Press releases

• According to the results of a study conducted by Rating Group, 17% of respondents said that their relatives had worked abroad as labor migrants during the previous six months, while 11% reported that members of their family were permanently employed abroad. At the same time, 70% stated that none of their close relatives had worked abroad during this period, and 2% were unable to answer.
• The highest share of respondents with family members who have experience of working abroad was recorded in the Western macro-region, especially in Zakarpattia. Such responses were also relatively more common among rural residents and among respondents with higher levels of income.
• Overall, 65% of respondents said they do not want to change their country of residence, while 27% reported that they are considering emigration. The desire to move abroad was most common among young people under the age of 35, among whom nearly half expressed such intentions. Men, respondents with higher levels of education, and those with higher incomes were also somewhat more inclined to consider leaving the country. Notably, among respondents who have labor migrants in their families, the intention to emigrate is significantly higher.
• A relatively larger share of those who would like to leave Ukraine was recorded in the northern regions (Zhytomyr and Sumy oblasts and the city of Kyiv) as well as in the western regions (Zakarpattia, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts).
• When asked about the country in which they would prefer their children to live, half of the respondents (50%) named Ukraine. Another quarter chose European countries, 7% selected the United States, 3% mentioned other countries, and only 2% named Russia. Thirteen percent of respondents were unable to give a definite answer.
• Ukraine was more often chosen as the preferred country for children by older respondents, rural residents, and those with lower income levels. In contrast, younger, wealthier, and more highly educated respondents were more likely to prefer other countries, most often in the West, as a place of residence for the next generation. The presence of labor migrants in the family also strongly affects this choice: almost half of respondents who have relatives working abroad would prefer their children to live outside Ukraine rather than in their home country.
• The highest proportions of respondents who see living abroad as more desirable for their children were recorded in Sumy, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts, as well as in the city of Kyiv.

• According to a study conducted by Rating Group, 59% of respondents believe that the country needs radical change. Another 15% think things should remain as they are, so long as they do not get worse, and the same share would prefer a return to how things were in the past. Support for radical change is strongest among residents of Halychyna, while nostalgia for the past is most common in the non-occupied areas of Donbas, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia. Even in these regions, however, expectations of radical change significantly outweigh other attitudes.
• A quarter of respondents expect their family’s life to improve over the next five years. Thirty-seven percent believe it will remain unchanged, 18% expect it to worsen, and 21% were unable to assess their family’s future prospects. Optimism is most widespread in the western regions and in the capital area (Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast), although even there it is not dominant, as at least half believe their family’s situation will either stay the same or deteriorate.
• The most important problem for the country, in the view of respondents, is the military conflict in eastern Ukraine (75%). Almost half also point to bribery and corruption in government. Unemployment is named by 28%, while 19% mention rising prices for goods and low wages or pensions. Seventeen percent point to social inequality and the gap between rich and poor. Fifteen percent refer to rising utility tariffs and an insufficient level of social protection, 12% to rising crime and the inability to access quality medical care, 8% to unfavorable conditions for small and medium-sized businesses, 6% to a lack of freedom and democracy, and 4% to the inability to obtain a quality education.
• At the personal level, the most pressing issues are low wages and pensions (52%), rising prices and inflation (51%), and higher utility tariffs (50%). Around one in five also cite the war in eastern Ukraine, lack of access to quality healthcare, and unemployment as personal problems. About 14–15% mention insufficient social protection and corruption, and 11% point to social inequality. Other issues concern fewer than 8% of respondents.
• More than 90% of respondents assessed the political situation in the country as either critical or tense (33% and 59% respectively), with only 3% describing it as calm. High levels of perceived tension were recorded in all regions without exception.
• Despite this high level of social strain, a relative majority favors constructive rather than radical ways of resolving the crisis. Forty-four percent believe that real criminal investigations into corruption at the highest levels of government would most help reduce tensions. Thirty-seven percent say that projects aimed at improving people’s material conditions and living standards would help, and 35% point to real progress in Donbas, such as a ceasefire or the release of prisoners. Twenty percent believe broader public oversight of government actions would also reduce tensions.
