Press releases

• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Zhytomyr region from November 16 to December 2, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 6% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 24% consider the situation in their home region to be calm, and 41% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Nearly 55% of respondents view the situation in the country as tense, and 34% as critical. At the local level, assessments are somewhat better: between 38% and 51% see the situation as tense, and about 14–17% as critical.
• Similarly, respondents assess the correctness of the country’s direction of movement worse (16%) than that of the region (24%) or their city or village (29%). Residents of Zhytomyr city and small towns assess the direction of local development more critically. With regard to the direction of Ukraine’s movement, residents of the regional center are more pessimistic. Among age groups, representatives of the younger generation are the most critical.
• At the same time, despite negative assessments of the current situation, general expectations among residents of the region are rather positive-neutral. One in five believes that the situation in Ukraine and at the local level will improve next year. Half of respondents believe that the situation will not change. Nevertheless, about 20% have negative expectations.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine (61%) is the main nationwide problem according to residents of the region. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about low wages and pensions (48%), rising utility tariffs (45%), and rising prices for basic goods and inflation (35%). Socio-economic problems such as low wages and pensions, unemployment, and inflation are felt more acutely in rural areas, while lack of opportunities for entrepreneurship and education, as well as rising crime, are more characteristic concerns in small towns.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yuliia Tymoshenko, whom 22.1% of those who have decided and intend to participate in the elections are ready to support. Volodymyr Zelenskyi is supported by 14.5%, Petro Poroshenko by 12.0%, Oleh Liashko by 11.9%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 5.7%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 5.5%, Yurii Boiko by 3.5%, and Yevhenii Murayev by 3.4%. Other candidates have ratings below 3%. At the same time, nearly one in five residents of the region has not decided on a candidate.
• One in five believes that Yuliia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election. Over the past year, the number of those convinced of her victory has doubled. Eleven percent are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko (15% in 2017). Five percent see Volodymyr Zelenskyi winning, and about 4% expect Oleh Liashko to win. No more than 3% believe in a positive result for other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. Nearly 38% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with the support of 25.1% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Servant of the People is supported by 16.3%, European Solidarity by 12.4%, the Radical Party by 10.6%, Civic Position by 5.3%, and the Opposition Bloc by 4.3%. Other parties have ratings below 4%. At the same time, nearly one quarter of residents of the region have not decided on a party.
• Orientation of a candidate toward closer cooperation with the European Union (62%) is the motive that has a significant influence on respondents’ presidential choice. Other motives split respondents roughly in half. For 50%, the candidate’s ability to ensure radical changes in the country is important, while 42% stated that ensuring stability is more important to them. Forty percent said that experience in state politics is more important, while for half of respondents the candidate’s belonging to the generation of “new politicians” is important. The latter motive is dominant among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, and Yevhenii Murayev. Forty-nine percent choose a candidate primarily because of leadership qualities, while for 43% the presence of a strong team is more important. Forty-seven percent choose based on the socio-economic program, and 43% based on ideological views. Respondents equally assess the importance of a candidate’s orientation toward solving problems of the country or of the region.
• Thirty-five percent of respondents believe that the situation will not change as a result of the upcoming presidential elections, while 33% believe that it will improve. Fifteen percent state that it will worsen. Supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Yevhenii Murayev more often expect positive changes. Relatively fewer positive changes are expected by respondents who do not intend to vote or have not decided on their choice.
• According to respondents, the likelihood of election fraud at the nationwide level (36%) is higher than at the local level (25%). About 40% also allow the possibility of minor falsifications at all levels. At the same time, one quarter of respondents are convinced that there will be no fraud in their city or village.
• At the same time, 15% of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Thirty-one percent take a neutral position on this issue, while 51% oppose this type of campaigning. Poorer respondents are more favorable toward candidates distributing assistance.
• Residents of the region assess the performance of local authorities significantly better than that of central authorities. Thirteen percent of respondents are satisfied with the activity of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, and only 7% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, more than 80% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of central authorities. More critical assessments are observed in the regional center.
• Twenty-five percent of respondents are satisfied with the activity of the regional state administration (28% in 2017). Over the year, the level of satisfaction with the activity of the city or village head did not change (42%). Local leaders are rated more favorably in the regional center and in villages.
• Respondents more often observe an increase in corruption in Ukraine as a whole than in the region or their place of residence. Half of respondents believe that the situation with bribery has not changed at either the central or local levels. Between 10% and 14% reported a decrease in corruption.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. In year-to-year dynamics, most indicators show no change. The situation in school education is rated relatively better. Assessments of road conditions and life safety improved significantly over the year. Respondents expressed the most negative views about the state of the environment.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated the possibility of finding a job relatively higher, and the possibility of engaging in entrepreneurship the lowest. Opportunities for leisure and recreation and achieving success are rated higher by residents of the regional center, entrepreneurship by residents of small towns, and living safely by residents of villages. In general, urban residents rate job-search opportunities higher than rural residents. Younger and wealthier respondents rate all opportunities higher than older and poorer ones.
• About 7% see high economic development potential for Ukraine, the region, and their city or village over the next 5–10 years. About 40% assess this potential as medium. One third see low potential, and 10–13% see no prospects for economic growth at all, both nationally and locally. Residents of small towns assess growth potential more critically.
• The majority of respondents (72%) feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine. The same share feel proud to be residents of their region, and 75% of their city or village. The older the respondents, the higher the level of pride. The most common source of regional pride is nature (56%). Forty percent are proud of their region’s history, 26% of culture and art, 24% of local residents, 18% of natural resources, 11% of notable people and landmarks, and 10% of traditions.
• Sixty-nine percent consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while nearly 27% hold the opposite view. Residents of cities, younger respondents, and wealthier respondents more often report personal happiness. On the other hand, one third of older respondents and nearly half of poorer respondents consider themselves unhappy.
• Residents of the region more often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Kyiv and Vinnytsia regions. Among neighboring countries, respondents consider themselves closest to Belarus and Poland, as well as Russia.
• Nearly one third of respondents expressed a desire to start their own business. Seven percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs. Half do not have such aspirations. A higher desire to start a business is observed among residents of the regional center, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals. Among the latter, one in five stated that they already run a business. Among those wishing to start a business, 31% would like to engage in trade, 12% in construction and repair, 10% in farming, 10% in entertainment and leisure, and 9% in the beauty and health industry.
• Over the past year, the share of those wishing to work abroad increased from 22% to 32%. At the same time, 60% of them are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future. Higher migration intentions are observed among young people (47%), residents of the regional center (38%), and respondents with average income levels (36%).
• Seventy-four percent believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language. Fourteen percent support granting Russian official status in certain regions, and 9% support granting Russian the status of a state language.
• More than half of respondents (64%) consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine. Twenty percent hold the opposite view, and 16% are undecided.
• Over the past year, the share of those supporting Ukraine’s accession to the European Union decreased slightly from 61% to 57%, as did support for NATO accession (from 48% to 44%). At the same time, the number of opponents did not increase. Among directions of foreign economic integration, the pro-European vector leads with 51%, 34% support Ukraine’s equidistance from Russia and the West, and only 5% support accession to the Customs Union.

• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Cherkasy region from November 16 to December 7, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 3% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 18% consider the situation in the region to be calm and 49% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Fifty-seven percent of respondents view the situation in the country as tense, and 34% as critical. In the region, 61% see the situation as tense, while in their city 36% do so; only 5% consider the local situation to be critical.
• Respondents assess the correctness of the country’s direction (13%) and the region’s direction (15%) worse than that of their city or village (29%). Residents of rural settlements and the oldest respondents are more optimistic in their assessments of the situation in their locality.
• Despite negative assessments of the current situation, general expectations among residents of the region are rather neutral-positive. About 19% believe that the situation in Ukraine will improve next year, 13% hold this view regarding the region, and 16% regarding their settlement. The overwhelming majority believe that the situation will not change. Between 11% and 15% think it will worsen. Younger respondents and residents of smaller settlements are more optimistic in their assessments.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine (87%) and corruption in government (64%) are the two largest nationwide problems according to residents of the region. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about rising utility tariffs (64%), low income (61%), and inflation (55%). At the level of personal problems, socio-economic issues such as unemployment, inflation, high tariffs, and low income are felt more acutely in rural areas, while problems of corruption and social protection concern residents of the regional center somewhat more.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yuliia Tymoshenko, whom 20.6% of those who have decided and intend to vote are ready to support. Volodymyr Zelenskyi is supported by 12.6%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 12.1%, Petro Poroshenko by 9.4%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 5.9%, Ruslan Koshulynskyi by 5.8%, Oleh Liashko by 5.6%, Yurii Boiko by 4.2%, Oleksandr Shevchenko by 4.1%, and Andrii Sadovyi by 2.7%. Other candidates have ratings below 2.5%. One in ten residents of the region has not decided on a candidate.
• Twenty-one point three percent of respondents believe that Yuliia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election. Over the past year, the number of those convinced of her victory has doubled. Nine percent are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko (14% in 2017). About 6% see Volodymyr Zelenskyi winning, 4.5% Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3% Ruslan Koshulynskyi and Yurii Boiko each, and 2% Oleh Liashko. Fewer than 2% believe in the victory of other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Yurii Boiko, Petro Poroshenko, and Ruslan Koshulynskyi.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. More than 60% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with the support of 21.0% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Servant of the People is supported by 14.1%, Civic Position by 12.9%, European Solidarity by 8.8%, Svoboda by 6.0%, the Radical Party by 5.2%, the Opposition Bloc by 4.7%, and UKROP by 4.2%. Other parties have ratings below 4%. At the same time, 11% of respondents have not decided on a party.
• Orientation of a candidate toward solving the country’s problems (68%), personal leadership qualities (67%), socio-economic program (60%), and orientation toward closer cooperation with the European Union (59%) are motives that significantly influence respondents’ presidential choice. At the same time, 30% also tend to focus on a politician’s ideological views rather than their program, 28% focus on the candidate’s strong team, and for 22% attention to their region is important. For 56%, experience in politics is important, while 40% state that belonging to the generation of “new politicians” matters more to them, which is especially relevant for younger voters and supporters of Ruslan Koshulynskyi, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk. When choosing between radical change and ensuring stability, 54% choose radical change, particularly supporters of Koshulynskyi, while 36% prefer stability.
• Thirty-five percent of respondents expect that the situation in Ukraine will improve as a result of the upcoming presidential elections, while the same share believe that it will not change. Only 8% believe it will worsen. Supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko more often expect positive changes. Respondents who do not intend to vote expect significantly fewer positive changes.
• According to respondents, the likelihood of election fraud at the nationwide level (61%) is higher than at the regional level (42%) or in their city or village (28%). About one third also allow the possibility of minor falsifications. Twenty-one percent believe that there will be no fraud in their locality.
• At the same time, 17% of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Twenty-three percent take a neutral position, while 54% oppose this type of campaigning. Residents of villages and the poorest respondents are more favorable toward the distribution of assistance.
• Residents of the region assess the performance of local authorities better than that of central authorities. Eleven percent of respondents are satisfied with the activity of President Petro Poroshenko, 13% with Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, and only 7% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, more than 80% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of central authorities.
• Over the year, satisfaction with the activity of the regional state administration declined from 23% to 17%, while satisfaction with the work of city or village heads remained almost unchanged at 46–47%. Satisfaction with local leaders is significantly higher among rural residents.
