Press releases

Foreign policy

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February–March 2013, 58% of residents of Odesa region, when choosing between signing the Association Agreement and subsequent accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, chose the Customs Union and CES, while 25% preferred the Association Agreement and subsequent EU accession. Another 18% were undecided.
• About 56% of Odesa region residents would prefer Ukraine not to become an EU member and instead maintain open borders with Russia — without visas and customs controls — while having closed borders with the EU — with visas and customs controls. Meanwhile, 27% would prefer Ukraine to sign a political association agreement and a Free Trade Agreement and, after becoming an EU member, have closed borders with Russia — with visas and customs controls — while maintaining open borders and a visa-free regime with EU countries. Another 17% found it difficult to answer.
• About 68% of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly states with open borders, without visas and customs controls. About 11% believe relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs controls. At the same time, 19% believe Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state. Another 2% were undecided.
• Residents of the region more optimistically assess prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and CES (56%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (22%). About 23% were unsure.
• Similarly, respondents evaluated employment prospects: 49% believe employment opportunities would improve if Ukraine joined the CES, while 25% believe they would improve if Ukraine joined the EU. About 26% were undecided.

Dual citizenship

• About 58% of Odesa region residents generally agree that Ukraine should introduce the possibility of dual citizenship with other countries, while 21% do not support this idea. About 15% are neutral, and 6% are undecided.
• If dual citizenship were allowed in Ukraine, 31% of Odesa region residents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 7% would choose German citizenship, 4% — U.S. citizenship, and 3% — Italian or Canadian citizenship. At the same time, less than one-third of respondents (27%) would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• About 53% of respondents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship (26.3% definitely would, 26.4% probably would). About 39% would not want Russian citizenship (23.3% definitely would not, 15.2% probably would not). About 9% were undecided.
• The share of those who would like to obtain EU citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship is lower than the share of those who would like Russian citizenship — about 44% (17.7% definitely would, 24.8% probably would). The same share (44%) would not want EU citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 14% were undecided.

Forecasts

• About one-third of Odesa region residents (33%) believe that if Ukraine faced a difficult situation requiring significant non-repayable financial assistance, Russia would be the first to provide support. About 10% believe it would be the European Union, 5% — the International Monetary Fund, and 4% — international humanitarian organizations such as the UN. About 35% believe no one would help Ukraine, and 9% were undecided.
• About 36% of respondents believe Ukraine will eventually be accepted into the European Union (9% are certain, 26% think it is likely). However, more respondents — about 50% — believe Ukraine will never become an EU member (20% are certain, 30% think it is unlikely). About 15% were undecided.

Status of the russian language

• About 52% of Odesa region residents believe the Russian language should become the second state language throughout Ukraine. About 42% believe Russian should become a regional language in areas where the majority of the population supports this. About 5% believe Russian should be excluded from official communication across Ukraine. About 2% were undecided or refused to answer.

State structure

• About 40% of respondents believe a federal system suits Ukraine better, while 38% believe a unitary system is more appropriate. About 22% have not formed an opinion.

Land reform

• About 72% of Odesa region residents are aware that the authorities are preparing land reform allowing the free sale and purchase of land. About 65% view this reform negatively (39% negatively, 26% rather negatively), while 21% view it positively (8% positively, 14% rather positively). About 14% were undecided.
• Most respondents (52%) support only long-term leasing of agricultural land. About 28% would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land but only to Ukrainian citizens, and only 6% would allow it to foreigners. About 15% were undecided.

Attitudes toward referendums

• About 73% of respondents support the idea of resolving a significant share of important issues at both local and national levels through referendums, while 16% do not support this. About 12% were undecided.
• Most respondents agree that citizens should be able, via local referendums, to dismiss heads of regional or district administrations (73%), dismiss mayors and call new elections (75%), dissolve local councils and call new elections (70%), and dismiss village heads (73%).
• Most respondents also agree that citizens should be able, via nationwide referendums, to decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political, or economic alliances (72%), dissolve Parliament (67%), adopt and amend the Constitution (71%), and dismiss the Government (66%).

