Press releases

• On December 15, 2013, on the day of the repeat elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Rating Group conducted an exit poll at four constituencies: 132, 194, 197 and 223. The survey was conducted at the exits of 125 polling stations and lasted from 8:00 to 17:00 (in rural areas) and until 18:30 (in cities). The total number of respondents exceeded 7,300. Polling stations were selected randomly in accordance with the principle of uniform coverage. Respondents at polling stations were selected according to a fixed sampling interval. The survey was anonymous: respondents filled out questionnaires (ballots) themselves and placed them into specially prepared boxes.
• Several important observations were recorded. On December 15, 2013, a record number of refusals to participate in the exit poll was observed compared to previous elections in these constituencies, despite the methodology remaining unchanged. In constituencies 132, 194 and 223, the number of refusals was several times higher than in constituency 197. According to interviewers’ observations, older respondents and groups of people entering and leaving polling stations together were more likely to refuse participation. It was also noted that refusals were more frequent in the first half of the day than in the second, and many respondents refused without providing any explanation.
• As a result, the exit poll may not have captured the voting behavior of a portion of voters, primarily those who, for various reasons, did not want to re-report their voting choice. This may be the main reason why exit poll results differed from Central Election Commission results beyond the statistical margin of error (2.5–3%).
• Exit polls do not cover special polling stations (such as prisons, detention centers, or medical institutions). At the same time, in special polling stations within constituencies 132, 194 and 223, voter turnout was significantly higher and voting results differed substantially from overall constituency results. In addition, exit polls cannot capture results from home voting, as this information is not available to sociologists.
• For example, in constituency 132, candidate M. Kruglov received at special polling stations about 0.8 thousand votes (more than 1% of voters) more than A. Kornatskyi, while the total official margin between the candidates was 1.7 thousand votes. In constituency 194, candidate M. Poplavskyi received at special polling stations 2.8 thousand votes (almost 4% of voters) more than M. Bulatetskyi. In constituency 223, candidate V. Pylypyshyn received at special polling stations 1.6 thousand votes (more than 2% of voters) more than Yu. Levchenko, while the total official margin between the candidates was 3.3 thousand votes.
• Unfortunately, in some polling stations interviewers were directly obstructed by third parties. For example, at one polling station in Pervomaisk (constituency 132), unidentified individuals attempted to confiscate questionnaires and disrupted vote counting. At one polling station in Kyiv (constituency 223), the exit poll was temporarily suspended due to a provocation and a false police call. At several polling stations in Kyiv (constituency 223), interviewers’ work was obstructed by representatives of candidates, including representatives of Yu. Levchenko, who attempted to gain access to results, as well as by unidentified individuals of a “sports-type” appearance.
• Exit poll results changed throughout the day following similar trends: voters supported opposition candidates more actively in the second half of the day, which is partly explained by demographic voting patterns that will be analyzed and published after processing all original questionnaires. If the hypothesis is confirmed that older voters were more likely to support “independent” candidates and were also more likely to refuse participation in the exit poll, then the record level of refusals could be the main explanation for deviations between exit poll results and official Central Election Commission results. The underlying reasons for refusals, however, remain a separate topic for discussion beyond sociology.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2013, a clear majority of Ukrainians, 66%, agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people, while 22% disagreed and 12% were undecided. This represented the highest level of agreement recorded over the previous four years: in 2010, 61% held this view, in 2011 it stood at 58%, in 2012 at 59%, and in 2013 it increased to 66%. Over the same period, the share of those opposing recognition of the Holodomor as genocide declined from 25% to 22%. Support for the genocide thesis exceeded 80% in the West, Center, and North of the country, more than half in the East, and about 40% in the South and in Donbas. The indicator increased in all regions except the South.
• The belief that the Holodomor was a genocide was shared by around 90% of voters of Oleh Tiahnybok, Yuliia Tymoshenko, and Arsenii Yatseniuk, about 80% of voters of Vitalii Klychko and Petro Poroshenko, roughly half of Viktor Yanukovych’s voters, and over 40% of Petro Symonenko’s voters. Importantly, in the electorate of no presidential candidate did opponents of this view outnumber supporters. Agreement with the genocide thesis was found across all age groups, education levels, and among both men and women, although the share of those undecided was highest among younger respondents. Rural residents were more likely than urban residents to agree with the statement, at 79% versus 60%. Nearly 90% of respondents who considered Ukrainian their native language agreed that the Holodomor was a genocide, compared to about 60% among those who considered both Ukrainian and Russian their native languages and only around 40% among those who considered Russian their sole native language.

IRI today released its national survey of Ukraine public opinion. The poll indicates that 48 percent of Ukrainians believe that if the Association Agreement with the European Union were to be signed in November, it would impact Ukraine positively.  Additionally, 48 percent believe that signing the Association Agreement will increase the standard of living of citizens.

 The poll also found that reform of the economy, healthcare system and social services are the main reforms the government needs to undertake, with two-thirds of respondents believing the government needs to initiate economic reforms, 48 percent healthcare reforms and 36 percent social service reforms.

This survey was conducted August 27 – September 9, 2013. 

