hungary are simplifying employment rules for Ukrainians primarily to benefit their own economies rather than as a friendly gesture toward Ukraine.
• More than half (54%) think that a work visa is required to work abroad, while 29% think it is not.
• Two thirds of respondents do not want dual citizenship, while 35% would like to have a second passport. This desire is most common in the South, among young people, the employed, and higher-income groups. Among those who want another citizenship, EU countries were preferred by 42%, the United States by 18%, Canada by 15%, and Russia by 12%.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017, 55% of Nikopol residents believe that the situation in the city has somewhat or significantly worsened over the past two years. Another 28% say it has remained the same, and only 11% report an improvement. Younger residents (aged 18–35) are less pessimistic than older people. More than two thirds of voters of the Opposition Bloc and “For Life” say the situation has deteriorated. The most optimistic group are supporters of BPP “Solidarity”: one third of them report improvement and another 40% stability.
• Almost two thirds of respondents believe the city is moving in the wrong direction, while only 12% say it is moving in the right direction and 29% were unable to assess the situation. Again, younger people are more optimistic. Voters of “For Life” and the Opposition Bloc give the most negative assessments (over 70%), while BPP “Solidarity” supporters are the most positive (44% say the city is moving in the right direction).
• Seventy percent of respondents say the economic situation of their families has worsened over the past year (47% say it has worsened significantly). 23% report no change and only 4% say it has improved. In all social groups, more than half report worsening material conditions.
• At the same time, 39% have optimistic expectations about Nikopol’s future, while 43% are rather or very pessimistic and 18% cannot assess the city’s prospects. Young people are more optimistic. Optimism is also higher among voters of BPP “Solidarity,” Vidrodzhennia, and Batkivshchyna, while pessimism dominates among supporters of “For Life” and the Opposition Bloc.
• Among utilities, residents rated gas supply and electricity the highest: 34% rated them as good or excellent, and about 42–43% as average. However, around one fifth rated them as poor or very poor.
• Water supply received the worst evaluations: 37% rated it as poor, 35% as average, and only 26% as good or excellent.
  Heating was rated good or excellent by 16%, average by 25%, and poor by 30%, while another 30% could not assess it.
• Nearly 90% of respondents consider gas, electricity, and water services to be expensive, and almost 70% say the same about heating.
• Among other services, schools and kindergartens, markets and shops, and universities and colleges receive mostly average ratings, with relatively few good evaluations and around 15–30% negative assessments.
• Cultural institutions, sports facilities, street lighting, monuments, and industrial zones are generally rated poorly or only average.
  Roads and sidewalks receive the worst evaluations, with more than 80% dissatisfied.
• When asked what should be improved first, 36% chose road repairs, followed by city beautification (10%), healthcare (6%), renewable energy, street lighting, parks, water quality, job creation, and playgrounds (3–4% each).
• Among priority infrastructure projects, 48% again chose road repairs, followed by improvement of residential areas (11%), street lighting, parks, and new sports facilities (5–6%).
• If parliamentary elections were held soon, 54% would vote, while 38% would not. Among likely voters, the Opposition Bloc leads (17.5%), followed by Batkivshchyna (13.6%), For Life (9.4%), BPP Solidarity (8.5%), UKROP (6.6%), Vidrodzhennia (6.3%), Radical Party (4.4%), and Svoboda (3.1%). Almost one fifth are undecided.
• The highest trust is placed in the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant (66%), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) (58%), neighborhood associations (49%), and civic organizations (46%).
  The lowest trust is shown toward the city council, executive committee, courts, police, and prosecutors.
• Among NGOs, veterans’ organizations (42%) and youth organizations (41%) are rated best.
• Fifty-six percent of residents have a positive attitude toward foreign investors. Investors from Canada and Germany are viewed most positively, while investors from Russia are viewed most negatively.
• Seventy-six percent support renewable (“green”) energy.
• A majority supports key elements of the healthcare reform, including medicine reimbursement, public health centers, medical insurance, and price regulation of medicines. Overall, 55% support the medical reform package.
• Only 14% reported paying a bribe in the past year, while about half believe local corruption has not changed over the last two years.
• Eleven percent say they have been victims of crime.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in July–August 2017, 47% of respondents said that over the past two years the overall quality of public healthcare in the country had worsened, while only 10% reported improvement. One third (34%) said that the quality had not changed, and 9% were unable to answer.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents (71%) trust advice on treatment and healthy lifestyles from relatives and friends. Almost the same high level of trust is shown toward medical professionals: ambulance doctors are trusted by 68%, qualified nurses by 66%, pharmacists and pharmacy staff by 65%, and family doctors and therapists by 63%. Half of respondents (51%) trust advice from medical lecturers, and almost as many (46%) from athletes. Priests and clergy are trusted by 31%, while 15% listen to folk healers and psychics. Only 4% trust advice from members of parliament on health and treatment.
• Trust patterns vary across groups. Relatives and friends are trusted most in the South, among older people and those with lower incomes. Medical professionals are trusted most in the East, among older people, women, and those with medium or high incomes. Medical lecturers and athletes are trusted more by youth and middle-aged people, especially men and higher-income respondents. Clergy are trusted more in the West, among older people and women. Folk healers are trusted more in the East, among middle-aged and older people, and more by women than men.
• Almost half of respondents (46%) do not trust homeopathy as a system of treatment. At the same time, 30% do trust it, especially in the East, among women and older people, while 24% were undecided.
• 57% know their family doctor or therapist. Awareness is highest in the East, among city residents, women, and older people.
• The vast majority of respondents (93%) do not have private health insurance; only 7% do. Even among respondents with relatively high incomes (more than 5,000 UAH), only 11% have insurance. More than half said that even if they had insurance, they would visit doctors in the same way as before; one third said they would go more often, and 6% less often.
• The share of people who say treatment is very expensive for them and their families has increased sharply — from 39% last October to 61% now. This concern is strongest in the Center and South, among older people, low-income respondents, and those without insurance. Only 13% say treatment is more or less affordable. Even half of those with insurance say healthcare is very expensive.
• Among government healthcare initiatives, respondents are most aware of the free or low-cost provision of medicines for diabetes, asthma and cardiovascular diseases by prescription (77%) and the introduction of national health insurance (61%). About half know about raising doctors’ salaries through contracts and tight control over charitable funds for the Okhmatdyt hospital (54% and 50%), both much higher than in May 2017.
• More people do not know than know about reference pricing of medicines, patient–doctor contracts, public health centers, hospital districts, subsidies for internally displaced persons, and standardized treatment protocols based on evidence-based medicine. Nevertheless, public awareness of healthcare reforms has grown over the past three months.