• Respondents more often observe an increase in corruption in Ukraine as a whole (52%) than in the region (35%) or their place of residence (21%). Thirty-seven percent believe that the situation with bribery has not changed at the central level, while 43–49% hold this view regarding their locality. Only 1–4% reported a decrease in corruption.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. The situation in school education, life safety, and agricultural development is rated relatively better. In agriculture, approval dynamics over the year are the most positive. At the same time, assessments of school education, ecology, social protection, and the fight against corruption have declined, with the latter rated the worst.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated the possibility of leisure and recreation the highest, and the ability to achieve success the lowest. Most opportunity areas, except leisure, are rated higher by wealthier respondents. Young people and rural residents rate leisure and safety higher, while younger respondents also rate opportunities for achieving success higher. Residents of the regional center rate job opportunities higher.
• Only 2–3% see high economic development potential for Ukraine, the region, and their city or village over the next 5–10 years. Between 20% and 30% assess this potential as medium. About 40–45% see low potential. Twelve to fourteen percent see no prospects for economic growth in Ukraine and the region at all, while 24% see none in their city or village. Residents of small towns assess growth potential for the country and region somewhat better.
• Between 73% and 74% feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine, residents of the region, and residents of their city or village. Older respondents feel pride slightly more often. The most common sources of regional pride are nature (48%) and history (44%). Culture and traditions are cited by 31% each, notable people of the region by 28%, landmarks and local residents by 18–19%, cuisine and culinary traditions by 13%, and sports achievements and natural resources by 10–11%.
• About 70% consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while 17% hold the opposite view. Younger and wealthier respondents more often report personal happiness. At the same time, one in five among the older generation and one in three among the poorest respondents consider themselves unhappy.
• Residents of the region most often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Kyiv, Poltava, and Kirovohrad regions. Among neighboring countries, respondents consider themselves closest to Belarus, somewhat less to Poland, and partially to Russia.
• Twenty-seven percent expressed a desire to start their own business, while 47% do not have such a desire and 18% are undecided. Eight percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs. A higher desire to start a business is observed among residents of smaller towns and villages, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals. Among the latter, 28% stated that they already run a business. Among those wishing to start a business, 31% would like to engage in trade.
• Over the past year, the share of those wishing to work abroad decreased from 39% to 34%. Forty percent of them are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future, while 30% are not. Higher migration intentions are observed among young people (62%).
• An absolute majority of respondents (85%) believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language. Eight percent support granting Russian official status in certain regions, and 4% support granting Russian the status of a state language.
• Eighty-one percent consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine. Only 9% hold the opposite view, and 10% were unable to answer.
• Support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union has slightly decreased from 64% to 61%. Support for NATO accession has remained almost unchanged at 47–48%, while the number of opponents decreased from 24% to 20%. Among directions of foreign economic integration, the pro-European vector leads with 50% (59% in 2017). Only 2% support accession to the Customs Union. Over time, the share of those supporting Ukraine’s equidistance from Russia and the West increased from 20% to 33%.

• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Dnipropetrovsk region from November 16 to December 2, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 6% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 30% consider the situation in the region to be calm and 40% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Fifty percent of respondents view the situation in the country as tense, and 40% as critical. At the local level, assessments are better: between 35% and 42% see the situation as tense, and about 20% consider it critical.
• Similarly, respondents assess the correctness of the country’s direction (12%) worse than that of the region (21%) or their city or village (26%). Residents of the regional center assess local affairs better than the overall situation in the country, while a more critical attitude toward local affairs is expressed by residents of other cities in the region.
• At the same time, despite negative assessments of the current situation, general expectations among residents of the region are rather neutral-positive. Only 16–18% believe that the situation in Ukraine and at the local level will worsen next year. Half believe it will not change, while between 16% and 19% have optimistic expectations about the future.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine (70%) is the main nationwide problem according to residents of the region. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about rising utility tariffs (51%), low wages and pensions (48%), and the war in Donbas (41%). Problems such as bribery and corruption in government, low wages and pensions, and rising utility tariffs are felt more acutely in rural areas.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yuliia Tymoshenko, whom 21.8% of those who have decided and intend to vote are ready to support. Volodymyr Zelenskyi is supported by 17.0%, Yurii Boiko by 14.0%, Petro Poroshenko by 8.8%, Yevhenii Murayev by 6.0%, Oleh Liashko by 5.2%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko by 4.7%. Other candidates have ratings below 3%. At the same time, more than a quarter of residents of the region have not decided on a candidate.
• One in five respondents believes that Yuliia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election. Over the past year, the number of those convinced of her victory has tripled. As last year, 9% are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko. About 7% see Volodymyr Zelenskyi winning, and 5% Yurii Boiko. No more than 2% believe in the victory of other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. Almost 60% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with the support of 21.1% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Servant of the People is supported by 15.2%, the Opposition Bloc by 14.6%, the “For Life” party by 6.4%, European Solidarity by 5.5%, UKROP and the Radical Party by 5.3% each, the “Nashi” party by 4.4%, and Civic Position by 3.6%. Other parties have ratings below 2%. At the same time, almost one in five residents of the region has not decided on a party.
• A socio-economic program (69%) and orientation toward solving the country’s problems (63%) are motives that significantly influence respondents’ presidential choice. For 58%, the candidate’s ability to ensure stability in the country is important, while 36% stated that ensuring radical change is more important to them. Orientation toward cooperation with the EU is important for 54%, while for 24% orientation toward cooperation with Russia is more important. Forty-nine percent choose a candidate primarily because of leadership qualities, while for 40% the presence of a strong team is more important. For 48%, experience in public office is more important, while for 42% belonging to the generation of “new politicians” matters more. The latter motive is dominant among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Yevhenii Murayev.
• Thirty-four percent of respondents expect that the situation in Ukraine will improve as a result of the upcoming presidential elections. Thirty-five percent believe that the situation will not change, and only 13% believe it will worsen. Supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Yuliia Tymoshenko, and Petro Poroshenko more often expect positive changes. Those who do not intend to vote more often expect deterioration.
• Two thirds of respondents expect significant election fraud in the presidential elections at both the national and local levels. One in four believes that falsifications will be minor, and fewer than 10% believe the elections will be fair.
• At the same time, 13% of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Twenty percent take a neutral position, while 64% oppose this type of campaigning. A more favorable attitude toward the distribution of assistance by candidates is observed in the regional center and among the youngest respondents.
• Residents of the region assess the activity of local authorities significantly better than that of central authorities. Thirteen percent of respondents are satisfied with the activity of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, 12% with President Petro Poroshenko, and only 5% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, more than 80% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of the President and the Prime Minister, and almost 90% with Parliament. More critical assessments are observed in cities of the region.
• Over the year, the level of satisfaction with the activity of the regional state administration and city or village heads has practically not changed. Satisfaction with local heads is higher among residents of Dnipro and villages than in other cities of the region. Activity of the regional state administration is rated more positively in the regional center.
• Almost half of respondents believe that the level of corruption has increased both at the national and local levels. Thirty percent believe that the situation with bribery has not changed. Only 4–6% reported a decrease in corruption.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. In annual dynamics, most indicators show negative trends or no change. The situation in school education and the condition of roads is assessed relatively better. Respondents speak most negatively about the fight against bribery at the local level.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated the possibility of finding a job and leisure and recreation the highest, and engaging in entrepreneurship the lowest. Residents of the regional center, younger respondents, and wealthier respondents rate all opportunities higher.
• One in ten sees high economic development potential for Ukraine, the region, and their city or village over the next 5–10 years. About one third assess this potential as medium. Almost the same share see low potential, while 11–13% see no opportunities for economic growth at any level. Younger and middle-aged respondents assess economic potential somewhat better, while rural residents are more critical regarding the potential of their own locality.
• Sixty-seven percent feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine. Slightly more feel proud to be residents of their region (72%) and of their city or village (74%). Pride increases with age. The most common sources of regional pride are nature (35%) and local history (31%). Twenty-one percent are proud of industry, 18% of local residents, 16% of natural resources, 14% of culture and sports achievements, 13% of landmarks, and 12% of regional traditions.
• More than 70% consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while a quarter of respondents hold the opposite view. Younger and wealthier respondents more often report personal happiness. At the same time, one in three representatives of the older generation consider themselves unhappy.
• Residents of the region more often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Zaporizhzhia region. Among neighboring countries, respondents consider themselves closest to Belarus, Russia, and Poland.
• Thirty-five percent expressed a desire to start their own business. Nine percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs. Almost half stated that they do not want to run their own business. A higher desire to become an entrepreneur is observed among residents of the regional center, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals. Among the latter, one quarter reported that they already run a business. Among those wishing to start a business, 35% would like to engage in trade, 10% in farming, 9% in construction and repair, and 8% in entertainment and leisure.
• Over the past year, the share of those wishing to work abroad increased slightly from 31% to 35%. Fifty-four percent of them are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future. Traditionally, higher migration intentions are observed among young people (55%), residents of cities in the region (about one third), and wealthier and middle-income respondents (about 40%).
• Fifty-two percent believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language. Thirty-six percent support granting Russian the status of a state language, and another 10% support granting Russian official status in certain regions.
• Half of respondents (52%) consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine, while 34% hold the opposite view.
• Over the past year, the share of those opposing Ukraine’s accession to the European Union increased from 25% to 32%, and to NATO from 37% to 43%. At the same time, the number of supporters of the pro-Western vector has remained almost unchanged (46% for EU accession and 32% for NATO). The share of those supporting Ukraine’s equidistance from the EU and Russia has also increased from 30% to 34%.

• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Kirovohrad region from November 16 to December 4, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 3% of respondents assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 19% consider the situation in the region to be calm, and 37% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Almost 58% view the situation in the country as tense, and 33% as critical. At the local level, assessments are somewhat better: between 45% and 55% see the situation as tense, and between 14% and 17% as critical.
• Respondents assess the correctness of the direction of movement of the country (15%) and the region (18%) worse than that of their city or village (27%). Residents of the regional center are more optimistic in these assessments, while people of middle age are more critical.
• Despite negative assessments of the current situation, general expectations among residents of the region are rather neutral-positive. One in three to one in four believe that the situation in Ukraine and locally will improve next year. The overwhelming majority (40–50%) think that the situation will not change. Between 11% and 15% believe that it will worsen.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine (79%) is the most significant nationwide problem according to residents of the region. Unemployment is also considered a major problem (47%). At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about low income and rising utility tariffs, both cited by 51%. Unemployment, inflation, and low income are felt more acutely in rural areas, while tariffs, healthcare, and social protection are of greater concern to residents of the regional center.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yuliia Tymoshenko, whom 24.1% of those who have decided and intend to vote are ready to support. Volodymyr Zelenskyi is supported by 13.4%, Petro Poroshenko by 12.9%, Oleh Liashko by 10.0%, Yurii Boiko by 9.6%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 4.9%, and Vadym Rabinovych and Oleksandr Shevchenko by 4.1% each. Other candidates have ratings below 3%. At the same time, every fifth resident of the region has not decided on a candidate.
• One quarter of respondents believe that Yuliia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election. Over the past year, the number of those convinced of her victory has increased more than threefold. Eleven percent are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko (the same as in 2017). About 6% consider the victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyi likely, 5% that of Yurii Boiko, and 4% that of Oleh Liashko. Fewer than 2% believe in a positive result for other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Vadym Rabinovych.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. Almost 60% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with the support of 25.9% of those who have decided and intend to participate in elections. Servant of the People is supported by 15.6%, European Solidarity by 11.2%, the Opposition Bloc by 10.3%, the Radical Party by 8.8%, Za Zhyttia by 4.8%, and Civic Position by 4.7%. Other parties have ratings below 4%. At the same time, 18% have not decided on their choice.
