Press releases

The National Centre for Culture published on its website (www.nck.pl/badania) the report “Ukrainians on History, Culture and Polish–Ukrainian Relations”, prepared by Tomasz Stryjek, Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, and Kamila Zacharuk.
The report presents the results of a study conducted by the National Centre for Culture and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The research was carried out in Ukraine at the end of 2016 and consisted of qualitative and quantitative parts, conducted in parallel. Fieldwork was carried out by the Rating Group (Kyiv, Ukraine).

In the qualitative part of the study the following questions were asked:Given the complexity of the research questions and the rule that one focus-group discussion should not last longer than two hours, the research team decided to conduct two group interviews of different types (“History” and “Culture and Memory Politics”) in each of the four regions of Ukraine (a total of eight focus groups). Each group consisted of 9 to 11 participants.

• What beliefs and assessments do representatives of contemporary Ukrainian humanitarian and creative intelligentsia express regarding the influence of Poland and Poles on the history of Ukraine, the cultural heritage in Ukraine remaining from the period when both countries – partially or entirely – belonged to one state (14th–20th centuries), and the current state of preservation of this heritage?
• How does the contemporary Ukrainian intelligentsia assess the accessibility of Polish culture in Ukraine, and how familiar are its representatives with the activities of specific Polish institutions and programs implemented in this field?
• How does Ukrainian intelligentsia view contemporary Polish and Ukrainian historical policies conducted by these two countries toward each other?

‍

In the quantitative part, the survey was conducted on a sample of 4,000 respondents, selected to be representative for the four Ukrainian macro-regions (West, Center, South, East) and for the whole country. This sample made it possible to draw conclusions on percentage distributions within each region with accuracy of at least ±3%.

The main research questions of the quantitative part:The full report (available in Polish) presents the results of both parts of the study, starting with the survey findings.

• What does it mean to be Ukrainian, and does this definition include reference to the past?
• Which symbols of the past are important for Ukrainians today?
• What is the attitude of Ukrainians toward selected past events and how much do they participate in maintaining memory of them?
• What do Ukrainians know about the common Polish-Ukrainian past and how do they relate to it?
• How are opinions about current events formed among Ukrainians?
• What influences the perception of the past and to what extent?

‍

MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHORS

Conclusions from the quantitative part

Residents of Ukraine most often identify themselves through citizenship – 42% indicated this. Ethnic identification (Ukrainian, Russian, etc.) is relatively popular only in the West, where it is slightly less common than civic identification.

The history of Ukraine is considered very important or important by 83% of respondents; 82% say the same about the history of their region. Only 51% consider the history of the USSR important.

Participation in memory-preserving activities (anniversaries, visits to memorial sites) is low, despite the high declared importance of history.

Main sources of historical knowledge:

• Family and relatives – 40%
• School – 38%
• Books – 36%
• Films – 29%
• Ukrainian TV – 25%
• Internet – 24%

The most watched historical films concern World War II:

• Iron Hundred (2004) – 55%
• White Bird with a Black Mark (1970) – 49%
• Haytarma (2013) – 48%

Highest positive evaluations among 22 historical figures:

• Taras Shevchenko – 92%
• Bohdan Khmelnytsky – 84%
• Yaroslav the Wise – 83%
• Volodymyr the Great – 82%
• Mykhailo Hrushevsky – 75%
• Viacheslav Chornovil – 65%

Most negative evaluations:

• Stalin – 78%
• Lenin – 59%
• Gorbachev – 53%
• Catherine II – 51%
• Khrushchev – 43%
• Bandera – 40% (36% positive, 19% neutral, 4% unknown)

52% believe the Khmelnytsky uprising (1648) was a struggle for Ukrainian independence.
63% describe the Holodomor as genocide committed by the Soviet authorities against Ukrainians.

48% chose only positive characteristics of OUN, 22% only negative.
51% chose only positive characteristics of UPA, 6% only negative.

34% believe the collapse of the USSR brought more losses than benefits; 29% think the opposite.

Most important holidays:

• Victory Day (9 May) – 39%
• Independence Day (24 August) – 30%

58% consider decommunization unnecessary; 34% consider it necessary.

Among 10 countries, Poland ranks second after Russia in how important history is for relations:

• Russia – 70%
• Poland – 67%

‍

Conclusions from the qualitative part

Perceptions of Poland’s role in Ukrainian history are ambivalent. Poland is seen both as a carrier of Western civilization and as a power that limited Ukrainian political and cultural emancipation before 1939.

Regional differences do not support the idea of “two” or “four” Ukraines in memory or identity. The only clear pattern is that critical views of Poland are strongest in the West and decrease eastward and southward.

The war in Donbas has led to greater social consolidation. Many respondents believe weak or unclear memory policy contributed to the loss of Crimea and Donbas.

Key events in Ukrainian–Polish memory:

1. Cossack–Polish conflicts
2. 1918–1921 struggle and cooperation
3. Volhynia and Eastern Galicia 1943–44 and Operation Vistula
4. WWII repression by Nazis and USSR
5. Poland’s support of Ukraine after 1991

Polish focus on Volhynia is perceived as one-sided and dismissive of Polish responsibility before 1939.

Ukrainians do not have a clear image of responsibility for Volhynia, including the role of UPA. The Polish parliament’s 2016 classification of UPA actions as genocide is widely perceived as imposed.

Respondents see medieval, 19th-century, and post-1991 periods as mostly positive for Polish-Ukrainian relations and believe Poland should focus more on these periods.

