Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 62% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Alexander Lukashenko, 54% toward Barack Obama, and 51% toward Angela Merkel. In addition, 45% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Bronisław Komorowski, 39% toward José Manuel Barroso, 36% toward Dalia Grybauskaitė, and 16% toward Vladimir Putin.
• The ranking of negative attitudes is led by V. Putin (75%). 32% of respondents have a negative attitude toward A. Merkel, 31% toward B. Obama, 26% toward A. Lukashenko, and 25% toward N. Nazarbayev.
• Residents of the western, central, and northern regions are more favorable toward B. Obama, A. Merkel, B. Komorowski, J. M. Barroso, D. Grybauskaitė, and F. Hollande. Meanwhile, residents of the South and East have a more positive attitude toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev. At the same time, in the South there is also a positive attitude toward A. Merkel. Relatively positive attitudes toward V. Putin are recorded only in Donbas. Older people tend to have a more positive attitude toward A. Lukashenko and N. Nazarbayev, while young people more often support B. Obama and A. Merkel.
• The higher the education level of respondents and the higher their material status, the more positive their attitudes are toward B. Obama, B. Komorowski, J. M. Barroso, D. Grybauskaitė, and F. Hollande. Accordingly, attitudes toward A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev, and V. Putin are more negative in these groups.
• Compared with a similar survey conducted in October of the previous year, the level of positive attitude toward V. Putin decreased from 47% to 16%, and toward A. Merkel from 61% to 51%. At the same time, attitudes toward B. Obama improved from 51% to 54%. It should also be noted that the number of respondents with negative attitudes toward politicians increased simultaneously: negative attitudes toward V. Putin rose from 40% to 75%, toward A. Merkel from 13% to 32%, and toward B. Obama from 25% to 31%.
• It is worth noting that Ukrainians are generally very tolerant in their attitudes toward citizens of other countries. At the same time, attitudes toward foreign citizens are much better than toward the leaders of those same countries.
• Ukrainians have the most positive attitude toward Belarusians (53% definitely positive; 41% rather positive), and the least positive toward Russians (39% definitely positive; 33% rather positive).
• Overall, about 90% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Europeans, Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, and French; about 80% toward Americans; and about 70% toward Russians.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 86% of Ukrainians consider themselves patriots of their country. At the same time, 50% definitely characterize themselves as patriots, and another 36% say they are rather patriots than not. Only 6% do not consider themselves patriots, while 8% were unable to determine their position.
• Over the past year, the share of those who consider themselves patriots increased from 81% to 86%, and compared to 2010 it increased from 76% to 86%. At the same time, the share of those who do not consider themselves patriots more than halved (from 15% in 2010 to 6% in 2014). Residents of the West, North and Center, people with higher income and higher education levels, as well as Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely to consider themselves patriots.
• Overall, 76% of respondents would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence if they faced such a choice today. At the same time, 12% would not support it, and another 12% were undecided. Over the past year, there has been a significant increase in supporters of Independence (from 61% to 76%), while the number of opponents almost halved. The vast majority of respondents in all regions support Ukraine’s Independence, except in Donbas, where supporters and opponents are equal at 34% each, while almost a third (31%) were undecided.
• The younger the respondents, the more they support Ukraine’s Independence. Support is also higher among respondents with higher education and higher income. More than 90% of respondents who consider Ukrainian their native language would vote for Independence. Among those who consider both Russian and Ukrainian native languages, more than 70% would support Independence. Among those who consider Russian their native language, 45% would support Ukraine’s Independence today, while only 30% would vote against it. The higher the level of patriotism among respondents, the more likely they are to support the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence.
• Regionally, the dynamics of readiness to vote for Independence are positive: support increased significantly in all regions, including in the South (from 48% to 64%) and in the East (from 44% to 70%). As a year earlier, about one third of Donbas residents support Ukraine’s Independence, while the number of opponents decreased (from 57% to 34%) and the number of undecided increased (from 11% to 31%).
• An absolute majority of respondents (64%) primarily identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Half as many identify themselves as residents of their region, city or village (30%). 21% would identify themselves by nationality, and 17% would simply say “a human being.” 8% consider themselves Europeans, and the same share would identify themselves by their family role. 4% identify themselves as “a Soviet person” and 4% as “a citizen of the world.” About 3% would identify themselves by profession or religion.
• Over the past four years, identification as citizens of Ukraine and as Europeans has increased. At the same time, fewer respondents identify themselves as simply “a human being,” “a Soviet person,” or primarily through family role. “Citizen of Ukraine” is the dominant identity marker in all regions except Donbas, where the main identity marker remains “resident of one’s region, city or village.” Younger respondents and those with higher education are more likely to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Rural residents are more likely to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine or by nationality, while urban residents are more likely to say “resident of a region/city” or simply “a human being.” Identification as “European” is highest in the West and lowest in Donbas, and is more typical for younger and more educated respondents. Identification through family role is more typical in the Central region and among people with lower education. Identification as a “Soviet person” is more typical for residents of Donbas and the East, older people and those with lower education.
• The main sources of pride in their country and people are the place where respondents were born and raised (35%), the land and territory where they live (35%), their state (29%) and outstanding people of their nationality (28%). Hard work and ability to manage households were mentioned by 26%, language of their people by 23%, history and past by 22%, moral qualities of the people by 21%, songs, holidays and traditions by 19%. Slightly fewer mentioned the flag, coat of arms and anthem (14%), native nature (14%), religion and faith (14%), graves of ancestors and memory of them (12%), literature and arts (8%), sports victories (6%) and military strength of the state (2%).
• In recent years, Ukrainians have started to feel more pride in their land and territory, their state, their language and national symbols, while pride related to nature, traditions and sports victories decreased. Men are more likely to feel pride related to land, state and sports achievements. Women are more likely to feel pride related to people’s work ethic, traditions, literature and arts. Respondents with higher education more often feel pride in the state, people’s moral qualities and culture, while those with lower education more often mention history, traditions, religion and memory of ancestors. Urban residents more often mention people’s moral qualities, traditions, nature, literature and arts, while rural residents more often mention the state, language, work ethic, national symbols and religion.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 37% of respondents believe that representatives of big business should not be present in parliament under any circumstances, while another 33% believe they may be present only if they sell their businesses. Meanwhile, 18% see nothing wrong with big business representatives being present in parliament, and 12% were undecided.
• More loyal attitudes toward the presence of big business representatives in parliament are observed among people with higher levels of education and higher incomes.
• The majority of respondents (58%) believe that political parties should finance parliamentary election campaigns from the income and savings of party leaders. At the same time, 24% believe campaigns should be financed through voters’ contributions to party campaign funds, 22% — through sponsorship from big business, 9% — through state funding, 3% suggested other options, and 12% were undecided.
• According to 81% of respondents, the state should conclude an agreement with big business on returning part of capital to state ownership. Only 5% disagree with this idea, while 14% were undecided. Support for such an agreement is highest in Kyiv, the Center, the North, Galicia, and the West, and lowest in Kharkiv region.
• When asked what the state should do with large enterprises owned by oligarchs, 45% supported conducting objective investigations and returning only illegally obtained enterprises to state ownership, 36% supported nationalizing all large enterprises owned by oligarchs, 11% supported allowing owners to compensate for illegally obtained assets while retaining ownership, and only 2% supported taking no action. Another 6% were undecided.
• Over the past three months, the share of respondents supporting full nationalization of large enterprises decreased (from 44% to 36%), while support increased for investigations and the return of only illegally obtained enterprises (from 36% to 45%).