• In the presidential рейтинги, Yuliya Tymoshenko leads, with 18.7% of those who would participate in elections and have decided on their choice saying they would vote for her. Petro Poroshenko is supported by 15.6%, Yurii Boiko by 11.7%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 9.7%, Oleh Liashko by 8.7%, Vadym Rabinovych by 8.3%, Andrii Sadovyi by 6.4%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 3.9%, and Arsenii Yatseniuk by 1.7%. Another 15.3% would vote for other candidates not listed.
• Tymoshenko leads in almost all regions of Central Ukraine and parts of the West, and is among the top three candidates in nearly every region. Poroshenko has strong positions in parts of the West and in Kyiv, while Boiko leads in most regions of the South and East.
• Support for Tymoshenko is relatively even across the Center, North, West, and part of the South. Poroshenko’s strongest support is in Vinnytsia Oblast, somewhat lower in the West and Center, and lower still in the South. Hrytsenko’s base is mainly in parts of the West, Kyiv Oblast, and Cherkasy Oblast. Liashko is strongest in the North and in Bukovyna, Sadovyi in Halychyna, Volyn, and Khmelnytskyi, while Rabinovych and Boiko draw their support primarily from the South and East, with Boiko’s voters more concentrated in the industrial eastern regions.
• Modeling a second-round presidential runoff between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko shows that 30% of those intending to participate in the main election would vote for Tymoshenko, while 23% would support Poroshenko. Twenty-eight percent would refuse to participate in such a second round, and 19% are undecided. Poroshenko would win in only three regions—Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernivtsi—while the candidates would receive roughly equal support in Rivne, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Donetsk oblasts and Kyiv. Tymoshenko would win in the remaining seventeen regions.
• The pro-European vector dominates in almost all regions except Odesa, Kharkiv, and Donbas. Overall, 52% would support EU membership in a referendum, 27% would oppose it, and 20% would either be undecided or not vote.
• Support for NATO membership has increased by one and a half times over the past three years. Today 43% support joining the Alliance, while 34% oppose it, and nearly a quarter are undecided or would not vote. Support for NATO is lower in the South and East and is weakest among the oldest respondents.
• One third of respondents regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, while 55% do not feel nostalgic for it. Nostalgia is strongest in the South and East and weakest in the West, and it correlates regionally with opposition to NATO membership.
• Pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian orientations are clearly dominant in society. At least half of respondents want their children to live in Ukraine, about one third would choose the European Union, 7% the United States, and only 2% Russia, a pattern broadly consistent across regions.
• Forty-seven percent say they use Ukrainian at home, 29% use both Ukrainian and Russian, 24% use Russian, and 1% another language. Exclusive use of Ukrainian is most common in the West, North, and Center, while Russian is more prevalent in Odesa, Kharkiv, and Donbas; elsewhere both languages are widely used.
• Support for Ukrainian as the sole state language continues to grow: 61% now favor it, compared with 47% in 2014. Another 20% support granting Russian official status in certain regions, while 15% favor making Russian a state language. Support for granting Russian any special status is highest in the South and East.
• Forty-three percent believe Ukraine should become a major agricultural power, and the same share believe it should focus on high-technology industries and manufacturing. The agricultural path is more popular in the West and Center, while technological development is favored in the East, South, and in the capital.
• The idea of allowing the sale of agricultural land is not supported by society: 77% oppose it, only about 10% support it, and 13% are undecided.
• Half of respondents think Ukraine should be a parliamentary-presidential republic, 17% prefer a purely parliamentary system, 14% a presidential one, and 20% are undecided.
• Only 28% believe Ukraine needs a dictatorship led by a strong leader, while 56% oppose dictatorship and 16% are undecided.
• Two thirds support a unitary state, 19% favor a federal structure, and 19% are undecided. Support for federalism is highest in Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts, though even there supporters of a unitary state still predominate.
• Regarding ways to resolve the Donbas issue, most respondents support peaceful initiatives. Thirty-two percent favor a ceasefire and recognition of the territories as temporarily occupied, and 21% favor granting them federal status within Ukraine. Eight percent support separation from Ukraine, and 18% are undecided. At the same time, 21% believe military action should continue until full restoration of Ukrainian control, especially in the West and Center, although even there peaceful approaches prevail.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in November–December 2017, 43% of respondents said that the overall quality of public healthcare services in the country had deteriorated over the past two years. Only 11% reported improvement, 38% believed that nothing had changed, and 8% were unable to answer. At the same time, compared with the previous year, the share of those who speak about deterioration in this sphere has decreased.