Since the Maidan, civil society has grown strongly, and Polish-Ukrainian cooperation now happens mostly through NGOs, humanitarian aid, culture, and youth work.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 30% of Ukrainians trust Anatolii Hrytsenko. Nearly one in five trust Yuliia Tymoshenko, Andrii Sadovyi, Vadym Rabinovych, and Oleh Liashko. 16–17% trust Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Yurii Boiko, while 13–14% trust Mykola Katerynchuk, Oleh Tiahnybok, Dmytro Dobrodomov, Volodymyr Groysman, Mikheil Saakashvili, Yurii Lutsenko, and Andrii Parubii. 11% trust Nadiia Savchenko.
• If parliamentary elections were held in the near future, 13.9% of those who intend to vote and have decided on a party would vote for Batkivshchyna. 10.4% would support the Opposition Bloc, 10.2% would vote for BPP Solidarity, 9.5% for the Radical Party, and 9.2% for the party “For Life.” 7.7% would choose Civic Position, 7.1% Samopomich, 6.6% Svoboda, and 2% each People’s Control and UKROP. Other parties have support below 2%.
• If a presidential election were held next Sunday, 15% of decided voters would vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko. 12% would support Petro Poroshenko, 10.2% Yurii Boiko, 10.1% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Vadym Rabinovych, 9.6% Oleh Liashko, 7.6% Andrii Sadovyi, and 4.8% Oleh Tiahnybok. All other candidates have support below 2%.
• 76% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the wrong direction, 13% think they are going in the right direction, and 10% are undecided. People in the West and young respondents are more likely to assess the situation positively.
• More than half of respondents (53%) consider the military conflict in eastern Ukraine to be the most important problem. More than 45% are concerned about low wages or pensions and rising utility tariffs. More than one third see price increases and inflation as major problems. About a quarter also cite bribery and corruption in government and unemployment.
• Over the last two years, the importance of problems such as low wages/pensions, rising prices, and corruption in central government has increased. At the same time, the perceived importance of utility tariff increases has significantly declined (from 70% to 45%). In the West, people are more concerned about the war in Donbas and corruption in central government, while in the South and East people are more concerned about low incomes, rising prices, and utility costs.
• Half of respondents support the idea of dissolving parliament and holding new parliamentary elections, 37% do not support it, and 13% are undecided. Support for early parliamentary elections has remained almost unchanged over the past year. Support is highest among voters of the Opposition Bloc and Batkivshchyna, and lowest among supporters of BPP Solidarity.
• 54% say they are not ready to personally defend their rights and interests by participating in protests, while 36% are ready to do so and 10% are undecided. Readiness to protest is higher in the West and Center, and among young and middle-aged people.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in May 2017, only 9% of respondents believe that the quality of public medical services has improved over the last two years. At the same time, half say the situation has worsened, one third believe it has remained the same, and 11% were unable to answer.
• Among the latest government initiatives in healthcare reform, respondents most strongly support reimbursement of the cost of medicines for diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular diseases (88%) and the introduction of control over public funds used for the construction of the Okhmatdyt diagnostic complex (80%).
• About two thirds of respondents support the introduction of reference pricing for medicines, the creation of Public Health Centers for disease prevention and promotion of healthy lifestyles, mandatory medical insurance for all citizens, and subsidies for medical services for internally displaced persons from Donbas and Crimea.
• More than half support the introduction of standardized protocols based on “evidence-based medicine” for the treatment of all diseases and an increase in doctors’ salaries by at least 30% through contracts between patients and doctors. 41% support contracts between doctors and patients with a guaranteed price for treatment.
• Over the last two months, support has slightly increased for almost all initiatives, except for mandatory medical insurance, contracts between patients and doctors, and strict control over public funds.
• 90% support the idea that medical care should be provided to everyone regardless of their financial situation. Around 80% agree that public budget funds should “follow the patient” and be paid to doctors only for actually provided services, rather than depend on the size of hospitals or number of beds, and that charitable donations for medical care should not be taxed. The same share supports creating a special state fund for financing treatment of ATO veterans and priority state funding for their medical needs.
• 75% support making information on charitable medical donations by public officials public in electronic declarations, as well as tax benefits for enterprises that pay for their employees’ health insurance.
• 70% support a cost-sharing model for treatment where 70% is paid by the state and 30% (or less) by the patient.
• 60% support the idea that hospitals and medical institutions should have more self-governance in making decisions that affect patient care. Half approve granting medical workers the right to operate as entrepreneurs and pay lower taxes. 43% support the statement that the state may refuse to pay for treatment if a person neglects their health.
• 77% support introducing a mechanism that allows individuals to contact a pharmaceutical regulatory agency to verify the quality of their medicines, 9% do not support it, and 13% are undecided. Support for this mechanism is higher in the West, South, and Center than in the East.
• Half of respondents believe that medical workers convicted by a court for demanding bribes should be banned from working in medicine; 15% think they should be banned from public institutions but allowed to work privately; 21% think paying a fine is sufficient; 3% think there should be no punishment; 11% are undecided. Support for a full ban is lower in the South, and those who have medical professionals in their family are less inclined to support bans.
• Nearly half of respondents said that the Ministry of Health is important to them personally and to their families. 40% said it has no significance for them. The Ministry is considered most important in the South and least important in the East. It matters more to older respondents than to younger ones.

 The Third In-Depth Look at Ukrainian Local Governance

This annual survey provides an extensivelook at citizen attitudes about local governance and municipal services.

Polling was conducted in the 22 regional capitals of Ukraine not under the control of Russian or Russian-backed forces, as well as in the cities of Mariupol and Severodonetskin the Donbas region.The survey is based on a sample size of more than 19,000 respondents.

The findings will inform future discussions on decentralization, anti-corruption initiatives and other reforms set forth by the pro-European government in Kyiv.

