Press releases

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012, 45% of respondents would definitely take part, and another 32% would probably take part.
• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012, 21.7% of respondents (among those who would take part in the election) would vote for Viktor Yanukovych, 19.8% for Yulia Tymoshenko, 10.8% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 7.9% for Vitali Klitschko, 6.2% for Petro Symonenko, 3.8% for Serhiy Tihipko, 3.6% for Oleh Tyahnybok, 3.1% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko, 1.4% for Nataliya Korolevska, 1.3% for Volodymyr Lytvyn, and 0.7% for Viktor Yushchenko. Other candidates were supported by 3.4%, 3.8% would not support any candidate, and 12.5% were undecided.

TRENDS:
Compared with February, the number of the undecided decreased (from 14.1% to 12.5%) and the number of “against all” also decreased (from 6% to 3.8%).

• Unlike Yulia Tymoshenko, whose rating remained almost unchanged (19.4% in February versus 19.9% in March), the rating of Viktor Yanukovych increased (from 19.7% to 21.7%), which allowed him to widen the gap from the Batkivshchyna leader to almost 2%.
• At the same time, Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s rating declined (from 12.8% to 10.8%), repeating the dynamics of the Front for Change party, while Vitali Klitschko’s rating increased (from 6.5% to 7.9%).
• The positions of Petro Symonenko, Oleh Tyahnybok, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Nataliya Korolevska improved slightly.
• Despite the fact that in the “first-round rating” Viktor Yanukovych is currently leading, in a conditional “second-round” contest the incumbent president would be defeated by Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Vitali Klitschko. Moreover, over the past six months, the lead in favor of opposition candidates has increased. As six months ago, Arseniy Yatsenyuk shows the largest lead against Viktor Yanukovych (despite the fact that in the first-round personal rating he trails both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko by about half).

YANUKOVYCH vs. TYMOSHENKO

• According to the Sociological Group “Rating,” if the presidential election of Ukraine were held in March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko reached the second round, then 30% of respondents (among those who intend to vote) would support the incumbent president, 36.6% would support the former prime minister, 23.7% would support neither candidate, and 9.8% would be undecided.
• It should be recalled that in the last presidential election Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the second round (49% to 45%).
• Yanukovych is most supported in the South (52%) and Donbas (44%), and somewhat less in the East (41%). Tymoshenko, in turn, is most supported in the West (68%), the Center (41%), and the North (46%). Among supporters of other potential candidates, Yanukovych in a contest against Tymoshenko is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (33%) and Symonenko’s supporters (29%).
• The leader of Batkivshchyna is supported by Yatsenyuk’s supporters (54%), Tyahnybok’s (51%), Klitschko’s (40%), and Hrytsenko’s (36%). It should be noted that over the past six months Tymoshenko increased her support among supporters of Yatsenyuk, Tyahnybok, and Klitschko, which raised her second-round rating from 31% to 37%.

YANUKOVYCH vs. YATSENYUK

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached the second round, then 29% of respondents would support the incumbent president, 38.1% would support the leader of Front for Change, 21.5% would support neither candidate, and 11.4% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Yatsenyuk increased his second-round rating from 35% to 37%, partly due to growing support among supporters of Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Klitschko.
• Yanukovych is most supported against Yatsenyuk in the South (51%), Donbas (44%), and East (40%). Yatsenyuk is most supported in the West (69%), the North (48%), and the Center (37%). Among voters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (36%), although this support has declined noticeably, and by Symonenko’s supporters (29%).

YANUKOVYCH vs. TYAHNYBOK

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Oleh Tyahnybok reached the second round, 31.2% would support the incumbent president, 24.4% would support the Svoboda leader, 31.5% would support neither candidate, and 12.9% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Tyahnybok increased his second-round rating from 17% to 24%, especially in the West (up to 61%) and the North (up to 32%). This growth can be partly attributed to opposition unification, since support for Tyahnybok in the second round rose among Batkivshchyna supporters from 30% to 48%, and among Front for Change supporters from 26% to 44%.
• Yanukovych has his highest second-round rating in a contest against Tyahnybok, especially in the South (53%), Donbas (47%), and East (41%). The Center most rejects the Yanukovych–Tyahnybok pairing, where almost half oppose both candidates. At least one third of voters in the South, Donbas, East, and North also oppose both candidates.

YANUKOVYCH vs. KLITSCHKO

• If the presidential election of Ukraine were held in late March 2012 and Viktor Yanukovych and Vitali Klitschko reached the second round, 28.1% would support the incumbent president, 36.6% would support the UDAR leader, 21.4% would support neither candidate, and 13.9% would be undecided.
• Over the past six months Klitschko increased his second-round rating from 28% to 37%, partly due to growing support among supporters of Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yatsenyuk.
• Yanukovych is most supported in the South (47%), Donbas (44%), and East (38%). Klitschko is most supported in the West (66%), North (54%), and Center (57%), as well as in the East (23%).
• Among supporters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by Tihipko’s supporters (35%) and Symonenko’s (27%). Klitschko is supported by Tyahnybok’s supporters (64%), Tymoshenko’s (62%), Yatsenyuk’s (58%), Hrytsenko’s (46%), and also by one quarter of the undecided.

GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL POLITICIANS

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in March 2012, among national politicians, residents of Ivano-Frankivsk trust Vitali Klitschko the most (64%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk (58%), Oleh Tyahnybok (51%), Yulia Tymoshenko (50%), and Anatoliy Hrytsenko (48%).
• Much fewer people trust Viktor Yushchenko (14%), Serhiy Tihipko (14%), and Viktor Yanukovych (5%).
• In terms of full trust (“fully trust”), Yulia Tymoshenko (23%) and Oleh Tyahnybok (22%) are the leaders.
• The leaders of distrust are Viktor Yanukovych (86%), Viktor Yushchenko (79%), and Serhiy Tihipko (77%).

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in March 2012, the Svoboda party would win in Ivano-Frankivsk. About 55% of voters would definitely take part in the elections, and another about 30% would probably take part.
• Thus, Svoboda would be supported by 25.7% of voters (among those who intend to vote), Batkivshchyna by 21.9%, Front for Change by 14.5%, UDAR by 8.2%, Civic Position by 4.8%, the Party of Regions by 3.5%, and Our Ukraine by 2.6%.
• Other parties would receive over 10%, and 13% of voters would be undecided.
• Over the past six months, the ratings of the leaders — Svoboda and Batkivshchyna — have not changed: in July of last year they were supported by 26% and 22% respectively. At the same time, UDAR increased significantly (from 3% to 8%), while the ratings of Front for Change (from 18% to 15%) and Strong Ukraine (from 3% to 1%) declined. It can be assumed that these parties lost their voters to UDAR.

DISTRICT

• If the parliamentary elections in the single-member district that includes Ivano-Frankivsk were held in March 2012, the winner would be the Svoboda candidate, the head of the regional council Oleksandr Sych (30.4%). His closest competitors would be the incumbent mayor, Volodymyr Anushkevychus from the Ukrainian People’s Party (16.1%), and Yuriy Solovey from UDAR (15.5%), who would share second and third place.
• Other possible candidates would be supported by far fewer voters: Ihor Prokopiv (8.8%), Roman Tereshko (8.5%), Zynoviy Shkutyak (6%), Ihor Zvarych (3.5%). 4.5% would support other candidates, and 6.7% would be undecided.
• Oleksandr Sych is supported by over 80% of Svoboda supporters, almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Civic Position, and one in ten supporters of UDAR and Front for Change.
• Yuriy Solovey is supported by over 70% of UDAR supporters and almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change.
• Volodymyr Anushkevychus is supported by almost one in five supporters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, and almost one third of Our Ukraine supporters.
• At the same time, for the possible Front for Change candidate Ihor Prokopiv, currently no more than half of his party’s supporters are ready to vote. For the possible Batkivshchyna candidate Roman Tereshko, only one third of his party’s supporters are ready to vote.

ELECTORAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF CANDIDATES

• Besides direct ratings, the electoral attractiveness of potential single-member district candidates was also studied.
• For Oleksandr Sych, 25% of voters would definitely vote for him, and another 31% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 56%. Another 19% have a positive attitude toward him, but not enough to vote.
• For Yuriy Solovey, 10% would definitely vote for him, and another 35% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 45%. Another 21% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Volodymyr Anushkevychus, 12% would definitely vote for him, and another 28% could consider voting for him. Thus, his maximum potential is up to 40%. Another 22% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• As we can see, all three candidates have significant reserves to improve their positions. Oleksandr Sych’s starting position is somewhat better: the number of his “hard” supporters (i.e., Svoboda voters) is at least twice as large as that of the others.
• Other candidates also have good, though more hypothetical, prospects.
• For Ihor Prokopiv, 5% would definitely vote for him, another 31% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 36%. Another 25% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Zynoviy Shkutyak, 5% would definitely vote, another 20% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 25%. Another 25% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• For Roman Tereshko, 6% would definitely vote, another 14% could consider voting, so his maximum potential is 20%. Another 20% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• Finally, Ihor Zvarych could receive up to 11%. Another 13% have a positive attitude but not enough to vote.
• Oleksandr Sych can mobilize over 90% of Svoboda supporters. Yuriy Solovey over 80% of UDAR supporters, Ihor Prokopiv up to 70% of Front for Change supporters, and Roman Tereshko up to 50% of Batkivshchyna supporters.