• Fifty-four percent of respondents know their family doctor or therapist, while 45% do not. Awareness is highest among women and older people. Thirty-one percent use the services of a family doctor or pediatrician, while 20% do not. Residents of rural areas, as well as those living in the South and the Center of the country, turn to pediatricians more often.
• One third of respondents used ambulance services during the past year. City residents, people in the Central and Southern regions, and older respondents relied on ambulance services more frequently. Among those who used emergency services, 72% were satisfied with the quality of care and the professionalism of ambulance teams, about a quarter were dissatisfied, and 3% were undecided.
• Among the reforms and legislative changes adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in autumn 2017, the highest awareness was recorded for pension and healthcare reforms: 86–88% of respondents had heard about them. Sixty-nine percent were aware of education reform and 64% of judicial reform.
• Among government initiatives in healthcare, the best-known are the introduction of free (or low-co-payment) medicines for diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular diseases on a doctor’s prescription (74%), and the introduction of nationwide health insurance (71%). About two thirds are aware of initiatives to raise doctors’ salaries through contract-based mechanisms and to introduce contracts between patients and doctors. Fifty-five percent know about the creation of hospital districts with one multidisciplinary hospital in each oblast and several intensive-care hospitals, 53% know about the creation of Public Health Centers in each region, and 51% know about the introduction of reference pricing for medicines. Awareness is lower regarding stricter control of public funds for building Okhmatdyt (47%) and lowest regarding subsidies for medical services for internally displaced persons from Donbas and Crimea (39%). Overall awareness of healthcare reform initiatives increased over the previous three months.
• Among these initiatives, the highest support is for free or low-cost medicines for chronic diseases and stricter oversight of public funds for Okhmatdyt (86% and 85% respectively). Seventy-seven percent support Public Health Centers and reference pricing, 71% support nationwide health insurance, 68% support higher doctors’ salaries through contracts and subsidies for internally displaced persons, 63% support contracts for free primary care, and 48% support the creation of hospital districts.
• Support for all key elements of the healthcare reform has declined somewhat since August. Two thirds of respondents support draft laws that include all nine initiatives, 21% oppose them, and 13% are undecided. Support is higher in the West, among urban residents, youth, and people with higher incomes, and lowest in the East, among older people and rural residents.
• If given a choice of standardized treatment protocols, 54% would prefer international protocols, while only 26% would choose domestic ones and about 20% are undecided. Over the past three months, support for domestic protocols increased from 20% to 26%.
• Compared with August, the share of those who consider the Ministry of Health important for themselves and their families increased from 57% to 62%, while 31% expressed the opposite view.
• More than half of respondents (56%) trust Ukrainian television most when hearing about healthcare reform. A quarter trust Ukrainian websites, 15–16% social networks and Ukrainian newspapers, 12% Ukrainian radio, 6% Western websites, 4% Western media, and only small shares trust Russian media sources.
• In the context of healthcare reform, people trust relatives most (51%) and medical professionals (39%), while much lower trust is placed in authorities, NGOs, ministers, or politicians.
• In general, Ukrainian television is trusted by 49% of respondents, Ukrainian websites by 41%, social networks by 37%, newspapers by 33%, and radio by 29%. Trust in Russian media is very low and is higher only in the South and East. Younger people trust online sources and social media more, while older people rely mainly on television, newspapers, and radio.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group, at least two thirds of respondents (63%) are dissatisfied with state-provided medical services over the past five years. Compared to the previous year, the share of dissatisfied respondents has slightly increased, from 59% to 63. At the same time, 26% say they are satisfied with public healthcare services, which is lower than a year earlier (32%). Satisfaction with these services is somewhat higher among urban residents than among rural ones.
• Only 18% of respondents believe that the overall quality of public medical services in their region has improved over the past two years, while 15% say the quality of services they personally received has improved. Compared to last year, the share of positive evaluations has fallen by nearly one third, while the number of those who saw no changes has increased to 41% and 46% respectively. Urban residents are more likely than rural residents to report positive changes. The frequency of doctor visits also affects perceptions: the more often people seek medical care, the better they tend to rate healthcare services.
• Over the past year, there has been a slight increase in the number of respondents who positively assess the performance of public medical institutions: 42% now evaluate the quality of services positively, while 46% evaluate it negatively. The most favorable assessments come from urban residents, people under 35, those with children under 18, and wealthier respondents.
