Press releases

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, 54% of respondents view positively the idea of establishing a Unified Local (Autocephalous) Church in Ukraine. Nineteen percent hold an opposing view, while another 19% express indifference toward this issue.
• Support for the idea of a Unified Local Church is highest in Western Ukraine (68%) and in the Central regions (58%). At the same time, in the South at least 45% support this initiative, while in the East the share of supporters stands at 37%. It should be noted that in the southern and eastern regions, unlike other parts of Ukraine, there is a relatively higher proportion of respondents who are either indifferent or negative toward this topic—around one quarter in each category.
• The idea of a Local Church enjoys particularly strong support among the oldest respondents (61%). Among young people, support stands at about 45%, and among middle-aged respondents at 51%. In terms of religious affiliation, the highest level of support for autocephaly is found among parishioners of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate). In both of these groups, support for the idea of a Unified Local Church exceeds 75%. Among adherents of other denominations, about half support the idea. Among those who consider themselves believers but do not associate with any denomination, support stands at 43%, while among non-believers it is 29%. The strongest opposition to the idea of a Local Church is found among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), where more than half express a negative attitude. Nevertheless, nearly one third of this group (28%) still view autocephaly positively.
• Overall, 36% of respondents believe that the creation of a Unified Local Church would rather unite the country, while 23% say that this initiative would have no impact on social consolidation. At the same time, 24% warn of a possible societal split. Concerns about division following the granting of autocephaly are most common in the East (34%) and among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (57%). In most other regional, age, and confessional groups, however, those who believe that the creation of a Local Church would unite the country outnumber those who hold the opposite view.
• Thirty percent of all respondents believe that Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) should head the Unified Local Church. Seven percent believe that Metropolitan Onufrii of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) should assume this role, while 3% favor Metropolitan Makarii of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Eleven percent believe that none of these figures should lead the Local Church, and 42% have not yet formed an opinion on this issue. Among those who support the creation of a Unified Local Church, preferences regarding potential leaders are similar: Patriarch Filaret is supported by 50%, Metropolitan Onufrii by 5%, and Metropolitan Makarii by 4%. One third of this group has not yet decided who should become the head of the Unified Local Church.
• As a potential leader of the Unified Local Church, Patriarch Filaret enjoys the greatest support among parishioners of the church he leads (57%). His support is somewhat lower among adherents of other denominations: 31% among Greek Catholics, 21% among members of other denominations, and 20% among believers without a specific confessional affiliation. Among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), Metropolitan Onufrii is more often seen as the appropriate leader of a Unified Local Church (29%). At the same time, one in ten respondents in this group would not object to Patriarch Filaret heading the Local Church after autocephaly is granted.
• Thirty-four percent of respondents trust Pope Francis (16% do not trust him). Thirty percent trust Patriarch Filaret (17% do not trust him). Twenty percent trust Bartholomew I, the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (13% do not trust him). Nineteen percent trust Archbishop Sviatoslav, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (12% do not trust him). Sixteen percent trust Metropolitan Onufrii, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (28% do not trust him). Thirteen percent trust Metropolitan Makarii, the primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (12% do not trust him). Only 13% trust Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, while 37% do not trust him.
• Pope Francis, Patriarch Filaret, Bartholomew I, Archbishop Sviatoslav, and Metropolitan Makarii enjoy the highest levels of trust in Western Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufrii has relatively higher levels of trust in the South, while Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church is more trusted in the South and East. Church leaders generally enjoy higher levels of trust among older respondents.
• It should also be noted that some church leaders enjoy respect among adherents of denominations other than those they lead. For example, Pope Francis, in addition to his high level of trust among Greek Catholics, also enjoys high trust among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate). Patriarch Filaret is viewed positively by supporters of both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. A similar pattern applies to Bartholomew I. Archbishop Sviatoslav enjoys relatively high levels of trust among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), while Metropolitan Makarii is trusted among members of both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In contrast, Metropolitan Onufrii and Patriarch Kirill enjoy relatively higher levels of trust exclusively among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

• According to the results of the research carried out by the Rating Group in September-October 2018, 52% of the respondents expressed their readiness to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine with arms in case of corresponding threat (in 2017, this number was 54%, in 2012 - 33%). The highest number of such was recorded in the West (63%), in the Center and South - half. At the same time, in the East, the relative majority (55%) said they were not ready to defend their Fatherland with arms in their hands (35% were ready, 10% have not decided). Patriotism is more obvious among men and wealthy respondents.
• 62% of the polled support the idea of establishing a public holiday of Ukraine Defender’s Day on October 14 (25% do not support). At the same time, a half (51%) oppose the abolition of the celebration of the Fatherland Defender’s day on February 23 (in 2017, this number was somewhat higher - 56%). It should be noted that while the number of the supporters of the holiday introduction on October 14 is higher in the West, the number of the opponents of the Soviet holiday abolition is higher in the South and East. The number of the sympathizers of the idea of establishing the Ukraine Defender’s Day on Pokrova is higher among those with higher income and education level, and also among the rural residents. Interestingly, there are no differences between the genders in question of supporting or not supporting both initiatives. Moreover, among the supporters of the idea of establishing October 14 as the Ukraine Defender’s Day, 42% do not support the abolition of the Soviet holiday celebration on February 23.
• 45% of the respondents support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as members of the struggle for state independence of Ukraine (in 2017 - 49%). One-third have the opposite opinion, almost a quarter did not answer. Since the beginning of research in 2010, the level of support for this initiative has increased 2.5 times.
• The highest number of those who support the recognition of the OUN-UPA is recorded in the West (80%). The Center has 45% of such respondents. The number of those who have the opposite opinion is the highest among the residents of the South and East (respectively, 52% and 46%). The highest number of those who support the idea of the OUN-UPA recognition was recorded among men, those with higher income and education.
• 56% of the respondents are positive towards the idea of reconciliation between the soldiers of the Soviet Army and the OUN-UPA. 22% expressed opposing considerations, 23% hesitated to answer. The highest number of those who are positive towards reconciliation was recorded in the West (70%) and the lowest - in the East (40%). The support for the idea is somewhat higher among men, rural citizens, and older respondents. Among the supporters of the OUN-UPA recognition, 79% agree with the reconciliation idea. At the same time, among those who do not support the idea of the national rebel movement recognition, the number of such is 36%.
• An absolute majority of the respondents (82%) agree with the thesis that during the Second World War soldiers of the Soviet Army defended their Fatherland. However, in comparison with the previous years, this number is somewhat lower (in 2017 - 90%, in 2012 - 96%). 51% of the respondents agree with the thesis that during the Second World War, the OUN-UPA warriors defended their Fatherland. The level of support for the latter thesis is the same as it used to be last year (in comparison with 2012, it has increased 1.5 times). The number of the supporters of the thesis that the soldiers of the OUN-UPA defended their Fatherland is the highest in the West, the lowest - in the South and East.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, 73% of respondents believe that Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction. Only 15% think the country is developing in the right direction, while 13% were undecided. Young people assess the situation more optimistically: about one quarter of youth believe the country is moving in the right direction. Older respondents are the most pessimistic. In electoral terms, dissatisfaction with the current situation is highest among supporters of Vadym Rabinovych, Yurii Boiko, and Yuliia Tymoshenko, while nearly three quarters of Petro Poroshenko’s supporters are convinced that the country’s direction is correct.
• A clear majority (64%) believe the country needs radical changes. At the same time, 12% prefer that everything remain as it is, and 19% support a return to the past. Over recent months, the share of those demanding radical change has slightly decreased, while support for stabilization or a return to previous conditions has grown. Calls for radical change are more common in Western Ukraine, whereas preferences for stabilization or a return to the past are more prevalent in the South and East. Supporters of Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Anatolii Hrytsenko, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, and Andrii Sadovyi most often advocate change; voters of Petro Poroshenko tend to favor stabilization, while supporters of Yurii Boiko and Vadym Rabinovych are more inclined toward a return to the past.
• Regarding parliamentary elections, 42% say they would look for an alternative among new political parties, while 38% intend to vote for parties already represented in parliament. Readiness to support non-parliamentary parties is higher among supporters of Servant of the People, For Life, Svoboda, and among undecided voters. By contrast, voters of parliamentary forces such as BPP Solidarity, Batkivshchyna, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc more often prefer established political projects.
• Two thirds of respondents believe that the 2019 presidential election will not be fair; only 16% think it will be fair, while one quarter were undecided. Skepticism about election fairness is strongest among supporters of Yurii Boiko, Vadym Rabinovych, and among those who do not intend to vote at all.
• Public opinion is split on leadership experience: 43% believe the next president should have significant governing experience, while nearly the same share prefer a new figure without state governance experience. Demand for “new faces” is highest among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, while preference for an experienced politician dominates among supporters of Petro Poroshenko and Yuliia Tymoshenko.
• The top demand placed on the future president is ending the war in Eastern Ukraine (66%). Other expectations include fighting corruption (49%), raising social standards (34%), reviving industry (33%), and improving healthcare quality (24%). Every sixth respondent also expects reduced oligarchic influence, revival of the agricultural sector, and stimulation of business development. In recent months, demand has increased for ending hostilities, improving social standards and healthcare, and supporting business. Younger and middle-aged respondents emphasize anti-corruption, industrial revival, and business development, while older respondents prioritize social standards and healthcare.
• In the presidential vote intention, Yuliia Tymoshenko leads with 13.2% of all respondents. She is followed by Volodymyr Zelenskyi (7.8%), Petro Poroshenko (6.8%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (6.6%), Yurii Boiko (5.7%), Vadym Rabinovych (5.4%), Oleh Liashko (5.2%), and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (5.0%). Other candidates each receive less than 2.5%. 17.0% are undecided, and 12.6% do not plan to vote.
• Support for Tymoshenko is relatively even across regions, with a stronger base in Central Ukraine. Zelenskyi performs better in the Center and South; Poroshenko and Hrytsenko in the West; Boiko and Rabinovych have their strongest support in the South-East.
• The so-called “second-choice” rating indicates that Hrytsenko, Tymoshenko, and Zelenskyi could each gain up to an additional 5% if voters’ primary candidates withdrew. Vakarchuk could gain 4.4%, Rabinovych 3.8%, Sadovyi 3.4%, Liashko 2.8%, Nalyvaichenko and Shevchenko about 2.2% each.
• Petro Poroshenko continues to top the anti-rating: about half of voters would not vote for him under any circumstances. Around a quarter would not support Oleh Liashko, Yuliia Tymoshenko, Arsenii Yatseniuk, or Yurii Boiko; nearly one sixth would not support Vadym Rabinovych or Oleh Tiahnybok.
• Belief in electoral victory has grown for Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko: 18% think Tymoshenko will become president, and 14% believe Poroshenko will win. Fewer than 4% expect victory by other candidates, while nearly half are unsure.
• Only one third of respondents say they would personally participate in rallies or demonstrations in support of their preferred candidate; 62% would not. Willingness to mobilize is highest among supporters of Zelenskyi, Vakarchuk, and Hrytsenko.
• About one third would vote for another candidate if their preferred one withdrew in favor of someone else; 20% would switch to a different candidate regardless, 20% would abstain, and one quarter are undecided. Supporters of Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, Boiko, and Rabinovych are most likely to follow their candidate’s endorsement, while among voters of Sadovyi, Liashko, Hrytsenko, Vakarchuk, and Zelenskyi this share is about 40%. Voters in the South and East more often say they would abstain under such circumstances than those in the West and Center.
• In the party rating, Batkivshchyna leads with 14%. It is followed by Servant of the People (8.2%), For Life (6.4%), Civic Position (6.2%), BPP Solidarity (5.9%), Opposition Bloc (5.8%), Radical Party (4.6%), Self-Reliance (3.4%), and Svoboda (2.7%). Other parties poll below 2%. 17.1% are undecided, and 14.4% do not plan to vote in parliamentary elections. Batkivshchyna’s support is relatively even nationwide, with its strongest showing in Central Ukraine; For Life and the Opposition Bloc dominate in the South-East; Civic Position in the West and Center; Servant of the People in the Center and South; and BPP Solidarity, Self-Reliance, and Svoboda in the West.