• Support for reforms is very high. The most supported initiatives are free or low-cost medicines by prescription and control over Okhmatdyt funds (91% and 89%). Public health centers and reference pricing are supported by 77%, medical subsidies for IDPs by 71%, national health insurance by 69%, standardized treatment protocols and doctors’ salary reform by 67%, patient–doctor contracts by 57%, and hospital districts by 44%.
• Overall, 72% support the healthcare reform bills, 15% oppose them, and 12% are undecided. Support is higher in the West, among women, young and middle-aged people, higher-income groups, and families with medical workers, and lowest in the East.
• Regarding financing, 53% support the principle “money follows the patient”, while 20% support funding based on the number of hospitals and beds; 27% are undecided or reject both models. 58% prefer international standardized treatment protocols, while 20% prefer domestic ones.
• Nearly all respondents (97%) believe healthcare should be provided regardless of a person’s income. Large majorities support transparency of medical donations (84%), a 70/30 state–patient cost split (83%), priority funding for ATO veterans (82%), tax exemptions for medical donations (81%), money following the patient (80%), tax benefits for employers who insure workers (79%), and a special fund for ATO veterans (79%).
• The least supported ideas are allowing doctors to work as entrepreneurs with lower taxes (51%) and denying state-funded treatment to people who neglect their health (44%).
• Vaccination is supported by 84%; 75% believe it should be mandatory.
• 56% say they were not asked for bribes in the past year, 20% experienced corruption, and 22% did not visit doctors.
• 73% support co-payment for medical services, especially if it helps eliminate bribes. 78% would support cost-sharing if it reduced corruption.
• 63% support organ donation after death, 80% support medical training for ambulance drivers, and 85% support creating a paramedic service.
• The share of people who see the Ministry of Health as important for their families increased from 49% to 57% between May and August 2017.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in August 2017, 83% of respondents said they consider themselves patriots of their country. Compared with the same period in 2014, the overall share of patriotically minded citizens has almost not changed. Only 10% expressed the opposite view, while 7% were unable to answer.
• In all macro-regions of Ukraine, the share of those who consider themselves patriots exceeds 75%: 88% in the West, 84% in the Center, 83% in the East, and 77% in the South. At the same time, in the southern regions 18% of respondents said they do not consider themselves patriots. In the East this share is 11%, in the Center 8%, and in the West 5%. The older the respondents, the more likely they are to describe themselves as patriots.
• 76% of respondents said that if the choice were made today, they would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. This figure has not changed since 2014. For comparison, in 2013 this share was 61%.
• Support for Ukraine’s independence is highest in the West (93%). In the Center, 76% support it; in the South, 66%; and in the East, 64%. At the same time, in the South and East the share of those holding the opposite view reaches 21–22%. Younger respondents and those with higher education are more likely to support Ukraine’s independence.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in July 2017, 37% of respondents support the creation of a Unified Local Church in Ukraine. 18% oppose this initiative, while 23% say the issue is not important to them and another 23% were undecided.
• Compared with 2014, the share of those who support church unification has changed little, while the number of opponents has fallen by about one and a half times. At the same time, the proportion of those without a clear position has increased.
• Support for the creation of a Unified Local Church is highest among members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (66%) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (61%). In contrast, among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), opponents (42%) outnumber supporters (23%). At the same time, 36% of UOC-MP followers say they are either indifferent to this issue or have no clear opinion. Among believers of other denominations, those without a defined position also prevail.
• Regional differences are pronounced. Support for unification is highest in Western Ukraine (61%). In the Center, 40% support the idea, 17% oppose it, and 43% have no clear position. In the South, 24% support the creation of a Unified Church, 25% oppose it, 33% are indifferent, and 19% are undecided. In the East, only 11% support the idea, 20% oppose it, 40% could not answer, and 29% said they are indifferent.
• Support for church unification is more common among older respondents, women, people with higher education, and those with higher incomes.
• Among those who support unification, two thirds favor creating a Unified Local Church based on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 16% support unification on the basis of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and 7% on the basis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).
• The vast majority of UOC-KP and UGCC followers prefer unification around their own Churches. Among UOC-MP parishioners, only slightly more than half support unification around the UOC-MP, while one quarter would prefer unification around the UOC-KP. Among believers who do not identify with any denomination, two thirds favor unification around the UOC-KP.
• Compared with 2014, the share of UOC-KP and UGCC adherents has remained almost unchanged, while the share of UOC-MP followers has declined (from 22% to 17%). At the same time, the proportion of those who consider themselves believers but do not belong to any denomination has increased (from 24% to 31%).
• The UOC-KP is most strongly represented in the West, Center, and South, and least in the East. The UGCC is concentrated primarily in Western Ukraine, while the UOC-MP is strongest in the East.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group on behalf of Focus magazine, more than 70% of Kyiv residents say they would take part in mayoral elections if they were held in the near future, while 23% say they would not and 5% are undecided.
• If the mayoral election were held now, Vitalii Klitschko would receive 39.4% of the vote among those intending to participate. Boryslav Bereza would get 8.5%, Volodymyr Bondarenko 5.9%, Oleksandr Omelchenko 4.6%, and Tetiana Montian 2.4%. All other candidates are below 2%. About one quarter of respondents remain undecided.
• Almost half of Kyiv residents believe the city is moving in the wrong direction, 30% say it is moving in the right direction, and one quarter cannot assess the situation.
• More than 40% are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Vitalii Klitschko, while about half are dissatisfied and 8% are undecided. Compared to 2016, satisfaction has increased from 35% to 43%.
• Only 22% are satisfied with the Kyiv City Council, while over 60% are dissatisfied. Communal services receive even worse ratings: only one in five residents is satisfied, while more than 70% are dissatisfied.
• The cost of коммунальні послуги (utilities) is the biggest concern for 60% of Kyiv residents. Nearly two thirds are worried about rising crime and drug or alcohol abuse. Around 30% point to illegal construction, a quarter to poor road conditions, and about one fifth to low quality of medical care and high public transport fares.
• Among young people, the most pressing issues are drug and alcohol abuse, poor funding of schools, lack of parking spaces, shortages in kindergartens, stray animals, and lack of sports facilities. Middle-aged respondents more often mention bad roads, traffic congestion, and street vending. Older residents are more concerned about crime, poor quality of medical services, public transport, sidewalks, street lighting, and the condition of housing.
• Forty-seven percent say the visa-free regime with the EU is important to them personally, the same share say it is not.
• Sixty-two percent believe Ukraine should join the European Union, 5% support joining the Customs Union, about one fifth support a neutral position between the EU and Russia, and 12% are undecided.
