Press releases

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, UEFA EURO 2012 generated substantial interest among Ukrainians. Almost everyone who plans to follow the tournament intends to support the national team, even though its chances of winning are rated lower than those of Spain and Germany, which most respondents consider the main favorites of the championship.
• About half of Ukraine’s adult population aged 18 and over planned to follow the course of EURO 2012. In particular, 31 percent intended to watch most matches from the group stage through to the final, 9 percent planned to follow only the playoff matches and the final, and another 9 percent planned to watch only the final. At the same time, 46 percent were not interested in the tournament at all, while 5 percent had not yet decided.
• For obvious reasons, EURO 2012 attracted much greater interest among Ukrainians than the previous FIFA World Cup. According to Rating’s 2010 survey, the World Cup attracted the attention of fewer than 40 percent of Ukrainians.
• Interest in EURO 2012 was highest in Western Ukraine, Donbas, the North, and the East, and lowest in the Center and the South, regions that did not host any matches.
• Seventy-five percent of Ukrainian men and fewer than 30 percent of women planned to follow the tournament. More than half of men intended to watch most matches from the group stage to the final. In 2010, almost two-thirds of men and only about one-fifth of women followed the World Cup, which means that the greatest growth in interest since then occurred among women.
• Interest in EURO 2012 increased with younger age, higher levels of education, and higher income. Among internet users, the share of football fans was about one and a half times higher than among those who did not use the internet.
• Besides the Ukrainian national team, which was supported by 92 percent of fans, many respondents also planned to support Russia (23 percent), Germany (15 percent), England (15 percent), Spain (15 percent), and Italy (12 percent). Smaller shares said they would support France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. Every team participating in EURO 2012 had some supporters among Ukrainians, and only 3 percent of those who planned to watch the tournament had not yet decided whom to support.
• Compared to two years earlier, Ukrainian fans had become noticeably less supportive of Italy and France, most likely due to the weak performances of those teams at the previous World Cup. At the same time, Germany, England, and Spain continued to enjoy strong support, especially among the most devoted football fans, typically middle-aged men who planned to follow all matches and had a strong interest in football.
• It is worth recalling that neither Ukraine nor Russia participated in the final stage of the previous World Cup. Support for Ukraine’s national team was strongest in the West, Donbas, the North, and the Center, and weakest in the South. Support for Russia was highest in the East, South, and Donbas, much lower in the Center, and almost absent in the West. Germany and Spain were more strongly supported in the South and East, France in the East, and England in the Center.
• Respondents considered Spain and Germany the most likely winners of EURO 2012, followed by England and Italy. At the same time, nearly a quarter of Ukrainians believed that the Ukrainian national team also had a chance of winning. Far fewer respondents believed in the chances of the Netherlands, France, Portugal, or Russia, while about a quarter of respondents were unable to evaluate the chances of the participating teams.
• More experienced football fans tended to bet on Spain, Germany, and England, reflecting the preferences of men who planned to watch all tournament matches. Ukrainian women, by contrast, were more inclined to believe in the success of Ukraine’s national team and were also more likely than men to believe in Russia’s chances. Belief in Italy’s and Portugal’s chances was roughly similar among men and women.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group, residents of Lviv are generally satisfied with the level of preparation of their city for hosting the UEFA EURO 2012 European Football Championship. The highest ratings were given to the readiness of Lviv residents themselves to welcome visitors: 5% rated it as “excellent,” 47% as “good,” and another 28% as “satisfactory,” while only 8% rated it as “unsatisfactory.”
• The quality of catering services was assessed as follows: 5% rated it “excellent,” 36% “good,” 25% “satisfactory,” and 11% “unsatisfactory.” The comfort of the Arena Lviv stadium was rated “excellent” by 8%, “good” by 32%, “satisfactory” by 24%, and “unsatisfactory” by 8%. The preparedness of government services (police, customs, hospitals, etc.) was rated “excellent” by 3%, “good” by 29%, “satisfactory” by 32%, and “unsatisfactory” by 16%. The comfort of tourist accommodation in the city was rated “excellent” by 3%, “good” by 31%, “satisfactory” by 29%, and “unsatisfactory” by 13%.
• The most negative evaluations were given to transport connections, with 41% rating them “unsatisfactory,” and the condition of roads, which 37% rated “unsatisfactory.” At the same time, transport preparation was rated “excellent” by 2%, “good” by 20%, and “satisfactory” by 32%, while road conditions were rated “excellent” by 2%, “good” by 20%, and “satisfactory” by 38%.
• Residents of the Frankivskyi district rated the readiness of Lviv residents to welcome guests, the quality of catering, accommodation conditions, and the stadium higher than residents of other districts. Meanwhile, satisfaction with transport connections is lowest in the Halytskyi district and in Sykhiv, and highest in the Zaliznychnyi district. The condition of roads is rated worst in the Halytskyi district and best in the Zaliznychnyi district.
• Young people are the most satisfied with the city’s preparations for the Championship, followed by middle-aged residents, while pensioners are the least satisfied. Men are naturally more satisfied with the stadium.
• Respondents who are satisfied with the work of the city authorities tend to give better assessments of the city’s readiness for EURO-2012. However, attitudes toward the city government are not decisive: regardless of their views on the city hall, Lviv residents in general positively assess their city’s readiness to host the Championship.
• Fifty-nine percent of Lviv residents will support Ukraine at EURO-2012. Considering that one third of residents do not follow football at all, practically every football fan in Lviv will support the national team. The highest level of support for Ukraine is in the Lychakiv district (67%) and the Halytskyi district (64%), slightly lower in Sykhivskyi and Shevchenkivskyi (59% each), lower still in Frankivskyi (57%) and Zaliznychnyi (53%).
• Germany is second in popularity among Lviv residents (12%), followed by England (9%), Spain (9%), Italy (7%), Poland (6%), the Netherlands and Portugal (4% each), France (3%), and Russia (2%). Support for Germany is highest in Sykhiv (20%) and lowest in the Lychakiv district (7%). Spain and England are most supported in the Sykhiv and Frankivskyi districts.
• Only 11% of respondents believe Ukraine will win the Championship. The strongest belief is in Germany’s victory (21%), followed by Spain (15%) and England (12%). Much fewer Lviv residents believe in Italy (7%), the Netherlands (5%), France (4%), Portugal (3%), or Poland (1%).
• Belief in Ukraine’s victory is highest in the Shevchenkivskyi district (16%) and lowest in the Halytskyi district (6%), where belief in Germany’s victory is the strongest (27%). Belief in Spain is highest in Sykhiv (18%) and in the Halytskyi district (17%), while belief in England is highest in Sykhiv and the Zaliznychnyi district (14% each).
• By age, young people most often support Ukraine (69%), although they are more likely than others to believe that Germany or Spain will win the tournament.
• Thus, among those who support the “blue and yellow” national team, only 19% believe it will win the Championship. The main favorites among supporters of Ukraine are Germany (31%) and Spain (23%).
• Among Lviv residents who support Germany, two thirds are fully convinced it will win EURO-2012, while one in four believes Spain could win, and one in five predicts England. Among supporters of England, only half are convinced of England’s victory, and Germany is seen as the main competitor (37%). By contrast, Lviv residents who support Spain are 100% convinced of its victory.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in May 2012, the level of political engagement among residents of Lviv has slightly decreased over the past six months, but it remains relatively high. Forty-six percent said they would definitely take part in parliamentary elections, and another 31% said they would probably participate rather than not.
• The highest voter mobilization is among supporters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and the Front for Change (the latter two were surveyed as a single list). If parliamentary elections had taken place in May 2012, 33.5% of Lviv voters would have supported the joint list of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change (among those intending to vote). Svoboda would have taken second place with 19.7%, and UDAR would have ranked third with 10.7%.
• The Party of Regions would have been supported by 4.6% of voters, Our Ukraine by 3.2%, Civic Position by 3.0%, Nataliia Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!” by 2.4%, the European Party by 1.9%, and the Communist Party by 1.6%. Other parties would have received 5.7%. A further 13.7% were undecided.
• Compared to December of the previous year, Batkivshchyna had 21% support and Front for Change 16%, while by May nearly 34% were ready to vote for their united list. Civic Position lost support, declining from 6% in October–November to 5% in December and down to 3% in May. UDAR continued to grow, rising from 3% to 7% by the end of the previous year and reaching 11% in May. Svoboda also improved its position, rising from 17% to 20%. Support for the Party of Regions (5%) and Our Ukraine (3%) remained stable.
• The most trusted politicians among Lviv residents are Vitalii Klitschko (57%), Arsenii Yatseniuk (56%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (46%), Oleh Tiahnybok (42%), and Anatolii Hrytsenko (35%). Much lower trust is given to Nataliia Korolevska (13%), Viktor Yushchenko (12%), Serhii Tihipko (12%), Volodymyr Lytvyn (9%), Mykola Azarov (8%), and Viktor Yanukovych (6%). These figures are also the leaders in distrust: Korolevska is distrusted by 70%, Tihipko by 81%, Yushchenko by 82%, Azarov by 84%, Lytvyn by 85%, and Yanukovych by 88%.
• Over the last six months, trust in Yuliia Tymoshenko rose significantly from 37% to 46%, giving her, for the first time in three years, a positive trust balance in Lviv. Trust also increased for Arsenii Yatseniuk (from 47% to 56%), Vitalii Klitschko (from 51% to 57%), and Oleh Tiahnybok (from 40% to 42%). In contrast, trust in Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych continued to decline, reaching their lowest levels in three years.
• In single-member district No. 115 (Sykhiv and part of the Lychakiv district), the current leaders are Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (18.4%), Dmytro Dobrodomov (12.9%), Andrii Parubii (11.7%), and Mykhailo Khmil (8.5%). If Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda nominated a single candidate, support for Mykhalchyshyn would rise to 26%, for Khmil to 23%, and for Parubii to 20%, putting them far ahead of Dobrodomov. The greatest boost from unification would go to Khmil, whose rating would triple.
• In district No. 116 (Railway District and part of Shevchenkivskyi District), the leader remains Iryna Farion (18.9%), followed by Vasyl Kuibida (13.2%) and Yaroslav Hinka (7.2%). A united opposition candidate would significantly increase Farion’s support to 29% and Kuibida’s to 20%.
• In district No. 117 (Frankivskyi and Halytskyi Districts), there is no clear leader. The top contenders are Petro Pysarchuk (12.9%) and Ihor Vasiunyk (12.1%), followed by Taras Stetskiv (9.1%), Viktoriia Liaskovska (7.2%), and Oksana Yurynec (5.7%). If the opposition nominated a single candidate, Vasiunyk’s support would rise to 24% and Stetskiv’s to 23%, giving them a clear lead.
• In district No. 118 (Pustomyty District and parts of Lychakiv and Shevchenkivskyi Districts), Bohdan Dubnevych remains the clear leader with 31.8%, far ahead of Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (11.9%) and Yurii Hudyma (8.1%). However, a united opposition candidate could significantly narrow the gap, bringing Mykhalchyshyn up to 25% or Parubii up to 21%.
• According to respondents, the key qualities a candidate for parliament should have are the ability to keep promises (52%), honesty (36%), and the ability to bring change (30%). Voters also expect candidates to care about ordinary people, understand economics, be patriotic, reliable, and have a development program for the region.
• Most respondents believe a candidate should focus more on solving local issues in the constituency rather than national politics. Many also prefer experienced politicians over businesspeople, new faces over former MPs, and candidates in opposition rather than those supporting President Yanukovych. Party affiliation matters for some voters, but for many, the candidate’s personality is more important than party label.