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURES OF ELECTORATES

• Traditionally, UDAR has the youngest electorate. Batkivshchyna and Svoboda also have relatively young electorates.
• Noteworthy is the unusual “rejuvenation” of Batkivshchyna’s electorate, which may be the result of attracting young people on the wave of protest sentiment caused by the conviction of Yulia Tymoshenko. This choice cannot yet be considered stable.
• Among single-member district candidates, young people most support Yuriy Solovey, Volodymyr Anushkevychus, and Roman Tereshko.
• Men support Svoboda, UDAR, and Civic Position more. Women support Batkivshchyna, the Party of Regions, and Front for Change more.
• Relatively more people with higher education are among supporters of UDAR and Front for Change, as well as Batkivshchyna and Svoboda. Among candidates: supporters of Roman Tereshko, Zynoviy Shkutyak, Volodymyr Anushkevychus, and Ihor Prokopiv.
• There are more employed people among supporters of Civic Position and Front for Change. Voters of Front for Change and the Party of Regions also have relatively higher incomes; accordingly, these are more supporters of Ihor Prokopiv and Ihor Zvarych.

CRITERIA OF CHOICE

• The key trait that, in respondents’ opinion, a parliamentary candidate from the district should have is keeping promises (58%).
• The candidate should also be able to bring change (30%), have a regional development program (22%), understand economics (21%), have management experience (18%), be a strong leader (21%), and be a patriot (16%).
• Less important for people is that the candidate be young and energetic (13%), honest (12%), able to find compromises (12%), care about ordinary people (10%), be reliable (11%), be religious (10%), understand legal issues (9%), speak clearly (8%), care about family values (7%), engage in charity (7%), have political experience (5%), care about traditions and culture (4%), and have legislative experience (4%).

LOCAL PROBLEMS

• According to city residents, the main regional problems are poor road conditions (57%), unemployment (56%), rising prices and inflation (46%), and poverty (42%).
• Other important problems are alcoholism and drug addiction (33%), rising utility tariffs (32%), declining industry (30%), mass migration abroad (29%), and corruption in local authorities (29%).
• Less important problems include homeless animals (21%), lack of attention to youth issues (20%), waste collection and disposal (19%), lack of playgrounds (19%), rising crime (18%), poor healthcare (18%), neglected agriculture (15%), poor ecology (15%), pressure on small and medium business (14%), and lack of government transparency (13%).
• Even less important problems are violations of democracy, human rights and freedoms (9%), poor water supply and drainage (8%), poor housing development (7%), poor development of sports and football (7%), poor public transport (7%), poor education (6%), and suppression of national culture and language (6%).

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 52% of surveyed Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. 34% do not support it. Another 15% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past year the number of supporters of European integration has declined to the level of 2009. Thus, in October 2009, accession of Ukraine to the European Union was supported by 51% of respondents; in April 2010 — 52%; in September 2010 — 57%; in January 2011 — 56%; in April 2011 — 51%; and again 52% in February 2012. Thus, the peak of support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union occurred in late 2010 – early 2011.
• Among the strongest supporters of European integration are residents of the West (78%), somewhat fewer in the Center (59%) and North (55%). Accordingly, this includes over 80% of Svoboda supporters, about 70% of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, UDAR, Civic Position, as well as Strong Ukraine. Among the strongest opponents are CPU voters, two thirds of whom do not support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Party of Regions supporters are almost evenly split on this issue: about 40% support European integration, while 45% do not.
• The higher the respondents’ level of education and the younger they are, the more they support Ukraine’s accession to the EU and the less they support forming a single state with Russia and Belarus and granting Russian the status of a second state language.
• At the same time, 47% of respondents support the formation of a single state of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. 42% do not support it. Another 11% are undecided. Importantly, about 30% of those who support the formation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also simultaneously support Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
• Compared to April of last year, the number of such people decreased by a quarter (in April it was almost 40%), which indicates an increase in polarization of society along ideological lines. This is especially visible in regional terms: the “pro-Russian” vector is gaining popularity in Donbas, the South, and the East, while the “pro-Western” vector is strengthening in Western Ukraine. This is also confirmed by the fact that for most markers the number of unambiguous supporters and unambiguous opponents is increasing.
• Taking these features of the responses into account, respondents were asked a direct question. Thus, according to those surveyed, for Ukraine signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is more beneficial (39%) than joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (36%). 26% were unable to decide. Compared to October of last year, the number of supporters of the Free Trade Agreement with the EU did not decrease; instead, the number of those who consider the Customs Union more beneficial increased slightly (from 34% to 36%).
• As a result, the West, North, and Center of Ukraine are more supportive of the Agreement with the EU, while Donbas, the South, and the East support joining the Customs Union. However, about 20% of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters support joining the Customs Union, just as about 20% of Party of Regions supporters support the Agreement with the EU. Strong Ukraine supporters are split almost evenly: 40% for the EU Agreement and 41% for the Customs Union with Russia.
• 46% of respondents support granting Russian the status of a state language. Almost the same number (45%) oppose this. Another 8% are undecided. It should be noted that over the past two years the numbers of supporters and opponents of bilingualism have been almost equal. However, compared to 2009, support for granting Russian state language status has decreased (in 2009 it was over 50%).
• Among the strongest supporters of bilingualism are residents of Donbas (84%), the East (71%), and the South (65%). Accordingly, these are CPU supporters (72%), Party of Regions (71%), People’s Party (58%), and Strong Ukraine (53%). Among the strongest opponents are Svoboda voters, 100% of whom oppose granting Russian state language status.
• Public attitudes toward Ukraine’s accession to NATO have worsened somewhat: from 26% in September 2010 to 24% in January 2011, 22% in April 2011, and down to 20% in February 2012. More than 68% of respondents do not support Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Another 13% are undecided. Strong support for joining the North Atlantic Alliance exists only in the West of the country (about half of respondents). Among party supporters, NATO accession is traditionally advocated primarily by supporters of Svoboda and Civic Position.
• Meanwhile, against the backdrop of intensified gas negotiations, the number of supporters of extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has significantly decreased. Over the year, the number of supporters fell from 42% to 33%, while the number of opponents rose from 42% to 49%. 18% were undecided. The initiative lost support not only in the Center and North, but also in the East, South, and Donbas, where no more than half of respondents support it.
• Recently, attitudes toward the idea of creating a trilateral “gas” consortium to divide ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system among Russia, the EU, and Ukraine have improved. Over the past year (since January 2011), support for the initiative increased from 30% to 35%, while the number of opponents decreased from 42% to 37%. Accordingly, attitudes toward the consortium have returned to the 2009 level, when 36% supported it and 35% opposed it.
• Given the ambiguity of the initiative and difficulties in understanding it (almost 30% were undecided), respondents were asked a clarifying question: “Do you support the idea of transferring control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system to Russia?” Thus, the absolute majority (78%) do not support transferring control of Ukraine’s gas transit system to Russia. Only 8% support it. 14% were undecided. The strongest support for transferring control to Russia comes from residents of the South (22%) and CPU supporters (17%). At the same time, over 70% of Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine supporters oppose it, over 80% of UDAR, almost 90% of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change, and almost 100% of Svoboda oppose it.
• 24% of respondents support recognizing OUN-UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s state independence, while 57% do not support it. Another 19% are undecided. Public attitudes toward this issue fluctuate from year to year: after support rose from 20% to 27% in 2011, it declined again in 2012 to 24%, which is less than last year but more than the year before. More than 90% of Svoboda supporters support recognition of OUN-UPA, while about the same share of CPU supporters oppose it. Among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Civic Position, and UDAR, the number of supporters and opponents is almost equal. The idea is opposed by the vast majority of supporters of the Party of Regions (83%), Strong Ukraine (63%), People’s Party (67%), and those who vote “against all” (68%).
• 59% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was genocide of the Ukrainian people. 26% disagreed, and 16% were undecided. It is important to note fluctuations in public opinion on this issue: in March 2010, 61% agreed; in January 2011 this fell to 53%; in April 2011 it rose again to 58%; and finally stabilized at 59% in February 2012. Almost 90% of residents of the West, over 70% of the North and Center, and about 40% of the East and South share the genocide thesis. About 40% of Party of Regions and CPU supporters also share this view.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, an absolute majority of surveyed citizens do not support (91%) the idea of abolishing the March 8 holiday. Only 5% support it. Another 4% could not decide on this issue.
• 86% of respondents will celebrate March 8 this year, 14% will not.
  The least likely to celebrate March 8 are older people and pensioners (72%), residents of Western Ukraine (74%), supporters of Svoboda (74%), and rural residents (81%).
• The age-old question of whom men should congratulate first on March 8 produced the following results.
  In the opinion of 42% of women and 52% of men, men should first congratulate their wife or beloved woman.
  At the same time, 36% of women and 32% of men believe that the mother should be congratulated first, about 2% – the mother-in-law.
• At the same time, 18% of women and 12% of men believe that it does not matter whom men congratulate first on March 8.
• Thus, there are more men who would like to congratulate their wives first than women who want this themselves. Therefore, we can assume that wives place their mothers first in the “hierarchy of women” more often than men themselves, who are often accused of this.
• The tradition of congratulating one’s mother first is more typical of cities, residents of the North, and young people, while congratulating one’s wife or beloved woman first is more typical of residents of the Center and West and people of middle age.
• In the opinion of 46% of women and 41% of men, men should prepare breakfast on March 8.
  A quarter of both men and women believe that both the man and the woman together should prepare the festive breakfast.
• At the same time, for almost 20% of women and men it does not matter who prepares breakfast on March 8, and 9% of women and 13% of men believe that the woman should do it.
• 36% of men and only 23% of women believe that having sex on March 8 is a mandatory attribute of the holiday.
• At the same time, for 41% of women and only 31% of men, having sex on March 8 is not a mandatory attribute of the holiday.
  At least another third of respondents could not decide on this question.
• Thus, another study by the Sociological Group “Rating” confirmed that sex is more important for Ukrainian men than for women, especially on March 8! :))
• Most often, sex as a mandatory attribute of March 8 was indicated by respondents aged 30–39 (40%), 16–29 (38%), and 40–49 (30%).
• Supporters of Svoboda and UDAR most often supported “mandatory sex” on March 8, probably because these parties have many men and young people among their supporters.
  Least often – supporters of the Communist Party, the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Batkivshchyna, as well as “against all” and “undecided” respondents.
• The average amount women expect to receive as a gift on March 8 is 182 UAH.
  The maximum amount named by women was 4000 UAH.
• At the same time, the average amount men plan to spend on a gift for their beloved woman is almost 290 UAH, which is more than one and a half times more than women expect.
  The maximum amount named by men was 8000 UAH.
• 21% of women believe that their men will not buy anything for this holiday.
  At the same time, only 9% of men admitted that they will buy nothing.
• Almost another quarter of surveyed women and men did not answer this question.
• Thus, either women think very poorly of their men and their expectations are clearly understated, or, on the contrary, men are ready to impress their women more and grow in their eyes. We also cannot rule out the version that not all men’s gifts reach the “addressees” who expect them :))
• In any case, the study confirmed that men are ready for the holiday! And that is pleasing!
  Perhaps women should also prepare better for it, because men also have their own expectations (see above). Then the number of unexpected “addressees” will decrease, then deputies will not have to worry about low birth rates, and March 8 will become a shared holiday of the total victory of love and spring, and then every woman will receive an unexpected but desired gift!