• A candidate’s focus on solving the country’s problems (63%), socio-economic program (59%), and orientation toward closer cooperation with the EU (56%) are motives that significantly influence respondents’ presidential choice. At the same time, 30% are inclined to focus on a politician’s ideological views rather than their program, 23% consider attention to their region important, and 22% view cooperation with Russia as more appropriate, especially voters of Yurii Boiko. For 52%, personal leadership qualities of the candidate are important, while 38% consider the presence of a strong team more important. Another 48% choose a candidate primarily because of political experience, while for 42% belonging to the generation of “new politicians” is important, particularly among younger respondents and voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Oleksandr Shevchenko. When choosing between radical changes and ensuring stability, 49% prefer radical changes, while 42% lean more toward stability.
• Forty-seven percent of respondents expect that the situation in Ukraine will improve as a result of the upcoming presidential elections. Thirty percent believe that the situation will not change, and only 9% say that it will worsen. Supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko more often expect positive changes. Significantly fewer positive changes are expected by respondents who do not intend to vote.
• According to respondents, the likelihood of election fraud at the national level (43%) is higher than at the local level (20–26%). About half of respondents allow the possibility of minor falsifications. Twenty-one percent believe that there will be no fraud in their locality.
• Twenty-one percent of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Thirty-three percent take a neutral position, while 42% oppose this form of campaigning. Residents of the regional center and rural areas, as well as respondents with middle and lower income levels, are more favorable toward the distribution of assistance.
• Residents of the region assess the performance of local authorities better than that of central authorities. Nine percent are satisfied with the activity of President Petro Poroshenko, slightly more (11%) with the activity of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, and only 3% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, more than 80% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of central authorities. Residents of the regional center assess it somewhat better.
• Over the year, satisfaction with the activity of the regional state administration decreased significantly (from 39% to 19%), as did satisfaction with the work of the city or village head (from 51% to 36%). Satisfaction with local heads is higher among residents of small towns and villages.
• Respondents more often observe an increase in corruption in Ukraine as a whole (34%) than in the region (22%) or their place of residence (17%). Between 50% and 55% believe that the situation with bribery has not changed at either the central or local levels. Only 4–6% reported a decrease in corruption in the region and the country, while 15% reported a decrease in their locality.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. Agricultural development, school education, and road conditions received relatively better evaluations. In year-to-year dynamics, most indicators show negative trends, with the exception of agriculture. Evaluations of school education, ecology, social protection, youth support, and the fight against corruption have deteriorated significantly, with the latter rated the worst.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated opportunities for leisure and recreation and achieving success the highest, and finding a job the lowest. All opportunities are rated higher by residents of the regional center. Leisure, success, and employment opportunities are rated better by wealthier respondents.
• About 21% see high economic development potential for Ukraine, while 10% see such potential for the region and for their city or village over the next 5–10 years. Between 35% and 45% assess the potential as medium. About one third see low potential, and 8–12% see no prospects for economic growth at all, both nationally and locally. Residents of the regional center assess the growth potential of their city somewhat more positively.
• Sixty-nine percent feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine, while 21% do not. Seventy percent feel proud to be residents of their region, and the highest share feel proud of their city or village (77%), while 17% hold the opposite view. Older respondents feel pride somewhat more often. The most common sources of regional pride are history (37%) and nature (36%). Twenty-three percent are proud of local culture, 20% of traditions, 18% of local residents, about 15% of agriculture, prominent people, and sports achievements, 12% of natural resources, and 11% of landmarks and cuisine.
• About 70% consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while 23% hold the opposite view. Younger and wealthier respondents more often report personal happiness. At the same time, almost one third of representatives of the older generation and the poorest groups consider themselves unhappy.
• Residents of the region most often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Cherkasy, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Among neighboring countries, respondents consider themselves closest to Belarus, Poland, and Russia.
• Thirty-four percent expressed a desire to start their own business, while 37% do not have such a desire and 23% are undecided. Six percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs. A higher desire to start a business is observed among residents of small towns, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals. Among the latter, 34% reported that they already run a business. Among those wishing to start a business, 47% would like to engage in trade.
• Over the past year, the share of those wishing to work abroad increased from 26% to 38%. At the same time, 65% of them are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future. Higher migration intentions are observed among young people (53%).
• Seventy percent believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language. Thirteen percent support granting Russian official status in certain regions, and 11% support granting Russian the status of a state language.
• About half of respondents (52%) consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine, while 30% hold the opposite view and 18% were unable to answer.
• Support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union remains at the same level (45–46%). NATO accession is supported by 37%, the same as last year. At the same time, the number of opponents of alliance with NATO has slightly decreased (from 32% to 29%). Among directions of foreign economic integration, the pro-European vector is supported by 42%, and the Customs Union by 9%. Over time, the share of those supporting Ukraine’s equidistance from Russia and the West has decreased (from 34% to 26%).
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• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Kharkiv region from November 16 to December 4, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole significantly worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 6% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 33% consider the situation in the region to be calm and 45% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Fifty-four percent of respondents view the situation in the country as tense, and 37% as critical. Half of respondents assess the situation in the region as tense, and another 13% as critical. Assessments of the situation in respondents’ own cities are better: 36% see it as tense and 15% as critical.
• Similarly, respondents assess the correctness of the country’s direction (14%) worse than that of the region (34%) or their city or village (40%). The direction of the country’s development is assessed most negatively in Kharkiv city and in rural areas, while the local situation is evaluated most critically by residents of small towns.
• General expectations among residents of the region are rather negative-neutral. Only one in ten believes that the situation in Ukraine will improve next year. Expectations regarding the local situation are somewhat more optimistic: 14% expect improvement in the region and 17% in their city or village. At the same time, about half believe that the situation will not change at any level, while about one quarter have pessimistic expectations regarding the future of Ukraine, and one quarter regarding the region or their place of residence.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine (66%) is the main nationwide problem according to residents of the region. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about rising utility tariffs (55%), low wages and pensions (50%), and rising prices for basic goods (44%). Most problems are felt more acutely in small towns and rural areas than in the regional center.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yurii Boiko, whom 19.8% of those who have decided and intend to vote are ready to support. Yuliia Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi are each supported by 15.5%, Yevhenii Murayev by 11.5%, Petro Poroshenko by 9.0%, Vadym Rabinovych by 6.5%, and Oleh Liashko by 4.5%. Other candidates have ratings below 4%. At the same time, every fourth resident of the region has not decided on a candidate, and every seventh does not intend to vote.
• At the same time, 19.5% of respondents believe that Yuliia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election. Over the past year, the number of those convinced of her victory has increased fivefold. Fourteen point one percent are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko (compared to 7% in 2017). About 4.8% see Yurii Boiko winning, and 4.3% Volodymyr Zelenskyi. No more than 3% believe in the victory of other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. Almost 61% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, the Opposition Bloc leads with the support of 16.4% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Batkivshchyna is supported by 14.3%, Servant of the People by 12.6%, the “Nashi” party by 10.9%, European Solidarity by 9.0%, For Life by 8.7%, Revival by 8.3%, and the Radical Party by 4.0%. Other parties have ratings below 3%. At the same time, one quarter of residents of the region have not decided on a party choice, and one in six does not intend to vote.
• The candidate’s socio-economic program and personal leadership qualities (59% each) are motives that significantly influence respondents’ presidential choice. At the same time, the presence of a strong team is important for 32% of respondents, and ideological views for 31%. Fifty-two percent expect a politician to be able to ensure stability in the country, while for 38% the desire to implement change is more important. Fifty-one percent choose a candidate primarily because of their orientation toward solving the country’s problems, while for 40% orientation toward solving both national and regional problems is important. For 47%, experience in public office matters, while 40% stated that belonging to the generation of “new politicians” is more important. The latter motive is dominant among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Yevhenii Murayev. For 44%, orientation toward cooperation with the European Union is important, while for 30% cooperation with Russia is more important, and one quarter have not decided on this issue.
• Thirty-three percent of respondents believe that the situation in Ukraine will not change as a result of the upcoming presidential elections, while 22% expect deterioration. On the other hand, 29% expect improvement. The largest share of those expecting improvement are among supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko. Relatively fewer positive changes are expected by respondents who have not decided or do not intend to vote. Half of those who do not intend to vote have negative expectations.
• According to respondents, the likelihood of election fraud in the presidential elections is higher at the national level (53%) than at the local level (48% in the region and 43% in the city or village). About one third also allow for minor falsifications at all levels.
• At the same time, 25% of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Another 26% take a neutral position, while 46% oppose this type of campaigning. Vote-buying is more strongly condemned by residents of small towns and respondents of the middle age group.
• Residents of the region assess the activity of local authorities significantly better than that of central authorities. Only 14% are satisfied with the activity of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, 9% with President Petro Poroshenko, and 8% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, about 90% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of central authorities.
• Over the year, the level of satisfaction with the activity of the regional state administration and local heads increased: satisfaction with the regional administration rose from 29% to 40%, and with local leaders from 52% to 56%. Satisfaction with the regional administration and the mayor is highest among residents of Kharkiv city.
• Respondents more often perceive an increase in the level of corruption nationwide (45%) than in the region (34%) or at their place of residence (30%). About half of respondents believe that the level of bribery has not changed at either the central or local levels. Only 4–6% reported a decrease in corruption.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. Relatively better assessments were given to the condition of roads, the environment, school education, and personal safety. The worst assessments concern the fight against bribery at the local level. In annual dynamics, improvements in assessments are observed for most indicators, especially regarding road conditions and personal safety.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated the possibility of leisure and recreation highest, and engaging in entrepreneurship lowest. Opportunities for recreation, achieving success, finding a job, and entrepreneurship were rated higher in the regional center, while personal safety was rated higher in small towns and villages. Younger and wealthier respondents rate all opportunities higher.
• Respondents assess the economic development potential at the local level somewhat better than that of Ukraine as a whole. Only 7% see high economic development potential for Ukraine over the next 5–10 years. One quarter assess it as medium, while almost 40% see low potential and 17% see no opportunities for economic growth at all. In contrast, one in ten sees significant development potential locally, one third assess it as medium, one third as low, and one in ten see no potential. Residents of Kharkiv city assess the development potential of their city most positively.
• Half of respondents (52%) feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine, while 41% hold the opposite view. Significantly more feel proud to be residents of their region (76%) and of their city or village (82%). The most common sources of regional pride are nature (38%). Culture and art and history are each cited by 30%, landmarks by 29%, local residents by 28%, natural resources, science, and education by 23% each, regional traditions by 20%, sports achievements by 15%, prominent individuals by 13%, and industry by 12%.
• Almost 70% consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while one quarter hold the opposite view. Younger and wealthier respondents more often report personal happiness. At the same time, one in three representatives of the older generation consider themselves unhappy, and among the poor this share reaches 44%.
• Residents of the region more often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Poltava region. Among neighboring countries, respondents consider Belarus and Russia to be closest.
• Thirty percent expressed a desire to start their own business. Eight percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs, while 56% stated that they do not have such a desire. A higher desire to start a business is observed among residents of the regional center, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals. Among the latter, one quarter reported that they already run a business. Among those wishing to start a business, 29% would like to engage in trade, 15% in tourism, 14% in the beauty and health industry, 11% in entertainment and leisure or transport services, 10% in the IT sector, and 9% in farming or construction and repair.