• If a referendum on NATO membership were held today, 55% would support it, 18% would oppose it, 10% would not vote, and 17% are undecided. Support for visa-free travel, EU membership, and NATO is stronger among younger people and those with higher incomes.
• Sixty percent support restricting economic relations with Russia, while about one quarter support maintaining or expanding them. About half support introducing a visa regime with Russia, while almost 40% oppose it.
• Fifty-six percent support ending the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) only after full restoration of Ukrainian control over Donbas. Smaller shares support broader autonomy, federalization, or separation.
• Fifty-three percent support the trade blockade of the self-proclaimed DNR/LNR territories.
• Sixty percent believe Ukraine should use all possible means to return Crimea, while a quarter think the country should accept its annexation.
• Views on the Minsk agreements are divided: 36% want new agreements, 13% support full implementation, nearly 20% favor withdrawing from negotiations, and more than 30% are undecided.
• Victory Day on May 9 remains personally meaningful for 84% of respondents. International Women’s Day (March 8) is personally meaningful for 70%, and May 1 is meaningful for almost half.
• More than 70% oppose granting Russian the status of a state language. Nearly 70% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, though about one fifth do.
• Fifty-four percent support banning the St. George ribbon, while over 30% oppose it. In contrast, only one quarter support banning Russian websites, while a majority oppose it.
• About one third of Kyiv residents receive utility subsidies, and another quarter intend to apply. Public opinion is split between keeping subsidies and shifting support toward energy-efficiency assistance.
• Seventy-seven percent use the Internet at least once a week.
  Facebook is used by 61%, VKontakte by 34%, Odnoklassniki by 33%, Twitter by 16%, and Instagram by 13%. People with lower incomes use VKontakte and Odnoklassniki more, while higher-income users prefer Facebook.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group for Focus magazine in May 2017, more than 60% of Ukrainians consider a unitary state structure to be optimal for Ukraine, while 20% support a federal model and 18% are undecided. Support for a unitary system is strongest in Western Ukraine. Among respondents who express distrust toward Russia, one in ten supports a federal structure for Ukraine.
• For 40% of respondents, the visa-free regime with the European Union is personally important, while 55% say it is not important, and 7% are undecided. These figures have changed little since 2016. Visa-free travel is more important for residents of Western Ukraine and for young people, and least important for pensioners.
• Half of Ukrainians believe Ukraine should become a member of the European Union, 12% support joining the Customs Union, and 28% prefer equidistance from both the EU and Russia. One in ten is undecided. Support for EU membership is strongest in the West and among young people. Among those who do not trust the EU, only 15% support EU membership, while 30% favor the Customs Union and 45% prefer neutrality between the EU and Russia.
• If a referendum on NATO membership were held, 43% would vote in favor, 30% against, 13% would not vote, and 14% are undecided. Support for NATO is higher in Western Ukraine and among young people. Even among those who distrust NATO, one in ten would still support joining it.
• In terms of international trust, Ukrainians express the highest trust in Belarus (60%), the European Union and Canada (56% each), and the United Nations (48%). Russia is trusted least (73% do not trust it). Trust in Canada, the EU, NATO, the United States, the OSCE, and the IMF is higher in the West and Center, while Belarus, the CIS, China, and Russia receive more trust in the South and East.
• Nearly 60% support limiting economic relations with Russia, about 30% support maintaining or expanding them, and 15% are undecided. Compared with 2016, support for limiting ties with Russia has slightly increased. Support for maintaining or expanding relations is more common in the East and South, among older people, and among supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc.
• Almost 40% support introducing visas for travel to Russia, about half oppose it, and 10% are undecided. Support for visas has grown somewhat in recent months and is strongest in Western Ukraine, rural areas, among younger people, and among supporters of Svoboda.
• Regarding Donbas, 40% support ending the Anti-Terrorist Operation only after full restoration of Ukrainian control over the entire region. 13% support broader economic and humanitarian autonomy, 18% support federal-style autonomy within Ukraine, 12% support separation, and 18% are undecided. Support for restoring full Ukrainian control is strongest in the Center and West, in rural areas, and among youth.
• 43% oppose the trade blockade of the territories controlled by the so-called DPR/LPR, while 40% support it, and 17% are undecided. Support is highest in Western Ukraine, rural areas, and among young people.
• More than half believe Ukraine should use all possible means to return Crimea, one quarter believe Ukraine should accept its annexation by Russia, and about 20% are undecided. Support for returning Crimea is strongest in the West, rural areas, and among young people.
• 56% say they are superficially familiar with the Minsk Agreements, one third are not familiar, 7% know them well, and 4% are undecided. Awareness is higher in the East, in cities, and among men.
  Almost 30% support revising the Minsk Agreements and signing new ones, 16% support full implementation, 17% favor withdrawing from negotiations, 5% support another option, and one third are undecided. Full implementation is more supported in the East and among voters of For Life and the Opposition Bloc, while revising the agreements is more supported in the West and Center.
• Regarding historical and symbolic holidays, 82% view Victory Day (May 9) as personally meaningful, while 7% see it as outdated. More than 70% view International Women’s Day (March 8) as meaningful, and 50% consider May 1 meaningful. Residents of Western Ukraine, rural populations, and Svoboda voters are more likely to see these holidays as outdated or simply days off.
• Two thirds do not support granting Russian the status of a state language, 30% support it, and 7% are undecided. Support for this has slightly increased and is strongest in the East, South, and in cities.
• One third regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, 53% do not, and 14% are undecided. Regret is most common in the East and South, among women, older people, and voters of For Life and the Opposition Bloc.
• 45% support banning the St. George ribbon, about 40% oppose, and 17% are undecided. Support is strongest in the West and among younger and middle-aged people.
  Nearly 60% oppose banning Russian websites, about 25% support the ban, and 20% are undecided.
• More than half believe church property and parish transitions should be decided by parishioners themselves, while smaller shares assign this role to church leadership, priests, or authorities.
• One third of households own agricultural land, most commonly in the West and among rural residents. Only 11% support free land sales, while 53% believe land should not be a commodity at all.
• Nearly two thirds believe cooperation with the IMF leads to falling living standards and higher prices, while views on whether the IMF helps or harms Ukraine are deeply divided and strongly linked to party affiliation.
• Large majorities oppose raising the retirement age and increasing required years of contributions, but 63% support mandatory sex education in schools.
  Support for restoring the death penalty stands at 38%, while 47% oppose it.
  Only 23% support banning abortions, 18% support legal gun ownership, 14% support legal prostitution, and 6% support legalizing soft drugs.
• Only 6% consider NABU effective in fighting corruption, while 83% believe tougher criminal punishment is the best anti-corruption tool.
• 51% receive utility subsidies, and support for subsidies has grown since 2016. Most believe the current subsidy system is better than energy-efficiency assistance.
• 65% use the internet weekly, and 48% use Facebook, 44% VKontakte, and 43% Odnoklassniki, with strong regional differences.