Happy holiday to you, dear, beloved, and desired women!!!

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in February 2012, 42% of respondents would definitely take part in them, and another 33% would rather take part.
• Compared with previous months, voter mobilization has slightly decreased. As in December last year, the most mobilized voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the Communist Party. The highest level of mobilization is in the West, North, and East, and the lowest in the Center and South.

RESULTS

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in February 2012, 19.6% of respondents (among those who would participate in the elections) would vote for Batkivshchyna, 18.2% for the Party of Regions, 11.2% for Front for Change, 7% for the Communist Party, 6.5% for UDAR of V. Klitschko, 4.3% for Svoboda.
  Another 2.9% would support Strong Ukraine, 2.1% Civic Position, 1.6% the People’s Party.
  All other parties are supported by less than 1% each, together about 5%.
  7.9% would not support any party (“against all”), 13.9% are undecided.
• Because of changes in the election law, the “against all” category was asked an additional question:
  “According to the new law, voters in the 2012 parliamentary elections will not have the option to vote ‘against all’. How will you vote then?”
• According to the results, the answers were distributed as follows:
  16% of those who previously chose “against all” will vote for specific parties (relatively more for UDAR, Front for Change, and Batkivshchyna),
  48% are undecided,
  36% will not take part in the elections.
• Thus, the “against all” responses were redistributed, the likely turnout was clarified downward, and final party ratings were calculated.
• Accordingly, Batkivshchyna is supported by 20.3%, the Party of Regions by 18.8%, Front for Change by 11.7%, the Communist Party by 7.2%, UDAR by 6.9%, Svoboda by 4.5%, Strong Ukraine by 3.1%, Civic Position by 2.2%, the People’s Party by 1.6%.
  Other parties together — more than 5%.
  18.2% of voters are undecided.
• Thus, only the share of the undecided increased significantly (from 14% to 18%), while party indicators and their positions in the ranking practically did not change.
• If presidential elections in Ukraine were held in February 2012, 19.7% of respondents (among those who would participate) would vote for V. Yanukovych, 19.4% for Y. Tymoshenko, 12.8% for A. Yatsenyuk, 6.5% for V. Klitschko, 5.6% for P. Symonenko, 3.7% for S. Tihipko, 3% for O. Tyahnybok, 2.7% for A. Hrytsenko, 1.5% for V. Lytvyn, 0.7% for N. Korolevska, 0.6% for V. Yushchenko.
  Almost 4% would support other candidates, 6% would support none, 14.1% are undecided.

TRENDS

• Compared with December last year, the strongest growth is shown by UDAR, whose position improved from 5% to 6.5%. As a result, UDAR has come very close in the ranking to the Communist Party (7%), and V. Klitschko has regained fourth place in the presidential rating.
• The ratings of the leaders have hardly changed: Batkivshchyna, as in December, slightly exceeds the Party of Regions (19.6% vs 18.2%), while in the presidential rating their positions have become equal (19.7% for Yanukovych vs 19.4% for Tymoshenko). At the same time, Yanukovych’s position improved slightly compared to December, while that of the Party of Regions worsened.
• The ratings of Front for Change (11.2%) and A. Yatsenyuk (12.8%) are completely stable.
• The Communists failed to confirm the dynamic growth recorded in December (over 8%), but even this result is sufficient to enter parliament.
• The position of Svoboda has not changed (4.4%); the party remains close to overcoming the 5% electoral threshold.
• At the same time, Strong Ukraine (2.9%) and Civic Position (2.1%) have significantly smaller chances of overcoming the threshold under the current version of the election law.
• All data are presented among respondents who intend to take part in the elections.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, none of the tested versions of joint party lists currently produces a cumulative effect — accordingly, parties running “separately” produce better final results than running together.
• The only form of unification that almost achieves a cumulative effect is a JOINT LIST OF BATKIVSHCHYNA AND FRONT FOR CHANGE. This alliance would currently be supported by 30% of voters, while the parties running separately could obtain 31%.
  Only in the West does such a union produce a gain: 51% separately vs 53% together.
• The main problem is that supporters of Front for Change perceive such a union worse (only 75% of its supporters are ready to vote for a joint list) than supporters of Batkivshchyna (90%).
  At the same time, the losses from Front for Change are compensated by flows from Svoboda, Civic Position, the European Party, and Our Ukraine. Up to 10% of the undecided and “against all” are also ready to support this union.
• It is interesting that adding Svoboda to this alliance does not increase its electoral weight. A JOINT LIST of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda would also be supported by 30%, while running separately these parties could obtain up to 35%.
• Only about 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, 70% of Front for Change supporters, and 70% of Svoboda supporters are ready to back such a three-party union.
  Importantly, both Batkivshchyna and Front for Change supporters are more cautious about a three-party union than about a two-party one. Losses are compensated by small inflows from Our Ukraine and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (up to 15%), Civic Position and the European Party (10%), up to 10% of the undecided and 6% of “against all”.
• Only in the West does the three-party union gain more (56%) than the two-party one (53%).
  In the North they are equal (37%).
  In the Center, however, there are heavy losses: Batkivshchyna + Front for Change = 31%, but Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda = only 25%.
• Thus, adding Svoboda is perceived most painfully in the Center, and the degree of rejection grows directly with the degree of Svoboda’s radicalism.
• Batkivshchyna supporters perceive any coalition better than the supporters of its potential allies. A certain sense of insecurity, caused by the absence of a leader, is noticeable — therefore, unification is also seen as a form of protection.
• A cumulative effect is also not achieved by a union of pro-government parties. A JOINT LIST of the Party of Regions, the People’s Party, and Strong Ukraine would be supported by 21%, while running separately they could receive 23%.
• Supporters of the Party of Regions feel most confident (almost 90% ready to support a joint list).
  This is not the case for People’s Party (52%) or Strong Ukraine (64%).
  Up to 10% of the undecided are also ready to vote for this list.
  Supporters of the Communist Party are almost inactive — only 5% would vote for such a list.
  This format is most promising in the East and Donbas.
• It should be emphasized that in all formats most voters who do not support their party joining do not switch sides — they move into the “undecided” category.

