Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in October 2012 in single-member constituency No. 126, Batkivshchyna was the clear leader in party support among voters who intended to take part in the election, who accounted for around 90% of all respondents in the district. Almost 40% said they would vote for Batkivshchyna, while 27.8% supported UDAR and 16.9% Svoboda. All other parties were supported by less than 1.5% each, and about one in ten voters remained undecided. Compared with two months earlier, support for Batkivshchyna declined by about five percentage points, with the sharpest drop recorded in Stryi district, while UDAR’s rating grew by nearly ten points, especially in Stryi and Zhydachiv districts. Support for Svoboda also increased, mainly due to a recovery in Stryi district. The share of undecided voters remained within the margin of error.
• The social profiles of party electorates differed markedly. UDAR had the youngest voter base, with about one third under the age of 30, while among Batkivshchyna supporters around one third were pensioners. Men were more prevalent among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR, while women dominated Batkivshchyna’s electorate. Among UDAR and Svoboda voters, the proportions of working and non-working respondents were similar, whereas Batkivshchyna supporters were more likely to be unemployed. Nearly two thirds of Batkivshchyna’s electorate lived in rural areas.
• In the majoritarian race, Oleh Kanivets was the frontrunner, supported by 40.5% of respondents, followed by Andriy Kota with 29.8%, Ihor Ostash with 7.8%, and Ihor Teniukh with 3.9%, while around 15% of voters were still undecided. Kanivets was backed by about two thirds of Batkivshchyna supporters and nearly half of Svoboda voters, but only a small share of UDAR’s electorate. In contrast, almost three quarters of UDAR supporters intended to vote for Kota. Mobilization of Batkivshchyna and UDAR voters in support of their respective candidates increased by about 15 percentage points compared with previous measurements.
• Kanivets remained the leading candidate in Stryi district, where his support was roughly double that of his closest rival, and in Zhydachiv district he had nearly caught up with Kota. Across the entire constituency, Kanivets’s personal rating rose by seven points despite the decline in Batkivshchyna’s party support, although in the city of Stryi his popularity fell. Kota’s rating also increased, though less than that of UDAR, with gains concentrated in Stryi and losses in Zhydachiv. Ostash experienced the largest decline, particularly in Stryi.
• Younger voters were most strongly represented among Kota’s supporters, while pensioners were more common among the electorates of Kanivets, Ostash, and Teniukh. Women were slightly more prevalent among Kanivets’s supporters, whereas men dominated Ostash’s electorate. Kanivets’s voters were more likely to live in rural areas, while Ostash’s and Teniukh’s supporters were predominantly urban.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the leaders of electoral preferences among political parties in the constituency are Batkivshchyna, which 29.3% of respondents who intend to vote (88% in the constituency) are ready to support, and the UDAR party with 27.0%. Svoboda is supported by 23.9% of respondents. The ratings of other parties are much lower: the Party of Regions is supported by 2.8%, Nasha Ukraina by 1.4%, “Ukraine – Forward!” by 1.4%, and the Communist Party by 0.5%. Those who are still undecided amount to 1.1%.
• Compared to last month, the rating of Batkivshchyna has slightly decreased — by 3%. At the same time, UDAR has grown significantly — by 11%. The rating of Svoboda remains unchanged.
  The number of those who cannot decide has decreased by 6%.
• The largest share of young people is among UDAR supporters — 35%. Meanwhile, the largest share of older voters (50+) is among Batkivshchyna supporters — 47%. Among Party of Regions supporters, the largest share of people with higher education — 44%.
• There are more men among UDAR voters, while women significantly dominate the Batkivshchyna electorate.

ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL POLITICIANS

• B. Dubnevych is known to 88% of respondents, Yu. Mykhalchyshyn to 75%, and T. Mandziuk to only 39%.
• The leaders in the positive attitude rating are Yu. Mykhalchyshyn and B. Dubnevych. 35–36% of respondents have a positive opinion of them. Only 15% have a positive opinion of T. Mandziuk.
• A quarter of respondents have a negative opinion of B. Dubnevych. At the same time, only 6–9% have a negative opinion of his opponents.
• Yu. Mykhalchyshyn is the clear favorite in the positive-attitude ranking among Svoboda supporters — 72%. A third of UDAR and Batkivshchyna voters also view him positively, as well as one in five of the undecided.
• B. Dubnevych is viewed positively by half of Batkivshchyna supporters, 43% of Party of Regions supporters, and one third of UDAR, Svoboda, and the undecided.
• T. Mandziuk is viewed positively mainly by UDAR supporters.

CANDIDATE RATINGS

• The leaders of electoral support among candidates in the single-member district are B. Dubnevych (31.3%) and Yu. Mykhalchyshyn (30.2%).
  T. Mandziuk is supported by 12.9%. The ratings of other candidates do not exceed 1.5%. The share of those who are undecided is 22.5%.
• Compared to the previous survey, there are some changes in the candidates’ ratings. The rating of B. Dubnevych has remained virtually unchanged, Yu. Mykhalchyshyn has fallen by 5%, while T. Mandziuk’s popularity has increased (by almost 5%). There is also a slight decrease in the number of undecided voters.
• B. Dubnevych is supported by 46% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 35% of Party of Regions, 28% of UDAR, 18% of Svoboda, and one quarter of the undecided.
• Yu. Mykhalchyshyn is supported by two thirds of Svoboda supporters, one quarter of Batkivshchyna, 14% of UDAR, and 12% of the undecided.
• T. Mandziuk is supported by 40% of UDAR supporters. In other electorates, his support is low.
• The youngest electorate belongs to T. Mandziuk — 33% are young people. The largest share of older voters is among Yu. Mykhalchyshyn’s supporters — half are 50+.
• Among B. Dubnevych’s supporters, only one quarter have higher education, compared with 34% among Yu. Mykhalchyshyn’s supporters and 43% among T. Mandziuk’s.
• Women dominate among B. Dubnevych’s supporters, while men slightly dominate among T. Mandziuk’s electorate.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, the leaders in the ranking of political forces in single-member electoral district No. 115 of the city of Lviv are the UDAR party, which 29.6% of respondents intend to vote for, and Batkivshchyna, supported by 27.6%. The data are presented among those who stated that they intend to take part in the elections — such respondents make up 82% in the district. Svoboda also has significant support — 18.2%. The ratings of other parties are much lower — about 3% of respondents intend to vote for Nasha Ukraina, the Party of Regions, or the party “Ukraine – Forward!”. Other political forces are supported by no more than 1% of respondents. The share of those undecided is 14.1%.
• Over the past month, the popularity of the UDAR party has increased by almost 10%, allowing it to take the leading position in the ranking. The popularity of Batkivshchyna has fallen by 6%, and that of Svoboda by 3%. No significant changes are observed in the ratings of other parties or in the number of the undecided.
• The largest share of young people is among UDAR supporters. In contrast, more than half of Batkivshchyna supporters are over 50 years old. Among Svoboda voters, more than 40% are older.
• More than half of UDAR and Svoboda supporters have higher education. Among Batkivshchyna voters, this share is one third, while 40% of this party’s supporters have secondary specialized education. In Batkivshchyna’s electorate, two thirds are women. Among UDAR supporters, 56% are women, while among Svoboda supporters the gender balance is equal.
• ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL POLITICIANS
• The politicians whose names were included in the questionnaire are well known in the district: D. Dobrodomov is known by 78% of respondents, R. Fedyshyn by 71%, and M. Khmil by 68%.
• The highest positive rating belongs to D. Dobrodomov — 47% of respondents have a positive opinion of him (a quarter say their attitude is definitely positive).
• M. Khmil evokes positive emotions in 35% of respondents, and R. Fedyshyn in 27% (8% have a negative opinion of him).
• D. Dobrodomov is the favorite among UDAR supporters — three quarters of them have a positive attitude toward him. Among supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, 48% hold a positive opinion of him.
• M. Khmil is viewed positively by two thirds of Batkivshchyna supporters, half of Svoboda supporters, and only 28% of UDAR supporters.
• R. Fedyshyn is viewed positively by 35% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 29% of UDAR, and 28% of Svoboda supporters.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS
• Among the candidates in the district, two leaders of electoral support remain. Against the backdrop of the growing rating of UDAR, D. Dobrodomov, with 32.6%, has taken the leading position. M. Khmil, against the background of declining ratings of Batkivshchyna, with 27%, has fallen to second place. R. Fedyshyn is supported by 9.8%. Other candidates have virtually no chance of interfering in the fight for victory. One quarter of respondents remain undecided.
• D. Dobrodomov mobilizes 71% of UDAR supporters, 17–18% of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda supporters, and 15% of those undecided about their party choice.
• M. Khmil is supported by 58% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 44% of Svoboda, and only 4% of UDAR supporters.
• Almost every tenth supporter of the most popular parties intends to vote for R. Fedyshyn.
• Over the past month, Dobrodomov’s rating has increased by 4%; Khmil’s decline is within the statistical margin of error. Meanwhile, Fedyshyn’s popularity has tripled.
• There is a gradual decline in the share of those undecided about a candidate — from 33.3% to 24.1%.
• The youngest electorate is that of R. Fedyshyn — one third are under 30 years old. The largest share of older voters is among M. Khmil’s supporters — half are over 50.
• The highest share of people with higher education is among Dobrodomov’s supporters and among those undecided about candidates.
• Women dominate among supporters of R. Fedyshyn and D. Dobrodomov, while among M. Khmil’s supporters there is gender parity.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, if the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early October 2012, 50% of respondents would definitely take part in them and another 31% would probably take part. The highest level of mobilization is recorded in the Center, East, and West of the country. Among party supporters, the greatest willingness to vote is expressed by supporters of the Party of Regions and Svoboda. The lowest readiness is among the undecided and supporters of Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”.