• Over the past year, the share of those wishing to work abroad increased from 24% to 35%. Fifty-seven percent of them are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future, while 34% are not. Higher migration intentions are traditionally observed among young people (54%), city residents (35–37%), and respondents with middle and high incomes (44–45%).
• Thirty-seven percent support granting the Russian language state status, 31% support granting it official status in certain regions, while 28% believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language.
• Forty-eight percent of respondents do not consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine, while 35% hold the opposite view and 17% were unable to answer.
• The number of supporters of the pro-Western vector is smaller than the number of opponents, although the share of opponents decreased over the year. Thus, 35% support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (33% in 2017), while 44% do not support it (49% in 2017). Twenty-four percent support accession to NATO (22% in 2017), while 56% do not support it (60% in 2017). Among different vectors of foreign economic integration, equidistance from Russia and the West continues to lead (36%). Twenty percent support accession to the Customs Union.
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• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Poltava region from November 16 to December 9, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 7% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 40% consider the situation in the region to be calm and 54% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Almost 69% of respondents view the situation in the country as tense, and 21% as critical. At the local level, assessments of the situation are somewhat better: between 33% and 44% see the situation as tense, and only 7–10% consider it critical.
• Respondents assess the correctness of the direction of development of the country and the region somewhat worse, at 14% and 15% respectively, than that of their city or village, which stands at 22%. The correctness of developments in one’s own city or village is rated higher by residents of small towns and villages than by residents of the regional center.
• At the same time, despite negative assessments of the current situation, general expectations among residents of the region are rather negative-neutral. More than half of respondents believe that the situation, both in Ukraine and locally, will not change next year. About one quarter believe it will worsen. Only one in ten has optimistic expectations about the future.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine, cited by 63%, and bribery and corruption in government, cited by 48%, are the two main nationwide problems according to residents of the region. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about rising utility tariffs, mentioned by 64%, low wages and pensions, mentioned by 54%, and rising prices for basic goods and inflation, mentioned by 44%. Socio-economic problems such as low wages and pensions and inflation at the personal level are felt more acutely in the regional center and small towns.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yuliia Tymoshenko, whom 25.3% of those who have decided and intend to vote are ready to support. Volodymyr Zelenskyi is supported by 18.0%, Petro Poroshenko by 10.6%, Oleh Liashko by 8.5%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 7.9%, and Yurii Boiko by 6.7%. Other candidates have ratings below 5%. At the same time, one in five residents of the region has not decided on a candidate, and the same share does not intend to vote.
• Yuliia Tymoshenko is the candidate whose victory respondents believe in most. Over the past year, the share of those convinced of her victory increased from 18% to 29%. Fifteen percent are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko, compared to 23% in 2007. About 5% see Volodymyr Zelenskyi winning. No more than 3% believe in a positive result for other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. Fifty-two percent of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with the support of 28.7% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Servant of the People is supported by 16.1%, European Solidarity by 9.8%, Civic Position by 8.2%, the Radical Party by 7.9%, and the Opposition Bloc by 6.0%. Other parties have ratings below 4%. At the same time, almost one quarter of residents of the region have not decided on a party choice, and one in five does not intend to vote.
• Orientation of a candidate toward closer cooperation with the European Union, cited by 66%, is a motive that has a significant influence on respondents’ presidential choice. Fifty-eight percent choose a candidate primarily because of leadership qualities, while for 33% the presence of a strong team is more important. Sixty percent consider experience in public office important, while 34% say belonging to a generation of “new” politicians is more important, a motive that is dominant among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Fifty-seven percent prioritize the socio-economic program, while 34% focus on ideological views. Orientation toward solving national problems is a motive for 54% of respondents, while for 39% it is important that the candidate focuses on solving both national and regional problems. The choice between a candidate’s ability to ensure stability in the country or to implement radical changes divided respondents almost evenly.
• Forty-six percent of respondents expect that the situation in Ukraine will not change as a result of the upcoming presidential elections. Another 24% believe the situation will improve, while 21% say it will worsen. Supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko are more likely than others to expect positive changes. Respondents who do not intend to vote or have not decided on their choice are relatively less likely to expect positive changes.
• According to respondents, the likelihood of election fraud in the presidential elections is higher at the national level, at 53%, than at the regional level, at 35%, or the local level, at 24%. Another 40–50% allow for the possibility of minor falsifications.
• Eleven percent of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Twenty-one percent take a neutral position on this issue, while 66% oppose this type of campaigning. A more favorable attitude toward the distribution of assistance by candidates is observed in the regional center.
• Residents of the region assess the activity of local authorities somewhat better than that of central authorities. Ten percent of respondents are satisfied with the activity of President Petro Poroshenko, 12% with the activity of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, and only 5% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, more than 80% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of central authorities.
• Over the year, the level of satisfaction with the activity of the regional state administration decreased somewhat, from 28% to 15%, as did satisfaction with city and village heads, from 43% to 38%. The share of those dissatisfied with the activity of the regional state administration increased slightly, from 64% to 67%, while dissatisfaction with city and village heads remained almost unchanged. Satisfaction with local leaders is significantly higher among residents of small towns and villages than in the regional center.
• Respondents more often perceive an increase in corruption nationwide than in the region or at their place of residence. About half of respondents believe that the situation with bribery has not changed at either the central or local levels. Only 5–9% reported a decrease in corruption.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. In annual dynamics, all indicators show negative trends. Respondents speak most positively about the situation in agriculture and school education, although assessments of the latter have deteriorated significantly over the year. Significant declines were also observed in indices related to ecology, personal safety, the fight against corruption, social protection, and healthcare, with the last two rated worst by respondents.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated opportunities for recreation and leisure and the ability to live safely highest. The lowest ratings were given to opportunities for entrepreneurship. In cities, opportunities for recreation, job search, and safe living are rated higher. At the same time, residents of Poltava city assess opportunities for achieving success and engaging in entrepreneurship in their city very pessimistically. Younger and wealthier respondents rate all opportunities higher than older and poorer ones.
• About 5% see high economic development potential for Ukraine, the region, and their city or village over the next 5–10 years. Almost one third assess the potential as medium. More than 40% see low potential, and 13–17% see no opportunities for economic growth at either the national or local level. Younger respondents rate growth potential at all levels more highly.
• More than half of respondents, at 59%, feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine, while 35% hold the opposite view. Respondents feel somewhat more pride in being residents of their region, at 70%, and of their city or village, at 74%. The most frequent sources of pride in the region are nature, cited by 38%, and history, cited by 37%. Twenty-six percent are proud of culture and art, 24% of traditions, 22% of local residents, 17% of natural resources, 14% each of landmarks and cuisine and culinary traditions, 12% of notable regional figures, and 10% of agriculture.
• Almost 69% consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while 27% hold the opposite view. Younger and wealthier respondents more often report personal happiness. On the other hand, 36% of older respondents and 49% of those in the poorest category consider themselves unhappy.
• Residents of the region most often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Kharkiv region. Among neighboring countries, residents consider themselves close to Russia, Belarus, and partly to Poland.
• Almost 28% expressed a desire to start their own business, while 64% hold the opposite view. Three percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs. A higher desire to start a business is observed among younger and wealthier respondents. Among the latter, 12% stated that they are already engaged in business. Among those wishing to start a business, 31% would like to engage in trade, 11% in the catering sector and farming, 10% in construction, and 9% each in entertainment and leisure, tourism, and the beauty and health industry.
• Twenty-seven percent of respondents expressed a desire to work abroad, while 68% hold the opposite view. Forty-eight percent are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future, while 34% did not express such intentions. Traditionally, higher migration intentions are observed among young people, at 50%, residents of the regional center, at 37%, and wealthier respondents, at 46%.
• Eighty percent believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language. Nine percent support granting the Russian language official status in certain regions, and 8% support granting it state language status.
• More than half of respondents, at 69%, consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine, while 21% hold the opposite view. One in ten was undecided.
• Over the past year, the share of those supporting Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, at 52%, and NATO, at 41%, has remained almost unchanged. Among different vectors of foreign economic integration, the pro-European direction leads at 50%, 31% support Ukraine’s equidistance from Russia and the West, and only 7% support accession to the Customs Union.

• Within the framework of the “Portraits of Regions” project, the Rating Group conducted a survey among residents of Chernihiv region from November 16 to December 4, 2018. In total, 1,600 respondents took part in the study, which was carried out using the method of face-to-face interviews. The sample was formed taking into account the age and gender structure of the region as well as the type of settlement. The margin of error does not exceed 2.4%.
• Analysis of the survey results showed that residents of the region assess the situation in the country as a whole significantly worse than the situation at the local level.
• Only 8% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, while 37% consider the situation in the region to be calm and 55% see the situation in their city or village as calm. Almost 69% of respondents view the situation in the country as tense, and 16% as critical. At the local level, assessments of the situation are somewhat better: between 30% and 40% see the situation as tense, and only about 3% consider it critical.
• Similarly, respondents assess the correctness of the country’s direction (12%) worse than that of the region (16%) or their city or village (31%). Evaluations of the direction of development of both the country and the region are especially critical among residents of small towns and villages. At the same time, in their own localities rural residents assess the situation somewhat better than those living in small towns.
• At the same time, despite negative assessments of the current situation, general expectations among residents of the region are rather positive-neutral. Only 15–20% believe that the situation, both in Ukraine and locally, will worsen next year. The overwhelming majority believe that it will not change, and one in ten has optimistic expectations about the future.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine (80%) and bribery and corruption in government (49%) are the two main nationwide problems according to residents of the region. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about low wages and pensions (66%), rising utility tariffs (52%), and rising prices for basic goods and inflation (46%). Socio-economic problems such as low wages and pensions, unemployment, inflation, and insufficient social protection are felt more acutely in small towns and villages.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Yuliia Tymoshenko, whom 26.8% of those who have decided and intend to vote are ready to support. Oleh Liashko is supported by 17.9%, Volodymyr Zelenskyi by 12.8%, Petro Poroshenko by 8.8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 7.7%, and Yurii Boiko by 7.4%. Other candidates have ratings below 4%. Almost one in five residents of the region has not yet decided on a candidate.
• Every fifth respondent believes that Yuliia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election. Over the past year, the number of those convinced of her victory has increased by one and a half times. Eleven percent are confident in the victory of Petro Poroshenko (13% last year). About 9% see Oleh Liashko winning. No more than 5% believe in a positive result for other candidates. Confidence in favorites is mainly expressed by supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Oleh Liashko.
• The negative rating is led by Petro Poroshenko. Almost 66% of respondents would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with the support of 26.6% of those who have decided and intend to vote. The Radical Party is supported by 19.1%, Servant of the People by 10.5%, Civic Position by 8.1%, European Solidarity by 6.9%, the Opposition Bloc by 6.4%, the Agrarian Party by 3.9%, and UKROP by 3.1%. Other parties have ratings below 3%. At the same time, almost one in five residents of the region has not decided on a party choice.
• The candidate’s socio-economic program (70%), orientation toward closer cooperation with the European Union (68%), experience in public office (66%), and leadership qualities (64%) are motives that significantly influence respondents’ presidential choice. For 55%, it is important that the candidate focuses primarily on solving national problems, while 37% stated that the ability to solve both national and local problems is more important. The choice between a politician’s ability to ensure radical change (43%) or, conversely, to stabilize the situation (51%) divided respondents almost evenly. The latter motive is dominant among supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Yurii Boiko, and Anatolii Hrytsenko.
