News and Press releases

• Public support for the need to amend the Constitution this year is growing. Whereas in March 2009, 48.9% of respondents believed that constitutional reform was not timely that year, by May 2009 this share had fallen to 44.5%. By contrast, in March only 23.8% supported the idea of amending the Basic Law that year, while in May this figure rose to 31.6%. The share of respondents who were undecided on this issue also declined from 27.3% to 23.9%.
• Compared with March 2009, the number of respondents who believe that amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine should be approved only by a vote in the Verkhovna Rada increased from 12.1% to 15.7%.
• At the same time, public opinion continues to be dominated by the view that constitutional amendments should be approved only through a nationwide referendum, a position held by 62.1% of respondents.
• Only 3.1% believe that constitutional amendments can be legitimized solely by the President’s signature, and 1% solely by the signature of the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada. A further 18.2% of respondents were unable to answer this question.
• According to a relative majority of respondents, 45.5%, constitutional changes should strengthen the powers of the President. One quarter believe that parliament should be granted greater powers, 17.6% think that the Constitution should not be changed at all, and 10.7% were undecided.
• Seventy-eight percent of respondents do not support the idea of electing the President in parliament, with 51.6% completely opposed and 26.4% rather opposed. The share of supporters of this idea stands at 11.4%.
• Only 47.2% of respondents were able to name the correct date of Constitution Day in Ukraine, 28 June. A further 19.6% named a different date, while one third do not know at all when this state holiday is celebrated.

• Over the past two months, support for the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, has increased the most, from 20.1% to 25.3%. Support for the leader of BYuT, Yulia Tymoshenko, has instead declined, from 16.8% to 15.9%.
• Support for Arsenii Yatsenyuk has also increased slightly, from 12.2% to 13.2%.
• Support for the incumbent President Viktor Yushchenko fluctuates at around 3–4%, for the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn at 6–7%, and for the leader of the Communists at 4–5%.
• 15.8% would vote “against all,” and 9.6% are undecided.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held next Sunday, five political forces would enter parliament: the Party of Regions (24.9%), BYuT (15.2%), the Yatsenyuk Bloc (10.4%), the Lytvyn Bloc (6.1%), and the Communist Party of Ukraine (5.4%).
• Close to passing the 3% threshold are Our Ukraine (2.8%) and Svoboda (2.4%). 13.4% would vote “against all,” and 11.3% are undecided.
• 54% of respondents agree that parliament should dismiss the Minister of Internal Affairs, Yurii Lutsenko, while 34.3% disagree.
• One third of respondents believe that trade unions in Ukraine primarily defend the interests of company management, and one in five believe they defend the interests of politicians. Only 15% of citizens think that trade unions defend the interests of ordinary workers, 16.6% believe they do not defend any interests at all, and 14.6% were unable to answer this question.
• Accordingly, only 16.8% of respondents rated the activity of trade unions in Ukraine over the past six months positively, while 28.5% rated it negatively. At the same time, 37.2% of respondents think that trade unions in Ukraine play no role at all. 17.5% were undecided.

• hereas in September 2007 respondents to a similar question tended more toward the answer that the country lacked legality above all, in May 2009 it was order that was seen as most lacking (an increase from 41.4% to 45.3%). Perceived shortages of stability (from 21.8% to 25.1%), leadership (from 20.1% to 23.6%), wisdom (from 8.9% to 11.3%), money (from 5.4% to 8.1%), and faith (from 2.8% to 5.3%) also increased. Perceptions of a lack of honesty, justice, decisiveness, and patriotism decreased slightly or remained unchanged.
• Almost 90% of respondents felt the effects of the economic crisis personally.
• In order to reduce the impact of the crisis, 47.2% of citizens cut spending on food, 43.2% abandoned planned purchases of household appliances and electronics, and nearly one in ten limited themselves in everything. In addition, 28.7% of respondents turned to relatives and close ones for help, 17.1% gave up summer holidays, and 14.3% converted all their savings into U.S. dollars.
• Only 1.7% of respondents turned to the state for assistance.
• At the same time, 7.5% of respondents did nothing to reduce the impact of the economic crisis.

I. Perception of presidential candidates by Lviv residents

So what is the dynamic of electoral sentiments among Lviv residents in 2009? Let us begin with the expectations of the people of Lviv regarding the upcoming presidential elections.

We are comparing data from a survey conducted in April 2009 with data from a survey conducted at the end of December of last year. Over these four months, Arsenii Yatseniuk has moved to the top of the list of presidential candidates. In fact, for us, the growth of support for Yatseniuk was an expected trend, and I am convinced that he had already taken first place in January–February of this year, while we only confirmed it in April. The dynamics of his rating were positive throughout this period, starting in October, when Yatseniuk began to be actively discussed as a presidential candidate. At present, he has almost 23.5%.

As for the other candidates, Yulia Tymoshenko has, of course, lost the most. She now has only 19.5%. Compared with the end of last year, she has lost a full 5 percentage points. This is a significant drop, especially given that those 5% have become supporters of her direct competitor in Lviv — Arsenii Yatseniuk. Here we see a clear trend: Tymoshenko is going down, Yatseniuk is going up.

At the moment, my assessment is that the growth of Yatseniuk’s rating and, correspondingly, the decline of Tymoshenko’s rating have stopped. I think that over the next month or two, and perhaps even until autumn, their positions will remain roughly at this level.

The candidate who is now closest to these two leaders is Oleh Tyahnybok. At present, his rating is just over 10%. It should be noted that over the past four months he has lost some of his positions. However, this is probably not so much due to his own personal performance, but rather to the fact that in the most recent April survey we included Anatolii Hrytsenko, who is seen as a certain alternative to the main politicians. He is a new face. He was a relatively “tough” Minister of Defense and also positions himself as a “strong hand.”

So you think that some of Tyahnybok’s supporters moved to Hrytsenko because they have a similar image of strong-willed, authoritarian-type leaders who are capable of “restoring order”?

That is generally how people perceive Hrytsenko. Therefore, I believe that the 2–2.5% decline in Tyahnybok’s rating occurred due to the entry of Anatolii Hrytsenko into the presidential race, whom we included in this list for the first time.

As for Viktor Yushchenko, his rating is stable; over four months it has neither increased nor decreased. At present, it stands at around 7%. It should be said that this is also a certain point at which his rating is likely to remain for quite some time. These are the main positions.

And what about Yanukovych?

Viktor Yanukovych is traditionally perceived rather negatively in Lviv. At present, 4% of Lviv residents are ready to vote for him. On the one hand, this is very little, but on the other hand, it is somewhat more than a year or two ago.