• The most outstanding Ukrainians of all time are considered to be Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The Rating Group presents a special project entitled “People’s TOP,” which will consist of a series of surveys aimed at identifying the very best of the best. A distinctive feature of the methodology is that respondents are not given any lists or prompts; people express their opinions exclusively through open-ended questions.
• In May, we present the issue “Outstanding Ukrainians of All Time.” According to the survey results, an overwhelming majority of respondents named Taras Shevchenko as one of the greatest Ukrainians of all time (58.7%). Completing the top three are Lesya Ukrainka (22.5%) and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (20.1%).
• The rest of the top ten includes Ivan Franko (12.7%), Vitali Klitschko (10.8%), Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (7.7%), Hryhorii Skovoroda (5.7%), Ivan Mazepa (5.6%), Stepan Bandera (4.3%), and Yaroslav the Wise (3.8%). The second ten includes Mykola Amosov (3.7%), Viacheslav Chornovil (3.5%), Andrii Shevchenko (3.0%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (2.8%), Volodymyr Klitschko (2.8%), Mykola Hohol (2.4%), Serhii Koroliov (2.1%), Sofia Rotaru (1.9%), Borys Paton (1.8%), and Serhii Bubka (1.6%).
• The third ten consists of Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi (1.6%), Lina Kostenko (1.4%), Volodymyr the Great (1.4%), and three presidents of modern Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych (1.4%), Leonid Kuchma (1.1%), and Leonid Kravchuk (1.1%), as well as Oleksandr Dovzhenko (1.1%), Valerii Lobanovskyi (1.1%), Bohdan Stupka (0.9%), and Pavlo Tychyna (0.9%).
• The top 50 also includes, with scores between 0.5% and 0.8%, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, Ivan Skoropadskyi, Sydir Kovpak, Taras Bulba, Ivan Kotliarevskyi, Yana Klochkova, Princess Olha, Oleh Blokhin, Petro Symonenko, Danylo Halytskyi, Petro Sahaidachnyi, Vasyl Stus, Pylyp Orlyk, Nestor Makhno, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Roman Shukhevych, Liliia Podkopaieva, Volodymyr Vernadskyi, Viktor Yushchenko, Ivan Kozhedub, Mykola Pyrohov, and Andrii Sheptytskyi.
• In total, respondents named 224 different individuals. At the same time, about 15% of respondents were unable to name or recall any outstanding Ukrainians, with the highest share on the Donbas (27%) and the lowest in Central Ukraine (9%).
• The figure of Taras Shevchenko is recognized equally across all age groups and both in villages and cities, and he is mentioned most frequently in Western Ukraine and more often by women. Lesya Ukrainka is more often named in villages, in the West, North, and East, and more often by women. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi is more often mentioned in cities and more often by men; his figure is more widely recognized in Central, Northern, and Eastern Ukraine and least in the West. Ivan Franko is mentioned most frequently in Western Ukraine, more often in villages, and more often by older people than by the young.
• Vitali Klitschko is seen as an outstanding Ukrainian mainly by young people, much more often by men, and more often in villages. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Hryhorii Skovoroda, and Ivan Mazepa are more often named in cities, primarily by middle-aged and older people. Hrushevskyi is mentioned more in Central Ukraine, Skovoroda in the North, and Mazepa in the West.
• Stepan Bandera is named mainly in Western Ukraine, where he ranks among the top five most outstanding Ukrainians of all time. Viacheslav Chornovil is also named relatively more often in the West. In Central Ukraine, Yuliia Tymoshenko is named more often; in the South, Mykola Amosov, Serhii Koroliov, Mykola Hohol, Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, as well as Leonid Kuchma and Volodymyr Klitschko; in the East, Yaroslav the Wise, Volodymyr the Great, as well as Sofia Rotaru and Valerii Lobanovskyi; in the Donbas, Serhii Bubka; and in the North, Borys Paton and Oleksandr Dovzhenko.

• According to the aggregated results of surveys conducted by the Rating Group in 2012, 50% of respondents consider Ukrainian to be their native language, 29% consider Russian. At the same time, 20% consider both Ukrainian and Russian equally their native language. Another 1% consider another language to be their native one.
• In the West (96%), Center (75%), and North (58%), Ukrainian is predominantly considered the native language. At the same time, in the East (36%), South (56%), and Donbas (67%), Russian predominates.
  Ukrainian is more often considered the native language by rural residents and older people.
• 45% of respondents usually speak Ukrainian at home, 39% speak Russian, and 15% speak both Ukrainian and Russian equally.
  In the West (91%), Center (73%), and North (51%), people mainly communicate at home in Ukrainian; in the East (65%), South (67%), and Donbas (83%), in Russian.
  Ukrainian is more often spoken by people of middle and older age, and much more in rural areas.
• Thus, Ukrainian is spoken by fewer people than those who consider it their native language. Conversely, Russian is spoken by more people than those who consider it their native language.
• On the issue of granting Russian the status of a state language, there is complete parity: 46% of respondents are against, and the same share (45%) are in favor. Another 8% are undecided.
  It should be noted that over the past two years, the number of opponents and supporters of bilingualism has been almost equal. However, compared with 2009, support for granting Russian the status of a state language has declined (from 54% to 46%), while the number of opponents has increased from 40% to 45%.
• The strongest supporters of bilingualism are residents of the Donbas (84%), the East (71%), and the South (65%). Opponents are concentrated in the Center (58%), the North (68%), and the West (89%).
  Granting Russian the status of a state language is mainly supported by voters of the Communist Party of Ukraine (72%) and the Party of Regions (71%).
  Mostly opposed are supporters of UDAR (59%), Civic Position (66%), Batkivshchyna (69%), Front for Change (70%), and 100% of Svoboda voters.
• Despite the fact that Ukrainian is spoken more often by older people, young people are more opposed to bilingualism.
• Another important feature: among respondents who support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, the vast majority (72%) support granting Russian the status of a state language. At the same time, among those who support signing a free trade agreement with the European Union, the vast majority (72%) are against bilingualism. As is known, young people also more strongly support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.

