Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, about one third of Kyiv residents plan to spend the summer at home, and at least one in ten will not have a vacation at all this summer. Another 14% have not yet decided on their summer vacation plans.
• Among those who plan to leave the city this summer, the most popular option is vacationing at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov (18%). At the same time, 13% plan to spend their summer vacation abroad, and 7% — in another city or village in Ukraine. Every sixth Kyiv resident plans to spend their vacation at a country house.
• The overwhelming majority of elderly people will stay in Kyiv this summer, choosing their home or country house as a place for vacation. The younger the respondents, the more likely they are to leave the city for vacation. Almost every fifth respondent aged 18–39 plans a trip abroad.
• As respondents’ education level increases, the share of those planning to leave the city also increases. Only one quarter of people with higher or incomplete higher education will spend their vacation at home, and 10% will not have a vacation at all. At the same time, every fifth respondent with a higher education diploma plans to vacation at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov, while slightly fewer (15%) plan to vacation abroad.
• More than half of women will spend the summer at home, at a country house, or at work. Men are more mobile, especially regarding trips abroad. At the same time, 16% of men have not yet decided where they will spend their vacation this year. Among women, this share is lower.
• In the context of summer vacations, the electoral aspect is also notable. The most “stable” voters (people who consistently participate in elections) are more likely to spend the summer at home or at a country house. At the same time, some electoral groups could experience significant losses. In particular, supporters of V. Klitschko and M. Katerynchuk could be in a less favorable position, as at least one third of their supporters plan foreign trips or vacations at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov, while some plan trips across cities and villages of Ukraine. Meanwhile, P. Poroshenko and O. Popov would be in a more favorable position, as their supporters are mostly older people who plan to spend the summer at home or at a country house.
• Among political parties, the most vulnerable situation is for UDAR, which is supported mainly by young people. At the same time, the largest share of those staying at home is among supporters of the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, and the Party of Regions.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 59% of respondents believe that Ukraine rather lacks a “strong hand” than “democracy” (26%). Every sixth respondent was undecided on this issue.
• At the same time, 42% of respondents believe that Ukraine rather lacks “greater freedom of speech” than “greater censorship” (26%). Every third respondent was undecided.
• Half of respondents believe that Ukraine “needs to develop market relations,” while 31% believe it should “return to a planned economy.” Every fifth respondent was undecided.
• It is noteworthy that one third of supporters of a “strong hand” simultaneously support increasing freedom of speech in the country, and 40% support further development of the market economy.
• Support for a “strong hand” ranges from about 70% of respondents in the South and Donbas to about 50% in the West and North of the country; from about 80% among supporters of the Communist Party and 70% among supporters of the Party of Regions to about half among supporters of UDAR, Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• At the same time, clear correlations are observed: the younger the respondents and the higher their education level, the more likely they are to support deepening democracy, increasing freedom of speech and developing market relations.
• In addition, Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely than Russian-speaking respondents to believe that the country lacks democracy and freedom of speech. Similar patterns are observed by nationality: ethnic Russians are more likely than ethnic Ukrainians to support a “strong hand,” increased censorship and a return to a planned economy.
• Interestingly, women support a “strong hand,” increased censorship and a return to a planned economy more often than men.
• Clear support for the idea of increasing censorship in Ukraine is recorded only in Donbas. The same applies to returning to a planned economy.
• At the same time, equal shares of respondents in the South and East support both increased censorship and increased freedom of speech. Meanwhile, in the Center, and especially in the North and West of the country, there is clear support for increasing freedom of speech and deepening market relations.
• 44% of Ukrainians do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while 41% do regret it. Every sixth respondent was undecided.
• Compared to a previous survey conducted at the end of 2010, the share of those who regret the USSR decreased from 46% to 41%, while the share of those who do not regret it increased from 36% to 44%. Thus, over the past 2.5 years, nostalgia for the USSR has declined, primarily due to demographic changes, as older people remain the main supporters of the Soviet Union.
• Other patterns are also present. For example, women regret the USSR more often than men. Russian-speaking respondents and ethnic Russians also regret the USSR more often than ethnic Ukrainians. The higher the education level of respondents, the lower the level of nostalgia for the USSR.
• Among those who regret the USSR, 75% believe Ukraine lacks a “strong hand,” half would like to return to a planned economy, and 40% support increasing censorship in the country. At the same time, about one quarter support deepening market relations and increasing freedom of speech.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the opposition political rally “Ukraine, Rise Up!”, which took place on May 18 in Kyiv, received more support among Kyiv residents than the Party of Regions rally “To Europe Without Fascists.”
• About one third of surveyed Kyiv residents evaluated the opposition rally positively, one quarter — neutrally, while about one fifth — negatively. About the same share had not heard about the rally at all.
• In contrast, only about one tenth of respondents evaluated the Party of Regions rally positively, about one fifth — neutrally, while more than 40% evaluated it negatively. About one quarter had not heard about this rally.
• The most positive evaluation of the “Ukraine, Rise Up!” rally was among supporters of Svoboda (57%). Supporters of Batkivshchyna evaluated it more positively (49%) than supporters of UDAR (36%). About 40% of supporters of the Communist Party and Party of Regions evaluated the opposition rally negatively.
• The rally “To Europe Without Fascists” was evaluated relatively positively mainly by Party of Regions supporters (51%). The most negative attitudes toward this rally were among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna (about 70%).
• Older respondents were the most informed about the May 18 rallies. At the same time, about one third of young people had not heard about the opposition rally, and more than 40% had not heard about the Party of Regions rally. Support for both rallies was also generally higher among older respondents.
• Men supported the opposition rally more than women (40% vs 26%), and evaluated the Party of Regions rally more negatively (50% vs 40% among women).
• Most respondents believed that participants of the rallies received payment for participation. Regarding the Party of Regions rally, 51% believed all participants were paid, 17% believed only some were paid, and only 7% believed no one was paid. Regarding the opposition rally, 35% believed all participants were paid, 21% believed some were paid, and 16% believed no one was paid.
• There is a trend: the younger the respondents, the more likely they were to believe rallies were paid, which may partly explain lower support among youth.
• About 38% believed more Kyiv residents attended the opposition rally, 8% believed more attended the Party of Regions rally. Another 7% believed participants of both rallies were mostly non-Kyiv residents, 9% believed mostly Kyiv residents attended both. About 38% could not answer.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in May 2013, about 60% of voters would have participated.
• Among those intending to vote, 35.9% would have supported Vitalii Klitschko, 17.1% Oleksandr Popov, and more than 11% Petro Poroshenko.
• More than 5% would have supported Mykola Tomenko, about 4% Andrii Illienko, about 3% Mykola Katerynchuk, and about 2% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko. Around 3% would have voted for other candidates, while about one in six remained undecided.
• Compared to March 2013, support increased for V. Klitschko (from 31% to 36%), P. Poroshenko (from 7% to 11%), and M. Katerynchuk (from 1% to 3%). Meanwhile, support for O. Popov declined (from 20% to 17%). The share of undecided voters also decreased (from 25% to 15%). Due to the dominance of opposition sentiment in Kyiv, most undecided voters shifted toward candidates associated with the opposition. Popov also partially lost support to Poroshenko, as their electorates were similar and oriented mainly toward older voters. Klitschko and Katerynchuk, meanwhile, were more youth-oriented candidates.
• Women showed higher support for Katerynchuk, Poroshenko, and Popov, and there were also more undecided voters among women. Men showed higher support for Hrytsenko, Illienko, and Klitschko.
• If the mayoral election had been held in two rounds and the runoff had included Oleksandr Popov and Vitalii Klitschko, about 25% would have supported Popov and more than 70% Klitschko, while about 5% would have remained undecided.
• If the runoff had been Popov vs. Poroshenko, about one third would have supported Popov, 57% Poroshenko, and about 10% would have remained undecided.
• If the runoff had been Popov vs. Katerynchuk, about 40% would have supported Popov, 47% Katerynchuk, and 16% would have remained undecided.
• If Kyiv City Council elections had been held at that time, among those intending to vote: 27.5% would have supported UDAR, 14.2% Batkivshchyna, 13.6% Svoboda, and almost 10% the Party of Regions. Other parties would have received less than 5% each. Nearly one quarter remained undecided.
• Compared to March 2013, the most significant growth was recorded for Svoboda (from 11% to 14%). Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party slightly strengthened their positions, and support for the European Party also increased. UDAR’s support remained largely unchanged.