• Thirty-four percent of respondents do not expect any changes in the country after the upcoming elections. At the same time, 29% believe that the situation will improve, and only 14% say it will worsen. Twenty-three percent were unable to answer this question. Supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Yurii Boiko more often expect positive changes. Those expecting deterioration are more common among respondents who do not intend to vote or have not decided on their choice.
• Almost half of respondents (48%) allow for the possibility of significant falsifications in the presidential elections at the national level. At the local level, expectations of violations are significantly lower: 28% allow for significant falsifications at the regional level, and 22% at the level of the city or village.
• At the same time, 14% of respondents have a positive attitude toward situations in which some politicians provide material assistance to voters during elections. Thirty-eight percent take a neutral position on this issue, while 45% oppose this type of campaigning. A more favorable attitude toward the distribution of assistance by candidates is observed in Chernihiv city and among older and poorer respondents.
• Residents of the region assess the activity of local authorities significantly better than that of central authorities. Ten percent of respondents are satisfied with the activity of President Petro Poroshenko, 12% are satisfied with the activity of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, and only 6% with the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, more than 80% expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of central authorities. More critical assessments are observed in rural areas.
• Over the year, the level of satisfaction with the activity of the regional state administration decreased somewhat, from 41% to 30%, as did satisfaction with city and village heads, from 62% to 50%. Local leaders are rated very positively in Chernihiv city and in villages. In small towns, dissatisfaction with local leaders outweighs satisfaction.
• Respondents more often perceive an increase in corruption nationwide than in the region or at their place of residence. Almost two thirds of respondents believe that the situation with bribery has not changed at either the central or local levels. Only 6% reported a decrease in corruption.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in various sectors and services. In annual dynamics, most indicators show either negative trends or no change. Exceptions include personal safety and the fight against crime, where assessments have improved over the year. Relatively better evaluations are given to school education, safety, and road conditions. The worst assessments concern healthcare, social protection, and industrial development.
• Among opportunities in the region, respondents rated opportunities for recreation and leisure and the ability to live safely highest. The lowest ratings were given to opportunities to find a job. Opportunities for recreation, achieving success, finding a job, and entrepreneurship are rated relatively higher by residents of the regional center, while the ability to live safely is rated higher in villages. Wealthier respondents rate all opportunities higher than poorer ones.
• Only about 2% see high economic development potential for Ukraine, the region, and their city or village over the next 5–10 years. About one quarter assess the potential as medium. Half see low potential, and 5% see no opportunities for economic growth at either the national or local level. Residents of the regional center assess development potential at all levels more optimistically.
• An absolute majority of respondents (73%) feel proud to be citizens of Ukraine, while 14% hold the opposite view. Respondents feel somewhat more pride in being residents of their city or village (78%). The most frequent sources of pride in the region are nature (55%) and history (45%). Thirty percent are proud of local residents, 27% of regional traditions, 22% of culture and art, 20% each of landmarks and agriculture, 16% of natural resources, and 10% of notable local figures.
• Almost 60% consider themselves definitely or rather happy people, while 19% hold the opposite view. Urban residents, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals more often report personal happiness. On the other hand, one in five village residents and one in four representatives of the older generation consider themselves unhappy. Among the poor, as many as 40% feel unhappy.
• Residents of the region more often noted cultural and historical closeness to residents of Kyiv, Poltava, and Sumy regions. Among neighboring countries, residents feel the greatest closeness to Belarus, and somewhat less to Russia and Poland.
• Twenty-nine percent expressed a desire to start their own business. Four percent reported that they are already entrepreneurs, while half of respondents do not intend to engage in business. A higher desire to start a business is observed among urban residents, younger respondents, and wealthier individuals. Among the latter, one in five stated that they are already engaged in entrepreneurship. Among those wishing to start a business, 31% would like to engage in trade, 11% each in construction and repair or car service, and 10% each in transport and logistics, catering, and entertainment and leisure.
• Over the past year, the share of those wishing to work abroad increased from 22% to 33%. Only one third of them are ready to invest earned money in starting a business in Ukraine in the future. Higher migration intentions are observed among young people (66%), urban residents (36%), and respondents with middle income levels (43%).
• Eighty percent believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language. Twelve percent support granting the Russian language official status in certain regions, and 3% support granting it state language status.
• An absolute majority of respondents (73%) consider Russia to be an aggressor country toward Ukraine. Only 12% hold the opposite view, and 15% were undecided.
• Over the past year, the share of those supporting Ukraine’s accession to the European Union increased somewhat, from 44% to 47%. Support for NATO membership remained almost unchanged at 38%. Among different vectors of foreign economic integration, the pro-European direction leads at 45%. Thirty-seven percent support Ukraine’s equidistance from Russia and the West, and only 5% support accession to the Customs Union.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group, the majority of respondents (62%) consider Russia to be an aggressor country with respect to Ukraine. Twenty-six percent of respondents hold the opposite view, while another one in ten have not decided.
• Fifty-eight percent of respondents believe that Russia committed an act of military aggression against Ukraine during the incident involving Ukrainian and Russian military vessels in the Sea of Azov, which took place on November 25, 2018. Twenty-two percent hold the opposite opinion, while another one fifth were undecided.
• At the same time, only one third of respondents support the decision to impose martial law for 30 days in certain regions, while almost 60% do not support it.
• The decision to impose martial law is supported by only half of those who consider Russia an aggressor. The decision is relatively more supported by residents of Western Ukraine (44%) and Central Ukraine (39%), less so in the South (24%), and least of all in the East (14%). It is more often supported by respondents who speak Ukrainian at home (45%) than by those who speak Russian (17%), and is somewhat more supported by men (38%) than by women (28%).
• At the same time, only 14% support the decision to impose martial law for 60 days and across the entire territory of Ukraine, while 76% do not support it.
• Meanwhile, the majority of respondents (69%) consider the introduction of martial law to be a delayed decision and are convinced that it should have been introduced back in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in Donbas.
• Almost two thirds of respondents allow for the possibility that President Petro Poroshenko intended to impose martial law in Ukraine for 60 days in order to postpone the presidential elections.
• At the same time, most respondents believe that the introduction of martial law will draw the attention of the international community to the Ukrainian–Russian conflict (60%) and will contribute to the introduction of additional international sanctions against Russia (55%).
• However, only 31% of respondents believe that the introduction of martial law will help improve the country’s defense capability.
• Overall, 22% assess the likelihood of a full-scale ground military invasion of Ukraine by Russia as high, 29% as medium, and 17% as low. One fifth believe that there is no threat at all, while one tenth were undecided. A higher level of invasion threat is perceived by respondents in the western and central parts of the country, and a lower level in the south and east.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from September 29-October 14, 2018. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote. The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size.

The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 61.8%.

English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in October 2018, 31% of respondents assess the level of professionalism and competence of doctors in Ukraine as high (in June, this figure was 39%). At the same time, 51% hold the opposite opinion (54% in June). The competence of doctors is assessed relatively better in the western regions; however, in these same regions almost one quarter of respondents hesitated to give an answer to this question. Higher assessments of doctors’ professionalism were also given by those who have medical workers in their families or who personally know their family doctor.
• Almost two thirds of respondents stated that they know their family doctor or therapist, while 32% said they do not. A relatively higher level of awareness is observed in the western regions, in rural areas, among women, and among older people.
• More than 80% of respondents (as in June of the same year) have heard about the national program “Doctor for Every Family.” A high level of awareness is observed across all macro-regions and demographic categories.
• Fifty-six percent reported that they have already chosen their doctor and signed a contract with them (36% in June), while 42% said they have not yet done so. A higher level of engagement in signing contracts with family doctors is observed in the western and eastern macro-regions, among women, and among older respondents.
• Seventy-six percent of those who have already signed contracts with a family doctor are satisfied with them, and only 6% expressed dissatisfaction, while 18% were uncertain in their assessments. One third of respondents who noticed changes after signing a contract with a family doctor reported that the doctor became more attentive and polite. Thirteen percent stated that it became easier to get an appointment, 9% said they received free medications from their doctor, and 8% each reported improved conditions of care (repairs, modern equipment, etc.) or receiving referrals for free laboratory tests. On the other hand, 25% said they did not notice any changes after signing the contract, and another 22% had not visited their doctor at all since signing the agreement.
• Sixty-six percent stated that they have heard about the “Affordable Medicines” program, under which pharmacies provide free medications to patients with chronic diseases such as type II diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and bronchial asthma. Thirty-three percent know nothing about this program. A higher level of awareness is observed among residents of the southeastern regions, women, and older respondents.
• Nineteen percent reported that they personally or their close relatives (spouse, children, grandparents, siblings, etc.) participated in the “Affordable Medicines” program, with the highest participation among older respondents, women, and those who have medical workers in their families. At the same time, 78% said they did not participate in this initiative. Almost half of those who participated in the “Affordable Medicines” program stated that it is successful, while 39% hold the opposite view. Sixty-three percent said that within the framework of this program they are satisfied with the territorial accessibility of pharmacies participating in the initiative, while 32% are dissatisfied. Fifty-seven percent expressed satisfaction with the availability of medications in pharmacies, while 39% are dissatisfied. Fifty percent said they are satisfied with the quality of medications, while 41% are dissatisfied.
• Forty-six percent of respondents stated that over the past 12 months they were not asked to pay a bribe for treatment (56% in June). Only 7% reported encountering corruption when receiving medical services, while 41% said they had not visited a doctor during this period. Only 14% said they gave a gift (such as sweets, alcohol, etc.) as a token of gratitude for treatment or medical services during the past 12 months (27% in June). Forty percent stated that they did not have such experience, while 41% had not visited a doctor recently.
• Fifty-six percent of respondents consider the Ministry of Health to be important for themselves and their families, while 32% expressed the opposite opinion. Views on the importance of the профиль ministry were expressed relatively more often by residents of western and central regions, women, and those who have medical workers in their families.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, 79% of citizens believe that the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people. This view is shared by an absolute majority of residents in the western and central parts of the country (92% and 83% respectively), as well as by a relative majority in the South and East (69% and 67%). Support for this position is more common among rural residents, younger respondents, and those who speak Ukrainian at home. In long-term dynamics since 2010, the share of those who recognize the Holodomor as genocide has increased by about one third.
• A positive attitude toward the recognition of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 as genocide by the U.S. Senate is expressed by 69% of respondents, while 62% believe that Ukraine should continue to seek international recognition of the Holodomor as genocide. Both initiatives receive stronger support among residents of the western and central macro-regions, people from rural areas, and Ukrainian-speaking respondents.
• Sixty-eight percent of respondents stated that they would light a candle this year on the Day of Remembrance of the Holodomor victims in memory of those who died of starvation, while 21% said they would not do so. This initiative is most strongly supported in the West and Center (84% and 70% respectively). At the same time, more than half of respondents in the South and East also said they would take part in this commemorative action.
• When asked about responsibility for organizing the Holodomor, respondents most often blamed Joseph Stalin personally (47%, compared to 42% in 2008) and the central leadership of the USSR as a whole (39%, compared to 38% in 2008). Another 28% (23% in 2008) placed responsibility on the Soviet punitive agencies (NKVD, GPU), while 23% (17% in 2008) blamed the top leadership of Soviet Ukraine. Only 3% said that Ukrainian peasants (“kulaks”) who allegedly refused to hand over grain voluntarily were responsible. Fewer than 5% adhere to the view that the Holodomor was caused by natural factors (11% in 2008). Respondents from western and central regions more often pointed to Stalin’s personal responsibility, while residents of the West, Center, and East more frequently mentioned Soviet law enforcement and state institutions. Respondents from the South were less likely than others to blame Soviet leaders and more often hesitated or pointed to unfavorable natural conditions as the cause.