RESULTS:

• If the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early October 2012, the Party of Regions would win, supported by 23% of respondents who intend to vote. Approximately equal numbers of voters would support UDAR (17.9%) and Batkivshchyna (16.5%).
  12.8% would vote for the Communist Party, 6% for Svoboda.
  Another 3.1% would support Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”.
  About 1% would support Nasha Ukraina.
  Other parties would receive over 2%, and 17.2% would be undecided.

TRENDS:

• Over the past month, support for the Party of Regions has slightly decreased (from 26% to 23%), while support for the Communist Party has increased (from 11% to 13%). The Party of Regions has the strongest support in Donbas (almost 50%) and in the South (almost 40%), while the Communist Party is strongest in the South and East. Interestingly, over the past month the presidential rating of Viktor Yanukovych has practically not changed (25%).
• The party that gained the most is UDAR (from 12% to 18%), while support for Batkivshchyna fell (from 23% to 17%).
• It should be noted that while UDAR increased its ratings in the West and Center, it also expanded support in the East, South, and Donbas. Batkivshchyna, despite significant losses, remains the leader in the West, but in the Center and North it has been caught up with and sometimes overtaken by UDAR.
• Svoboda has also increased its rating, crossing the electoral threshold with 6%. The party grew in the West and North, including Kyiv.
• It should be noted that UDAR, Batkivshchyna, and Svoboda together are supported by over 40% of voters, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party together have 36%. Since all of these parties exceed the electoral threshold as of early October, the pro-opposition parties would receive 119 seats in the new Verkhovna Rada, while the current coalition parties would receive 106.
• It is also noteworthy that over the past several months the combined support for pro-government and pro-opposition parties has hardly changed; shifts occur within the groups. Thus, the decline in Batkivshchyna has been accompanied by growth of UDAR and Svoboda. Similarly, the decline of the Party of Regions has been accompanied by rising support for the Communists. At the same time, over a longer period, against the background of stable pro-opposition support (about 40%), the ratings of pro-government parties have strengthened (from 25–28% at the beginning of the year to 36% in October).
• More than 50% of respondents, when deciding which party to vote for in the 2012 parliamentary elections, are more likely to vote against the course of President Viktor Yanukovych; one quarter would vote in support of the President’s course, and another quarter are undecided. These indicators have remained stable throughout the past year. More than half of Communist Party supporters and almost 40% of the undecided intend to vote against the President’s course.
• Despite this, only 37% of respondents believe that after the 2012 elections a parliamentary majority will be formed by parties opposed to the President, while the same share (36%) believe the majority will be formed by pro-presidential parties.
• The share of the undecided remains stable (17%), with the highest concentration in the East, Center, North, and South. Donbas is gradually mobilizing, primarily in favor of the Party of Regions.
• About 13% of the undecided believe UDAR has the greatest chance to win their vote, 12% name the Party of Regions, 9% Batkivshchyna, and 7% the Communist Party. At the same time, half of the undecided do not yet see any party capable of winning their support.
• Meanwhile, 22% of the undecided would under no circumstances support the Party of Regions, 19% Nasha Ukraina, 18% the Communist Party, 17% Batkivshchyna, 13% each the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and Svoboda, and 9% the party “Ukraine – Forward!”. Only 3% of the undecided would never support UDAR. Almost half of the undecided have no antipathy toward any party.
• Almost 40% of voters have already made their final choice, another 27% believe their choice is unlikely to change. Nearly one quarter admit it could change. Voters in Donbas, the East, and the South are the most confident in their choice.
• Among party supporters, the most confident are voters of the Party of Regions, Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and the Communist Party. Supporters of UDAR and “Ukraine – Forward!” are less confident — nearly 30% of them admit they may change their preference.
• It was also interesting to examine the effect of Yuliya Tymoshenko’s absence from the Batkivshchyna list. One quarter of respondents would be more likely to vote for Batkivshchyna if Tymoshenko were free and headed the party list, which is significantly higher than the party’s current rating. Under such conditions, only about 3% of opposition supporters would abandon the party, while one third of Svoboda supporters, over a quarter of UDAR and “Ukraine – Forward!” supporters, and one in ten undecided would switch to Batkivshchyna.
• It should be added that one in ten of Tymoshenko’s voters supports UDAR in parliamentary elections, and only 2% of Vitali Klitschko’s voters support Batkivshchyna.
• 56% of respondents expect that the October 28, 2012 parliamentary elections will bring positive changes, while 34% do not. Two years earlier, 49% expected positive changes from the 2010 local elections.
• 52% expect that the new parliament will be significantly renewed, while 35% do not. Two years earlier, 41% expected similar renewal after the 2010 local elections.
• 37% expect MPs to become more accountable to voters, while 48% do not. In 2010, only 29% expected such changes.
• The highest hopes for the elections are in the North and West.
• At the same time, 36% expect major fraud that would significantly affect the results; another 29% expect minor fraud that would not affect the outcome. Only 17% do not expect fraud. In 2010, 31% expected major fraud and 29% minor fraud.
• Supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda fear fraud the most, while Party of Regions supporters fear it the least. Accordingly, over half of those who expect fraud believe it will mainly be committed by the Party of Regions. Emotions play a large role: half of Party of Regions voters expect fraud from Batkivshchyna, while 84% of Batkivshchyna voters expect it from the Party of Regions.
• Only one quarter of respondents are ready to take part in protests if there is major fraud on October 28, 2012 (only 6% are definitely ready). Almost 70% are not ready.
• Almost half of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna supporters, about 40% of “Ukraine – Forward!”, and one third of UDAR supporters are ready to protest.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the leader of electoral preferences in district #121 (Drohobych) is the Batkivshchyna party, which would be supported by 41.5% of respondents who intend to take part in the elections (85% in total).
  UDAR is supported by 21.3%, and almost the same number support Svoboda (20.9%).
  The ratings of other parties are significantly lower. About 2% are ready to vote for Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions. Every tenth respondent has not yet decided on party preferences.
• VO Batkivshchyna enjoys greater support in villages (45%) than in cities (40%). Our Ukraine also has higher support in villages. Svoboda and UDAR, on the contrary, are more strongly supported in cities.
  UDAR is supported much more by young people, while Batkivshchyna is supported more by older voters. Svoboda has a fairly even age structure. There are also more older people among the undecided.
  Among supporters of UDAR and Svoboda there are more employed people and those with higher education. UDAR and Svoboda are supported more by men, while Batkivshchyna is supported more by women.