BELIEF IN UNIFICATION IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS

• When choosing whom to vote for in 2012:
  52% will vote against the course of President Yanukovych,
  22% will vote in support of his course,
  26% are undecided.
• In Donbas, more than one third will vote in support of Yanukovych’s course, and almost 30% against.
  In all other regions, opposition voting dominates, especially in the West (74%), North (69%), and Center (56%).
• Over 90% of Party of Regions supporters, nearly half of Strong Ukraine, and one quarter of Communists will vote in support of Yanukovych.
  About 90% of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and Front for Change supporters will vote against Yanukovych.
  Half of “against all” and over one third of the undecided share this stance.
• Despite strong public demand for opposition unity, belief that it will happen is weak.
  Voters believe pro-government parties are more likely to unite (53% yes, 24% no) than the opposition (44% yes, 36% no).
• Only about half of residents of the West and North believe in opposition unity.
  Nearly 60% of Western Ukrainians believe in unity of pro-government parties.
  The East is most convinced of government unity (almost 70%).
  The South mostly believes in neither.
• Batkivshchyna supporters believe most in opposition unity; Party of Regions supporters believe most in government unity.
  Among opposition voters, UDAR supporters believe the least in unity; among government voters — Communists.

SUPPORT FOR SINGLE CANDIDATES

• Despite weak belief in unity, support for unified opposition candidates is high:
• 43% would vote for a single opposition candidate in a single-member district,
  34% would not,
  23% are undecided.
• Almost 90% of Batkivshchyna, over 70% of Front for Change and Svoboda, almost 60% of UDAR and Civic Position could support such candidates.
  Support is highest in the West (64%), North (56%), Center (46%), lower in the East and Donbas.
• For a single pro-government candidate:
  32% would support,
  46% would not,
  23% undecided.
• Support for pro-government candidates reaches 40% in the East and Donbas, about one third in the South and Center, and about one quarter in the North and West.
  Over 90% of Party of Regions, about 70% of Strong Ukraine and People’s Party, and only one third of Communists would support such candidates.

 Kyiv, Ukraine – IRI today released its first in a series of national polls of Ukrainian public opinion. 

The poll, conducted October 30 – November 11, 2011 (PDF), is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the current Ukrainian economic, social and political landscape. 

Among the findings in the poll, 13 percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the right direction, while 71 percent believe it is moving in the wrong direction.  The three most important issues facing Ukrainians are: unemployment, corruption within the state bodies and low industrial production. 

Additionally, 81 percent support the international community freezing the international assets of and suspending visas for Ukrainian officials, including judges, engaged in corrupt practices, while only six percent oppose such actions.

Finally, representative of the general mood in the country, three percent believe that the 2012 parliamentary elections will be absolutely free and fair, while 15 percent believe the elections will be somewhat free and fair.  These numbers contrast with 39 percent of respondents who believe that the elections will be somewhat not free and fair and 26 percent who believe the elections will be absolutely not free and fair

Most recently, IRI conducted two public opinion surveys on the Crimean peninsula (November 2011 and December 2009).  Data collected for IRI surveys is used to gauge public opinion and to assist IRI’s political party partners with building platforms based on the issues most important to the Ukrainian people. 

The randomly collected sample of 2,016 men and women of voting age was collected nationwide.  The study was analyzed by Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization.  The survey was fielded by the Rating Group under the supervision of IRI.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed plus or minus 2.2 percent.

• Ukrainians tend to feel unsafe rather than safe. The further east, the less safe citizens feel and the less satisfied they are with their lives. City residents, women, and older people feel especially unprotected.
  The key security problems that citizens see are not so much crime as poverty, corruption, and economic crises.
  Among possible crimes, Ukrainians fear most becoming victims of financial fraud and scams, hooligan attacks on the street, and robbery. Almost half of young women fear becoming victims of sex-related crimes.
• Despite the fact that citizens relatively rarely contact law-enforcement agencies, Ukrainians in general have a negative attitude toward them; courts are trusted the least. Only 12% contacted the police during the year. Two thirds of respondents did not have to observe any actions by law-enforcement officers in the current year in which human rights were violated.
• Importantly, the level of trust in law-enforcement agencies at the local level is significantly higher than at the central level. Similarly, Ukrainians evaluate the level of security in their own locality much better than the level of security in the country as a whole. In addition, people who contacted law-enforcement agencies and obtained a positive result have a significantly better attitude toward them afterward.
• The key problems of the Ukrainian police are corruption, public distrust, low morality of officers, high dependence on higher authorities, and low level of professional training. At the same time, according to the majority, these problems are not new and arose either during the Soviet period or in the early years of independence. More than 80% emphasize that the Ukrainian law-enforcement system needs reforms, including 51% who say they are urgent.
• An absolute majority of respondents (65%) believe that control over compliance with the law in the country is a shared responsibility of citizens and law-enforcement agencies.
• Almost 70% of respondents expressed readiness to help police officers in the performance of their professional duties, but only 14% under any circumstances, while about half would do so only if it does not harm their own interests or those of their relatives. Notably, in regions where local police are trusted most (the West), the highest readiness to help was also recorded. In contrast, in the East and South fewer people were willing to help.
• Only every third witness of offenses committed by others during the past year, and only every sixth witness of bribery, abuse of state funds and property, reported this to the relevant authorities. People usually do not contact law-enforcement agencies because of lack of faith that criminals will be punished, fear that the police will not protect witnesses from criminals, and fear of being turned from a witness into a suspect.
• Almost 60% of respondents believe that the Ukrainian police will cope with maintaining public order during EURO-2012 next year.
• Only 21% of respondents have a positive attitude toward the idea of renaming the militia to police, 43% have a negative attitude, and 36% are undecided.
• According to the results of a study conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” at the end of December 2011, 42% of Ukrainians are satisfied with their lives (only 10% fully satisfied), while 54% are not satisfied (including 20% fully dissatisfied). Another 4% were undecided.
  Residents of Western Ukraine are the most satisfied with their lives, residents of Southern and Eastern Ukraine less so. The younger the respondents, the more satisfied they are with their lives. City residents are more optimistic; likewise, men feel more satisfied than women.
• According to the latest Eurobarometer data published in October 2011, on average 81% of EU residents are satisfied with their lives (one quarter fully satisfied) and only 18% are dissatisfied. By this indicator Ukraine is behind every EU country, most of all Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, and Ireland. At the same time, Ukraine is closest in life-satisfaction levels to Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Portugal, Lithuania, and Latvia. Starting from Estonia, the gap increases sharply to Ukraine’s disadvantage.

SENSE OF PERSONAL SAFETY

• Only 7% of Ukrainians feel completely safe, and 31% feel rather safe walking alone after dark in their neighborhood. At the same time, 54% feel unsafe, and 8% are undecided.
  By this indicator, Ukraine also trails all EU countries, most of all Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Slovenia, while being closest to Bulgaria and Lithuania.
• Residents of villages feel much safer than city residents. Older people and women feel the least protected.
  People feel safest in Western Ukraine, and least protected in the South and especially the East, where only one quarter feel rather safe, while 60% feel rather unsafe walking alone after dark.
• Only 4% believe that the level of safety in their locality improved over the past year, 61% say it stayed the same, and 28% say it worsened.
  Only 6% believe road safety improved, 51% say it did not change, and 37% say it worsened.
  Only 2% think overall safety in the country improved, 41% say it did not change, and 48% say it worsened.
• Two thirds of those who feel completely safe are satisfied with their lives, while 60% of those who feel unsafe are dissatisfied.

FACTORS OF INSECURITY

• The most important security problems for Ukrainians are poverty (66%), corruption (53%), economic and financial crises (40%), street crime (35%), and environmental degradation (23%).
  Less important are organized crime (14%), natural disasters and technological catastrophes (10%), civil conflicts (6%), cybercrime (6%), terrorism (4%), nuclear disasters (4%), religious and national extremism (3%), illegal immigration (3%), and border insecurity (2%).
• Eurobarometer data (November 2011) show that for EU citizens the main threats are economic and financial crises (33%), terrorism (25%), poverty (24%), organized crime (22%), and corruption (18%).
  Compared with the EU, Ukrainians rate poverty (66 vs 24%) and corruption (53 vs 18%) much higher as threats. They also rate street crime as a bigger threat, while they fear organized crime, cybercrime, terrorism, religious extremism, and illegal immigration less.
• 63% fear becoming victims of financial fraud, 61% fear hooligan attacks, 60% fear home or car robbery, and 57% fear street robbery.
  About 30% fear sexual crimes. Almost half fear being convicted for a crime they did not commit.
  Women fear all these threats more than men, especially sexual crimes (almost 50%). Fear is higher in cities, in the East and South, and among middle-aged and older people. Youth fear sexual crimes the most.

TRUST IN LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

• About a third could not assess the Security Service of Ukraine, customs, and tax authorities; a quarter could not assess the prosecutor’s office; one sixth could not assess courts and traffic police; and only one tenth could not assess the militia.
  Overall, attitudes toward law-enforcement are more negative than positive.
• Among law-enforcement agencies, the Security Service of Ukraine is trusted the most (16% fully trust it), while courts are trusted the least (only 8% fully trust them).
  Compared with a similar survey in Russia (Levada Center, autumn 2011), trust in law-enforcement is higher in Russia than in Ukraine, but in both countries courts are trusted least.
• Trust in local police is higher than in national police. 29% completely distrust local police, but 41% completely distrust the police overall.
  Two thirds did not observe any police actions violating human rights during the year. Among those who did: 17% saw rudeness, 13% abuse of office, 12% bribery, 7% cruelty, 7% falsification of cases, 4% refusal to accept complaints.
• Only 12% contacted law-enforcement during the year; only half resolved their issue. 10% contacted traffic police; about 70% of those resolved their issue.
  Those who received positive outcomes trust police more.
• PROBLEMS OF THE UKRAINIAN POLICE
• Main obstacles: corruption (64%), public distrust (39%), low morality (39%), dependence on higher authorities (34%), low professional training (31%).
  Over 80% say reforms are needed; 51% say urgently.