And what has been the dynamic over the past four months?

His rating has been stable. It has not moved in any direction. That is, the people who have gradually become disappointed in the current authorities have not chosen Yanukovych as an alternative. No matter how you look at it, he is not accepted in Western Ukraine, and particularly in Lviv.

So we can say that in Lviv the supporters of the main political figures have already made their choices and the overall picture has stabilized. Are any surprises still possible?

I do not think that any surprises should be expected, even though about 10% of Lviv residents remain undecided. Practice shows that these 10% will in fact be choosing among four candidates — Yatseniuk, Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko. And people tend to vote for those who are leaders, who have a chance to win. Therefore, in practice, it is Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko who will compete for the votes of the 10% of Lviv residents who have not yet decided.

I should also say that in our survey about 10% are ready to vote “against all” in the presidential election, and slightly less than 5% do not intend to participate in the election at all. On the one hand, this group can be considered small, but on the other hand, these figures are higher than last year or the year before. People are disappointed. You know that usually those who vote “against all” make up no more than 2–3%. In our surveys, this figure now stands at as much as 10%, three or even four times higher than usual. However, I think that as the elections approach and the active phase of the campaign begins, a significant share of these people will decide and vote.

We are now talking about ratings in percentages, but could you translate these percentages into absolute numbers?

I am not ready to operate with exact absolute numbers, but we can make a rough calculation. If there are about 530,000 voters in Lviv, then this means that roughly one in five — just over 100,000 — are ready to vote for Tymoshenko. For Yatseniuk, it is 23.3%, meaning about one in four, around 120,000 voters. These are absolute numbers from the total electorate. However, about 70% of voters will actually come to the polls. Presidential elections are more important for people, and turnout is usually higher. Perhaps about 75% will come to vote in Lviv — that would be roughly 420,000 voters. Calculations should be based on this number.

It would be interesting to draw an electoral map of Ukraine from the point of view of different politicians. On such a map, Lviv, for example, would be a city of 120,000 voters for Yatseniuk, but only 15,000 for Yanukovych…

I agree. It would be interesting to compare Lviv with other million-plus cities. Then one should speak not only about percentages and ratings, but also about the absolute weight of the population. After all, 20% in Lviv may correspond in absolute numbers to only 5% in Donetsk. And that is what the competition is about. For Yanukovych, of course, Lviv is not very interesting, but still — the larger the city, the greater its weight in the national sample.

Can one draw a group portrait of a Lviv voter who supports one candidate or another?

We can talk about those candidates who enjoy significant support in Lviv, namely Yatseniuk, Tymoshenko, and Tyahnybok, who has twice the support of Yushchenko. So I would focus on these three typical electorates.

Supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko, who four years ago were considered a protest electorate — that is, people who opposed the authorities and wanted change — have now become the least protest-oriented, since Tymoshenko is in power. This does not mean that the electorate has changed — that four years ago one group voted for Tymoshenko and now another does. These are the same people, but they have changed their attitude toward their leader. And because Tymoshenko is now prime minister and part of the governing authorities, they have also changed their attitude toward politics in the country. As a result, they are currently not ready for early elections or for protest actions.

Are Tymoshenko’s supporters mainly women or men, and what is their age?

Sixty percent of Tymoshenko’s electorate are women and 40% are men. For example, for Lytvyn the picture is the opposite — 65% of his supporters are men. The same is true for Tyahnybok, where 60% of his supporters are also men.

If we continue to draw an average Lviv supporter of Tymoshenko, it is a woman under 30 years old and among the less affluent, which translates into the socialist and populist attitudes characteristic of this electorate. We have already mentioned that compared to a year ago, Tymoshenko’s rating has dropped significantly, by about 10 percentage points, and she has accordingly suffered electoral losses, including in Lviv. However, the 20% who are currently ready to vote for Yulia Tymoshenko are the most confident in their choice. They may be disappointed in Tymoshenko herself, in the economic crisis, in the Ukrainian authorities, and in the electoral process, but they do not see another option or another politician they could vote for. Therefore, she still has a stable core electorate. And as I said earlier, her ratings are unlikely to fall further.

Supporters of Arsenii Yatseniuk

Very different people are his supporters. This is primarily because he is a new name among presidential candidates and represents a relatively new political force. In fact, the core of his electorate consists of people who just a year ago were supporters of Our Ukraine or Viktor Yushchenko, meaning a center-right electorate. It was precisely from among Yushchenko’s supporters that Yatseniuk’s rating began to grow — at least initially. But that was only the beginning. The subsequent growth, the roughly 5 percentage points he gained this year, came at the expense of Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has already bottomed out at 6–7% and is unlikely to fall further. At this point, Yatseniuk is already gaining support from the Tymoshenko Bloc.

Since Yatseniuk’s electorate is being replenished by supporters of different politicians, it has become quite heterogeneous. His electorate is not clearly defined. However, it can be said that almost half of Yatseniuk’s supporters are people under 40 years of age. These are mostly young and active people. They are ready to participate in protest actions, meaning they are more politically active than others. They are among the most financially secure — not necessarily the richest, but those who have been least affected by the economic crisis. These are people who are able to cope even in the difficult conditions in which we now find ourselves.

At the same time, they declaratively seek stability. When we ask people whether they want radical change or stability, Yatseniuk’s supporters overwhelmingly choose stability. These are likely people involved in business, who depend on the economic and political situation in the country. For them, stability is the best option; they do not want radical change. They want to continue living as they have been living, to grow gradually, without revolution and without collapse.

These are interesting people — ready to go to a revolution in order to achieve stability.

That is the paradox. They choose Yatseniuk as someone who is perceived as a pragmatist, a supporter of the European course, and not associated with radical or unpredictable decisions, unlike, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko.

The main advantage of Yatseniuk is that he is seen as a new face in politics, someone not implicated in corruption. That is why Lviv residents are willing to give him a chance in the upcoming presidential election.

Supporters of Oleh Tyahnybok

Tyahnybok also has a very clearly defined electorate. Both he and his political force have for a long time been consistently articulating the same positions and are ideologically well defined. The vast majority of Tyahnybok’s supporters have supported him for many years. We see that his roughly 10% in the presidential race or the 17.5–18% for the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda in parliamentary elections were accumulated gradually, step by step. There have been no sudden spikes; the growth of his rating has been steady.

Back in 2006, about 3% of the population of Lviv Oblast voted for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. Today, according to our surveys, almost 18% in Lviv are ready to vote for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. This is significant growth, but it took four full years. This gradual growth is very good for this politician and this political force, because these people come consciously and are not likely to defect to another party tomorrow.