• UDAR was mainly supported by younger voters, while older voters were more represented among Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and undecided voters. Men showed greater support for Svoboda and UDAR. Women were more represented among undecided voters and supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Party of Regions. Compared to March, the share of men among Svoboda supporters increased, while it decreased among UDAR supporters.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 50% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 37% do not support it, and another 13% are undecided. At the same time, 42% of respondents support the creation of a single state including Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, while 47% do not support this idea and 11% are undecided. Notably, one in four Ukrainians who support the creation of a single state with Russia simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
• Given these response patterns, respondents were asked a direct question. According to respondents, signing the Association Agreement and Free Trade Area with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (41%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (38%), while 20% could not decide. Compared to 2010–2012, there is a trend toward growth in support for both integration options, while the share of undecided respondents has decreased from 27% to 20% over the last two years.
• Traditionally, Western, Northern, and Central regions of Ukraine show higher support for the Agreement with the European Union, while Donbas, Southern, and Eastern regions show higher support for joining the Customs Union. At the same time, the East and the Center remain transitional regions without a strong dominance of one integration vector over the other, and they also show the highest share of respondents who simultaneously support both integration options. Younger people and those with higher education levels traditionally show higher support for signing the EU Association Agreement, while older respondents are more likely to support joining the Customs Union.
• According to respondents, closer ties with the European Union would bring key benefits such as more travel opportunities (55%), better job opportunities (53%), increased investment in Ukraine (51%), development of democracy (41%), better education opportunities (41%), poverty reduction (39%), and reduced corruption (39%). In turn, closer ties with Russia would bring key benefits such as lower gas prices (55%), closer ties between peoples (53%), support for domestic industry (51%), and support for domestic agriculture (41%). The same share of respondents (21%) believe that closer ties with either the EU or Russia would provide better protection of Ukraine’s borders, while 15% believe neither option would bring advantages.
• Forty percent of respondents believe that joining the Customs Union would increase Ukrainians’ well-being (39% disagree). At the same time, 46% believe that joining the EU would increase Ukrainians’ well-being (34% disagree). Forty-six percent believe joining the Customs Union would stimulate industry and agriculture in Ukraine (36% disagree), while 55% believe EU accession would provide a development boost for Ukraine (30% disagree). Forty-three percent believe that Ukraine will always be treated as a second-class country by Russia, and 58% believe the same about Europe. As a result, 70% believe Ukraine should first establish internal order before joining any international integration project, while only 16% disagree.
• Half of respondents believe the European Union will remain largely stable over the next 5–10 years. Among them, 28% believe the EU composition will mostly remain unchanged (possibly with minor membership changes), and 22% believe the number of EU member states will definitely grow. Another 16% believe only a few powerful states will remain in the EU, while only 9% believe the EU will cease to exist within 5–10 years. More than half of respondents believe Ukraine will eventually join the EU, including 4% who believe this could happen within 1–2 years, 12% within 3–5 years, 18% within 5–10 years, and 23% who see it as a distant перспектива. At the same time, one quarter believe Ukraine will never join the EU, and one fifth are undecided.
• There is a direct relationship between belief in Ukraine’s chances of EU membership, belief in the EU’s long-term stability, and support for Ukraine signing the EU Association Agreement. When evaluating perceptions of countries, respondents were asked to choose statements reflecting their views of Europe, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Overall, associations with Belarus are more positive than with Russia, associations with Russia are more positive than with Ukraine, and the most positive associations are linked to Europe.
• The most common associations with Europe include a developed economy (61%), a large number of migrants (59%), high education standards (58%), prosperity (56%), active citizens defending their rights (54%), new technologies (54%), confidence in the future (52%), fair courts (52%), safety (52%), developed democracy (51%), law-abiding citizens (49%), freedom of speech (48%), stability (46%), gender equality (45%), strong business opportunities (45%), and accessible healthcare (37%). Russia is also associated with migrants, though at about half the level of Europe. Belarus is associated with stability, law-abiding citizens, and accessible education at levels close to Europe. Russia is associated with high education standards and confidence in the future, but significantly less than Europe.
• Ukraine scores worse than Belarus, Russia, and especially Europe across most of these associations. The only areas where Ukraine outperforms Russia and Belarus (while still lagging behind Europe) are freedom of speech and gender equality. Ukrainians tend to associate Ukraine strongly with unemployment, poverty, corruption, and inequality (70–80%), economic crisis (about 60%), and degradation (about 40%). However, economic crisis is also associated with Europe (32%) and Russia (30%), and to a lesser extent Belarus (17%). Shared associations for Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia include shared culture, language, and history. Unlike Europe and Belarus, Ukraine (39%) and especially Russia (69%) are associated with large natural resources. Ukraine is rarely associated with strong government (2%) or strong military (2%), while more than 40% associate these with Russia and Belarus, and about a quarter with Europe. Ukraine is also less associated with censorship (12%) compared to Russia (about 25%) and Belarus (about one third).
• Only 3% of respondents could not name any associations with Europe, compared to 2% for Ukraine and Russia and 5% for Belarus. Only 12% of respondents had visited EU countries within the last five years, while about one quarter had visited CIS countries. Despite this, more respondents would prefer to live in Europe (43% would like to live there, 45% would not), compared to Russia (30% would like to live there, 61% would not) and Belarus (21% would like to live there, 67% would not). The desire to live in Russia is strongly regionally divided, while the desire to live in Europe is shared across regions. There is also a direct relationship between frequency of visits to Europe and the desire to live there, as well as support for Ukraine’s EU accession.
• Finally, almost half of respondents believe their children or grandchildren would have a better future in Ukraine integrated with Europe, while one third believe this would be in Ukraine integrated with Russia or the CIS, and almost one quarter remain undecided. At the same time, only about 70% of Customs Union supporters believe their children would have a better future through integration with Russia, while every sixth sees a better future through integration with Europe. Among undecided respondents, one third also see a better future through integration with Europe, while only 16% see it through integration with Russia, and about half remain undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 60% of respondents support the view that some professions are purely “male” and some are “female”. 36% disagree with this statement, and another 5% are undecided.
• Respondents were asked to assess who typical professions are more suitable for: men, women, or equally for both. According to respondents, professions such as “police officer”, “politician”, “businessman”, and “scientist” are perceived as more typical for men. At the same time, professions such as “salesperson” and “secretary” are perceived as more typical for women. Meanwhile, “manager”, “journalist”, and “doctor” are considered equally suitable for both men and women.
• In particular, 56% of women and 63% of men agreed that the profession of “police officer” is more typical for men. At the same time, 56% of women and 64% of men agreed that the profession of “secretary” is more typical for women. Similarly, 34% of women and 43% of men agreed that “salesperson” is more of a female profession.
• In other cases, responses were less categorical. For example, 30% of men and 22% of women agreed that “politician” is more of a male profession, while nearly 70% of men and 80% of women believe that this profession is equally suitable for both genders. Similarly, 25% of men and 19% of women believe that “businessman” is more of a male profession, while nearly 70% of men and 80% of women believe it is suitable for both. Regarding the profession of “scientist”, 21% of men and 13% of women considered it more male, while nearly 80% of both men and women believe it is equally suitable.
• From 80% to 90% of both men and women believe that professions such as “manager”, “journalist”, and “doctor” are equally suitable for both genders.
• Among respondents, 14% of women and 8% of men reported that they had at some point wanted to master a profession traditionally considered typical for the opposite gender. This was more common among younger respondents and those with higher education. At the same time, 80% of women and almost 90% of men said they had never had such a desire.
• Almost every tenth surveyed woman reported being refused employment because of her gender. Such responses were more common among middle-aged respondents with higher education. At the same time, 6% of men also reported being refused employment because of gender.
• About 29% of respondents support banning the indication of candidate gender in job advertisements, while 28% do not support it. At the same time, 33% are indifferent and 10% are undecided. Older respondents are the most indifferent to this issue. Support for such a ban is higher among people with higher education. Men and women generally have similar attitudes toward this issue, although women who personally experienced gender-based refusal support the ban significantly more.