• Most respondents believe that both high-ranking officials and representatives of big business convicted of embezzlement of state property should receive maximum prison sentences. This position is supported by 68% regarding high-ranking officials and 62% regarding big business representatives. Providing at least minimum prison sentences is supported by 12% (for officials) and 15% (for business representatives). Approximately equal shares support suspended sentences combined with bans on holding public office (8% and 9% respectively). Only 1% support no punishment, and about 5% were undecided.
• About 30% of respondents would like to start their own business, while 55% would not. Only 3% stated they already own a business, and 12% were undecided. Over the past year, the share of those willing to engage in entrepreneurship increased slightly (from 27% to 30%), while the share of those unwilling decreased. At the same time, the share of those already running a business decreased (from 5% to 3%).
• Entrepreneurial aspirations are highest among residents of Kyiv, the West, Galicia, and the Center, as well as among men and younger people.
• 47% of respondents positively assess their chances of starting a business within the next one to two years, 46% believe they have no such chances, and 6% were undecided. Compared to the previous year, the share of those optimistic about entrepreneurial prospects decreased (from 54% to 47%), while skepticism increased.
• Regarding the idea of free sale of agricultural land, the majority of respondents (74%) have a negative attitude, 13% support the idea, and 12% were undecided. Over the past two years, there has been a slight increase in support for free agricultural land sales (from 9% in 2012, 11% in 2013, to 13% in 2014).

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held in early July 2014, about 60% of voters would have taken part in them. The highest level of mobilization was recorded in Galicia, Kyiv, the Center, and the West (around 80%). The lowest level was recorded in Donbas (27%) and in the South of the country (37%).
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in early July 2014, the Solidarity party would have won. Thus, 23% of respondents (among those who would have participated in the elections) would have voted for Solidarity, 13% for the Radical Party, 11% for Batkivshchyna, 7% for UDAR, and 5% for Civic Position. Around 4% of voters were ready to vote for Svoboda and the Communist Party. Around 3% would have been received by Strong Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and Front for Change. The party of O. Bohomolets would have received slightly less than 2%, while Right Sector and Self-Reliance (A. Sadovyi) would have received around 1%. About 4% of voters would have supported other parties, and 16% were undecided.
• Slightly more than one third of respondents (38%) were completely confident in their party choice. One third (32%) admitted they could change their choice, and nearly the same share (30%) were not confident in their choice or had not decided.
• Voters of the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, the Radical Party, UDAR, and Solidarity were the most confident in their choice compared to others.
• At the same time, an absolute majority of respondents believed that the new parliament should have fewer Members of Parliament than currently. Thus, 84% of respondents considered 300–350 MPs to be the optimal number. Only 4% believed there should be 450 MPs as at present, while 12% were undecided.
• The only politicians with a positive balance of trust versus distrust were P. Poroshenko, A. Yatsenyuk, and A. Hrytsenko. A significant level of trust was also recorded for V. Klitschko, O. Liashko, and O. Bohomolets. Respondents expressed the highest levels of distrust toward M. Dobkin, R. Akhmetov, and S. Tihipko.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, more than half of respondents (58%) believe that Russian intelligence services are behind the armed confrontations in Eastern Ukraine, while half (49%) believe that the entourage of former President V. Yanukovych is involved. Another quarter place responsibility on the Party of Regions (28%) and local oligarchs (24%). Every fifth respondent (18%) believes the confrontations are driven by local residents dissatisfied with the policies of the new government; 15% attribute them to radical nationalist organizations, 11% to Western intelligence services, and 6% to Ukrainian intelligence services. Four percent chose another option, and 11% were undecided.
• Compared to the April survey, the number of those who consider the entourage of former President Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and Western and Ukrainian intelligence services to be involved in the confrontations in the East has increased. At the same time, the share of those who believe local residents dissatisfied with the new government are responsible has decreased.
• Regionally, in Western and Central Ukraine, more respondents began to believe that the former President’s entourage is involved, while in the South fewer respondents hold this view. The Party of Regions is also blamed more often in the West, North, and Center. Compared to the previous survey, local residents dissatisfied with the new government are mentioned more often in the West, but less often in the East, South, and Donbas.
• In Donbas, more respondents began blaming Russian intelligence services and radical nationalist organizations. In this region, as well as in the South, there has been an increase in the number of those who believe local oligarchs and Western intelligence services are involved in the confrontations in Eastern Ukraine.
• When asked, “How would you assess the current state of relations between Ukraine and Russia?”, the majority (57%) described it as a war, 19% as a political conflict, 8% as a temporary misunderstanding, 6% as an economic conflict, 1% chose another option, and 9% were undecided. In most regions, respondents described relations as a war, except in Donbas and Kharkiv, where respondents were more likely to describe them as a political conflict.
• More than half of respondents (58%) believe Ukraine should completely close its border with Russia, 34% oppose this, and 8% are undecided. Border closure is supported in most regions except the South, Kharkiv, and Donbas.
• At the same time, half of respondents (49%) believe that a visa regime with Russia should be introduced, 41% oppose it, and 10% are undecided. Opposition to a visa regime is strongest in the South, Kharkiv, and Donbas.
• A large majority of respondents (75%) support a unitary state structure for Ukraine, 12% support a federal structure, and 13% are undecided. Over the previous three months, support for a unitary state increased (from 69% in April to 75% in July). Support for a unitary system is lowest in Donbas, among urban residents, and among Russian-speaking respondents. Donbas is the only region where a relative plurality (40%) supports a federal structure (29% unitary, 31% undecided). In all other regions, support for a unitary state prevails.
• Separation of Galicia from Ukraine is rather supported by 9% of respondents, rather opposed by 81%, and 10% are undecided. Over the previous two years, support for separation of Galicia increased from 5% in 2012 to 10% in 2014. Support for this idea is highest in Donbas, Kharkiv, the South, and Dnipro, as well as among supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine.
• Separation of Donbas is supported by 11%, opposed by 81%, and 8% are undecided. Over the past two years, support for separation increased from 2% in 2012 to 11% in 2014. The highest support is in Donbas itself (37%), about 10% in the South, Kharkiv region, Galicia, and Dnipro, and among supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine.
• Regarding integration choices, 61% of respondents support joining the European Union, 20% support joining the Customs Union, and 19% are undecided. Since April, support for EU integration has increased while support for the Customs Union has decreased. The highest support for the Customs Union is in Donbas (58%), Kharkiv region (42%), and the South (29%).
• If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held today, 44% would support joining, 35% would oppose it, and 22% would be undecided. Over the previous three months, support for NATO membership increased slightly, while opposition decreased by 11%. At the same time, the share of undecided respondents increased by 7%. Support for NATO membership is highest in Galicia (88%) and lowest in Donbas, Kharkiv region, and the South, where most respondents oppose joining NATO. Support for NATO membership is higher among men and people with higher education.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the 2014 FIFA World Cup generated less interest than the 2010 World Cup and significantly less than EURO 2012. Most fans supported Brazil and Germany, which were also considered the main favorites of the tournament, while Brazil’s chances of winning were assessed as twice as high.
• About one third of the adult population followed the events of the 2014 World Cup. In particular, 14% followed or intended to follow most matches, 9% followed the playoff matches and the final, and another 9% followed only the final. Meanwhile, 65% were not interested in the tournament at all. The highest level of interest was observed in the North, Center, and West of Ukraine. The decrease in overall interest was largely explained by the difficult situation in Eastern Ukraine: while in 2010 the Donbas region showed significant interest in the tournament, in 2014, due to objective circumstances, interest there was the lowest.