Please describe the portrait of a voter who would vote for Oleh Tyahnybok.

As I said, most of Tyahnybok’s supporters are men, and almost two thirds of them are over 40 years old. These are people with clearly defined views. They come to Svoboda not because of some short-term campaign or political situation, but consciously, seriously, and for the long term, often for ideological reasons. We can say that about half of Svoboda’s supporters choose ideology over the economy. For Ukraine, this is a very high figure.

Everyone who votes for Tyahnybok trusts him, but not everyone who votes for Svoboda is ready to vote for Tyahnybok as a presidential candidate. They do not believe he can win, and therefore they do not see the point in voting for him. Some of them will vote for Yatseniuk, and a very small share for Tymoshenko.

Both Yatseniuk’s and Tyahnybok’s supporters favor holding early elections at all levels — presidential, parliamentary, and local. This is understandable, since these political forces are not represented in power and want their representatives there. In contrast, the Tymoshenko Bloc and Tymoshenko’s supporters are categorically opposed to any early elections.

Supporters of Viktor Yanukovych

There is only one thing that can be stated with certainty: they are predominantly Russian-speaking people, mostly of retirement age and with higher education. Yanukovych, like the Party of Regions, has in Lviv taken over the votes of those who always voted for socialists and communists. In fact, this pro-Russian vector was transferred to Yanukovych from those two political forces. He himself did not create it here.

Anothers to add, about another 0.5% of Yanukovych’s rating consists of people who vote for him simply to express their disagreement with the Orange politicians. He is the only politician from the “non-Orange” camp who has gained any support in Western Ukraine. Even Oleksandr Moroz, who had 1% in Lviv in December, now has zero; Symonenko has 0.1%.

Lytvyn could also be considered a kind of alternative for some Lviv voters, but the 3% he has are simply people who personally view Lytvyn positively. In the second round, they would vote for someone — or perhaps not come at all. Between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko they might refuse to choose, but between Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk they would likely choose Yatseniuk as a real alternative. In 2006, Lytvyn’s entire campaign was built on the idea of the need for an alternative and a unifying force. In that sense, in a second round his supporters would vote for Yatseniuk.

So Yatseniuk has the greatest growth potential in Lviv?

Yes, because he is perceived as a new politician. Given that Tymoshenko’s rating has been declining over the past one to two years, I do not see a reason why it would suddenly start growing now. Of course, it might increase slightly due to an active campaign, visits, and agitation, but this is unlikely to change the overall picture. Her decline has stopped, and during the campaign she may gain one or two percentage points as people make their final decisions, but she is unlikely to take first place in Lviv or Lviv Oblast.

• In spring 2009, rising prices and the devaluation of the hryvnia are becoming increasingly painful issues for Lviv residents. 51.4% believe that the situation in Ukraine is deteriorating, while 40.3% think it is not changing. Only 2.1% of respondents feel that the situation in the country is improving.
• Only 7.5% of respondents have not felt the effects of the financial and economic crisis in Ukraine. 47.3% have felt the impact of the crisis very seriously, and another 42.9% have felt it to some extent.
• 85.6% of respondents are most concerned about rising prices (in December it was 73.4%), and 40.3% are concerned about the depreciation of the hryvnia (in December it was 33.9%). At the same time, concern about job losses decreased from 48% to 29.1%, and concern about delayed wage payments decreased from 20.1% to 12.5%.
• 58% of respondents personally are ready to take part in various protest actions, including due to non-payment of salaries or pensions (44.5%), deterioration of their personal financial situation (41.4%), rising prices or utility tariffs (40%), and the tense political situation in the country (33.6%). 22% are ready to protest for money or some form of remuneration.
• 11.9% are ready to participate in all of the listed protest actions. 33.4% are confident that they will not take part in any of these protest actions.
• Lviv residents want to primarily elect deputies rather than parties. 49% are against introducing a bicameral Parliament in Ukraine. 26.3% of respondents are ready to support the introduction of a bicameral Parliament, while 24.6% are undecided.
• Residents of Lviv are mostly against early elections. In particular, 47.6% do not support early elections to the Verkhovna Rada (45.5% are in favor), and 52.3% are against early presidential elections (40.9% are in favor). Notably, 37.9% support both early parliamentary and early presidential elections, while 43.9% support neither early presidential nor parliamentary elections.
• Lviv residents do not support elections being held under the existing proportional electoral system with closed party lists. This applies both to elections to the Verkhovna Rada, where only 10.4% called it optimal, and to local council elections, where only 10% consider it the best option.
• Respondents view the majoritarian electoral system most favorably. 33.6% consider it the best for parliamentary elections, and 36.6% for local elections. 20.3% believe that a proportional system with open lists is optimal for elections to the Verkhovna Rada, while 17.5% consider it the best for local elections. 22% believe that a mixed system, combining proportional and majoritarian elements, is the best electoral system.
• In Lviv, the Yatsenyuk Bloc became the leader of electoral support in parliamentary elections. The Hrytsenko Bloc passes the 3% threshold.
• Since the beginning of the year, support for the Yatsenyuk Bloc has increased from 13.6% to 21.4%, allowing it to overtake the BYuT, which has 19.1%. Third place belongs to Svoboda with 16.5%. More than 3% was received by Our Ukraine (5.3%), the Party of Regions (4.4%), and the Hrytsenko Bloc (3.4%).
• Voters’ motives in supporting political forces differ. 40% of BYuT supporters have supported this force for a long time and have not become disillusioned with it, while another 40% have become disappointed but still consider it the best among the alternatives. Meanwhile, 82% of Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters and 48% of Svoboda supporters began supporting these forces recently because they became disappointed with others.
• Notably, 22% of Hrytsenko Bloc supporters support it “out of spite” toward another political force.
• In Lviv, trust in Yushchenko and Tymoshenko continues to decline. Over the past year, trust in Viktor Yushchenko in Lviv has fallen from 77.3% to 22.8%, and trust in Yulia Tymoshenko has fallen from 85.4% to 37.4%. Distrust in the President stands at 66.9%, and in the Prime Minister at 57.1%.
• At the same time, since the beginning of the year, trust in all national leaders has declined, most notably in Oleh Tiahnybok (from 56.6% to 42.6%) and Yurii Lutsenko (from 39.3% to 28.9%). The exception is Arsenii Yatsenyuk, whose level of trust has not changed since the beginning of the year.
• The highest levels of trust among Lviv residents are enjoyed by Yatsenyuk (63.3%), Tiahnybok (42.6%), and Tymoshenko (37.4%). Only Yatsenyuk has a positive trust balance (+35.3%). Respondents were most uncertain in their attitudes toward Anatolii Hrytsenko (18.3%).
• The politician who is most distrusted in Lviv is traditionally Viktor Yanukovych (89.3%).
• In the presidential elections in Lviv, Yatsenyuk leads with 23.3%, followed by Tymoshenko with 19.5%, and Tiahnybok with 10.4%. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has stabilized at 6.9%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko is fifth with 5.5%. 10.8% of respondents would not vote for any of the candidates, and another 9.5% have not decided.
• It is interesting that in Yulia Tymoshenko’s electorate in Lviv, 59% are women, while among Volodymyr Lytvyn’s voters, 65% are men. The highest shares of voters with higher education are found among Viktor Yanukovych’s and Anatolii Hrytsenko’s supporters.