Third Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey from Ratinggroup

• The leader of the trust rating among national politicians in Ternopil is Anatolii Hrytsenko. He is trusted by 40% of respondents and not trusted by 52%. He is the only politician on the list whose level of trust has increased compared to last year; for all others it has declined.
  Andriy Sadovyi is trusted by 28% and not trusted by 66%; Oleh Tiahnybok — 28% trust, 68% distrust; Yuliia Tymoshenko — 25% and 72% respectively; Andrii Parubii — 21% and 80%; Oleh Liashko — 21% and 77%; Petro Poroshenko — 20% and 77%; Mikheil Saakashvili — 18% and 74%; Volodymyr Groysman — 16% and 78%; Yurii Boyko is trusted by only 2% and distrusted by 78%.
  Arsenii Yatseniuk is the leader of the distrust rating among Ternopil residents (87% do not trust him, 9% do).
• The leader of the party rating is Svoboda. 13.3% of those who intend to vote are ready to support it. 11.7% support Batkivshchyna, 10.8% support BPP Solidarity, 9.6% support Civic Position, 8.9% support Samopomich, and 8.2% support the Radical Party. Ratings of other parties are below 3%. 19% are undecided. 73% of respondents say they are ready to participate in parliamentary elections.
• The leader of the presidential race in Ternopil is Yuliia Tymoshenko. 14.5% of those who intend to vote are ready to support her. Petro Poroshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko each have 12%, Oleh Liashko and Oleh Tiahnybok — 8.8% each, Andrii Sadovyi — 8.4%, Dmytro Yarosh — 4.4%, Arsenii Yatseniuk — 3.1%, Yurii Boyko — slightly less than 1%, and Serhii Tihipko — about 0.5%. 7% are ready to vote for another candidate. Nearly 20% are undecided.
• Svoboda is the clear leader in elections to the Ternopil City Council. 21.8% of those who would participate in voting are ready to support it. 9.8% would vote for Batkivshchyna, 8.6% for Civic Position, 7.9% for Samopomich, 6.6% for BPP Solidarity, and 6.0% for the Radical Party. Other parties score below 3%. 27.6% of voters are undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, only 24% of Ukrainians consider themselves gambling-prone people, while 75% say this trait is not characteristic of them. Gambling-prone respondents are more common among urban residents, men, younger people, the employed, and the more educated.
• 46% of respondents have a positive attitude toward gambling that does not involve money or winnings. The most favorable attitudes toward this type of entertainment are found in the South. Urban residents, men, younger respondents, and wealthier people are also more supportive. By contrast, only 11% have a positive attitude toward gambling for money. In general, the higher the level of education and income, the more positive the attitude toward such activities.
• More than 70% believe that gambling can lead to addiction, and another one in five rather agrees with this view. At the same time, only 2–4% said that they personally or their relatives had experienced such addiction.
• 74% of respondents believe that responsibility for gambling addiction lies primarily with the individual, while 22% say it should lie with the organizers of gambling activities.
• 67% believe that an adult has the right to gamble for money, while 27% hold the opposite view. Men, urban residents, younger people, the more educated, and wealthier respondents are more convinced that an adult should be free to decide whether to gamble.
• Among gambling activities, respondents are most favorable toward lotteries: 32% support them, while 60% do not. 17% view bookmaker betting positively, 76% negatively. 13% have a positive view of casinos and 83% a negative one. For online casinos, 8% are positive and 86% negative; for card games for money, 8% positive and 88% negative; for slot machines, 7% positive and 91% negative. Older respondents and those with lower incomes are more negative toward all forms of gambling.
• 83% said they had not gambled for money in the past five years, while 17% had done so at least once. Gambling is somewhat more common among urban residents, men, younger people, and the better-off. Among those who consider themselves gambling-prone, almost half had gambled for money.
• Among money-based games played over the last five years, lotteries were mentioned most often (23%). 8% had placed bets with bookmakers, 8% had played slot machines, 7% had played cards for money, 4% had used online casinos, and 3% had played in casinos. Younger and wealthier respondents played more frequently.
• Asked whether they would like to gamble for money in the future, respondents most often chose lotteries (21%). 9% would like to place bets with bookmakers, 8% to play in casinos, 6% to play cards for money, 5% to use slot machines, and 5% to play online casinos. Younger and wealthier respondents expressed greater interest.
• 87% know that gambling is banned in Ukraine, while 13% do not. 73% support the ban, while 22% do not. Support is higher among older people, women, and those with lower incomes.
• At the same time, assessments of the ban’s consequences differ sharply from support for it. Only 17% believe the ban has been successful, while 71% say it has been rather or completely unsuccessful. 79% believe the ban pushed gambling into the shadow economy, 57% say it reduced state and local budget revenues, and 43% believe it reduced employment (almost the same share think it did not). Nearly half believe the ban did not reduce the number of people who spend money on gambling, and 57% say it did not reduce gambling addiction.
• When asked which forms of gambling could be allowed in Ukraine, 58% said lotteries, 25% bookmakers, 18% casinos, 11% online casinos, 9% slot machines, and 7% card games for money. At the same time, one third believe that none of these should be allowed. Younger and wealthier respondents are more tolerant of legalization.
• 45% believe there are no advantages to legalizing gambling. 38% say legalization could bring additional tax revenue, about 20% think it could reduce corruption or create jobs, and 12% believe it could attract foreign tourists or stimulate entrepreneurship.
• 34% say legalization should be allowed only in special gambling zones (like Las Vegas), 29% through strict penalties and license revocation, 22% only in luxury hotels, and 21% with mandatory bans for addicted players. Only 8% support legalization with minimal restrictions, while 36% believe legalization is unacceptable under any conditions.
• A quarter of respondents believe only Ukrainian companies should be allowed to operate if gambling is legalized; 7% would allow companies from the EU, 2% from the USA, and less than 1% from Russia. 20% would allow companies from any country, while 40% would allow none at all.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in February 2017, respondents most strongly agree with the statement that “Money is freedom and a sense of security” (index 1.9). They agree somewhat less with “Money is status and power” (index 1.7) and “Money should be saved and controlled” (index 1.4), and much less with “Money is image and respect” (index 0.5). Respondents disagree with the statement “Money is evil” (index –0.8).
• An absolute majority agree that money is important (90%), that having savings makes people feel safer (87%), that money is good (85%), and that money gives freedom and independence (79%). 82% agree that money is a symbol of status in modern society, 80% say money is power, and just over 70% believe that with money one can achieve anything.
• A large majority (74%) say they spend money carefully and plan expenses thoroughly. 64% believe that time is money (almost one quarter are undecided on this). Two thirds of respondents value money very highly, and slightly fewer (61%) believe money allows them to be who they want to be.
• Almost half believe that money makes people around them respect them, while one third disagree. 46% say that money is the most important thing in their lives, and almost as many (41%) disagree. 40% think money helps to make many friends, while slightly more (43%) do not believe this.
• One third (32%) believe that money is the root of all evil, while almost half (48%) disagree. Only 27% say that money is evil, while 52% disagree. 16% believe money is indecent, while 68% do not.
• The strongest support was for the statements that savings provide security and that money is important, while the weakest support was for the idea that money is indecent.
• The idea that money is status and power is most strongly supported in the East and least in the West. Residents of the East and Center are more likely to agree that money should be saved and controlled. In the West, support is lowest for the views that money is freedom and security and money is image and respect, but this region also has the fewest people who disagree that money is evil.
• Younger respondents are three times more likely than older ones to believe that money is image and respect, while older people are twice as likely to agree that money is evil. The belief that money should be saved and controlled is more typical of older people.
• Women are more inclined than men to think that money should be saved and controlled, and less likely to think that money gives image and respect. Both men and women equally believe that money is freedom and security.
• The wealthier people are, the less they believe that money should be saved and controlled, and the more they agree that money gives status, power, image, and freedom. The poorest respondents are twice as likely to agree that money is evil and least likely to agree that money brings image and respect.
• More than half (54%) believe that being poor is not shameful, while 31% think it is. A large majority (72%) believe that being rich is not shameful.
• In the East, people most strongly support the ideas that being poor is shameful and being rich is not. The older respondents are, the more likely they are to see poverty as shameful and the less likely they are to think wealth is shameful. Men are slightly more likely than women to feel shame about both poverty and wealth.
• 40% would like to be seen as rich, 41% would not, and 19% are undecided. The fewest people who want to appear rich are in the East, but this region also has the highest share of undecided respondents. Urban residents and men are somewhat more likely to want to be seen as rich than rural residents and women. The younger and wealthier people are, the more they want to appear rich.
• 52% agree that rich people can be successful and effective politicians, one third disagree, and 16% are undecided. This view is most common in the East and West and least common in the South. Younger, more educated, and wealthier respondents are more likely to agree.
• People feel most comfortable communicating with others of similar income (92%), somewhat less comfortable with poorer people (84%), and least comfortable with richer people (65%). Residents of the East are relatively less comfortable communicating with both poorer and richer people. In the Center, people are most relaxed about interacting with wealthier individuals.
• Only 14% say their income is sufficient, 27% say it is rather insufficient, and 56% say it is definitely insufficient. An overwhelming 89% would like to earn more. People in the West are somewhat more likely than others to say their income is sufficient. Older, wealthier, and male respondents are more likely to feel their income is enough.