• The full report can also be viewed and downloaded on our Facebook page.
• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating”, if the Presidential elections of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, only 35% of respondents would definitely take part, and another 38% would rather take part.
• If the Presidential elections of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, 21.9% of respondents (among those who would participate in the election) would vote for Viktor Yanukovych, 16% for Yulia Tymoshenko, 9.6% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 8.8% for Vitali Klitschko, 6.9% for Petro Symonenko, 4.1% for Nataliya Korolevska, 3.6% for Oleh Tyahnybok, 2.7% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko, 2.5% for Serhiy Tihipko, and 0.8% for Volodymyr Lytvyn. Other candidates were supported by 2.7%, 3.7% would not support any candidate, and 16.8% were undecided.

TRENDS:

• Compared with March, citizens’ willingness to participate in the elections has decreased. In particular, the share of respondents who would definitely participate in the presidential elections fell from 45% to 35%.
• Over the past two months, Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating has declined most noticeably (from 19.8% to 16%), which was accompanied by an increase in support for Nataliya Korolevska (from 1.4% to 4.1%). The latter has overtaken Serhiy Tihipko, Oleh Tyahnybok, and Anatoliy Hrytsenko in the rankings.
• A slight decline in Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s figures was accompanied by a similar rise for Vitali Klitschko.
• Viktor Yanukovych’s rating has remained almost unchanged over the past several months; however, compared with December of last year, it has increased slightly (from 18.9% to 21.9%). Against the background of declining support for the leader of Batkivshchyna, the gap between Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych has widened in favor of the latter.
• Oleh Tyahnybok shows stable positions, with his personal rating traditionally somewhat lower than that of the Svoboda party. Petro Symonenko also demonstrates stable results, likewise lagging behind the rating of the Communist Party.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, 34% of respondents would definitely take part in them, and another 34% would rather take part. The highest level of voter mobilization is recorded in the West, and the lowest in the South, East and Donbas of the country. The highest mobilization is among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU).
• RESULTS:
  If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in early May 2012, the joint list of Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes would win. Thus, 25.6% of respondents (among those who would take part in the elections) would vote for the unified list of Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes, 22% for the Party of Regions, 9.2% for UDAR of V. Klychko, 7.6% for the Communist Party, and 4.4% for Svoboda. Another 3.8% of voters would support N. Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, 2.4% would support Civic Position. All other parties together – over 6%, undecided – 19%.
• The full report can be viewed and downloaded on our Facebook page.
• TRENDS:
  Over the past two months, citizens’ willingness to participate in elections has decreased. In particular, the share of respondents who would definitely take part in parliamentary elections fell from 45% to 34%. After the merger of Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes, the number of undecided voters also slightly increased (from 17.7% to 19%).
• The largest losses were suffered by Batkivshchyna and Front of Changes, whose combined rating fell from 30% to 25.6% since February. Most of these losses occurred in Batkivshchyna’s electorate, primarily in favor of N. Korolevska’s party “Ukraine – Forward!”, whose rating increased from 1% to 3.8%.
• The rating of the Party of Regions has practically not changed over the last two months.
• UDAR also gained support – from 7.2% to 9.2%, as a result of which it took third place in the rating, overtaking the Communist Party. The positions of the Communists themselves remain stable, showing slight growth trends.
• The Svoboda party continues to demonstrate its traditional stability – over the past six months its rating has not fallen below 4% and has not risen above 5%.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens support the President’s social initiatives and are ready to significantly improve their attitude toward the Head of State if these initiatives are successfully implemented. However, far fewer believe in their successful implementation, while the majority consider the social initiatives to be populism for which the state has no money.
• Awareness of the President’s social initiatives
  58% of respondents are well informed about the social initiatives announced by the President in early March, 23% know about them in general terms, 10% have heard something but very little, and 9% know nothing at all.
  People of older age with a relatively higher level of education are the best informed about the President’s social initiatives, especially in Donbas, the Center, and the East of the country. Interestingly, supporters of Svoboda and the Communist Party are more informed about the President’s social initiatives than supporters of the Party of Regions. The least interested are citizens who are undecided in their choice and those who do not plan to vote.
• Support for individual social initiatives of the President
  The absolute majority (from 84% to 94%) of respondents support the President’s social initiatives.
• Thus, state stimulation of the creation of new jobs for young people and people of pre-retirement age is supported by 94% of respondents, including 74% who fully support it and 20% who rather support it.
  Stabilizing prices for essential medicines for elderly people is supported by 93% of respondents, including 69% who fully support it and 24% who rather support it.
  Doubling the one-time Victory Day payment to war invalids is supported by 93% of respondents, including 66% who fully support it and 27% who rather support it.
  Increasing pensions for almost 9 million pensioners by at least 100 hryvnias is supported by 92% of respondents, including 64% who fully support it and 28% who rather support it.
  Paying compensation of 1,000 hryvnias for devalued savings of the former USSR Savings Bank to more than 5 million citizens who did not receive them in 2008–2009 is supported by 89% of respondents, including 62% who fully support it and 27% who rather support it.
  Introducing a wealth tax, in particular taxing apartments over 200 m², houses over 400 m², cars with engine volumes over 3.4 liters, etc., is supported by 89% of respondents, including 65% who fully support it and 24% who rather support it.
  Introducing mortgage loans at 2–3% for certain categories of citizens is supported by 84% of respondents, including 58% who fully support it and 26% who rather support it.
• Social initiatives are supported almost equally in different regions of the country. At the same time, there are certain differences depending on political sympathies.
  Thus, the introduction of mortgage loans at 2–3% is more supported by supporters of the Party of Regions and Front for Change, and least supported by supporters of Batkivshchyna.
  The wealth tax is more supported by supporters of the Communist Party, and least by supporters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda.
  Compensation payments for devalued USSR Savings Bank deposits are equally supported by supporters of the Communist Party, Svoboda, and the Party of Regions, and least by UDAR and Front for Change.
  State stimulation of job creation for young people and those of pre-retirement age is more supported by supporters of the Communist Party, Party of Regions, and Front for Change, and least by Svoboda. Doubling the Victory Day payment to war invalids and stabilizing medicine prices for the elderly are more supported by supporters of the Communist Party.
  As we can see, the President’s social initiatives were liked most by supporters of the Communist Party.
• Belief in the implementation of the President’s social initiatives is two to three times lower than their level of support.
  Thus, respondents most believe in the implementation of the initiative to double the one-time Victory Day payment to war invalids (52% believe, 36% do not), as well as raising pensions by at least 100 hryvnias (47% believe, 42% do not), and paying compensation of 1,000 hryvnias for devalued USSR Savings Bank deposits (41% believe, 47% do not).
  Least believed in are initiatives to stabilize medicine prices (32% believe, 56% do not), create new jobs (27% believe, 59% do not), introduce cheap mortgages (27% believe, 55% do not), and introduce a wealth tax (28% believe, 60% do not).
  People in the West and Donbas believe the least in the implementation of the President’s social initiatives. Significantly more believe in the South, Center, and North.
  Only supporters of the Party of Regions believe in the implementation of social initiatives (from 55% to 80%) more than they disbelieve. Supporters of the Communist Party also believe in their implementation (from 30% to 65% depending on the initiative). Among supporters of opposition parties, relatively more belief is shown by supporters of UDAR, Svoboda, and Front for Change.
• Attitudes toward the social initiatives
  35% of respondents believe that the state has the necessary funds to implement the President’s social initiatives, 47% believe that there is no money for them, and 18% could not answer.
  Those who believe that such funds exist are primarily supporters of the Party of Regions, and to a lesser extent the Communist Party, Batkivshchyna, and UDAR.
  Interestingly, those who believe that the necessary funds exist are twice as likely to believe in successful implementation.
• 75% of respondents believe that President Viktor Yanukovych’s social initiatives are rather pre-election populism, and only 14% consider them rather care for people. Relatively more people who consider the initiatives care for people live in the South of the country.
  Half of Party of Regions supporters consider the initiatives care for people, while one third consider them pre-election populism. Supporters of all other political forces overwhelmingly consider the initiatives pre-election populism, even Communist Party supporters, who liked them the most.
  Interestingly, those who consider the social initiatives to be care for people are three times more likely to believe in their successful implementation.
  90% of respondents who believe that there is no money for the initiatives and 60% of those who believe that there is money consider them pre-election populism.
• Despite the fact that most respondents consider the President’s social initiatives to be pre-election populism, a significant share are ready to improve their attitude toward Viktor Yanukovych if they are successfully implemented.
  Thus, 19% of respondents said their attitude toward President Viktor Yanukovych would definitely improve if the initiatives are implemented, and another 23% said it would rather improve. 46% think their attitude will not change, only 3% think it will worsen, and 9% could not answer.
• Thus, more than 40% of respondents could improve their attitude toward the Head of State if he fulfills his social promises — almost twice the current level of trust in Viktor Yanukovych.
  Those most ready to improve their attitude toward Yanukovych are residents of the South, East, and Center of the country; more often older people and youth; more often city residents than rural; more often women than men.
  An absolute majority of Party of Regions supporters, at least half of Communist Party supporters, about 40% of the undecided and those who do not plan to vote are ready to improve their attitude toward the President if the initiatives are fulfilled.
  The most steadfast are supporters of Svoboda and Civic Position, although even among them about a quarter could improve their attitude toward Yanukovych if the initiatives are implemented.
  Notably, among those who consider the initiatives pre-election populism, almost one third are ready to improve their attitude toward Yanukovych if they are fulfilled. At the same time, almost 90% of those who consider the initiatives care for people are ready to improve their attitude toward him.

Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI released its second in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion.  The poll, conducted February 17 – March 7, 2012, is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape. 

Among the findings in the poll, 13 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction.  The percentage remained the same since IRI’s last national poll conducted in December 2011.  However, since December, the number of people who believe the country is moving in the wrong direction increased from 71 percent to 73 percent.  The three most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment, low industrial production and corruption within the state bodies.  Seventy-four percent of Ukrainians do not support giving away part or Ukraine’s entire gas transportation system to Russia if it were to result in a reduction in the price Ukraine pays for imported gas from Russia. 

Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people.  The randomly collected sample of 1,201 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide. The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group under the supervision of IRI. The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent with a response rate of 56 percent.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority supports the introduction in Ukraine of the state emergency assistance system “112,” while at the same time citizens are poorly informed that such a system exists.
• Only 8% of respondents are well informed about the introduction in Ukraine of the state emergency assistance system “112,” a single and free phone number for calling emergency services; 29% know about it in general terms, and another 26% have heard something but very little. At the same time, 37% know nothing about it at all.
• Residents of Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine are the best informed about the introduction of the “112” system; the worst informed are those in Donbas and the South. Urban residents are more informed than rural residents, and men more than women. The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the better informed they are about the introduction of the “112” system in Ukraine.
• An absolute majority of respondents (72%) support the introduction in Ukraine of the state emergency assistance system “112.” Only 10% do not support it, and another 18% are undecided.
• A clear relationship is observed: the better respondents are informed about the introduction of the “112” emergency system, the more they support it.
• Most respondents insist on the urgent introduction of the state emergency assistance system “112” in Ukraine. About half believe that implementation of the “112” system should be completed already in 2012, including 28% who say urgently, before EURO-2012, and 19% who say by the end of 2012.
• At the same time, 9% believe that work on implementing the “112” emergency system can be completed in 2013–2014, and 17% are convinced that this issue can be postponed even longer. 27% were unable to decide.
• The better respondents are informed about the “112” system in Ukraine, the more of them insist on its urgency: 90% of those who are well informed believe that the implementation of “112” should be completed during 2012.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the absolute majority of respondents will celebrate Easter (Pascha) this year, and most will go to church: some to attend the service, others simply to bless their Easter basket. And although far from everyone observes the Great Lent, understanding of its meaning already exists, at least among those who do fast.
• 91% of respondents know that Easter means the Resurrection of Jesus Christ; the rest (9%) do not know, including 3% who believe it is the Birth of Jesus Christ, and 1% who believe it is the Baptism.
• 96% of respondents plan to celebrate Easter this year, including 82% who will definitely celebrate and another 14% who will most likely do so.
• Easter is one of the most mass celebrations in Ukraine and carries a clear unifying effect: it will be celebrated by both older people and youth; in both the West and the East; by believers of both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kyiv Patriarchate; and by supporters of both the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna.
• Thus, 77% of respondents plan to go to church on Easter, including 38% who primarily plan to attend the church service, and 39% who plan to bless their Easter basket. In the West, people will go to church primarily to attend the service. In the North and Donbas, nearly equal numbers will go both to attend the service and simply to bless the basket. Meanwhile, in the Center, South, and East, people will go to church primarily to bless their Easter basket.
• Those who primarily plan to attend the Easter service are older people, pensioners, especially residents of villages, and more women than men. The overwhelming majority of Greek Catholics, almost half of believers of the UOC-KP, and one third of believers of the UOC-MP will go to church primarily to attend the service.
• 7% of respondents observe the Great Lent for the entire period, another 11% only on certain days. 15% try to fast but do not always succeed, another 5% would like to but cannot for health reasons. 60% definitely do not observe the Fast.
• The highest level of fasting is in the West (15% for the whole period, 28% only on certain days), which corresponds to Greek Catholics. The lowest is in the East. Believers of the UOC-KP fast somewhat more often than believers of the UOC-MP.
• Believers who do not associate themselves with any confession and non-believers practically do not observe fasting.
• The older the respondents and the lower their level of education, the more they observe fasting. Fasting is practiced mainly by women and rural residents. Among older people there are also the most who would like to fast but cannot because of health.
• The main purpose of fasting is spiritual purification (59%). Less often people fast for physical cleansing (15%) or weight loss (3%). Another one in six fasts simply because it is customary.
• 80% of those who strictly observe the fast do so for spiritual purification. Among those who only try, a large share fast because it is customary.
• During Lent, respondents are most willing to give up food of animal origin (70%), less willing to give up alcohol and cigarettes (58%), entertainment and celebrations (50%), and swearing (40%). They are practically not ready to give up watching entertainment TV programs (20%) and intimate relations (19%).

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, the topic of intellectual property protection in Ukraine is full of contradictions. Ukrainians seem to understand the importance of intellectual property rights, and at the same time are completely unwilling to comply with them, shifting all responsibility onto the authorities. The average Ukrainian is ready to selflessly defend their own intellectual rights and with the same selflessness violate the intellectual rights of others.
• Understanding the importance of intellectual property protection
• Almost 80% of respondents believe that intellectual property rights must be protected (including 58% who believe they must always be protected and 21% who believe they must be protected but not always). Only 4% hold the opposite opinion. Another 17% could not decide on this issue.
• Only 13% of respondents believe that the actions of the authorities to protect intellectual property rights in Ukraine are effective, while 60% believe they are ineffective. Another 27% could not assess this.
• Respect for intellectual property rights in practice
• If a person has the choice to buy a copy of a book reprinted from the original at a lower price than the original and of nearly the same quality, only 13% would refuse the cheap copy and buy the original. Meanwhile, 32% would buy the cheap copy, and 26% would try to obtain it for free (for example, by downloading it from the internet). 30% of respondents could not decide, mainly older people.
• If a person has the choice to buy a copied music, movie, or software disc at a lower price than the original and of nearly the same quality, only 12% would refuse the cheap copy and buy the original. Meanwhile, 25% would buy the cheap copy, and 31% would try to obtain it for free (for example, by downloading it from the internet). 32% of respondents could not decide.
• If a person has the choice to buy clothing counterfeited to imitate a famous global brand at a lower price than the original and of nearly the same quality, only 15% would refuse the cheap copy and buy the original. Meanwhile, 58% would buy the cheap copy. 28% could not decide.
• Thus, nearly 60% of Ukrainians are ready to violate intellectual property rights when buying clothing, books, music, films, or software.
• Clear trends are observed. The younger respondents are, the more often they use the internet, and the higher their education, the more likely they are to reject the original in favor of a cheap copy or a free version. Almost 50% of respondents aged 18–29 would try to download music, films, or software for free, another quarter would buy a cheap copy, and only one in ten would buy the original.
• Responsibility for violating intellectual property rights
• Despite the fact that the absolute majority of respondents are not ready to comply with intellectual property rights in practice, most of them indirectly understand that responsibility for violations should exist.
• Respondents were asked to imagine that they had written a book or music, developed software, or made an invention, and then learned that someone was using it for free and they were receiving nothing.
• After that, 18% agreed that the person should be punished and that criminal liability should apply; 27% believe there should be administrative liability (for example, a fine); another 18% said that a warning is enough the first time, and punishment should apply only if it happens again.
• That is, almost two thirds of respondents would prefer to punish a person who violates their intellectual property rights.
• Only 18% would not support punishment: 11% said they would allow free use as long as authorship is acknowledged, and only 7% said they would actually be happy that others use their invention and no payment is needed. Another 19% could not decide.
• Support for tougher liability is higher among men, middle-aged people, and those with secondary education. Notably, internet users also support tougher liability when their own intellectual property rights are violated.
• The paradox is that nearly 60% of respondents who admitted they would buy pirated discs or try to download music, films, or software for free, also believe that if their own intellectual property rights were violated, responsibility should apply, including 16% who support criminal liability.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group in March 2012, a slight weakening of protest moods among citizens is recorded. As before, social issues are capable of provoking protests much more strongly than ideological ones.