• Two thirds of Lviv residents are convinced that Lviv should transfer no more than 30% of its funds to the state budget. Two thirds of Lviv residents are convinced that Lviv should transfer no more than 30% of its funds to the state budget. According to 41.1%, the situation in Lviv is deteriorating. 43.9% believe that the situation in Lviv is not changing, while 10% say it is improving.
• Since the beginning of the year, the thesis that Lviv today primarily needs radical change has been strengthening. The share of supporters of this view has increased from 53.4% to 57.9%. 36.4% believe that at the moment Lviv needs stability more than change.
• Trust in A. Sadovyi has decreased since the beginning of the year from 44.3% to 39.3%. 49% do not trust the mayor, compared to 46% in December. 24.9% trust M. Kmit, while 49.4% do not trust the head of the Lviv Regional State Administration. Trust in the head of the regional council, M. Senyk, stands at 14.4%, while distrust is 61.4%.
• 21.1% of respondents are convinced that Lviv should not transfer any funds to the state budget. Another 22.6% think it should transfer only 10%, 23.6% a share of 30%. Only 11.9% believe the city should give half of its funds to the state treasury, and another 7.1% think it should give 70%.
• Under conditions of crisis, 21% of Lviv residents are not at all concerned about the city’s preparation for Euro 2012. In December 2008, this share was 16.3%. Those who are very concerned about preparations for Euro 2012 now account for 32% (previously 29.4%). 42.5% are somewhat concerned about preparations for the European Football Championship.
• 44.3% of Lviv residents do not believe that former judge Zvarych will be convicted for corruption. 32% believe that I. Zvarych will be convicted. 16.9% of respondents are undecided on this issue. According to 20.8% of respondents, it would be more appropriate to release former judge I. Zvarych in exchange for him revealing the names of high-ranking officials involved in corruption. At the same time, 61.5% are convinced that he should be convicted. 17.8% were unable to answer this question.
• In the elections to the Lviv City Council, the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda is leading with 19.3%. Also among the top three are the Yatseniuk Bloc (19%) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, whose support has fallen from 23.1% in December 2008 to 16.9%. These trends are mainly explained by the demand for new forces. In particular, 43.3% of surveyed Lviv residents expect the emergence in Lviv of a qualitatively new political force that would truly represent the interests of Lviv residents. 32% do not expect such a political force to appear.
• Close to passing into the city council are Our Ukraine (5.3%), the Party of Regions (3.6%), and the Civic Party Pora (2.6%). The share of those who intend to vote “against all” has increased over four months from 8.6% to 12.8%, while the number of those who are undecided has decreased from 10.8% to 7.4%.
• 92.6% of Lviv residents go to church on Easter to have their paskas blessed, and 45.9% observe the conditions of the Easter fast. 97.8% of city residents celebrate Easter, while only 1.9% do not. Only 5.1% do not have their paskas blessed on Easter. Almost two thirds of them are men, and almost half have higher or incomplete higher education. 40.4% of respondents do not observe the conditions of the Easter fast, with men and women represented almost equally. 13.8% were undecided on this question.

Oleksii Antypovych for “Expert Ukraine”