• Rating Group continues its special project “People’s TOP”, which consists of a series of studies identifying the best of the best. The key feature of the methodology is that respondents are not given any lists or prompts; people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions, naming their own options. In April, we present the issue “The Country Where One Would Like to Be Born.”
• According to the study results, almost half of respondents (48%), if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose Ukraine. About 9% of respondents would choose Russia, 5% — Germany, 4% — the United States, 2% each — the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, and France, and 1% each — Poland, Canada, Sweden, and Belarus. At the same time, 2% would choose the USSR, and about 4% — other countries. About 16% of respondents were unable to answer the question.
• Overall, 15% of respondents, if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose EU countries, and another 4% — the United States. Meanwhile, about 10% would choose Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan, and another 2% would choose the USSR.
• Russia was most often chosen in Donbas (18%), as well as in the South (13%) and East (13%) of the country. Germany, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom were more often chosen in the West and North of the country. At the same time, in the Center of the country, Ukraine was most often chosen.
• The younger the respondents, the smaller the share of those who would like to be born in Ukraine: only about 40% of young people would choose Ukraine, while among older people this share is about 1.5 times higher. About every tenth young Ukrainian would like to be born in the United States, slightly fewer — in Germany and the United Kingdom. Women are more attached to Ukraine than men. Men more often chose Russia, Germany, and the United States.
• Interestingly, every tenth voter of the Communist Party of Ukraine would like to be born in the USSR. Every sixth voter of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party would like to be born in Russia. Meanwhile, every sixth voter of UDAR would choose Germany. The most loyal to the country turned out to be voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda — almost 60% of them, if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose Ukraine.