The randomly selected sample consists of 1,200 Ukrainian residents older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote and is representative of the general population by age, gender and education.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.  The United States Agency for International Development-funded survey was conducted by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of IRI, and the fieldwork was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had taken place in early October 2013, about 70% of voters would have participated. At the same time, if presidential elections had taken place in early October, turnout would have been about 73%. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded in Western Ukraine (around 80%), while the lowest was in the Donbas and Southern regions (around 50%).
• If parliamentary elections had been held in early October 2013, the Party of Regions would have won. Among those who intended to participate in the elections, 23% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 22% for Batkivshchyna, 18% for UDAR, 9% for the Communist Party, and 7% for Svoboda. About 6% would have supported other parties, while 14% were undecided. After redistribution of undecided voters, support would have been 27% for the Party of Regions, 26% for Batkivshchyna, 21% for UDAR, 10% for the Communist Party, and 9% for Svoboda, with other parties receiving about 7%. Compared to previous parliamentary election results, total support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda) increased from 50% to 56%, while total support for parties forming the parliamentary majority (Party of Regions and the Communist Party) decreased from 43% to 37%. Regional patterns showed the Party of Regions leading in the Donbas, South and East, while Batkivshchyna led in the West, Center and North. UDAR outperformed Batkivshchyna in the East and Svoboda in the West. The highest share of undecided voters was recorded in the Donbas (25%).
• If presidential elections had taken place in early October 2013 and Yulia Tymoshenko had participated, Viktor Yanukovych would have received 24% of support among those intending to vote, Yulia Tymoshenko 21%, Vitalii Klitschko 19%, Petro Symonenko 7%, Oleh Tyahnybok 6%, and Petro Poroshenko 2%. Other candidates would have received about 5%, about 4% would not support any candidate, and 11% would have been undecided. If Tymoshenko had not participated and Arsenii Yatseniuk had run instead, Yanukovych would have received 24%, Klitschko 20%, and Yatseniuk 17%, while Tyahnybok and Symonenko would each have received about 7%, and Poroshenko about 3%. Yanukovych remained the leading candidate in the Donbas, South and East, while Tymoshenko led in the West, Center and North, closely followed by Klitschko. In hypothetical second-round scenarios, Klitschko would have defeated Yanukovych with 37% versus 22%, while Yatseniuk would have received 30% against 23% for Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko 28% against 24% for Yanukovych.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 53% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 35% do not support it and another 12% are undecided. At the same time, a plurality believes that signing the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (47%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (34%), while 19% could not decide. Over the previous three years, the share of respondents who consider signing the EU Agreement more beneficial increased from 39% to 47%, reaching the highest level recorded during that period. Western and Northern regions show significantly higher support for the EU Agreement, while the South and Donbas are more supportive of joining the Customs Union. The Center and East act as transitional regions where support for both integration directions is roughly balanced, with slightly more support for the EU Agreement in the Center and for the Customs Union in the East.
• Support for integration options differs significantly by electoral preferences. The absolute majority of Petro Symonenko’s voters (82%) support the Customs Union, while voters of Oleh Tyahnybok (85%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (75%), Yulia Tymoshenko (73%) and Vitalii Klitschko (72%) support signing the EU Agreement. Among Viktor Yanukovych’s voters, support for EU accession (42%) and opposition to it (45%) are almost equal. At the same time, about half of his voters consider joining the Customs Union more beneficial for Ukraine, while about one quarter support signing the EU Agreement.
• Almost half of respondents (49%) expected that Ukraine and the European Union would sign the Association Agreement in November 2013, while about one quarter did not believe this would happen. Over the previous month, the share of those expecting the Agreement to be signed increased from 39% to 49%, including a significant increase among opponents of European integration. Most respondents (38%) believed that signing the Agreement would be the result of joint efforts by Ukraine and the EU, while 13% attributed it mainly to Ukraine’s efforts and 26% to the EU’s efforts. For the European Union, potential signing of the Agreement would be seen more as a victory (49%) than a defeat (3%), while 30% believed it would mean neither. For Ukraine, it would also be seen more as a victory (45%) than a defeat (16%), while 22% believed it would mean neither. For Russia, however, signing the Agreement would more likely be seen as a defeat (52%) than a victory (2%), while 29% believed it would mean neither. A majority of respondents (56%) expected that if the Agreement were signed, Russia would increase pressure on Ukraine, while 10% expected a decrease in pressure and 19% believed nothing would change.
• At the same time, 38% of respondents support the creation of a unified state including Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, while 50% oppose this idea and 12% are undecided. Over the previous three years, the share of supporters reached its lowest level, while the share of opponents reached its highest. The share of respondents who simultaneously supported both EU accession and a unified state with Russia declined from about 40% in 2011 to about 20% in October 2013. Regarding language policy, 43% support granting Russian the status of a state language, while 51% oppose it and 5% are undecided. Support for bilingualism was higher than opposition in 2009, equal in 2010–2011, and since mid-2012 opposition has consistently exceeded support. The strongest support for bilingualism is recorded in the Donbas (85%), South (69%) and East (57%).
• Only 20% of respondents support Ukraine joining NATO, while about two thirds oppose it and 15% are undecided. Relatively higher support for NATO membership is recorded only in Western Ukraine and among voters of Tyahnybok and Klitschko, which is partly explained by a higher share of men among their supporters, as men traditionally show higher support for NATO membership than women. Additionally, 27% of respondents support recognizing OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukrainian state independence, while 52% oppose this and 20% are undecided. Public opinion on this issue remains unstable and fluctuates yearly. Support is highest among voters of Tyahnybok and Tymoshenko and lowest among voters of Yanukovych and Symonenko. Only about 5–6% of residents in the Donbas and South support such recognition, while in Western Ukraine support exceeds 70%.