• The elections of deputies to the Ternopil Regional Council produced sensational results. They showed that a politician who relies on behind-the-scenes agreements can lose the trust of voters within a single month. Only four days after the elections, on 19 March, deputies of the new convocation of the Ternopil Regional Council gathered for a session. It took place despite the decision of the Kyiv District Administrative Court of 18 March banning the official publication of the election results. In addition, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc withdrew its deputies from the regional council and appealed to the прокуратура demanding that legality be ensured.
• In the new regional council, the number of Tymoshenko Bloc deputies turned out to be unexpectedly small — only 12. The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” received the largest number of seats (50 deputies). The Yedynyi Tsentr party secured 20 mandates, the Party of Regions 14. Another 11 deputies represent the Ukrainian People’s Party bloc, eight represent Our Ukraine, and five the Lytvyn Bloc.
• Despite the chaotic nature of the electoral process (the elections were canceled 12 days before the voting date and reinstated again one day before the vote) and the sensational nature of the results, the outcome of these local elections is indicative on a national scale. Although parliament decided to cancel the elections and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc tried to derail the vote, the elections took place. This should serve as a lesson for politicians: the issue of power must be decided at polling stations, not in courts or parliamentary back rooms. And if deputies decide to boycott elections, such a campaign must be launched at least three weeks before election day with appropriate information support. The Tymoshenko Bloc’s efforts to disrupt the elections were relatively successful only in the regional center, where turnout was record low. Many residents of the region never learned that the elections were being challenged and came to polling stations on the appointed day. Leaders of the Tymoshenko Bloc claim that one of the reasons for the high activity in rural polling stations was falsification by the regional administration. Most residents of Ternopil region think otherwise. When asked “Were there falsifications in the elections?”, 26% of voters answered no, 41% reported minor violations that could not seriously affect the results of the campaign, and only 20% said there were many cases of falsification, although two thirds of them did not participate in the elections and therefore could not have been witnesses to violations. At the same time, three quarters of respondents in our survey say they perceive the court lawsuits of the Tymoshenko Bloc as an attempt to cancel unfavorable voting results.
• Three Galician defeats of Tymoshenko
• The election campaign in Ternopil was short — only three months — and very dynamic. The Tymoshenko Bloc, which was the favorite and planned to fight for monopoly power in the region, suffered a crushing defeat. The battle for Ternopil may become decisive in choosing a strategy for the presidential campaign both for Yulia Tymoshenko and for her opponents. The decline in the rating of Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine, which began in 2006, surprises no one. The cooling of sympathy for the Tymoshenko Bloc is also not news. But the fall of Tymoshenko’s personal rating is a truly new trend. Back in January, the level of voter trust in the prime minister in the region was one and a half times higher than the rating of her party. In February, Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating fell from 24% to 17% and became equal to the party’s rating.
• There are several reasons for this decline. One is the impact of the economic crisis. Sociological surveys conducted in February by Rating Group show that 58% of residents of the region are convinced that Tymoshenko, as head of government, is incapable of overcoming the economic crisis, and 40% believe that she is not even trying to do so. The second reason is fatigue in Galicia from the Yushchenko–Tymoshenko confrontation: over the past year, two thirds of voters have worsened their attitude toward both the prime minister and the president. Thus, the image of a hardworking Yulia Tymoshenko, who is prevented from working by the head of state, has been almost destroyed. (Interestingly, 55% of respondents are convinced that if Yushchenko were not president and Tymoshenko remained prime minister, she would find other people to blame for her mistakes.) Finally, the third argument, very important for residents of Western Ukraine, is the prime minister’s pro-Russian foreign policy. Almost two thirds of those surveyed believe that over the past six months the Ukrainian prime minister has been moving closer to the Russian leadership. At the same time, the majority (69%) are convinced that it is Vladimir Putin, not Yulia Tymoshenko, who benefits from their mutual agreements, and only 18% believe that the Ukrainian prime minister benefits.
• These elections will long be associated with Tymoshenko’s defeat: a few days before them, the Tymoshenko Bloc managed to punish itself. Its loyal voters were disoriented by calls to boycott the campaign, yet the Bloc failed either to disrupt the elections or to remove itself from the ballots. As a result, the Tymoshenko Bloc reduced its own result by at least half.
• Now the time has come for Yulia Tymoshenko to make tough кадрові decisions. Local party members were the main initiators of these elections, seeking to put an end to the power of representatives of the presidential secretariat in the region. In the end, they proved unable to conduct the campaign, although they once planned to hold early mayoral elections in Ternopil at the same time, but this was stopped in Kyiv.
• The Ternopil lessons
• For Svoboda, these elections may open the road to the Verkhovna Rada. It is now obvious to everyone that, with similar voter support in other Galician regions, this force would be able to overcome the electoral threshold (unless, of course, it is suddenly raised to five or seven percent). Strangely enough, Svoboda’s victory plays into the hands of the Party of Regions and the Communists, who in parliamentary races will actively exploit the thesis of the threat of radical Ukrainian nationalism. This will bring them additional votes in the south-east.
• For Yedynyi Tsentr, these elections may not bring significant dividends, but supporters of Presidential Secretariat head Viktor Baloga are clearly not among the losers. The campaign showed that administrative resources work, as does the bet on non-ideological regional leaders who enjoy a high degree of voter trust. Therefore, changing the electoral law from proportional to majoritarian, or as a compromise moving to open lists, is a priority task for Yedynyi Tsentr. This is its only path to parliament. By and large, the strong result of Yedynyi Tsentr is not so much the merit of Viktor Baloga or Ihor Kryil, but primarily a reflection of the trust of regional residents in specific candidates from the party list. Incidentally, last week Kryil registered in parliament a draft Electoral Code that contains this very model.
• The result of the Party of Regions — almost ten percent — is unexpected and is rather the result of network electoral technologies than party campaigning. A high result in the northern districts of Ternopil region (as in the 2007 elections) was delivered by voters oriented toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Pochaiv Lavra is located in the region, and local clergy enjoy authority among residents of nearby villages and do not hide their positive attitude toward the Party of Regions. It is unlikely that the Party of Regions will be able to repeat the Ternopil result across all of Western Ukraine in parliamentary elections, although it may double its traditional two-to-three-percent rating there.
• The most important lesson from these elections should be learned by Yulia Tymoshenko. If the prime minister does not change her attitude toward Russia, does not change her rhetoric toward Viktor Yushchenko, and does not revise a government policy based on making many statements that are later not backed by concrete decisions, she may permanently lose the trust of voters in western regions of Ukraine.
• Although Svoboda came first in the party race in Ternopil region, its leader Oleh Tyahnybok is not the most popular politician in the region. That position belongs to Arsenii Yatseniuk, whose rating is about 30%. In terms of trust, he is twice as popular as both Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, not to mention Viktor Yanukovych.
• The participation in the Ternopil elections of a political force directly supported by the former speaker could have seriously influenced their outcome. It is possible that such a force might even have won the elections, since the potential electoral core of Arsenii Yatseniuk is located precisely in the west of the country. In him, as in Tyahnybok, voters see an alternative to the current politicians. However, the leader of the Front for Change did not enter the Ternopil battle.
• The March electoral campaign in Ternopil region became a challenge not only for politicians but for democracy as a whole. Its results are largely emotional and will soon be reinterpreted by both voters and politicians, which will affect nationwide ratings. These elections underscored the growing demand for new faces in Ukrainian politics and confirmed that campaigns must be conducted in the regions. They proved that the winner will be the one who bets on authoritative local leaders.

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• Only 16.9% believe that these lawsuits would aim to defend the lawful rights of citizens. Overall, 71.5% expect that political forces will challenge the election results in court, while 22.3% do not have such expectations. At the same time, 66.6% are convinced that the court decision to reinstate the elections to the Ternopil Regional Council was fair.
• 68% are convinced that fear of losing was the key reason behind the decision of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc to withdraw from the elections at the last moment. Only 10.9% think that the Bloc sought to save state budget funds in this way, while another 12.9% believe that it was protesting against the illegal nature of these elections. 67.3% believe that the decision of the Verkhovna Rada on 3 March to cancel the Ternopil elections, adopted by the votes of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Party of Regions, was illegal, while 20.4% are confident in its legitimacy.
• 58.3% of respondents think that the political forces that insisted on canceling these elections infringed on the constitutional right of citizens to choose, while 30.5% disagree with this. 58.3% of all respondents in Ternopil are confident that the elections were conducted honestly and democratically. Among those who came to the polling stations on 15 March, 71.1% are convinced that the elections were fair and democratic.
• 25.9% are confident that there were no falsifications in the elections, while 40.8% believe there were minor violations that could not significantly affect the election results. Among the 19.9% who think that there were significant falsifications in the elections to the regional council, two thirds did not take part in the elections. 10.2% of respondents intended to vote in the regional council elections but were convinced that the elections had been canceled.
• 33% said they voted on 15 March. 17% wanted to come to the elections but could not find the time. Only 36% had no intention of participating in the early elections. 38.3% of respondents knew whom they would vote for long before the elections, 22.6% decided during the last few weeks, 15.1% decided in the last week, and 22.9% made their decision on election day.
• The most important reason for their choice of a political force, according to 36% of respondents, was that it best defends Ukrainian interests. 19.4% chose a party based on the principle of “the lesser evil,” 14.9% because it is represented by professional managers who have proven their ability to effectively run the region, 14.3% expressed in this way a protest against another political force and/or politician, and 8.3% supported the leader of that force at the national level in this way.