Foreign policy

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February–March 2013, 58% of residents of Odesa region, when choosing between signing the Association Agreement and subsequent accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, chose the Customs Union and CES, while 25% preferred the Association Agreement and subsequent EU accession. Another 18% were undecided.
• About 56% of Odesa region residents would prefer Ukraine not to become an EU member and instead maintain open borders with Russia — without visas and customs controls — while having closed borders with the EU — with visas and customs controls. Meanwhile, 27% would prefer Ukraine to sign a political association agreement and a Free Trade Agreement and, after becoming an EU member, have closed borders with Russia — with visas and customs controls — while maintaining open borders and a visa-free regime with EU countries. Another 17% found it difficult to answer.
• About 68% of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly states with open borders, without visas and customs controls. About 11% believe relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs controls. At the same time, 19% believe Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state. Another 2% were undecided.
• Residents of the region more optimistically assess prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and CES (56%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (22%). About 23% were unsure.
• Similarly, respondents evaluated employment prospects: 49% believe employment opportunities would improve if Ukraine joined the CES, while 25% believe they would improve if Ukraine joined the EU. About 26% were undecided.

Dual citizenship

• About 58% of Odesa region residents generally agree that Ukraine should introduce the possibility of dual citizenship with other countries, while 21% do not support this idea. About 15% are neutral, and 6% are undecided.
• If dual citizenship were allowed in Ukraine, 31% of Odesa region residents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 7% would choose German citizenship, 4% — U.S. citizenship, and 3% — Italian or Canadian citizenship. At the same time, less than one-third of respondents (27%) would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• About 53% of respondents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship (26.3% definitely would, 26.4% probably would). About 39% would not want Russian citizenship (23.3% definitely would not, 15.2% probably would not). About 9% were undecided.
• The share of those who would like to obtain EU citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship is lower than the share of those who would like Russian citizenship — about 44% (17.7% definitely would, 24.8% probably would). The same share (44%) would not want EU citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 14% were undecided.

Forecasts

• About one-third of Odesa region residents (33%) believe that if Ukraine faced a difficult situation requiring significant non-repayable financial assistance, Russia would be the first to provide support. About 10% believe it would be the European Union, 5% — the International Monetary Fund, and 4% — international humanitarian organizations such as the UN. About 35% believe no one would help Ukraine, and 9% were undecided.
• About 36% of respondents believe Ukraine will eventually be accepted into the European Union (9% are certain, 26% think it is likely). However, more respondents — about 50% — believe Ukraine will never become an EU member (20% are certain, 30% think it is unlikely). About 15% were undecided.

Status of the russian language

• About 52% of Odesa region residents believe the Russian language should become the second state language throughout Ukraine. About 42% believe Russian should become a regional language in areas where the majority of the population supports this. About 5% believe Russian should be excluded from official communication across Ukraine. About 2% were undecided or refused to answer.

State structure

• About 40% of respondents believe a federal system suits Ukraine better, while 38% believe a unitary system is more appropriate. About 22% have not formed an opinion.

Land reform

• About 72% of Odesa region residents are aware that the authorities are preparing land reform allowing the free sale and purchase of land. About 65% view this reform negatively (39% negatively, 26% rather negatively), while 21% view it positively (8% positively, 14% rather positively). About 14% were undecided.
• Most respondents (52%) support only long-term leasing of agricultural land. About 28% would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land but only to Ukrainian citizens, and only 6% would allow it to foreigners. About 15% were undecided.

Attitudes toward referendums

• About 73% of respondents support the idea of resolving a significant share of important issues at both local and national levels through referendums, while 16% do not support this. About 12% were undecided.
• Most respondents agree that citizens should be able, via local referendums, to dismiss heads of regional or district administrations (73%), dismiss mayors and call new elections (75%), dissolve local councils and call new elections (70%), and dismiss village heads (73%).
• Most respondents also agree that citizens should be able, via nationwide referendums, to decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political, or economic alliances (72%), dissolve Parliament (67%), adopt and amend the Constitution (71%), and dismiss the Government (66%).