View the report.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, when speaking about the country overall, the majority of city residents believe that Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction (68%), while only 19% believe the country is moving in the right direction. Another 13% were undecided. At the same time, when assessing the situation in the city, 42% of respondents believe that Ternopil is moving in the right direction, while the same share (41%) believe it is moving in the wrong direction, and 17% are undecided. Most respondents (57%) believe that the situation in the city over the past 12 months has significantly or somewhat improved, about a quarter believe it has not changed, and only 18% believe that changes were mostly negative. Looking ahead, 51% expect the situation in the city to improve over the next 12 months, 28% do not expect changes, and 17% expect deterioration. When comparing Ternopil with other regional centers of Ukraine, an absolute majority (68%) would classify the city as average, while 4% consider it a leader and 20% an outsider.
• Among the key local problems, residents are most concerned about poor road conditions (73%), employment problems (55%), high utility tariffs (48%), poor quality healthcare services (46%), poor drinking water quality (41%), and poor performance of housing maintenance services (35%). In addition, respondents mention the sanitary condition of the city (28%) and chaotic urban development (24%). Compared to the previous year, the number of residents concerned about road conditions increased (from 64% to 73%), poor healthcare quality (from 42% to 46%), poor drinking water quality (from 35% to 41%), chaotic construction (from 18% to 24%), and insufficient parking infrastructure (from 5% to 11%). At the same time, concern about employment decreased (from 68% to 55%) and about the sanitary condition of the city (from 34% to 28%), while other issues remained at approximately the same level.
• In September 2012, the majority (51%) of Ternopil residents expected positive changes following parliamentary elections. One year later, only 6% reported that these expectations were met, while the expectations of the majority (79%) were not met. Currently, the biggest expectations from the newly elected Parliament relate to increasing salaries and pensions (53%), creating new jobs (39%), ensuring economic growth (36%), fighting corruption (34%), and protecting the Ukrainian language and culture (33%). Compared to expectations before the elections, ideological expectations have decreased, while socio-economic expectations have increased. In particular, expectations related to salary and pension growth increased (from 44% to 53%), job creation (from 36% to 39%), healthcare quality improvement (from 21% to 25%), and education quality improvement (from 12% to 19%). At the same time, expectations related to protecting Ukrainian language and culture decreased (from 52% to 33%), the release of Yulia Tymoshenko (from 21% to 17%), freedom of speech (from 19% to 16%), and initiating impeachment of President Yanukovych (from 23% to 13%).
• If elections to the Ternopil City Council were held next Sunday, more than 75% of residents would participate. The highest support would be for Svoboda (34%), followed by UDAR (26%) and Batkivshchyna (23%). Around 3% would vote for the Party of Regions, 2% for Our Ukraine, more than 3% for other parties, and 9% are undecided. Among candidates for mayor, the highest support would be for incumbent mayor Serhiy Nadal (48%), followed by Vitaliy Maksymov (11%) and Roman Zastavnyy (about 10%). More than 4% would support Ihor Huda, about 4% each would support Vasyl Lylo and Mykhailo Ratushnyak, nearly 3% would support Petro Landyak, nearly 8% would support other candidates, and 9% are undecided. The most well-known local politicians are Serhiy Nadal, Roman Zastavnyy, and Oleh Kayda, who are known by almost all respondents. Around 80% also know Vasyl Lylo, Mykhailo Ratushnyak, and Vitaliy Maksymov. The most positive attitudes are recorded toward Serhiy Nadal (56%), Oleh Kayda (42%), Roman Zastavnyy (31%), and Vitaliy Maksymov (26%). The most negative attitudes are recorded toward Roman Zastavnyy (33%) and Petro Hoch (31%). The highest satisfaction among residents is with the work of the mayor (68%), while satisfaction with the acting head of the regional council (23%) and the head of the regional state administration (23%) is significantly lower.
• Among national politicians, local residents trust Vitaliy Klitschko the most (69%), followed by Oleh Tyahnybok (59%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk (59%), and Yulia Tymoshenko (49%). The highest levels of distrust are toward Viktor Yushchenko (80%), Viktor Yanukovych (87%), Mykola Azarov (89%), and Petro Symonenko (89%). Over the past year, trust in Tyahnybok and Yatsenyuk has remained stable, while trust in Tymoshenko and Klitschko has increased. If presidential elections were held next Sunday, more than 80% of residents would participate. Vitaliy Klitschko would receive the highest support (31%), followed by Yulia Tymoshenko (21%), Oleh Tyahnybok (14%), and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (13%). Around 4% would vote for Petro Poroshenko, around 2% each for Viktor Yanukovych and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, more than 4% for other candidates, 2% would vote against all candidates, and 8% are undecided. If Tymoshenko did not participate, Klitschko would receive 36%, Yatsenyuk 23%, and Tyahnybok 16%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in Lviv, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Khmelnytskyi, an absolute majority of residents like living in their cities. The highest share of residents satisfied with living in their city is recorded in Ternopil (91%), while the lowest is in Khmelnytskyi and Ivano-Frankivsk (80%). Residents of these two cities also demonstrated the highest share of dissatisfaction, although such respondents account for only about 2%.
• Lviv, according to most of its residents, is an attractive tourist city (61%) with rich history and beautiful architecture, many monuments, as well as numerous cafes and coffee shops. Lviv residents are also more likely than others to believe that their city plays an important role in the country’s development (21%) and is a politically active center (19%). At the same time, Lviv is least often perceived by its residents as a quiet and cozy city (13%), a clean and well-maintained city (9%), and as having convenient transport infrastructure.
• For Ternopil residents, their city is primarily quiet, cozy and green (59%), with a large youth population. A significant share of respondents (42%) highlight the city’s spirituality and religiosity. About one-third of residents consider the city clean, well-maintained and environmentally friendly, which distinguishes it from other cities. The least frequently mentioned characteristics of Ternopil are quality of healthcare and education (3%), availability of large opportunities (3%), and opportunities to work and earn income (7%). Among all cities studied, Ternopil is least often perceived as playing an important role in the country’s development.
• For residents of Chernivtsi, the most important characteristics of their city are beautiful architecture (63%) and the presence of parks and green areas (56%), combined with rich historical heritage. Chernivtsi is also perceived as a spiritual and religious city (49%), with friendly and pleasant residents (46%). More than in other cities, residents highlight employment and income opportunities (20%), opportunities for child development (19%), as well as education quality (15%) and healthcare quality (13%). At the same time, residents least often mention low cost of living.
• For Ivano-Frankivsk residents, their city is primarily quiet and cozy (39%), with a religious character, a large youth population, and friendly residents. Around one quarter consider the city safe and traditional. Ivano-Frankivsk, like Lviv, is also perceived as a politically active city (17%). The least mentioned characteristics are vibrant cultural and sports life, availability of major opportunities (5%), and quality of education and healthcare.
• For residents of Khmelnytskyi, the city is perceived as quiet and cozy (around 40%), with many parks, cafes and coffee shops, and a large youth population. Around 15% note relatively low cost of living, which is the highest among all cities studied. At the same time, residents least often mention religiosity and preservation of traditions. Khmelnytskyi is also least often perceived as a tourist destination (7%), reflected in low indicators of architectural beauty, monuments and historical heritage.
• Among youth, their hometown is primarily associated with leisure opportunities, cafes and coffee shops, youth population, attractive people, and cultural and sports life. Middle-aged residents emphasize monuments, parks and green areas, environmental quality, cleanliness, as well as opportunities for work, recreation and child development. Older generations emphasize spirituality and religiosity, historical heritage and safety.
• If respondents were forced to move abroad permanently, most residents of Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk would choose the United States, Canada and Germany as the most attractive destinations. For residents of Chernivtsi and Khmelnytskyi, Germany would be the top destination, followed by the United States. Residents of these two cities also show the highest share of potential migration to Russia. Interestingly, migration to Italy and the United Kingdom is more common than to neighboring Poland, although Poland remains one of the most attractive destinations for residents of Khmelnytskyi and Lviv.
• If respondents were forced to move to another location within Ukraine, residents of Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Khmelnytskyi would primarily choose Western Ukraine and the Kyiv region. Residents of Chernivtsi are most attracted to the capital region, followed by Western and Southern Ukraine. Lviv residents are equally likely to consider moving either to Kyiv or to Western Ukraine. At the same time, among those who have decided on a potential relocation destination, most would prefer to move abroad rather than within Ukraine.