• 56% of Ukrainian men and 13% of women followed the World Cup. In 2010, nearly two thirds of men and almost every fifth woman followed World Cup matches. Most fans were young and middle-aged people. Additionally, the higher the level of education and income, the higher the interest in the tournament.
• One third of fans supported Brazil, while 27% supported Germany. The Netherlands were supported by 15%, France by 12%, Argentina by 9%, Portugal by 8%, Belgium by 3%, Uruguay by 2%, and Mexico by 1%. Notably, a significant share of Ukrainians supported teams that did not advance from the group stage: Spain (21%), Italy (15%), England (13%), Portugal (8%), Russia (6%), and Croatia (4%). It is likely that after these teams were eliminated, overall interest in the tournament declined.
• While during EURO 2012 about one quarter of Ukrainian fans supported Russia, during the 2014 World Cup only 6% did so.
• According to respondents, the highest chances of winning were attributed to Brazil (23%), Germany (14%), and the Netherlands (7%). France and Argentina were each named by 3% as potential winners.
• It is also worth noting that in 2012 Ukrainians accurately predicted the winner of the European Football Championship: nearly one third predicted Spain, which ultimately won EURO 2012.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with two other leading polling organizations in mid-May 2014, just one week before the presidential election, Ukrainians demonstrated a very high level of electoral engagement. About 82% of voters said they were definitely or likely to participate in the vote, while 12% said they would not and 6% were undecided. In the presidential election scheduled for May 25, Petro Poroshenko remained the clear frontrunner, supported by 34% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko ranked second with 6.5%, followed by Serhiy Tihipko with 5.8%. Oleh Liashko and Anatoliy Hrytsenko each received just over 4% support, Mykhailo Dobkin 3.5%, and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko 2.2%, while all other candidates polled below 2%. At the same time, nearly 23% of respondents said they had not yet decided whom to vote for, and about 12% stated they would not take part in the election.
• Among those who intended to vote and had already made their choice, Poroshenko’s lead was even more pronounced, with 53.2% support, compared with 10.1% for Tymoshenko and 8.8% for Tihipko, while Liashko and Hrytsenko would each receive just over 6%. When asked to predict the likely winner regardless of their own voting intentions, nearly half of respondents named Poroshenko, while only small shares expected Tymoshenko or Tihipko to win, and more than a third declined to make a forecast.
• The survey also measured views on key political and social issues. A plurality of respondents supported Ukrainian as the sole state language with Russian allowed official use, while others favored granting Russian official status in certain regions or making both Ukrainian and Russian state languages. An overwhelming majority supported Ukraine’s unitary form of government, with fewer than one in six favoring a federal system. Developments in the southeast of the country were most often seen as a form of covert Russian aggression, although significant minorities interpreted them as either a popular uprising or as terrorist acts.

• According to a nationwide study conducted by Rating Group in April 2014 as part of its “People’s TOP” project, which relies exclusively on open-ended questions without any prompted lists, respondents were asked to name their three favorite films. More than 600 different films and television series were mentioned, and only 16% of respondents were unable to name a favorite. The most frequently cited titles included The Magnificent Century: Roxolana, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, The Diamond Arm, The Irony of Fate, Love and Doves, Office Romance, and Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, along with a number of other iconic Soviet and post-Soviet productions.
• Clear regional patterns emerged in cultural preferences. In Western Ukraine, Roxolana, Power, Brigade, The Engagement Ring, and Angelika were mentioned more often than elsewhere. In the Center, respondents more frequently named Gentlemen of Fortune, Cops, Wedding in Malynivka, Twilight, and The Matrix. In the North, favorites included Interns, Operation “Y”, Titanic, The Fifth Element, and Doctor House. In the East, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, Office Romance, Seventeen Moments of Spring, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, and The Caucasian Captive were particularly popular. In Donbas, the most frequently mentioned films were The Diamond Arm, Love and Doves, Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, White Sun of the Desert, and Gone with the Wind, while in the South viewers preferred The Irony of Fate, Girls, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, The Three Musketeers, and the series Glukhar.
• Gender and age differences were also pronounced. Men tended to prefer adventure films, comedies, action movies, historical films, and crime dramas such as The Diamond Arm, Only Old Men Are Going to Battle, Operation “Y”, Cops, Brigade, Glukhar, 9th Company, Die Hard, Brother, and Star Wars. Women more often chose melodramas and comedies, including Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, The Irony of Fate, Office Romance, Love and Doves, Girls, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, Titanic, Pretty Woman, as well as the television series Roxolana and Power. Older respondents showed a stronger preference for classic Soviet films and for Roxolana, while younger people were more inclined toward contemporary international cinema such as Titanic, Avatar, Pretty Woman, and Die Hard, and middle-aged respondents gravitated more toward series such as Brigade and Cops.
• Language and place of residence also shaped preferences. Ukrainian-speaking respondents more often named Roxolana, Power, Gentlemen of Fortune, and For Two Hares, while bilingual respondents favored The Irony of Fate, Girls, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, Matchmakers, and Twilight. Russian-speaking respondents more frequently chose Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, Office Romance, Love and Doves, and The Caucasian Captive. Urban residents preferred The Irony of Fate, The Diamond Arm, The Caucasian Captive, Office Romance, Ivan Vasilievich Changes Profession, Gentlemen of Fortune, Avatar, and Titanic, while rural residents more often cited Roxolana, Power, Spring on Zarechnaya Street, Cops, Matchmakers, The Dawns Here Are Quiet, Die Hard, and 9th Company.
• When classified by country of origin, the majority of favorite films were of Soviet origin, accounting for about 40% of all mentions, while one third were foreign productions, around one fifth were Russian, and only 5% were Ukrainian. Foreign films were most popular in the West and in the Northern and Central regions, while Soviet films dominated in the East, South, and Donbas. Russian films were mentioned least often both in the West and in Donbas. Soviet films were more popular among women, older people, urban residents, and those with lower incomes, while Russian films were more often favored by men. Ukrainian films were more frequently chosen by rural residents and older, lower-income groups, whereas younger, more affluent, Ukrainian-speaking respondents tended to prefer foreign cinema.
• Two thirds of all favorite titles mentioned were feature films and one third were television series. Feature films were especially dominant in Donbas, while series were most popular in the West. Preference for feature films increased with higher levels of education and income and was more common among men and Russian-speaking urban residents, whereas series were more often favored by women, Ukrainian-speaking rural residents, and people with lower incomes.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in late April 2014, electoral engagement in Ukraine remained high, with more than three quarters of respondents saying they would definitely or likely participate in the presidential election. After accounting for those who were not fully certain about their participation, the expected turnout was estimated at around 64 percent, with the highest participation projected in the West, North, and Center of the country, and the lowest in Donbas and the South, where voter activity had declined sharply compared to previous waves.
• In the presidential race, Petro Poroshenko remained the clear frontrunner. Among all respondents, 34.3% were ready to vote for him, compared with 11.1% for Yulia Tymoshenko and 5.7% for Serhiy Tihipko. Mykhailo Dobkin and Anatoliy Hrytsenko followed with around 4% each, while Oleh Liashko, Petro Symonenko, Oleh Tiahnybok, and Olha Bohomolets attracted smaller shares of support. Among likely voters, Poroshenko’s lead was even more pronounced, exceeding 40 percent nationwide, and he was the leading candidate in all regions except Donbas, where Dobkin ranked first amid extremely high levels of indecision and non-participation.