• Over the past ten years, support for the idea of holding a trial against those responsible for the Holodomor has increased from 37% to 48%, while support for initiatives to provide compensation to genocide victims and their families has grown from 46% to 63%. As with previous statements, these initiatives enjoy greater support in the West and Center, among rural residents, and among Ukrainian-speaking respondents.
• Among historical figures, respondents expressed the most positive attitudes toward Bohdan Khmelnytsky (73%) and Mykhailo Hrushevsky (68%). In addition, 53% expressed a positive attitude toward Ivan Mazepa.
• Positive attitudes toward Leonid Brezhnev and Peter I were reported by 47% and 43% respectively (with negative attitudes at 39% and 26%). Stepan Bandera is viewed positively by 36% and negatively by 34%, while attitudes toward Symon Petliura are evenly split, with 30% positive and 30% negative.
• Respondents tend to view Vladimir Lenin and Mikhail Gorbachev more negatively than positively (about one quarter express positive views, while 51–52% hold negative views). The most negative attitudes are expressed toward Joseph Stalin, with 21% positive and 58% negative.
• Over the past six years, attitudes toward Ukrainian historical figures have generally improved. Attitudes toward Stalin and Lenin have remained largely unchanged, while attitudes toward Peter I have deteriorated. Significant regional differences are observed in perceptions of Russian and Soviet historical figures, who are viewed much more favorably in the southeastern regions, with the exception of Gorbachev, who is viewed more positively in the West. Conversely, figures such as Petliura and Bandera are viewed more positively in the West. Khmelnytsky and Hrushevsky receive similarly positive evaluations across all regions of Ukraine.

• According to the results of the joint sociological study conducted by the three research organizations, 78% of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction. Only 12% consider the direction of the country’s development to be correct, which represents a deterioration compared to the previous month, when this share stood at 15%. Another 11% of respondents were unable to answer this question.
• Assessments of the direction of development at the local level are also predominantly negative, although they are somewhat better than evaluations at the national level. In particular, 64% of respondents believe that their oblast is developing in the wrong direction, while 17% assess it as moving in the right direction. Similarly, 58% negatively evaluate the situation in their settlement, whereas 26% give a positive assessment.
• In the view of most respondents, peace is the issue Ukraine lacks the most today, with 64% pointing to this factor. Stability is identified by 41% as a key deficit, order by 40%, while prosperity and development are mentioned by 35–36%. Unity and justice are named by 27% each. The issue of peace is especially salient in Galicia and Donbas, stability is more important for the South, development and prosperity for the East, and unity for Donbas. Order and justice are considered equally important across almost all macro-regions.
• Economic decline and the mass emigration of Ukrainians abroad are seen as the most pressing threats facing Ukraine today, each cited by 59% of respondents. Poverty is mentioned by 51%. Other threats, such as the devaluation of the hryvnia, population decline, the disintegration of the country, rising crime, and deterioration of public health, are mentioned by 32–39% of respondents. More than one quarter consider a full-scale war with Russia, a power vacuum, and societal degradation to be relevant threats, while every fifth respondent points to potential environmental disasters. Economic decline is more often perceived as a threat in the South, while mass emigration is more salient in Galicia. Concerns about currency devaluation, depopulation, state collapse, crime, and societal degradation are stronger in the southeastern regions. Respondents from Galicia and the Center more often emphasize the risks of full-scale war with Russia and political chaos.
• At the national level, the war in the East and bribery and corruption in government are identified as the two main problems, cited by 66% and 43% respectively. Unemployment and low wages are considered nationwide problems by about one third of respondents.
• At the personal level, respondents most often mention rising utility tariffs, low wages and pensions, and increasing prices for basic goods as their main concerns. The war in the East is perceived as a personal problem by 28% of respondents. Bribery and corruption, lack of employment, and poor-quality healthcare are mentioned by 17–19%, while insufficient social protection concerns 11%.
• Yuliya Tymoshenko remains the leader of the presidential рейтинг, significantly outpacing her closest competitors. Among those who have decided on their choice and intend to vote, 21% are ready to support Tymoshenko. Volodymyr Zelenskyi is supported by 11%, Petro Poroshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko by 10% each, Yurii Boiko by 9%, Oleh Liashko by 8%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 6%, and Yevhenii Muraiev by 5%. Other candidates have support below 5%. Over the past six months, Tymoshenko’s rating has increased noticeably, while Zelenskyi’s support has nearly doubled against the backdrop of declining ratings for Vakarchuk. The emergence of Muraiev as a candidate has significantly reduced support for Vadym Rabinovych.
• Tymoshenko leads electoral preferences in all macro-regions except Donbas, where she trails Yurii Boiko. At the same time, Petro Poroshenko tops the negative rating, with more than half of respondents stating that they would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• Every fifth voter believes that Yuliya Tymoshenko will become the next President of Ukraine. Fourteen percent believe in Petro Poroshenko’s victory, while fewer than 4% expect any other politician to win the presidency. Over the past six months, the share of respondents who believe in Tymoshenko’s victory has almost doubled, while expectations regarding Poroshenko have remained largely unchanged.
• Second-round simulations show that Tymoshenko would win in all likely electoral pairings, whereas Poroshenko would lose against any potential opponent in the runoff.
• Seven political parties currently have significant chances of entering parliament. Batkivshchyna remains the leader, supported by 22% of decided voters who intend to vote. The Servant of the People party is supported by 11%, Civic Position by 10%, the Opposition Bloc by 9%, Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” by 8%, the Radical Party by 7%, and Yevhenii Muraiev’s party “Nashi” by 5%. Over the past six months, support has increased for Batkivshchyna, Servant of the People, and UKROP, while the emergence of the “Nashi” project has significantly reduced support for the party “For Life.”
• For nearly half of respondents, the main motive when choosing a political party is support for its socio-economic initiatives. Eighteen percent vote primarily based on sympathy for the party leader, and 12% based on ideological principles. Voting motivated by socio-economic initiatives dominates among voters of almost all leading political parties.
• Two thirds of respondents believe that Ukraine most urgently needs economic reforms. Social reforms are considered a priority by 43%, anti-corruption reforms by 37%, political reforms by 16%, and humanitarian and security reforms by about 10%. Over the past five months, the perceived importance of social reforms has increased somewhat, while the salience of anti-corruption reforms has declined.
• Opposition to the sale of agricultural land remains very strong: 72% are against lifting the moratorium, while only 13% support the introduction of a land market. Support for land reform is somewhat higher among younger and wealthier respondents. There is no significant difference between urban and rural residents, as the overwhelming majority in both groups oppose land sales, with rural residents even slightly more critical.
• Public support for European integration and NATO membership remains in place. EU membership is supported by half of respondents, while 30% are opposed. NATO membership has slightly more supporters than opponents, with 40% in favor and 36% against. Pro-Western orientations are stronger among residents of central and western regions, younger people, and wealthier respondents. However, over the past two years, support for both EU and NATO membership has slightly declined.
• When forced to choose a single vector of foreign economic integration, 47% support joining the European Union, while only 11% support joining the Customs Union. At the same time, 30% believe Ukraine should remain equally distant from both Europe and Russia. Notably, supporters of EU integration tend to maintain their position consistently, whereas two thirds of those opposed to integration with Europe favor neutrality, and only one quarter support joining the Customs Union.
• When asked to choose between military blocs and neutrality, 39% support joining NATO, 35% favor a non-aligned status, and only 9% support joining the CSTO. The vast majority of NATO supporters maintain their preference under these conditions, while nearly 70% of those opposed to NATO favor neutrality rather than alignment with the CSTO.
• Support for peaceful approaches to resolving the conflict in Donbas has increased slightly over the past month. Thirty-one percent support ending hostilities and recognizing these territories as temporarily occupied, while 27% favor granting them a federative status within Ukraine. Only 8% support separation of these territories from Ukraine, and 17% remain undecided. At the same time, 17% believe military action should continue until full restoration of Ukrainian control, down from 21% previously.
• Finally, 63% of respondents consider Russia to be an aggressor toward Ukraine. Twenty-two percent hold the opposite view, and 15% are undecided. The highest shares of those who do not consider Russia an aggressor, or who are unsure, are found in the South, East, and Donbas.

• According to the results of a public opinion survey conducted between September 28 and October 16, 2018 by the Social Monitoring Center, the Oleksandr Yaremenko Ukrainian Institute for Social Research, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and the Rating Group, the issues that currently concern Ukrainians the most are the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine (54.4%), low wages and pensions (54.1%), rising utility tariffs (48.1%), rising prices for basic goods and inflation (34.9%), unemployment and lack of jobs (26.8%), bribery and corruption in government (25.5%), as well as the inability to obtain quality medical care (19%).
• The military conflict in the East is of greatest concern to residents of Donbas (68.4%), respondents aged 50–59 (54.7%), men (54.2%), and those with an average material standard of living (55.7%). Low wages and pensions are a more acute problem for older people (62.8%), women (53.9%), and respondents with very low or low material status (56.9%). Rising utility tariffs are a particularly sensitive issue for respondents aged 60 and older (53.3%), women (50.4%), and economically disadvantaged respondents (50.4%). Rising prices for basic goods and inflation most concern these same categories of respondents. Unemployment and lack of work are felt more strongly by residents of Western (30.5%) and Southern (29.4%) Ukraine, respondents aged 18–29 (35.5%), men (27%), and rural residents (31%).
• A total of 75.8% of respondents stated that they are ready to come to polling stations during the presidential election. At the same time, 11.9% believe they will definitely not vote, 7.6% say they are unlikely to vote, and 4.7% were undecided or refused to answer.
• If the presidential election were held next week, the highest chances of reaching the second round would belong to Yuliya Tymoshenko (13.4% of all respondents / 18.9% of those who have decided and intend to vote), Volodymyr Zelenskyi (7.6% / 10.7%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (7.0% / 9.9%), Petro Poroshenko (7.0% / 9.9%), and Yurii Boiko (6.9% / 9.8%). Oleh Liashko (5.7% / 8.0%) and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (4.9% / 7.0%) have significantly lower chances of advancing to the final stage of the election.
• Second-round simulations of the presidential election produced the following results. In a Poroshenko–Hrytsenko pairing, 14.3% would support Poroshenko and 33.1% would support Hrytsenko. In a Tymoshenko–Hrytsenko pairing, 24.8% would vote for Tymoshenko and 26.9% for Hrytsenko. In a Poroshenko–Tymoshenko pairing, 15.1% would support Poroshenko and 30.7% Tymoshenko. In a Poroshenko–Boiko pairing, 20.0% would support the incumbent president and 20.2% would support the leader of the Opposition Bloc. In a Tymoshenko–Boiko pairing, 30.3% would vote for Tymoshenko and 16.8% for Boiko. In a Hrytsenko–Boiko pairing, support would stand at 31.3% and 15.9%, respectively.
• Regarding parliamentary elections, 72.3% of respondents stated that they would be ready to take part in elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, while 21.9% said they would not, and 5.8% were undecided.
• When asked directly about party choice, 14.7% said they would not participate in parliamentary elections if they were held on the nearest Sunday. One fifth of all respondents (20.3%) had not yet made a final decision.