•  The results of the survey conducted by the Rating Group revealed that considering the matter of support for the requirement to comply with the Euro-5 environmental standard for all imported cars and, accordingly, for the total ban on the import to Ukraine of the cars manufactured earlier than 2008/2009, the opinions of the polled differ. 34% support the ban on the import of cars older than 10 years, while 47% stand against such an initiative. 19% have not decided on the answer yet. Permission to import old cars is more often supported by younger respondents, as well as by those who already have or are going to purchase cars with the European number plates. 
• 62% believe that it is necessary to reduce taxes and make import cars more accessible. 14% stand against tax cuts as it will affect the state budget revenues. 15% don’t find the issue of imported cars’ taxation to be relevant. Likewise, younger people, those with higher income, and those who already have or are going to purchase cars with the European number plates are more likely to support taxes’ reduction.
• 50% of the respondents believe the optimal solution to the problem of a large number of uncustomed cars with the European number plates will be allowing them to proceed through the customs clearance with reduced taxes. 12% believe that they should be allowed to legalize but with current tariffs for customs clearance. 14% support the fact that they should be legalized without any customs clearance at all. Only 4% stand for leaving the situation status quo. The same number advocates for a complete ban and confiscation of "Euro cars". Support for the idea of official legalization along with the customs duties’ payment (reduced or current) prevails in all regional, age, and property groups. Even two-thirds of those who already have a car with the European registration or are going to purchase such support this way of resolving the issue. At the same time, within the same groups, there is a relatively high number of those who stand for a full customs amnesty of the "Euro cars" (a quarter to one-third). Among those who have a car with the Ukrainian registration or are going to buy it, support for such a way of resolving the issue is much weaker.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from May 26-June 10, 2018. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size.

The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 62,7%.

English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.