Internet use

• About every second resident of Odesa region (51%) has access to the internet at home, at work, at their place of study, or via a mobile device. Almost all of them (49% of residents) have experience using the internet. Monthly internet audience reaches 47% of residents (used at least once in the 30 days before the survey), weekly — 44%, daily — 35%.
• About 32% of respondents used social networks such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki during the month before the survey. About 11% used Facebook, 3% — Twitter, and 2% — LiveJournal.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority of surveyed Kyiv residents (78%) do not support the initiative to move all supermarkets and hypermarkets at least 5 km outside the city. Only 14% have a positive attitude toward this idea. At the same time, 5% are indifferent to it, and 3% are undecided.
• It is characteristic that the younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the less they support the initiative to move hypermarkets outside the city. In particular, more than 80% of young people do not support this idea. Women also support the idea less than men.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the majority of surveyed Kyiv residents (58%) do not support the idea of banning second-hand clothing sales, while only 20% support it. At the same time, 18% are indifferent to this issue, and 4% are undecided.
• Interestingly, the younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the less they support the idea of banning second-hand sales. For example, almost 70% of young people do not support the idea, while among pensioners this share is slightly more than half.
• Women also support the idea less than men.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, more than half of Kyiv residents support the idea of nominating a single opposition candidate in the Kyiv mayoral election, while only 15% do not support it. At the same time, 18% are indifferent to this issue and 14% are undecided.
• The idea is positively perceived by more than 70% of supporters of V. Klychko, A. Hrytsenko, A. Illienko, P. Poroshenko, and O. Kuzhel, as well as by about half of those who have not yet decided on their preferred candidate. Only supporters of O. Popov and the Party of Regions are skeptical about this initiative.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in early March 2013, about 55% of voters would have definitely participated.
• If the Kyiv mayoral election had been held in early March 2013, among those intending to vote, 31% would have supported Vitalii Klychko, 20.3% — Oleksandr Popov, and almost 7% — Petro Poroshenko.
• About 4% of voters would have supported Andrii Illienko and Oleksandra Kuzhel each, about 2% — Anatolii Hrytsenko. More than 1% — Oleh Liashko, Oleksandr Omelchenko, and Mykola Katerynchuk. About 3% would have voted for other candidates, while one quarter were undecided.
• Clear trends are observed: the younger the respondents, the more often they support Vitalii Klychko; the older the respondents, the more often they support Oleksandr Popov and Petro Poroshenko.
• If the Kyiv mayoral election had taken place in two rounds and Oleksandr Popov and Vitalii Klychko had advanced to the second round, 26.5% of respondents (among those intending to vote) would have supported the incumbent city head, 60.4% — the UDAR party leader, and 13.1% would have been undecided.
• If the second round had been between Oleksandr Popov and Petro Poroshenko, 36.6% would have supported the incumbent city head, 41.5% — Petro Poroshenko, and 21.9% would have been undecided.
• If the second round had been between Oleksandr Popov and Mykola Katerynchuk, 41.2% would have supported the incumbent city head, 35% — the leader of the European Party, and 23.9% would have been undecided.
• Interestingly, 35% of Kyiv residents would have liked to see Vitalii Klychko as the Mayor of Kyiv and almost as many (37%) — as the leader of the UDAR faction in the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, 15% would not have wanted to see him in either role, and 13% were undecided.
• It is characteristic that two-thirds of Klychko’s own voters would have preferred to see him specifically as Mayor of Kyiv, and only one in five — as leader of the UDAR faction in parliament. Among supporters of Oleksandra Kuzhel, half supported Klychko as mayor and half — in parliament. Supporters of other candidates would have preferred to see Klychko mainly in parliament.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of respondents (81%) support the adoption of a Law of Ukraine on the Recall of Members of Parliament. Only 13% do not support it, and 6% are undecided.
• The initiative is popular across all regions and among voters of different parties. The only slightly lower support is observed in Donbas and among voters of the Party of Regions, where the share of undecided respondents is the highest.
• According to the majority of respondents (61%), a member of parliament should be recalled by voters.
  14% believe this should be done by voters but initiated by the party, and another 14% believe it should be exclusively the prerogative of the party that nominated the candidate.