• Voter choice was relatively stable, particularly among supporters of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, and almost half of respondents said they supported their preferred candidate because they genuinely liked them and approved of their program and actions, although a substantial share admitted voting mainly because the alternatives were seen as worse. In all tested second-round scenarios, Poroshenko would defeat his main rivals by wide margins, although turnout in Donbas and parts of the South would drop significantly regardless of the pairing.
• Public willingness to endure economic hardship in exchange for future improvement increased markedly compared to March, especially in the West, North, and Center, while residents of Donbas and the South were much less prepared to accept short-term sacrifices. Attitudes toward oligarch-owned enterprises were divided between those favoring full nationalization and those preferring to return only illegally obtained assets to the state, with radical nationalization most popular among older, lower-income voters and supporters of the Communist Party.
• Most Ukrainians believed that the price paid to Russia for gas was above the market level and strongly supported keeping the gas transit system in state ownership. Support for reducing or completely ending purchases of Russian gas had grown substantially, and a large majority were ready to save gas, heating, or electricity if this would strengthen Ukraine’s position in relations with Russia, although willingness to do so was much lower in Donbas and the South.
• Regarding the protests in eastern Ukraine, a majority of respondents attributed them primarily to Russian special services and the entourage of former President Viktor Yanukovych, while significant shares also pointed to local oligarchs, the Party of Regions, and discontented local residents. Views varied regionally, with residents in the East, South, and especially Donbas more likely to see the protests as driven by local grievances.
• On how the Ukrainian authorities should respond to protesters calling for secession, opinions were split between those favoring negotiations while preserving territorial integrity and those supporting tough measures, including the use of force if necessary. In the event of a Russian military incursion across mainland borders, a majority of Ukrainians supported armed resistance to defend the country, although large minorities in the South, East, and Donbas preferred negotiations. About 44% of respondents said they were personally ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms, with the highest readiness observed in the West, North, and Center, as well as among younger, male, more educated, and higher-income respondents.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in April 2014, one third of Ukrainians reported that they regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while almost half said they do not. Since 2010, the share of those expressing nostalgia for the USSR has declined by nearly one and a half times, while the proportion of those who do not regret its collapse has grown steadily. This shift accelerated over the last year, reflecting a rapid transformation of public attitudes. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union is more widespread in the East, South, and especially in Donbas, while it is significantly lower in the Center of the country. Older people, those with lower levels of education and income, and ethnic Russians are more likely to regret the collapse of the USSR, while among ethnic Ukrainians this sentiment has declined sharply over the past year.
• Public attitudes toward historical and political figures also reveal deep and shifting divisions. Half of respondents expressed a positive view of Peter the Great, although this figure has declined in recent years, while around 30% hold a negative opinion. He is viewed more favorably in the East, South, Donbas, and to a lesser extent in the Center and North, and ethnic Russians tend to evaluate him slightly more positively than ethnic Ukrainians. Ivan Mazepa is viewed positively by 41% of respondents and negatively by 30%, with the strongest support in the West, Center, and North, and a much weaker but still notable level of support in the South and East. Ethnic Ukrainians are far more likely than ethnic Russians to hold positive views of Mazepa, and higher education is associated with more favorable attitudes.
• Joseph Stalin is viewed negatively by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, with only one in five expressing a positive attitude. Negative views of Stalin have grown significantly in recent years, although he retains more support in Donbas and the South, as well as among older, less educated, and lower-income respondents and among ethnic Russians. Stepan Bandera remains a highly polarizing figure: nearly one third of respondents view him positively, while almost half hold negative opinions. However, positive attitudes toward Bandera have increased substantially over the past two years, especially in Western Ukraine, and are more common among younger, more educated respondents and ethnic Ukrainians.
• Vladimir Putin is viewed overwhelmingly negatively, with more than three quarters of respondents expressing unfavorable opinions. This represents a dramatic shift from late 2013, when positive views outnumbered negative ones. Only in Donbas does a majority still hold positive attitudes toward him, while in all other regions negative views dominate, particularly in the Center, North, and West. Ethnic Russians are far more likely to view Putin positively than ethnic Ukrainians, although even among ethnic Russians he no longer enjoys majority support.
• These attitudes form coherent ideological patterns. Those who regret the collapse of the USSR are far more likely to view figures such as Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin positively, while those who do not regret the Soviet collapse are much more likely to hold positive views of Mazepa and Bandera and strongly negative views of Stalin and Putin. At the same time, even among those who admire Peter the Great, attitudes toward Putin have shifted sharply, with many now viewing him more negatively than figures historically associated with Ukrainian independence.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group as part of a joint project with three other leading polling organizations in April 2014, Ukrainians demonstrated a very high level of electoral engagement, with around 85% of voters saying they were definitely or likely to participate in the upcoming election, while only 11% expressed the opposite view. In the presidential election scheduled for May 25, 2014, Petro Poroshenko was the clear frontrunner, supported by 32.9% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko ranked second with 9.5%, followed by Serhiy Tihipko with 5.1%. Mykhailo Dobkin was supported by 4.2% of voters, while Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko received 4%. At the same time, about 22% of respondents said they had not yet decided whom to vote for or would not participate, and 9% stated they were ready to vote “against all.”
• Among those who intended to vote and had already made their choice, the leading candidates were even more clearly defined. Petro Poroshenko would receive 48.4% of the vote, Yulia Tymoshenko 14%, and Serhiy Tihipko 7.4%, while Mykhailo Dobkin and Petro Symonenko would receive 6% and 5.6%, respectively. Respondents were also asked to make their own prediction about who would become the next President of Ukraine regardless of their personal voting intentions. Here again, Petro Poroshenko was seen as the most likely winner, with 38.7% expecting his victory. Only 8.6% predicted a win for Yulia Tymoshenko, and 2.5% for Serhiy Tihipko, while 1.9% believed Mykhailo Dobkin would win. Nearly half of all respondents did not venture a forecast.
• The survey also explored attitudes toward language policy, state structure, and foreign relations. A plurality of respondents supported Ukrainian as the only state language with Russian allowed as an official language, while others favored granting Russian official status in certain regions or making both languages state languages. A strong majority of Ukrainians supported the unitary form of the state, while fewer than one in five favored a federal system. In relations with Russia, most respondents preferred friendly relations with open borders and no visas or customs while maintaining independence, whereas about one third favored a relationship similar to that with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs. Only a small minority supported unification with Russia.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre in late March and early April 2014, most Ukrainians expressed clear preferences regarding the country’s future institutional, linguistic, and geopolitical orientation. If a referendum were to be held on key issues such as the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the territorial structure of the state, and Ukraine’s integration choices, 82.7% of voters said they would definitely or likely participate. Among those willing to take part, 71.4% would vote for a unitary state, while only 17.1% would support federalization. Nearly 60% would support Ukrainian as the only state language, while 36.5% would oppose this. A similar share would vote in favor of joining the European Union, compared to about a quarter who would prefer accession to the Customs Union, while support for NATO membership would be notably weaker, with less than 40% in favor and nearly half opposed.
• When calculated among all respondents rather than only likely participants, the results show a similarly strong preference for a unitary system with decentralization, supported by more than two thirds, while fewer than one in five would vote for a federal structure. On language policy, a majority would support Ukrainian as the sole state language with free use of Russian, while a substantial minority would favor both Ukrainian and Russian as state languages. In terms of Ukraine’s integration path, a majority would support joining the European Union, whereas less than one quarter would favor the Customs Union. NATO membership would be backed by just over one third of respondents, while almost half would oppose it.