• According to a Rating Group survey conducted in May 2017, more than 60% of Ukrainians reported that their material situation had worsened over the past year, 30% said it had not changed, and only 6% said it had improved. Another 2% were undecided. More than 60% said they are unable to pay utility bills, while 35% said they can afford them. Almost all respondents (97%) said they feel the impact of rising consumer prices.
• When asked about the causes of the country’s socio-economic situation, 65% blamed the incompetence and corruption of the current authorities, 54% cited the war in the East, 31% the inability of parliament to pass needed laws, and 28% corruption and incompetence of previous governments. In the West, war and the failures of previous authorities are more often blamed; in the South and East, respondents more often blame the current government, parliament, lack of political compromise, external interference, and weak public support for reforms.
• Most Ukrainians describe the country’s condition in strongly negative terms.
  85% believe Ukraine is in a state of chaos, 75% say it is in a state of collapse, while only 44% think it is in a state of change, 21% in development, and 17% in consolidation.
• 52% support dissolving parliament and holding early parliamentary and presidential elections, while nearly 40% oppose this, and 10% are undecided.
• Parliamentary voting intentions: Among those who plan to vote and have decided on a party:
  • Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) – 13.2%
  • BPP Solidarity – 11.3%
  • Opposition Bloc – 10.4%
  • Radical Party – 8.9%
  • For Life – 8.2%
  • Civic Position – 7.6%
  • Self-Reliance (Samopomich) – 7.1%
  • Svoboda – 6.4%
  • UKROP, Agrarian Party, People’s Control – 2.3% each
  • New Forces Movement – 2.2%
  ‍
• If their preferred party did not run, many would shift to Fatherland (5.5%), Self-Reliance, Radical Party, and Svoboda (around 3.7% each), while 45% would be undecided.28.6% say they would never vote for BPP Solidarity, followed by the Opposition Bloc (15.5%), Radical Party (7.3%), and Fatherland (6.5%).
• Presidential race: If presidential elections were held the following Sunday (among decided voters):
  • Yulia Tymoshenko – 15.2%
  • Petro Poroshenko – 11.6%
  • Oleh Liashko – 8.5%
  • Yuriy Boyko – 8.5%
  • Vadym Rabinovych – 7.8%
  • Anatoliy Hrytsenko – 7.2%
  • Andriy Sadovyi – 6.6%
  ‍
• Second-round simulations show Tymoshenko beating Poroshenko (32% vs 24%), Tymoshenko beating Boyko (36% vs 28%), and Tymoshenko beating Liashko (33% vs 21%). Turnout in these scenarios would be low, with around one third saying they would not vote.
• Who can fix the country? Only small minorities believe any politician can:
  • Pull Ukraine out of the economic crisis: Tymoshenko 13%, Rabinovych 9%, Liashko 8%, Poroshenko 7%. One third believe no one can.
  • Stop the war: Poroshenko and Tymoshenko 8% each; 38% say no one can.
  • Unite the country: Tymoshenko 10%, Poroshenko 8%; one third say no one can.
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• Protest potential: 70% believe the current situation could lead to mass nationwide protests similar to 2004 or 2013.
  41% support launching protests immediately, 47% oppose, and 12% are undecided.
  Nearly 40% say they would personally join protests if they began soon. Protest readiness is highest in the West and among supporters of Self-Reliance, the Radical Party, and For Life.
• Land reform: If a referendum were held on lifting the ban on selling agricultural land, about 75% would vote against, 20% in favor, and 7% would abstain or be undecided.
  If land sales were allowed, 40% say they might join protests, while half would not.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from April 21- May 5, 2017. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. Additionally, 1,378 respondents were surveyed in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 64,2%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.