• At the same time, nearly 40% of respondents were unable to evaluate the quality of services in private healthcare facilities at all. Among those who could, 48% rated them positively and 13% negatively. Younger people, wealthier respondents, and city residents are more inclined to view private healthcare positively.
• Thirty-five percent of respondents reported having witnessed reconstruction or renovation of hospitals over the past two years, while 46% said they had not. Reports of hospital upgrades were significantly more common among those who visit doctors more frequently.
• Thirty-five percent of respondents are aware that laws have been adopted to launch healthcare reform next year, while 49% have at least heard about it. Only 15% say they know nothing about the reform. Awareness is higher among city residents, older people, women, and those with higher education.
• Thirty-three percent support the introduction of healthcare reform in Ukraine, while 39% oppose it and 28% are undecided. Support is higher among young people, men, those with higher education, and those who are informed about the reform.
• Only 22% are confident that healthcare reform will improve the healthcare system over the next two years, while 26% believe the situation will worsen and 34% expect no change. Compared to the previous year, the share of optimistic respondents has fallen by half. People over 50 are the most pessimistic. In the longer term (five to ten years), expectations are more positive: 35% expect improvement, 19% deterioration, and 23% no change, while 23% are unsure. Young people and those with higher education are the most optimistic, and one quarter of those who expect no change in the short term still believe the situation will improve in the long run.
• Thirty percent of respondents consult a doctor or medical specialist less than once a year, one quarter do so once a year or every six months, 15% at least once every three months, and only 4% consult a doctor monthly.
• A majority of respondents (58%) know who their family doctor or therapist is. Awareness is higher among women and older people. More than half of all respondents (53%) fully or partially trust their family doctor, with women and older respondents showing more trust. Among those who know their family doctor, 80% trust them.
• Seventy-eight percent believe it is necessary to consult a doctor before starting treatment. For 43% of respondents the treatment plan provided by a doctor is usually clear, and for 39% it is partly clear. Urban residents, women, those who know their doctor, and those who visit medical facilities more often are more likely to understand their prescriptions.
• Sixty-six percent of respondents fully or partially follow their doctor’s prescriptions after a consultation, while 9% make their own decisions regardless of medical advice and 5% seek a second opinion. Women are more likely than men to follow doctors’ recommendations. Compliance is much higher among those who know their doctor and especially among those who trust them.
• Most respondents trust medical professionals’ advice (87%), as well as pharmacists (71%) and relatives or acquaintances (70%). Far fewer trust information from television, the internet, newspapers, or radio. Sixteen percent trust advice from folk healers or fortune-tellers, particularly in cities and among older people, while younger respondents are more inclined to trust information from relatives and the internet.
• When choosing a healthcare facility, 51% value doctors’ professionalism and experience most, 49% trust in the doctors working there, 32% good treatment of patients by staff, and 24% modern equipment. Twenty-four percent also consider the availability of subsidized services, a figure that has grown markedly. Younger and wealthier people focus more on doctors’ professionalism and attitude, urban residents on modern equipment and speed of service, while older and low-income respondents prioritize access to benefits.
• Patterns of self-monitoring show that 15% measure their blood pressure daily, 28% several times a month, and 21% less than once a year. One third of respondents have never had blood pressure problems, while 25% experience them several times a month and 6% daily. Problems are more common among women, older people, the poor, and those under stress.
• Only 4% weigh themselves daily, while younger people and women do so more often than men and older people. Almost 40% have an ECG less than once a year, and those with blood pressure problems or frequent doctor visits are more likely to have it done. Nearly half check blood sugar and cholesterol less than once a year.
• Almost half of respondents have never sought treatment for cardiovascular diseases, while others have done so recently or in the past, more often in cities, among women, and among older people. Sixty percent do not take medication for blood pressure, and almost 90% do not take medication for blood sugar or cholesterol. Among those who have regular blood pressure problems, two thirds take blood pressure medication.
• When blood pressure problems occur, one third take doctor-prescribed medicine, 27% rely on their own experience, 11% use traditional remedies, and 11% see a doctor immediately. Half say their last blood pressure reading was normal, and two thirds report normal sugar and cholesterol levels.