• Most respondents (62%) believe the optimal workday is 8 hours, 27% prefer a shorter day (6–7 hours), and only 2% would work 10 hours or more. Support for a shorter workday is higher in the West and Center, among rural residents, women, younger people, and the more educated. Interestingly, poorer people support a shorter workday more than the wealthier.
• More than half (56%) are willing to work longer hours to earn extra money, while 32% are not. This willingness is highest in the West and lowest in the East, and is more common among younger, wealthier, and male respondents.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost two thirds of respondents (59%) are dissatisfied with state medical services over the past five years. The number of those who are satisfied is twice as low (32%). The level of satisfaction with this type of service is somewhat higher among rural residents than among urban residents. At the same time, district centers show the lowest level of satisfaction.
• 23% of respondents believe that over the past two years the overall quality of public medical services in the region has improved; the same share noted an improvement in the quality of services they personally received. At the same time, 38–39% did not observe any changes. People in villages are more likely to report positive changes than city residents (with the lowest ratings in district centers).
• The quality of medical care in public healthcare institutions is evaluated negatively by 52% of respondents, while 40% give positive assessments. More negative evaluations come from urban residents compared to rural residents (56% vs. 48%), and from those who visit doctors rarely compared to those who do so frequently (63% vs. 54%). Youth, people with minor children, and low-income groups are the most critical.
• At the same time, the quality of care in private medical institutions is evaluated positively by more than 52%, 12% evaluate it negatively, and more than a third could not give an assessment. Younger and middle-aged people, wealthier respondents, and those who visit doctors more often are more inclined to rate private medicine positively.
• 40% confirmed (and nearly the same share did not) that they had witnessed hospital renovations or repairs over the past two years. Such updates were mentioned much more often in villages than in cities (50% vs. 30%).
• 22% consult a doctor or medical specialist less than once a year, 27% once a year, a quarter every six months, 15% every three months, and only 7% do so monthly. Urban residents, middle-aged and older people, women, and poorer groups tend to consult doctors more frequently.
• A large majority (67%) know who their family doctor or therapist is. Awareness is higher among rural residents, women, middle-aged and older people, and people with children. 54% fully or partially trust their family doctor. Among those who know their doctor, 74% trust them.
• 91% believe it is necessary to consult a doctor before starting treatment. Half usually understand the treatment scheme provided, and one third partially understand it. Respondents with higher education and higher income tend to understand prescriptions better.
• Most respondents fully (40%) or partially (31%) follow doctors’ prescriptions; 7% decide independently, and 14% consult another doctor. Women are more likely to follow prescriptions. Those who know and trust their doctor follow prescriptions far more often.
• 87% trust medical professionals’ recommendations, 71% trust pharmacists, 70% trust relatives and acquaintances. Much fewer trust TV (28%), the Internet (26%), the press (22%) or radio (19%). 15% trust folk healers, especially older people.
• When choosing a medical facility, 58% value doctors’ professionalism, 48% trust in doctors, 39% good attitudes toward patients, and 29% modern equipment. Comfort, benefits, and speed of service are less important. Villagers and younger and wealthier respondents value professionalism and attitudes more; equipment matters more to youth; comfort matters more to urban and wealthier groups; benefits matter more to poorer and older people; speed matters more to wealthier groups.
• Blood pressure is measured daily by 15%, monthly by 26%, quarterly or semi-annually by 29%, yearly by 10%, and less often by 16%.
• One third never had blood-pressure problems, while others experience them with varying frequency, more often among women, older people, poorer respondents, and those under stress.
• Body weight is measured daily by 14%, monthly by 24%, quarterly or semi-annually by 30%, yearly by 13%, and less often by 16%.
• ECGs are done less than once a year by 35%, annually by 35%, semi-annually by 16%, more often by small shares, more often by women and older people.
• Blood sugar is checked less than annually by 35%, yearly by 25%, more often by women and older people.
• Cholesterol is checked less than annually by 37%, yearly by 19%, more often by women and older people.
• 45% never sought cardiovascular care; those who did recently are more often urban, female, older, and poorer.
• More than half do not take blood-pressure medication; among those with regular pressure problems, two thirds do.
• When pressure problems occur, one third self-medicate, one third follow doctors’ prescriptions, others seek doctors or folk remedies.
• 79% walk outdoors daily.
• 43% eat fresh fruits and vegetables daily.
• About one third eat meat daily.
• One third eat sweets daily.
• 18% eat fried/fatty food daily.
• 10% drink soda daily.
• 47% drink alcohol monthly or less; 22% never drink.
• 14% exercise daily; 28% never exercise.
• 74% do not smoke.
• Stress is experienced daily by 7%, weekly by nearly 20%, monthly by 43%, never by one third.
• 28% rate cardiovascular care in their locality positively, 25% negatively. District centers have the worst ratings.
• About one quarter rate oblast-level care positively.
• One third go to local hospitals, 16% to the Rivne regional hospital, 11% to the Polischuk center, 9% to family doctors.
• Nearly half believe there are not enough cardiovascular facilities in their area.
• 91% agree excess weight affects cardiovascular disease; 63% know 140/90 is high blood pressure.
• Most agree that not smoking, moderate alcohol, healthy diet, weight control, sports, and checkups are important.
• 79% get medical information from doctors; 39% from family; one third from pharmacists.
• Most do not know about the World Bank–MoH project; 73% consider it important.
• Half believe the project will improve the situation.
• 47% believe healthcare will improve in the next 1–2 years.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, 60% of respondents said that they are employed, while 40% are not. Among those who do not work, 32% are pensioners, 27% are engaged in household work and childcare, 13% are studying, 21% are unemployed but looking for a job, and 6% are unemployed and not looking for work.
• The highest share of employed people is in the East (67%), slightly lower in the West (57%). The higher the level of education, the larger the share of those who are employed.
• When assessing working conditions, most working respondents report the absence of vibration, noise, and air pollution, low physical strain, and comfortable lighting and temperature. At the same time, about half of respondents report very high nervous stress.
• Relations with management and co-workers are mostly assessed as friendly and comfortable.
• 88% of those who work are wage employees, while 12% are self-employed (entrepreneurs, those working in family businesses, etc.).
• An absolute majority (89%) work full time, while 11% work part-time. 30% work in shifts, and 70% do not. 22% work at night, while 78% do not.
• Women, rural residents, and low-income respondents are more likely to work part-time. Older, low-income, and respondents with secondary education more often work in shifts. The higher the level of education and income, the fewer those who work at night. Among men, the share of those working at night is twice as high as among women.
• Among nearly half (47%) of employed respondents, their pay depends on their own effort and productivity; for almost the same share (46%) it does not, and 7% could not answer.
• 12% have additional employment besides their main job, while 88% do not. 17% have other employees under their supervision, while 83% do not.
• The younger the respondents and the higher their income, the more likely they are to believe that their pay depends on their own effort and productivity.
• Among the least well-off, the share of those who have additional jobs is the highest.
• In the West and Center, the highest shares of respondents have people under their supervision (19% and 20% respectively), while in the East this share is twice as low (11%).
• 39% work overtime; among them almost two thirds (62%) receive additional pay, while 38% do not. The wealthier the respondents, the more often they work overtime. Men work overtime more often than women.
• 52% of respondents believe they have achieved a balance between work and personal life; 37% say they lack time for personal life; 4% lack time for professional self-realization; and 7% could not answer.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, the lowest daily levels of stress among respondents are caused by family relations, professional activity, and the external environment, while the highest stress levels are caused by the war and military threat, socio-political instability in the country, corruption, and respondents’ own financial situation.
• Half of respondents assess the material situation of their family as satisfactory. Only 15% believe they have more or less enough money to live on. At the same time, one third report that they consider themselves poor. Those who consider themselves poor are more numerous in the East, among older people, rural residents, respondents with poor health, and those with low education.
• Slightly less than half of respondents assess their housing and living conditions as average, more than a third as comfortable, and one in five as poor.
• The worst housing conditions are more often reported by residents of the East and South. The higher the education and income of respondents, the better they assess their housing conditions.
• 42% of respondents believe that they fully control their lives and are free in their decisions, and approximately the same share say they partially control their lives. At the same time, 19% state that they have almost no control over their own fate. The highest share of those who report no control over their lives is in the East, among people over 50, the poor, and respondents with poor health.
• Only 18% of respondents assess their social status as high. Half consider themselves to be of middle status, while a quarter believe they belong to the lower social strata. The latter group is most common in the East, among older and poor respondents.
• About one third of respondents are completely satisfied with their lives, about half are rather satisfied, and one quarter are not satisfied. In the East, the share of dissatisfied reaches almost 40%. Dissatisfaction with life is higher among those over 50 and among respondents with low income.