COOPERATION WITH LAW-ENFORCEMENT

• 65% believe law enforcement is a shared responsibility of citizens and authorities.
  70% are ready to help police, but mostly only if it does not harm their interests.
• Only one third of witnesses to crimes and one sixth of witnesses to corruption reported them. Main reasons: lack of faith in punishment (56%), fear of reprisals (48%), and fear of becoming a suspect (47%).
• OTHER QUESTIONS
• Almost 60% believe police will ensure order during EURO-2012.
  Only 21% support renaming militia to police; 43% oppose; 36% undecided.
  30% agree that Ukraine is becoming a “police state”, 36% disagree, 34% undecided.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, conducted at the end of December 2011, the level of political activity of Lviv residents remains at a relatively high level: 50% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 28% would rather take part than not.
  The highest level of voter mobilization is among Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held at the end of December 2011, 20.7% of Lviv residents would support the Batkivshchyna party (data are given among those who intend to take part in the elections).
  Somewhat fewer Lviv residents would support Svoboda (17.1%) and Front for Change (16%).
  The UDAR party would be supported by 6.2% of voters, Civic Position by 4.5%, the Party of Regions by 3.9%, Our Ukraine by 3.3%, the Communist Party and For Ukraine! by 1% each.
  Other parties would be supported by about 4.8% of voters.
  10% of voters would not support any party, 11.6% are undecided.
• Compared to November, the changes are minimal. Due to growth in support compared to September, Batkivshchyna continues to hold leadership in the rankings in Lviv. The ratings of Svoboda, Front for Change, and UDAR did not change in December. At the same time, the number of the “undecided” continued to grow (from 7% in September, 11% in November to 12% in December) and “against all” (from 6% in September, 8% in November to 10% in December).
• The signing in early December of the Law on the Election of People’s Deputies gave a formal start to election campaigns in single-member districts, including in Lviv. In this connection, during December four “signal” surveys were conducted in four electoral districts of Lviv in order to understand whom Lviv residents remember from previous elections, whom they trust among new politicians, etc.
• Key methodological points that were taken into account in preparing and conducting the study:
• When forming the list of potential candidates, primarily the experience of politicians running in the respective districts was taken into account. In isolated cases, information from experts and the media was used. In addition, the list ensured maximum representation of candidates from the main parties.
• In each district, both the rating and the electoral attractiveness of potential candidates were measured. The latter indicator was calculated using a separate scale, which made it possible to identify both “core” supporters and “potential” supporters who may vote for a candidate. This also made it possible to show the overall positive and negative attitudes toward local politicians.
• In each Lviv district, its own list of candidates was studied. At the same time, in order to more fully study public opinion, the electoral attractiveness of three “universal” candidates — opinion leaders representing different socio-political groups — was also measured in each district: the incumbent mayor Andriy Sadovyi, who conducts active political activity but is not clearly aligned with any party and has not declared any intention to run; the leader of Svoboda Oleh Tyahnybok, who conducts active political activity clearly aimed at parliamentary elections; and the rector of Lviv National University Ivan Vakarchuk, who is not actively involved in politics but enjoys a high level of public trust.

DISTRICT #1 (Sykhiv, part of Lychakiv district)

• Currently there are two leaders of electoral sympathy in the district: Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (Svoboda) – 15% and Andrii Shkil (Batkivshchyna) – 13%.
  Somewhat fewer voters are currently ready to vote for Taras Chornovil (7%), Oleksandr Sheika (6%), Andrii Parubii (6%), and Dmytro Dobrodomov (5%).
  Even fewer would support Volodymyr Hirniak (3%), Ihor Rudnytskyi (2%), Volodymyr Zahorskyi (2%), and Oleh Matsekh (2%).
  Other candidates would be supported by about 12% of district voters, 15% would not support anyone, and 15% are undecided.
• For Mykhalchyshyn, with a rating of 15%, 8% are firmly ready to vote and 14% could consider voting for him, meaning his total potential is 22%.
  For Shkil, with 13%, 8% are firm supporters and 19% are potential, giving him a total of 27%, meaning he may overtake Mykhalchyshyn.
• Several other politicians have high electoral attractiveness: Parubii can grow from 6% to 15%, Dobrodomov from 5% to 15%, and Sheika from 6% to 12%.
  The leader of the anti-rating is Taras Chornovil (almost 60% would not vote for him under any circumstances).
• In the 2002 parliamentary elections in this district, Chornovil won decisively with 66%.
  Recent electoral experience includes Sheika (Front for Change) who received 9% in 2010 regional elections, Zahorskyi (Party of Regions) with 7%, and Pavlo Sobol (Pora) with 4%, none of whom retained their results.

DISTRICT #2 (Zaliznychnyi, part of Shevchenkivskyi district)

• Currently there is one clear leader of electoral sympathies in the district: Iryna Farion (Svoboda) – 21%.
• Significantly fewer voters are currently ready to support Vasyl Kuibida (7%), Yurii Pidlisnyi (6%), Roman Ilyk (6%), and Yaroslav Hinka (5%).
• Even fewer are ready to vote for Petro Khobzei (3%), Mykola Kniazhytskyi (2%), Oleh Sorochkin (2%), and Petro Kachura (2%).
  Other candidates would be supported by about 6% of district voters, 11% would not support anyone, and 31% are undecided.For Farion, with a rating of 21%, 12% are firmly ready to vote and 14% may consider voting for her, meaning she has a potential of 26%.
• For Kuibida, with 7%, 4% are firm supporters and 12% are potential, giving him 16% total.
• The remaining politicians have much weaker chances: Ilyk and Pidlisnyi can increase from 6% to 9%, Hinka from 5% to 8%.Thus, Farion, who won the 2010 regional council elections in single-member district No. 2 with 31%, can currently confirm her leadership in parliamentary elections as well.
• Kuibida’s potential corresponds to his 16% result in the 2010 local elections.
• Pidlisnyi (Front for Change), who received 8% in 2010, and Khobzei (Our Ukraine), who received about 5%, have also confirmed their potential.At the same time, Petro Kachura, who won this district in the 2002 parliamentary elections with 41%, is currently supported by only 2%.
• Mykola Kniazhytskyi, who had 14% in 2002, now also has only 2%.
• Andrii Senyshyn, who had 13% in 2002, now has 1%.
• Since these politicians do not have either strong positive or strong negative images, voters have simply forgotten them.Among party supporters, the greatest chances to attract voters have Hinka (electorally attractive to 92% of UDAR supporters), Farion (77%), Pidlisnyi (47% among Front for Change) and Khobzei (47% among Our Ukraine).
• Farion and Kuibida can attract the largest share of undecided voters — 15% and 12% respectively.
• Kuibida can also attract about one quarter of Front for Change and Batkivshchyna supporters.
  ‍

DISTRICT #3 (Frankivskyi and Halytskyi districts)There is no clearly expressed leader here; instead, there is a tight group of contenders — a true “group of death.”Six candidates have roughly equal support:

• Stepan Kubiv (9%), Petro Pylypenko (8%), Stepan Kurpil (7%), Petro Pysarchuk (7%), Taras Stetskiv (7%), and Viktor Pynzenyk (6%).Less support goes to Vira Liaskovska (4%), Petro Adamyk (2%), and Yaroslav Kendzor (2%).
• About 10% support other candidates, 16% would support none, and 24% are undecided.Potential growth:It is notable that Pylypenko, who won the 2010 regional election with 27%, now has only 8%.
• Stetskiv (34% in 2002) and Kurpil (21% in 2002) are now both at 7%.
• Pynzenyk, who won the district in 1998 with 47%, now has 6%.
• Although Stetskiv and Pynzenyk have the highest positive image, voters say this is no longer enough to vote for them.Party transfer potential:
  • Pysarchuk is attractive to 70% of Party of Regions supporters
  • Kubiv to 56% of Front for Change
  • Pylypenko to 51% of Svoboda
  • Stetskiv and Pynzenyk attract many undecided voters
  ‍

DISTRICT #4 (Pustomyty district, parts of Lychakiv and Shevchenkivskyi)

• Two clear leaders:
  Bohdan Dubnevych – 21% and Oleh Hudyma – 13%.
  Then Yaroslav Mudryi (Svoboda) – 8%, Mykhailo Kadykalo (Front for Change) – 6%.Dubnevych has the strongest core: 17% firm + 14% potential = 31%.
  Hudyma: 13% → 21%,
  Mudryi: 8% → 16%,
  Kadykalo: 6% → 11%.