The National Centre for Culture published on its website (www.nck.pl/badania) the report “Ukrainians on History, Culture and Polish–Ukrainian Relations”, prepared by Tomasz Stryjek, Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, and Kamila Zacharuk.
The report presents the results of a study conducted by the National Centre for Culture and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The research was carried out in Ukraine at the end of 2016 and consisted of qualitative and quantitative parts, conducted in parallel. Fieldwork was carried out by the Rating Group (Kyiv, Ukraine).

In the qualitative part of the study the following questions were asked:Given the complexity of the research questions and the rule that one focus-group discussion should not last longer than two hours, the research team decided to conduct two group interviews of different types (“History” and “Culture and Memory Politics”) in each of the four regions of Ukraine (a total of eight focus groups). Each group consisted of 9 to 11 participants.

• What beliefs and assessments do representatives of contemporary Ukrainian humanitarian and creative intelligentsia express regarding the influence of Poland and Poles on the history of Ukraine, the cultural heritage in Ukraine remaining from the period when both countries – partially or entirely – belonged to one state (14th–20th centuries), and the current state of preservation of this heritage?
• How does the contemporary Ukrainian intelligentsia assess the accessibility of Polish culture in Ukraine, and how familiar are its representatives with the activities of specific Polish institutions and programs implemented in this field?
• How does Ukrainian intelligentsia view contemporary Polish and Ukrainian historical policies conducted by these two countries toward each other?

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In the quantitative part, the survey was conducted on a sample of 4,000 respondents, selected to be representative for the four Ukrainian macro-regions (West, Center, South, East) and for the whole country. This sample made it possible to draw conclusions on percentage distributions within each region with accuracy of at least ±3%.

The main research questions of the quantitative part:The full report (available in Polish) presents the results of both parts of the study, starting with the survey findings.

• What does it mean to be Ukrainian, and does this definition include reference to the past?
• Which symbols of the past are important for Ukrainians today?
• What is the attitude of Ukrainians toward selected past events and how much do they participate in maintaining memory of them?
• What do Ukrainians know about the common Polish-Ukrainian past and how do they relate to it?
• How are opinions about current events formed among Ukrainians?
• What influences the perception of the past and to what extent?

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHORS

Conclusions from the quantitative part

Residents of Ukraine most often identify themselves through citizenship – 42% indicated this. Ethnic identification (Ukrainian, Russian, etc.) is relatively popular only in the West, where it is slightly less common than civic identification.

The history of Ukraine is considered very important or important by 83% of respondents; 82% say the same about the history of their region. Only 51% consider the history of the USSR important.

Participation in memory-preserving activities (anniversaries, visits to memorial sites) is low, despite the high declared importance of history.

Main sources of historical knowledge:

• Family and relatives – 40%
• School – 38%
• Books – 36%
• Films – 29%
• Ukrainian TV – 25%
• Internet – 24%

The most watched historical films concern World War II:

• Iron Hundred (2004) – 55%
• White Bird with a Black Mark (1970) – 49%
• Haytarma (2013) – 48%

Highest positive evaluations among 22 historical figures:

• Taras Shevchenko – 92%
• Bohdan Khmelnytsky – 84%
• Yaroslav the Wise – 83%
• Volodymyr the Great – 82%
• Mykhailo Hrushevsky – 75%
• Viacheslav Chornovil – 65%

Most negative evaluations:

• Stalin – 78%
• Lenin – 59%
• Gorbachev – 53%
• Catherine II – 51%
• Khrushchev – 43%
• Bandera – 40% (36% positive, 19% neutral, 4% unknown)

52% believe the Khmelnytsky uprising (1648) was a struggle for Ukrainian independence.
63% describe the Holodomor as genocide committed by the Soviet authorities against Ukrainians.

48% chose only positive characteristics of OUN, 22% only negative.
51% chose only positive characteristics of UPA, 6% only negative.

34% believe the collapse of the USSR brought more losses than benefits; 29% think the opposite.

Most important holidays:

• Victory Day (9 May) – 39%
• Independence Day (24 August) – 30%

58% consider decommunization unnecessary; 34% consider it necessary.