  Another 12% believe recall should be carried out by a court: 7% think the court should decide independently, while 5% think it should be done at the initiative of the parliamentary majority.
• Additionally, 5% believe only parliament should recall a deputy, and another 5% believe this should be done by the President.
  10% were undecided on this issue.
• As with the previous question, opinions among respondents from different regions and supporters of different parties are largely similar.
• More than half of respondents believe deputies should be recalled for corruption offenses and for failing to fulfill campaign promises.
  Nearly 40% believe deputies should be recalled for betraying state interests and failing to fulfill obligations declared in the oath.
• About one third support recall for systematic absence from plenary sessions and committee meetings, and the same share supports recall for failing to uphold publicly declared ideological commitments.
  26% believe deputies should be recalled if they switch to another faction, and 22% — for non-personal voting.
  Only 4% were undecided on this issue.
• Recall for corruption offenses is most strongly supported by voters of the Communist Party and UDAR.
  Recall for failing to uphold ideological promises is most supported by voters of the Party of Regions.
  Recall for switching factions is most supported by voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda.
  The strictest punishment for systematic absence from parliamentary work is most supported by Communist Party voters.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, for the absolute majority of respondents (71%), March 8 is a good occasion to do something pleasant for women close to them. At the same time, for 11% the March 8 holiday symbolizes women’s struggle for their rights, for 9% it is a political holiday from the Soviet past, and for 6% it is just an ordinary day.
• The younger the respondents, the more often they associate March 8 with a good occasion to do something nice for women close to them, while older respondents more often describe March 8 as a political holiday from the Soviet past.
• Only 7% of men say that March 8 symbolizes women’s struggle for their rights, while among women this share is twice as high.
• Married and unmarried respondents have similar attitudes toward the holiday.
• The highest share of those who associate March 8 with women’s struggle for rights is among supporters of the Communist Party, while those who consider it an ordinary day are more common among supporters of Svoboda.
• For comparison, respondents were also asked to evaluate their attitudes toward February 23.
• Thus, only 41% of respondents consider February 23 a good occasion to do something pleasant for men close to them (this is more often stated by women). For 39%, it is a holiday for men who are or were related to the military (this is more often stated by men themselves). Only 12% consider it a political holiday from the Soviet past, and 7% consider it an ordinary day.
• Overall, the majority in one way or another perceive February 23 as a holiday. The younger the respondents, the more often they associate February 23 with a good occasion to do something nice for men close to them, while older respondents more often associate it with a holiday for men connected to the military or a political holiday from the Soviet past.
• The highest share of those who associate February 23 with a military-related men’s holiday is among supporters of the Communist Party, while those who consider it an ordinary day are more common among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• Thus, there is a visible trend: young people increasingly move March 8 and February 23 outside the political context — the holidays acquire new associations and traditions, while the political component is gradually fading.
• It is worth noting that gifts are given more often on March 8 and February 23 than on Valentine’s Day (February 14), which remains a more youth-oriented holiday. About 40% of both men and women received gifts on Valentine’s Day this year. At the same time, 70% of men received gifts on February 23, and the same share of women expect to receive gifts on March 8.
• However, as last year, we observe something interesting and somewhat illogical regarding “women’s and men’s” holidays. This February 23, the number of men who received gifts was higher than the number of women who gave them. Possibly for this mysterious reason, we observe another interesting trend: the number of men planning to give gifts on March 8 is higher than the number of women who expect to receive gifts.
• Sociologists now have a new research question: do women underestimate men, or do men overestimate their “gift-giving” intentions? Or are there other, third factors? We will definitely find out.
• For now, we will believe that men will be able to pleasantly surprise women on this holiday and improve their ratings — and we wish the same to everyone!
• Happy holiday to you, our best women on the planet!
  May spring bloom in your soul!