• According to the latest survey conducted by the Rating Group, around 40% of respondents consider themselves football fans: 9% identify as football fans, 9% as active supporters, and another 22% consider themselves supporters but not active ones. At the same time, almost 60% are not interested in football.
• According to long-term observations, the peak number of football supporters in Ukraine was recorded during the EURO 2012 period. In 2009, about one third of respondents identified themselves as football supporters, while immediately after EURO 2012 almost half of respondents did so. Later, the indicator stabilized at around 40%, confirming the emotional nature of its growth. In 2012, regions that hosted EURO 2012 demonstrated a sharp increase in the number of supporters, while in 2013 the figures stabilized. Overall, hosting EURO 2012 in Ukraine increased public interest in football. Another factor contributing to the growth in the number of supporters (from 33% in 2009 to 40% in 2013) was the success of Ukrainian clubs, the level of the domestic championship and the performance of the national team.
• The most active supporters remain young people and men. Almost one third of men actively follow football, while among women this share is three times lower (around one in ten). Only about 40% of men are not interested in football at all, while among women this share exceeds 70%.
• Among Ukrainian football clubs, Dynamo is the most popular (39%), followed by Shakhtar (25%). Less popular clubs include Metalist (6%), Dnipro (3%), Karpaty (3%) and Chornomorets (3%). Dynamo is most supported in the North, Center and West of the country. Shakhtar is the clear favorite in Donbas and shares leadership with Dynamo in the South. In the East, Metalist is the most popular club, slightly ahead of Shakhtar, Dnipro and Dynamo.
• Around 45% of football supporters in Ukraine do not support the idea of merging the Ukrainian and Russian football championships into a single league, while 37% support the idea and 17% are undecided. Among those not interested in football, only 11% support the idea, around one quarter oppose it, and about two thirds are undecided. The idea is most popular among supporters in the South, while in other regions opponents prevail. Only supporters of Chornomorets and Metalist tend to support the idea more than oppose it. Among supporters of Shakhtar and Dnipro opinions are divided almost equally. At the same time, Dynamo supporters mostly oppose the idea, as do supporters of Karpaty, nearly 90% of whom expressed opposition.

• According to the latest survey by Rating Group, in August 2013, 81% of Ukrainians to some extent consider themselves patriots of their country. In particular, 40% of respondents clearly identify themselves as patriots, while another 41% say “rather yes than no.” At the same time, 13% do not consider themselves patriots, and another 5% were undecided. Thus, over the past year the share of those who consider themselves patriots has remained unchanged (in August 2012, 40% definitely described themselves as patriots and another 42% as rather patriots). If looking at a longer trend, since 2010 the share of people who consider themselves patriots has slightly increased. In September 2010, only 31% clearly described themselves as patriots and another 45% as rather patriots. Overall, the share of respondents who consider themselves patriots of their country increased from 77% to 81%.
• Interestingly, the highest levels of patriotism are reported both among the youngest and the oldest respondents. At the same time, there is a trend showing that the older respondents are, the less they support Ukraine’s independence. This suggests that some respondents who call themselves patriots do not necessarily mean an independent Ukraine, and this is more typical among older people. Overall, 61% of respondents would support the declaration of Ukraine’s Independence if such a choice were presented today, while 28% would not support it and 11% are undecided. Over the past year (since August 2012), these indicators have remained almost unchanged.
• Regionally, almost 90% would support Independence in the West, nearly 70% in the North and Center, while in the East and South fewer than half would support it, and in Donbas only about one third. Donbas is the only region where opponents of Independence outnumber supporters, whereas a year earlier these indicators were nearly equal. At the same time, almost half of Party of Regions supporters would support Independence, while nearly 40% would not. Among Communist Party supporters, opponents of Independence dominate (about two thirds).
• As noted, younger respondents are more likely to support Ukraine’s Independence. Men support Independence more than women. The higher a person’s material well-being, the higher the support for Independence. Almost 80% of respondents whose native language is Ukrainian support Independence. Among those who consider both Russian and Ukrainian as native languages, about half support it, while among those who consider only Russian as their native language, only about one third support it. Nearly 90% of Greek Catholic Church parishioners, more than 70% of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) parishioners, and almost 60% of believers who do not identify with any denomination support Independence. Among Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) parishioners, fewer than half support it, although supporters still outnumber opponents.
• 46% of respondents are ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms if necessary. This is the highest level recorded in the past three years: in 2010 it was 43%, and in 2012 only about one third. At the same time, 43% are not ready to defend territorial integrity with arms, and 11% are undecided. Previously, higher readiness to defend the country with arms was mainly expressed by supporters of Svoboda, but now similar levels are observed among supporters of other opposition parties such as UDAR and Batkivshchyna (about 60%). Another notable point is that in Donbas the number of respondents ready to defend territorial integrity with arms is 1.5 times higher than the number who would support Independence. Almost 60% of men and every third woman are ready to defend the country with arms. The younger the respondents, the higher the declared readiness to defend the country.