SINGLE OPPOSITION CANDIDATE

• 63% support the idea of a unified opposition candidate.
• Highest in District #2, lowest in #3.34% would vote for a candidate backed by Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda.
• 37% would decide depending on the person.
• Support for a UDAR + Civic Position candidate is smaller but has growth potential.

PUBLIC FIGURE POTENTIAL

• Support potential:
  • Andriy Sadovyi – 31–37%
  • Oleh Tyahnybok – 23–35%
  • Ivan Vakarchuk – 28–32%
  Only Dubnevych, Farion, and Shkil approach these levels.

• Kubiv from 9% to 17%
• Pylypenko from 8% to 14%
• Kurpil from 7% to 13%
• Pysarchuk from 7% to 11%
• Stetskiv from 7% to 13%
• Pynzenyk from 6% to 14%
• Liaskovska from 4% to 13%

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2011, for 48% of respondents the most favorite winter holiday is New Year, while for 41% it is Christmas. Another 5% prefer St. Nicholas Day the most, and 2% – Old New Year. Only 1% of respondents do not like any of the winter holidays, and 2% were unable to determine which holiday they prefer.
• Regionally, Christmas is significantly more popular in the West of the country (66%). In the Center, New Year and Christmas are equally popular, while in the North, South, Donbas and East New Year is the most favorite holiday, as noted by up to 60% of respondents. The older the respondents are, the more they value Christmas; younger respondents prefer New Year. Men tend to prefer New Year, while women prefer Christmas. Religious respondents are much more likely to look forward to Christmas than New Year, especially Greek Catholics (73%), followed by Orthodox believers of the Moscow Patriarchate (49%) and the Kyiv Patriarchate (42%). Believers who do not associate themselves with any denomination (58%) and non-believers (73%) are much more likely to prefer New Year.
• 44% of respondents plan to put up a real Christmas tree at home for New Year, about a quarter plan to use an artificial tree, 15% will limit themselves to New Year decorative compositions, and 18% will most likely have neither a tree nor a decoration. The latter category is mostly represented by older people: almost 40% of respondents aged over 60 do not plan to decorate their homes for the winter holidays. At the same time, almost 60% of respondents aged 18–39 plan to put up a real tree, while almost 40% will use an artificial tree or a decorative composition. The tradition of installing a real tree is most widespread in the West, South and Donbas, while artificial trees are most common in the North (especially Kyiv) and in the Center. New Year decorative compositions are most popular in the East, where a large share of the population lives in urban areas.
• Respondents were also asked what they would wish for the Ukrainian state in 2012. The most common wishes were citizens’ welfare (68%), economic growth (62%) and stability (53%). Other frequently mentioned wishes included reducing corruption (46%), peace (45%), improving public health (44%) and responsible government (43%). 29% wished for fair elections, almost the same share wished for a qualitatively new government (29%) and national unity (28%). 24% wished for improvements in culture and education, and 21% wished for successful hosting of EURO 2012. Effective socio-economic reforms and new political leadership were equally important wishes, each receiving 20%. Smaller shares mentioned repayment of external debt (17%), democratic development (16%), stronger international reputation (14%), strengthening independence (14%), higher birth rates (14%), responsible citizens (13%), sports achievements (12%), a qualitatively new opposition (11%) and secure borders (9%).
• Age differences in responses were minimal, but regional differences were observed. Residents of the East and Donbas more often wished for welfare, economic growth, stability, reduced corruption and improved public health. Residents of the Center more often wished for peace. Residents of the North more often wished for external debt repayment, higher birth rates, sports achievements, new political leaders and a qualitatively new opposition. Donbas residents more often wished for a qualitatively new and responsible government. Residents of the West more often wished for national unity, spiritual development, democratic development, stronger international reputation and stronger independence. Residents of the East more often wished for effective socio-economic reforms. At the same time, respondents from the West, North and East were united by the wish to improve culture and education. Respondents from the East and West were united by the wish for successful hosting of EURO 2012. The wish for fair elections united respondents across all regions of the country.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had taken place in December 2011, 36% of respondents would have definitely participated and another 37% would have rather participated. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and the Communist Party of Ukraine.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in December 2011, 20.3% of respondents (among those who intended to vote) would have supported Batkivshchyna, 19.4% – the Party of Regions, 11.3% – Front for Change, 8.1% – the Communist Party, 5% – UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, and 4.4% – Svoboda. Another 2.3% would have supported Civic Position, 1.2% – the People’s Party, and 1% – Our Ukraine. Other parties would have received 3.5%. Around 9.4% would have voted against all parties, and 14% were undecided.
• At the same time, respondents most wanted to see Front for Change (33%), Batkivshchyna (28%), the Party of Regions (21%), UDAR (21%), Svoboda (16%), the Communist Party (15%) and Civic Position (15%) represented in the next parliament. Fewer than 10% wanted to see other political forces represented. The highest perceived chances of passing the 5% electoral threshold were attributed to the Party of Regions (56%), Batkivshchyna (45%), Front for Change (41%), the Communist Party (23%), Svoboda (17%) and UDAR (14%). Only 7% believed Civic Position could pass the threshold, although twice as many respondents wanted to see it in parliament.
• Regional preferences differed. Residents of Western Ukraine most wanted to see Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and Svoboda in parliament. Residents of the Center and North preferred Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and UDAR. Residents of the South preferred the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, while residents of the East preferred Front for Change and the Party of Regions. In Donbas, respondents most wanted to see the Party of Regions, the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party.
• About 31% expected that the next parliament would form a pro-presidential majority, while 39% expected an opposition majority, and 30% were undecided. Pro-presidential majority expectations were more common in the East and Donbas, while opposition majority expectations dominated in the West, North and Center.
• If presidential elections had taken place in December 2011, 18.9% would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 18.9% – Yulia Tymoshenko, 12.8% – Arsenii Yatseniuk, 6% – Petro Symonenko, 5.5% – Vitalii Klitschko, 3.9% – Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3.7% – Oleh Tyahnybok and 2.7% – Serhii Tihipko. Around 5% would have supported other candidates, 7.8% would have voted against all candidates, and 14.5% were undecided.
• The key trend of the month was the growth of support for the Communist Party (from 5% in November to 8% in December), primarily in the East, Donbas and the Center. At the same time, with Batkivshchyna remaining stable (around 20%), the Party of Regions lost its leading position mainly due to voter shifts toward the Communist Party. There were also signs of gradual fragmentation of support among traditional political leaders, with moderate growth recorded for Front for Change and Svoboda, while UDAR remained close to the electoral threshold. The personal rating of Anatolii Hrytsenko also increased, although it remained significantly higher than the rating of his party, Civic Position.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2011, two thirds of Ukrainian families have a tradition of giving presents on St. Nicholas Day. At the same time, 29% do not follow this tradition, while 1% are not familiar with this holiday. Another 6% of respondents were unable to say whether such a tradition exists in their families.
• The tradition is most widespread in Western Ukraine, where it is practiced by 90% of families. It is less common in the North (67%) and the Center (62%), and even less so in the South (56%), the East (52%), and the Donbas (51%).
• The custom of giving presents on St. Nicholas Day is more prevalent among religious people, especially Greek Catholics (92%), as well as among Orthodox believers of the Kyiv Patriarchate (73%) and the Moscow Patriarchate (58%). Almost half of non-believers do not observe this tradition.
• Women, young people, and respondents of middle age are more likely than others to maintain the tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in late November and early December 2011, political engagement in Lviv remained relatively high. Almost half of residents said they would definitely participate in parliamentary elections and another 30% said they were likely to do so. Voter mobilization was strongest among supporters of Svoboda, the Party of Regions, and Batkivshchyna, while supporters of Front for Change, UDAR, and Civic Position were somewhat less mobilized.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place at that time, Batkivshchyna would have received the largest share of support among likely voters in Lviv, followed closely by Svoboda and Front for Change. Civic Position, UDAR, the Party of Regions, Our Ukraine, and the Communist Party would have attracted smaller shares, while a notable proportion of voters were either undecided or said they would not support any party. In a hypothetical presidential election held at the beginning of December, Yulia Tymoshenko would have led with 20% of the vote among likely voters, narrowly ahead of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, followed by Oleh Tiahnybok, Vitali Klitschko, and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, while Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko trailed far behind.
• Among national politicians, Vitali Klitschko enjoyed the highest level of trust in Lviv, and his trust rating had increased over the previous month. Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko were also viewed relatively positively, with Hrytsenko’s trust growing enough to surpass that of Oleh Tiahnybok, whose ratings remained stable. Attitudes toward Yulia Tymoshenko continued to improve, with distrust declining substantially over the previous six months, although her trust was still lower than that of Klitschko and Yatsenyuk. Viktor Yushchenko recorded a historically low level of trust and a record-high level of distrust, while Serhiy Tihipko and Viktor Yanukovych also faced overwhelming distrust, with Yanukovych’s negative ratings remaining stable over the year.
• The data pointed to several important trends. In November, Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna regained leadership in the ratings, driven in part by improving public attitudes toward the former prime minister. At the same time, the steady growth of Front for Change stalled for the first time in a year and a half, and Yatsenyuk lost his lead in the presidential ranking. Support for Klitschko and Hrytsenko continued to rise, increasingly at the expense of Yatsenyuk. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions gained some support by absorbing former Tihipko voters, while Tihipko’s own ratings continued to fall. Growing dissatisfaction with Viktor Yushchenko also contributed to the decline of Our Ukraine. The share of undecided voters and those who would vote “against all” also increased over the month.
• At the local level, a majority of Lviv residents were satisfied with the performance of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, and dissatisfaction had declined slightly over the month. The head of the regional council, Oleh Pankevych, remained poorly known, with more than 40% unable to evaluate his performance, and a similar pattern was observed for the newly appointed head of the regional state administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, whose work most respondents could not yet assess.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in early November 2011, 45% of respondents felt that freedom of speech in Ukraine had been curtailed since the presidential election, while 32% said they did not perceive such restrictions and 22% were undecided. This was the worst indicator recorded over the previous two years: only about one third of Ukrainians did not sense a deterioration in freedom of speech, and just 9% of them were fully confident in that view. After a temporary improvement at the beginning of 2011, perceptions clearly worsened again toward the end of the year. For comparison, in April 2010 nearly two thirds of citizens did not feel any rollback of freedom of speech, meaning that within a year and a half this share had fallen by half.
• Negative trends were more often reported by middle-aged respondents and by those with relatively higher levels of education, and men were more sensitive to the issue than women. Over the preceding six months, the sharpest increase in concern about freedom of speech was recorded in the North of the country, particularly in Kyiv. In the North, West, Center, and South, the number of people who perceived restrictions on freedom of speech exceeded the number of those who did not, a pattern especially visible among supporters of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, UDAR, and the Front for Change. By contrast, in the East and in Donbas, most respondents did not perceive a rollback of freedom of speech, a view that was particularly common among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party.