• Public opinion was also tested on a range of concrete policy options for Ukraine’s future. Support for signing the Association Agreement with the European Union and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was high, with around 60% in favor. In contrast, ideas of political or state integration with Russia were overwhelmingly rejected: only one fifth supported a union state with Russia and Belarus, fewer than one in ten supported Ukraine becoming part of the Russian Federation, and a similar share favored their own region joining Russia. Joining the CIS Collective Security Treaty was supported by less than one in five, while a clear majority opposed it. Nearly half of respondents favored maintaining Ukraine’s non-aligned status, and most opposed introducing a visa regime with Russia. Opinions on withdrawing from the CIS were divided almost evenly.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre in late March and early April 2014, public attitudes toward key state institutions and political leaders were highly differentiated. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov received full support from 21.1% of respondents, while 32.8% said they supported some of his actions and 38.5% did not support his activities. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was viewed more favorably: 30.8% fully supported his work, 28.0% supported some of his actions, and 35.5% did not support him. The Cabinet of Ministers as a whole was fully supported by 20.6% of respondents, partially supported by 33.9%, and not supported by 36.8%, while the Verkhovna Rada received full support from 15.6%, partial support from 38.7%, and no support from 38.0%.
• Support for the security institutions was the highest it had been in several years. The Armed Forces were fully supported by 37.6% of respondents and partially supported by another 30.9%, with only 22.8% expressing no support. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was fully supported by 17.5% and partially supported by 32.3%, while 34.7% did not support its activities. The police were fully supported by 13.6% and partially supported by 32.5%, while 42.2% expressed no support. Levels of support for state institutions were significantly higher in the Western and Central regions than in the South and East. For example, only 15.5% in the West and 24.1% in the Center did not support the acting president, compared with 46.7% in the South and 64.2% in the East.
• Electoral mobilization was very high: 85.4% of respondents said they intended to participate in the early presidential election, including 62.2% who were fully certain and another 23.2% who said they were likely to vote. If the election had taken place in the days of the survey, Petro Poroshenko would have received the support of 28.2% of all respondents. Yulia Tymoshenko followed with 13.0%, Serhiy Tihipko with 6.1%, Olha Bohomolets and Oleh Liashko with 3.7% each, Mykhailo Dobkin with 3.6%, Petro Symonenko with 3.2%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko with 3.0%, Oleh Tiahnybok with 1.6%, Dmytro Yarosh with 1.2%, Renat Kuzmin with 0.2%, and Vadym Rabinovych with 0.1%.
• Compared with the previous joint survey conducted by four polling organizations in mid-March 2014, when Vitali Klitschko was still included in the list of candidates, electoral support increased for Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Serhiy Tihipko.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted by Rating Group, a clear majority of Ukrainians believe that the top priorities for reform are fighting corruption and reforming the economy. Sixty-three percent of respondents named anti-corruption reform as the most urgent task, while 61% pointed to the economy. At the same time, 42% believe reforms are needed in the army and defense sector, and 33% emphasized the importance of ensuring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Health care reform was mentioned by 35% of respondents, social protection by 30%, industry by 28%, agriculture by 25%, and the police by 21%. Regional differences are evident: in Western Ukraine the strongest demand is for reforms of the army and territorial integrity, in the East and Donbas for economic and industrial reform, in the South for agriculture, and in the Center for health care, although across all regions fighting corruption remains the top priority.
• When asked about the key criteria for lustration in Ukraine, more than half of respondents named involvement in corruption schemes as the main basis for applying lustration. Far fewer pointed to political corruption, changes in political orientation, adherence to certain ideologies seen as harmful to the country, or involvement in human rights violations during recent protests. At the same time, one in ten respondents opposed lustration altogether, arguing that it could further destabilize the country, while another 12% were undecided. A strong majority believe that lustration should apply to all individuals involved in corruption and illegal actions regardless of their political affiliation or the period in which they were in power, while smaller groups favor limiting it to specific political periods such as 2010–2014 or 2005–2009.
• Most Ukrainians also support the idea of forming a coalition government that would include representatives of all major political forces from all regions of the country. This idea is particularly popular in the West, North, and East of Ukraine. There is also broad public support for the entry of new leaders into politics, especially through participation in parliamentary and presidential elections. Around four in ten respondents fully support this idea, and another third are rather supportive than opposed. Support for new leaders is slightly stronger with regard to parliamentary elections than presidential ones, while only about one in ten respondents are against it, and one in six remain undecided. Support for new presidential candidates is highest in the West and North and lowest in Donbas, the East, and the Center of the country.
• In choosing a candidate to vote for, the most important criterion for voters is an untainted reputation free of corruption, followed by the personal qualities of the politician, the candidate’s political program, and a consistent, stable political position. Regarding Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation, 38% of respondents believe the Association Agreement with the European Union and the free trade area should be signed as soon as possible, with support particularly high in Western Ukraine. Another 21% favor signing the agreement once Ukraine is ready, while nearly a third do not support signing it at all. Support for NATO membership is more divided: 28% favor submitting an application as soon as possible, another 14% support doing so once a societal consensus is reached, and 44% oppose NATO membership altogether. In contrast, only a minority support joining the Customs Union, while a majority are against it.
• The data also show that supporters of new political leaders are significantly more likely to back European integration and NATO membership than those who oppose new leaders, while the opposite pattern is observed with regard to the Customs Union.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, more than half of Kyiv residents definitely planned to participate in the Kyiv mayoral and Kyiv City Council elections scheduled for May 25, 2014, while nearly another 30% answered “rather yes than no.” It is important to note that the survey was conducted on March 22–28, before it became known that Vitalii Klitschko withdrew from the presidential race and decided to run for Kyiv mayor.
• In the Kyiv City Council elections, party ratings were as follows: 19% of those intending to vote would support Batkivshchyna, 16% UDAR, 10% the European Party, 7% the Radical Party, 6% each Svoboda and Civic Position, 3% each Right Sector, Democratic Alliance and the Party of Regions, and 2% the Communist Party. Almost 20% were undecided. If the Solidarity party (Petro Poroshenko) had been included on the list, the ratings would have been as follows: 25% for Solidarity, 14% for Batkivshchyna, 11% for UDAR, 8% for the European Party, 5% each for Svoboda and the Radical Party, 4% for Civic Position, 3% for Right Sector, and 2% each for the Party of Regions, Democratic Alliance and the Communist Party. Almost 17% would have been undecided. The largest vote transfers to Solidarity would have come from UDAR and Batkivshchyna.
• Among proposed candidates for the position of Kyiv mayor, the leaders of electoral preferences were Mykola Katerynchuk (12% among those intending to vote), followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko (11%), Oleh Liashko (8%), Volodymyr Bondarenko (8%), and Yurii Lutsenko (8%). About 5% were ready to support Volodymyr Makeienko, about 4% each Vyacheslav Kyrylenko and Lesia Orobets, about 3% Andrii Illienko, 2% Tetiana Montian, and 1% Ihor Lutsenko. Every tenth respondent would choose another candidate for mayor, and nearly 24% were undecided. The idea of holding mayoral elections in two rounds was supported by 44% of Kyiv residents, while almost the same share (42%) opposed it, and 14% were undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in March 2014, a clear majority of respondents consider a unitary state to be the most optimal form of government for Ukraine. Sixty-one percent support a unitary system, while 24% prefer a federal structure, and 15% remain undecided. Compared to 2011, support for a unitary state increased substantially from 50% to 61%, while support for federalization remained almost unchanged.