• 82% of respondents believe that, if necessary, they can receive emotional support from others; 9% believe they cannot, and 9% could not answer. 77% said they could receive physical assistance, 13% said they could not, and 10% were undecided. Slightly fewer (69%) expect financial support, while 20% believe they would not receive it and 11% could not answer. The younger the respondents and the higher their income, the more often they believe they could receive emotional, physical, and financial support.
• Few respondents reported participating in civic organizations. Only 7% said they are members of religious organizations, 5% belong to professional clubs, 3% to artistic or civic NGOs, and 2% are members of political parties.
• Almost a third of respondents believe that household duties are shared equally, 24% perform most of the duties themselves, 20% say another family member performs most of them, 14% say all duties fall on them, and only 5% say all duties fall on another family member. Among those who perform most household duties, there are four times more women than men.
• About one third of respondents believe that their profession has high prestige, about half say it has medium prestige, and one quarter believe it has low prestige.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group among those who have worked abroad during the last five years, the majority (77%) went for seasonal work, only 15% worked on a permanent basis, and 7% had other types of employment.
• One third of respondents worked abroad this year, one quarter last year, while one in five did so five years ago.
• Almost one third (31%) stayed abroad for work for about half a year, 21% for several months, 15% for more than one year, 14% for up to one year, 14% for several years, and 5% did not answer this question.
• Among those who worked in EU countries, there were slightly more people working on a permanent basis than among those who worked in Russia. Women and respondents with higher education also more often worked on a permanent basis.
• Most respondents worked in Poland (36%), followed by Russia (25%), 5% worked in Czechia and Germany, 3% in Italy, while the rest worked in other countries, mainly in Western Europe. Almost 30% refused to answer this question.
• Among residents of the West and Center, most worked in Poland, while in the South and especially the East, most worked in Russia.
• Among those who worked abroad, almost half worked in construction and repairs (43%), about half as many (23%) in agriculture, 10% in household work, and 3% each in IT, childcare, and the restaurant business (cooks, waiters, cleaners). 2% each worked in the hotel business, as office workers, and as medical staff. 1% each reported working as cleaners and in personal services (hairdressers, masseurs, technicians).
• Most people who worked in construction did so in Russia, while those who worked in EU countries were more often employed in agriculture and domestic work.
• Most respondents were satisfied with their earnings while working abroad (19% very satisfied, 62% rather satisfied). Dissatisfaction with earnings was highest in the East of the country.
• 18% of respondents personally encountered fraud in Ukraine when arranging official documents for employment abroad, 78% did not, and 4% were undecided.
• 31% personally experienced a mismatch between promised employment conditions and the actual conditions received at their workplace abroad, 58% did not, and 11% did not answer.
• 35% worked abroad officially, 61% unofficially, and 4% did not answer.
• The largest share of officially employed workers abroad was among migrants from the East (44%), and the smallest from the South (27%). Among those who worked in the EU, there were twice as many officially employed (36%) as among those who worked in Russia. Older respondents and those with higher education were more often officially employed.
• More people who experienced a mismatch between promised and actual working conditions were found among men, older respondents, and those who worked in EU countries.
• Among the problems most often encountered while working abroad, respondents mentioned the language barrier and a sense of being treated as second-class (both 27%). 22% reported lack of a contract with the employer, 18% each mentioned poor living conditions and problems with medical care. 13% reported unpaid overtime, 11% experienced refusal of payment, 8% faced nationality-based discrimination, 6% had problems with law enforcement, and 2% encountered extortion or crime. At the same time, more than a third (38%) said they had no problems while working abroad.
• A sense of being second-class (33%), language barrier (39%), and problems with medical care (30%) were the most common problems among those who worked in the EU, while among those who worked in Russia, the main problem was poor living conditions (30%), followed by lack of a contract (27%). More than half of those who worked in Russia had no problems, while among those who worked in the EU, only 30% reported having no problems.
• The majority (71%) of migrant workers would like to work abroad again in the future, 11% would rather not, 5% would definitely not, and 13% were undecided.
• The largest number of respondents would like to work in Germany (23%) and Poland (22%), about 10% in Italy, the USA, and the UK, 6–7% in Czechia and Russia, and 18% were undecided.
• Respondents most often need help with finding a job (32%), obtaining a visa (28%), and medical care (25%). Less urgent needs include adaptation to living conditions in another country (20%), protection of human rights abroad (18%), legal consultations (15%), negotiations with potential employers (13%), finding housing (13%), assistance with arrival at the place of residence or work (12%), and insurance (10%). 9% said they need no assistance, and 7% were undecided.
• Among those who worked in EU countries, more people would need help with obtaining a visa, adapting to living conditions, and legal consultations. Among those who worked in Russia, more people would need help with medical care and insurance.
• Among those who worked unofficially, relatively more people would need help with finding a job and negotiating with employers, while among those who worked officially, more would need help with medical care and legal consultations.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, two thirds of respondents know who their family doctor or therapist is, while the other third do not. The older the respondents, the higher their awareness of their family doctor. Women are better informed about this than men.
• 53% of respondents trust their family doctor, 21% do not, and 26% were unable to assess their level of trust. Trust is directly related to how often respondents visit doctors and how well they know their family doctor – among those who know their doctor, almost 80% trust him or her. Women and older people trust doctors more than men and younger respondents.
• Almost half (48%) say that their family doctor has given them advice on disease prevention or recommendations for a healthy lifestyle, while the same share say they have not received such recommendations. Among those who received this advice, 82% trust their family doctor.
• 37% of respondents consult a doctor or another medical professional about their health or medical advice less than once a year. A quarter do so once a year, 17% at least every six months, 10% every three months, and 5% monthly. Women consult medical professionals more often than men, and older people do so more often than younger ones.
• 42% of respondents report having one to three illnesses that currently bother them. 17% say they suffer from more than four illnesses, while one third report no current health problems. Health status depends on age: the older the respondent, the more likely they are to have health concerns. Men complain about their health less often than women.
• 27% of respondents checked their heart and blood vessels this year, 16% did so last year, 20% more than two years ago, 12% more than four years ago, and 18% have never checked their cardiovascular system. The highest share of people who were tested this year was in the South (31%) and the East (40%). In contrast, one quarter of respondents in the West have never undergone such examinations. Older people and women are more likely to have undergone cardiovascular check-ups this year.
• Two thirds of respondents do not take medications or vitamins to treat or prevent heart disease, while one third do. 42% of women take heart-related medicines, compared to 22% of men. Half of those aged 51+ take such medication. Among those who frequently visit doctors or who underwent cardiovascular examinations this year, almost two thirds take these medicines.
• 39% of respondents trust television news about changes in the healthcare sector, while 56% do not. 36% trust similar information from the Internet, 39% do not, and 26% cannot assess their level of trust. 29% trust such information in the print media, while 56% do not; 27% trust medical news on the radio, while 52% do not. Residents of the West are most likely to trust healthcare news across all media types, while residents of the East are least likely. Young people trust online sources more, while older people trust television. Women trust healthcare news on television slightly more than men.
• 76% of respondents trust the fire and rescue service in their region, while 14% do not. 74% trust the ambulance service, 22% do not. 57% trust medical institutions (polyclinics and hospitals), 36% do not; 55% trust pharmacies, 38% do not; 48% trust the police, 45% do not.
• This creates a situation where people, on the one hand, are dissatisfied with the state of healthcare and believe that the overall quality of public medical services is deteriorating or not improving, while on the other hand they continue to trust medical institutions and doctors.
• Among recent government initiatives to reform healthcare, respondents most strongly support reimbursement of patients’ costs for medicines for diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular diseases (84%) and the introduction of mandatory health insurance (64%). The establishment of Public Health Centers is supported by 58%, opposed by 21%, and 22% are undecided. Standardized treatment protocols are supported by 57%, opposed by 12%, and 30% are undecided. Adoption of a public health development concept is supported by 57%, opposed by 22%, with the same share undecided. The introduction of a contract-based system that would increase doctors’ salaries is supported by 44%, opposed by 35%, with 21% not answering. Contracts with a guaranteed treatment price are supported by 38%, opposed by 42%, and 20% are undecided. The creation of hospital districts is supported by 36%, opposed by 44%, and 20% are undecided.
• Support for the creation of a paramedic service to provide first aid in traumatic situations increased from 64% in October to 69% in December. Support for abolishing Order No. 33, under which public funding was allocated to medical institutions based on the number of hospital beds, remained virtually unchanged at 58%.
• 64% support the use of competitive and transparent tenders for government procurement of certain medicines, while 17% do not.