• According to the research carried out by the Rating Group in August 2018, 82% of Ukrainian citizens (as much as in 2017) consider themselves as patriots of their country. Only 13% have the opposite opinion, 5% could not answer.
• In all macro regions of Ukraine, the total number of patriotic citizens exceeds 75%: in the West this figure is 85%, in the Center - 84%, in the South - 79%, in the East - 76%.
• Over the research period, the largest number of those who would have supported the proclamation of Independence of Ukraine if today they were given such a choice has been recorded - almost 80% (in 2012 this figure was 62%). Only 13% expressed opposing considerations, 7% hesitated to respond.
• The largest number of those who support the proclamation of Ukraine's independence has been recorded in the West (93%). At the Center there are 82% of such respondents, in the South - 72%, in the East - 63%. The number of those who have the opposite opinion is the highest in the Southern and Eastern regions (20% to 25%). Also, a relatively higher number of those who would not support the independence of our state today have been recorded among the older generation, those with lower income and education. The independence support is clearly correlated with the sense of patriotism: the higher the level of patriotic sentiments, the more people support the proclamation of Independence of Ukraine.
• Over the last 8 years, the number of those who identify themselves as a citizen of Ukraine has increased: while in 2010 the number of those who could have called themselves Ukrainians was 57%, in 2018 there is already 66% of such respondents. This year, as compared to the whole research period, the lowest number of those who identify themselves as residents of their region, city, or village has been noted (19%), as well as the number of those who simply mention their nationality (13%). At the same time, as compared to the 2014 poll, there has been a significant increase in the number of those who would choose the alternative "just a person" (up to 29%, 24% in 2012, and 26% in 2010). 10% of the respondents named their family role as an identifier, 9% consider themselves "a citizen of the world". 6% of the polled characterize themselves as "Soviet person" and "Europeans". Also, 5% while answering to the question "Who am I?" mentioned their religious convictions, 3% - their profession and occupation.
• Although the "citizen of Ukraine" identifier is dominant in all regions of Ukraine, the differences are also observed. Thus, in the Center the number of those who have chosen this alternative is 74%, in the West - 67%, in the South - 61%, in the East - 55%.
• The residents of the Western regions were more likely to identify themselves on a national basis. The association with the "Soviet person" is more implicit for the citizens of Southern and Eastern macro regions, as well as for the older people. The residents of the West and Center, as well as young people, are more likely to identify themselves with the "Europeans".
• Almost 70% of the respondents consider Ukraine rather than Russia to be the successor of Kyiv Rus. The opposite opinion is expressed only by 9%. 6% believe that neither Ukraine nor Russia can claim the heritage of the old state. Over the last 10 years, the number of those who consider Ukraine as the successor of Kyiv Rus has increased (54% in 2008), while the number of those who share the opposite opinion has decreased (in 2008 - 18%).
• The respondents from the Western and Central macro regions were more likely to mention Ukraine while answering this issue (79%). In the South and East, the number of such respondents  was more than a half. At the same time, 20% to 25% of the polled in these areas couldn’t answer this question; in the Eastern regions, every fourth, in general, believes Russia to be the successor of Kyiv Rus. The higher the level of patriotism of the polled, the more often they note that it is Ukraine that is the successor of Kyiv Rus.
• 52% of the respondents indicated that it was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) that had the right to be considered the historical successor of the Orthodox Church established in Kyiv Rus 1030 years ago. 12% mentioned the same about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), 3% - the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 2% - Russian Orthodox Church, 5% - other. 27% of the polled were unable to decide on this issue.
• Over the last 10 years, the number of those who believe that the UPC (KP) has the right to be considered the historical successor of the Orthodox Church approved in Kyiv Rus 1030 years ago has increased more than one and a half times. More often than others, the legal succession of the UPC (KP) was declared by the residents of the West and Center and also rural citizens. This opinion is also dominating among the parishioners of the UPC (KP) and the UGCC. Instead, the majority of the UPC (MP) parishioners consider their church to be the successor of the Orthodox Church established in Kyiv Rus 1030 years ago.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group among residents of Dnipro, Yuliia Tymoshenko leads the presidential rating. She is supported by 19.0% of those who intend to vote. Volodymyr Zelenskyi follows with 13.5%, Yurii Boiko with 13.4%, Anatolii Hrytsenko with 8.3%, Vadym Rabinovych with 7.9%, Petro Poroshenko with 7.0%, Oleh Liashko with 5.9%, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk with 3.9%. Other candidates receive less than 2%. 12.0% of respondents remain undecided.
• In the so-called “second choice” ranking, Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads: 12.7% say they would support him if their primary candidate were not on the ballot. About 8% would then vote for Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Yuliia Tymoshenko, or Oleh Liashko; 6.8% for Anatolii Hrytsenko; 6.2% for Vadym Rabinovych; 5.8% for Yurii Boiko; 3.1% for Andrii Sadovyi; and 2.7% for Petro Poroshenko.
• The anti-rating is led by Petro Poroshenko: nearly half (48%) of Dnipro residents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. The anti-ratings of Arsenii Yatseniuk (28.6%), Nadiia Savchenko (21.9%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (19.1%), Oleh Tiahnybok (16.7%), Oleh Liashko (16.2%), Yurii Boiko (14.6%), and Vadym Rabinovych (13.6%) are also notable.
• About 16% of respondents believe Yuliia Tymoshenko will become the next President of Ukraine. 7.2% expect Petro Poroshenko, 6.1% Volodymyr Zelenskyi, 5.5% Yurii Boiko, 3.6% Oleh Liashko, 2.5% Anatolii Hrytsenko, and 2% each Vadym Rabinovych and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk.
• For an overwhelming majority (83%), it is important that the future president actively defends the interests of their city. One third of respondents consider Leonid Kuchma the best President of Ukraine, 13% name Leonid Kravchuk, about 10% Viktor Yanukovych, and 5% each Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko. 28% did not choose any of the former presidents.
• In the party rating, Batkivshchyna leads with support from about 20% of those intending to vote. Servant of the People has 14.6%, the Opposition Bloc 13.9%, For Life 8.2%, Civic Position 7.8%, BPP Solidarity 6.7%, while the Radical Party and UKROP receive 5.9% and 5.6% respectively. Other parties score below 2%, and 8.8% are undecided.
• A clear majority of respondents believe that candidates who distribute illegal material benefits to voters during campaigns should be strictly punished (59%). About one third think this form of campaigning should be allowed, and nearly one in ten are undecided.
• 70% of respondents say Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction, one in five think otherwise, and 9% are unsure. Assessments of local affairs are less pessimistic: 42% consider the situation in their city to be moving in the wrong direction, nearly the same share think it is moving in the right direction, and 18% are undecided.
• Satisfaction with local authorities varies. 65% are satisfied with the performance of Dnipro Mayor Borys Filatov, while 32% are dissatisfied. The work of Regional Governor Valentyn Reznichenko is rated positively by 49% and negatively by 35%. Opinions on the City Council are split: 46% are dissatisfied and 43% satisfied.
• More than 70% of respondents are dissatisfied with the work of municipal services and medical institutions, and over half express negative views of local educational institutions.
• Among city problems, the cost of utilities concerns nearly 80% of respondents. About 42–43% are worried about poor road conditions and public transport fares, 35% about drug and alcohol abuse, and 31% about rising crime and the low professional level of medical staff. More than a quarter are concerned about the condition of sidewalks and pedestrian paths, and one fifth about street lighting and the quality of public transport services.
• Regarding foreign policy, one third support Ukraine’s accession to NATO, while about half oppose it; 16% are undecided or would not vote. 45% support EU membership, more than a third oppose it, and 18% are undecided or would abstain. Support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration increases with younger age and is highest among voters of Civic Position and BPP Solidarity.
• When choosing an integration vector, 39% believe Ukraine should maintain equidistance from the EU and Russia without joining alliances; 34% favor EU membership, 16% support joining the Customs Union, and about one in ten are undecided.
• On language policy, nearly half believe Ukrainian should be the sole state language with free use of Russian in all spheres. 29% support granting Russian state language status nationwide alongside Ukrainian, and one fifth favor Ukrainian as the state language with Russian having official status in certain regions.
• Regarding the past, 46% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, while 44% feel nostalgic; about one fifth are undecided.
• As for resolving the conflict in Donbas, the most supported options are ending hostilities and recognizing the territories as temporarily occupied / freezing the conflict (35%) and granting autonomy or a federal status within Ukraine (33%). 10% support continuing military actions until full restoration of Ukrainian control, 7% favor separation of these territories, and 14% are undecided.
• Two thirds of Dnipro residents consider Russia an aggressor toward Ukraine; one quarter disagree and 8% are unsure. About half believe Ukraine should limit or fully terminate economic relations with Russia, one quarter oppose reducing ties, 14% favor significant expansion of relations, and one in ten are undecided. Support for maintaining or expanding economic ties with Russia is highest among voters of the Opposition Bloc and For Life, as well as among older respondents.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, respondents currently have a low level of awareness about what the main candidates plan to do if elected president: between 45% and 65% of respondents say they are not familiar with the candidates’ plans.
• Relatively higher awareness is observed with regard to Yuliia Tymoshenko’s plans (46%): 15% say they know a lot about her plans, 18% are partially familiar with them, and another 14% know very little.
• Somewhat fewer respondents are aware of the policy initiatives of Oleh Liashko (39%) and Petro Poroshenko (36%). Nearly 60% of respondents know nothing about the plans of Yurii Boiko and Anatolii Hrytsenko. About two thirds of respondents are unaware of the plans of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk. In general, older voters tend to be better informed about candidates’ plans, while young people are relatively better informed about the plans of Vakarchuk and Zelenskyi.
• Almost half of respondents say they are definitely going to vote in the presidential election, while one in five say they are more likely to vote than not.
• Yuliia Tymoshenko remains the leader of the presidential rating, supported by 17.7% of those who intend to vote and have already made up their minds. Anatolii Hrytsenko could receive 10.7%, Yurii Boiko 8.9%, Oleh Liashko 8.5%, Petro Poroshenko 8.3%, Volodymyr Zelenskyi 8.0%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk 8.0%, and Vadym Rabinovych 5.9%. Other candidates have ratings below 3%. Nearly one in five respondents remain undecided.
• Tymoshenko has strong electoral positions in almost all macro-regions, with relatively higher support in the West, Center, and South. Hrytsenko’s core electorate is also concentrated mainly in the western and central regions, while his support is weaker elsewhere. Poroshenko’s support is relatively even across macro-regions, except for the East. Liashko is supported mainly in the South and Center, Vakarchuk in the West. Voters of Boiko, Rabinovych, and Zelenskyi are relatively more numerous in the East and South, with Boiko and Rabinovych having stronger support in the East, and Zelenskyi in the South.
• According to the so-called “second choice” indicator, the greatest additional electoral potential is seen for Volodymyr Zelenskyi (8.0%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (7.5%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (6.1%), Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (5.7%), and Oleh Liashko (4.8%). Under certain conditions, 3.7% could additionally vote for Vadym Rabinovych, 3.4% for Yurii Boiko, and 3.1% for Petro Poroshenko.
• The anti-rating continues to be led by Petro Poroshenko: half of respondents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. 26–29% would not support Yuliia Tymoshenko, Oleh Liashko, or Arsenii Yatseniuk in any case. 18% would not support Oleh Tiahnybok, 17% Yurii Boiko, 15% Vadym Rabinovych, 13% Volodymyr Zelenskyi, and 11% Sviatoslav Vakarchuk.
• 16% of respondents believe the next president will be Yuliia Tymoshenko, 12.7% believe it will be Petro Poroshenko. Another 6.7% think Yurii Boiko will become president, 4.7% Volodymyr Zelenskyi, 3.7% Oleh Liashko, 3.4% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 2.9% Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, and 1.9% Vadym Rabinovych. Almost 40% of respondents were unable to predict who would become the next president. Over the past few months, confidence in Tymoshenko’s victory has increased (from 10% to 16%), while confidence in Poroshenko’s victory has decreased (from 15% to 13%).
• Willingness to participate in parliamentary elections is somewhat lower: 46% say they will definitely vote, and another one quarter say they are more likely to vote than not.
• The party rating is led by Batkivshchyna, supported by 19.5% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice. Second place is shared by the Opposition Bloc, Civic Position, and Servant of the People, each with around 11%. For Life is supported by 7.2%, the Radical Party by 7.0%, BPP Solidarity by 6.5%, Samopomich by 4.3%, Svoboda by 4.1%, and the Agrarian Party by 2.5%. Other parties have ratings below 2%. Nearly one in six respondents remain undecided.
• Batkivshchyna, the Opposition Bloc, Civic Position, For Life, and BPP Solidarity are more often supported by middle-aged and older respondents. Servant of the People currently has greater support among young people.
• Batkivshchyna and BPP Solidarity show relatively strong results in all macro-regions except the East. Civic Position is better supported in the West and Center. The Opposition Bloc and For Life have their strongest positions in the South and East, the Radical Party and Servant of the People in the Center and South, while Samopomich and Svoboda are strongest in the West.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, the greatest sources of joy in Ukrainians’ lives are family (74%), children (63%), and friends (49%). These three categories have consistently topped the “joy ranking” for the past ten years, the entire period during which the Sociological Group “Rating” has been monitoring this issue.
• Joy is also commonly associated with travel (30%), communicating with nature (30%), money (29%), music (27%), work (25%), pets (24%), and gifts (22%).
• Nearly one in five Ukrainians say they find joy in vacations or holidays, books, the internet, watching television, food, sex, as well as household chores and sports. One in six associate joy with cinema, birthdays, prayer, and shopping. Almost one in ten mention theatre, dancing, singing, victories of a favorite sports team, or simple solitude. Around 5% derive joy from education and alcohol, while 1–2% mention gambling and light drugs. Only 1% of Ukrainians state that nothing brings them joy in life.
• Over the past ten years, the sense of joy has increased the most in relation to family, children, friends, vacations and travel, pets, contact with nature, sports, sex, food, books, theatre, singing, and dancing.
• At the same time, during this decade there has been a significant decline in the number of respondents who say they find joy in watching television. It is worth noting that in 2009–2011, watching television consistently ranked among the top five sources of joy, whereas today it occupies a position in the middle of the second ten.
• Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who associate joy with money, work, gifts, the internet, household chores, cinema, prayer, victories of a favorite team, and shopping has either increased only slightly or remained largely unchanged.
• An age-based analysis shows that older people experience relatively more joy primarily from watching television, household chores, and prayer. Pets, books, singing, and solitude also fall into categories where there is no pronounced age difference. Middle-aged respondents derive relatively more joy from children and work, while young people are more likely to associate joy with friends, money, music, food, sex, sports, cinema, shopping, dancing, and education.
• Clear gender differences in perceptions of joy were also recorded. Women, more often than men, derive joy from family, children, nature, gifts, books, shopping, dancing, singing, theatre, household work, prayer, and solitude. Men, in turn, more often associate joy with friends, work, food, the internet, sex, sports, cinema, victories of a favorite team, alcohol, and gambling.
• People with higher incomes tend to experience relatively more joy from almost all aspects of life, except watching television and household chores. At the same time, children bring joy equally to respondents regardless of income level.