• 7.2% of respondents think that the economic crisis in Ukraine will be overcome within the next six months, another 19.2% within the next year, and 38.7% in 2–3 years. On the other hand, 13.9% believe that the overcoming of the economic crisis will take no sooner than in 4–5 years. 5.2% are convinced that the economic crisis in the country will not be overcome at all. 15.7% were unable to answer this question.
• 32.7% think that today in Ukraine the economic crisis is felt more strongly than the political one (16.4%). At the same time, 41.8% of respondents believe that today Ukraine is experiencing both a political and an economic crisis. Only 1.3% do not feel any crisis. 7.8% were unable to answer this question.
• In overcoming the economic crisis in Ukraine, 63.4% of respondents rely on themselves, 18.5% on domestic business, 7.6% on assistance from other countries, and only 6.1% on the authorities. 4.4% were unable to answer this question.
• 56.5% think that in conditions of crisis the authorities most lack an understanding of the problems of ordinary citizens, 54.4% a respect for the law, 45.4% unity, and 35.2% common sense. One third believe that the authorities lack professionalism, and 27.1% believe they lack decisiveness.

• To the question “Under what conditions are you personally ready to take part in protest actions?” 37.8% of respondents answered that they are not ready to take part in protests under any circumstances. 16.2% could not answer this question.
• At the same time, 35.6% of respondents (the largest share) are ready to take part in protest actions if there are delays in salary or pension payments, 27.1% — if they (or members of their families) are dismissed from work, and 22.2% — in the case of violations of their rights and freedoms. Only 15.4% are ready to take part in protests in the event of early parliamentary elections, and 4.3% — in the event of early presidential elections.
• 61.3% would not agree to take part in a protest action against the current authorities even if they were offered financial compensation. 19.1% are ready to participate in a protest action against the authorities for money. 19.6% were undecided on this question.

• 48.9% of respondents believe that the issue of reforming the Constitution of Ukraine is not timely this year, and only 23.8% are convinced that it is relevant this year. 27.3% could not answer this question.
• At the same time, 63.4% are confident that amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine should be approved only by a nationwide referendum, 12.1% — by a vote in the Verkhovna Rada, 2.9% — by the signature of the President, 1.2% — by the signature of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. 18.7% were undecided on this issue.
• 47.3% of respondents do not support calling early elections to the Verkhovna Rada, 36.3% support them, and 16.4% are undecided.
• At the same time, 52.7% support calling early presidential elections, while 35.6% do not support them. 11.7% are undecided.
• Respondents evaluate the work of V. Lytvyn as Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada the most positively (25.1%), and the work of V. Stelmakh as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine the least positively (6.8%).
• 72.7% of respondents negatively evaluate the work of V. Yushchenko as President, and 68.8% negatively evaluate the work of Y. Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. Slightly more respondents evaluate V. Yushchenko’s work as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces positively (15.4%) than his work as President of Ukraine (12.3%).
• A quarter of respondents know nothing about the activity of R. Bohatyriova in the position of Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. At the same time, 12.2% evaluate her work positively, and 42.8% negatively.
• 9.7% positively evaluate the work of O. Medvedko as Prosecutor General, and 62.3% negatively.

Party of Regions and Lytvyn Bloc gained the most in March

• Compared to February, the ratings of the leading force — the Party of Regions — increased slightly (from 19.4% to 21.2%), as did the ratings of the Lytvyn Bloc — from 5.5% to 7.4%, moving it into fifth place.
  The second highest level of support belongs to BYuT (18.5%).
  The Yatseniuk Bloc is third (9.4%) and is ahead of the Communist Party of Ukraine (8.1%).
• Support for Our Ukraine and Svoboda is close to the 3% electoral threshold.
  The share of respondents who support no party or have not decided decreased in March to 14.8% and 9.6%, respectively.

Yanukovych, Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk remain the leaders in the presidential race

• Viktor Yanukovych remains first in the presidential rating (20.1%).
  The top three also includes Yuliya Tymoshenko (16.8%) and Arseniy Yatseniuk (12.2%), whose ratings remained relatively stable.
• Over the past month, Volodymyr Lytvyn strengthened his position somewhat (7.1%), placing him in fourth place.
  All other candidates have support below 5%.

Oleksii Antypovych, Rating Group

• At the end of February, 78% of respondents were convinced that the early elections in the Ternopil region would take place on time — March 15. Almost 68% expressed readiness to participate in them. Residents of the Ternopil region did not believe that attempts to cancel the local elections were connected with the desire to save money during the crisis — only 19% of respondents thought so. At the same time, 68% are convinced that such attempts are driven by fear of losing the elections.
• The election results could have been symptomatic on the scale of the entire country. The latest sociological studies show several defining trends.
• During the campaign, the fastest growth in support was demonstrated by VO “Svoboda” (from 13.2% in December to 26.4%) and YeTs (from 2.5% to 6.4%). Former leaders of electoral sympathy are now on the margins.
• The decline of NSNU ratings, which began back in 2006, no longer surprises anyone. The cooling of support for BYuT is also not new. But what we now see that is truly new is the decline of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s personal rating. Back in January, trust in and support for the Prime Minister personally exceeded support for BYuT by one third. Now these indicators are equally low — 17%. The loss of Tymoshenko’s electoral strength is the second trend that deserves attention. If the early elections in Kyiv were called Stalingrad for Tymoshenko, then the Ternopil elections could have been a kind of Kursk Bulge for BYuT.
• It is already obvious that leading the Government has not benefited the former Galician favorite (in the last parliamentary elections, more than 50% of voters here voted for BYuT). 68% of Ternopil residents negatively assess her performance as Prime Minister. At the same time, the most popular answers to the question “What or who prevents Yuliia Tymoshenko from governing effectively?” were “Tymoshenko’s own inability to organize work” and “the lack of professionalism of government members” (28% and 13% of respondents respectively), another 15% blame the President and 21% his Secretariat.
• Respondents mostly do not consider Tymoshenko’s complaints about Viktor Yushchenko to be justified. 55% are convinced that if Yushchenko were not President and Tymoshenko were Prime Minister, she would still make mistakes but would find other culprits. 59% consider Tymoshenko personally guilty of the economic crisis (the same share as Yushchenko). Almost the same number (58%) are convinced that, as head of the Government, she is not capable of overcoming this crisis, and 40% think that she is not even trying to do so.
• Almost two thirds of respondents believe that over the last six months Tymoshenko has moved closer to the leadership of Russia. This was supported by a majority of supporters of all parties, including half (!) of BYuT supporters. At the same time, in the West there is a widespread belief that if Tymoshenko secures the support of Vladimir Putin in the 2010 presidential elections, this will only harm her chances of winning; 69% are convinced that from any mutual agreements between Tymoshenko and Putin it is the latter who would benefit. Seeing the hopelessness of such cooperation for the Prime Minister herself and its harmfulness for the country, voters are gradually losing interest in Tymoshenko as a future candidate for President of Ukraine.
• A significant share of voters who are still ready to vote for BYuT are only waiting for someone else to appear. In the case of elections to the Ternopil Oblast Council, this was supposed to be VO “Svoboda.” Who the political process will give birth to at the all-Ukrainian level — time will tell.