• Only 27% believe that introducing patient-doctor contracts with at least a 30% increase in doctors’ salaries would improve healthcare quality. 36% believe it would have no effect, and 16% think it would worsen quality. 21% could not answer. Support is highest in the West (33%) and lowest in the East (17%), where the largest share of undecided respondents (37%) is also found. Those who visit doctors more often are more supportive of this initiative.
• 77% support vaccination of children against diseases such as polio, measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, and others. 12% oppose vaccination, and 11% are undecided. Support is somewhat higher among urban residents, women, older people, and those who trust medical institutions.
• 71% support mandatory childhood vaccinations against diseases that threaten public health, 13% oppose them, and 16% are undecided. Again, support is higher among urban residents, women, and those who trust medical institutions.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, 45% of working-age Ukrainians (men aged 18–65 and women aged 18–60) rate their health as good or very good, 43% as satisfactory, and 12% as poor or very poor. The highest share of those who consider their health good or very good is in the West (49%), while the lowest is in the East (37%). Rural residents rate their health more positively than urban residents (47% vs. 43%). The younger the respondents, the higher their education and income, the better they rate their health. Men more often consider their health good or very good than women (49% vs. 39%).
• Just under a third (29%) of Ukrainians report having chronic illnesses, while 71% say they do not. Among those with chronic conditions, 58% have one illness, 29% have two, and 13% have three or more. Urban residents report chronic illnesses more often than rural residents. Older people, those with poorer self-rated health, lower income, and women are more likely to report having chronic conditions.
• 38% of respondents visited a doctor in the past year, while 62% did not. Among those who did, one third visited once, 28% twice, 16% three times, 10% four times, and 15% five times or more. Older people, women, and urban residents visited doctors more often. Those who do not exercise are also more likely to visit doctors. Interestingly, non-smokers and those who do not drink alcohol also report more frequent doctor visits.
• 11% were hospitalized in the past year, while 89% were not. Among those hospitalized, 44% stayed for one day, 24% for 2–7 days, and 32% for more than 8 days.
• 38% of respondents smoke, while 62% do not. Among non-smokers, 23% are former smokers and 77% have never smoked. Smoking is most common in the East (43%) and least common in the West (31%). People aged 51+ smoke less than younger groups. Men smoke three times more often than women. Smoking is most prevalent among the lowest-income group.
• Only 2% drink alcohol (including beer) almost daily, 12% several times a week, 36% several times a month, 34% several times a year, and 16% do not drink at all. Drinking at least several times a month is most common in the Center and least common in the West. Men drink nearly twice as often as women. Those who report better health are more likely to drink alcohol. Both the lowest-income and highest-income groups drink more often than those with middle incomes.
• Only 9% exercise almost daily, 15% several times a week, 14% several times a month, and 12% several times a year, while 50% do not exercise at all. The share of people who exercise is highest in the Center and lowest in the East. People with better health exercise more often. Younger, wealthier, and more educated respondents exercise more frequently, and men exercise more than women.
• Over the past month, 8% felt sad or hopeless almost every day, 23% several times a week, and 44% several times a month, while about one quarter did not feel sadness or despair recently.
• During the same period, 5% felt lonely almost daily, 12% several times a week, 28% several times a month, while 54% did not feel lonely at all.
• The older respondents are, the worse their health and the lower their income, the more often they experienced sadness, hopelessness, and low mood. The same pattern is observed among those with lower social status, weaker feelings of control over their lives, and lower life satisfaction.
• Residents of the South felt loneliness more often than people in other regions. Older age, poorer health, and lower income are associated with more frequent feelings of loneliness. Women feel lonely more often than men. Lower social status, weaker sense of control over one’s life, and lower life satisfaction are also linked to more frequent loneliness.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, the greatest achievements among the events of 2016, in the view of respondents, were Jamala’s victory at the Eurovision Song Contest and the performance of the Ukrainian Paralympic team at the Rio de Janeiro Paralympic Games.
• Among the year’s achievements respondents also named the government’s initiative to raise the minimum wage to 3,200 UAH, the introduction of electronic income declarations for officials, the performance of Ukraine’s national team at the Olympic Games in Brazil, and the release of Nadiia Savchenko from Russian captivity. Respondents also viewed as relatively successful the launch of public procurement through the Prozorro electronic system, the reduction of excise duties on imported used cars, the increase in the army’s combat capability, the introduction of competitive selection for civil servants, and the entry into force of the EU–Ukraine Free Trade Area Agreement.
• Mixed assessments were given to the decentralization reform, the performance of Ukraine’s national football team at EURO-2016, the introduction of quotas for Ukrainian-language songs on radio, and the process of decommunization.
• Respondents considered the EU visa-free negotiations, the talks on resolving the situation in Donbas, and the investigation into the killings on Kyiv’s Independence Square in February 2014 to be failures. The lowest ratings on the “success–failure” scale were given to the fight against corruption, the situation with utility tariffs, the exchange rate, and prices for basic food products and services.
• Among areas of public policy in 2016, respondents rated national defense policy the most positively. 41% considered the government’s policy in this area successful, while nearly 50% held the opposite view. Compared with the beginning of 2016, the share of those seeing positive developments in defense increased (in January it was 34%).
• Police reform was considered successful by 28%, and unsuccessful by 65%. The share of those evaluating this area positively declined by one and a half times over the year.
• Decentralization was considered successful by 22%, while 62% did not see positive results. Compared with the beginning of the year, the number of those who rated this reform positively increased by more than one and a half times.
• Negotiations with the European Union on visa-free travel were rated positively by 18% and negatively by 74%. Over six months, the share of those who consider this policy unsuccessful increased (in January it was 54%).
• Social protection policy was considered successful by only 9% and unsuccessful by 87%. A slight positive trend was recorded over the year (from 5% to 9%).
• Support for small and medium-sized businesses was seen as successful by 9% and unsuccessful by 77%; the fight against corruption as successful by 8% and unsuccessful by 89%; judicial reform by 8% and 84%; healthcare policy by 7% and 89%; and limiting the influence of oligarchs by 6% and 89% respectively. At the same time, compared to the previous year respondents noted slight progress in anti-corruption efforts, judicial reform, SME support, and healthcare.
• More than 90% of respondents considered government performance unsuccessful in ensuring currency stability, utility services, and economic growth.
• Only 16% were satisfied with the performance of President Petro Poroshenko, while 82% were dissatisfied. A similar situation was observed for Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman: 16% satisfied, 78% dissatisfied. Speaker of Parliament Andriy Parubiy received 11% approval and 82% disapproval.
• Parliamentary opposition performance was approved by 12% and disapproved by 78%, while evaluations of the governing coalition were even worse: only 6% satisfied and 86% dissatisfied.
• The leader in party electoral preferences is Batkivshchyna. If elections were held soon, 16.0% of likely voters who had decided would vote for it. 11.8% would support BPP Solidarity, 11.7% the Opposition Bloc, 8.5% the Radical Party, 8.6% Samopomich, 6.7% Civic Position, 5.9% For Life, the same share Svoboda, 2.7% UKROP, and 2.5% the Saakashvili New Forces Movement. Other parties had ratings below 2%.
• In the presidential race, Yuliya Tymoshenko remains the leader with 17.7% of decided voters. Petro Poroshenko would receive 13.5%, Yuriy Boyko 10.4%, Oleh Liashko 8.8%, Andriy Sadovyi 8.4%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 8.1%, Vadym Rabinovych 7.3%, Oleh Tiahnybok 4.9%, Dmytro Yarosh 3.5%, Nadiia Savchenko 1.8%, and Andrii Biletskyi 0.9%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in December 2016, 64% of Ukrainians have a tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day. At the same time, one third do not have such a tradition, 2% do not know this holiday, and 3% were unable to give an answer. The highest support for this tradition is in the West (83%), somewhat lower in the Center (67%). In the South and East, about half of respondents give gifts on St. Nicholas Day. Women, younger people, wealthier Ukrainians, and those who have children under 18 are more inclined to support this tradition.
• More than one third of respondents (37%) believe in St. Nicholas. At the same time, 53% said they do not believe in him, 8% were undecided, and 2% do not know who he is. The largest share of believers is in the West (45%), and the smallest in the East (27%). The younger and more financially secure the respondents are, the more likely they are to believe in St. Nicholas. There are also more believers among women, urban residents, and those who have children under 18.
• In turn, 22% of Ukrainians believe in Father Frost (Did Moroz). 70% do not believe, 7% were undecided, and 1% do not know who he is. The highest share of those who believe in Father Frost is in the Center and the East (27% and 25%, respectively). In the South the figure is 20%, and in the West only 15%. Those who believe in Father Frost belong to the same social groups as those who believe in St. Nicholas: younger people, wealthier respondents, city residents, and those who have children under 18.
• New Year and Christmas are the most loved winter holidays for most Ukrainians (43% like New Year the most, 42% prefer Christmas). Another 5% named St. Nicholas Day as their favorite holiday, and 3% chose the Old New Year. 5% do not like any of these holidays, and 3% were undecided.
• In the East, South, and Center, New Year is more popular than Christmas, while in the West the situation is reversed and Christmas is the most loved holiday. The younger and wealthier the respondents are, the stronger their preference for New Year. New Year is more popular in cities, while Christmas is preferred more in rural areas. Men like New Year slightly more than women.