The study was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Rating Group from February 23 to March 14, 2013. The fieldwork phase took place from February 27 to March 10, 2013. The survey was conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (across 41 settlements), with a total of 1,060 respondents interviewed. The sample was multi-stage and random. The sampling error, with a 0.95 probability, does not exceed 3.1% (excluding the design effect).

Survey method: face-to-face interviews at respondents’ place of residence.

• 69% of Ukrainians believe that, overall, affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, while only 16% believe they are moving in the right direction. Another 16% were unable to determine their opinion on this issue.
• It is worth noting that compared to similar studies conducted in 2011–2012, evaluations have changed very little. The only exception was September 2012, when a quarter believed that affairs in Ukraine were moving in the right direction, while almost 60% believed they were moving in the wrong direction. This indicates that ahead of the parliamentary elections, public expectations improved (an emotional component was added), but six months later the indicators returned to the levels recorded in 2011–2012.
• Most respondents believe that the most important problems for Ukraine are unemployment (53%), corruption in government bodies (51%), and low production levels (45%). In addition, respondents noted control over price growth (26%), social protection for the poor (25%), government incompetence (22%), political instability (21%), and crime (15%).
• Compared to September of the previous year, the most noticeable increase occurred among those who identified corruption in government bodies (from 37% to 51%), low production levels (from 40% to 45%), government incompetence (from 13% to 22%), and political instability (from 16% to 21%) as key national problems.
• Among problems that personally concern citizens, respondents highlighted price control (54%), unemployment (50%), and social protection for the poor (37%). Citizens are also personally concerned about corruption in government bodies (27%), low production levels (22%), and delays in salary or pension payments (21%).
• Far fewer citizens are currently concerned about crime (12%), government incompetence (12%), shortages or possible shutdowns of gas, electricity, or water supply (10%), depreciation of the hryvnia (9%), political instability (9%), and land ownership issues (7%).
• Compared to September of the previous year, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of respondents who identified corruption in government bodies (from 23% to 27%) and government incompetence (from 6% to 12%) as key personal problems. Changes in other indicators were minimal.
• Thus, the survey shows that the main problems worrying Ukrainians are primarily economic. At the same time, citizens clearly distinguish between problems that affect them personally and those that are important for the country overall. Specifically, respondents consider price control, delays in salary or pension payments, social protection for the poor, depreciation of the hryvnia, and risks of utility shutdowns to be more important personally than nationally. In contrast, low production levels, corruption, political instability, and government incompetence are viewed as more important for the country than for individuals personally. Unemployment is considered equally important both personally and nationally.
• Regional differences are also notable. Unemployment and government incompetence are more important problems for residents of Western Ukraine; price growth control, corruption, and relations with Russia are more important for residents of the South and East; social protection for the poor is more important for residents of Central Ukraine.
• Women more acutely feel the impact of rising prices and social protection issues, while men more often highlight corruption, low production levels, unemployment, and crime. Young people are more sensitive to corruption, government incompetence, and political instability; middle-aged people to unemployment and low production levels; older people to price growth and social protection for low-income groups.
• Respondents did not note significant positive changes in most spheres of the country’s life. For example, 73% believe that price levels worsened over the past two years, 24% believe they did not change, and only 2% believe they improved.
• More than half of respondents noted deterioration over the past two years in healthcare, employment opportunities, political stability, professionalism of authorities, agricultural development, overall economic development, and anti-corruption efforts. More than 40% noted deterioration in small and medium business development, social protection, and housing and utility services.
• Relatively more positive assessments were given to changes in European integration, language issues, salary and pension payments, hryvnia stability, and relations with Russia.
• 72% of respondents would support, in a referendum, constitutional and legal provisions allowing citizens to dismiss officials, MPs, judges, and law enforcement leaders at all levels. Only 8% would oppose such a proposal, 10% were undecided, and 11% would not participate in such a referendum.
• 43% of respondents would support Ukraine joining the European Union, while 26% would oppose it. 19% were undecided, and 11% would not participate.
• 40% would support Ukraine joining the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, while 33% would oppose it. 16% were undecided, and 11% would not participate.
• 36% would support electing the President of Ukraine in a single round, while 37% would oppose it. 17% were undecided, and 10% would not participate.
• 33% would support introducing a purely majoritarian electoral system for parliamentary elections, about a quarter would oppose it, nearly 30% were undecided, and 14% would not participate.
• Only 16% would support introducing a bicameral parliament, about one third would oppose it, one third were undecided, and 16% would not participate.

Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI today released its survey of Ukraine public opinion (PDF).  The poll indicates that the top issues that worry Ukrainians involve the economy, with more than 50 percent of respondents citing unemployment and corruption within state bodies as the top challenges facing Ukraine, followed closely by low industry production, control over price growth and social protection for the poor.  Unemployment and state corruption remain the top concerns for Ukrainians, regardless of gender, age group or region.  Ukrainians also continue to be pessimistic about the direction their country is going in, with 69 percent responding that Ukraine is heading in the wrong direction.
Another interesting finding involves the Ukrainian public’s views on Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the European Union.  The agreement, which is expected to be signed in July, is the result of joint negotiations that aims to strengthen ties and enhance cooperation between the European Union and Ukraine.  When asked if the agreement will be useful or harmful to Ukraine, a slight majority of 51 percent of respondents believes it will be useful, including 65 percent of Ukrainian youth aged 18-29.

This survey was conducted May 14 – 28, 2013.  The randomly selected sample consists of 1,200 Ukrainian residents older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote and is representative of the general population by age, gender and education.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent.  The National Endowment for Democracy-funded survey was conducted by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of IRI, and the fieldwork was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine.