According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if the Presidential elections in Ukraine had taken place at the end of February 2013, about 70% of voters would have participated.

In particular, among those who intended to vote:

• 25.1% would support Viktor Yanukovych
• 15.1% – Vitalii Klitschko
• 13.9% – Yulia Tymoshenko
• 7.9% – Oleh Tyahnybok
• 7.7% – Petro Symonenko
• 7.4% – Arsenii Yatseniuk

Support for other politicians was significantly lower:

• 1.7% – Anatolii Hrytsenko
• 1.5% – Serhii Tihipko
• 1.2% – Petro Poroshenko
• 1.1% – Nataliia Korolevska
• Other politicians – 4%
• Undecided – 11.1%
• “Against all” – 2.3%

If Yulia Tymoshenko did not participate in the election, the top three would look as follows:

• Viktor Yanukovych – 25.1%
• Vitalii Klitschko – 16.8%
• Arsenii Yatseniuk – 15.1%

Additionally:

• 8.9% would support Oleh Tyahnybok
• 7.7% – Petro Symonenko
• 2.2% – Anatolii Hrytsenko
• 1.7% – Serhii Tihipko
• 1.4% – Petro Poroshenko
• 1.4% – Nataliia Korolevska
• Other politicians – over 4%
• Undecided – 12.6%
• “Against all” – 2.3%

If Tymoshenko did not run, nearly 60% of her voters would support Yatseniuk in the first round, about 10% would support Klitschko, about 10% Tyahnybok, and about one sixth would be undecided or vote “against all”.

Thus, if Presidential elections had taken place at the end of February 2013, Yanukovych would likely face Klitschko or Yatseniuk (or Tymoshenko) in the second round.

Since opposition forces collectively had higher overall support, Yanukovych risked losing the second round to almost any opposition leader represented in parliament. Klitschko had the strongest chances at that moment, followed by Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko, with slightly lower chances for Tyahnybok.

Second-round scenarios:

Yanukovych vs Klitschko:

• Yanukovych – 30.2%
• Klitschko – 49%
• Against both – 11.6%
• Undecided – 9.2%

Yanukovych vs Yatseniuk:

• Yanukovych – 33%
• Yatseniuk – 40%
• Against both – 18.4%
• Undecided – 8.6%

Yanukovych vs Tymoshenko:

• Yanukovych – 33.2%
• Tymoshenko – 36.4%
• Against both – 22.4%
• Undecided – 8%

Yanukovych vs Tyahnybok:

• Yanukovych – 33.5%
• Tyahnybok – 32.3%
• Against both – 23.4%
• Undecided – 10.8%

Over the year, second-round ratings increased notably for Klitschko (from 37% to 49%) and Tyahnybok (from 24% to 32%). Yatseniuk also increased (from 38% to 40%). The incumbent President also increased slightly, but less significantly.