Internet use

• About every second resident of Odesa region (51%) has access to the internet at home, at work, at their place of study, or via a mobile device. Almost all of them (49% of residents) have experience using the internet. Monthly internet audience reaches 47% of residents (used at least once in the 30 days before the survey), weekly — 44%, daily — 35%.
• About 32% of respondents used social networks such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki during the month before the survey. About 11% used Facebook, 3% — Twitter, and 2% — LiveJournal.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority of surveyed Kyiv residents (78%) do not support the initiative to move all supermarkets and hypermarkets at least 5 km outside the city. Only 14% have a positive attitude toward this idea. At the same time, 5% are indifferent to it, and 3% are undecided.
• It is characteristic that the younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the less they support the initiative to move hypermarkets outside the city. In particular, more than 80% of young people do not support this idea. Women also support the idea less than men.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the majority of surveyed Kyiv residents (58%) do not support the idea of banning second-hand clothing sales, while only 20% support it. At the same time, 18% are indifferent to this issue, and 4% are undecided.
• Interestingly, the younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the less they support the idea of banning second-hand sales. For example, almost 70% of young people do not support the idea, while among pensioners this share is slightly more than half.
• Women also support the idea less than men.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, more than half of Kyiv residents support the idea of nominating a single opposition candidate in the Kyiv mayoral election, while only 15% do not support it. At the same time, 18% are indifferent to this issue and 14% are undecided.
• The idea is positively perceived by more than 70% of supporters of V. Klychko, A. Hrytsenko, A. Illienko, P. Poroshenko, and O. Kuzhel, as well as by about half of those who have not yet decided on their preferred candidate. Only supporters of O. Popov and the Party of Regions are skeptical about this initiative.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in early March 2013, about 55% of voters would have definitely participated.
• If the Kyiv mayoral election had been held in early March 2013, among those intending to vote, 31% would have supported Vitalii Klychko, 20.3% — Oleksandr Popov, and almost 7% — Petro Poroshenko.
• About 4% of voters would have supported Andrii Illienko and Oleksandra Kuzhel each, about 2% — Anatolii Hrytsenko. More than 1% — Oleh Liashko, Oleksandr Omelchenko, and Mykola Katerynchuk. About 3% would have voted for other candidates, while one quarter were undecided.
• Clear trends are observed: the younger the respondents, the more often they support Vitalii Klychko; the older the respondents, the more often they support Oleksandr Popov and Petro Poroshenko.
• If the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in two rounds and Oleksandr Popov and Vitalii Klychko had advanced to the second round, 26.5% of respondents (among those intending to vote) would have supported the incumbent city head, 60.4% — the UDAR party leader, and 13.1% would have been undecided.
• If the second round had been between Oleksandr Popov and Petro Poroshenko, 36.6% would have supported the incumbent city head, 41.5% — Petro Poroshenko, and 21.9% would have been undecided.
• If the second round had been between Oleksandr Popov and Mykola Katerynchuk, 41.2% would have supported the incumbent city head, 35% — the leader of the European Party, and 23.9% would have been undecided.
• Interestingly, 35% of Kyiv residents would have liked to see Vitalii Klychko as the Mayor of Kyiv and almost as many (37%) — as the leader of the UDAR faction in the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, 15% would not have wanted to see him in either role, and 13% were undecided.
• It is characteristic that two-thirds of Klychko’s own voters would have preferred to see him specifically as Mayor of Kyiv, and only one in five — as leader of the UDAR faction in parliament. Among supporters of Oleksandra Kuzhel, half supported Klychko as mayor and half — in parliament. Supporters of other candidates would have preferred to see Klychko mainly in parliament.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of respondents (81%) support the adoption of a Law of Ukraine on the Recall of Members of Parliament. Only 13% do not support it, and 6% are undecided.
• The initiative is popular across all regions and among voters of different parties. The only slightly lower support is observed in Donbas and among voters of the Party of Regions, where the share of undecided respondents is the highest.
• According to the majority of respondents (61%), a member of parliament should be recalled by voters.
  14% believe this should be done by voters but initiated by the party, and another 14% believe it should be exclusively the prerogative of the party that nominated the candidate.
  Another 12% believe recall should be carried out by a court: 7% think the court should decide independently, while 5% think it should be done at the initiative of the parliamentary majority.
• Additionally, 5% believe only parliament should recall a deputy, and another 5% believe this should be done by the President.
  10% were undecided on this issue.
• As with the previous question, opinions among respondents from different regions and supporters of different parties are largely similar.
• More than half of respondents believe deputies should be recalled for corruption offenses and for failing to fulfill campaign promises.
  Nearly 40% believe deputies should be recalled for betraying state interests and failing to fulfill obligations declared in the oath.
• About one third support recall for systematic absence from plenary sessions and committee meetings, and the same share supports recall for failing to uphold publicly declared ideological commitments.
  26% believe deputies should be recalled if they switch to another faction, and 22% — for non-personal voting.
  Only 4% were undecided on this issue.
• Recall for corruption offenses is most strongly supported by voters of the Communist Party and UDAR.
  Recall for failing to uphold ideological promises is most supported by voters of the Party of Regions.
  Recall for switching factions is most supported by voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda.
  The strictest punishment for systematic absence from parliamentary work is most supported by Communist Party voters.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, for the absolute majority of respondents (71%), March 8 is a good occasion to do something pleasant for women close to them. At the same time, for 11% the March 8 holiday symbolizes women’s struggle for their rights, for 9% it is a political holiday from the Soviet past, and for 6% it is just an ordinary day.
• The younger the respondents, the more often they associate March 8 with a good occasion to do something nice for women close to them, while older respondents more often describe March 8 as a political holiday from the Soviet past.
• Only 7% of men say that March 8 symbolizes women’s struggle for their rights, while among women this share is twice as high.
• Married and unmarried respondents have similar attitudes toward the holiday.
• The highest share of those who associate March 8 with women’s struggle for rights is among supporters of the Communist Party, while those who consider it an ordinary day are more common among supporters of Svoboda.
• For comparison, respondents were also asked to evaluate their attitudes toward February 23.
• Thus, only 41% of respondents consider February 23 a good occasion to do something pleasant for men close to them (this is more often stated by women). For 39%, it is a holiday for men who are or were related to the military (this is more often stated by men themselves). Only 12% consider it a political holiday from the Soviet past, and 7% consider it an ordinary day.
• Overall, the majority in one way or another perceive February 23 as a holiday. The younger the respondents, the more often they associate February 23 with a good occasion to do something nice for men close to them, while older respondents more often associate it with a holiday for men connected to the military or a political holiday from the Soviet past.
• The highest share of those who associate February 23 with a military-related men’s holiday is among supporters of the Communist Party, while those who consider it an ordinary day are more common among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• Thus, there is a visible trend: young people increasingly move March 8 and February 23 outside the political context — the holidays acquire new associations and traditions, while the political component is gradually fading.
• It is worth noting that gifts are given more often on March 8 and February 23 than on Valentine’s Day (February 14), which remains a more youth-oriented holiday. About 40% of both men and women received gifts on Valentine’s Day this year. At the same time, 70% of men received gifts on February 23, and the same share of women expect to receive gifts on March 8.
• However, as last year, we observe something interesting and somewhat illogical regarding “women’s and men’s” holidays. This February 23, the number of men who received gifts was higher than the number of women who gave them. Possibly for this mysterious reason, we observe another interesting trend: the number of men planning to give gifts on March 8 is higher than the number of women who expect to receive gifts.
• Sociologists now have a new research question: do women underestimate men, or do men overestimate their “gift-giving” intentions? Or are there other, third factors? We will definitely find out.
• For now, we will believe that men will be able to pleasantly surprise women on this holiday and improve their ratings — and we wish the same to everyone!
• Happy holiday to you, our best women on the planet!
  May spring bloom in your soul!