• Most respondents walk outdoors daily and consume fresh fruits and vegetables frequently, though many also regularly eat meat, sweets, fried and fatty foods, and sugary drinks. Alcohol consumption is generally moderate, with nearly half drinking once a month or less and almost one quarter abstaining entirely. Only 15% exercise daily, while 42% do not exercise at all. Three quarters do not smoke, though smoking is much more common among young people and men.
• Most respondents recognize the health risks of excess weight and high blood pressure and agree that healthy eating, not smoking, moderate alcohol use, physical activity, and preventive checkups are essential for preventing cardiovascular disease. Information about prevention is most often received from television, doctors, and medical facilities, although nearly half report not receiving any such information recently.
• Thirty-seven percent rate cardiovascular care in their locality positively, while 13% rate it negatively and nearly half have never used such services. Urban residents, older people, and frequent patients give better ratings. Most people do not seek such care outside their home city.
• In case of cardiovascular problems, most people turn to district or city hospitals, followed by regional hospitals, clinics, or family doctors. District hospitals receive the highest quality ratings, followed by the Rivne Regional Clinical Hospital and local clinics. Nearly half of respondents believe there are too few facilities for treating cardiovascular disease, especially in rural areas.
• Most respondents are unaware that Rivne Oblast participates in a World Bank and Ministry of Health project to improve cardiovascular care, although the majority consider the project important and many expect it to improve the situation.
• Most respondents obtain medical information from doctors, followed by family and friends, pharmacists, and television, with far fewer relying on the internet or other sources.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in November 2017, the leader in party electoral preferences is the Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) party, which 16.8% of decided voters who intend to participate in the election said they would support. Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” is backed by 14.5%, the Opposition Bloc by 9.4%, the For Life party by 8.9%, the Radical Party by 7.7%, Civic Position by 6.8%, Samopomich by 6.5%, and Svoboda by 5.6%. All other parties score below 3%.
• In the parties’ “anti-rating,” the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” leads, as 22.5% of those who plan to vote said they would never support it under any circumstances. The Opposition Bloc is rejected by 11.5%, the Radical Party by 7.4%, Fatherland by 6.2%, the People’s Front by 6.1%, and Svoboda by 4.0%.
• In the presidential ranking, Yuliya Tymoshenko is in first place, with 15.8% of decided voters willing to vote for her. She is followed by Petro Poroshenko with 13.8%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk with 9.6%, Vadym Rabinovych with 8.4%, Anatolii Hrytsenko with 8.3%, Oleh Liashko with 8.0%, Yurii Boiko with 7.0%, Oleh Tyahnybok with 4.7%, and both Volodymyr Groysman and Andrii Sadovyi with 4.6% each.
• In the politicians’ “anti-rating,” Petro Poroshenko again ranks first: 23.9% of those intending to vote said they would never vote for him. Oleh Liashko is rejected by 10.2%, Yurii Boiko by 9.8%, Arsenii Yatseniuk by 8.5%, Yuliya Tymoshenko by 6.8%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 5.1%, Vadym Rabinovych by 4.8%, and Volodymyr Groysman by 3.1%.
• Modeling a second round of the presidential election between Yuliya Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko shows that 27% would support Tymoshenko and 21% would vote for Poroshenko. At the same time, 37% said they would not participate in such a runoff, and 13% were undecided.
• Early parliamentary elections are supported by 47% of respondents, while 41% oppose them and 12% are undecided. Early presidential elections are supported by 44%, opposed by 46%, and 10% are undecided.
• Thirty-three percent of respondents support organizing nationwide mass protests to remove the current authorities, while 54% oppose this idea and 13% are undecided. Support for mass protests is most common in the western regions and among supporters of the Radical Party and the For Life party.
• Forty-five percent believe that Petro Poroshenko should be allowed to complete his presidential term and then be replaced through elections. Thirty-eight percent favor his immediate removal from office, while only 5% support his re-election. Twelve percent are undecided.
• If a referendum on introducing a visa regime with Russia were held, 32% would support it, while 51% would oppose it, 4% would not vote, and 13% are undecided. Support for visas with Russia is highest in the western regions, where 42% favor the idea, although a similar share there also oppose it. In other macro-regions, opponents outnumber supporters. Among party supporters, the strongest advocates of visas with Russia are voters of Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, while the strongest opponents are supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the For Life party.
• Granting Russian the status of a state language is supported by 29% of respondents, while 63% oppose it and 8% are undecided. In the East and South, at least 40% support bilingualism, but a similar share are also opposed. Support for two state languages is lowest in the West.