According to the survey conducted by the Sociological Group Rating, 70% of the polled Ukrainians are satisfied with the electricity supply services provided to them, 28% - are rather dissatisfied. The number of those satisfied is relatively higher among the residents of the Center and urban citizens.

At the same time, only one-third of the respondents believe that tariffs for electricity supply services comply with their quality; more than 60% have the opposite opinion. Those who are generally satisfied with the electricity supply services are more likely to see the correspondence between price and quality of such services.

20% of the polled consider Ukraine to be completely energy independent, a half - partly independent, almost 20% - fully energy dependent, every tenth – could not answer.

According to 45% of the respondents, over the last four years, Ukraine has become more energy independent of Russia, 18% have an opposite vision, a quarter believes that nothing has changed, 13% - were not able to answer.

40% noted that Ukraine should continue to buy gas on a reverse pattern from European partners, the same number supports starting direct negotiations with Russia on new gas prices, almost 20% - have not determined.
80% of Ukrainians support the decision of the court against the Russian company “Gazprom” regarding the illegality of the "take and pay" scheme, as a result of which Ukraine will be able to receive 2.6 billion dollars of compensation and continue to buy gas from anyone at own choice.
According to one-third of the respondents, coal is to be purchased abroad. 46% believe that Ukraine has to negotiate with the so-called DNR-LNR on coal supply to Ukraine, 21% - have not determined.
Nearly a half of the polled are more likely to be positive towards the investors from Germany, Canada, Poland, and Japan; 45% - the United States (23% neutral, 19% negative), 37% to 41% - Italy, Turkey, and Denmark (one-third neutral, 14-21% negative), one-third – China and South Korea (26% neutral, 25-26% negative), 26% - Cyprus (28% neutral, 27% negative). 15% are positive towards the investors from Russia, 18% - neutral, 56% - negative.

More than two-thirds of the polled find the support from Germany (68%), Poland (64%), Canada (63%), the United Kingdom and the United States (62% each), Japan and France (60% each) to be favorable. A half estimates as favorable the support from Italy and China, only 22% - from Russia (59% - not favorable).

Almost 90% are rather positive towards renewable (“green” energy), 8% have a neutral attitude, 2% - negative, 3% - not determined.
75% support the introduction of a "green tariff" for those electricity producers who operate with renewable sources, which will facilitate the gradual transition of Ukraine to renewable energy sources. 15% - do not support the initiative, 10% - have not determined.

One-third of the respondents favor the introduction of the Law amendments and reduction of the payments to renewable energy producers. 46% consider it necessary to keep tariffs at the same level (not to change the Law), 22% could not answer. At the same time, among those who generally support the "green tariff", more than a half is opposed to amending the legislation and reducing payments to renewable energy producers.

Assessing the advantages of Ukraine's cooperation with different countries, the relative majority of the respondents (45%) agree that the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is rather to bring benefits to Ukraine, while 22% believe that this Agreement is more likely to harm our state, a quarter knows nothing about it, every tenth could not decide on the attitude.

Likewise, the majority (54%) believes that the Free Trade Agreement with Canada is more beneficial to Ukraine, while 12% believe that this Agreement is more likely to harm our state, almost a quarter knows nothing about it, and almost every tenth could not decide on the attitude.
51% believe that the future Free Trade Agreement with Israel will rather bring benefits to Ukraine, while 13% believe that this agreement is more likely to harm our country, almost a quarter knows nothing about it, and every tenth could not decide on the attitude.
More optimistic attitude towards these agreements was recorded among the respondents from Western and Central Ukraine, more often those were young people and people with relatively higher incomes.

If a referendum on Ukraine joining NATO were held today, 45% of the polled would vote for joining, one-third - against, every tenth - would not vote, the same number have not decided on their attitude.

If Ukraine considered the option of signing an agreement with other countries on providing military support to them in the event of aggression, the respondents consider Poland (74%), Great Britain (60%), the USA (59%), Georgia (55), Belarus (53%), and Turkey (49%) to be the most acceptable from the proposed list of countries. About 40% of the polled would support the agreement with Moldova and China, one-third - with India. At the same time, only 19% of the polled would support the agreement on military support with Russia, while two-thirds would not support it.