Although Yatseniuk trailed Tymoshenko in first-round ratings, he attracted broader second-round support. Klitschko voters were less likely to support Yatseniuk or Tymoshenko in the second round than vice versa. Yatseniuk voters were also less likely to support Tyahnybok or Tymoshenko. However, if Yatseniuk reached the second round, he would receive support from nearly 90% of Tymoshenko voters, 75% of Klitschko voters, and 60% of Tyahnybok voters.

Supporters of Symonenko and Tihipko were more likely to vote for Yanukovych, while supporters of Hrytsenko and Poroshenko were more likely to vote against him.

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• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had been held at the end of February 2013, about two thirds of voters would have participated.
• The highest level of mobilization was recorded in Western Ukraine, while the lowest was in Donbas and the South of the country, where only about half of voters confirmed their intention to participate.
• If parliamentary elections had been held at the end of February 2013, the Party of Regions would have won. Among those who intended to vote, 24.9% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 19.3% for Batkivshchyna, 18.1% for UDAR, 11.9% for Svoboda, and 8.7% for the Communist Party. Another 1.2% would have supported Nataliia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward!, while less than 1% would have supported the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Our Ukraine. The remaining parties would have received 2.7%, while 11.8% would have remained undecided.
• For a more accurate comparison with election results, undecided voters were redistributed. After redistribution, if elections had been held at the end of February 2013, 28.2% would have voted for the Party of Regions, 22% for Batkivshchyna, 20.4% for UDAR, 13.5% for Svoboda, and 10% for the Communist Party. Other parties would have received about 6%.
• Compared to the parliamentary election results, the following trends are observed. Combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) increased from 50% to 56%, while combined support for parties forming the parliamentary majority (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased from 43% to 38%. New parliamentary parties (UDAR and Svoboda) gained support, while established parties (Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, and the Communist Party) lost support. The Party of Regions remained the clear leader among voters in Donbas, the South, and the East. Batkivshchyna shared first place in Western Ukraine with Svoboda and UDAR, and in the Center and North with UDAR.
• UDAR continued to be supported mainly by younger voters, while the Communist Party was supported mainly by older voters. The most educated electorate was observed among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR, while the least educated electorate was among Communist Party supporters. The electorates of Svoboda and UDAR also had the highest share of employed voters, while the Communist Party electorate was dominated by pensioners. Batkivshchyna had higher support in rural areas, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party had stronger support in cities. As in previous elections, UDAR and Svoboda were more supported by men, while Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and the Communist Party were more supported by women.
• Supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna were predominantly Ukrainian-speaking. Over the previous six months, the share of Ukrainian-speaking voters in the Svoboda electorate decreased from 75% to 68%, while the share of those speaking both Ukrainian and Russian or primarily Russian increased. Among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, more than half were Russian-speaking, about one quarter spoke both languages at home, and another quarter spoke Ukrainian. Among UDAR supporters, about half spoke Ukrainian at home and half spoke Russian or both languages. Among undecided voters, Russian-speaking respondents were more common, which is consistent with the fact that the highest share of undecided voters was recorded in the South, East, and Donbas.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2012, 50% of residents of Mykolaiv region, when choosing between signing an Association Agreement followed by accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, prefer the Customs Union and the CES, while 34% prefer signing the Association Agreement and further accession to the EU. Another 16% were undecided.
• Fifty-four percent of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to be independent but friendly states, with open borders, without visas or customs controls. At the same time, 34% believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas and customs controls. Meanwhile, 7% believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state, and another 5% were undecided.
• Residents of the region are more optimistic about the prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and the CES (51%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (29%). At the same time, 21% do not know which option would be better.
• Respondents evaluated employment prospects slightly differently: 46% believe that employment opportunities would improve if Ukraine joins the CES, while 30% believe employment would improve if Ukraine joins the EU. Another 24% were undecided.
• Fifty-three percent of respondents somewhat or fully agree that Ukraine should introduce the possibility of dual citizenship with other countries, while 28% do not support this idea. Another 13% are neutral, and 7% were undecided. If dual citizenship were allowed, 28% of residents of Mykolaiv region would like to obtain Russian citizenship while retaining Ukrainian citizenship. Seven percent would prefer German citizenship, 3% US citizenship, 3% Italian citizenship, and 2% Canadian citizenship. At the same time, more than one third of respondents (36%) would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents are aware that the authorities are preparing to implement land reform that would allow the free sale and purchase of land. At the same time, 81% of residents of Mykolaiv region have a negative attitude toward this reform, while only 7% have a positive attitude, and 11% were undecided.
• The majority of respondents (68%) support only long-term lease of agricultural land. Ten percent would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land only for Ukrainian citizens, and only 1% would allow it for foreigners. Another 21% were undecided.
• Sixty-three percent of respondents in the region support the idea of resolving a significant share of important issues at both local and national levels through referendums, while 26% do not support this proposal and 11% were undecided.
• Most residents of Mykolaiv region agree that citizens should be able to use local referendums to dismiss the head of the regional state administration or district administration (66%), dismiss the mayor and call new elections (66%), dissolve regional, city, district, settlement and village councils and call new elections (61%), and dismiss the village head (60%).
• Most respondents also agree that Ukrainian citizens should be able to use nationwide referendums to decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political or economic unions (69%), dissolve the Verkhovna Rada (61%), adopt and amend the Constitution (60%), dismiss the Government (60%), and dismiss the President (56%).