READINESS FOR PROTESTS

• 36% of respondents are ready to personally defend their rights and interests by participating in protest actions, including 13% who are definitely ready. For comparison, in April of last year, those ready to personally defend their rights in protest actions were somewhat higher – 40%, including 17% who were definitely ready to do so.
• At the same time, 55% are not ready to participate in protests (in April it was 51%). Another 10% could not answer the question.
• Traditionally, the highest readiness for protests is in the West (54%). Significantly fewer are ready for protests in the North (36%), South (33%), and Center (32%) of Ukraine. Even fewer – in the Donbas (28%) and in the East (24%).
• Compared to April of last year, the level of protest activity increased only in the West and South of the country.
• Among voters, the highest readiness for protests is among supporters of Svoboda (65%), as well as Batkivshchyna (52%), UDAR (49%), and Front for Change (48%). The lowest is among supporters of Civic Position, the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and among the “undecided.”
• It should be noted that the highest readiness for protests is observed among working citizens, people with medium incomes and secondary education. A slight weakening of protest moods is observed among citizens with higher incomes and higher levels of education.
• As a rule, these are people of a wide age range. Protest moods are most widespread among students, workers, and the unemployed, slightly less among entrepreneurs. These are more often men than women, and more often rural residents.

READINESS FOR PROTESTS BY TOPIC

• It should be emphasized immediately that social issues are capable of mobilizing people for protests much more than political or ideological ones.
• Thus, people are most ready to personally go out to protests in the event of delays in salary or pension payments (44%) and sharp price increases and inflation (43%). At the same time, even on these issues, the number of those ready to protest is smaller than those not ready (48%).
• Somewhat fewer people are ready to go out to protests in the event of increases in utility tariffs (37% ready and 54% not ready), mass persecution of ordinary citizens by law enforcement agencies (31% ready and 56% not ready), falsification of parliamentary election results (30% ready and 62% not ready), transfer of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Russia (26% ready and 64% not ready), and a decision on the free sale of agricultural land in Ukraine (28% ready and 65% not ready).
• Only 20% of respondents are ready to go out to protests in the event of granting the Russian language the status of a second state language, while 72% are not ready. Conversely, only 16% are ready to go out to protests in the event of banning the use of the Russian language in state institutions, while 75% are not ready.
• On most of these topics, residents of the West are significantly more protest-oriented than other regions. This applies both to socio-economic and ideological issues. The greatest difference compared to other regions is observed in the topics of possible election falsifications, transfer of the gas transit system to Russia, and the issue of the Russian language. At the same time, residents of the South are much more ready to defend the rights of the Russian language in protest actions (even more than in the East and Donbas).
• The second region in terms of protest moods is the North.
• There are also other regional specifics. For example, the topic of possible persecution of ordinary people by law enforcement agencies can mobilize residents of the Center more; the free sale of agricultural land – the South; increases in utility tariffs – the East.
• As already noted, supporters of Svoboda are much more ready for protests than others. This applies both to socio-economic and ideological issues. The greatest protests among Svoboda supporters can be expected in the case of delays in salary and pension payments, as well as transfer of the gas transit system to Russia or oppression of the Ukrainian language. In general, Svoboda supporters are ready for protests in other cases as well.
• Supporters of Batkivshchyna and UDAR are also relatively easy to mobilize, especially in the case of price increases and inflation, as well as utility tariff increases, election falsifications, and possible persecution of ordinary people by law enforcement agencies. Supporters of Batkivshchyna may also be mobilized by the decision on the free sale of agricultural land.
• Supporters of the Party of Regions are known to be more likely to go out to protests in the case of price increases and utility tariff hikes, and delays in salary and pension payments, than in the case of oppression of the Russian language.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012, 45% of respondents would definitely take part, and another 32% would probably take part.
• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012, 21.7% of respondents (among those who would take part in the election) would vote for Viktor Yanukovych, 19.8% for Yulia Tymoshenko, 10.8% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 7.9% for Vitali Klitschko, 6.2% for Petro Symonenko, 3.8% for Serhiy Tihipko, 3.6% for Oleh Tyahnybok, 3.1% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko, 1.4% for Nataliya Korolevska, 1.3% for Volodymyr Lytvyn, and 0.7% for Viktor Yushchenko. Other candidates were supported by 3.4%, 3.8% would not support any candidate, and 12.5% were undecided.

TRENDS:
Compared with February, the number of the undecided decreased (from 14.1% to 12.5%) and the number of “against all” also decreased (from 6% to 3.8%).

• Unlike Yulia Tymoshenko, whose rating remained almost unchanged (19.4% in February versus 19.9% in March), the rating of Viktor Yanukovych increased (from 19.7% to 21.7%), which allowed him to widen the gap from the Batkivshchyna leader to almost 2%.
• At the same time, Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s rating declined (from 12.8% to 10.8%), repeating the dynamics of the Front for Change party, while Vitali Klitschko’s rating increased (from 6.5% to 7.9%).
• The positions of Petro Symonenko, Oleh Tyahnybok, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Nataliya Korolevska improved slightly.
• Despite the fact that in the “first-round rating” Viktor Yanukovych is currently leading, in a conditional “second-round” contest the incumbent president would be defeated by Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Vitali Klitschko. Moreover, over the past six months, the lead in favor of opposition candidates has increased. As six months ago, Arseniy Yatsenyuk shows the largest lead against Viktor Yanukovych (despite the fact that in the first-round personal rating he trails both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko by about half).

YANUKOVYCH vs. TYMOSHENKO

• According to the Sociological Group “Rating,” if the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko reached the second round, then 30% of respondents (among those who intend to vote) would support the incumbent president, 36.6% would support the former prime minister, 23.7% would support neither candidate, and 9.8% would be undecided.
• It should be recalled that in the last presidential election Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the second round (49% to 45%).
• Yanukovych is most supported in the South (52%) and Donbas (44%), and somewhat less in the East (41%). Tymoshenko, in turn, is most supported in the West (68%), the Center (41%), and the North (46%). Among supporters of other potential candidates, Yanukovych in a contest against Tymoshenko is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (33%) and Symonenko’s supporters (29%).
• The leader of Batkivshchyna is supported by Yatsenyuk’s supporters (54%), Tyahnybok’s (51%), Klitschko’s (40%), and Hrytsenko’s (36%). It should be noted that over the past six months Tymoshenko increased her support among supporters of Yatsenyuk, Tyahnybok, and Klitschko, which raised her second-round rating from 31% to 37%.

YANUKOVYCH vs. YATSENYUK

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached the second round, then 29% of respondents would support the incumbent president, 38.1% would support the leader of Front for Change, 21.5% would support neither candidate, and 11.4% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Yatsenyuk increased his second-round rating from 35% to 37%, partly due to growing support among supporters of Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Klitschko.
• Yanukovych is most supported against Yatsenyuk in the South (51%), Donbas (44%), and East (40%). Yatsenyuk is most supported in the West (69%), the North (48%), and the Center (37%). Among voters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (36%), although this support has declined noticeably, and by Symonenko’s supporters (29%).