CANDIDATE RATINGS

• The leader of electoral preferences in the district among candidates is R. Ilyk. If elections were held in the near future, 31.5% of respondents who intend to vote would support him.
  12.6% would vote for M. Zadorozhnyi, 8.9% for O. Starovoit, 8.1% for I. Kurus. About 4% are ready to support V. Vozniak. More than 12% would support other candidates. About 22% remain undecided.
• R. Ilyk mobilizes 60% of Batkivshchyna supporters and almost 30% of Svoboda supporters.
  At the same time, almost a quarter of Svoboda supporters back M. Zadorozhnyi.
  Supporters of UDAR are largely uninterested in these candidates: almost 40% of them are ready to vote for O. Starovoit, one quarter are undecided, and only 7% each would vote for R. Ilyk or M. Zadorozhnyi.
• O. Starovoit and V. Vozniak are supported more by young people; one quarter of voters aged under 29 are also found among the undecided. R. Ilyk and M. Zadorozhnyi are supported more by older people.
  Men support O. Starovoit and V. Vozniak more, while women more often support the Batkivshchyna candidate R. Ilyk.
  Among R. Ilyk’s supporters, the non-employed dominate, as well as among O. Starovoit’s supporters — in the first case due to a high share of older people and women, and in the second due to a large share of youth.
  Among supporters of I. Kurus and V. Vozniak, the employed predominate.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the clear leader of electoral preferences in the multi-member constituency No. 125 is Batkivshchyna. If elections were held in the near future, 42.2% of respondents who intend to vote (88% overall) would support this political force.
• Svoboda is supported by 18.8%, UDAR – 17.8%. The ratings of other parties are significantly lower. Thus, Our Ukraine would receive 2.8%, the party “Ukraine – Forward!” – 2.1%, the Party of Regions – 1.5%, and the Communist Party (CPU) – 0.6%. Other parties together receive 3.2%. Every ninth respondent has not yet decided on a party preference.
• Among all respondents / Among those who intend to vote
  
  • Batkivshchyna – 38.1 / 42.2
  • Svoboda – 17.0 / 18.8
  • UDAR – 16.4 / 17.8
  • Our Ukraine – 2.6 / 2.8
  • Ukraine – Forward! – 2.0 / 2.1
  • Party of Regions – 1.4 / 1.5
  • CPU – 0.7 / 0.6
  • Other party – 2.8 / 3.2
  • Will not vote – 7.2 / –
  • Hard to say – 11.9 / 11.0
• In terms of districts, Batkivshchyna is the leader in all parts of the constituency. Its highest support is in Starosambir district (49%), and the lowest in Skole and Turka districts (37–38%). Svoboda’s rating is highest in Sambir and Skole district, slightly lower in the other two districts (17–18%). UDAR is supported by 19–20% in Sambir, Skole district, and Turka district (where it ranks second). In Starosambir district, however, support for V. Klychko’s party is somewhat lower – 15.0%.
• In Skole and Turka districts, 5–6% support Our Ukraine.
• No significant territorial differences are observed in the level of respondents’ certainty.
• One-third of UDAR’s electorate consists of young people under 30. In contrast, supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda are mostly over 50 years old.
• The largest share of respondents with higher education is again among UDAR’s supporters, while the smallest is among Batkivshchyna’s. In Batkivshchyna’s electorate, women clearly outnumber men, while in other parties there is gender parity.
• 42% of UDAR’s supporters live in cities. The electorates of the other viable parties are at least two-thirds rural.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS
• The leader of electoral preferences in the constituency among single-mandate candidates is A. Lopushanskyi. 31.2% of respondents who intend to vote would support him.
• M. Hychka would receive 17.9%, A. Tyahnybok – 15.4%, I. Pukshyn – 13.9%. Other candidates are far behind: D. Shchykitka – 4.8%, A. Deineka – 3.3%, the rest – below 1%.
  11.0% remain undecided.
• A. Lopushanskyi mobilizes 38% of Batkivshchyna supporters, one-third of Svoboda supporters, one-quarter of UDAR supporters, and 16% of those undecided about parties.
• M. Hychka is supported by one-fifth of Batkivshchyna and UDAR voters, 17% of the party-undecided, and only 8% of Svoboda supporters.
  A. Tyahnybok is mainly supported by Svoboda voters (49%) and every tenth Batkivshchyna supporter. Among UDAR supporters, he has little support.
• I. Pukshyn mobilizes 17% of Batkivshchyna voters, 16% of the undecided, and 13% of UDAR supporters. Among Svoboda voters, his support is negligible.
• D. Shchykitka is supported only by one-fifth of UDAR supporters.
• The highest support for A. Lopushanskyi is in Starosambir district (36%), and the lowest in Skole district (25%).
• M. Hychka’s rating is high only in Starosambir district (31%). In Sambir it is 13%, and in Skole and Turka districts – 9% each.
• A. Tyahnybok is most supported in Sambir (26%) and Skole district (21%). In the other districts his support is lower (10–11%).
• I. Pukshyn has a high rating only in Turka district (32%). In other areas, his support ranges from 5% (Sambir) to 13% (Skole district).
• In A. Lopushanskyi’s electorate, almost one-third are under 30, while one-quarter are pensioners.
  A. Tyahnybok has the oldest electorate – one-third are pensioners.
• Men are most numerous among A. Tyahnybok’s voters, while women dominate among M. Hychka’s.
• Among Svoboda’s candidate, the share of employed voters is the highest (48%). In contrast, I. Pukshyn has the largest share of unemployed voters (two-thirds).
• The electorates of A. Tyahnybok and D. Shchykitka are half urban, while for the other candidates they are predominantly rural (for I. Pukshyn – 80%).