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 52% of Ukrainian respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, while 34% do not support it and 14% are undecided.
• It should be noted that during 2012 the number of supporters of European integration remained stable, which is slightly lower than in 2010–2011 but higher than in 2009. At the same time, the number of “strong” supporters of EU accession increased each year: while in 2010–2011 about one quarter of Ukrainians definitely supported EU membership, in 2012 at least one third did so.
• The strongest supporters of EU accession are young people, with almost two thirds of respondents aged 18–29 supporting the initiative and only about one quarter opposing it. Older respondents are the most skeptical, with 38% supporting and 43% opposing. The highest support for EU accession is observed in Western Ukraine (77%), followed by the Center (64%), North (54%), and East (51%). At the same time, about half of respondents in the South and Donbas do not support the initiative.
• At the same time, 41% of respondents support the idea of forming a single state consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, while 44% do not support it and 15% are undecided. While in 2010–2011 supporters of a common state consistently outnumbered opponents, in 2012 the trend reversed. Support for a common state with Russia is highest among older respondents (53%) and lowest among youth (32%), and is more common in cities than in rural areas. The initiative consistently receives the highest support in the South (64%), Donbas (57%), and East (54%). Meanwhile, more than half of residents in Central and Northern Ukraine and more than 80% in Western Ukraine do not support forming a single state consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.
• Interestingly, at least one quarter of respondents who support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Considering this, respondents were asked a direct question. According to respondents, signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial for Ukraine (40%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (37%), while 23% were undecided. Over the last year, support for signing a Free Trade Agreement with the EU has remained almost unchanged, while the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 37%).
• As a result, Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine show greater support for the agreement with the European Union, while Donbas, the South, and the East show greater support for joining the Customs Union. There is also a relatively higher share of undecided respondents in the East. Youth and people with higher education traditionally show greater support for signing the Free Trade Agreement with the EU, while older respondents are more likely to support joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
• Forty-one percent of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language, while more than half (51%) oppose it and 8% are undecided. Over the past two years, the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been nearly equal. However, in 2012, support for granting Russian state language status sharply declined, especially during the second half of the year. In longer-term dynamics, support decreased from 52–54% in 2009–2010 to 41% in 2012, while opposition increased from 40–41% to 51%.
• Support for bilingualism is highest in Donbas (75%), the South (72%), and the East (53%). Meanwhile, almost 70% of residents of Central and Northern Ukraine and nearly 90% of Western Ukraine do not support the initiative. Granting Russian state language status is more supported by older respondents and less supported by youth, and is more common in cities than in rural areas.
• It can be assumed that the recent strengthening of the legal status of the Russian language in certain territories contributed to a deterioration in attitudes toward granting Russian state language status nationwide. According to a similar survey conducted by Rating Group in July 2012, nearly 80% of respondents had no problems using their native language during the previous year. According to 37% of respondents, the Ukrainian language needs greater legislative protection, while 18% believe Russian needs more protection, and 34% believe both languages are sufficiently protected.
• Only 19% of respondents support Ukraine’s accession to NATO, while nearly two thirds do not support it. Support for NATO accession remained stable throughout 2012, but in longer-term dynamics it slightly declined from 24–26% in 2010 to 19% in 2012. Clear support for NATO accession is observed mainly in Western Ukraine (about half of respondents). Youth show slightly more positive attitudes toward NATO compared to middle-aged and older respondents.
• About one quarter of respondents support recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 51% do not support it and 26% are undecided. Compared to 2010, support increased from 20% to 23%, while opposition decreased from 61% to 51%, and the share of undecided respondents increased. The idea is supported by more than 60% of residents in Western Ukraine and about one quarter of residents in Central and Northern Ukraine. Meanwhile, more than half of residents in the East, nearly 70% in Donbas, and the South do not support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for state independence. The idea is more supported in rural areas than in cities. The highest share of undecided respondents on this issue is among youth, while the highest level of opposition is among older respondents.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2012, about 80% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region know who currently serves as the head of the Regional State Administration. At the same time, 3% believe they know who the governor is, but during the survey named a different person. Nearly one in five respondents (17%) do not know or do not remember the governor’s surname.
• A relative majority of respondents were unable to clearly assess the governor’s performance and gave a neutral evaluation (“neither good nor bad”) — 42%. At the same time, almost as many residents of Dnipropetrovsk region (40%) evaluate the governor’s performance positively (7% — very good, 33% — rather good). About every tenth respondent evaluated his work negatively or was undecided.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) believe that the situation in the region has improved since the appointment of the current head of the Regional State Administration (7% — significantly improved, 41% — somewhat improved). About one-third believe that the appointment of the current governor had no impact on the situation in the region (36%). Another 5% reported a deterioration of the situation, and about every tenth respondent could not determine their answer.
• If residents of the region had the opportunity to elect the head of the Regional State Administration, almost every second respondent would vote for the current governor (47%). About 6% would vote for another candidate, and 14% would not participate in such elections. At the same time, about one-third (32.3%) could not decide on their choice.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2012, 45% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region believe that Ukraine should orient its development toward cooperation with Russia and joining the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other countries. At the same time, 28% of respondents believe that Ukraine should focus on joining the European Union, while 19% support maintaining full independence in political and economic decision-making without joining either the EU or the Common Economic Space. Another 8% were undecided on this issue.
• When choosing between signing the Association Agreement with subsequent accession to the European Union or full participation in the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 57% of Dnipropetrovsk region residents prefer the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, while 31% prefer the Association Agreement and subsequent accession to the EU. Another 12% were undecided.
• About 70% of respondents would like Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly states, with open borders, without visas or customs controls. At the same time, 13% believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be the same as with other countries, with closed borders, visas, and customs controls. Another 13% believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state. Another 5% were undecided.
• Residents of the region assess more optimistically the prospects for selling Ukrainian industrial and agricultural products if Ukraine becomes a full member of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space (50%) than if Ukraine joins the EU (28%). At the same time, 23% do not know which option would be better.
• Opinions differ slightly regarding employment opportunities. About 44% of respondents believe employment prospects would improve if Ukraine joins the Common Economic Space, while 32% believe employment prospects would improve if Ukraine joins the EU. Another 24% were undecided.
• About 60% of respondents are to some extent in favor of introducing dual citizenship with other countries, while 23% do not support this idea. Another 10% are neutral, and 7% are undecided.
• If dual citizenship were allowed in Ukraine, 30% of Dnipropetrovsk region residents would like to obtain Russian citizenship while keeping Ukrainian citizenship. About 10% would prefer German citizenship, 5% — US citizenship, 3% — Canadian citizenship, and 2% each — Italian, Israeli, and Polish citizenship. At the same time, about 30% would not want to obtain a second citizenship.
• About 83% of respondents are aware that the authorities are preparing a land reform allowing the free sale and purchase of land. At the same time, 70% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region have a generally negative attitude toward this reform, while only 20% have a positive attitude. Another 10% were undecided.
• Most respondents (61%) support only long-term lease of agricultural land. About 25% would allow free sale and purchase of agricultural land only to Ukrainian citizens, and less than 3% would allow it to foreigners. Another 11% were undecided.
• About 72% of respondents in the region support the idea that a significant share of important issues, both at the local and national levels, should be decided through referendums, while 17% do not support this idea. Another 11% were undecided.
• Most respondents agree that citizens should have the ability through local referendums to dismiss mayors and call new elections (74%), dismiss heads of regional or district administrations (71%), dismiss village heads (71%), and dissolve regional, city, district, settlement, and village councils and call new elections (67%).
• Most respondents also agree that citizens of Ukraine should have the ability through nationwide referendums to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada (72%), dismiss the Government (68%), dismiss the President (67%), decide on Ukraine’s accession to military, political, or economic alliances (70%), and adopt or amend the Constitution (65%).