Source: The International Republican Institute

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, about one third of Kyiv residents plan to spend the summer at home, and at least one in ten will not have a vacation at all this summer. Another 14% have not yet decided on their summer vacation plans.
• Among those who plan to leave the city this summer, the most popular option is vacationing at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov (18%). At the same time, 13% plan to spend their summer vacation abroad, and 7% — in another city or village in Ukraine. Every sixth Kyiv resident plans to spend their vacation at a country house.
• The overwhelming majority of elderly people will stay in Kyiv this summer, choosing their home or country house as a place for vacation. The younger the respondents, the more likely they are to leave the city for vacation. Almost every fifth respondent aged 18–39 plans a trip abroad.
• As respondents’ education level increases, the share of those planning to leave the city also increases. Only one quarter of people with higher or incomplete higher education will spend their vacation at home, and 10% will not have a vacation at all. At the same time, every fifth respondent with a higher education diploma plans to vacation at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov, while slightly fewer (15%) plan to vacation abroad.
• More than half of women will spend the summer at home, at a country house, or at work. Men are more mobile, especially regarding trips abroad. At the same time, 16% of men have not yet decided where they will spend their vacation this year. Among women, this share is lower.
• In the context of summer vacations, the electoral aspect is also notable. The most “stable” voters (people who consistently participate in elections) are more likely to spend the summer at home or at a country house. At the same time, some electoral groups could experience significant losses. In particular, supporters of V. Klitschko and M. Katerynchuk could be in a less favorable position, as at least one third of their supporters plan foreign trips or vacations at the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov, while some plan trips across cities and villages of Ukraine. Meanwhile, P. Poroshenko and O. Popov would be in a more favorable position, as their supporters are mostly older people who plan to spend the summer at home or at a country house.
• Among political parties, the most vulnerable situation is for UDAR, which is supported mainly by young people. At the same time, the largest share of those staying at home is among supporters of the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, and the Party of Regions.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 59% of respondents believe that Ukraine rather lacks a “strong hand” than “democracy” (26%). Every sixth respondent was undecided on this issue.
• At the same time, 42% of respondents believe that Ukraine rather lacks “greater freedom of speech” than “greater censorship” (26%). Every third respondent was undecided.
• Half of respondents believe that Ukraine “needs to develop market relations,” while 31% believe it should “return to a planned economy.” Every fifth respondent was undecided.
• It is noteworthy that one third of supporters of a “strong hand” simultaneously support increasing freedom of speech in the country, and 40% support further development of the market economy.
• Support for a “strong hand” ranges from about 70% of respondents in the South and Donbas to about 50% in the West and North of the country; from about 80% among supporters of the Communist Party and 70% among supporters of the Party of Regions to about half among supporters of UDAR, Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• At the same time, clear correlations are observed: the younger the respondents and the higher their education level, the more likely they are to support deepening democracy, increasing freedom of speech and developing market relations.
• In addition, Ukrainian-speaking respondents are more likely than Russian-speaking respondents to believe that the country lacks democracy and freedom of speech. Similar patterns are observed by nationality: ethnic Russians are more likely than ethnic Ukrainians to support a “strong hand,” increased censorship and a return to a planned economy.
• Interestingly, women support a “strong hand,” increased censorship and a return to a planned economy more often than men.
• Clear support for the idea of increasing censorship in Ukraine is recorded only in Donbas. The same applies to returning to a planned economy.
• At the same time, equal shares of respondents in the South and East support both increased censorship and increased freedom of speech. Meanwhile, in the Center, and especially in the North and West of the country, there is clear support for increasing freedom of speech and deepening market relations.
• 44% of Ukrainians do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while 41% do regret it. Every sixth respondent was undecided.
• Compared to a previous survey conducted at the end of 2010, the share of those who regret the USSR decreased from 46% to 41%, while the share of those who do not regret it increased from 36% to 44%. Thus, over the past 2.5 years, nostalgia for the USSR has declined, primarily due to demographic changes, as older people remain the main supporters of the Soviet Union.
• Other patterns are also present. For example, women regret the USSR more often than men. Russian-speaking respondents and ethnic Russians also regret the USSR more often than ethnic Ukrainians. The higher the education level of respondents, the lower the level of nostalgia for the USSR.
• Among those who regret the USSR, 75% believe Ukraine lacks a “strong hand,” half would like to return to a planned economy, and 40% support increasing censorship in the country. At the same time, about one quarter support deepening market relations and increasing freedom of speech.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the opposition political rally “Ukraine, Rise Up!”, which took place on May 18 in Kyiv, received more support among Kyiv residents than the Party of Regions rally “To Europe Without Fascists.”
• About one third of surveyed Kyiv residents evaluated the opposition rally positively, one quarter — neutrally, while about one fifth — negatively. About the same share had not heard about the rally at all.
• In contrast, only about one tenth of respondents evaluated the Party of Regions rally positively, about one fifth — neutrally, while more than 40% evaluated it negatively. About one quarter had not heard about this rally.
• The most positive evaluation of the “Ukraine, Rise Up!” rally was among supporters of Svoboda (57%). Supporters of Batkivshchyna evaluated it more positively (49%) than supporters of UDAR (36%). About 40% of supporters of the Communist Party and Party of Regions evaluated the opposition rally negatively.
• The rally “To Europe Without Fascists” was evaluated relatively positively mainly by Party of Regions supporters (51%). The most negative attitudes toward this rally were among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna (about 70%).
• Older respondents were the most informed about the May 18 rallies. At the same time, about one third of young people had not heard about the opposition rally, and more than 40% had not heard about the Party of Regions rally. Support for both rallies was also generally higher among older respondents.
• Men supported the opposition rally more than women (40% vs 26%), and evaluated the Party of Regions rally more negatively (50% vs 40% among women).
• Most respondents believed that participants of the rallies received payment for participation. Regarding the Party of Regions rally, 51% believed all participants were paid, 17% believed only some were paid, and only 7% believed no one was paid. Regarding the opposition rally, 35% believed all participants were paid, 21% believed some were paid, and 16% believed no one was paid.
• There is a trend: the younger the respondents, the more likely they were to believe rallies were paid, which may partly explain lower support among youth.
• About 38% believed more Kyiv residents attended the opposition rally, 8% believed more attended the Party of Regions rally. Another 7% believed participants of both rallies were mostly non-Kyiv residents, 9% believed mostly Kyiv residents attended both. About 38% could not answer.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in May 2013, about 60% of voters would have participated.
• Among those intending to vote, 35.9% would have supported Vitalii Klitschko, 17.1% Oleksandr Popov, and more than 11% Petro Poroshenko.
• More than 5% would have supported Mykola Tomenko, about 4% Andrii Illienko, about 3% Mykola Katerynchuk, and about 2% each Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko. Around 3% would have voted for other candidates, while about one in six remained undecided.
• Compared to March 2013, support increased for V. Klitschko (from 31% to 36%), P. Poroshenko (from 7% to 11%), and M. Katerynchuk (from 1% to 3%). Meanwhile, support for O. Popov declined (from 20% to 17%). The share of undecided voters also decreased (from 25% to 15%). Due to the dominance of opposition sentiment in Kyiv, most undecided voters shifted toward candidates associated with the opposition. Popov also partially lost support to Poroshenko, as their electorates were similar and oriented mainly toward older voters. Klitschko and Katerynchuk, meanwhile, were more youth-oriented candidates.
• Women showed higher support for Katerynchuk, Poroshenko, and Popov, and there were also more undecided voters among women. Men showed higher support for Hrytsenko, Illienko, and Klitschko.
• If the mayoral election had been held in two rounds and the runoff had included Oleksandr Popov and Vitalii Klitschko, about 25% would have supported Popov and more than 70% Klitschko, while about 5% would have remained undecided.
• If the runoff had been Popov vs. Poroshenko, about one third would have supported Popov, 57% Poroshenko, and about 10% would have remained undecided.
• If the runoff had been Popov vs. Katerynchuk, about 40% would have supported Popov, 47% Katerynchuk, and 16% would have remained undecided.
• If Kyiv City Council elections had been held at that time, among those intending to vote: 27.5% would have supported UDAR, 14.2% Batkivshchyna, 13.6% Svoboda, and almost 10% the Party of Regions. Other parties would have received less than 5% each. Nearly one quarter remained undecided.
• Compared to March 2013, the most significant growth was recorded for Svoboda (from 11% to 14%). Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party slightly strengthened their positions, and support for the European Party also increased. UDAR’s support remained largely unchanged.