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Presidential elections in Ukraine had taken place at the end of February 2013, about 70% of voters would have participated.

In particular, among those who intended to vote:

• 25.1% would support Viktor Yanukovych
• 15.1% – Vitalii Klitschko
• 13.9% – Yulia Tymoshenko
• 7.9% – Oleh Tyahnybok
• 7.7% – Petro Symonenko
• 7.4% – Arsenii Yatseniuk

Support for other politicians was significantly lower:

• 1.7% – Anatolii Hrytsenko
• 1.5% – Serhii Tihipko
• 1.2% – Petro Poroshenko
• 1.1% – Nataliia Korolevska
• Other politicians – 4%
• Undecided – 11.1%
• “Against all” – 2.3%

If Yulia Tymoshenko did not participate in the election, the top three would look as follows:

• Viktor Yanukovych – 25.1%
• Vitalii Klitschko – 16.8%
• Arsenii Yatseniuk – 15.1%

Additionally:

• 8.9% would support Oleh Tyahnybok
• 7.7% – Petro Symonenko
• 2.2% – Anatolii Hrytsenko
• 1.7% – Serhii Tihipko
• 1.4% – Petro Poroshenko
• 1.4% – Nataliia Korolevska
• Other politicians – over 4%
• Undecided – 12.6%
• “Against all” – 2.3%

If Tymoshenko did not run, nearly 60% of her voters would support Yatseniuk in the first round, about 10% would support Klitschko, about 10% Tyahnybok, and about one sixth would be undecided or vote “against all”.

Thus, if Presidential elections had taken place at the end of February 2013, Yanukovych would likely face Klitschko or Yatseniuk (or Tymoshenko) in the second round.

Since opposition forces collectively had higher overall support, Yanukovych risked losing the second round to almost any opposition leader represented in parliament. Klitschko had the strongest chances at that moment, followed by Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko, with slightly lower chances for Tyahnybok.

Second-round scenarios:

Yanukovych vs Klitschko:

• Yanukovych – 30.2%
• Klitschko – 49%
• Against both – 11.6%
• Undecided – 9.2%

Yanukovych vs Yatseniuk:

• Yanukovych – 33%
• Yatseniuk – 40%
• Against both – 18.4%
• Undecided – 8.6%

Yanukovych vs Tymoshenko:

• Yanukovych – 33.2%
• Tymoshenko – 36.4%
• Against both – 22.4%
• Undecided – 8%

Yanukovych vs Tyahnybok:

• Yanukovych – 33.5%
• Tyahnybok – 32.3%
• Against both – 23.4%
• Undecided – 10.8%

Over the year, second-round ratings increased notably for Klitschko (from 37% to 49%) and Tyahnybok (from 24% to 32%). Yatseniuk also increased (from 38% to 40%). The incumbent President also increased slightly, but less significantly.

Although Yatseniuk trailed Tymoshenko in first-round ratings, he attracted broader second-round support. Klitschko voters were less likely to support Yatseniuk or Tymoshenko in the second round than vice versa. Yatseniuk voters were also less likely to support Tyahnybok or Tymoshenko. However, if Yatseniuk reached the second round, he would receive support from nearly 90% of Tymoshenko voters, 75% of Klitschko voters, and 60% of Tyahnybok voters.

Supporters of Symonenko and Tihipko were more likely to vote for Yanukovych, while supporters of Hrytsenko and Poroshenko were more likely to vote against him.