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the clear leader of electoral preferences in the multi-member constituency No. 126 (Stryi) is Batkivshchyna. If elections were held, 44.4% of respondents who intend to vote (89% in the constituency) would support this political force.
• UDAR would receive 18.6%, Svoboda – 13.1%. Our Ukraine would gain 2.9%, the Party of Regions – 2.8%, and “Ukraine – Forward!” – 2.1%. The ratings of other parties are below 2%. 13.4% of respondents remain undecided.
• Batkivshchyna leads the party ratings in all territories of the constituency. However, the share of its supporters differs significantly by district. Thus, in Stryi district it is supported by 52%, in Zhydachiv district – 42%, and in the city of Stryi – only 39%. In Stryi city, the highest share of undecided voters is recorded (20%).
• UDAR is most strongly supported in Zhydachiv district – 24% of respondents. In Stryi district, 17% would vote for this party, and in Stryi city – 14%. In the city of Stryi, UDAR ranks third, behind Svoboda, which here is supported by 15%. A high level of support for Svoboda is also observed in Zhydachiv district (15%), while in Stryi district its popularity is noticeably lower (9%).
• In Zhydachiv district, Our Ukraine also enjoys relatively higher support (5%).
• The youngest electorate traditionally belongs to UDAR (one-third of its voters are under 30). In contrast, one-third of Batkivshchyna’s and Svoboda’s supporters are pensioners. Svoboda has the largest share of voters with higher education. Men are most numerous among Svoboda’s supporters, while women dominate among Batkivshchyna’s supporters. The latter’s electorate mostly lives in rural areas. Half of UDAR’s voters are concentrated in Zhydachiv district.
• A high concentration of Svoboda supporters is also observed there. Meanwhile, Batkivshchyna has noticeably more supporters in Stryi district.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS.
  O. Kanivets is the leader in the single-member district. 32.8% of respondents who intend to vote would support him.
  A. Kit would receive 24.0%, I. Ostash – 13.2%, I. Teniukh – 4.6%, S. Kanivets – 3.7%. The ratings of other candidates are below 2%. 17.7% remain undecided.
• A. Kit is supported by nearly two-thirds of UDAR’s supporters in the district. In turn, O. Kanivets is supported by slightly less than half of Batkivshchyna’s supporters. 15% of Batkivshchyna voters would vote for A. Kit, and 13% for I. Ostash. It is I. Ostash who may most strongly split Batkivshchyna’s vote.
• At the same time, O. Kanivets has a solid reserve of support among Svoboda’s voters – every third of them is ready to vote for him. Every fifth Svoboda supporter would vote for one of the other two candidates. Among the undecided, one quarter support O. Kanivets, and one in ten support I. Ostash or A. Kit.
• By territory, O. Kanivets has the highest rating in Stryi city (42%) and Stryi district (34%). In Zhydachiv district, his support is somewhat lower (25%).
• A. Kit is the clear leader in Zhydachiv district (45%). In Stryi district, his support is much lower: 15% in the district and only 7% in Stryi city.
• I. Ostash is best supported in Stryi city (21%). In Stryi district, 15% would vote for him, while in Zhydachiv district – only 6%.
• The largest share of undecided voters is in Stryi district – 18–21%. In Zhydachiv district, their share is slightly lower (15%).
• One quarter of the electorates of O. Kanivets and A. Kit are young people under 30. At the same time, among A. Kit’s supporters, one quarter are pensioners, while for O. Kanivets this group accounts for one in five.
• Among supporters of I. Teniukh and I. Ostash, men prevail, while among O. Kanivets’ supporters, women dominate.
• Among O. Kanivets’ supporters, the share of employed people is the highest (65%), while it is the lowest among A. Kit’s electorate (41%).
• The largest share of urban residents is found among I. Ostash’s supporters, and the smallest among A. Kit’s. Three-quarters of A. Kit’s supporters live in Zhydachiv district.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the clear leader of electoral preferences in the multi-member constituency #122 is VO Batkivshchyna. If elections were held, 43.3% of respondents who intend to take part in them (more than 90% of the district) would vote for this political formation.
• UDAR would receive 20.8% of the vote, VO Svoboda – 18.0%. Nasha Ukraina would gain 3.3%, “Ukraine – Forward!” – 1.3%, and the Party of Regions – 1.2%. The ratings of other parties are below 1%. 10.4% of respondents have not yet decided.
• There are certain territorial differences in party popularity. Thus, the rating of Batkivshchyna is higher in Yavoriv district (48%) than in Zhovkva district (38%).
• For VO Svoboda, the rating is one third higher in Zhovkva district (21%) than in Yavoriv district (14%). In contrast, UDAR is more popular in Yavoriv (23% vs. 19%). There are no significant differences in the ratings of other political forces by district.
• The level of indecision is higher in Zhovkva district (14% vs. 7%).
• The largest share of young voters is among UDAR supporters (40% aged under 30). Accordingly, people with higher education are also more numerous in this electoral group (35%). Women dominate among supporters of Batkivshchyna, while men dominate among supporters of UDAR. In the electorates of all the most popular parties, rural residents prevail, especially among supporters of Batkivshchyna.
• CANDIDATE RATINGS
• The leader of electoral preferences in the single-member constituency is T. Kozak. If elections were held in the near future, 47% of voters would be ready to vote for him. V. Pazyniak would be supported by 26.8%. The ratings of other candidates are significantly lower: I. Samardak – 3.4%, H. Babii – 1.7%, I. Kozak – 1.4%. 17% of respondents have not yet decided.
• T. Kozak mobilizes 58% of UDAR supporters, 47% of VO Batkivshchyna supporters, 37% of VO Svoboda voters, and 39% of those undecided about party choice.
• V. Pazyniak is supported by 40% of Svoboda supporters and 35% of Batkivshchyna supporters. Among UDAR voters, only 10% support this candidate.
• I. Samardak is supported only by 15% of UDAR voters.
• By district, candidate popularity differs somewhat from the overall district ranking. Thus, T. Kozak’s popularity is higher in Zhovkva district (55%), while in Yavoriv district 40% of respondents are ready to support him. There, his main competitor is V. Pazyniak, whose rating is 34%. In Zhovkva district, however, V. Pazyniak has significantly fewer supporters – 19%.
• I. Samardak is supported equally in both districts at 3–4% (with 3–5% potential reserve).
• The share of undecided voters does not differ greatly across locations and amounts to 16–18%.
• The highest share of young people is among I. Samardak supporters (39%). One quarter of V. Pazyniak’s voters and every fifth voter of T. Kozak are pensioners.
• Among supporters of the UDAR candidate, men prevail. Among supporters of T. Kozak and V. Pazyniak, the gender distribution does not differ from the overall demographics – 45% men and 55% women.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, the leader of electoral preferences in multi-member electoral district #124 is VO Batkivshchyna. This political alliance would be supported, if elections were held in the near future, by 47.0% of respondents who intend to participate in the elections (84% in the district).
  20.3% would vote for UDAR, 19.0% for VO Svoboda. The ratings of other parties are much lower: the Party of Regions – 2.1%, Our Ukraine – 2.0%, “Ukraine – Forward!” – 1.7%, CPU – 0.7%. Other parties would be supported by 1.1% of respondents. 6.2% have not decided on their party preference.
• In the territorial breakdown, although the top three remain unchanged, some differences are visible. In particular, the rating of VO Batkivshchyna in the districts is one-fifth higher than in Chervonohrad (52% vs. 39%).
  In addition, UDAR enjoys significantly stronger support in Chervonohrad — here a quarter of respondents would vote for it, while in the districts UDAR’s rating is 17%.
  The rating of Svoboda is almost independent of territory and fluctuates between 18–20%. About 4% of respondents in Chervonohrad support the Party of Regions, while in villages this figure is much lower (1%). The share of the undecided does not depend on the area.
• The youngest electorate belongs to UDAR — half are under 40. Among the United Opposition, almost half are over 50.
  There are more men among supporters of Klychko’s party, more women among supporters of Batkivshchyna. UDAR also has more respondents who are employed. Two-thirds of Batkivshchyna supporters do not work.
  70% of UDAR supporters and 62% of Svoboda supporters live in cities, while Batkivshchyna has approximately equal numbers of urban and rural voters.