The sociological study “Socio-political situation in Ukraine” was conducted by two sociological services: the Center for Social and Marketing Research SOCIS and the Rating Group.

• At the end of 2016, 69.9% of respondents described the current situation in Ukraine as tense, while another 23.2% considered it explosive. Only 5.2% said the situation in the country was stable, and 1.9% could not give a clear answer.
• 54.3% of respondents identified the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine as the main problem requiring immediate resolution. Another 37.9% pointed to rising prices for basic goods and inflation. 37.8% said low wages and pensions need urgent attention, 33.9% pointed to utility tariffs, 27.5% to corruption in the central government, 26.9% to lack of jobs and unemployment, and 19.7% to the high cost and low quality of medical services. Smaller shares mentioned social inequality and the gap between rich and poor (12.8%), corruption in courts, police and the prosecutor’s office (12.0%), insufficient social protection (10.6%), and crime and public safety (7.5%). Only small minorities named unfavorable conditions for small and medium business (4.3%), low quality of education (2.8%), and lack of freedom and democracy (2.2%) as urgent problems.
• Respondents showed relatively high readiness to take part in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. 37.8% said they were fully certain they would vote, and another 34.0% said they were likely to come to the polling stations. At the same time, 25.4% stated that they would definitely not participate, and 2.9% could not answer.
• Among all respondents, the leaders of the presidential rating were Petro Poroshenko with 9.6% and Yuliia Tymoshenko with 9.4%. Yurii Boiko was supported by 6.3%, Vadym Rabinovych by 6.0%, Oleh Liashko by 5.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 5.2%, and Andrii Sadovyi by 4.3%. Other candidates listed in the survey were supported by less than 3%. There was a strong demand for a hypothetical “other candidate”, with 12.1% saying they would likely support someone not listed in the questionnaire. 12.7% could not decide or refused to answer, while 21.6% said they would not participate in the elections at all.
• A simulated presidential election based only on those who intended to vote and had made a choice produced the following results. Petro Poroshenko would receive 14.7%, Yuliia Tymoshenko 14.6%, Yurii Boiko 10.0%, Vadym Rabinovych 9.2%, Oleh Liashko 9.2%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.8%, Andrii Sadovyi 6.8%, Oleh Tiahnybok 3.1%, Nadiia Savchenko 2.4%, Dmytro Yarosh 2.4%, Arsenii Yatseniuk 1.1%, and Viktor Medvedchuk 1.0%. 17.7% would vote for other candidates not listed.
• 47.2% of respondents supported holding early parliamentary elections, while 44.9% opposed this idea and 8.0% were undecided.
• 36.3% said they were fully ready to participate in parliamentary elections if they were held next Sunday, and 34.5% said they were rather ready to vote. 25.2% were not confident they would participate, and 4.0% could not answer or refused to respond.
• Among all respondents, 10.0% would vote for Batkivshchyna, 9.3% for Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, 7.3% for the Opposition Bloc, 6.4% for Samopomich, 5.8% for Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, 5.7% for For Life, 4.8% for Civic Position, 3.2% for Svoboda, and 2.8% for the Movement of New Forces. Other parties had less than 2%. 12.3% were undecided or refused to answer, and 22.4% said they would not vote at all.
• A simulated parliamentary election among those who intended to vote and had chosen a party gave the following results. Batkivshchyna would receive 15.5%, Petro Poroshenko Bloc 14.1%, Opposition Bloc 11.2%, Samopomich 9.8%, Radical Party 9.1%, For Life 8.8%, Civic Position 7.1%, Svoboda 4.9%, and the Movement of New Forces 4.1%. Other parties would receive less than 2%.
• 20.1% of respondents named Yurii Boiko as the leader of the current opposition, 14.5% named Yuliia Tymoshenko, 11.5% Oleh Liashko, 7.7% Vadym Rabinovych, 7.5% Mikheil Saakashvili, 4.1% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 4.0% Andrii Sadovyi, and 2.2% Oleh Tiahnybok. 25.1% could not answer or refused to respond.
• 60.7% said they would vote in favor of joining the European Union if a referendum were held soon, 23.8% would vote against, 9.2% would not participate, and 6.3% were undecided.
• If a referendum on joining NATO were held, 47.2% would vote in favor, 33.6% against, 11.0% would not participate, and 8.3% were undecided.
• When asked whether they would support the Maidan today, 10.2% said they would regularly participate, 21.8% would not participate personally but would morally support the protesters, 13.5% would occasionally join protests, and 9.2% would support financially without participating. At the same time, 31.9% said they were against the Maidan, 6.7% were indifferent, and 6.8% could not answer.
• 16.9% believe another Maidan is highly likely in the near future, 38.3% consider it quite likely, 27.8% think it is unlikely, and 9.5% see it as almost impossible, while 7.6% were undecided.
• At the same time, 44.1% do not support the idea of a new Maidan, 16.2% would support it and personally participate, 30.8% would support it without personal participation, and 8.9% were undecided.
• 59.5% consider participation in elections the most acceptable way to defend their position. 21.1% would turn to protests, 9.5% to civil disobedience actions, 3.8% would defend their position with weapons, and 3.8% would do so by joining an opposition party. 18.0% said none of these forms suited them, and 6.6% could not answer.
• 46.3% believe the November protests in Kyiv were organized and paid for by political forces, 33.7% think they were genuine protests of ordinary people, and 20.1% could not evaluate them.
• 47.0% consider continued diplomatic efforts the best way to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 20.8% favor a referendum on the status of the occupied territories, 12.7% support isolating the territories and freezing the conflict, 9.8% support military mobilization to regain them, 2.1% propose other solutions, and 7.7% were undecided.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, the leader of electoral support among political parties is Batkivshchyna. 17.4% of respondents who intend to vote and have decided on their preferences would vote for this party. 12.6% would support BPP Solidarity, 11.1% the Opposition Bloc, 8.4% the Radical Party, 7.4% Samopomich, 6.2% the party “For Life”, 6.1% Svoboda, 5.6% Civic Position, 3.1% the Saakashvili Party, and about 3% would support Yarosh’s Movement and the UKROP party.
• In six-month dynamics, the top five parties remain almost unchanged. Batkivshchyna’s rating is stable (16–18%), while BPP Solidarity has gradually grown after its summer decline (from 9% to 13%). The decline of the Opposition Bloc (from 17% to 11%) is primarily linked to the emergence of the For Life party, which has a similar electorate. Samopomich (from 12% to 7%) and the Radical Party (from 11% to 8%) have also declined. Ratings of Civic Position, Svoboda, the Saakashvili Party, and UKROP remain stable.
• Regionally, Batkivshchyna leads in the West and the Center, with BPP Solidarity in second place, coming close to the leader in the West. In the South and East, the Opposition Bloc leads, while Batkivshchyna and BPP Solidarity share second and third places.
• The leader in presidential electoral preferences is Yuliya Tymoshenko — 17.7% of those ready to vote and who have decided on their preferences would vote for her. Petro Poroshenko is supported by 14.3%, Yuriy Boyko by 10.2%, Oleh Liashko by 9.9%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko by 8.2%, Vadym Rabinovych by 7.5%, Andriy Sadovyi by 7.3%, Oleh Tiahnybok by 4.5%, and Dmytro Yarosh by 2.4%. Compared to September, no significant changes occurred. Over six months, Tymoshenko’s support rose from 15% to 18%, and Poroshenko’s from 12% to 14%. Boyko declined (from 14% to 10%), Sadovyi fell (from 10% to 7%), and Nadiya Savchenko lost almost all support (from 10% to 2%).
• In the West, Poroshenko narrowly leads, with Tymoshenko second. In the Center, Tymoshenko leads and Poroshenko is second. In the South and East, Boyko narrowly leads, followed by Tymoshenko (South) and Poroshenko (East).
• 11% believe that Tymoshenko would win if elections were held soon, 9% believe Poroshenko would win, while half could not decide. Among Batkivshchyna supporters, 68% believe in Tymoshenko’s victory; among BPP supporters, 60% believe Poroshenko would win.
• In a second-round simulation, between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, 16% would support Poroshenko, 27% Tymoshenko, 45% would not vote, and 12% are undecided. Tymoshenko has stronger support in all regions and among supporters of other candidates.
• Between Poroshenko and Liashko, support is almost equal (20% vs 19%), with 47% not voting.
• Between Poroshenko and Boyko, 23% would support Poroshenko and 17% Boyko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Boyko, 33% would vote for Tymoshenko and 15% for Boyko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Liashko, 28% would vote for Tymoshenko and 13% for Liashko.
• Between Tymoshenko and Sadovyi, 25% would vote for Tymoshenko and 20% for Sadovyi.
• Thus, Poroshenko beats Boyko and sometimes Liashko, while Tymoshenko leads in all pairings.
• 14% believe Tymoshenko represents ordinary people, 12% Vakarchuk, 11% Liashko, and 42% say no politician represents them.
• 45% support dissolving parliament and holding new elections. 46% support early presidential elections.
• Only 11% think Ukraine is on the right track; 78% think it is on the wrong one. 89% say the socio-economic situation has worsened.
• Two thirds blame corruption at the top, followed by war in Donbas, oligarchs, and self-interest of officials.
• 69% hold President Poroshenko responsible for the current situation.
• 27% think the President can lead Ukraine out of crisis; 32% think he can stop the war.
• 43% receive utility subsidies; 70% support raising the minimum wage to 3,200 UAH, though only 38% expect it to improve their family finances.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in September 2016, the majority of respondents (72%) agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people; 14% do not agree, and 14% were undecided.
• Despite the fact that the share of those who recognize the Holodomor as genocide slightly declined compared to the previous year (from 80% to 72%), it remains at the same level as in 2014 and is higher than in 2010–2012 (about 60%).
• The statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people is shared by virtually all residents of the West (97%), the majority of respondents in the Center (78%), nearly two thirds in the South (57%), and slightly less than half in the East (48%).
• Residents of rural areas agree with the genocide thesis more often than urban residents (79% vs 68%). Among respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 83% support the statement, while among those who consider Russian their native language, only 47% do. By age groups, support for the genocide thesis ranges from 70% to 75%, but the share of those who oppose it increases with age.
• Among supporters of European integration, 86% agree that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide, compared to only 48% among opponents. A similar pattern exists regarding NATO membership (91% vs 53%). In contrast, respondents who support joining the Customs Union are much less inclined to recognize the Holodomor as genocide (only 38%).
• Interestingly, nostalgia for the USSR does not decisively determine attitudes toward recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. Among those who regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 59% still agree that the Holodomor was a genocide (25% disagree). Among those who do not regret the collapse, 85% agree.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 55% of Ukrainians said they followed the U.S. presidential election. Interest was highest in Western Ukraine (67%) and lowest in the East (48%). The elections were followed more often by men, middle-aged and older people, and those with higher levels of education and income. The lowest interest was observed among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the Radical Party.
• 39% of Ukrainians sympathized with Hillary Clinton, one in ten with Donald Trump, while 42% sympathized with neither candidate. Among those who followed the elections, 62% supported Clinton and 15% supported Trump.
• Support for Clinton was strongest among respondents with higher education and income, more often in cities, and especially in Western and Central Ukraine. In the East and South, most respondents did not sympathize with either candidate.
• Clinton’s support was relatively higher among women, while Trump had relatively more support among men. However, overall, both genders tended to favor the Democratic candidate.
• Among supporters of Ukrainian political parties, Clinton was most often supported by voters of BPP Solidarity, Civic Position, Svoboda, Wave (Saakashvili’s party), Batkivshchyna, and Samopomich. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc, by contrast, were more likely to sympathize with Trump.
• A plurality (42%) expect no changes in U.S.–Ukraine relations following Donald Trump’s victory. At the same time, one quarter believe relations will deteriorate, especially in Central and Southern Ukraine. Only 7% believe relations will improve.