• According to the consolidated results of surveys conducted by the Rating Group during 2010–2012, most Ukrainians agree with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people. In October 2012, 59% of respondents agreed with this statement, while 22% disagreed. Another 19% were undecided.
• Public opinion on this issue showed fluctuations over time. In March 2010, 61% agreed with the genocide thesis. In January 2011, this share decreased to 53%, but by April 2011 it increased again to 58%. Throughout 2011–2012, support for this thesis remained close to 60%.
• At the same time, the share of opponents of recognizing the Holodomor as genocide decreased by about one third during 2011–2012 — from 34% to 22%.
• Regionally, the genocide thesis is supported by around 80% of residents in the West, Center, and North, as well as more than half in the South, about one third in the East, and about one quarter in Donbas.
• All age groups show agreement with the thesis, although the largest share of undecided respondents is among young people (about one quarter). Rural residents are more likely to agree with the genocide thesis than urban residents (64% vs 57%).

• According to the exit poll “UKRAINE–2012” conducted by Rating Group on October 28, 2012, commissioned by Channel 5, the survey was carried out at the exit of 350 polling stations. A total of 23,800 respondents were interviewed
• . According to the exit poll results, the Party of Regions was supported by almost 29% of respondents, Batkivshchyna by about 24%, UDAR by about 14%, the Communist Party by about 13%, and Svoboda by more than 12%. Deviations above the statistical margin of error were recorded only for Svoboda (-2.2), which, according to the Central Election Commission, received less support than indicated by the exit poll (10.4% vs. 12.6%).
• At the same time, according to official CEC data, the results of the Party of Regions (+1.3%) and Batkivshchyna (+1.6%) were higher than those shown by the Rating Group exit poll. Notably, all exit polls conducted on October 28, 2012 showed higher results for Svoboda than the CEC data, while Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party showed lower results. Regarding the Party of Regions, exit polls demonstrated mixed trends. According to official CEC results, the gap between the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna was 4.5%. The closest estimates were provided by Rating Group (4.8%), the National Exit Poll (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Razumkov Centre, KIIS) at 3.7%, and TNS/SOCIS at 6.6%.
• Compared with the latest Rating Group pre-election surveys (after redistribution of undecided voters), the total support for coalition parties (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased slightly from 44.5% in September to 43.2% on election day, while the combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) increased from 46.4% in September to 49.9% on election day. The data also confirmed demographic voting patterns, including lower turnout among younger voters and higher participation among older age groups, which slightly reduced UDAR’s final result compared to polling expectations.

• According to the exit poll conducted by Rating Group in Single-Member District No. 83 in Ivano-Frankivsk, Oleksandr Sychev of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” won a decisive victory, receiving 59.1% of the vote among all respondents. Oleksandr Shevchenko, running as an independent candidate, placed second with 22.6%, followed by Volodymyr Chornous of the UDAR party with 9.5%. Oleksandr Sychev, running as an independent candidate, received 3.3%, while Oleksandr Kohut of the Party of Regions was supported by 1.6% and Ihor Miglachov of the Communist Party of Ukraine by 1.3%. The remaining candidates each received less than 1%: Taras Bodnar 0.7%, Vasyl Humeniuk 0.5%, Volodymyr Titov 0.4%, and Valentyn Valentiiev 0.1%, while 1.0% of respondents did not indicate their choice.
• The exit poll was conducted at the exits of 25 polling stations, with more than 1,700 respondents interviewed. The sample was representative of the adult population of the district aged 18 and over. Polling stations were selected randomly with proportional coverage, and respondents at each station were chosen using a fixed step sampling procedure.

• According to the exit poll conducted by Rating Group in single-member electoral district No. 120 (Lviv region), Yaroslav Dubnevych, running as an independent candidate, received 42.0% of the vote, while Tetiana Chornovol from the All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna received 40.6%. Andrii Tyndyk of the UDAR party led by Vitalii Klitschko was supported by 5.5% of respondents, Ivan Denkovych, running as an independent, received 2.7%, Ivan Bilak of the Party of Regions and Ivan Kupyak of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists each received 2.5%, Yosyp Halamai of the People’s Party received 1.5%, Leonid Aleksyuk of the Communist Party of Ukraine received 0.5%, and Andrii Petryshyn of the Civic Solidarity party received 0.4%. A total of 1.6% of respondents did not indicate their choice on the questionnaire.

According to the exit poll conducted by Rating Group in single-member electoral district No. 206 (Chernihiv region), the leading candidate was Vladyslav Atroshenko, running as an independent candidate, with 38.1% of the vote. Volodymyr Polishchuk from the All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna received 19.7%, Stanislav Prokopenko from the Party of Regions received 16.8%, Raisa Yasochko from the Communist Party of Ukraine received 8.2%, and Olena Popova from the UDAR party led by Vitalii Klitschko received 6.7%. Other candidates received less than 3% each: Oleh Kupriienko (Radical Party of Oleh Liashko) – 2.2%, Andrii Atroshchenko (independent) – 1.8%, Iryna Eristova (Natalia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward!) – 1.4%, Valerii Riabchenko (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) – 0.8%, Valentyna Suraieva (independent) – 0.6%, Oleksandr Kyrychenko (People’s Party) – 0.5%, Oleh Shevtsov (Ukraine of the Future party) – 0.5%, Vitalii Svyrydenko (independent) – 0.4%, Oleksandr Prokhorskyi (For Human Rights party) – 0.3%, Serhii Mykheievskyi (Fair Ukraine party) – 0.2%. A total of 2.1% of respondents did not indicate their choice in the questionnaire.