YANUKOVYCH vs. TYAHNYBOK

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Oleh Tyahnybok reached the second round, 31.2% would support the incumbent president, 24.4% would support the Svoboda leader, 31.5% would support neither candidate, and 12.9% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Tyahnybok increased his second-round rating from 17% to 24%, especially in the West (up to 61%) and the North (up to 32%). This growth can be partly attributed to opposition unification, since support for Tyahnybok in the second round rose among Batkivshchyna supporters from 30% to 48%, and among Front for Change supporters from 26% to 44%.
• Yanukovych has his highest second-round rating in a contest against Tyahnybok, especially in the South (53%), Donbas (47%), and East (41%). The Center most rejects the Yanukovych–Tyahnybok pairing, where almost half oppose both candidates. At least one third of voters in the South, Donbas, East, and North also oppose both candidates.

YANUKOVYCH vs. KLITSCHKO

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Vitali Klitschko reached the second round, 28.1% would support the incumbent president, 36.6% would support the UDAR leader, 21.4% would support neither candidate, and 13.9% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Klitschko increased his second-round rating from 28% to 37%, partly due to growing support among supporters of Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yatsenyuk.
• Yanukovych is most supported in the South (47%), Donbas (44%), and East (38%). Klitschko is most supported in the West (66%), North (54%), and Center (57%), as well as in the East (23%).
• Among supporters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (35%) and Symonenko’s (27%). Klitschko is supported by Tyahnybok’s supporters (64%), Tymoshenko’s (62%), Yatsenyuk’s (58%), Hrytsenko’s (46%), and also by one quarter of the undecided.

GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL POLITICIANS

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in March 2012, among national politicians, residents of Ivano-Frankivsk trust Vitali Klitschko the most (64%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk (58%), Oleh Tyahnybok (51%), Yulia Tymoshenko (50%), and Anatoliy Hrytsenko (48%).
• Much fewer people trust Viktor Yushchenko (14%), Serhiy Tihipko (14%), and Viktor Yanukovych (5%).
• In terms of full trust (“fully trust”), Yulia Tymoshenko (23%) and Oleh Tyahnybok (22%) are the leaders.
• The leaders of distrust are Viktor Yanukovych (86%), Viktor Yushchenko (79%), and Serhiy Tihipko (77%).

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in March 2012, the Svoboda party would win in Ivano-Frankivsk. About 55% of voters would definitely take part in the elections, and another about 30% would probably take part.
• Thus, Svoboda would be supported by 25.7% of voters (among those who intend to vote), Batkivshchyna by 21.9%, Front for Change by 14.5%, UDAR by 8.2%, Civic Position by 4.8%, the Party of Regions by 3.5%, and Our Ukraine by 2.6%.
• Other parties would receive over 10%, and 13% of voters would be undecided.
• Over the past six months, the ratings of the leaders — Svoboda and Batkivshchyna — have not changed: in July of last year they were supported by 26% and 22% respectively. At the same time, UDAR increased significantly (from 3% to 8%), while the ratings of Front for Change (from 18% to 15%) and Strong Ukraine (from 3% to 1%) declined. It can be assumed that these parties lost their voters to UDAR.

DISTRICT

• If the parliamentary elections in the single-member district that includes Ivano-Frankivsk were held in March 2012, the winner would be the Svoboda candidate, the head of the regional council Oleksandr Sych (30.4%). His closest competitors would be the incumbent mayor, Volodymyr Anushkevychus from the Ukrainian People’s Party (16.1%), and Yuriy Solovey from UDAR (15.5%), who would share second and third place.
• Other possible candidates would be supported by far fewer voters: Ihor Prokopiv (8.8%), Roman Tereshko (8.5%), Zynoviy Shkutyak (6%), Ihor Zvarych (3.5%). 4.5% would support other candidates, and 6.7% would be undecided.
• Oleksandr Sych is supported by over 80% of Svoboda supporters, almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Civic Position, and one in ten supporters of UDAR and Front for Change.
• Yuriy Solovey is supported by over 70% of UDAR supporters and almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change.
• Volodymyr Anushkevychus is supported by almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, and almost one third of Our Ukraine supporters.
• At the same time, for the possible Front for Change candidate Ihor Prokopiv, currently no more than half of his party’s supporters are ready to vote. For the possible Batkivshchyna candidate Roman Tereshko, only one third of his party’s supporters are ready to vote.

ELECTORAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF CANDIDATES

• Besides direct ratings, the electoral attractiveness of potential single-member district candidates was also studied.
• For Oleksandr Sych, 25% of voters would definitely vote for him, and another 31% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 56%. Another 19% have a positive attitude toward him, but not enough to vote.
• For Yuriy Solovey, 10% would definitely vote for him, and another 35% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 45%. Another 21% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Volodymyr Anushkevychus, 12% would definitely vote for him, and another 28% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 40%. Another 22% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• As we can see, all three candidates have significant reserves to improve their positions. Oleksandr Sych’s starting position is somewhat better: the number of his “hard” supporters (i.e., Svoboda voters) is at least twice as large as that of the others.
• Other candidates also have good, though more hypothetical, prospects.
• For Ihor Prokopiv, 5% would definitely vote for him, another 31% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 36%. Another 25% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Zynoviy Shkutyak, 5% would definitely vote, another 20% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 25%. Another 25% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Roman Tereshko, 6% would definitely vote, another 14% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 20%. Another 20% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• Finally, Ihor Zvarych could receive up to 11%. Another 13% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• Oleksandr Sych can mobilize over 90% of Svoboda supporters. Yuriy Solovey over 80% of UDAR supporters, Ihor Prokopiv up to 70% of Front for Change supporters, and Roman Tereshko up to 50% of Batkivshchyna supporters.

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURES OF ELECTORATES

• Traditionally, UDAR has the youngest electorate. Batkivshchyna and Svoboda also have relatively young electorates.
• Noteworthy is the unusual “rejuvenation” of Batkivshchyna’s electorate, which may be the result of attracting young people on the wave of protest sentiment caused by the conviction of Yulia Tymoshenko. This choice cannot yet be considered stable.
• Among single-member district candidates, young people most support Yuriy Solovey, Volodymyr Anushkevychus, and Roman Tereshko.
• Men support Svoboda, UDAR, and Civic Position more. Women support Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and Front for Change more.
• Relatively more people with higher education are among supporters of UDAR and Front for Change, as well as Batkivshchyna and Svoboda. Among candidates: supporters of Roman Tereshko, Zynoviy Shkutyak, Volodymyr Anushkevychus, and Ihor Prokopiv.
• There are more employed people among supporters of Civic Position and Front for Change. Voters of Front for Change and the Party of Regions also have relatively higher incomes; accordingly, these are more supporters of Ihor Prokopiv and Ihor Zvarych.

CRITERIA OF CHOICE

• The key trait that, in respondents’ opinion, a parliamentary candidate from the district should have is keeping promises (58%).
• The candidate should also be able to bring change (30%), have a regional development program (22%), understand economics (21%), have management experience (18%), be a strong leader (21%), and be a patriot (16%).
• Less important for people is that the candidate be young and energetic (13%), honest (12%), able to find compromises (12%), care about ordinary people (10%), be reliable (11%), be religious (10%), understand legal issues (9%), speak clearly (8%), care about family values (7%), engage in charity (7%), have political experience (5%), care about traditions and culture (4%), and have legislative experience (4%).

LOCAL PROBLEMS

• According to city residents, the main regional problems are poor road conditions (57%), unemployment (56%), rising prices and inflation (46%), and poverty (42%).
• Other important problems are alcoholism and drug addiction (33%), rising utility tariffs (32%), declining industry (30%), mass migration abroad (29%), and corruption in local authorities (29%).
• Less important problems include homeless animals (21%), lack of attention to youth issues (20%), waste collection and disposal (19%), lack of playgrounds (19%), rising crime (18%), poor healthcare (18%), neglected agriculture (15%), poor ecology (15%), pressure on small and medium business (14%), and lack of government transparency (13%).
• Even less important problems are violations of democracy, human rights and freedoms (9%), poor water supply and drainage (8%), poor housing development (7%), poor development of sports and football (7%), poor public transport (7%), poor education (6%), and suppression of national culture and language (6%).