Interestingly, the supporters of Ukraine joining NATO are relatively more likely to support the signing of military support agreements with Poland, the United States, the United Kingdom and Georgia, while the opponents of NATO membership - with Russia and Belarus.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, Yuliya Tymoshenko remains the leader of the presidential rating: 17.1% of those who intend to participate in the vote and have already decided on their choice are ready to vote for her. Anatoliy Hrytsenko is supported by 9.7%, Yuriy Boyko by 8.9%, Volodymyr Zelenskyy by 8.5%, Oleh Liashko by 8.1%, Petro Poroshenko by 7.8%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 6.6%, Yevhen Murayev by 4.2%, Vadym Rabinovych by 3.7%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 2.6%, Andriy Sadovyi by 2.2%, Serhiy Taruta by 1.5%, Arseniy Yatsenyuk by 1.3%, and Roman Bezsmertnyi by 1.2%. Among respondents who intend to vote, almost one in five has not yet decided on their choice.
• In the so-called “second choice” rating, the leading positions are held by Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (5.3%), Yuliya Tymoshenko (4.9%), Volodymyr Zelenskyy (4.7%), and Anatoliy Hrytsenko (4.7%).
• The negative rating continues to be led by Petro Poroshenko: almost half of respondents stated that they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Yuliya Tymoshenko would not be supported by 28.5% of respondents, Arseniy Yatsenyuk by 26.9%, Oleh Liashko by 26.2%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 18.9%, Yuriy Boyko by 16.1%, and Vadym Rabinovych by 15.6%.
• Three quarters of those surveyed believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction. Thirteen percent hold the opposite view, while 12% are undecided in their assessment. In the perception of problems, the tendency persists whereby the war in Eastern Ukraine and corruption remain the most important nationwide issues, while at the personal level social problems dominate, primarily low wages and pensions as well as high utility tariffs.
• The number of supporters of pro-Western integration exceeds the number of its opponents: 50% support accession to the European Union, while 28% are opposed; 42% support Euro-Atlantic integration, while 35% are opposed. When choosing between directions of integration into economic unions, 42% of respondents support accession to the European Union, 36% support equidistance from both Russia and the EU, 11% support joining the Customs Union, and another 11% are undecided. In regional terms, a trend can be observed whereby supporters of equidistance prevail in the southern and eastern regions (40–45%). At the same time, in the South the number of supporters of joining the Customs Union is half that of supporters of European integration, while in the East their numbers are almost equal.
• Sixty-one percent of respondents believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language, while Russian should be freely used in all spheres of life. Seventeen percent support granting Russian the status of an official language in certain regions while preserving Ukrainian as the state language, and 19% support granting state status to both Ukrainian and Russian. The largest number of supporters of granting Russian some form of official status is recorded in the South and East. At the same time, even in these regions, 40–45% support maintaining the status quo in state language policy.
• Respondents have the most positive attitudes toward Belarus (74%), Canada (68%), and the European Union (68%). Attitudes toward the United States are positive among 58% and negative among 27%; toward the CIS, 44% positive and 31% negative; toward Russia, 35% positive and 52% negative. Attitudes toward international organizations are as follows: 58% view the UN positively and 20% negatively; the OSCE, 50% positively and 26% negatively; NATO, 49% positively and 30% negatively; the IMF, 39% positively and 35% negatively. About a quarter of respondents were unable to express any attitude toward these international institutions. Western countries and institutions are viewed more positively in the West and Center of Ukraine, while Belarus, the CIS, and Russia receive more positive attitudes in the South and East.
• Two thirds of respondents support peaceful ways of resolving the problem of the occupied Donbas: 32% support ending hostilities and recognizing these territories as temporarily occupied (freezing the conflict), 24% support granting these territories autonomy or a federal status within Ukraine, and 9% support their complete separation. At the same time, 21% support continuing military actions until full restoration of Ukrainian authority throughout Donbas. The view that the conflict in Donbas should be resolved by armed means is not dominant in any macro-region of the country.
• Only 9% of respondents stated that they know the content of the Minsk agreements well. Another 49% said they are superficially familiar with them and have heard about them in the media, while almost 40% are not familiar with their content at all. Only 14% believe that Ukraine should fully implement all the conditions set out in the Minsk agreements. In turn, 17% believe that Ukraine should withdraw from the negotiation process and make decisions without international mediators, while a relative majority of 32% argue that the agreements should be revised and new ones signed. About one third of respondents were unable to answer this question. The better respondents are acquainted with the substance of the agreements, the more clearly they express their views on their future. Over the past year, the share of respondents who support revising the Minsk agreements and signing new ones has slightly increased.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in June 2018, 44% of respondents stated that over the past two years the overall quality of public healthcare services in the country has deteriorated. Fourteen percent reported seeing improvements, 32% believe that nothing has changed in the quality of public healthcare services, and 10% were unable to answer. Over the past six months, the share of those who say the situation has improved has slightly increased.
• Thirty-eight percent rate the level of professionalism and competence of doctors in Ukraine as high, while 54% hold the opposite view. Professional qualities of medical staff were rated somewhat higher in the eastern regions than elsewhere. Having a medical professional in the family and being acquainted with one’s family doctor also positively affects approval of doctors’ competence.
• Fifty-five percent know their family doctor or therapist, while 44% do not. A relatively higher level of awareness is observed among women and older respondents.
• Eighty-six percent have heard about the national program “Doctor for Every Family,” while 12% said they know nothing about it. Seventy percent stated that they support such a program. The reform is perceived more positively in western regions, and support is also somewhat higher among younger respondents and those who know their family doctor.
• Thirty-six percent reported that they have already chosen a family doctor and signed a contract with them, while 63% have not yet done so. Respondents from the East, older respondents, and urban residents more often reported having chosen a family doctor. Among those who have already signed a contract, 82% said they are satisfied with their doctor, and only 7% expressed dissatisfaction.
• Twenty-two percent of respondents reported having family members who work in professional medicine, including doctors, nurses, speech therapists, psychologists, and others.
• Seventy-three percent support voluntary vaccination of children against diseases such as polio, measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, and others, while 21% do not support it. In the case of mandatory vaccination, the level of support decreases somewhat: 66% support it and 27% do not. Voluntary vaccination is viewed more favorably by younger respondents and women, while mandatory vaccination is relatively more often supported by older people.
• Sixty-eight percent said they have heard about the “Affordable Medicines” program, under which pharmacies provide free medicines to patients with chronic conditions such as type II diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and bronchial asthma. Thirty-one percent know nothing about it. Higher awareness is observed among older respondents and those who have medical workers in their families.
• Fifty percent support the introduction of the “money follows the patient” principle in healthcare financing. Twenty percent expressed the opposite view, 17% said they support neither the old nor the new financing system, and 14% were unable to answer. Support for the new model of budget allocation for healthcare is higher in western and central regions, among younger respondents, and among urban residents.
• Forty-nine percent reported that they have heard about the entry into force of the Law of Ukraine “On Improving Access to and Quality of Medical Care in Rural Areas,” under which 5 billion hryvnias were allocated for rural healthcare development, including purchasing new ambulances, providing transport for doctors, installing Internet access, and purchasing medical equipment. The same share, 49%, said they know nothing about it. Awareness of this initiative was reported more often by the oldest respondents. Among those who had heard about the law, more than 80% support it, while only 12% do not.