• At the end of February, 78% of residents of Ternopil region believed that the early elections to the regional council would take place on time, on 15 March 2009. Only 15% did not believe that the early elections to the regional council would be held on 15 March. 68% of respondents expressed their readiness to take part in these elections. 68% of residents of Ternopil region are convinced that attempts by certain political forces to disrupt the local elections are caused by fear of losing them. Residents of Ternopil region did not believe that attempts by certain political forces to disrupt the local elections were connected with the desire to save state budget funds during the crisis – only 19% believed this.
• Support for the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc in the elections to the Ternopil Regional Council has decreased by one third since December 2008 and by more than half compared to the 2006 elections. The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” is in the lead. Next come the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and “Our Ukraine,” whose support weakened the most in the second half of 2008.
• During the election campaign, the fastest growth in voter support was demonstrated by the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (from 13.2% in December to 26.4%) and by “Yedynyi Tsentr” (from 2.5% to 6.4%). As for the latter, it is worth noting that the relatively high level of trust in the list leader, the head of the regional state administration Y. Chyzhmar (16%), allowed Yedynyi Tsentr to count on higher electoral dividends from the campaign.
• The Lytvyn Bloc closes the group of parties expected to pass the electoral threshold. The Ukrainian People’s Party, “Pora,” and the Party of Regions also had chances to compete for representation in the regional council, as their ratings were close to the electoral threshold.
• The main reason for the growth of support for the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” is disappointment in the traditional leaders of electoral preferences (the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and “Our Ukraine”). In particular, over just the last month, Yulia Tymoshenko’s personal rating (in the presidential elections) decreased from 25% to 17%. The downward trajectory of Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating as a result of the crisis repeats the dynamics of support for the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. At the same time, respondents who in December–January did not support any political force intended in February to vote mainly for the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda.”

• 42% of respondents wanted to receive compensation for their Oshchadbank deposits but did not receive it. Only 32% both wanted and received compensation from Oshchadbank. 22% did not want to receive compensation for lost deposits. 4% were undecided.
• Only 19% of respondents still expect Yulia Tymoshenko to fulfill her campaign promise to return Oshchadbank deposits. 81% (including 80% of BYuT supporters) do not expect Y. Tymoshenko to return the deposits.
• According to 36% of respondents, Y. Tymoshenko bears the main responsibility for the suspension of compensation payments for lost Oshchadbank deposits. Another 22% place the main responsibility on Viktor Yushchenko, while 31% believe that Y. Tymoshenko and V. Yushchenko share equal responsibility. 5% do not consider either of them responsible. Only 1% of respondents said they did not feel the suspension of payments for lost Oshchadbank deposits. 5% were undecided.
• Almost half of respondents (46%), answering the question “How did Y. Tymoshenko’s attempt to fulfill the promise of compensation for Oshchadbank deposits affect the economic situation?”, said it had a negative impact because people received additional funds and prices increased. At the same time, the same share of respondents (46%) noted a positive impact of compensation payments for lost Oshchadbank deposits on the economic situation, as people received additional money.

Oleksii Antypovych for the newspaper Express (No. 24)

• The decline in the ratings of Our Ukraine and Viktor Yushchenko is no longer news. Today, the trajectory of falling ratings is being repeated by the BYuT bloc, especially in Western Ukraine. The early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council, scheduled for March 15, may record this defeat: any result in the repeat elections below the 50% that BYuT gained in the previous elections cannot be considered a victory.
• Sociological studies show that since the 2007 early elections, BYuT’s ratings in the Ternopil region have almost halved.
• The main trigger for disappointment was the policy of confrontation between the two key Orange politicians.
• The situation collapsed with the onset of the economic crisis. People are dissatisfied with the authorities: in 2008, only 1.7% of voters in the Ternopil region assessed the Prime Minister’s work fully positively, 21% rather positively, while 73.1% assessed Yulia Tymoshenko’s performance negatively. Even among BYuT supporters, more than half—53%—are critical of the Prime Minister’s activities. According to these results, Tymoshenko’s rating could potentially fall by another half.
• One may assume that voters choose Y. Tymoshenko only due to the absence of a real alternative candidate.
• In addition to the difficult economic situation, the main reason for the negative dynamics of BYuT’s rating is the bloc leader’s inability to establish constructive cooperation with the President—something expected by 65% of her voters (the same share of Yushchenko’s supporters also hope for this). Whereas earlier the majority placed responsibility for the conflict on the President and his entourage, now only 18% of the region’s residents do so.
• Y. Tymoshenko is also reproached for failing to fulfill key campaign promises, such as not abolishing military conscription (64.7% of voters) and suspending payments of lost savings in the Savings Bank (66.7%).
• Economic miscalculations by the government also did not go unnoticed. 73.7% of voters blame Y. Tymoshenko for rising prices.
• Voters reacted no less sensitively to the political somersaults of the BYuT leader.
• 67.9% of voters do not support Tymoshenko’s rapprochement with Vladimir Putin.
• BYuT’s ratings in the Ternopil region were particularly damaged by joint voting with the Party of Regions: only 18.4% believed this was necessary to restore order in the country. The rest perceived such behavior as an attempt to please Russia or to take revenge on the President. Joint voting for the de facto official status of the Russian language in Ukraine was approved by only 3.6% of Ternopil residents, while 56% believe that BYuT either complied with the Party of Regions’ demands or that the language issue is unimportant to Y. Tymoshenko.
• People are especially troubled by problems they encounter at the local level. On these issues, virtually none of the parties represented in Ternopil’s authorities has much to boast about. But, as always, the greatest responsibility lies with leaders at the national level.
• To the question, “Representatives of which political force earn the most from land deals?” 31.7% of voters—the highest share—named BYuT. The same proportion consider BYuT representatives in the executive branch guilty of embezzling funds allocated for flood relief.
• Most striking is that 30% of Tymoshenko’s own voters share this view. This effectively means that BYuT is losing support even among its sympathizers.
• Overall, one can also note a change in the profile of Yulia Tymoshenko’s electorate. If earlier the most patriotically minded citizens voted for the current Prime Minister, now these are people neutral toward the national idea or even oriented pro-Russian.
• BYuT’s decline is the most striking, but other political players are also disappointing their voters. As a result, there is no automatic transfer of sympathies. Rather, we are seeing total disillusionment followed by refusal to participate in voting.
• The election campaign in Ternopil forces politicians to reflect. Therefore, it is not surprising that so many have appeared who want these elections canceled.