Among 10 countries, Poland ranks second after Russia in how important history is for relations:

• Russia – 70%
• Poland – 67%

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Conclusions from the qualitative part

Perceptions of Poland’s role in Ukrainian history are ambivalent. Poland is seen both as a carrier of Western civilization and as a power that limited Ukrainian political and cultural emancipation before 1939.

Regional differences do not support the idea of “two” or “four” Ukraines in memory or identity. The only clear pattern is that critical views of Poland are strongest in the West and decrease eastward and southward.

The war in Donbas has led to greater social consolidation. Many respondents believe weak or unclear memory policy contributed to the loss of Crimea and Donbas.

Key events in Ukrainian–Polish memory:

1. Cossack–Polish conflicts
2. 1918–1921 struggle and cooperation
3. Volhynia and Eastern Galicia 1943–44 and Operation Vistula
4. WWII repression by Nazis and USSR
5. Poland’s support of Ukraine after 1991

Polish focus on Volhynia is perceived as one-sided and dismissive of Polish responsibility before 1939.

Ukrainians do not have a clear image of responsibility for Volhynia, including the role of UPA. The Polish parliament’s 2016 classification of UPA actions as genocide is widely perceived as imposed.

Respondents see medieval, 19th-century, and post-1991 periods as mostly positive for Polish-Ukrainian relations and believe Poland should focus more on these periods.

Since the Maidan, civil society has grown strongly, and Polish-Ukrainian cooperation now happens mostly through NGOs, humanitarian aid, culture, and youth work.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 30% of Ukrainians trust Anatolii Hrytsenko. Nearly one in five trust Yuliia Tymoshenko, Andrii Sadovyi, Vadym Rabinovych, and Oleh Liashko. 16–17% trust Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Yurii Boiko, while 13–14% trust Mykola Katerynchuk, Oleh Tiahnybok, Dmytro Dobrodomov, Volodymyr Groysman, Mikheil Saakashvili, Yurii Lutsenko, and Andrii Parubii. 11% trust Nadiia Savchenko.
• If parliamentary elections were held in the near future, 13.9% of those who intend to vote and have decided on a party would vote for Batkivshchyna. 10.4% would support the Opposition Bloc, 10.2% would vote for BPP Solidarity, 9.5% for the Radical Party, and 9.2% for the party “For Life.” 7.7% would choose Civic Position, 7.1% Samopomich, 6.6% Svoboda, and 2% each People’s Control and UKROP. Other parties have support below 2%.
• If a presidential election were held next Sunday, 15% of decided voters would vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko. 12% would support Petro Poroshenko, 10.2% Yurii Boiko, 10.1% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Vadym Rabinovych, 9.6% Oleh Liashko, 7.6% Andrii Sadovyi, and 4.8% Oleh Tiahnybok. All other candidates have support below 2%.
• 76% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the wrong direction, 13% think they are going in the right direction, and 10% are undecided. People in the West and young respondents are more likely to assess the situation positively.
• More than half of respondents (53%) consider the military conflict in eastern Ukraine to be the most important problem. More than 45% are concerned about low wages or pensions and rising utility tariffs. More than one third see price increases and inflation as major problems. About a quarter also cite bribery and corruption in government and unemployment.
• Over the last two years, the importance of problems such as low wages/pensions, rising prices, and corruption in central government has increased. At the same time, the perceived importance of utility tariff increases has significantly declined (from 70% to 45%). In the West, people are more concerned about the war in Donbas and corruption in central government, while in the South and East people are more concerned about low incomes, rising prices, and utility costs.
• Half of respondents support the idea of dissolving parliament and holding new parliamentary elections, 37% do not support it, and 13% are undecided. Support for early parliamentary elections has remained almost unchanged over the past year. Support is highest among voters of the Opposition Bloc and Batkivshchyna, and lowest among supporters of BPP Solidarity.
• 54% say they are not ready to personally defend their rights and interests by participating in protests, while 36% are ready to do so and 10% are undecided. Readiness to protest is higher in the West and Center, and among young and middle-aged people.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in May 2017, only 9% of respondents believe that the quality of public medical services has improved over the last two years. At the same time, half say the situation has worsened, one third believe it has remained the same, and 11% were unable to answer.
• Among the latest government initiatives in healthcare reform, respondents most strongly support reimbursement of the cost of medicines for diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular diseases (88%) and the introduction of control over public funds used for the construction of the Okhmatdyt diagnostic complex (80%).
• About two thirds of respondents support the introduction of reference pricing for medicines, the creation of Public Health Centers for disease prevention and promotion of healthy lifestyles, mandatory medical insurance for all citizens, and subsidies for medical services for internally displaced persons from Donbas and Crimea.
• More than half support the introduction of standardized protocols based on “evidence-based medicine” for the treatment of all diseases and an increase in doctors’ salaries by at least 30% through contracts between patients and doctors. 41% support contracts between doctors and patients with a guaranteed price for treatment.
• Over the last two months, support has slightly increased for almost all initiatives, except for mandatory medical insurance, contracts between patients and doctors, and strict control over public funds.
• 90% support the idea that medical care should be provided to everyone regardless of their financial situation. Around 80% agree that public budget funds should “follow the patient” and be paid to doctors only for actually provided services, rather than depend on the size of hospitals or number of beds, and that charitable donations for medical care should not be taxed. The same share supports creating a special state fund for financing treatment of ATO veterans and priority state funding for their medical needs.
• 75% support making information on charitable medical donations by public officials public in electronic declarations, as well as tax benefits for enterprises that pay for their employees’ health insurance.
• 70% support a cost-sharing model for treatment where 70% is paid by the state and 30% (or less) by the patient.
• 60% support the idea that hospitals and medical institutions should have more self-governance in making decisions that affect patient care. Half approve granting medical workers the right to operate as entrepreneurs and pay lower taxes. 43% support the statement that the state may refuse to pay for treatment if a person neglects their health.
• 77% support introducing a mechanism that allows individuals to contact a pharmaceutical regulatory agency to verify the quality of their medicines, 9% do not support it, and 13% are undecided. Support for this mechanism is higher in the West, South, and Center than in the East.
• Half of respondents believe that medical workers convicted by a court for demanding bribes should be banned from working in medicine; 15% think they should be banned from public institutions but allowed to work privately; 21% think paying a fine is sufficient; 3% think there should be no punishment; 11% are undecided. Support for a full ban is lower in the South, and those who have medical professionals in their family are less inclined to support bans.
• Nearly half of respondents said that the Ministry of Health is important to them personally and to their families. 40% said it has no significance for them. The Ministry is considered most important in the South and least important in the East. It matters more to older respondents than to younger ones.