• Rating Group was inspired to conduct this study by the results of a reader survey carried out by the American magazine Motor Trend on the most irritating factors on the road. Of course, these studies are different, primarily because of their different methodologies, and therefore they are not directly comparable, but for identifying certain trends such a comparison is possible.
• According to the results of the study by the Sociological Group “Rating”, less than one third of Ukraine’s adult population aged 18 and over drive a car; among them, less than one quarter are active drivers. The remaining respondents (about 70%) do not drive at all. In the structure of Ukrainian drivers, men dominate significantly (over 80%) as well as middle-aged people aged 30–49 (about 50%). By occupation, the largest groups are office employees (23%) and workers (32%), with equal shares of people with higher education (40%) and secondary specialized education (40%).
• Thus, drivers are most irritated on the road by those fellow drivers who cut in front of others (63%), park in a way that obstructs traffic (51%), do not use turn signals when turning or changing lanes (46%), and blind others with high beams at night (42%).
• Drivers are also irritated by those who drive in the middle of the road or between lanes (35%), refuse to let other cars pass (35%), exceed the speed limit (34%), talk on a mobile phone while driving (25%), are aggressive and swear or gesture behind the wheel (24%), and do not turn on red when a green arrow is allowed (22%).
• Ukrainian drivers are much less irritated by slow drivers (13%), drivers who play loud music in their cars (14%), those who drive dirty cars in good weather (9%), smoke while driving (9%), or constantly let other cars go ahead of them (5%). Only 3% of Ukrainian drivers say that nothing and no one irritates them on the road.
• Compared to the results of the Motor Trend survey, American and Ukrainian drivers are equally irritated by drivers who talk on a mobile phone while driving.
• At the same time, Ukrainian drivers are much more irritated by those who cut in, do not use turn signals, and do not turn on red when a green arrow is allowed, and are much less irritated by slow drivers. Thus, the origin and mental roots of the saying “The slower you go, the farther you’ll get” appear quite logical.
• A few more interesting points. Drivers who speed, talk on mobile phones, smoke, and play loud music irritate passengers more than drivers. At the same time, passengers are almost not irritated at all by slow drivers. Passengers are also more than three times less irritated by drivers who cut in front of others. Obviously, passengers simply do not fully understand this problem as such.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2011, 13% of respondents consider a presidential system to be optimal for Ukraine, 34% support a presidential-parliamentary form of government, 26% a parliamentary-presidential system, 5% a parliamentary system, 2% a dictatorship, and 21% could not decide on this issue.

TRENDS:

• Support for a presidential system in Ukraine has been gradually declining: from 24% in October 2009 and 26% in April 2010 to 16% in March 2011 and to 13% in November 2011. A presidential-parliamentary system has been consistently supported by about one third of respondents.
• These trends closely mirror the dynamics of Viktor Yanukovych’s approval ratings: from 36% in October 2009 and 44% in April 2010 to 26% in March 2011 and 20% in November 2011.
• Against this background, support for parliamentary-presidential and parliamentary forms of government is increasing (a three-year peak is recorded): from 22% in October 2009 and 20% in April 2010 to 25% in March 2011 and 31% in November 2011.
• Among the strongest supporters of strengthening presidential power in Ukraine are voters of the Party of Regions, Svoboda, and UDAR. Among the strongest supporters of strengthening parliamentary powers are voters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party, and again Svoboda.
• A pro-presidential system is most strongly supported by residents of the North, the Donbas, and the West, while a pro-parliamentary system is most strongly supported in the Center and the East. The largest share of undecided respondents is in the South.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held at the beginning of November 2011, 33% of respondents would definitely have taken part in them and another 33% would rather have taken part. Electoral activity for the presidential election is slightly higher: 35% would definitely have participated and another 33% would rather have participated. The most mobilized voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna, the Communist Party (CPU), and the Party of Regions.

RESULTS:

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held at the beginning of November 2011, 22% of respondents (among those who would have taken part in the elections) would have voted for the Party of Regions, 19.9% for Batkivshchyna, 9.8% for Front for Change, 5.4% for the Communist Party, 4.7% for UDAR of Vitalii Klychko, and 3.3% for Svoboda.
• Another 1.9% of voters would have supported Civic Position, 1.2% the People’s Party, and 1.1% Nasha Ukraina. Other parties would have been supported by 4.3% of voters, 13.2% would have supported no party (“against all”), and 13.2% would have been undecided.
• Thus, if elections had taken place at the beginning of November and the electoral threshold had remained at 3%, six parties would have entered parliament: the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, the Communist Party, UDAR, and Svoboda. If the threshold were increased to 4%, five parties would enter parliament, and if raised to 5%, only four.
• If a presidential election had been held at the beginning of November 2011, 20.1% of respondents (among those who would have voted) would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 19.3% Yulia Tymoshenko, 11.1% Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 5.5% Vitali Klitschko, 5.2% Petro Symonenko, 2.8% Oleh Tyahnybok, 2.2% Serhiy Tihipko, and 2.6% Anatolii Hrytsenko. Other candidates would have been supported by nearly 5%, 11.9% would have voted “against all”, and 14.3% were undecided.
• TRENDS:
  • Despite the fact that the Party of Regions’ rating has stabilized (22%), support for Viktor Yanukovych continues to decline (from 23% in May to 21% in September and 20% in November).
  • At the same time, support for Yulia Tymoshenko (up to 19%) and Batkivshchyna (up to 20%) has increased — the improving attitude toward Tymoshenko recorded recently in the West, North, and Center of the country is turning into electoral gains.
  • As a result, the gap between first and second place in the presidential rating has narrowed to 1%, and in the party rating to 2%.
  • It is also worth noting the stability of the Communists (5%) and Civic Position (2%).
  • In contrast, Front for Change (10%) and UDAR (5%) have lost their growth momentum. Svoboda (3%) has also been unable to stop its downward trend.
  • The number of respondents who support no party (13%) and those who are undecided (13%) continues to grow.
  ‍
• All data are presented among respondents who intend to take part in the elections.