• Among the services that could be provided by the eHealth electronic system being gradually introduced in Ukraine, respondents found checking and comparing pharmacy prices the most convenient. Sixty-six percent said it would be convenient for them to do this using the system, while 29% disagreed. Scheduling appointments with doctors, checking one’s medical history, signing contracts with family doctors, and printing official prescriptions would be convenient for 50% to 60% of respondents, while 35% to 40% consider these services inconvenient. In contrast, using eHealth for medical consultations via video conferencing received mixed evaluations: 46% would find it convenient, while the same share would find it inconvenient. Receiving medical services through eHealth is clearly perceived more positively by younger and middle-aged respondents, while the oldest respondents are more likely to consider this mode of communication inconvenient. Men and wealthier respondents also tend to find eHealth services more convenient.
• Fifty-six percent of respondents said that over the past 12 months they were not asked to pay a bribe for medical treatment, while 15% reported encountering corruption when receiving medical services, and 27% said they had not visited a doctor during this period. Residents of southern regions, younger respondents, and wealthier respondents encountered demands for bribes relatively more often. At the same time, 27% said they had given gifts (such as sweets, alcohol, etc.) as a token of gratitude for treatment or medical services over the past 12 months, while 40% said they had no such experience. Younger and wealthier respondents reported such practices somewhat more often, as did respondents in the West and Center.
• Two thirds support introducing a cost-sharing system for medical treatment, where part of the cost is paid by the state and part by the patient, while 25% oppose this initiative. Support for co-financing treatment costs is more common in western and central regions, among younger and wealthier respondents. Among those who are not opposed to such a system, 33% said they are willing to pay no more than 5% of the total cost, 26% no more than 10%, 13% no more than 20%, and 14% are willing to pay up to a quarter of the cost of treatment. Again, younger and wealthier respondents more often stated their readiness to co-finance a quarter of treatment costs.
• More than 80% said they support the introduction in Ukraine of a new system of standardized entrance exams for applicants to medical universities, based on international practices and higher admission requirements. The same share believe that graduation exams for obtaining a medical diploma should be difficult (52% say very difficult, 35% say rather difficult). Only 7% supported simplifying exams for medical students.
• Fifty-eight percent of respondents consider the Ministry of Health important for themselves and their families, while 35% expressed the opposite opinion. Residents of western regions, younger respondents, and those who have medical professionals in their families more often emphasized the importance of the ministry.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 76% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, 13% express the opposite view, and 11% are undecided. Residents of the central and western regions express relatively less pessimism, while the highest level of criticism is observed in the South.
• Only 8% of respondents report an improvement in the economic situation of their families over the past six months. By contrast, 60% say it has worsened, and another 30% report no change. The highest share of those who see a deterioration in their personal financial situation is in the South (74%), and the lowest in the West (40%). The older the respondents, the more often they report a worsening of their own economic situation.
• The war in eastern Ukraine remains the most important national problem in the eyes of citizens (78%). Bribery and corruption as nationwide problems are mentioned by 55% of respondents, and unemployment by 29%. Low wages and pensions, insufficient social protection, social inequality, and rising prices for basic goods as country-level problems concern between 16% and 18% of respondents.
• At the same time, the ranking of personal problems is led by socio-economic issues: rising prices and tariffs, as well as low wages and pensions, personally concern more than half of respondents. The war in the East, low quality of medical services, and lack of work are personal problems for one in five respondents. Insufficient social protection, bribery and corruption in government are considered problems by 15–16% of respondents, and social inequality by 10%. Other issues personally concern no more than 10%.
• Two thirds of respondents clearly place responsibility for the difficult situation currently facing Ukraine on former President Viktor Yanukovych. Fifty-three percent hold the same view regarding Petro Poroshenko, 51% regarding former Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, and 40% regarding the current Head of Government Volodymyr Groysman. Russia is unequivocally considered responsible for the situation in Ukraine by 52% of respondents, and the United States by 21%. Opinions on the responsibility of the Ukrainian people as a whole are divided: 9% clearly consider the people responsible, while 24% see no fault at all. Regionally, responsibility for Yanukovych, Azarov, and Russia is assessed relatively higher in western regions, while responsibility for Poroshenko and the United States is assessed higher in the East.
• Among reforms, citizens are most critical of anti-corruption efforts and healthcare reform. Nearly 80% are dissatisfied with the fight against bribery, while 5% are satisfied; dissatisfaction with healthcare reform stands at 75%, with 10% satisfied. Sixty-one percent are dissatisfied with police reform, while 21% are satisfied; dissatisfaction with judicial reform is 56%, with only 5% satisfied; dissatisfaction with education reform is 50%, with 13% satisfied; and dissatisfaction with decentralization is 36%, with 27% satisfied. Most reforms are perceived relatively more positively in western regions. Younger respondents tend to view government initiatives more positively than the oldest respondents.
• Ending hostilities in the East is the dominant demand citizens place on the next President of Ukraine (63%). Strengthening the fight against corruption is expected by 49% of respondents, industrial revival by 40%, and raising social standards by 30%. Improvements in healthcare quality, reducing the influence of oligarchs on politics, reviving the agricultural sector, strengthening national defense, and stimulating business development are expected by 11% to 19%. Improving Ukraine’s international image, reforming education and science, and protecting the Ukrainian language and culture are mentioned by 4% to 8% of respondents.
• Two thirds believe that the upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine will be dishonest. Only 12% are convinced they will be conducted fairly, while 22% are unable to answer.
• Sixty-four percent believe that presidential candidates on whose behalf material assistance is distributed to voters during elections (food packages, funds for repairs, assistance for medical treatment, etc.) should be strictly punished. Twenty-three percent hold the opposite view. A relatively higher tolerance for vote-buying is observed among respondents in the South, where one third believe such practices should not be punished. Support for distributing assistance is also relatively higher among the oldest respondents.
• Politicians’ appearances in the media are the main source from which citizens learn about presidential candidates’ programs (70%). Thirty-five percent obtain such information from relatives and acquaintances, 27% from political advertising in the media, 22% from leaflets and brochures distributed during campaigns, 19% from news websites, 17% from social networks, 16% from outdoor advertising, 13% from articles in print media, 9% from politicians’ official websites, and 8% from speeches at rallies and meetings with voters. At the same time, only 14% of respondents stated that they have ever fully read a presidential candidate’s program. Forty-nine percent said they had read them partially, while 33% said they had never fully read the programs of politicians running for the highest state office.
• Yulia Tymoshenko remains the leader of the presidential rating, with 16% of those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice ready to support her. Anatolii Hrytsenko is supported by 11.7%, Yurii Boiko by 10.5%, Volodymyr Zelenskyy by 9.3%, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Oleh Liashko, and Petro Poroshenko by 8.6% each. Vadym Rabinovych has 7.6%, Andrii Sadovyi 3.4%, Oleh Tiahnybok 2.8%, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 2.0%, Roman Bezsmertnyi 1.4%, Serhii Taruta 1.1%, and Arsenii Yatseniuk 1.1%.
• In the “second choice” ranking, the leading positions are held by Anatolii Hrytsenko, who could receive support as an alternative to the main favorite from 7.5% of voters, followed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy (6.3%), Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (6.0%), Vadym Rabinovych (5.7%), and Yulia Tymoshenko (5.3%).
• Petro Poroshenko continues to lead the negative rating: nearly 52% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances. Thirty percent would not vote for Arsenii Yatseniuk, 23.8% for Oleh Liashko, 23% for Yurii Boiko, 20.8% for Yulia Tymoshenko, 16.0% for Vadym Rabinovych, and 14.7% for Oleh Tiahnybok.
• The party rating is led by Batkivshchyna, which is supported by 17% of those who intend to vote and have decided. The second position is shared by the Opposition Bloc, Civic Position, and the Servant of the People party, each with about 10.5%. The For Life party is supported by 9.6%, the Radical Party by 8.2%, BPP Solidarity by 7.4%, Samopomich by 5.1%, and Svoboda by 3.8%. Other parties have ratings below 2%.
• Support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO remains stable: 51% support EU membership and 29% oppose it; 44% support Euro-Atlantic integration and 36% oppose it.