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• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had been held at the end of February 2013, about two thirds of voters would have participated.
• The highest level of mobilization was recorded in Western Ukraine, while the lowest was in Donbas and the South of the country, where only about half of voters confirmed their intention to participate.
• If parliamentary elections had been held at the end of February 2013, the Party of Regions would have won. Among those who intended to vote, 24.9% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 19.3% for Batkivshchyna, 18.1% for UDAR, 11.9% for Svoboda, and 8.7% for the Communist Party. Another 1.2% would have supported Nataliia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward!, while less than 1% would have supported the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Our Ukraine. The remaining parties would have received 2.7%, while 11.8% would have remained undecided.
• For a more accurate comparison with election results, undecided voters were redistributed. After redistribution, if elections had been held at the end of February 2013, 28.2% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 22% for Batkivshchyna, 20.4% for UDAR, 13.5% for Svoboda, and 10% for the Communist Party. Other parties would have received about 6%.
• Compared to the parliamentary election results, the following trends are observed. Combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) increased from 50% to 56%, while combined support for parties forming the parliamentary majority (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased from 43% to 38%. New parliamentary parties (UDAR and Svoboda) gained support, while established parties (Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, and the Communist Party) lost support. The Party of Regions remained the clear leader among voters in Donbas, the South, and the East. Batkivshchyna shared first place in Western Ukraine with Svoboda and UDAR, and in the Center and North with UDAR.
• UDAR continued to be supported mainly by younger voters, while the Communist Party was supported mainly by older voters. The most educated electorate was observed among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR, while the least educated electorate was among Communist Party supporters. The electorates of Svoboda and UDAR also had the highest share of employed voters, while the Communist Party electorate was dominated by pensioners. Batkivshchyna had higher support in rural areas, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party had stronger support in cities. As in previous elections, UDAR and Svoboda were more supported by men, while Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party were more supported by women.
• Supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna were predominantly Ukrainian-speaking. Over the previous six months, the share of Ukrainian-speaking voters in the Svoboda electorate decreased from 75% to 68%, while the share of those speaking both Ukrainian and Russian or primarily Russian increased. Among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, more than half were Russian-speaking, about one quarter spoke both languages at home, and another quarter spoke Ukrainian. Among UDAR supporters, about half spoke Ukrainian at home and half spoke Russian or both languages. Among undecided voters, Russian-speaking respondents were more common, which is consistent with the fact that the highest share of undecided voters was recorded in the South, East, and Donbas.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2012, 50% of residents of Mykolaiv region, when choosing between signing an Association Agreement followed by accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, prefer the Customs Union and the CES, while 34% prefer signing the Association Agreement and further accession to the EU. Another 16% were undecided.
• Fifty-four percent of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to be independent but friendly states, with open borders, without visas or customs controls. At the same time, 34% believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas and customs controls. Meanwhile, 7% believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state, and another 5% were undecided.
• Residents of the region are more optimistic about the prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and the CES (51%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (29%). At the same time, 21% do not know which option would be better.
• Respondents evaluated employment prospects slightly differently: 46% believe that employment opportunities would improve if Ukraine joins the CES, while 30% believe employment would improve if Ukraine joins the EU. Another 24% were undecided.
• Fifty-three percent of respondents somewhat or fully agree that Ukraine should introduce the possibility of dual citizenship with other countries, while 28% do not support this idea. Another 13% are neutral, and 7% were undecided. If dual citizenship were allowed, 28% of residents of Mykolaiv region would like to obtain Russian citizenship while retaining Ukrainian citizenship. Seven percent would prefer German citizenship, 3% US citizenship, 3% Italian citizenship, and 2% Canadian citizenship. At the same time, more than one third of respondents (36%) would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents are aware that the authorities are preparing to implement land reform that would allow the free sale and purchase of land. At the same time, 81% of residents of Mykolaiv region have a negative attitude toward this reform, while only 7% have a positive attitude, and 11% were undecided.
• The majority of respondents (68%) support only long-term lease of agricultural land. Ten percent would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land only for Ukrainian citizens, and only 1% would allow it for foreigners. Another 21% were undecided.
• Sixty-three percent of respondents in the region support the idea of resolving a significant share of important issues at both local and national levels through referendums, while 26% do not support this proposal and 11% were undecided.
• Most residents of Mykolaiv region agree that citizens should be able to use local referendums to dismiss the head of the regional state administration or district administration (66%), dismiss the mayor and call new elections (66%), dissolve regional, city, district, settlement and village councils and call new elections (61%), and dismiss the village head (60%).
• Most respondents also agree that Ukrainian citizens should be able to use nationwide referendums to decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political or economic unions (69%), dissolve the Verkhovna Rada (61%), adopt and amend the Constitution (60%), dismiss the Government (60%), and dismiss the President (56%).