 The Third In-Depth Look at Ukrainian Local Governance

This annual survey provides an extensivelook at citizen attitudes about local governance and municipal services.

Polling was conducted in the 22 regional capitals of Ukraine not under the control of Russian or Russian-backed forces, as well as in the cities of Mariupol and Severodonetskin the Donbas region.The survey is based on a sample size of more than 19,000 respondents.

The findings will inform future discussions on decentralization, anti-corruption initiatives and other reforms set forth by the pro-European government in Kyiv.

Third Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey from Ratinggroup

• The leader of the trust rating among national politicians in Ternopil is Anatolii Hrytsenko. He is trusted by 40% of respondents and not trusted by 52%. He is the only politician on the list whose level of trust has increased compared to last year; for all others it has declined.
  Andriy Sadovyi is trusted by 28% and not trusted by 66%; Oleh Tiahnybok — 28% trust, 68% distrust; Yuliia Tymoshenko — 25% and 72% respectively; Andrii Parubii — 21% and 80%; Oleh Liashko — 21% and 77%; Petro Poroshenko — 20% and 77%; Mikheil Saakashvili — 18% and 74%; Volodymyr Groysman — 16% and 78%; Yurii Boyko is trusted by only 2% and distrusted by 78%.
  Arsenii Yatseniuk is the leader of the distrust rating among Ternopil residents (87% do not trust him, 9% do).
• The leader of the party rating is Svoboda. 13.3% of those who intend to vote are ready to support it. 11.7% support Batkivshchyna, 10.8% support BPP Solidarity, 9.6% support Civic Position, 8.9% support Samopomich, and 8.2% support the Radical Party. Ratings of other parties are below 3%. 19% are undecided. 73% of respondents say they are ready to participate in parliamentary elections.
• The leader of the presidential race in Ternopil is Yuliia Tymoshenko. 14.5% of those who intend to vote are ready to support her. Petro Poroshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko each have 12%, Oleh Liashko and Oleh Tiahnybok — 8.8% each, Andrii Sadovyi — 8.4%, Dmytro Yarosh — 4.4%, Arsenii Yatseniuk — 3.1%, Yurii Boyko — slightly less than 1%, and Serhii Tihipko — about 0.5%. 7% are ready to vote for another candidate. Nearly 20% are undecided.
• Svoboda is the clear leader in elections to the Ternopil City Council. 21.8% of those who would participate in voting are ready to support it. 9.8% would vote for Batkivshchyna, 8.6% for Civic Position, 7.9% for Samopomich, 6.6% for BPP Solidarity, and 6.0% for the Radical Party. Other parties score below 3%. 27.6% of voters are undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, only 24% of Ukrainians consider themselves gambling-prone people, while 75% say this trait is not characteristic of them. Gambling-prone respondents are more common among urban residents, men, younger people, the employed, and the more educated.
• 46% of respondents have a positive attitude toward gambling that does not involve money or winnings. The most favorable attitudes toward this type of entertainment are found in the South. Urban residents, men, younger respondents, and wealthier people are also more supportive. By contrast, only 11% have a positive attitude toward gambling for money. In general, the higher the level of education and income, the more positive the attitude toward such activities.
• More than 70% believe that gambling can lead to addiction, and another one in five rather agrees with this view. At the same time, only 2–4% said that they personally or their relatives had experienced such addiction.
• 74% of respondents believe that responsibility for gambling addiction lies primarily with the individual, while 22% say it should lie with the organizers of gambling activities.
• 67% believe that an adult has the right to gamble for money, while 27% hold the opposite view. Men, urban residents, younger people, the more educated, and wealthier respondents are more convinced that an adult should be free to decide whether to gamble.
• Among gambling activities, respondents are most favorable toward lotteries: 32% support them, while 60% do not. 17% view bookmaker betting positively, 76% negatively. 13% have a positive view of casinos and 83% a negative one. For online casinos, 8% are positive and 86% negative; for card games for money, 8% positive and 88% negative; for slot machines, 7% positive and 91% negative. Older respondents and those with lower incomes are more negative toward all forms of gambling.
• 83% said they had not gambled for money in the past five years, while 17% had done so at least once. Gambling is somewhat more common among urban residents, men, younger people, and the better-off. Among those who consider themselves gambling-prone, almost half had gambled for money.
• Among money-based games played over the last five years, lotteries were mentioned most often (23%). 8% had placed bets with bookmakers, 8% had played slot machines, 7% had played cards for money, 4% had used online casinos, and 3% had played in casinos. Younger and wealthier respondents played more frequently.
• Asked whether they would like to gamble for money in the future, respondents most often chose lotteries (21%). 9% would like to place bets with bookmakers, 8% to play in casinos, 6% to play cards for money, 5% to use slot machines, and 5% to play online casinos. Younger and wealthier respondents expressed greater interest.
• 87% know that gambling is banned in Ukraine, while 13% do not. 73% support the ban, while 22% do not. Support is higher among older people, women, and those with lower incomes.
• At the same time, assessments of the ban’s consequences differ sharply from support for it. Only 17% believe the ban has been successful, while 71% say it has been rather or completely unsuccessful. 79% believe the ban pushed gambling into the shadow economy, 57% say it reduced state and local budget revenues, and 43% believe it reduced employment (almost the same share think it did not). Nearly half believe the ban did not reduce the number of people who spend money on gambling, and 57% say it did not reduce gambling addiction.
• When asked which forms of gambling could be allowed in Ukraine, 58% said lotteries, 25% bookmakers, 18% casinos, 11% online casinos, 9% slot machines, and 7% card games for money. At the same time, one third believe that none of these should be allowed. Younger and wealthier respondents are more tolerant of legalization.