• The unitary model is supported in most regions of the country, with the exception of Donbas, where a majority favors a federal system. At the same time, only a small minority of Ukrainians believe that Crimea should be separated and transferred to Russia. Most respondents support either maintaining Crimea’s autonomy within Ukraine or granting it the status of a regular oblast. Over the past three years, support for autonomy within Ukraine increased markedly, while support for granting Crimea the status of a regular region declined, and the share of those favoring separation remained marginal and largely unchanged. Those who support transferring Crimea to Russia are concentrated mainly in the South of the country.
• When asked directly about the separation of Crimea from Ukraine, an overwhelming majority oppose this idea, and only a small minority support it. A similar pattern is observed regarding the possible separation of Donbas or Galicia, with the vast majority of respondents rejecting these scenarios. Although support for territorial separation has increased slightly over the previous two years, these attitudes have grown primarily in Crimea and Donbas and do not dominate in any region. Even among Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian respondents, no more than a quarter support the separation of Crimea or Donbas, while roughly 70% are opposed.

• According to surveys conducted by Rating Group in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa, an absolute majority of residents are satisfied with living in their cities. The highest levels of satisfaction were recorded in Kharkiv, where 90% of respondents said they like living in their city, as well as in Odesa, Lviv, and Kyiv. The lowest shares were found in Dnipropetrovsk (80%) and Donetsk (78%), where only about one third of residents reported being very satisfied.
• Kyiv is most commonly perceived by its residents as a green city with a large share of young people, a rich history, and many monuments, making it one of the most attractive cities in Ukraine for tourists. Kyiv is also seen as the city offering the greatest opportunities for children’s development and for work and income generation. At the same time, Kyiv residents are the least likely among all surveyed cities to say that people in their city know how to work well.
• Lviv is viewed by most of its residents as an attractive tourist city with a rich history, beautiful architecture, many monuments, and a strong café culture. Compared to other cities, Lviv is most often described as religious and spiritual, quiet, cozy, and safe. However, it is also perceived as providing the fewest opportunities for work and income, as well as for children’s development, which is reflected in the lowest assessment of education quality. Residents are also dissatisfied with the number of shopping and entertainment centers and with the convenience of transportation.
• For Kharkiv residents, their city is a green urban environment with many shopping and entertainment centers and a large share of young people. Many respondents also highlight its architecture, monuments, and numerous cafés. Kharkiv is perceived as quiet, tidy, and environmentally clean, which distinguishes it from other cities. It also receives the highest ratings for education, roads, and healthcare, making it a city of significant opportunities combined with a relatively low cost of living.
• In Dnipropetrovsk, the most distinctive feature for residents is the large number of young people. The city is seen as industrial but with many shopping and entertainment centers, cafés, and restaurants. Dnipropetrovsk is regarded as the most politically active city and one that plays an important role in the country’s development. At the same time, it is not perceived as environmentally clean, quiet, or tidy, nor as attractive for tourists, and residents frequently point to poor roads.
• Donetsk is perceived by its residents as an industrial city with many parks, squares, and shopping and entertainment centers. More than half of respondents highlighted its particularly interesting sports life, making Donetsk a clear leader among Ukrainian cities on this indicator. Cultural life, historical heritage, architecture, spirituality, and respect for traditions are mentioned much less often. Donetsk also scores lowest on education quality and on opportunities for children’s development, work, and income.
• Most residents of Odesa consider their city to have a rich history, beautiful architecture, and many monuments. It is viewed as highly attractive for tourists due to its traditions, the most interesting cultural life, and good food. Odesa also stands out for having friendly and pleasant people who know how to enjoy life. However, it receives the lowest ratings for road and healthcare quality and for affordability of living, and it is perceived as one of the least politically active cities.
• Young people tend to see their hometown primarily as a center of leisure, with many cafés, attractive people, and an interesting sports life. Middle-aged residents are more likely to emphasize cultural life, job opportunities, and affordability. Older respondents place greater importance on spirituality, history, monuments, cleanliness, and coziness.
• Most respondents believe that developments in their own cities are moving in the right direction, especially in Donetsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Lviv, while Kyiv residents are the most critical, and a large share of Dnipropetrovsk residents remain undecided. At the national level, however, respondents generally believe that Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction, particularly in Odesa and Kyiv, while Donetsk and Kharkiv show more optimism. Residents of all cities except Kyiv tend to evaluate past changes in their cities positively, with Kharkiv and Lviv being the most optimistic. Nearly one third of Kyiv residents assess past changes negatively. Expectations for the coming year are most positive in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, while Kyiv shows the highest level of negative expectations, and residents of Odesa and Donetsk generally expect no major changes.
• Most respondents identify Kharkiv and Kyiv as the country’s leading cities. About one in eight respondents classify their city as average compared to other regional centers. Residents of Donetsk, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk are more modest in their assessments, with about one third placing their cities among the average. Lviv residents are the most reserved, with roughly half calling their city a leader and about 40% describing it as average.

• Rating Group continues the “People’s TOP” project, which consists of a series of studies aimed at identifying the best of the best. The special feature of the methodology is that respondents are given no lists or prompts and express their opinions only through open-ended questions, naming their own options. This time the question was: “Name your THREE favorite songs.”
• Determining Ukrainians’ favorite songs turned out to be quite difficult. During the survey, respondents named around 800 songs, while one quarter were unable to name a favorite song. In order to compile a ranking from the 800 named songs, a TOP-30 of the most popular songs was identified and the weight of each song within the TOP-30 structure was calculated.
• Thus, according to the results of the study, the most favorite song of Ukrainians is “Chervona Ruta” (its share in the TOP-30 is 14.3%). Other favorite songs include “Chornobryvtsi” (5%), “Odna Kalyna” (4.3%), “Nese Halia Vodu” (4.1%), “Oi, Smereko” (3.9%), “Million Alykh Roz,” “Khutorianka,” “Ridna Maty Moia,” and “Katyusha” (3.6% each), “Aisberg” and “Den Pobedy” (3.3% each), “O Bozhe, Kakoi Muzhchina” (3.2%), “Cheremshyna” and “Oi, na hori dva dubky” (3% each).
• Based on the named favorite songs, a TOP-30 of the most popular performers was also identified and the weight of each within the TOP-30 structure calculated. Thus, the most popular performers are Sofia Rotaru (share in the TOP-30 14.3%) and Alla Pugacheva (11.2%). In Sofia Rotaru’s repertoire the most popular song is “Chervona Ruta,” while among Alla Pugacheva’s songs the most popular are “Million Alykh Roz” and “Aisberg.”
• Also included in the TOP-30 of popular performers are Stas Mikhailov (8.4%), Okean Elzy (4.7%), Grigory Leps (4.2%), Ani Lorak (4.1%), Taisia Povaliy (3.6%), Mikhail Krug and the group Lyube (3.5% each), Nikolai Baskov (3.2%), and Mykola Hnatiuk (3.1%).
• In the West, songs more popular than in other regions include “Chervona Ruta,” “Khutorianka,” “Oi, Smereko,” “Oi, na hori dva dubky,” and “Vodohrai.” Among performers: Sofia Rotaru, Okean Elzy, Mykola Hnatiuk, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, and Nazar Yaremchuk.
  In the Center: “Ridna Maty Moia,” “Nese Halia Vodu,” “Vsyo dlia tebya,” and “Rozpriahaitе, khloptsi, koni.” Among performers: Grigory Leps, Elena Vaenga, Oksana Bilozir, and Oleg Gazmanov.
  In the North, more favorite songs are “Oi, u vyshnevomu sadu,” “Nich yaka misyachna,” “Cheremshyna,” “Nadezhda,” and “Belye rozy.” Among performers: Okean Elzy, Nina Matviyenko, TIK, Alisa, and Madonna.