‍

Ukrainians’ interest and expectations of the elections results in the USA from Ratinggroup

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2016, almost half of respondents (48%) support the ban of communist ideology in Ukraine, 36% are against it, and 16% are undecided. Over the past two years, the share of those supporting the ban has not changed. A majority of residents in the West (78%), half of residents in the Center, and one third of residents in the South support banning communist ideology, while in the East only 18% support it. The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the more likely they are to support the ban of communist ideology. Men support the ban somewhat more than women. Rural residents support the ban more than urban residents. Support for banning communist ideology is strongest among supporters of patriotic parties, such as Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 80%). The strongest opposition comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (about 70%).
• One third of respondents support a ban on nationalist ideology, while 40% are against it and one quarter are undecided. Over the past two years, support for banning nationalist ideology has declined from 40% to 35%. Nearly half of residents in the South, 40% in the East, and one third in the Center support such a ban, while in the West only 20% do. The older the respondents and the lower their income, the more likely they are to support banning nationalist ideology. Women support the ban more than men. Urban residents are more supportive than rural residents (38% vs 28%). In terms of party preferences, attitudes toward banning nationalist ideology are the exact opposite of those toward banning communist ideology. The strongest support for banning nationalism comes from supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc (over 55%), while the lowest support is among voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s Movement.
• 41% of respondents support the initiative to dismantle all Lenin monuments in Ukraine, while nearly half (48%) are against it and 11% are undecided. Support is highest in the West (72%), about 41% in the Center, 26% in the South, and only 18% in the East. The younger the respondents and the higher their education, the more likely they are to support dismantling Lenin monuments. Rural residents are more supportive than city dwellers. Men support this initiative more than women. The strongest supporters are voters of Svoboda and Yarosh’s National Movement (over 75%). Among voters of BPP, Samopomich, and Civic Position, supporters outnumber opponents roughly two to one (about 60% vs 30%). Among supporters of the Radical Party and Batkivshchyna, supporters and opponents are roughly equal. Voters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc are overwhelmingly against dismantling Lenin monuments.
• Attitudes toward the renaming of Soviet-era city and street names are mixed. Overall, more people oppose (57%) than support (35%) this initiative. However, when selective renaming is considered, support rises and supporters outnumber opponents (49% vs 44%). 34% believe that only names honoring Soviet political figures who committed crimes against the Ukrainian people should be changed, and 15% believe that all such names should be changed. At the same time, 44% oppose any renaming at all, and 7% are undecided. Support for renaming is highest in the West, while in the East and South it is predominantly negative. The higher the level of education, the greater the support for renaming. Men support it more than women. The lowest support is among the 60+ age group. Rural residents are more supportive than urban residents. Among party supporters, the pattern is similar to attitudes toward dismantling Lenin monuments, though opponents are relatively more numerous.
• 72% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude toward Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 8% a negative one. About half evaluate Ivan Mazepa (52%) and Peter I (50%) positively, although negative attitudes toward Peter I are somewhat higher (29% vs 22%). 36% have a positive view of Fidel Castro, 22% a negative one, and 42% are unsure or do not know him. 35% view Stepan Bandera positively, 46% negatively, and 18% are undecided. 26% have a positive view of Symon Petliura, while 45% have a negative view. Nearly one quarter are undecided. 25% view Ronald Reagan positively, 24% negatively, while half are unsure or do not know him. Stalin and Lenin have the worst ratings: only 22% and 25%, respectively, view them positively, and about two thirds view Stalin negatively, while almost 60% view Lenin negatively.
• Dynamics show that the share of Stalin supporters has remained almost unchanged in recent years (20–24%). Positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased significantly compared to 2012 (35% vs 22%) and slightly compared to 2014 (31%). This year, positive views of Peter I declined compared to 2012, but remained at the same level as in 2014 (50%). Positive views of Mazepa increased to 50%, compared to 44% in 2012 and 41% in 2014.
• In the West, there is a positive attitude toward Ukrainian historical figures—Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura—while in the East there is a stronger positive attitude toward Russian historical figures—Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin. The higher the level of education, the more positive respondents are toward Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Petliura, and Reagan. The lower the education, the more positive they are toward Lenin and Stalin. Rural residents view Hrushevsky and Bandera more positively and Peter I, Castro, Lenin, and Stalin more negatively.
• Supporters of Svoboda have the most positive views of Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera. BPP supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, Bandera, and Petliura positively. Samopomich supporters view Hrushevsky, Mazepa, and Bandera positively. Supporters of the Opposition Bloc most positively evaluate Peter I, Lenin, and Stalin.