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 52% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 34% do not support it and 14% are undecided.
• It should be noted that during 2012 the number of supporters of European integration remained stable, which is slightly lower than in 2010–2011 but higher than in 2009. At the same time, the number of “strong” supporters of EU accession increased each year: while in 2010–2011 about one quarter of Ukrainians definitely supported EU membership, in 2012 at least one third did so.
• The strongest supporters of EU accession are young people, with almost two thirds of respondents aged 18–29 supporting the initiative and only about one quarter opposing it. Older respondents are the most skeptical, with 38% supporting and 43% opposing. The highest support for EU accession is observed in Western Ukraine (77%), followed by the Center (64%), North (54%), and East (51%). At the same time, about half of respondents in the South and Donbas do not support the initiative.
• At the same time, 41% of respondents support the idea of forming a single state consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, while 44% do not support it and 15% are undecided. While in 2010–2011 supporters of a common state consistently outnumbered opponents, in 2012 the trend reversed. Support for a common state with Russia is highest among older respondents (53%) and lowest among youth (32%), and is more common in cities than in rural areas. The initiative consistently receives the highest support in the South (64%), Donbas (57%), and East (54%). Meanwhile, more than half of residents in Central and Northern Ukraine and more than 80% in Western Ukraine do not support forming a single state consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.
• Interestingly, at least one quarter of respondents who support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Considering this, respondents were asked a direct question. According to respondents, signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (40%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (37%), while 23% were undecided. Over the last year, support for signing a Free Trade Agreement with the EU has remained almost unchanged, while the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 37%).
• As a result, Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine show greater support for the agreement with the European Union, while Donbas, the South, and the East show greater support for joining the Customs Union. There is also a relatively higher share of undecided respondents in the East. Youth and people with higher education traditionally show greater support for signing the Free Trade Agreement with the EU, while older respondents are more likely to support joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
• Forty-one percent of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language, while more than half (51%) oppose it and 8% are undecided. Over the past two years, the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been nearly equal. However, in 2012, support for granting Russian state language status sharply declined, especially during the second half of the year. In longer-term dynamics, support decreased from 52–54% in 2009–2010 to 41% in 2012, while opposition increased from 40–41% to 51%.
• Support for bilingualism is highest in Donbas (75%), the South (72%), and the East (53%). Meanwhile, almost 70% of residents of Central and Northern Ukraine and nearly 90% of Western Ukraine do not support the initiative. Granting Russian state language status is more supported by older respondents and less supported by youth, and is more common in cities than in rural areas.
• It can be assumed that the recent strengthening of the legal status of the Russian language in certain territories contributed to a deterioration in attitudes toward granting Russian state language status nationwide. According to a similar survey conducted by Rating Group in July 2012, nearly 80% of respondents had no problems using their native language during the previous year. According to 37% of respondents, the Ukrainian language needs greater legislative protection, while 18% believe Russian needs more protection, and 34% believe both languages are sufficiently protected.
• Only 19% of respondents support Ukraine’s accession to NATO, while nearly two thirds do not support it. Support for NATO accession remained stable throughout 2012, but in longer-term dynamics it slightly declined from 24–26% in 2010 to 19% in 2012. Clear support for NATO accession is observed mainly in Western Ukraine (about half of respondents). Youth show slightly more positive attitudes toward NATO compared to middle-aged and older respondents.
• About one quarter of respondents support recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 51% do not support it and 26% are undecided. Compared to 2010, support increased from 20% to 23%, while opposition decreased from 61% to 51%, and the share of undecided respondents increased. The idea is supported by more than 60% of residents in Western Ukraine and about one quarter of residents in Central and Northern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than half of residents in the East, nearly 70% in Donbas, and the South do not support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for state independence. The idea is more supported in rural areas than in cities. The highest share of undecided respondents on this issue is among youth, while the highest level of opposition is among older respondents.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2012, about 80% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region know who currently serves as the head of the Regional State Administration. At the same time, 3% believe they know who the governor is, but during the survey named a different person. Nearly one in five respondents (17%) do not know or do not remember the governor’s surname.
• A relative majority of respondents were unable to clearly assess the governor’s performance and gave a neutral evaluation (“neither good nor bad”) — 42%. At the same time, almost as many residents of Dnipropetrovsk region (40%) evaluate the governor’s performance positively (7% — very good, 33% — rather good). About every tenth respondent evaluated his work negatively or was undecided.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) believe that the situation in the region has improved since the appointment of the current head of the Regional State Administration (7% — significantly improved, 41% — somewhat improved). About one-third believe that the appointment of the current governor had no impact on the situation in the region (36%). Another 5% reported a deterioration of the situation, and about every tenth respondent could not determine their answer.
• If residents of the region had the opportunity to elect the head of the Regional State Administration, almost every second respondent would vote for the current governor (47%). About 6% would vote for another candidate, and 14% would not participate in such elections. At the same time, about one-third (32.3%) could not decide on their choice.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2012, 45% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region believe that Ukraine should orient its development toward cooperation with Russia and joining the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other countries. At the same time, 28% of respondents believe that Ukraine should focus on joining the European Union, while 19% support maintaining full independence in political and economic decision-making without joining either the EU or the Common Economic Space. Another 8% were undecided on this issue.
• When choosing between signing the Association Agreement with subsequent accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 57% of Dnipropetrovsk region residents prefer the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, while 31% prefer the Association Agreement and subsequent accession to the EU. Another 12% were undecided.
• About 70% of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly states, with open borders, without visas or customs controls. At the same time, 13% believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs controls. Another 13% believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state. Another 5% were undecided.
• Residents of the region assess more optimistically the prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space (50%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (28%). At the same time, 23% do not know which option would be better.
• Opinions differ slightly regarding employment opportunities. About 44% of respondents believe employment prospects would improve if Ukraine joins the Common Economic Space, while 32% believe employment prospects would improve if Ukraine joins the EU. Another 24% were undecided.
• About 60% of respondents are to some extent in favor of introducing dual citizenship with other countries, while 23% do not support this idea. Another 10% are neutral, and 7% are undecided.
• If dual citizenship were allowed in Ukraine, 30% of Dnipropetrovsk region residents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 10% would prefer German citizenship, 5% — US citizenship, 3% — Canadian citizenship, and 2% each — Italian, Israeli, and Polish citizenship. At the same time, about 30% would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• About 83% of respondents are aware that the authorities are preparing a land reform allowing the free sale and purchase of land. At the same time, 70% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region have a generally negative attitude toward this reform, while only 20% have a positive attitude. Another 10% were undecided.
• Most respondents (61%) support only long-term lease of agricultural land. About 25% would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land only to Ukrainian citizens, and less than 3% would allow it to foreigners. Another 11% were undecided.
• About 72% of respondents in the region support the idea that a significant share of important issues, both at the local and national levels, should be decided through referendums, while 17% do not support this idea. Another 11% were undecided.
• Most respondents agree that citizens should have the ability through local referendums to dismiss mayors and call new elections (74%), dismiss heads of regional or district administrations (71%), dismiss village heads (71%), and dissolve regional, city, district, settlement, and village councils and call new elections (67%).
• Most respondents also agree that citizens of Ukraine should have the ability through nationwide referendums to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada (72%), dismiss the Government (68%), dismiss the President (67%), decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political, or economic alliances (70%), and adopt or amend the Constitution (65%).