• Rating Group continues to study public attitudes toward the Tymoshenko case (the first results were presented at the end of September 2011).
  One month after the verdict was announced, the majority of Ukrainians continue to recognize Yulia Tymoshenko’s guilt in the “gas case”, but at the same time consider this case to be more political and insist that the former Prime Minister should be free.
• Opinions on whether the former Prime Minister should have the right to participate in the 2012 elections, and whether the statements of European politicians constitute interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, are almost evenly divided.
• The dynamics indicate that the Tymoshenko case is moving from the economic or anti-corruption sphere clearly into the ideological one.
• In the opinion of the majority, the final decision in this case belongs to the President, not to the courts or the prosecutor’s office.
• As one month earlier, respondents consider Yulia Tymoshenko rather guilty (44%) of abuse of power or official authority during the signing of the 2009 gas agreements with Russia than not guilty (36%). One in five has not decided on this issue.
• At the same time, only one quarter (24%) of respondents support the prison sentence in the Tymoshenko case regarding the 2009 gas agreements. A majority (52%) insist on mitigation or cancellation of the sentence.
  Thus, 12% support a suspended sentence or amnesty after the court decision on imprisonment;
  21% believe that the 2009 gas agreements were unfavorable for Ukraine, but that criminal liability should be removed from Tymoshenko;
  another 18% believe that all charges against the former Prime Minister should be dropped.
  22% of respondents are undecided on this issue.
• As one month earlier, only about one quarter (27%) believe that the criminal case against Yulia Tymoshenko is rather the enforcement of the rule of law, while a majority (54%) see it as political persecution. Another 19% are undecided.
• More than half (51%) also consider the new criminal case against Yulia Tymoshenko—regarding the transfer of the debts of the EESU corporation to the state budget of Ukraine—to be political persecution. Only 28% believe that this new case is rather the enforcement of the law.
• Thus, in public perception the Tymoshenko case is becoming increasingly political and may intensify regional polarization. This is indicated, in particular, by regional dynamics.
  Only in the Donbas and the South has the number of people who consider Tymoshenko guilty increased. In all other regions, including the East, it has decreased, and accordingly the number of those who do not recognize her guilt has increased.
  Only in the Donbas does the number of those who support imprisonment exceed the number of those who insist on mitigation or cancellation of the sentence. In all other regions the opposite is true.
  The view that this is political persecution dominates in all regions except the Donbas.
• Opinions on whether Yulia Tymoshenko should be allowed to participate in the 2012 parliamentary elections are almost evenly split: 42% believe she should, and 40% believe she should not. 18% are undecided.
• In the West, North, and Center, more people agree that the former Prime Minister should be allowed to participate in the next elections; in the East, South, and Donbas, more believe that she should not.
• The right of Yulia Tymoshenko to participate in the next elections is supported by 100% of Batkivshchyna supporters, about 60% of Svoboda, Civic Position, and Front for Change supporters, more than half of UDAR supporters, one third of those voting “against all” and the undecided, and only 9% of Party of Regions supporters.
• A majority of respondents (41%) believe that the final decision in the Tymoshenko case (whether she will be released or not) depends only on President Viktor Yanukovych.
• Far fewer believe that the final decision depends on the courts (19%) or the Prosecutor General’s Office (10%). Even fewer believe it depends on the Verkhovna Rada (5%) or the Security Service of Ukraine (3%).
  2% believe it depends on none of the above, and 16% are undecided.
• Only residents of the Donbas and supporters of the Party of Regions believe that the final decision depends more on the courts; all other respondents believe it depends more on the President.
• A majority (46%) believe that after a change of power, criminal cases will also be opened against representatives of the current authorities. Only one third disagree. Another 21% are undecided.
• Interestingly, the least likely to believe that criminal cases will be opened against today’s authorities after a change of power are supporters of the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna, while the most likely to believe this are supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, and UDAR.
• 40% of respondents believe that comments by European Union politicians on the Tymoshenko verdict do not constitute interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Slightly fewer (36%) consider it interference. One quarter could not answer.
• At the same time, 40% view the comments of EU politicians on the Tymoshenko verdict positively, and 31% view them negatively. For 15% it is irrelevant, and another 15% are undecided.
• The position of those who see this as interference is not categorical, since only two thirds of them view the EU politicians’ comments negatively. At the same time, one in ten of them views the EU statements positively, and more than one in ten is indifferent.
• The most positive attitudes toward EU politicians commenting on the Tymoshenko case are found in the North, West, and Center—this includes over 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, almost 60% of Svoboda and Civic Position supporters, and almost 50% of Front for Change and UDAR supporters.
• The most negative attitudes are in the Donbas, South, and East—including over 60% of Party of Regions supporters and over 40% of Communist Party supporters.

Simferopol, Ukraine – Today, IRI released its survey of Crimean public opinion (PDF).  The poll, conducted September 20 – October 2, 2011, is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the Crimean economic, social and political landscape.
 
IRI’s 2011 survey reveals that Crimeans have become increasingly concerned about inflation and corruption, while Russian language issues and relations with Russia dropped in issues of concern since IRI’s 2009 survey.  Since that time, the Yanukovych administration has filled many administrative positions in Crimea with officials from the Donbas region in the eastern part of the country.  IRI’s 2011 survey shows that only seven percent of respondents support such actions.  Seventy-seven percent were in favor of the international community suspending visas and freezing assets abroad for Ukrainian officials, including judges, who are engaged in corrupt practices.

This is the second survey IRI has conducted in Crimea.  The first survey was conducted in November 2009.  This poll is part of IRI’s democratic development program in Ukraine, and was designed to enable leaders to identify citizen priorities, appropriately manage expectations, better inform the electorate of their progress and help foster the ongoing integration process of Crimea into Ukraine.

The randomly selected sample consists of 1,200 Crimean residents older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote and is representative of the general population by age, gender and education.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed + 2.8 percent.

Crimea is a distinct area of Ukraine, whose residents’ attitudes are influenced by their historical and cultural connection to Russia and tend to differ from residents in the rest of Ukraine.  Its ethnic composition of Ukrainians, Tatars and Russians further complicates the integration of Crimea into the wider social and political context of Ukraine.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group at the end of September 2011, the greatest sources of joy for adults aged 18+ are family (66%), children (53%), and friends (41%).
  Completing the top five of the “JOY RATING” are money (31%) and watching television (27%).
• For one in five, work brings joy. Almost one in five also finds joy in being in nature, travel, music, birthdays, and giving and receiving gifts.
  One in six gets joy from pets and from housework and household chores. Slightly fewer respondents gain joy from vacations/holidays (14%), food (13%), sex (13%), cinema (12%), books (12%), and the Internet (10%).
• Less than 10% of respondents get joy from prayer (church), shopping, singing, sports, and victories of their favorite team. Less than 5% get joy from dancing, studying, theater, solitude, alcohol, and gambling.
  Only 3% of respondents say that nothing brings them joy in life.
• It should be noted that compared to a similar survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” two years earlier, in 2011 people feel less joy only from watching television, going to the cinema, and vacations/holidays.
  For all other areas, feelings have either not changed or improved — the largest “increase in joy” is seen in work, sex, and the Internet, as well as birthdays and gifts, pets, and victories of favorite teams.
• At the same time, over the two years the number of people who feel joy from solitude has increased significantly — now 5%.
  In addition, over the two years people have begun to feel less joy from television and more from the Internet.
• As of the end of September 2011, the happiest appear to be residents of the North (especially Kyiv), the West, and the Center. The least joyful are residents of the Donbas.
• The WEST clearly leads in joy derived from family and children, work, songs, and prayer (church). As two years ago, prayer (church) brings the greatest joy to Greek Catholics.
• Residents of the CENTER receive relatively more joy from birthdays and gifts, as well as from housework and pets. By these criteria, the Center is very similar to the SOUTH, which in addition is the absolute leader in joy from watching television.
• Residents of the EAST are the absolute leaders in joy from money — here the saying “better to have a hundred friends than a hundred rubles” works less, because the East is the only region where people gain more joy from money than from friends. At the same time, people here like to spend time in nature and derive much more joy from vacations and travel than in other regions. They also enjoy birthdays and gifts, shopping, and food.
• Music, cinema, books, and theater bring significantly more joy to residents of the NORTH (especially Kyiv).
• Family brings joy equally to city and village residents. At the same time, friends, money, travel, books, and the Internet appeal more to city dwellers, while children, gifts, housework, church, and songs bring more joy to village residents.
• Family, children, gifts, housework, pets, books, theater, shopping, singing, and prayer bring more joy to women, while friends, money, work, television, food, the Internet, sports, victories of favorite teams, alcohol, and gambling bring more joy to men. As two years ago, sex brings significantly more joy to men than to women.
• Sadly, with age people feel less joy. The older people are, the less joy they feel from friends, money, travel, music, cinema, sex, shopping, dancing, and sports. The older people are, the less they enjoy birthdays. At the same time, they increasingly enjoy housework, television, and church. Nevertheless, older people enjoy books more than the young.
• Middle-aged people enjoy solitude more than others; they also derive more joy from giving gifts, books, theater, and being in nature. They also find work more joyful than others.
• As two years ago, young people continue to be less joyful than others about children (since they are still children themselves) and family, while enjoying friends, music, travel, the Internet, cinema, sex, dancing, and sports much more than others.
• Using correlation analysis of respondents’ answers, we attempt to construct a kind of JOY MATRIX and identify related types of joy.
• Thus, if “BIRTHDAYS” bring joy, then people also enjoy receiving and giving gifts and get more pleasure than others from shopping. As two years ago, they like receiving gifts more than giving them. Note that respondents who enjoy shopping also have a very positive attitude toward money, which is logical.
• The second — the most “ACTIVE” group of related joys — includes work, vacations/holidays, friends, food, money, sex, travel, and the Internet.
  This group contrasts with the “INACTIVE” one, which includes prayer, songs, and housework and household chores. For the latter, joy from pets is often a related type of joy.
• Sports, dancing, victories of a favorite team, and studying form the related joys in the “SPORT” group.
• The next — the “ART” group — includes cinema, music, books, and theater.
• Joy from “SOLITUDE” correlates most strongly with joy from being in nature. This group is close to and often overlaps with the “ART” group.
• People who feel joy from family also feel joy from children, and vice versa. This group is conditionally called the “FAMILY” group.
• In the “GAMBLING” group, alcohol and gambling are closely related sources of joy.