• UDAR was mainly supported by younger voters, while older voters were more represented among Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and undecided voters. Men showed greater support for Svoboda and UDAR. Women were more represented among undecided voters and supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Party of Regions. Compared to March, the share of men among Svoboda supporters increased, while it decreased among UDAR supporters.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 50% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 37% do not support it, and another 13% are undecided. At the same time, 42% of respondents support the creation of a single state including Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, while 47% do not support this idea and 11% are undecided. Notably, one in four Ukrainians who support the creation of a single state with Russia simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
• Given these response patterns, respondents were asked a direct question. According to respondents, signing the Association Agreement and Free Trade Area with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (41%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (38%), while 20% could not decide. Compared to 2010–2012, there is a trend toward growth in support for both integration options, while the share of undecided respondents has decreased from 27% to 20% over the last two years.
• Traditionally, Western, Northern, and Central regions of Ukraine show higher support for the Agreement with the European Union, while Donbas, Southern, and Eastern regions show higher support for joining the Customs Union. At the same time, the East and the Center remain transitional regions without a strong dominance of one integration vector over the other, and they also show the highest share of respondents who simultaneously support both integration options. Younger people and those with higher education levels traditionally show higher support for signing the EU Association Agreement, while older respondents are more likely to support joining the Customs Union.
• According to respondents, closer ties with the European Union would bring key benefits such as more travel opportunities (55%), better job opportunities (53%), increased investment in Ukraine (51%), development of democracy (41%), better education opportunities (41%), poverty reduction (39%), and reduced corruption (39%). In turn, closer ties with Russia would bring key benefits such as lower gas prices (55%), closer ties between peoples (53%), support for domestic industry (51%), and support for domestic agriculture (41%). The same share of respondents (21%) believe that closer ties with either the EU or Russia would provide better protection of Ukraine’s borders, while 15% believe neither option would bring advantages.
• Forty percent of respondents believe that joining the Customs Union would increase Ukrainians’ well-being (39% disagree). At the same time, 46% believe that joining the EU would increase Ukrainians’ well-being (34% disagree). Forty-six percent believe joining the Customs Union would stimulate industry and agriculture in Ukraine (36% disagree), while 55% believe EU accession would provide a development boost for Ukraine (30% disagree). Forty-three percent believe that Ukraine will always be treated as a second-class country by Russia, and 58% believe the same about Europe. As a result, 70% believe Ukraine should first establish internal order before joining any international integration project, while only 16% disagree.
• Half of respondents believe the European Union will remain largely stable over the next 5–10 years. Among them, 28% believe the EU composition will mostly remain unchanged (possibly with minor membership changes), and 22% believe the number of EU member states will definitely grow. Another 16% believe only a few powerful states will remain in the EU, while only 9% believe the EU will cease to exist within 5–10 years. More than half of respondents believe Ukraine will eventually join the EU, including 4% who believe this could happen within 1–2 years, 12% within 3–5 years, 18% within 5–10 years, and 23% who see it as a distant перспектива. At the same time, one quarter believe Ukraine will never join the EU, and one fifth are undecided.
• There is a direct relationship between belief in Ukraine’s chances of EU membership, belief in the EU’s long-term stability, and support for Ukraine signing the EU Association Agreement. When evaluating perceptions of countries, respondents were asked to choose statements reflecting their views of Europe, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Overall, associations with Belarus are more positive than with Russia, associations with Russia are more positive than with Ukraine, and the most positive associations are linked to Europe.
• The most common associations with Europe include a developed economy (61%), a large number of migrants (59%), high education standards (58%), prosperity (56%), active citizens defending their rights (54%), new technologies (54%), confidence in the future (52%), fair courts (52%), safety (52%), developed democracy (51%), law-abiding citizens (49%), freedom of speech (48%), stability (46%), gender equality (45%), strong business opportunities (45%), and accessible healthcare (37%). Russia is also associated with migrants, though at about half the level of Europe. Belarus is associated with stability, law-abiding citizens, and accessible education at levels close to Europe. Russia is associated with high education standards and confidence in the future, but significantly less than Europe.
• Ukraine scores worse than Belarus, Russia, and especially Europe across most of these associations. The only areas where Ukraine outperforms Russia and Belarus (while still lagging behind Europe) are freedom of speech and gender equality. Ukrainians tend to associate Ukraine strongly with unemployment, poverty, corruption, and inequality (70–80%), economic crisis (about 60%), and degradation (about 40%). However, economic crisis is also associated with Europe (32%) and Russia (30%), and to a lesser extent Belarus (17%). Shared associations for Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia include shared culture, language, and history. Unlike Europe and Belarus, Ukraine (39%) and especially Russia (69%) are associated with large natural resources. Ukraine is rarely associated with strong government (2%) or strong military (2%), while more than 40% associate these with Russia and Belarus, and about a quarter with Europe. Ukraine is also less associated with censorship (12%) compared to Russia (about 25%) and Belarus (about one third).
• Only 3% of respondents could not name any associations with Europe, compared to 2% for Ukraine and Russia and 5% for Belarus. Only 12% of respondents had visited EU countries within the last five years, while about one quarter had visited CIS countries. Despite this, more respondents would prefer to live in Europe (43% would like to live there, 45% would not), compared to Russia (30% would like to live there, 61% would not) and Belarus (21% would like to live there, 67% would not). The desire to live in Russia is strongly regionally divided, while the desire to live in Europe is shared across regions. There is also a direct relationship between frequency of visits to Europe and the desire to live there, as well as support for Ukraine’s EU accession.
• Finally, almost half of respondents believe their children or grandchildren would have a better future in Ukraine integrated with Europe, while one third believe this would be in Ukraine integrated with Russia or the CIS, and almost one quarter remain undecided. At the same time, only about 70% of Customs Union supporters believe their children would have a better future through integration with Russia, while every sixth sees a better future through integration with Europe. Among undecided respondents, one third also see a better future through integration with Europe, while only 16% see it through integration with Russia, and about half remain undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 60% of respondents support the view that some professions are purely “male” and some are “female”. 36% disagree with this statement, and another 5% are undecided.
• Respondents were asked to assess who typical professions are more suitable for: men, women, or equally for both. According to respondents, professions such as “police officer”, “politician”, “businessman”, and “scientist” are perceived as more typical for men. At the same time, professions such as “salesperson” and “secretary” are perceived as more typical for women. Meanwhile, “manager”, “journalist”, and “doctor” are considered equally suitable for both men and women.
• In particular, 56% of women and 63% of men agreed that the profession of “police officer” is more typical for men. At the same time, 56% of women and 64% of men agreed that the profession of “secretary” is more typical for women. Similarly, 34% of women and 43% of men agreed that “salesperson” is more of a female profession.
• In other cases, responses were less categorical. For example, 30% of men and 22% of women agreed that “politician” is more of a male profession, while nearly 70% of men and 80% of women believe that this profession is equally suitable for both genders. Similarly, 25% of men and 19% of women believe that “businessman” is more of a male profession, while nearly 70% of men and 80% of women believe it is suitable for both. Regarding the profession of “scientist”, 21% of men and 13% of women considered it more male, while nearly 80% of both men and women believe it is equally suitable.
• From 80% to 90% of both men and women believe that professions such as “manager”, “journalist”, and “doctor” are equally suitable for both genders.
• Among respondents, 14% of women and 8% of men reported that they had at some point wanted to master a profession traditionally considered typical for the opposite gender. This was more common among younger respondents and those with higher education. At the same time, 80% of women and almost 90% of men said they had never had such a desire.
• Almost every tenth surveyed woman reported being refused employment because of her gender. Such responses were more common among middle-aged respondents with higher education. At the same time, 6% of men also reported being refused employment because of gender.
• About 29% of respondents support banning the indication of candidate gender in job advertisements, while 28% do not support it. At the same time, 33% are indifferent and 10% are undecided. Older respondents are the most indifferent to this issue. Support for such a ban is higher among people with higher education. Men and women generally have similar attitudes toward this issue, although women who personally experienced gender-based refusal support the ban significantly more.