• As of now, eight political forces could potentially overcome the 5% threshold and enter parliament. Among those who have decided and intend to vote, 21.4% would support the Batkivshchyna party, 11.3% the Opposition Bloc, 10.5% Civic Position, 9.8% Servant of the People, 9.1% the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” 8.1% the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, 5.4% the For Life party, and 5.0% the Self-Reliance Union.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, 54% of respondents view positively the idea of establishing a Unified Local (Autocephalous) Church in Ukraine. Nineteen percent hold an opposing view, while another 19% express indifference toward this issue.
• Support for the idea of a Unified Local Church is highest in Western Ukraine (68%) and in the Central regions (58%). At the same time, in the South at least 45% support this initiative, while in the East the share of supporters stands at 37%. It should be noted that in the southern and eastern regions, unlike other parts of Ukraine, there is a relatively higher proportion of respondents who are either indifferent or negative toward this topic—around one quarter in each category.
• The idea of a Local Church enjoys particularly strong support among the oldest respondents (61%). Among young people, support stands at about 45%, and among middle-aged respondents at 51%. In terms of religious affiliation, the highest level of support for autocephaly is found among parishioners of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate). In both of these groups, support for the idea of a Unified Local Church exceeds 75%. Among adherents of other denominations, about half support the idea. Among those who consider themselves believers but do not associate with any denomination, support stands at 43%, while among non-believers it is 29%. The strongest opposition to the idea of a Local Church is found among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), where more than half express a negative attitude. Nevertheless, nearly one third of this group (28%) still view autocephaly positively.
• Overall, 36% of respondents believe that the creation of a Unified Local Church would rather unite the country, while 23% say that this initiative would have no impact on social consolidation. At the same time, 24% warn of a possible societal split. Concerns about division following the granting of autocephaly are most common in the East (34%) and among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (57%). In most other regional, age, and confessional groups, however, those who believe that the creation of a Local Church would unite the country outnumber those who hold the opposite view.
• Thirty percent of all respondents believe that Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) should head the Unified Local Church. Seven percent believe that Metropolitan Onufrii of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) should assume this role, while 3% favor Metropolitan Makarii of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Eleven percent believe that none of these figures should lead the Local Church, and 42% have not yet formed an opinion on this issue. Among those who support the creation of a Unified Local Church, preferences regarding potential leaders are similar: Patriarch Filaret is supported by 50%, Metropolitan Onufrii by 5%, and Metropolitan Makarii by 4%. One third of this group has not yet decided who should become the head of the Unified Local Church.
• As a potential leader of the Unified Local Church, Patriarch Filaret enjoys the greatest support among parishioners of the church he leads (57%). His support is somewhat lower among adherents of other denominations: 31% among Greek Catholics, 21% among members of other denominations, and 20% among believers without a specific confessional affiliation. Among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), Metropolitan Onufrii is more often seen as the appropriate leader of a Unified Local Church (29%). At the same time, one in ten respondents in this group would not object to Patriarch Filaret heading the Local Church after autocephaly is granted.
• Thirty-four percent of respondents trust Pope Francis (16% do not trust him). Thirty percent trust Patriarch Filaret (17% do not trust him). Twenty percent trust Bartholomew I, the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (13% do not trust him). Nineteen percent trust Archbishop Sviatoslav, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (12% do not trust him). Sixteen percent trust Metropolitan Onufrii, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (28% do not trust him). Thirteen percent trust Metropolitan Makarii, the primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (12% do not trust him). Only 13% trust Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, while 37% do not trust him.
• Pope Francis, Patriarch Filaret, Bartholomew I, Archbishop Sviatoslav, and Metropolitan Makarii enjoy the highest levels of trust in Western Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufrii has relatively higher levels of trust in the South, while Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church is more trusted in the South and East. Church leaders generally enjoy higher levels of trust among older respondents.
• It should also be noted that some church leaders enjoy respect among adherents of denominations other than those they lead. For example, Pope Francis, in addition to his high level of trust among Greek Catholics, also enjoys high trust among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate). Patriarch Filaret is viewed positively by supporters of both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. A similar pattern applies to Bartholomew I. Archbishop Sviatoslav enjoys relatively high levels of trust among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), while Metropolitan Makarii is trusted among members of both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In contrast, Metropolitan Onufrii and Patriarch Kirill enjoy relatively higher levels of trust exclusively among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

• According to the results of the research carried out by the Rating Group in September-October 2018, 52% of the respondents expressed their readiness to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine with arms in case of corresponding threat (in 2017, this number was 54%, in 2012 - 33%). The highest number of such was recorded in the West (63%), in the Center and South - half. At the same time, in the East, the relative majority (55%) said they were not ready to defend their Fatherland with arms in their hands (35% were ready, 10% have not decided). Patriotism is more obvious among men and wealthy respondents.
• 62% of the polled support the idea of establishing a public holiday of Ukraine Defender’s Day on October 14 (25% do not support). At the same time, a half (51%) oppose the abolition of the celebration of the Fatherland Defender’s day on February 23 (in 2017, this number was somewhat higher - 56%). It should be noted that while the number of the supporters of the holiday introduction on October 14 is higher in the West, the number of the opponents of the Soviet holiday abolition is higher in the South and East. The number of the sympathizers of the idea of establishing the Ukraine Defender’s Day on Pokrova is higher among those with higher income and education level, and also among the rural residents. Interestingly, there are no differences between the genders in question of supporting or not supporting both initiatives. Moreover, among the supporters of the idea of establishing October 14 as the Ukraine Defender’s Day, 42% do not support the abolition of the Soviet holiday celebration on February 23.
• 45% of the respondents support the idea of recognizing the OUN-UPA as members of the struggle for state independence of Ukraine (in 2017 - 49%). One-third have the opposite opinion, almost a quarter did not answer. Since the beginning of research in 2010, the level of support for this initiative has increased 2.5 times.
• The highest number of those who support the recognition of the OUN-UPA is recorded in the West (80%). The Center has 45% of such respondents. The number of those who have the opposite opinion is the highest among the residents of the South and East (respectively, 52% and 46%). The highest number of those who support the idea of the OUN-UPA recognition was recorded among men, those with higher income and education.
• 56% of the respondents are positive towards the idea of reconciliation between the soldiers of the Soviet Army and the OUN-UPA. 22% expressed opposing considerations, 23% hesitated to answer. The highest number of those who are positive towards reconciliation was recorded in the West (70%) and the lowest - in the East (40%). The support for the idea is somewhat higher among men, rural citizens, and older respondents. Among the supporters of the OUN-UPA recognition, 79% agree with the reconciliation idea. At the same time, among those who do not support the idea of the national rebel movement recognition, the number of such is 36%.
• An absolute majority of the respondents (82%) agree with the thesis that during the Second World War soldiers of the Soviet Army defended their Fatherland. However, in comparison with the previous years, this number is somewhat lower (in 2017 - 90%, in 2012 - 96%). 51% of the respondents agree with the thesis that during the Second World War, the OUN-UPA warriors defended their Fatherland. The level of support for the latter thesis is the same as it used to be last year (in comparison with 2012, it has increased 1.5 times). The number of the supporters of the thesis that the soldiers of the OUN-UPA defended their Fatherland is the highest in the West, the lowest - in the South and East.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, 73% of respondents believe that Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction. Only 15% think the country is developing in the right direction, while 13% were undecided. Young people assess the situation more optimistically: about one quarter of youth believe the country is moving in the right direction. Older respondents are the most pessimistic. In electoral terms, dissatisfaction with the current situation is highest among supporters of Vadym Rabinovych, Yurii Boiko, and Yuliia Tymoshenko, while nearly three quarters of Petro Poroshenko’s supporters are convinced that the country’s direction is correct.
• A clear majority (64%) believe the country needs radical changes. At the same time, 12% prefer that everything remain as it is, and 19% support a return to the past. Over recent months, the share of those demanding radical change has slightly decreased, while support for stabilization or a return to previous conditions has grown. Calls for radical change are more common in Western Ukraine, whereas preferences for stabilization or a return to the past are more prevalent in the South and East. Supporters of Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Anatolii Hrytsenko, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, and Andrii Sadovyi most often advocate change; voters of Petro Poroshenko tend to favor stabilization, while supporters of Yurii Boiko and Vadym Rabinovych are more inclined toward a return to the past.
• Regarding parliamentary elections, 42% say they would look for an alternative among new political parties, while 38% intend to vote for parties already represented in parliament. Readiness to support non-parliamentary parties is higher among supporters of Servant of the People, For Life, Svoboda, and among undecided voters. By contrast, voters of parliamentary forces such as BPP Solidarity, Batkivshchyna, the Radical Party, and the Opposition Bloc more often prefer established political projects.
• Two thirds of respondents believe that the 2019 presidential election will not be fair; only 16% think it will be fair, while one quarter were undecided. Skepticism about election fairness is strongest among supporters of Yurii Boiko, Vadym Rabinovych, and among those who do not intend to vote at all.
• Public opinion is split on leadership experience: 43% believe the next president should have significant governing experience, while nearly the same share prefer a new figure without state governance experience. Demand for “new faces” is highest among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, while preference for an experienced politician dominates among supporters of Petro Poroshenko and Yuliia Tymoshenko.
• The top demand placed on the future president is ending the war in Eastern Ukraine (66%). Other expectations include fighting corruption (49%), raising social standards (34%), reviving industry (33%), and improving healthcare quality (24%). Every sixth respondent also expects reduced oligarchic influence, revival of the agricultural sector, and stimulation of business development. In recent months, demand has increased for ending hostilities, improving social standards and healthcare, and supporting business. Younger and middle-aged respondents emphasize anti-corruption, industrial revival, and business development, while older respondents prioritize social standards and healthcare.
• In the presidential vote intention, Yuliia Tymoshenko leads with 13.2% of all respondents. She is followed by Volodymyr Zelenskyi (7.8%), Petro Poroshenko (6.8%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (6.6%), Yurii Boiko (5.7%), Vadym Rabinovych (5.4%), Oleh Liashko (5.2%), and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (5.0%). Other candidates each receive less than 2.5%. 17.0% are undecided, and 12.6% do not plan to vote.
• Support for Tymoshenko is relatively even across regions, with a stronger base in Central Ukraine. Zelenskyi performs better in the Center and South; Poroshenko and Hrytsenko in the West; Boiko and Rabinovych have their strongest support in the South-East.
• The so-called “second-choice” rating indicates that Hrytsenko, Tymoshenko, and Zelenskyi could each gain up to an additional 5% if voters’ primary candidates withdrew. Vakarchuk could gain 4.4%, Rabinovych 3.8%, Sadovyi 3.4%, Liashko 2.8%, Nalyvaichenko and Shevchenko about 2.2% each.
• Petro Poroshenko continues to top the anti-rating: about half of voters would not vote for him under any circumstances. Around a quarter would not support Oleh Liashko, Yuliia Tymoshenko, Arsenii Yatseniuk, or Yurii Boiko; nearly one sixth would not support Vadym Rabinovych or Oleh Tiahnybok.
• Belief in electoral victory has grown for Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko: 18% think Tymoshenko will become president, and 14% believe Poroshenko will win. Fewer than 4% expect victory by other candidates, while nearly half are unsure.
• Only one third of respondents say they would personally participate in rallies or demonstrations in support of their preferred candidate; 62% would not. Willingness to mobilize is highest among supporters of Zelenskyi, Vakarchuk, and Hrytsenko.
• About one third would vote for another candidate if their preferred one withdrew in favor of someone else; 20% would switch to a different candidate regardless, 20% would abstain, and one quarter are undecided. Supporters of Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, Boiko, and Rabinovych are most likely to follow their candidate’s endorsement, while among voters of Sadovyi, Liashko, Hrytsenko, Vakarchuk, and Zelenskyi this share is about 40%. Voters in the South and East more often say they would abstain under such circumstances than those in the West and Center.