Compared to December last year (survey conducted 8–15 December 2008), support for the Party of Regions fell from 25.4% to 19.4%, and for Our Ukraine from 4% to 2.4%. At the same time, support increased for Yatsenyuk’s Bloc (from 7.5% to 10.1%) and for the Communists (from 7.4% to 9.2%).
The ratings of BYuT and the Lytvyn Bloc changed only marginally.

In addition, the number of respondents who do not support any party or are undecided increased.

Among political leaders, the biggest drop was recorded for Viktor Yanukovych, whose support declined from 25.1% to 18.9%. The largest increase was for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, whose rating rose from 8.1% to 12.9%. The ratings of Yulia Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Symonenko remained almost unchanged.

Again, the share of respondents who do not support any political leader or are undecided also increased.

• 52% of respondents consider the demand by the Party of Regions faction to put the issue of the government’s resignation to a vote in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 5 February 2009 to be untimely. At the same time, 36% view this demand as timely, while 12% were unable to answer.
• Only 11% of those surveyed assessed the opposition’s chances of dismissing the government on 5 February 2009 as high, whereas nearly half (47%) considered them low, and another 25% rated them as “50–50.” 17% were undecided.
• 60% of respondents believe that bringing the issue of Tymoshenko’s government’s resignation to a vote was more advantageous for the coalition, while only 24% think it benefited the opposition. 16% could not decide.

The decline in the ratings of Our Ukraine and President Viktor Yushchenko, which began back in 2006 and now seems to have reached its lowest point, is no longer news. Today, the focus of attention not only for politicians and journalists but also for citizens is the dynamics of BYuT’s ratings, especially in Western Ukraine, where Yulia Tymoshenko and her political force are rapidly losing support. The early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council, scheduled for March 15, 2009, could lock in this defeat, because any result below the 50% that BYuT received in the previous elections would be seen as a loss.

Sociological surveys conducted in Ternopil Oblast show that since the 2007 early parliamentary elections, BYuT’s ratings have fallen by more than half. Since October 2008, Tymoshenko’s personal rating has dropped by 10 percentage points. In local elections, the situation looks even worse: BYuT’s support at the regional level is lower than at the national level. As a result, Arseniy Yatsenyuk has become the leader of public sympathy in the oblast.

A decline in trust in Tymoshenko has also been recorded in Lviv Oblast. In March 2008, 85% trusted Tymoshenko and 77% trusted Yushchenko, but by October 2008 these figures had fallen to 53% and 39% respectively. This is not surprising. In Western Ukraine, people are tired of being hostages to the conflict between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. The latest political crisis, driven by their constant confrontation, became a key trigger for disillusionment. The economic crisis, which affected almost every Ukrainian family, further deepened dissatisfaction. People are unhappy with the authorities, which at both the local and national level are largely represented by BYuT and Our Ukraine. Even though 42% of residents of Lviv Oblast positively assess the government’s anti-crisis efforts, 45% rate them negatively. If these trends continue, they could trigger a wave of local early elections across the country.

In the 2007 parliamentary elections, BYuT achieved record results and secured victories in key strategic regions. The main beneficiary of BYuT’s decline could be Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who is best positioned to capture the “free” votes of disappointed supporters of Our Ukraine and BYuT. Another potential winner is Svoboda, whose rating in Ternopil Oblast rose from 3% to 13% in just one year.

However, Yatsenyuk’s attempts to consolidate his position in Western Ukraine have so far been weak. The leaders of his “Front for Change” movement have been publicly presented only in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. In other regions, they remain largely unknown. This makes it advantageous for Yatsenyuk’s competitors to agree to early elections only if he is not ready for them.

According to the Central Election Commission, regular local elections are scheduled for 2010, while the timing of parliamentary elections remains uncertain. It is widely expected that parliamentary elections will be early, but it is unclear whether they will be held together with the presidential elections.

If early local elections are announced in other regions after Ternopil, BYuT risks losing its leadership in Western Ukraine, or at least cementing its weakened position. On the other hand, if local elections are held together with parliamentary elections, BYuT could rely on Tymoshenko’s personal rating as the core of its campaign.

So the key question remains: will early elections to the Ternopil Regional Council actually take place? Even though the campaign officially started on January 15, 2009, attempts to block the elections scheduled for March 15 cannot be ruled out.

The first sign of this came on January 16, 2009, when 237 MPs from BYuT, Our Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc voted to postpone the consideration of the report of a parliamentary investigative commission into the activities of the Ternopil City Council. That commission, headed by BYuT MP Ivan Denkovych, was established in June 2008 after accusations that the city authorities had illegally distributed land. It was expected that its work would lead to the re-election of the Ternopil mayor and city council. However, BYuT appears to have backed away, possibly after the painful defeat in Kyiv’s early elections or due to pressure from local elites.

At the same time, a December 2008 survey showed that 54% of Ternopil Oblast residents believe the region urgently needs radical change. A high turnout is expected: 40% said they would definitely vote on March 15, 35% probably would, 20% would not, and 5% were undecided. These elections clearly matter to citizens.

If any political force were to sabotage the elections, it would only damage its own ratings. This applies to all parties, including Yatsenyuk, in whom many voters have placed high—perhaps overly high—hopes. Another disappointment amid the crisis would only deepen public distrust.

Ternopil Oblast may not be large, but the political significance of these elections should not be underestimated. That is why leaders of all major political forces—Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Lytvyn, Yanukovych, and Kyrylenko—should publicly and honestly state their positions: Will these elections take place or not? Will early local elections follow in other regions? People deserve clarity about what is really happening in their regions.

• An overwhelming majority of residents of Ternopil Oblast (70%) trust Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Nearly half of those surveyed also trust Yuliia Tymoshenko (46%) and Oleh Tiahnybok (40%).
• Arseniy Yatsenyuk holds the highest presidential rating among residents of Ternopil Oblast. At the same time, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s personal rating declined by 10% compared to the survey conducted in October 2008. Compared to October, Oleh Tiahnybok’s rating increased slightly, while Viktor Yushchenko’s rating remained virtually unchanged.