• 45% believe there are no advantages to legalizing gambling. 38% say legalization could bring additional tax revenue, about 20% think it could reduce corruption or create jobs, and 12% believe it could attract foreign tourists or stimulate entrepreneurship.
• 34% say legalization should be allowed only in special gambling zones (like Las Vegas), 29% through strict penalties and license revocation, 22% only in luxury hotels, and 21% with mandatory bans for addicted players. Only 8% support legalization with minimal restrictions, while 36% believe legalization is unacceptable under any conditions.
• A quarter of respondents believe only Ukrainian companies should be allowed to operate if gambling is legalized; 7% would allow companies from the EU, 2% from the USA, and less than 1% from Russia. 20% would allow companies from any country, while 40% would allow none at all.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in February 2017, respondents most strongly agree with the statement that “Money is freedom and a sense of security” (index 1.9). They agree somewhat less with “Money is status and power” (index 1.7) and “Money should be saved and controlled” (index 1.4), and much less with “Money is image and respect” (index 0.5). Respondents disagree with the statement “Money is evil” (index –0.8).
• An absolute majority agree that money is important (90%), that having savings makes people feel safer (87%), that money is good (85%), and that money gives freedom and independence (79%). 82% agree that money is a symbol of status in modern society, 80% say money is power, and just over 70% believe that with money one can achieve anything.
• A large majority (74%) say they spend money carefully and plan expenses thoroughly. 64% believe that time is money (almost one quarter are undecided on this). Two thirds of respondents value money very highly, and slightly fewer (61%) believe money allows them to be who they want to be.
• Almost half believe that money makes people around them respect them, while one third disagree. 46% say that money is the most important thing in their lives, and almost as many (41%) disagree. 40% think money helps to make many friends, while slightly more (43%) do not believe this.
• One third (32%) believe that money is the root of all evil, while almost half (48%) disagree. Only 27% say that money is evil, while 52% disagree. 16% believe money is indecent, while 68% do not.
• The strongest support was for the statements that savings provide security and that money is important, while the weakest support was for the idea that money is indecent.
• The idea that money is status and power is most strongly supported in the East and least in the West. Residents of the East and Center are more likely to agree that money should be saved and controlled. In the West, support is lowest for the views that money is freedom and security and money is image and respect, but this region also has the fewest people who disagree that money is evil.
• Younger respondents are three times more likely than older ones to believe that money is image and respect, while older people are twice as likely to agree that money is evil. The belief that money should be saved and controlled is more typical of older people.
• Women are more inclined than men to think that money should be saved and controlled, and less likely to think that money gives image and respect. Both men and women equally believe that money is freedom and security.
• The wealthier people are, the less they believe that money should be saved and controlled, and the more they agree that money gives status, power, image, and freedom. The poorest respondents are twice as likely to agree that money is evil and least likely to agree that money brings image and respect.
• More than half (54%) believe that being poor is not shameful, while 31% think it is. A large majority (72%) believe that being rich is not shameful.
• In the East, people most strongly support the ideas that being poor is shameful and being rich is not. The older respondents are, the more likely they are to see poverty as shameful and the less likely they are to think wealth is shameful. Men are slightly more likely than women to feel shame about both poverty and wealth.
• 40% would like to be seen as rich, 41% would not, and 19% are undecided. The fewest people who want to appear rich are in the East, but this region also has the highest share of undecided respondents. Urban residents and men are somewhat more likely to want to be seen as rich than rural residents and women. The younger and wealthier people are, the more they want to appear rich.
• 52% agree that rich people can be successful and effective politicians, one third disagree, and 16% are undecided. This view is most common in the East and West and least common in the South. Younger, more educated, and wealthier respondents are more likely to agree.
• People feel most comfortable communicating with others of similar income (92%), somewhat less comfortable with poorer people (84%), and least comfortable with richer people (65%). Residents of the East are relatively less comfortable communicating with both poorer and richer people. In the Center, people are most relaxed about interacting with wealthier individuals.
• Only 14% say their income is sufficient, 27% say it is rather insufficient, and 56% say it is definitely insufficient. An overwhelming 89% would like to earn more. People in the West are somewhat more likely than others to say their income is sufficient. Older, wealthier, and male respondents are more likely to feel their income is enough.
• Most respondents (62%) believe the optimal workday is 8 hours, 27% prefer a shorter day (6–7 hours), and only 2% would work 10 hours or more. Support for a shorter workday is higher in the West and Center, among rural residents, women, younger people, and the more educated. Interestingly, poorer people support a shorter workday more than the wealthier.
• More than half (56%) are willing to work longer hours to earn extra money, while 32% are not. This willingness is highest in the West and lowest in the East, and is more common among younger, wealthier, and male respondents.