• Rating Group continues its special project “People’s TOP”, which consists of a series of studies identifying the best of the best. The key feature of the methodology is that respondents are not given any lists or prompts; people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions, naming their own options. In April, we present the issue “The Country Where One Would Like to Be Born.”
• According to the study results, almost half of respondents (48%), if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose Ukraine. About 9% of respondents would choose Russia, 5% — Germany, 4% — the United States, 2% each — the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, and France, and 1% each — Poland, Canada, Sweden, and Belarus. At the same time, 2% would choose the USSR, and about 4% — other countries. About 16% of respondents were unable to answer the question.
• Overall, 15% of respondents, if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose EU countries, and another 4% — the United States. Meanwhile, about 10% would choose Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan, and another 2% would choose the USSR.
• Russia was most often chosen in Donbas (18%), as well as in the South (13%) and East (13%) of the country. Germany, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom were more often chosen in the West and North of the country. At the same time, in the Center of the country, Ukraine was most often chosen.
• The younger the respondents, the smaller the share of those who would like to be born in Ukraine: only about 40% of young people would choose Ukraine, while among older people this share is about 1.5 times higher. About every tenth young Ukrainian would like to be born in the United States, slightly fewer — in Germany and the United Kingdom. Women are more attached to Ukraine than men. Men more often chose Russia, Germany, and the United States.
• Interestingly, every tenth voter of the Communist Party of Ukraine would like to be born in the USSR. Every sixth voter of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party would like to be born in Russia. Meanwhile, every sixth voter of UDAR would choose Germany. The most loyal to the country turned out to be voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda — almost 60% of them, if they had the opportunity to choose the country where they would be born, would choose Ukraine.