CANDIDATE RATINGS

• The leader of electoral preferences in the single-member district is S. Kurpil, whom 30.4% of respondents who intend to vote would support if elections were held in the near future.
  21.0% would vote for M. Kryshtopa, 12.5% for V. Viazivskyi, 7.0% for A. Seniuk. Other candidates have ratings below 2%. 22.7% remain undecided.
• S. Kurpil mobilizes almost half of Batkivshchyna supporters and a quarter of Svoboda supporters.
  However, UDAR supporters back him much less — only 9%.
• The closest competitor of S. Kurpil, M. Kryshtopa, mobilizes a quarter of UDAR supporters, every fifth undecided voter, and 16% of Svoboda supporters.
  A. Seniuk is popular mainly among one third of UDAR supporters.
• By territory, the candidate ratings look as follows. Support for S. Kurpil is slightly higher in the districts (33%), while in Chervonohrad 26% would vote for him.
  M. Kryshtopa is supported more in the city (25%), and less in the districts (18%).
  V. Viazivskyi is supported by 12–13% equally across territories.
  A. Seniuk is supported by 10% of respondents in Chervonohrad and only 5% in the districts.
• The youngest electorate is that of A. Seniuk — one third under 30. The oldest electorates belong to S. Kurpil and M. Kryshtopa — about 40% aged over 50.
  One third of UDAR’s candidate supporters have higher education, while among M. Kryshtopa’s supporters those with general or vocational secondary education clearly dominate.
  There are more men among A. Seniuk’s electorate, while women dominate among S. Kurpil’s supporters.
  Half of Kurpil’s electorate lives in villages, while among the other leading candidates two thirds of supporters live mainly in cities.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, Ukrainians are satisfied that EURO-2012 took place in Ukraine, they highly evaluated the quality of the Championship’s organization and primarily see image and reputational gains for the country. At the same time, Ukrainians acknowledge that EURO was “too expensive” for Ukraine, and that massive misappropriation of public funds occurred during its organization.
• Thus, 21% of respondents believe that the organization and hosting of EURO-2012 in Ukraine were carried out at a high level, another 54% say it was at a normal level, although it could have been better. Only 8% of respondents assessed the organization and hosting of EURO in the country as low.
• 77% of respondents believe that foreign fans must have been satisfied with their stay in Ukraine during EURO-2012. Only 8% hold the opposite view.
• The most positive assessments of the quality of organization and hosting of EURO came from residents of the East, from younger people, and more often men. Less positive assessments were given in the West and South.
• 78% of respondents are convinced that EURO gave Ukraine an opportunity to show itself in a better light to Europe; only 10% think otherwise. This statement is supported equally by residents of both the West and the East.
• At the same time, almost as many (75%) agree that hosting the Championship was too expensive a pleasure for the country. Interestingly, this thesis is also supported almost equally by residents of both the West and the East, and most strongly by supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party.
• Almost 60% of respondents believe that hosting EURO-2012 in Ukraine gave a boost to the country’s development; a quarter disagree. This opinion is more common among supporters of the Party of Regions and among the undecided. However, it is interesting that in the West more respondents share this view than in the East and especially in the South.
• At the same time, almost 70% of respondents believe that during preparations for the Championship there was large-scale embezzlement of public funds, and only 7% disagree. This view is most common in the West, Center and South of the country, and least common in the East. About half of supporters of the Party of Regions, around 70% of supporters of the Communist Party, Svoboda and UDAR, and over 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters share this opinion.
• Despite all this, 73% of respondents (especially in the West and among UDAR supporters) are convinced that it is very good that the Championship took place in Ukraine. Only 16% agree with the statement that Ukraine should have отказed to host the Championship, most of them in the Center and among supporters of Svoboda and the Communist Party.
• EURO ASSESSMENTS FROM THE FOOTBALL ITSELF
• Almost 30% of respondents followed most matches of the Championship, from the group stage through the final; another 20% followed only the quarter-finals, semi-finals and final, and every tenth watched only the final. Thus, in one way or another, almost 60% of Ukrainians followed EURO-2012.
• It is worth adding that according to a Sociological Group “Rating” survey conducted before EURO (in May), almost half of Ukrainians intended to follow the matches of the Championship — already more than World Cup-2010, which attracted less than 40%. During the Championship itself, interest in EURO increased further (from 50% to 60%), mainly due to the growth of the audience for the final matches. Audience growth occurred across all age groups, and women also joined the audience in large numbers. A certain “EURO fashion” emerged.
• Almost half (48%) are satisfied with the performance of the Ukrainian national team at EURO-2012, although only 12% are definitely satisfied. Among active fans, two-thirds are satisfied with the team’s performance, and a quarter are definitely satisfied.
• There are also clear emotional effects here, since more than half of respondents who watched only the quarter-finals, semi-finals and final (where the Ukrainian team no longer played) also expressed satisfaction with Ukraine’s performance. This suggests that these assessments were influenced by the general positive mood created by EURO-2012 as an event.
• About one quarter are dissatisfied with the team’s performance (among active fans — almost 30%).
• The Championship significantly increased interest in football: compared to 2009, the share of respondents who consider themselves football fans rose from 33% to 48%. This phenomenon is likely situational, since the number of hard-core fans did not change (6%), the number of active fans increased slightly (from 10% to 14%), and the number of so-called inactive fans rose sharply (from 18% to 29%).
• Every fifth woman classified herself as an inactive fan (only 7% as active). Among men, one-third consider themselves active fans, and almost 40% — inactive fans.
• The most active fans remain young people and city residents. In the West, football attracts significantly more interest than in the South. A direct relationship is observed: regions that did not host EURO matches increased their football fan base the least.
• The fewest football fans are found among supporters of the Communist Party (mostly older people), the party “Ukraine – Forward!” (mostly women), and among the undecided. Interest in football is higher among supporters of UDAR, the Party of Regions, and Batkivshchyna.

• According to the majority of Ukrainians, the image of a “REAL MAN” is best embodied by the Klitschko brothers and Vladimir Putin, and to a lesser extent by Viktor Yanukovych, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and footballer Andriy Shevchenko.
  At the same time, the image of a “REAL WOMAN,” in the opinion of respondents, is best embodied by Yulia Tymoshenko and Sofia Rotaru, and to a lesser extent by Ani Lorak, Angela Merkel, Alla Pugacheva, and Margaret Thatcher.
• The Sociological Group “Rating” continues its special project “People’s TOP,” which consists of a series of studies identifying the best of the best. The special feature of the methodology is that respondents do not receive any lists or prompts — people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions, naming three of their own choices. In October, we present the issue “Real Men and Women.”
• Thus, according to the study results, the majority of surveyed Ukrainians would name Vitalii Klitschko (30.1%) as a “real man” among famous people in Ukraine or abroad, as well as his brother Wladimir Klitschko (9.9%) and the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin (9.5%).
  Somewhat fewer named the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych (6.3%), opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk (5.3%), and footballer Andriy Shevchenko (5.1%).
• The top ten also included Ukrainian politicians Serhiy Tihipko (2.9%) and Oleh Tyahnybok (2.6%), as well as the presidents of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko (2.5%) and the United States Barack Obama (2.4%).
• The TOP-25 also included: Anatolii Hrytsenko (2%), Petro Symonenko (2%), Mykola Katerynchuk (1.9%), Yurii Lutsenko (1.7%), Mykhailo Poplavskyi (1.7%), Dmitry Medvedev (1.7%), Vasyl Virastyuk (1.6%), Petro Poroshenko (1.6%), Bohdan Stupka (1.4%), Mykola Azarov (1.3%), Rinat Akhmetov (1.3%), Volodymyr Lytvyn (1.1%), Iosif Kobzon (1%), Oleh Blokhin (1%), Viktor Yushchenko (1%).
• The Top-50 (with results between 0.4–0.9%) also included Savik Shuster, Yuri Gagarin, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Taras Shevchenko, Serhii Bubka, Viacheslav Chornovil, Viktor Pinchuk, Vlad Yama, Oleksandr Ponomaryov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Serhii Sobolev, Nikolai Baskov, Ihor Kondratiuk, Stas Mikhailov, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Lev Leshchenko, Valerii Meladze, Pavlo Zibrov, Georgy Zhukov, Maksim Galkin, Bruce Willis, Grigory Leps, Brad Pitt, Nicolas Sarkozy.
• In total, 323 men were named by respondents. At the same time, about 32% of respondents were unable to answer the question.
• According to the study results, the majority of surveyed Ukrainians would name former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (24%) as a “real woman” among famous people in Ukraine or abroad, as well as singer Sofia Rotaru (10.4%).
  Somewhat fewer named singer Ani Lorak (6.2%), German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel (5.2%), singer Alla Pugacheva (4.2%), and former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (4.2%).
• The top ten also included Ukrainian public figures Natalia Korolevska (3.4%), Taisia Povaliy (3.2%), Anna Herman (2.5%), and Oksana Marchenko (2.3%).
• The TOP-25 also included: Inna Bohoslovska (1.9%), Yana Klochkova (1.7%), Ruslana Lyzhychko (1.7%), Valentina Tereshkova (1.6%), Natalia Mohylevska (1.6%), Angelina Jolie (1.5%), Oleksandra Kuzhel (1.5%), Iryna Herashchenko (1.4%), Tina Karol (1.4%), Nina Matviienko (1.2%), Natalia Vitrenko (1.1%), Iryna Bilyk (1.1%), Olha Sumska (1%), Oksana Bilozir (0.9%), Raisa Bohatyriova (0.9%).
• The Top-50 (with results between 0.3–0.9%) also included Liliya Podkopayeva, Alla Mazur, Irina Allegrova, Madonna, Elizabeth II, Hillary Clinton, Svitlana Loboda, Iryna Akimova, Edita Piekha, Lina Kostenko, Ada Rohovtseva, Nina Karpachova, Vera Brezhneva, Ruslana Pysanka, Natalia Koroleva, Whitney Houston, Lolita Milyavskaya, Lyudmila Zykina, Lesya Ukrainka, Nadiya Kadyshova, Nastya Kamenskikh, Yevheniya Tymoshenko, Valeriya, Tamara Gverdtsiteli, Nadiya Babkina.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, conducted in September 2012, two thirds of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi: 12% are completely satisfied and another 48% are rather satisfied than dissatisfied.
• Compared to May, the level of satisfaction with the Lviv mayor’s performance increased from 54% to 60%. Accordingly, the share of those dissatisfied with his work decreased from 38% in May to 29% in September.
• Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Head of the Lviv Regional State Administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, is growing. Compared to the previous survey, the number of dissatisfied respondents increased from 47% to 51%. Only 13% are satisfied with his work.
• More than half of respondents were unable to give an assessment of the performance of the Head of the Lviv Regional Council. Compared to May, the level of dissatisfaction with his performance decreased from 41% to 34%. At the same time, the share of those who evaluate his work positively also declined — from 20% to 15%.
• In terms of party supporters, two thirds of supporters of the “passing” opposition parties and slightly more than half of Party of Regions sympathizers, as well as those who are undecided, are satisfied with the work of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi.
  The work of the Head of the Regional Council is positively assessed by one quarter of Svoboda supporters and the same share of Party of Regions supporters, every sixth Batkivshchyna supporter, every tenth UDAR supporter, and every tenth undecided voter.
• The work of the Head of the Lviv Regional State Administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, is approved by one third of Party of Regions supporters, 12–13% of supporters of the “passing” opposition parties, and every tenth among the undecided.