  Residents of the East and Donbas more often chose “Katyusha,” “Oi, moroz, moroz,” “Smuglyanka,” “Ah, kakaya zhenshchina,” and “Den Pobedy.” More popular performers in the East are Alla Pugacheva, Stas Mikhailov, Ani Lorak, Nikolai Baskov, and Sergey Trofimov. In Donbas — Mikhail Krug, Mikhail Shufutinsky, and Mikhail Boyarsky.
  In the South, favorite songs include “Aisberg,” “Lavanda,” and “A belyi lebed na prudu.” Among performers, Taisia Povaliy, Lyube, and Maya Kristalinskaya are more popular.
• Men more often prefer songs such as “Oi, Smereko,” “Den Pobedy,” “Rozpriahaitе, khloptsi, koni,” “Smuglyanka,” “Oi, chyi to kin stoit,” “Sharmanka,” and “Ryumka vodki na stole.” Their favorite performers are Lyube, Okean Elzy, Mikhail Krug, and Vladimir Vysotsky.
  Women prefer “Chervona Ruta,” “Odna Kalyna,” “Chornobryvtsi,” “O Bozhe, kakoi muzhchina,” “Aisberg,” “Million Alykh Roz,” and “Lavanda.” Among women, the most popular performers are Sofia Rotaru, Alla Pugacheva, Stas Mikhailov, Ani Lorak, Taisia Povaliy, and Natalie.
• With age, the popularity of songs such as “Chervona Ruta,” “Katyusha,” “Odna Kalyna,” and “Oi, moroz, moroz” increases. Modern songs such as “O Bozhe, kakoi muzhchina,” “Belye rozy,” “Sharmanka,” and “Vsyo dlia tebya” are favorites among young people and those of middle age.
• Those who consider Ukrainian their native language prefer “Chervona Ruta,” “Nese Halia Vodu,” “Oi, Smereko,” “Ridna Maty Moia,” “Oi, na hori dva dubky,” and “Oi, chyi to kin stoit.”
  Those who consider both languages native prefer “Odna Kalyna,” “Chornobryvtsi,” “Nich yaka misyachna,” “Aisberg,” and “Rozpriahaitе, khloptsi, koni.”
  Russian-speaking respondents more often chose “Katyusha,” “Oi, moroz, moroz,” “Smuglyanka,” “Den Pobedy,” “Million Alykh Roz,” and “Ah, kakaya zhenshchina.”
• Favorite songs of urban residents include “Million Alykh Roz,” “Katyusha,” “O Bozhe, kakoi muzhchina,” “Smuglyanka,” “Belye rozy,” “A belyi lebed na prudu,” “Nadezhda,” and “Oi, u vyshnevomu sadu.”
  Among rural residents, dominant favorites are “Chervona Ruta,” “Nese Halia Vodu,” “Oi, Smereko,” “Cheremshyna,” “Oi, na hori dva dubky,” “Odna Kalyna,” “Ridna Maty Moia,” and “Sharmanka.”
• Respondents’ answers were also grouped by period of creation (before and after the 1990s), language of performance, and musical style.
• In the structure of favorite songs, 51% are from the post-1990s period, while 49% were created before the 1990s.
  Modern songs are more popular in Donbas (57%) and the East (55%), especially among men, Russian-speaking urban residents, youth, people with higher education and higher incomes. Supporters of “older” songs are more common in the West (57%) and Center (51%), more often women, older people with lower education and income.
• In the structure of favorite songs, 53% are Russian-language, 39% Ukrainian-language, and 8% foreign.
  Russian-language songs are more popular in Donbas (65%), the South (63%), the East (62%), and the North (53%).
  Ukrainian-language songs are most popular in the West (65%) and Center (43%).
  Foreign songs appear more often among favorites in Donbas (11%) and the North (10%), and least often in the West (5%).
  Russian-language songs are more loved by Russian-speaking urban residents, while Ukrainian songs are more popular among women, Ukrainian speakers, rural residents, older people, and those with lower education and income.
  Foreign songs are more often chosen by men, young people with higher education, and those with higher incomes.
• In terms of musical style, 48% of favorite songs are pop, 16% folk, 11% rock, 10% chanson. Patriotic songs and romances account for 5% each, bard songs 2%, and club/electronic and classical music 1% each.
• Pop music is much more popular among women.
  Folk songs are more popular in the West (27%), North (16%), and Center (17%); their fans are mainly women, Ukrainian-speaking rural residents, and older people with lower education and income.
  Rock music is more popular in the North (15%) and South (12%), mainly among men, urban residents, youth, people with higher education and income.
  Chanson is most popular in Donbas (16%), the South and East (11% each), and is chosen by men, Russian-speaking urban residents, and middle-aged people with higher incomes.
  Patriotic songs are also more widespread in the East and Donbas (around 8%), and in the North and South (5% each); their listeners are mainly Russian-speaking urban residents of older age with lower education and income.
  Romances are more popular in the East (7%), mainly among Russian-speakers.

• According to the results of a study conducted in December 2013 by the Center for Social and Marketing Research “SOCIS” and the Rating Group, 49.1% of respondents would vote in a referendum for Ukraine joining the European Union, while 29.6% would vote against. Another 21.3% were undecided or would not participate in such a referendum. Among those who had decided, the share of EU supporters would be 62.4%.
• If a referendum on Ukraine joining the Customs Union were held in the near future, 32.5% of Ukrainian citizens would support such a union, while 41.9% would vote against. Another 25.6% were undecided or would not participate.
• When asked to choose between two main foreign policy directions (“Imagine that a referendum is being held now on whether Ukraine should join the European Union or the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. What would be your choice?”), respondents answered as follows: 46.9% would support joining the EU, while 28.9% would vote for joining the Customs Union. Another 24.2% were undecided or would not participate.
• After Ukraine did not sign the EU Association Agreement at the end of November, attitudes toward President Viktor Yanukovych worsened among 45.7% of respondents. At the same time, 15.7% said their attitude improved. For 36.4% attitudes did not change. Another 3.1% were undecided.
• Only 1.8% of respondents assessed the current political situation in Ukraine as “stable”. At the same time, 46.1% described it as “tense”, and 49.4% as “explosive”.
• Half of Ukrainians (49.7%) said they would be ready to go out and protest if living conditions significantly worsened. Meanwhile, 28.5% said they would be ready to tolerate material and other hardships for the sake of maintaining order in the country. Another 21.8% were undecided.
• According to most respondents, civic activity (the Maidan) could influence the current situation in Ukraine: 41.3% said to a large extent, and 29.8% to a small extent. At the same time, almost one in five respondents (18%) believed civic activity would not influence the situation at all. Another 11% were undecided.
• 42% of respondents had a positive attitude toward the fact that after the EU Association Agreement was not signed, people in Kyiv and many other Ukrainian cities went out into the streets and organized protests. 35.6% had a negative attitude, 15.4% were neutral, and 7% were undecided or indifferent.
• 44.7% had a negative attitude toward the blocking of administrative buildings during protests (Presidential Administration, Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, Kyiv City State Administration, etc.). 24.9% had a positive attitude, 15.4% were neutral, and 11.8% were undecided or indifferent.
• At the same time, the overwhelming majority of respondents (73.6%) had a negative attitude toward the dispersal of the rally in Kyiv by the Berkut special police unit on the night of November 30. Only 9% viewed it positively, 11.2% neutrally, and 6.2% were undecided or indifferent.