•    According to the results of the research carried out by the Sociological group "Rating", the number of those who support market relations rather than planned economy has been gradually increasing in the country. The highest support for the market development is observed among the residents of the West. At the same time, in the East, despite the fact that almost every third supports the return to the planned economy, two-thirds still stand for the market. Support for the return to the planned economy is relatively higher among the older respondents, women, unemployed, people with lower incomes and lower education level.

•    Over the last five years, the demand for entrepreneurship has grown more than one and a half times. These days, almost a half of the polled would like to have their own business. The highest number of those who would like to become an entrepreneur was recorded among young respondents: almost three-quarters are willing to engage in their own business. Men, employed persons, those with higher incomes and education level are also more interested in entrepreneurship. Interestingly, among those who said that they had job, every tenth is already engaged in his/her own business.

•    Among those who would like to have their own business, the assessment of the prospects for starting own business in the nearest future has improved. These days, 22% of those who would like to engage in entrepreneurship stated a significant chance of opening a business in the nearest future (in the past surveys, the number of such respondents was no more than 6%). 41% of the respondents stated little chance to run own business, and 31% - total lack of such chance. Considering the regional context, relatively higher number of those thinking of real prospects of starting a business in the nearest future was recorded in the South and West. Also, the number of such respondents is higher among those of young and middle age, people with high income (41%) and those with higher education. The poorest, unemployed, and elderly people often state that there is no any chance to start their own business.
 

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, over the ten years since the introduction of External Independent Testing (EIT, ZNO) for admission to higher education institutions in Ukraine, public attitudes toward it have improved significantly. In May 2008, only about one quarter of respondents supported (definitely or rather supported) the introduction of EIT instead of university entrance exams. By May of this year, this figure had reached 52%, and nearly 75% among those who had personally taken the EIT tests.
• The younger the respondents and the higher their levels of income and education, the more likely they are to support the idea of replacing entrance exams with EIT. Support is also somewhat higher in western regions and among those who have experience with EIT (either personally or through their children or grandchildren), and somewhat lower in the East and among those without such experience.
• A similar trend is observed in assessments of the fairness of EIT. Ten years ago, only 26% believed that EIT allows for a fairer assessment of applicants’ knowledge, whereas this year the share of optimistic respondents reached 52%. Importantly, belief in the fairness of EIT is much more common among those who have taken the tests themselves (70%) than among those without such experience (45%).
• Forty percent believe that admission to higher education institutions is possible without corruption, which is almost double the level recorded in 2008 (22%). Moreover, 46% believe that the introduction of EIT helps combat corruption in university admissions, compared to 19% in 2008. Once again, optimism is more prevalent among younger and middle-aged respondents, those with higher incomes and education, residents of western regions, and those who have experience taking EIT and generally support it.
• Nearly half of respondents (48%) believe that EIT creates equal conditions for admission to higher education institutions for everyone, regardless of financial means. At the same time, 31% hold the opposite view, and one in five are undecided. Interestingly, belief in equal conditions is more common among people with middle and high incomes than among the poor and low-income groups, and more common among younger people than among the older generation. In addition, 38% of respondents are definitely or rather convinced that the introduction of EIT has improved the quality of secondary and higher education in Ukraine (somewhat more often among those who have experience taking EIT), while the same share believes the opposite, and one quarter are undecided.
• At the same time, 45% of respondents do not rule out the possibility that falsification of EIT results may occur. Twenty-six percent do not believe this is possible, and another 30% could not answer. Skepticism is more often observed among residents of western regions, men, and those who do not support EIT. Notably, distrust in EIT is somewhat higher among parents than among those who have personally taken the tests.
• According to respondents, the main advantages of EIT are objectivity of assessment through the elimination of the human factor (32%), reduction of corruption in university admissions (28%), and ensuring equal access to higher education regardless of an applicant’s financial situation (27%). About 20–21% also cite bringing Ukrainian education closer to European standards and improving the efficiency of student selection for higher education institutions, while 16% mention improving the quality of secondary and higher education. Thirteen percent believe EIT has no advantages at all, and one in five are undecided.
• At the same time, the main disadvantages of EIT identified by respondents include the difficulty and imperfection of the tests (31%), the need for additional tutoring (29%), and frequent changes to testing rules (26%). One in five considers the deepening inequality between ordinary and privileged schools to be a major drawback, 17% point to a decline in the quality of school education, 16% to the inability to assess students’ creative abilities, and 14% to imperfections in the grading system. Only 5% believe that EIT has no disadvantages, while one quarter are undecided.
• More than half (52%) of those who personally took EIT or whose children did so used private tutors in preparation for the tests, while 43% did not. Tutoring services were used more often by people with higher incomes and by urban residents, while no significant regional differences were found.
• Forty-one percent of respondents support the decision not to administer EIT in the subject “Russian language” starting in 2018, while 35% oppose this initiative and another quarter are undecided. The highest support for this decision is found among residents of western regions, rural residents, young people (under 25), wealthier respondents, and those who generally support EIT and have experience with it or whose children plan to enter higher education institutions in the near future. In contrast, the strongest opposition is observed in the East and South, among the oldest and poorest respondents, and among those who do not support EIT, have not taken it, and whose children do not plan to enter higher education institutions in the near future.
• At the same time, nearly half (47%) support the idea of introducing a mandatory EIT test in a foreign language, while 27% oppose it and an equal share are undecided. This idea is more popular among parents of prospective applicants, urban residents, and wealthier citizens than among those whose children are not yet planning to apply, rural residents, and lower-income groups.
• Eleven percent of respondents reported that their children intend to enter higher education institutions within the next three years, while 85% do not have such plans. The highest share of those whose children plan to apply to universities is found among middle-aged respondents, those with higher incomes, and residents of western regions.
• Over the past ten years, 12% of respondents have personally taken EIT tests, and another 20% reported that their children or grandchildren have done so. Two thirds of respondents under the age of 35 have had experience taking these tests within the last ten years.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, half of Kyiv residents believe that affairs in the city are moving in the wrong direction, while 33% hold the opposite view and 17% are undecided. The highest share of optimistic assessments is found among young people under 35 and wealthier residents, while the lowest is among older and the poorest respondents.
• Forty-five percent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the city mayor, Vitali Klitschko, while 40% expressed satisfaction. Twenty-two percent are satisfied with the work of the city council, whereas 63% are dissatisfied.
• Thirty-two percent are satisfied with the work of educational institutions and 46% are dissatisfied. Satisfaction with medical institutions is lower, with 22% satisfied and 68% dissatisfied. The work of municipal services is assessed most critically, with 22% satisfied and 74% dissatisfied.
• Kyiv residents consider the military conflict in eastern Ukraine (53%) and rising utility tariffs (51%) to be the most important problems. Low wages and pensions are considered a personal problem by 28%, corruption in central government by 20%, while rising crime, increasing prices for basic goods, unemployment, inability to obtain quality medical care, and corruption in courts, police, and prosecution services concern between 12% and 15%. Other issues worry fewer than 10% of respondents. Over the past year, the number of those concerned about rising tariffs and prices, low wages or pensions, and access to quality medical care has declined. At the same time, the share of respondents who view the war in the East, rising crime, and corruption in courts, police, and prosecution as problems has increased.
• The biggest city-level problem for Kyiv residents is the cost of utility services (57%). Drug addiction and alcoholism concern 35%, public transport fares 32%, poor road conditions 30%, rising crime and traffic congestion 22% each. Illegal construction, low professional standards of medical staff, stray animals, housing conditions, lack of places in kindergartens, and poor sidewalk conditions concern between 10% and 17% of respondents. Other city problems worry fewer than 10% of Kyiv residents.
• Fifty-five percent believe that the crime situation in the city has worsened over the past year, 25% say it has not changed, and only 7% report improvement. Over the year, the share of those who say the situation has worsened has slightly decreased.
• Two thirds of respondents do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while 24% hold the opposite view. Nostalgia for the USSR is most common among older people and the poorest respondents.
• Over the past year, overall attitudes toward the renaming of streets in Kyiv as part of decommunization have slightly improved. Nevertheless, 65% still believe that streets named after Soviet figures should not be renamed. Twenty-two percent think that only names associated with individuals who committed crimes against the Ukrainian people and for which there is documented evidence should be changed, while 9% support a complete renaming of streets associated with Soviet history.
• Forty percent of Kyiv residents say they would not mind changing their place of residence to a city in the European Union, while 55% do not have such a desire. Eighteen percent would like to move from Kyiv to another city in Ukraine, and only 7% would like to move to cities in Russia.
• Sixty-two percent would not like to move abroad permanently, while 35% are open to the idea. The highest share of those willing to leave permanently is among young people and the wealthiest respondents (over 40%). At the same time, 43% would like to go abroad for work, while 55% have no such intentions. Again, the youngest and wealthiest most often express a desire to work or find employment abroad.
• Eighty-four percent of Kyiv residents are proud of their city, while only 12% express the opposite view. The main reason for pride is Kyiv’s history (65%). The city’s natural attractiveness and cultural life are cited by 41–42%, and opportunities for self-realization by 30%. International status, education and science, sports life, and living conditions are sources of pride for 13–18%. Only 10% are proud of the city’s economic development, and 9% believe there is nothing to be proud of at all. Native Kyiv residents more often cite the city’s history and nature as reasons for pride, while those who moved to Kyiv more recently more often mention cultural life, opportunities for self-realization, international status, education and science, and sports.
• Among the city’s opportunities, residents rate leisure opportunities the highest. Slightly lower but still at a high level are opportunities for sports, cultural and educational activities, and self-realization. Opportunities for earning income are rated less favorably: 42% are rather satisfied, 29% dissatisfied, and about one third rate them as average.
• Forty-six percent of Kyiv residents plan to celebrate Kyiv Day this year, while 49% do not. A somewhat higher share of those wishing to participate in festive events is found among older respondents and those who are proud of the city.