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 52% of surveyed Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. 34% do not support it. Another 15% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past year the number of supporters of European integration has declined to the level of 2009. Thus, in October 2009, accession of Ukraine to the European Union was supported by 51% of respondents; in April 2010 — 52%; in September 2010 — 57%; in January 2011 — 56%; in April 2011 — 51%; and again 52% in February 2012. Thus, the peak of support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union occurred in late 2010 – early 2011.
• Among the strongest supporters of European integration are residents of the West (78%), somewhat fewer in the Center (59%) and North (55%). Accordingly, this includes over 80% of Svoboda supporters, about 70% of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, UDAR, Civic Position, as well as Strong Ukraine. Among the strongest opponents are CPU voters, two thirds of whom do not support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Party of Regions supporters are almost evenly split on this issue: about 40% support European integration, while 45% do not.
• The higher the respondents’ level of education and the younger they are, the more they support Ukraine’s accession to the EU and the less they support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus and granting Russian the status of a second state language.
• At the same time, 47% of respondents support the formation of a single state of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. 42% do not support it. Another 11% are undecided. Importantly, about 30% of those who support the formation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
• Compared to April of last year, the number of such people decreased by a quarter (in April it was almost 40%), which indicates an increase in polarization of society along ideological lines. This is especially visible in regional terms: the “pro-Russian” vector is gaining popularity in Donbas, the South, and the East, while the “pro-Western” vector is strengthening in Western Ukraine. This is also confirmed by the fact that for most markers the number of unambiguous supporters and unambiguous opponents is increasing.
• Taking these features of the responses into account, respondents were asked a direct question. Thus, according to those surveyed, for Ukraine signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial (39%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (36%). 26% were unable to decide. Compared to October of last year, the number of supporters of the Free Trade Agreement with the EU did not decrease; instead, the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 36%).
• As a result, the West, North, and Center of Ukraine are more supportive of the Agreement with the EU, while Donbas, the South, and the East support joining the Customs Union. However, about 20% of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters support joining the Customs Union, just as about 20% of Party of Regions supporters support the Agreement with the EU. Strong Ukraine supporters are split almost evenly: 40% for the EU Agreement and 41% for the Customs Union with Russia.
• 46% of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language. Almost the same number (45%) oppose this. Another 8% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past two years the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been almost equal. However, compared to 2009, support for granting Russian state language status has decreased (in 2009 it was over 50%).
• Among the strongest supporters of bilingualism are residents of Donbas (84%), the East (71%), and the South (65%). Accordingly, these are CPU supporters (72%), Party of Regions (71%), People’s Party (58%), and Strong Ukraine (53%). Among the strongest opponents are Svoboda voters, 100% of whom oppose granting Russian state language status.
• Public attitudes toward Ukraine’s accession to NATO have worsened somewhat: from 26% in September 2010 to 24% in January 2011, 22% in April 2011, and down to 20% in February 2012. More than 68% of respondents do not support Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Another 13% are undecided. Strong support for joining the North Atlantic Alliance exists only in the West of the country (about half of respondents). Among party supporters, NATO accession is traditionally advocated primarily by supporters of Svoboda and Civic Position.
• Meanwhile, against the backdrop of intensified gas negotiations, the number of supporters of extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has significantly decreased. Over the year, the number of supporters fell from 42% to 33%, while the number of opponents rose from 42% to 49%. 18% were undecided. The initiative lost support not only in the Center and North, but also in the East, South, and Donbas, where no more than half of respondents support it.
• Recently, attitudes toward the idea of creating a trilateral “gas” consortium to divide ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system among Russia, the EU, and Ukraine have improved. Over the past year (since January 2011), support for the initiative increased from 30% to 35%, while the number of opponents decreased from 42% to 37%. Accordingly, attitudes toward the consortium have returned to the 2009 level, when 36% supported it and 35% opposed it.
• Given the ambiguity of the initiative and difficulties in understanding it (almost 30% were undecided), respondents were asked a clarifying question: “Do you support the idea of transferring control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system to Russia?” Thus, the absolute majority (78%) do not support transferring control of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Russia. Only 8% support it. 14% were undecided. The strongest support for transferring control to Russia comes from residents of the South (22%) and CPU supporters (17%). At the same time, over 70% of Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine supporters oppose it, over 80% of UDAR, almost 90% of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change, and almost 100% of Svoboda oppose it.
• 24% of respondents support recognizing OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 57% do not support it. Another 19% are undecided. Public attitudes toward this issue fluctuate from year to year: after support rose from 20% to 27% in 2011, it declined again in 2012 to 24%, which is less than last year but more than the year before. More than 90% of Svoboda supporters support recognition of OUN-UPA, while about the same share of CPU supporters oppose it. Among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Civic Position, and UDAR, the number of supporters and opponents is almost equal. The idea is opposed by the vast majority of supporters of the Party of Regions (83%), Strong Ukraine (63%), People’s Party (67%), and those who vote “against all” (68%).
• 59% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was genocide of the Ukrainian people. 26% disagreed, and 16% were undecided. It is important to note fluctuations in public opinion on this issue: in March 2010, 61% agreed; in January 2011 this fell to 53%; in April 2011 it rose again to 58%; and finally stabilized at 59% in February 2012. Almost 90% of residents of the West, over 70% of the North and Center, and about 40% of the East and South share the genocide thesis. About 40% of Party of Regions and CPU supporters also share this view.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority of surveyed citizens do not support (91%) the idea of abolishing the March 8 holiday. Only 5% support it. Another 4% could not decide on this issue.
• 86% of respondents will celebrate March 8 this year, 14% will not.
  The least likely to celebrate March 8 are older people and pensioners (72%), residents of Western Ukraine (74%), supporters of Svoboda (74%), and rural residents (81%).
• The age-old question of whom men should congratulate first on March 8 produced the following results.
  In the opinion of 42% of women and 52% of men, men should first congratulate their wife or beloved woman.
  At the same time, 36% of women and 32% of men believe that the mother should be congratulated first, about 2% – the mother-in-law.
• At the same time, 18% of women and 12% of men believe that it does not matter whom men congratulate first on March 8.
• Thus, there are more men who would like to congratulate their wives first than women who want this themselves. Therefore, we can assume that wives place their mothers first in the “hierarchy of women” more often than men themselves, who are often accused of this.
• The tradition of congratulating one’s mother first is more typical of cities, residents of the North, and young people, while congratulating one’s wife or beloved woman first is more typical of residents of the Center and West and people of middle age.
• In the opinion of 46% of women and 41% of men, men should prepare breakfast on March 8.
  A quarter of both men and women believe that both the man and the woman together should prepare the festive breakfast.
• At the same time, for almost 20% of women and men it does not matter who prepares breakfast on March 8, and 9% of women and 13% of men believe that the woman should do it.
• 36% of men and only 23% of women believe that having sex on March 8 is a mandatory attribute of the holiday.
• At the same time, for 41% of women and only 31% of men, having sex on March 8 is not a mandatory attribute of the holiday.
  At least another third of respondents could not decide on this question.
• Thus, another study by the Sociological Group “Rating” confirmed that sex is more important for Ukrainian men than for women, especially on March 8! :))
• Most often, sex as a mandatory attribute of March 8 was indicated by respondents aged 30–39 (40%), 16–29 (38%), and 40–49 (30%).
• Supporters of Svoboda and UDAR most often supported “mandatory sex” on March 8, probably because these parties have many men and young people among their supporters.
  Least often – supporters of the Communist Party, the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Batkivshchyna, as well as “against all” and “undecided” respondents.
• The average amount women expect to receive as a gift on March 8 is 182 UAH.
  The maximum amount named by women was 4000 UAH.
• At the same time, the average amount men plan to spend on a gift for their beloved woman is almost 290 UAH, which is more than one and a half times more than women expect.
  The maximum amount named by men was 8000 UAH.
• 21% of women believe that their men will not buy anything for this holiday.
  At the same time, only 9% of men admitted that they will buy nothing.
• Almost another quarter of surveyed women and men did not answer this question.
• Thus, either women think very poorly of their men and their expectations are clearly understated, or, on the contrary, men are ready to impress their women more and grow in their eyes. We also cannot rule out the version that not all men’s gifts reach the “addressees” who expect them :))
• In any case, the study confirmed that men are ready for the holiday! And that is pleasing!
  Perhaps women should also prepare better for it, because men also have their own expectations (see above). Then the number of unexpected “addressees” will decrease, then deputies will not have to worry about low birth rates, and March 8 will become a shared holiday of the total victory of love and spring, and then every woman will receive an unexpected but desired gift!

Happy holiday to you, dear, beloved, and desired women!!!

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in February 2012, 42% of respondents would definitely take part in them, and another 33% would rather take part.
• Compared with previous months, voter mobilization has slightly decreased. As in December last year, the most mobilized voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the Communist Party. The highest level of mobilization is in the West, North, and East, and the lowest in the Center and South.