• At the time of the survey, 0.5% of respondents had participated in events supporting the government, and another 3.5% were ready to participate. Additionally, 12% said they supported pro-government rallies but were not ready to participate. Meanwhile, 75.8% did not support such events. Another 8.1% were undecided.
• On the other hand, 5.7% of respondents had participated in protests against the current government. Another 17.5% were ready to participate. One in five respondents (21.6%) supported such protests but were not ready to participate. At the same time, almost half (47.6%) did not support these actions. Another 7.7% were undecided.
• Attitudes toward the main demands of the opposition and Euromaidan toward the authorities were generally positive.
  
  • 53.3% supported the resignation of Interior Minister Vitalii Zakharchenko, 30.8% did not support it, and 15.9% were undecided.
  • 50.9% supported the resignation of the government led by Mykola Azarov, 37.9% did not support it, and 11.3% were undecided.
  • 46% supported early presidential elections, 42% opposed them, and 12% were undecided.
  • 46.1% supported early parliamentary elections, 40.8% opposed them, and 13.2% were undecided.
• Responsibility for resolving the political crisis was primarily assigned to the President (41.5%), civil society (32.6%), and opposition parties (29.3%). Another 19.1% said new leaders should be the main driving force, 17.3% named the Verkhovna Rada, and 7% named journalists and media representatives. 10.4% were undecided.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents (72.6%) supported the idea of a round table and negotiations between the government and opposition to resolve political contradictions and the crisis. 13.9% did not support negotiations, and 13.4% were undecided.

Electoral preferences of Ukrainian residents

• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 20.2% (among all respondents) would support Viktor Yanukovych, 18.6% Vitalii Klitschko, 9.4% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 7.1% Petro Poroshenko, 5.1% Oleh Tyahnybok, 4.5% Petro Symonenko, and 0.9% Viktor Medvedchuk. Other candidates would receive 4.7%. 14.7% would not participate, and 14.9% were undecided.
• If Yulia Tymoshenko were able to participate, support would be: Yanukovych – 20.1%, Tymoshenko – 16.6%, Klitschko – 16.2%, Poroshenko – 5.7%, Symonenko – 4.5%, Tyahnybok – 3.9%, Medvedchuk – 0.9%. Others – 3.6%. 14.7% would not vote, and 13.9% were undecided.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Klitschko, 25.2% (among all respondents) would vote for Yanukovych and 42.7% for Klitschko. 19.6% would not participate and 12.5% would be undecided. Among those who would vote and had decided, the result would be 63.3% vs. 36.7% in favor of Klitschko.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Yatseniuk, 25.8% would vote for Yanukovych and 35% for Yatseniuk. 24.4% would not participate and 14.8% would be undecided. The result would be 58.2% vs. 41.8% in favor of Yatseniuk.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Poroshenko, 25% would vote for Yanukovych and 33% for Poroshenko. 25.7% would not participate and 16.3% would be undecided. The result would be 57.5% vs. 42.5% in favor of Poroshenko.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, 26.6% would vote for Yanukovych and 32.1% for Tymoshenko. 25.8% would not participate and 15.5% would be undecided. The result would be 55.8% vs. 44.2% in favor of Tymoshenko.
• If the second round included Yanukovych and Tyahnybok, 27.1% would vote for Yanukovych and 28.8% for Tyahnybok. 27.6% would not participate and 16.5% would be undecided. The result would be 52.9% vs. 47.1% in favor of Tyahnybok.
• If parliamentary elections were held soon, party support would be: Party of Regions – 20.2% (among all respondents), Batkivshchyna – 17%, UDAR – 15.9%, Svoboda – 5.6%, Communist Party – 5.5%, Solidarity – 3.6%. Ukrainian Choice – 0.9%, Radical Party of Oleh Liashko – 0.7%, Our Ukraine – 0.3%. Other parties – 2.1%. 15.5% would not vote, and 12.6% were undecided.

• Rating Group continues its People’s TOP project, a series of studies aimed at identifying “the best of the best.” The distinctive feature of the methodology is that respondents are not provided with any lists or prompts and give their answers exclusively through open-ended questions, naming their own options. In this wave, respondents were asked to name their three favorite dishes, regardless of the cuisine of origin. The results show that borshch is by far the most popular dish among Ukrainians, chosen by 44% of respondents. It is followed by varenyky at 18%, especially those filled with cottage cheese, potatoes, and cherries, as well as shashlik at 10%, kholodets at 7%, cutlets at 6%, and pork chops at 5%. Other meat dishes together account for 14%, with sausage, French-style meat, and fried or stewed meat being the most frequently mentioned. About 7% named plov as their favorite dish and 4% roast, while only 4% of respondents chose salo as their top dish. Dumplings were mentioned by 10%, various potato dishes such as mashed potatoes at 11% and fried potatoes at 8% were also very common, while salads were highly popular, including Olivier at 11%, “Shuba” at 4%, and other salads at 10%, such as vegetable, vinaigrette, Greek, crab, meat, and Caesar salads. Fish dishes were named by 10% of respondents, with preferences for fried, stuffed, or jellied fish, herring, and seafood. Around 9% of respondents selected baked goods and desserts such as syrnyky, pies, ice cream, cottage cheese casserole, and fruit, while pancakes were chosen by 4%, mainly with cottage cheese filling. Other soups besides borshch were mentioned by 10%, including okroshka, solyanka, green borshch, broth, cabbage soup, kharcho, pea soup, and rassolnik, while various cereals were mentioned by 4%, mainly buckwheat, milk porridge, oatmeal, and kulish.
• Overall, Ukrainians’ top favorite dishes are borshch, varenyky, and meat-based dishes, with meat clearly preferred over potatoes and far more than fish. The culture of soups and desserts is well developed, and various salads are also relatively popular, even though most of them are not traditionally Ukrainian. Newer dishes such as pizza, chosen by 4%, and sushi, chosen by 2%, are gaining popularity. Ukrainians are generally very willing to share their food preferences, with only 4% unable to name a favorite dish. Regional differences are pronounced: in the West, cabbage rolls, varenyky, and potato pancakes are especially popular; in the Center, fish dishes, kholodets, and salo; in the North, potatoes, soups, and pork chops; in the South, dumplings, fried potatoes, and plov; and in the East and Donbas, salads and meat dishes such as Olivier and shashlik, as well as okroshka and “Shuba” salad.
• Age, education, and gender also shape culinary tastes. With increasing age and lower levels of education, respondents more often choose traditional Ukrainian dishes such as borshch, varenyky, and potatoes. Younger people prefer Olivier salad, shashlik, and fried or baked potatoes, while higher education is associated with a stronger preference for salads, shashlik, and pork chops. Non-traditional dishes such as pizza and sushi are especially popular among young people and those with higher education. Men gravitate toward heavier dishes like varenyky, shashlik, dumplings, fried or baked potatoes, and salo, and they also choose borshch more often than women. Women’s menus are lighter and more diverse, including salads, mashed potatoes, fish dishes, stewed or grilled vegetables, cabbage rolls, cereals, sushi, and desserts. Borshch and Olivier are particularly popular among lower-income respondents. Urban residents more often choose fish dishes, salads, roast, sushi, cakes, and pizza, while rural residents favor traditional foods such as borshch, varenyky, mashed potatoes, and kholodets. Preferences also vary by native language: Ukrainian-speaking respondents more often name borshch, varenyky, kholodets, cabbage rolls, and potatoes; Russian-speaking respondents prefer Olivier, other salads, plov, okroshka, pizza, and shashlik; and those who consider both languages native more often choose cutlets, fried potatoes, and “Shuba” salad.