• In the party rating, Batkivshchyna leads with 14%. It is followed by Servant of the People (8.2%), For Life (6.4%), Civic Position (6.2%), BPP Solidarity (5.9%), Opposition Bloc (5.8%), Radical Party (4.6%), Self-Reliance (3.4%), and Svoboda (2.7%). Other parties poll below 2%. 17.1% are undecided, and 14.4% do not plan to vote in parliamentary elections. Batkivshchyna’s support is relatively even nationwide, with its strongest showing in Central Ukraine; For Life and the Opposition Bloc dominate in the South-East; Civic Position in the West and Center; Servant of the People in the Center and South; and BPP Solidarity, Self-Reliance, and Svoboda in the West.

•  The results of the survey conducted by the Rating Group revealed that considering the matter of support for the requirement to comply with the Euro-5 environmental standard for all imported cars and, accordingly, for the total ban on the import to Ukraine of the cars manufactured earlier than 2008/2009, the opinions of the polled differ. 34% support the ban on the import of cars older than 10 years, while 47% stand against such an initiative. 19% have not decided on the answer yet. Permission to import old cars is more often supported by younger respondents, as well as by those who already have or are going to purchase cars with the European number plates. 
• 62% believe that it is necessary to reduce taxes and make import cars more accessible. 14% stand against tax cuts as it will affect the state budget revenues. 15% don’t find the issue of imported cars’ taxation to be relevant. Likewise, younger people, those with higher income, and those who already have or are going to purchase cars with the European number plates are more likely to support taxes’ reduction.
• 50% of the respondents believe the optimal solution to the problem of a large number of uncustomed cars with the European number plates will be allowing them to proceed through the customs clearance with reduced taxes. 12% believe that they should be allowed to legalize but with current tariffs for customs clearance. 14% support the fact that they should be legalized without any customs clearance at all. Only 4% stand for leaving the situation status quo. The same number advocates for a complete ban and confiscation of "Euro cars". Support for the idea of official legalization along with the customs duties’ payment (reduced or current) prevails in all regional, age, and property groups. Even two-thirds of those who already have a car with the European registration or are going to purchase such support this way of resolving the issue. At the same time, within the same groups, there is a relatively high number of those who stand for a full customs amnesty of the "Euro cars" (a quarter to one-third). Among those who have a car with the Ukrainian registration or are going to buy it, support for such a way of resolving the issue is much weaker.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from May 26-June 10, 2018. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size.

The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 62,7%.

English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.

• According to the research carried out by the Rating Group in August 2018, 82% of Ukrainian citizens (as much as in 2017) consider themselves as patriots of their country. Only 13% have the opposite opinion, 5% could not answer.
• In all macro regions of Ukraine, the total number of patriotic citizens exceeds 75%: in the West this figure is 85%, in the Center - 84%, in the South - 79%, in the East - 76%.
• Over the research period, the largest number of those who would have supported the proclamation of Independence of Ukraine if today they were given such a choice has been recorded - almost 80% (in 2012 this figure was 62%). Only 13% expressed opposing considerations, 7% hesitated to respond.
• The largest number of those who support the proclamation of Ukraine's independence has been recorded in the West (93%). At the Center there are 82% of such respondents, in the South - 72%, in the East - 63%. The number of those who have the opposite opinion is the highest in the Southern and Eastern regions (20% to 25%). Also, a relatively higher number of those who would not support the independence of our state today have been recorded among the older generation, those with lower income and education. The independence support is clearly correlated with the sense of patriotism: the higher the level of patriotic sentiments, the more people support the proclamation of Independence of Ukraine.
• Over the last 8 years, the number of those who identify themselves as a citizen of Ukraine has increased: while in 2010 the number of those who could have called themselves Ukrainians was 57%, in 2018 there is already 66% of such respondents. This year, as compared to the whole research period, the lowest number of those who identify themselves as residents of their region, city, or village has been noted (19%), as well as the number of those who simply mention their nationality (13%). At the same time, as compared to the 2014 poll, there has been a significant increase in the number of those who would choose the alternative "just a person" (up to 29%, 24% in 2012, and 26% in 2010). 10% of the respondents named their family role as an identifier, 9% consider themselves "a citizen of the world". 6% of the polled characterize themselves as "Soviet person" and "Europeans". Also, 5% while answering to the question "Who am I?" mentioned their religious convictions, 3% - their profession and occupation.
• Although the "citizen of Ukraine" identifier is dominant in all regions of Ukraine, the differences are also observed. Thus, in the Center the number of those who have chosen this alternative is 74%, in the West - 67%, in the South - 61%, in the East - 55%.
• The residents of the Western regions were more likely to identify themselves on a national basis. The association with the "Soviet person" is more implicit for the citizens of Southern and Eastern macro regions, as well as for the older people. The residents of the West and Center, as well as young people, are more likely to identify themselves with the "Europeans".
• Almost 70% of the respondents consider Ukraine rather than Russia to be the successor of Kyiv Rus. The opposite opinion is expressed only by 9%. 6% believe that neither Ukraine nor Russia can claim the heritage of the old state. Over the last 10 years, the number of those who consider Ukraine as the successor of Kyiv Rus has increased (54% in 2008), while the number of those who share the opposite opinion has decreased (in 2008 - 18%).
• The respondents from the Western and Central macro regions were more likely to mention Ukraine while answering this issue (79%). In the South and East, the number of such respondents  was more than a half. At the same time, 20% to 25% of the polled in these areas couldn’t answer this question; in the Eastern regions, every fourth, in general, believes Russia to be the successor of Kyiv Rus. The higher the level of patriotism of the polled, the more often they note that it is Ukraine that is the successor of Kyiv Rus.
• 52% of the respondents indicated that it was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) that had the right to be considered the historical successor of the Orthodox Church established in Kyiv Rus 1030 years ago. 12% mentioned the same about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), 3% - the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 2% - Russian Orthodox Church, 5% - other. 27% of the polled were unable to decide on this issue.
• Over the last 10 years, the number of those who believe that the UPC (KP) has the right to be considered the historical successor of the Orthodox Church approved in Kyiv Rus 1030 years ago has increased more than one and a half times. More often than others, the legal succession of the UPC (KP) was declared by the residents of the West and Center and also rural citizens. This opinion is also dominating among the parishioners of the UPC (KP) and the UGCC. Instead, the majority of the UPC (MP) parishioners consider their church to be the successor of the Orthodox Church established in Kyiv Rus 1030 years ago.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group among residents of Dnipro, Yuliia Tymoshenko leads the presidential rating. She is supported by 19.0% of those who intend to vote. Volodymyr Zelenskyi follows with 13.5%, Yurii Boiko with 13.4%, Anatolii Hrytsenko with 8.3%, Vadym Rabinovych with 7.9%, Petro Poroshenko with 7.0%, Oleh Liashko with 5.9%, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk with 3.9%. Other candidates receive less than 2%. 12.0% of respondents remain undecided.
• In the so-called “second choice” ranking, Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads: 12.7% say they would support him if their primary candidate were not on the ballot. About 8% would then vote for Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Yuliia Tymoshenko, or Oleh Liashko; 6.8% for Anatolii Hrytsenko; 6.2% for Vadym Rabinovych; 5.8% for Yurii Boiko; 3.1% for Andrii Sadovyi; and 2.7% for Petro Poroshenko.
• The anti-rating is led by Petro Poroshenko: nearly half (48%) of Dnipro residents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. The anti-ratings of Arsenii Yatseniuk (28.6%), Nadiia Savchenko (21.9%), Yuliia Tymoshenko (19.1%), Oleh Tiahnybok (16.7%), Oleh Liashko (16.2%), Yurii Boiko (14.6%), and Vadym Rabinovych (13.6%) are also notable.
• About 16% of respondents believe Yuliia Tymoshenko will become the next President of Ukraine. 7.2% expect Petro Poroshenko, 6.1% Volodymyr Zelenskyi, 5.5% Yurii Boiko, 3.6% Oleh Liashko, 2.5% Anatolii Hrytsenko, and 2% each Vadym Rabinovych and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk.
• For an overwhelming majority (83%), it is important that the future president actively defends the interests of their city. One third of respondents consider Leonid Kuchma the best President of Ukraine, 13% name Leonid Kravchuk, about 10% Viktor Yanukovych, and 5% each Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko. 28% did not choose any of the former presidents.
• In the party rating, Batkivshchyna leads with support from about 20% of those intending to vote. Servant of the People has 14.6%, the Opposition Bloc 13.9%, For Life 8.2%, Civic Position 7.8%, BPP Solidarity 6.7%, while the Radical Party and UKROP receive 5.9% and 5.6% respectively. Other parties score below 2%, and 8.8% are undecided.
• A clear majority of respondents believe that candidates who distribute illegal material benefits to voters during campaigns should be strictly punished (59%). About one third think this form of campaigning should be allowed, and nearly one in ten are undecided.
• 70% of respondents say Ukraine is moving in the wrong direction, one in five think otherwise, and 9% are unsure. Assessments of local affairs are less pessimistic: 42% consider the situation in their city to be moving in the wrong direction, nearly the same share think it is moving in the right direction, and 18% are undecided.
• Satisfaction with local authorities varies. 65% are satisfied with the performance of Dnipro Mayor Borys Filatov, while 32% are dissatisfied. The work of Regional Governor Valentyn Reznichenko is rated positively by 49% and negatively by 35%. Opinions on the City Council are split: 46% are dissatisfied and 43% satisfied.
• More than 70% of respondents are dissatisfied with the work of municipal services and medical institutions, and over half express negative views of local educational institutions.
• Among city problems, the cost of utilities concerns nearly 80% of respondents. About 42–43% are worried about poor road conditions and public transport fares, 35% about drug and alcohol abuse, and 31% about rising crime and the low professional level of medical staff. More than a quarter are concerned about the condition of sidewalks and pedestrian paths, and one fifth about street lighting and the quality of public transport services.
• Regarding foreign policy, one third support Ukraine’s accession to NATO, while about half oppose it; 16% are undecided or would not vote. 45% support EU membership, more than a third oppose it, and 18% are undecided or would abstain. Support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration increases with younger age and is highest among voters of Civic Position and BPP Solidarity.
• When choosing an integration vector, 39% believe Ukraine should maintain equidistance from the EU and Russia without joining alliances; 34% favor EU membership, 16% support joining the Customs Union, and about one in ten are undecided.
• On language policy, nearly half believe Ukrainian should be the sole state language with free use of Russian in all spheres. 29% support granting Russian state language status nationwide alongside Ukrainian, and one fifth favor Ukrainian as the state language with Russian having official status in certain regions.
• Regarding the past, 46% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, while 44% feel nostalgic; about one fifth are undecided.
• As for resolving the conflict in Donbas, the most supported options are ending hostilities and recognizing the territories as temporarily occupied / freezing the conflict (35%) and granting autonomy or a federal status within Ukraine (33%). 10% support continuing military actions until full restoration of Ukrainian control, 7% favor separation of these territories, and 14% are undecided.
• Two thirds of Dnipro residents consider Russia an aggressor toward Ukraine; one quarter disagree and 8% are unsure. About half believe Ukraine should limit or fully terminate economic relations with Russia, one quarter oppose reducing ties, 14% favor significant expansion of relations, and one in ten are undecided. Support for maintaining or expanding economic ties with Russia is highest among voters of the Opposition Bloc and For Life, as well as among older respondents.