RESULTS

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in February 2012, 19.6% of respondents (among those who would participate in the elections) would vote for Batkivshchyna, 18.2% for the Party of Regions, 11.2% for Front for Change, 7% for the Communist Party, 6.5% for UDAR of V. Klitschko, 4.3% for Svoboda.
  Another 2.9% would support Strong Ukraine, 2.1% Civic Position, 1.6% the People’s Party.
  All other parties are supported by less than 1% each, together about 5%.
  7.9% would not support any party (“against all”), 13.9% are undecided.
• Because of changes in the election law, the “against all” category was asked an additional question:
  “According to the new law, voters in the 2012 parliamentary elections will not have the option to vote ‘against all’. How will you vote then?”
• According to the results, the answers were distributed as follows:
  16% of those who previously chose “against all” will vote for specific parties (relatively more for UDAR, Front for Change, and Batkivshchyna),
  48% are undecided,
  36% will not take part in the elections.
• Thus, the “against all” responses were redistributed, the likely turnout was clarified downward, and final party ratings were calculated.
• Accordingly, Batkivshchyna is supported by 20.3%, the Party of Regions by 18.8%, Front for Change by 11.7%, the Communist Party by 7.2%, UDAR by 6.9%, Svoboda by 4.5%, Strong Ukraine by 3.1%, Civic Position by 2.2%, the People’s Party by 1.6%.
  Other parties together — more than 5%.
  18.2% of voters are undecided.
• Thus, only the share of the undecided increased significantly (from 14% to 18%), while party indicators and their positions in the ranking practically did not change.
• If presidential elections in Ukraine were held in February 2012, 19.7% of respondents (among those who would participate) would vote for V. Yanukovych, 19.4% for Y. Tymoshenko, 12.8% for A. Yatsenyuk, 6.5% for V. Klitschko, 5.6% for P. Symonenko, 3.7% for S. Tihipko, 3% for O. Tyahnybok, 2.7% for A. Hrytsenko, 1.5% for V. Lytvyn, 0.7% for N. Korolevska, 0.6% for V. Yushchenko.
  Almost 4% would support other candidates, 6% would support none, 14.1% are undecided.

TRENDS

• Compared with December last year, the strongest growth is shown by UDAR, whose position improved from 5% to 6.5%. As a result, UDAR has come very close in the ranking to the Communist Party (7%), and V. Klitschko has regained fourth place in the presidential rating.
• The ratings of the leaders have hardly changed: Batkivshchyna, as in December, slightly exceeds the Party of Regions (19.6% vs 18.2%), while in the presidential rating their positions have become equal (19.7% for Yanukovych vs 19.4% for Tymoshenko). At the same time, Yanukovych’s position improved slightly compared to December, while that of the Party of Regions worsened.
• The ratings of Front for Change (11.2%) and A. Yatsenyuk (12.8%) are completely stable.
• The Communists failed to confirm the dynamic growth recorded in December (over 8%), but even this result is sufficient to enter parliament.
• The position of Svoboda has not changed (4.4%); the party remains close to overcoming the 5% electoral threshold.
• At the same time, Strong Ukraine (2.9%) and Civic Position (2.1%) have significantly smaller chances of overcoming the threshold under the current version of the election law.
• All data are presented among respondents who intend to take part in the elections.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, none of the tested versions of joint party lists currently produces a cumulative effect — accordingly, parties running “separately” produce better final results than running together.
• The only form of unification that almost achieves a cumulative effect is a JOINT LIST OF BATKIVSHCHYNA AND FRONT FOR CHANGE. This alliance would currently be supported by 30% of voters, while the parties running separately could obtain 31%.
  Only in the West does such a union produce a gain: 51% separately vs 53% together.
• The main problem is that supporters of Front for Change perceive such a union worse (only 75% of its supporters are ready to vote for a joint list) than supporters of Batkivshchyna (90%).
  At the same time, the losses from Front for Change are compensated by flows from Svoboda, Civic Position, the European Party, and Our Ukraine. Up to 10% of the undecided and “against all” are also ready to support this union.
• It is interesting that adding Svoboda to this alliance does not increase its electoral weight. A JOINT LIST of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda would also be supported by 30%, while running separately these parties could obtain up to 35%.
• Only about 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 70% of Front for Change supporters, and 70% of Svoboda supporters are ready to back such a three-party union.
  Importantly, both Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters are more cautious about a three-party union than about a two-party one. Losses are compensated by small inflows from Our Ukraine and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (up to 15%), Civic Position and the European Party (10%), up to 10% of the undecided and 6% of “against all”.
• Only in the West does the three-party union gain more (56%) than the two-party one (53%).
  In the North they are equal (37%).
  In the Center, however, there are heavy losses: Batkivshchyna + Front for Change = 31%, but Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda = only 25%.
• Thus, adding Svoboda is perceived most painfully in the Center, and the degree of rejection grows directly with the degree of Svoboda’s radicalism.
• Batkivshchyna supporters perceive any coalition better than the supporters of its potential allies. A certain sense of insecurity, caused by the absence of a leader, is noticeable — therefore, unification is also seen as a form of protection.
• A cumulative effect is also not achieved by a union of pro-government parties. A JOINT LIST of the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Strong Ukraine would be supported by 21%, while running separately they could receive 23%.
• Supporters of the Party of Regions feel most confident (almost 90% ready to support a joint list).
  This is not the case for People’s Party (52%) or Strong Ukraine (64%).
  Up to 10% of the undecided are also ready to vote for this list.
  Supporters of the Communist Party are almost inactive — only 5% would vote for such a list.
  This format is most promising in the East and Donbas.
• It should be emphasized that in all formats most voters who do not support their party joining do not switch sides — they move into the “undecided” category.

BELIEF IN UNIFICATION IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS

• When choosing whom to vote for in 2012:
  52% will vote against the course of President Yanukovych,
  22% will vote in support of his course,
  26% are undecided.
• In Donbas, more than one third will vote in support of Yanukovych’s course, and almost 30% against.
  In all other regions, opposition voting dominates, especially in the West (74%), North (69%), and Center (56%).
• Over 90% of Party of Regions supporters, nearly half of Strong Ukraine, and one quarter of Communists will vote in support of Yanukovych.
  About 90% of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and Front for Change supporters will vote against Yanukovych.
  Half of “against all” and over one third of the undecided share this stance.
• Despite strong public demand for opposition unity, belief that it will happen is weak.
  Voters believe pro-government parties are more likely to unite (53% yes, 24% no) than the opposition (44% yes, 36% no).
• Only about half of residents of the West and North believe in opposition unity.
  Nearly 60% of Western Ukrainians believe in unity of pro-government parties.
  The East is most convinced of government unity (almost 70%).
  The South mostly believes in neither.
• Batkivshchyna supporters believe most in opposition unity; Party of Regions supporters believe most in government unity.
  Among opposition voters, UDAR supporters believe the least in unity; among government voters — Communists.

SUPPORT FOR SINGLE CANDIDATES

• Despite weak belief in unity, support for unified opposition candidates is high:
• 43% would vote for a single opposition candidate in a single-member district,
  34% would not,
  23% are undecided.
• Almost 90% of Batkivshchyna, over 70% of Front for Change and Svoboda, almost 60% of UDAR and Civic Position could support such candidates.
  Support is highest in the West (64%), North (56%), Center (46%), lower in the East and Donbas.
• For a single pro-government candidate:
  32% would support,
  46% would not,
  23% undecided.
• Support for pro-government candidates reaches 40% in the East and Donbas, about one third in the South and Center, and about one quarter in the North and West.
  Over 90% of Party of Regions, about 70% of Strong Ukraine and People’s Party, and only one third of Communists would support such candidates.

 Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI today released its first in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion. 

The poll, conducted October 30 – November 11, 2011 (PDF), is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape. 

Among the findings in the poll, 13 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction, while 71 percent believe it is moving in the wrong direction.  The three most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment, corruption within the state bodies and low industrial production. 

Additionally, 81 percent support the international community freezing the international assets of and suspending visas for Ukrainian officials, including judges, engaged in corrupt practices, while only six percent oppose such actions.

Finally, representative of the general mood in the country, three percent believe that the 2012 parliamentary elections will be absolutely free and fair, while 15 percent believe the elections will be somewhat free and fair.  These numbers contrast with 39 percent of respondents who believe that the elections will be somewhat not free and fair and 26 percent who believe the elections will be absolutely not free and fair

Most recently, IRI conducted two public opinion surveys on the Crimean peninsula (November 2011 and December 2009).  Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people. 

The randomly collected sample of 2,016 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide.  The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group under the supervision of IRI.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.2 percent.