• On October 28, 2012, commissioned by Channel 5, Rating Group conducted the “UKRAINE-2012” exit poll. The survey was carried out at the exits of 350 polling stations. A total of 23,800 respondents were interviewed. The margin of error for values close to 10% does not exceed 1%, and for values close to 20–30% it does not exceed 1.5–2%.
• According to the exit poll results, the Party of Regions was supported by nearly 29% of respondents, Batkivshchyna by about 24%, UDAR by about 14%, the Communist Party by about 13%, and Svoboda by more than 12%.
• Deviations above the level of statistical margin of error were recorded only for Svoboda (-2.2), which, according to Central Election Commission data, received less support than indicated by the exit poll (10.4% vs 12.6%). At the same time, according to CEC data, the results of the Party of Regions (+1.3%) and Batkivshchyna (+1.6%) were higher than those recorded in the Rating Group exit poll. It is notable that all exit polls conducted on October 28, 2012, showed higher results for Svoboda than the CEC results, while Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party showed lower results. For the Party of Regions, exit polls showed mixed trends, with some companies reporting lower results than the CEC and others higher.
• According to official CEC data, the gap between the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna was 4.5%. The closest figures to this were shown by the Rating Group exit poll (4.8%), the National Exit Poll (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Razumkov Centre, KIIS) at 3.7%, and TNS / SOCIS at 6.6%.
• Comparing election results with the latest Rating Group surveys (after redistribution of undecided voters) allows the following conclusions. Since September, the combined support for ruling coalition parties (Party of Regions and Communist Party) decreased from 44.5% to 43.2%, and remained unchanged since early October (43.2% in the election results). At the same time, combined support for opposition parties (Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda) grew dynamically from 46.4% in September to 48.8% in early October and to 49.9% in the October 28 election. Party ratings recorded by Rating Group in September were largely consistent with the results recorded by the CEC on October 28, except for Svoboda, whose support doubled compared to September and increased by one third compared to early October. Support for the Party of Regions slightly decreased (-1.5%), similar to Batkivshchyna (-1.6%), while support for UDAR and the Communist Party remained largely unchanged. At the same time, at the beginning of October, support for UDAR increased sharply, bringing it to second place for the first time, overtaking Batkivshchyna. Support for the Communist Party also increased while support for the Party of Regions declined. However, the peak of emotional voting observed in early October was not confirmed by more pragmatic voting behavior on October 28, and party support returned to September levels.
• Demographic characteristics of voting behavior show that youth were active in these elections only in Western Ukraine, while in the rest of the country youth demonstrated the lowest activity. This had been predicted by most sociologists, including Rating Group, as these trends repeat from election to election. In the structure of the electorate, youth aged 18–29 make up about one quarter, but among those who actually voted, youth aged 18–29 accounted for only 18%. Similarly, the share of voters aged 30–39 decreased from 18% to 15%. At the same time, there was a shift toward older age groups: the share of voters aged 50–59 increased from 17% to 21%, and those aged 60 and older increased from 25% to 28%. More detailed analysis showed the largest shifts occurred in the 55–64 age group (increase) and the 18–24 age group (decrease).
• The youngest electorates were observed among supporters of UDAR (32% aged 18–29 or 18% aged 18–24), Ukraine – Forward! (29% aged 18–29 or 17% aged 18–24), and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (23% aged 18–29 or 15% aged 18–24). UDAR was the leader among the youngest age groups. Analysis of age differences between all voters and those who actually voted on October 28 indicates an age imbalance that resulted in UDAR receiving 1.5–2% less support in the election than indicated by general support levels. In addition, primarily young voters supported the Green Party of Ukraine, the Greens, Green Planet, and Ukraine of the Future, which together received more than 1% support.
• The oldest electorate was observed in the Communist Party (23% aged 50–59 and 44% aged 60 and older). Primarily older voters also supported the Party of Pensioners of Ukraine. A significant share of older voters was also present among supporters of the Party of Regions (21% aged 50–59 and 33% aged 60 and older) and Batkivshchyna (25% aged 50–59 and 28% aged 60 and older). Svoboda and Our Ukraine were more supported by middle-aged voters.
• Women dominated among supporters of the Party of Regions (59%), Ukraine – Forward! (58%), and Batkivshchyna (58%). Men dominated among supporters of Svoboda (56%), UDAR (53%), and the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (53%). Our Ukraine and the Communist Party had relatively balanced gender structures.

• According to Rating Group, commissioned by Channel 5, the nationwide exit poll “UKRAINE–2012” was conducted on the day of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine on October 28, 2012. The survey was carried out at the exit of 350 polling stations, with more than 20,000 respondents interviewed. The sample was representative of the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 and over by region and type of settlement. Polling stations were selected randomly following the principle of equal distribution, and respondents at polling stations were selected according to a fixed interval applied consistently throughout election day.
• More than 700 interviewers were involved in conducting the “UKRAINE–2012” exit poll, with an additional 100 people responsible for organization, supervision, data collection, and data processing. The survey was anonymous: respondents completed the questionnaires themselves and placed them into specially prepared ballot boxes. The survey measured party choice, based on the question “Which party did you just vote for in the parliamentary elections of Ukraine?”, along with several socio-demographic characteristics of voters.