 The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from March 15-31, 2018. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size.

The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 65,4%.

English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, 75% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, while 14% hold the opposite view and 11% are undecided. Relatively less pessimism is expressed by residents of Kyiv and the Podillia cluster (Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi regions), while the highest level of criticism is observed in the southern and eastern regions.
• Demand for change is gradually increasing. Today, almost 70% of respondents believe the country needs radical transformations; another 10% think it is better to keep things as they are, as long as they do not worsen; while 16% favor a return to the way things were in the past. In almost all electoral groups—except supporters of the current authorities—the number of those demanding change exceeds the number favoring stability or a return to the past. A relatively higher demand for a backward turn is found among supporters of Yurii Boiko, Vadym Rabinovych, and Oleh Liashko (over 20%), while a preference for stability is most common among supporters of Petro Poroshenko (45%). The strongest demand for change is among younger respondents (under 40), wealthier and more educated individuals, as well as those seeking political change and looking for alternatives among “new” parties in upcoming elections—particularly supporters of Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and Volodymyr Zelenskyi. At the same time, demand for radical change remains high across other categories as well.
• Society is showing a growing demand for modernization of the political environment. In 2012, half of respondents were ready to support parties represented in parliament and only 21% wanted to replace them. By April of the current year, the situation had reversed: 46% expressed readiness to support new political projects, while only about one third would vote for parliamentary parties. Demand for political change is highest among youth, wealthier respondents, and urban residents. Even among supporters of “old” parties, at least one third are ready to seek alternatives.
• Ending military hostilities in eastern Ukraine and strengthening the fight against corruption are the two main expectations from the future President of Ukraine. Additionally, 38% expect the revival of industry, nearly one quarter expect improvements in healthcare quality and social standards, 16% expect a reduction in oligarchic influence on politics, 11% expect revival of the agricultural sector, and 7% expect stimulation of business development.
• New faces in Ukrainian politics enjoy the highest levels of public trust. Thirty-three percent trust Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (47% do not), while 32% trust Volodymyr Zelenskyi (50% do not). Trust levels for other politicians are as follows: Anatolii Hrytsenko—26%, Yuliia Tymoshenko—20%, Oleh Liashko—17%, Yurii Boiko—18%, Volodymyr Hroisman—17%, Andrii Sadovyi—17%, Vadym Rabinovych—14%, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko—14%, Petro Poroshenko—13%, Oleh Tiahnybok—11%, and Arsenii Yatseniuk—8%.
• In the presidential rating among all respondents, Yuliia Tymoshenko leads with about 9%, followed by Anatolii Hrytsenko at 7%. Yurii Boiko, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi each receive around 6%; Petro Poroshenko and Oleh Liashko—5%; Vadym Rabinovych—4%; Andrii Sadovyi—2%; Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Oleh Tiahnybok, and Arsenii Yatseniuk—1% each. Eleven percent would support another candidate, while about one third are undecided or do not intend to vote.
• Among those who intend to vote and have made a choice, support is as follows: Yuliia Tymoshenko—about 14%, Anatolii Hrytsenko—11%, Yurii Boiko, Petro Poroshenko, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk—9% each, Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Oleh Liashko—8% each, and Vadym Rabinovych—6%.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads the so-called “second choice” ranking: up to 6% would support him if their primary favorite were absent. About 4% would then vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Anatolii Hrytsenko, or Oleh Liashko; around 2% would choose Vadym Rabinovych, Yurii Boiko, Andrii Sadovyi, Oleh Tiahnybok, Petro Poroshenko, or Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.
• Supporters of “new” candidates, if their favorite does not participate, are more likely to vote for other “new faces” rather than long-standing political figures. At least one third of Vakarchuk’s supporters would vote for Zelenskyi under such circumstances.
• Petro Poroshenko leads the anti-rating: nearly half of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances. Anti-ratings are also high for Arsenii Yatseniuk (26%), Oleh Liashko (25%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (24%), Oleh Tiahnybok (18%), Yurii Boiko (17%), and Vadym Rabinovych (16%).
• The party rating is led by Batkivshchyna, supported by about 9% of all respondents. The Opposition Bloc, Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s Servant of the People, and Anatolii Hrytsenko’s Civic Position each receive around 6%. The Radical Party, For Life, and Petro Poroshenko Bloc–Solidarity each have about 5%, Samopomich—3%, and Svoboda and the Agrarian Party—2% each. Other parties together account for about 14%, while over one third are undecided or do not plan to vote.
• Among those who intend to vote and have decided, support for parties is as follows: Batkivshchyna—16%, Civic Position and the Opposition Bloc—10% each, Servant of the People—9%, For Life, the Radical Party, and BPP–Solidarity—8% each, and Samopomich—5%. Parties closest to passing the electoral threshold are Svoboda (4%), the Agrarian Party (3%), and UKROP (2%).
• The most common motivation for choosing a political party is support for its socio-economic initiatives. Seventeen percent choose based on sympathy for the party leader, and 11% based on ideological principles. Over recent years, demand for socio-economic initiatives has increased significantly, while the importance of ideology has declined.
• Society is gradually moving away from paternalistic expectations toward greater individual activity and internal locus of responsibility. In 2011, nearly 80% believed the government should be responsible for ensuring citizens’ livelihoods; today, fewer than 60% hold this view. Paternalistic values are strongest among the oldest and poorest respondents, while individual responsibility is more common among the youngest and wealthiest. Higher education also contributes to these value shifts.
• Views on income equalization have changed similarly. Seven years ago, nearly 70% supported such initiatives; today, support has halved. Instead, support is growing for stimulating individual activity by creating opportunities to increase income.
• By contrast, views on reducing the share of state ownership in business and industry show weaker dynamics. In 2011, 61% supported increasing state ownership; in 2017 this fell to 52%, but in 2018 it rose again to 58%.
• Despite value shifts, amid economic and political crises there is a growing demand for order—even at the cost of limiting democratic principles and freedoms. Seventy percent support such an approach (up from 63% last year). Only 15% favor greater freedom and democracy without order (down from 22% in 2017). Demand for order is highest among the oldest, poorest, and less educated, though even among the youngest, wealthiest, and most educated, at least 60% favor order.
• Against the backdrop of rising perceptions of local corruption, tolerance for corruption is declining. Over the past five years, those who believe corruption is increasing rose from 49% to 61%. At the same time, the share who consider bribery justified to resolve personally important issues fell from 37% to 13%. The share who personally gave bribes also declined from 27% in 2013 to 22% in 2018. Bribery is most common among respondents aged 30–50 and among wealthier and more educated individuals.
• Attitudes toward corruption as a phenomenon are also changing. More respondents now view corruption as a disease that hinders Ukraine’s development (55%), while fewer see it as a necessary mechanism for society’s functioning (39%). Support for the latter view is highest among the youngest (under 40), the most educated, and the wealthiest. Nearly half of those who personally gave bribes in the past year share this belief, and about one third justify bribery for personal purposes.
• An absolute majority of respondents (at least 75%) believe punishment for corruption among central government officials, law enforcement, tax and customs officials, and local authorities should be very severe (imprisonment, confiscation of property), with harsher penalties for higher-ranking officials. Between 11% and 18% believe penalties should be limited to fines or dismissal, and only 1–2% support mild punishments. Attitudes toward teachers and medical workers are more lenient: 44% support severe punishment, 32% moderate punishment, and 15% oppose any criminal liability for bribery among educators and doctors.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group among adult residents of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, and Lutsk who worked in Poland during the past five years, more than half of those with experience of labor migration to the neighboring country traveled there for work no more than three times (25% no more than once, 34% two to three times). Thirteen percent reported traveling for work from three to five times, 18% more than five times, and 7% said they work there almost on a permanent basis. Slightly greater experience of staying abroad was recorded among men, older respondents (aged 51 and over), and individuals with secondary education.
• More than half of respondents stated that the longest period they stayed working in Poland was from one to three months (9% less than one month, 49% from one to three months). One quarter said their longest stay was from three to six months, 14% from six months to one year, and 3% worked for more than one year. The largest share of those who stayed the longest in Poland is among the oldest respondents and those who had traveled there for work more than three times.
• Seventy-seven percent of respondents stated that in Poland they mainly performed physical labor, 16% worked in the service sector, 3% were engaged in intellectual work, and only 1% held managerial positions. Men almost universally (89%) performed physical labor, with only 6% working in services. Among women, 63% performed physical labor and 28% worked in services. The higher the level of education, the more often respondents found jobs in the service sector or were engaged in intellectual work.
• Thirty-four percent worked in agriculture in Poland, 32% in construction or repair work. Eight percent performed domestic work, 7% worked in the restaurant business, 5% in hotels, and 4% cared for elderly people, persons with disabilities, or others. Three percent were engaged in other types of activity, and less than 3% worked in other service jobs. Women and the oldest respondents more often worked in agriculture, while men, youth, and middle-aged respondents more often worked in construction and repair. Compared to men, women more often worked in domestic jobs, the restaurant sector, care for the elderly and people with disabilities, childcare, and services. The higher the level of education, the more often labor migrants found jobs not related to agriculture or construction.
• More than 80% searched for work through relatives and acquaintances: 66% through close contacts in Ukraine and 21% in Poland. Only 10% used Ukrainian employment agencies and 3% Polish agencies. Six percent found work through advertisements in Ukrainian media, 2% through Polish media, and 5% via social networks (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.). Less than 1% used state employment services in Ukraine or Poland.
• The main channel for job search for all respondent categories is primarily close contacts in Ukraine. At the same time, younger respondents more often than others used Ukrainian agencies, advertisements in domestic media, and social networks.
• Fifty-three percent of respondents named geographical proximity as the main reason for choosing Poland (rather than another country) for employment. Forty-four percent indicated higher wages as the motivation, 34% a low language barrier, and 30% the presence of family members or acquaintances already in Poland. Twenty-one percent chose Poland because there are more job offers there than in other countries. Stable political and economic conditions, cultural and historical proximity, or the inability to choose another European country were cited by 6–7%. Three percent saw opportunities for education or better prospects for personal development. Higher wages and a larger number of job offers more often motivated youth and middle-aged respondents, and somewhat more often men. Women more often chose Poland due to the low language barrier and the presence of relatives there.
• Thirty-nine percent believe that the most difficult aspect of working in Poland is prolonged separation from family. Thirty-two percent complain about long working hours per day, 28% about difficult working conditions, and 24% about the lack of social protection for Ukrainian labor migrants. Fourteen percent consider negative attitudes toward Ukrainians by Poles a problem, 13% administrative formalities in document processing, 12% the language barrier, 9% lack of days off, 8% poor living conditions, 4% conflicts with supervisors or employers, and 3% conflicts with colleagues. Separation from family is more often cited by middle-aged and oldest respondents, long working hours by younger respondents. Family-related difficulties are also more significant for women and for those who have traveled to Poland more than three times. The language barrier is mentioned less often by older respondents and those with repeated work experience in Poland.
• Two thirds never sent money to their families in Ukraine while working in Poland. Another 15% refused to answer this question. Six percent sent up to 500 zlotys per month, 8% sent 500–1,000 zlotys, and 11% sent more than 1,000 zlotys. The more often respondents worked in Poland, the larger the amounts they sent to their families.
• Forty-five percent stated that their monthly living expenses in Poland averaged between 200 and 500 zlotys. Twenty-two percent spent up to 200 zlotys, and 19% more than 500 zlotys. Fifteen percent could not answer.
• The most common additional non-wage benefits offered by employers were accommodation (58%). Thirty-five percent received free meals, 34% transportation to the workplace, and 28% internet access. Thirteen percent received assistance with document preparation for official registration, 12% mobile communication. Seven percent received social benefits (insurance, relocation assistance, etc.), and 5% educational services (Polish language courses or vocational training). Fifteen percent said they were offered nothing beyond wages.
• Among services used while working in Poland, respondents most often used mobile communication (72%). Fifty percent used the internet, 32% television. Thirteen percent used money transfer services, housing search and rental, and banks; 9% insurance services; and 7% private medical care. Other services such as car repair, freight transport, legal services, or car rental were used by no more than 2%. Those who had been to Poland more than three times more often used mobile communication, money transfers, banking services, housing rental, and insurance.
• Half of respondents (52%) generally rate Polish employers as good or very good, 38% gave neutral ratings, and only 8% rated them as bad or very bad. Women, wealthier respondents, and those who had worked in Poland more often rate Polish employers more positively.
• Similar trends are observed in assessments of coworkers: more than half (58%) rated them as good or very good, 36% neutral, and 4% bad or very bad. Wealthier respondents tend to rate coworkers more positively.
• Only 4% stated that they plan to purchase or already own real estate in Poland (mostly those who had worked there more than three times). The vast majority have no such plans (88% said they do not plan to, and 8% did not answer). A similar pattern applies to plans to establish a business or economic activity in Poland: only 3% reported such plans, 89% do not, and 9% could not answer.
• • Sixty-three percent said they plan to go to Poland for work again in the near future, 19% said they do not, and the same share could not answer. The highest share of those planning to return soon is among respondents who had worked in Poland more than three times.
• Seventy-four percent said they do not plan to move to Poland for permanent residence in the next few years. Eleven percent reported such plans, again most often among those who had been to Poland many times.
• Among countries where labor migrants would most like to work, 30% chose Poland, 27% Germany, 22% the United States, 20% Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark), 18% the Czech Republic, 13% the United Kingdom, 12% Canada, and 7% each the Netherlands and Belgium. Other countries were chosen by no more than 6%. Poland is more often chosen by older respondents, men, and those with secondary education. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries are more attractive to respondents with higher education.
• Two thirds of respondents believe that the introduction of a visa-free regime with the European Union has made it easier for Ukrainians to search for jobs and find employment abroad. Only 7% hold the opposite view, while one quarter could not answer. Slightly more positive assessments of the impact of visa-free travel on employment opportunities were recorded among women, people with higher education, and those who had been to Poland no more than once.

A more detailed report on the attitudes of Ukrainian labor migrants in Poland and Polish employers’ views of Ukrainian workers is available on the website of the recruitment company Personnel Service at personnelservice.pl/en/press-office/reports.

The Fourth In-Depth Look at Ukrainian Local Governance

This annual survey provides an extensivelook at citizen attitudes about local governance and municipal services.

Polling was conducted in the 22 regional capitals of Ukraine not under the control of Russian or Russian-backed forces, as well as in the cities of Mariupol and Severodonetskin the Donbas region.The survey is based on a sample size of more than 19,000 respondents.

The findings will inform future discussions on decentralization, anti-corruption initiatives and other reforms set forth by the pro-European government in Kyiv.

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Fourth annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey from Ratinggroup