• The results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group showed that since the beginning of the year, electoral preferences in electoral district No. 163 have been distributed among three political forces.
  The rating is led by VO Batkivshchyna with 27.6%. Almost the same number of supporters among those who intend to take part in the elections (87% in the district) is held by VO Svoboda – 26.0%.
  UDAR is supported by 20.1% of respondents.
  The rating of other parties is below 3%, including “Ukraine – Forward!” – 2.7%, Party of Regions – 2.6%, Our Ukraine and CPU – about 2% each.
  Those who have not yet decided – 14.9%.
• Despite Batkivshchyna being in first place, the dynamics of growth in the number of its supporters since the beginning of the year are negative.
  Thus, supporters of the parties that now make up this alliance at the end of 2011 accounted for about 50% of respondents (Batkivshchyna – 26%, Front for Change – 16%).
  Meanwhile, the rating of the current alliance has essentially remained at the level that Batkivshchyna alone had a year ago.
  At the same time, the rating of UDAR has increased significantly (from 5% to 20%), as well as VO Svoboda (from 19% to 26%).
• The youngest electorate belongs to UDAR – more than a third are under 30 years old.
  Among supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, more than a third are voters aged 50 and older.
  There are somewhat more supporters with higher education among UDAR’s electorate.
  Those with secondary education are more numerous among Svoboda’s supporters.
  There are more working people among supporters of V. Klitschko’s party.
  Also, among them there are noticeably more people with relatively high incomes.
  Among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR there is gender parity.
  At the same time, women dominate among supporters of Batkivshchyna.
• The leaders of the trust rating among respondents are V. Klitschko (trusted by 62%, not trusted by 31%), A. Yatseniuk (trusted by 58%, not trusted by 36%) and O. Tyahnybok (trusted by 57%, not trusted by 38%).
  O. Tyahnybok and V. Klitschko are the leaders of absolute trust — every fifth respondent fully trusts them.
  Y. Tymoshenko is trusted by 45%, and distrusted by the same share.
• The leaders of distrust are P. Symonenko, V. Yanukovych, M. Azarov and V. Lytvyn, whom about 90% of respondents do not trust.
  N. Korolevska is trusted by 11%, and distrusted by almost 80%.

RATINGS OF LOCAL POLITICIANS

• The leader of electoral sympathies among candidates in the single-member district is O. Kaida.
  45.0% of respondents who intend to vote are ready to give him their votes.
  The rating of his closest competitor V. Maksymov is twice as low – 21.2%.
  M. Ratushniak is supported by 6.5%, T. Pastukh by 4.2%, and Y. Oliinyk by 3.5%.
  The rating of other candidates is below 3%.
  Those undecided – 10.8%.
• O. Kaida mobilizes 91% of VO Svoboda supporters and half of those who support VO Batkivshchyna.
  V. Maksymov is supported by two thirds of UDAR voters and one third of the undecided.
• The youngest electorate belongs to T. Pastukh (almost half under 30) and V. Maksymov.
  Among supporters of M. Ratushniak and O. Kaida there are more older voters.
  Two thirds of supporters of the UDAR candidate are employed.
  Among supporters of O. Kaida and M. Ratushniak there is gender parity.
  Women are more likely to support T. Pastukh.

EXPECTATIONS FROM THE FUTURE VERKHOVNA RADA

• 96% of respondents believe that elections to the Verkhovna Rada should change the situation in the country for the better.
  At the same time, only half believe that this will actually happen after the October elections.
• The most disillusioned are among the undecided (52%) and supporters of T. Pastukh.
  The least disillusioned are among supporters of VO Svoboda and O. Kaida.
• 92% believe that the composition of the Ukrainian parliament must be renewed.
  However, only slightly more than half believe this will really happen.
• Belief in renewal is strongest among supporters of VO Svoboda and VO Batkivshchyna (two thirds of supporters), as well as O. Kaida.
  The lowest share is among the undecided.
• Ideological issues concern respondents no less than economic or social ones.
  Half of respondents primarily expect the future Verkhovna Rada to protect the Ukrainian language and culture.
  42–44% expect economic growth and higher wages and pensions.
  One third expect job creation and overcoming corruption.
  Every fifth expects impeachment of President Yanukovych, release of Yulia Tymoshenko and Y. Lutsenko, better health care, lower taxes, freedom of speech, and better relations with the EU.
  15% expect support for small and medium-sized businesses, 12% — better education.
  Only one in ten expects greater local self-government powers, unity of East and West, or support for sports.
  Only 2% expect better relations with Russia.
  10% expect nothing at all from the new Verkhovna Rada.
• 52% believe their single-member district MP should deal equally with local issues and national issues.
  36% think the MP should focus only on local problems.
  Only 6% think the MP should be primarily a national statesman.

DISTRICT PROBLEMS

• Two thirds of respondents are concerned about poor road conditions and employment problems — these are the key city problems in voters’ eyes.
  Half are concerned about high utility tariffs, and 42% about poor health care.
  One third see problems in drinking water quality, housing maintenance, and sanitation.
  Every fifth is worried about stray animals, chaotic construction, drug addiction and alcoholism.
  15% are concerned about lack of business conditions, 11–12% about shortages of schools and kindergartens, playgrounds, and environmental conditions.
  Only 5–6% worry about lack of public transport, sports facilities, street trading, parking, or crime.
  Only 3% are concerned about lack of greenery.

ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

• Two thirds of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor S. Nadal and Regional Council Chairman O. Kaida; one quarter are dissatisfied.
  At the same time, 67% are dissatisfied with the performance of Regional State Administration Head V. Hoptyan, and only 18% are satisfied.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in September, the level of political activity among residents of Lviv has slightly increased compared to May of this year: 51% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and another 32% would rather take part than not. Voter mobilization among supporters of parties that have the highest chances of entering parliament is extremely high, with more than 90% of their supporters intending to vote.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held in September 2012, 31.9% of Lviv residents would support Batkivshchyna, among those who intend to participate in the elections. Second place would go to Svoboda with 21.3%, and third to the UDAR party with 20.6%. The Party of Regions would be supported by 4.5% of voters, while all other political forces score below 3%. In particular, 2.2% would vote for Nataliya Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, 2.2% for Our Ukraine, and 1.5% for the Communist Party. Other parties would receive 2.3%, and 13.7% of voters remain undecided.
• Compared with May, Batkivshchyna’s rating has slightly decreased from 34% to 32%, while there is a clear upward trend in support for Svoboda, reflecting a recovery of positions lost in 2011. UDAR’s rating has nearly doubled since May, rising from 11% to 21%. The Party of Regions remains stable at 4%, and Our Ukraine stands at 2%.
• In District 115, which includes the Sykhivskyi District and part of the Lychakivskyi District, Batkivshchyna leads among political parties, supported by about one-third of voters who intend to vote. UDAR is supported by 23.4% of respondents and Svoboda by 20.9%. The Party of Regions would receive 2.9%, Our Ukraine 2.4%, Ukraine – Forward! 2.0%, and the Communist Party 1.4%, while all other parties have less than 1%. Twelve percent of voters are undecided. In the majoritarian race, two clear leaders have emerged: Mykhailo Khmil with 29.1% and Dmytro Dobrodomov with 28.3%. Other candidates trail far behind, and about one-third of voters remain undecided. Both leading candidates have strong electoral reserves and could mobilize up to three-quarters of their own party supporters, as well as about one-third of Svoboda voters. Modeling a two-candidate race shows no clear leader, with both candidates supported by about 33% each.
• In District 116, which includes the Railway District and part of the Shevchenkivskyi District, Batkivshchyna leads with 30%, while Svoboda and UDAR each have 22.4%. The Party of Regions stands at 4.6%, Ukraine – Forward! at 1.9%, and Our Ukraine at 1.5%, with other parties below 1% and 13.6% undecided. In the majoritarian contest, Iryna Farion is the clear leader with 38.2%, far ahead of her closest rival Andrii Bereziuk at 17.4%. Modeling a two-candidate race confirms Farion’s strong advantage.
• In District 117, covering the Frankivskyi and Halytskyi districts, Batkivshchyna leads with 33.3%, followed by Svoboda at 20.2% and UDAR at 18.3%. The Party of Regions has 6.4%, the Communist Party 2.9%, and Ukraine – Forward! 1.9%, with 13.3% undecided. The leading majoritarian candidate is Ihor Vasyunyk with 30.8%, followed by Taras Stetskiv and Olha Yuryntets. Vasyunyk has the strongest electoral reserves and is the clear favorite, particularly among Batkivshchyna supporters.
• In District 118, which includes Pustomyty District and parts of the Lychakivskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts, Batkivshchyna leads with 32.1%, followed by Svoboda with 24.0% and UDAR with 16.3%. Among majoritarian candidates, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn has taken the lead with 35.7%, overtaking Bohdan Dubnevych, whose support is 30.5%. Mykhalchyshyn’s support has tripled since May, and modeling two-candidate races confirms his clear advantage over his rivals.
• Most respondents, 83%, believe elections should bring positive change and renew parliament, although only about half believe this will actually happen. Almost half of respondents expect the new parliament to ensure economic growth, unite eastern and western Ukraine, and protect the Ukrainian language and culture. Other expectations include better healthcare, impeachment of President Yanukovych, protection of free speech, and tackling corruption, although support for small and medium-sized businesses and job creation remains low.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had taken place in early September 2012, 40% of respondents would definitely have participated, and another 34% would probably have taken part. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded in the western and central regions of the country. Among party supporters, the greatest willingness to vote was expressed by sympathizers of Svoboda, the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, and the Communist Party. The lowest readiness to participate was found among undecided voters and supporters of Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in early September 2012, the Party of Regions would have won with 26.3% of the vote among those who intended to participate. Slightly fewer respondents, 22.6%, would have voted for Batkivshchyna. A total of 12% would have supported UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, 10.8% the Communist Party, 4.1% Svoboda, and 3.7% Natalia Korolevska’s “Ukraine – Forward!”. About 1% would have voted for Our Ukraine, and 0.6% for Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party. More than 2% would have supported other parties, while 16.6% were undecided.
• Over the last several months the Party of Regions had been steadily gaining support, rising from 20% in July to 25% in August and 26% in September. UDAR and the Communist Party also showed slight growth. In contrast, Batkivshchyna, whose ratings had been stable during this period, declined in September from 26% to 23%. Svoboda and “Ukraine – Forward!” did not demonstrate any upward trends. Over the past month the number of undecided voters increased slightly from 15% to 17%. As a result, whereas in August the gap between the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna was two percentage points in favor of the opposition, in September it shifted to three points in favor of the Party of Regions.
• Around 40% of voters in western Ukraine were ready to vote for the United Opposition Batkivshchyna, about a quarter in the central region, and roughly one in ten in the east and south. The Party of Regions had the strongest support in the east and south, where it was backed by more than 40% of voters; about one in five supported it in the center and about one in ten in the west. The Communists almost doubled their support in the central region, where one in ten voters backed them, while their strongest support remained in the south and east, where nearly one in five voters supported the party. UDAR was most popular in the west and center, and it also gained support in the south and east. Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!” was consistently more popular in the central region, while Svoboda was strongest in the west. Undecided voters were most numerous in the east, which was also the region with the lowest willingness to vote in the October 28, 2012 election.
• If a presidential election had taken place in early September 2012, Viktor Yanukovych would have won the first round with 25.9% of the vote among likely voters. Yuliia Tymoshenko would have received 14%, Vitalii Klitschko 9.6%, Arsenii Yatseniuk 8.5%, Petro Symonenko 7.8%, Natalia Korolevska 3%, Oleh Tiahnybok 2.9%, Serhii Tihipko 2.1%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 1.9%, Viktor Yushchenko 1.1%, and Volodymyr Lytvyn 0.9%. More than 2% would have supported another candidate, almost 6% would not have supported any of the candidates, and 14.1% were undecided.

• According to the latest survey conducted by the Rating Group in August 2012, an increase in the level of patriotism was recorded in Ukraine. Compared to two years earlier, the share of respondents who consider themselves patriots of their country increased from 77% to 82%, and compared to six months earlier it rose even more sharply, from 73% to 82%. In particular, 40% of respondents clearly identify themselves as patriots of their country, while another 42% say they are rather patriots than not. Only 10% do not consider themselves patriots, and 8% were unable to decide.
• The most noticeable growth in patriotic sentiment was recorded in the East of the country, in Donbas, as well as in the West and the North. In the South, by contrast, opposite trends were observed. This means that patriotism increased most strongly in regions where EURO-2012 matches were held, which suggests that this growth may largely be connected to that event. Traditionally, older people are the most likely to consider themselves patriots. At the same time, patriotic attitudes have also grown among young people, and a particularly strong increase has been recorded among women. These trends further indirectly point to a link between EURO-2012 and the rise of patriotism, and one can even speak of the emergence of a certain “fashion for patriotism.”
• The strongest feelings of patriotism are observed among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna, but a significant increase in such attitudes is also recorded among supporters of the Party of Regions. The lowest levels of self-declared patriotism are found among supporters of UDAR and Natalia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, primarily because of the large share of young people in their supporter base.
• Ukrainians most often name as sources of pride in their country and people the place where they were born and grew up (34%), the land and territory where they live (29%), national songs, holidays and traditions (27%), native nature (26%), the country’s past and history (25%), Ukrainian diligence and ability to run a хозяйство (25%), and great people of their nationality (24%). In addition, people also take pride in the emotional qualities of their people (22%), the state in which they live (21%), and their native language (19%). Somewhat fewer respondents mention faith and religion (12%), sporting victories (12%), literature and art (11%), and the graves of ancestors and memory of them (11%). National symbols such as the flag, coat of arms and anthem evoke pride for only 4%, while military power inspires the least pride of all, at just 1%.
• The place where one was born and grew up evokes the greatest pride in the South, the East and Donbas, and more often among supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!” and the Party of Regions. Ukrainian songs and traditions are especially valued among supporters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party, while Ukrainian diligence is most often mentioned by supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!”. Great Ukrainians are admired most in the East, North and West, among both opposition supporters and those of the Party of Regions. Pride in history and the past is strongest in the North, Center and Donbas, especially among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions. Pride in the state, as well as in the language and religion of one’s people, is highest in the West. Sporting victories are most often mentioned in the Center, particularly by UDAR voters. Emotional qualities of the people are emphasized in the East, literature and art in the North, and respect for ancestors’ graves in the South.
• An absolute majority of respondents, 61%, answered the question “Who am I?” by saying “a citizen of Ukraine.” About half as many identified themselves primarily as residents of their region, city or village (29%) or simply as “a human being” (24%). Another 19% would name their nationality, almost one in ten would mention their family role or describe themselves as a Soviet person. Only 6% would call themselves Europeans, 5% would mention their profession, and about 3% would say they are a “citizen of the world” or refer to their religious beliefs.
• Those most likely to identify primarily as citizens of Ukraine live in the West and Center and are mainly supporters of Svoboda and the united opposition Batkivshchyna. Saying simply “a human being” is more common in the East and West, especially among supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!” and UDAR. Naming one’s nationality is most common in the West and North, especially among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna. About one third of Communist Party supporters and nearly one sixth of Party of Regions supporters consider themselves Soviet people. These views are most common among older people and pensioners, particularly in the South and East. Identifying as a European is most typical for young people and is most widespread among supporters of Svoboda and UDAR. The idea of being a “citizen of the world” is most common among supporters of “Ukraine – Forward!” and UDAR.
• Over the last two years, certain changes have occurred in how patriotism, national pride and self-identification are understood. Ukrainians have become more proud of their country through national songs, holidays and traditions, through native nature, and through national diligence and хозяйственность. At the same time, pride in national heroes, the state, ancestors’ graves, religion, and national symbols such as the flag, coat of arms and anthem has declined. Although the number of people identifying as citizens of Ukraine has grown, the share of those who would name their nationality has decreased.
• Based on correlations between answers to the questions “What makes you proud of your country and people?”, “Who am I?”, and “Do you consider yourself a patriot of your country?”, the study identifies markers of stronger and weaker patriotism. In the question about sources of pride, the most patriotic markers are “the flag, coat of arms and anthem,” “the state in which I live,” “great people of my nationality,” “the language of my people,” and “our literature and art.” In the question “Who am I?”, the most patriotic answers are “a citizen of Ukraine” and “naming one’s nationality.”
• This creates a paradoxical situation: overall patriotism seems to have increased, yet most key patriotic markers have declined. Moreover, over the past two years the share of people ready to defend their country with arms has fallen from 43% to 33%, while the share of those not ready to do so has risen from 38% to 54%. The more a person feels like a patriot, the more willing they are to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with weapons. This suggests that the growth of patriotism contains a strong emotional and possibly situational component. Readiness to defend the country is highest in the West, especially among supporters of Svoboda, and lowest in the South and among Communist Party supporters. Almost half of men and one in five women say they are ready to defend their country with arms.
• If Ukrainians had to decide today whether to support independence, 61% would support it, 26% would oppose it, and 13% would be undecided. Support for independence is nearly 90% in the West and around 70% in the North and Center, but less than half in the East, South and Donbas. Importantly, in every region supporters of independence still outnumber opponents. Independence is supported most strongly by young people and least by older people, even though older people tend to see themselves as more patriotic. Some older respondents consider themselves patriots while at the same time not recognizing independence and identifying as Soviet people.
• An overwhelming majority of respondents oppose the secession of Galicia (84%), Crimea (90%) or Donbas (90%). Only 5% support the separation of Galicia, less than 1% in the West but over 10% in Donbas and the South. Only 3% support the separation of Crimea, less than 1% in the West, 4% in Donbas, and about 10% in the South. Only 2% support the separation of Donbas, about 2% in the West and 8% in Donbas itself. Thus, residents of Galicia themselves categorically oppose separation, while some support for it exists in Donbas and the South, primarily among Communist Party supporters and to a lesser extent among Party of Regions supporters. In the West, Center, North and East, separation of any territories is not supported. In Crimea and Donbas there is some support for separation of their own territories, but these views are far from dominant, and the absolute majority emphasize the need to preserve the territorial integrity of the country.

• If parliamentary elections were held in the near future, the largest share of votes among those who intend to participate would be received by Batkivshchyna, supported by 26.2% of likely voters, and the Party of Regions with 24.6%. The UDAR party led by Vitalii Klychko would receive 11.8%, while the Communist Party of Ukraine would gain 9.4%. Close to the 5% electoral threshold are also Natalia Korolevska’s party Ukraine – Forward with 4.3% and the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda with 4.2%. At the same time, 15.4% of those who plan to vote had not yet decided which party to support.
• Batkivshchyna and UDAR are more often supported by voters in the Western and Central regions, while the Party of Regions and the Communist Party are more popular in the East and South, and Svoboda finds most of its support in the West of the country. Among respondents who had already decided which party they would vote for, confidence in their choice was quite high, with 48.9% being fully confident and a further 43.5% rather confident.
• The main reason respondents gave for choosing a party was its perceived ability to solve the country’s problems, cited by 51.5% of those intending to vote for a party. Other frequently mentioned reasons included the presence of a strong and decisive leader at the head of the party, mentioned by 41.7%, the belief that the party could improve the life of people like the respondent, cited by 31.2%, the closeness of the party’s ideological positions to the respondent’s own views and beliefs at 29.5%, the party’s ability to carry out reforms and positive changes in society at 24.8%, its capacity to ensure stability in the state at 24.0%, and the presence in the party leadership of people who command the respondent’s respect at 23.5%.
• These reasons were common across all regions, but some regional differences were also observed. In the South and East, respondents more often pointed out that although the chosen political force had shortcomings, other parties were even worse. In the Western region, voters more frequently mentioned that a party defends the Ukrainian language as the sole state language and protects Ukrainian culture, traditions and values.
• Overall, the pre-election situation was characterized by a low level of public optimism. Nearly two thirds of respondents, 63%, believed that events in Ukraine were moving in the wrong direction, a view shared by majorities in all regions, ranging from 54% in the South to 74% in the West.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, 45% of respondents feel that freedom of speech is being curtailed in Ukraine. Almost the same share (39%) do not feel a decline in freedom of speech. Thus, Ukrainians are almost evenly divided on this issue. Another one in six respondents is undecided.
• It should be noted that during 2011–2012, nearly half of respondents (from 43% to 46%) consistently felt that freedom of speech in Ukraine was being curtailed. At the same time, compared to the previous survey conducted in November of the previous year, the share of respondents who do not feel deterioration in this sphere increased from 35% to 39%.
• More than 60% of respondents in the West, about half in the North, and more than 40% in the Center and East feel that freedom of speech is being curtailed in Ukraine. At the same time, more than 50% of respondents in Donbas, more than 40% in the South and East, and about one third in the North and Center do not feel deterioration in this sphere.
• More than 70% of supporters of Svoboda and the United Opposition, as well as nearly 60% of UDAR supporters, feel that freedom of speech is being curtailed in Ukraine. At the same time, nearly 70% of supporters of the Party of Regions, slightly less than half of Communist Party supporters, and undecided voters do not feel such a threat.

• According to a survey conducted in July 2012, the five most serious threats facing the country are rising unemployment, mentioned by 44% of respondents, economic decline at 41%, abuse of power by the authorities at 25%, social degradation at 20%, and deterioration of medical care, also at 20%. These are followed by environmental disasters at 17%, rising crime at 16%, devaluation of the hryvnia at 15%, a potential split of the country at 13%, possible loss of independence at 11%, and mass migration of Ukrainians abroad at 10%. Fewer than one in ten respondents see threats such as a decline in education, a demographic crisis, an unconstitutional coup, the risk of civil war, or loss of control over Ukraine’s gas transit system. Only about 3% perceive a military threat from Russia or terrorism, and just 1% fear a military threat from the West. Only 3% of Ukrainians say they do not feel any of the listed threats at all.
• Compared with the previous survey conducted in March 2011, concerns about economic risks have declined noticeably. The share of those who see economic decline as a threat has fallen from 53% to 41% across all regions, while fears of unemployment have also decreased slightly from 47% to 44%, although they have risen in the Center and in Donbas. Concerns about devaluation of the hryvnia have dropped from 23% to 15% in all regions except the West. At the same time, anxiety about deteriorating medical services has increased from 15% to 20%, especially in the Center, South and Donbas. Worries about environmental disasters, rising crime, abuse of power, and social degradation have also grown. Over the past year, fears of a possible split of the country have increased by about one and a half times, rising from 9% to 13%, with particularly sharp growth both in the West and in the East. Concerns about the possible loss of independence have also risen, especially in both Western and Eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, fears of civil war have declined, while concerns about an unconstitutional coup have increased.
• Political affiliations also shape perceptions of threats. Supporters of Ukraine – Forward! and undecided voters are most worried about unemployment, while voters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party are most concerned about economic decline. Abuse of power worries supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, social degradation concerns Svoboda and Communist Party voters, and deterioration of medical services worries supporters of the Party of Regions and Ukraine – Forward!. Environmental disasters are most often cited by Party of Regions voters, while devaluation of the hryvnia and mass migration abroad are key concerns among UDAR supporters. Every third supporter of Svoboda believes Ukraine faces the threat of losing independence, every sixth sees a risk of civil war or an unconstitutional coup, and one in ten perceives a military threat from Russia. Terrorism is most often mentioned by supporters of Ukraine – Forward!, while one in ten supporters of the Party of Regions believes that Ukraine faces no threats at all.

IRI today released its third in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion (PDF).  The poll, conducted May 11 – June 2, 2012, is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape.
 
Among the findings in the poll, 14 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction, almost the same as in IRI’s last national poll conducted in March 2012.  However, since March, the number of people who believe the country is moving in the wrong direction decreased from 73 percent to 66 percent.  The two most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment and corruption within state bodies.  Only 19 percent of Ukrainians believe that the upcoming October 2012 parliamentary elections will be free and fair.  This number has not changed significantly from IRI November 2011 poll or the IRI March 2012 poll.

Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people.  The randomly collected sample of 1,200 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide.  The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group Ukraine under the supervision of IRI.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent with a response rate of 48 percent.