• Fifty-nine percent support a unitary system for Ukraine, while 23% favor a federal system. Support for federalism is highest in the South and East, at around 32–33%.
• Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is supported by 59% of respondents, opposed by 26%, with 11% undecided and 4% saying they would not vote in such a referendum. Support is highest in the West (81%) and lowest in the East (39%). Among party supporters, the strongest backing for EU membership comes from supporters of Samopomich and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, while it is lowest among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the For Life party.
• Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be supported by 47% of respondents, opposed by 36%, with 13% undecided and 4% saying they would not vote. As with EU membership, support is highest in the West (71%) and lowest in the East (25%), and opposition is strongest among supporters of the Opposition Bloc and the For Life party.
• Regarding Donbas, 43% support a political and diplomatic path to reintegration. Seventeen percent favor ceasing hostilities and freezing the conflict, 13% support granting the territories autonomous status within Ukraine, 11% favor returning them by force, 8% support their separation from Ukraine, and 9% are undecided. Ceasing hostilities or granting autonomy is more popular in the South and East, while military reconquest is more popular in the West and Center. At the same time, at least 40% in every macro-region support a political and diplomatic solution.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in November 2017, most respondents associate Turkey primarily with tourism, seaside holidays, and resorts (46%). Another 12% associate the country with Turkish goods, food products, and TV series, while one quarter of respondents were unable to name any associations with Turkey at all.
• Only 10% of respondents had ever visited Turkey, including 9% who had been there once or twice and 1% who had visited more than twice. Almost 90% had never been to the country. Visits were somewhat more common among people under 50 and among wealthier respondents, among whom more than one third had been to Turkey.
• Among those who had visited Turkey, the overwhelming majority (76%) traveled there for leisure and holidays. Another 24% visited for sightseeing in tourist cities. Only 6% went there for work, primarily residents of southern regions, 4% for business, and 3% to visit relatives.
• Overall, 53% of Ukrainian respondents said they had a positive attitude toward the Turkish people, 43% expressed a neutral attitude, and only 2% a negative one. The most positive views were recorded in the South and the Center (57% in both), followed by the West (53%) and the East (38%). City residents, people with higher incomes, those who had visited Turkey, and those who watch Turkish TV series tend to have more favorable views of Turks.
• Fifty-four percent of respondents described relations between Ukraine and Turkey as friendly, 37% as neutral, and only 1% as hostile, while 7% could not answer. Friendly perceptions are most widespread among residents of the Center, urban populations, young people under 35, and wealthier respondents.
• In general, 54% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Turkish goods, 37% are neutral, and only 2% are negative, while 7% are undecided. More favorable views are more common among city residents, people of younger and middle age, and wealthier respondents.
• Over the past year, 51% of respondents purchased Turkish clothing, 41% bought fruits and vegetables, 28% shoes, and 19% sweets. Fewer than 7% purchased Turkish children’s goods, household appliances, building materials, household chemicals, or medicines. Only 2% used Turkish airline services. One fifth of respondents said they had not bought any Turkish products or used services from Turkish companies, with the lowest levels of consumption recorded in western regions.
• Fifty-six percent do not watch Turkish TV series. Among those who do, 70% say that these series create a positive impression of Turkey, while only 5% say they create a negative one. Fourteen percent say they create no impression, and 11% were unable to answer. Turkish series are especially popular among women, particularly older women, and are more widely watched in rural areas than in cities.

• According to a nationwide sociological survey conducted between October 28 and November 14, 2017 by four polling organizations — SOCIS, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Rating Group, and the Razumkov Centre — with the support of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, the most urgent problems for most respondents were the war in eastern Ukraine (51.3%) and socio-economic issues, including rising prices (37%), low wages and pensions (36%), unemployment (27.1%), and high utility tariffs (26.9%). A substantial share of the population also named corruption in the central government (22.9%) and problems in healthcare (22.9%) among the country’s most serious challenges.
• Among the positive changes observed in respondents’ local communities over the past year, many mentioned road repairs (44.9%), higher pensions (27.3%), and improved public amenities in towns and villages (26.6%). At the time of the survey, 55.8% of households were already receiving increased pensions.
• If a presidential election were held on the coming Sunday, Petro Poroshenko would receive the highest support, with 16.1% of respondents ready to vote for him. Yuliya Tymoshenko (14.4%) and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (12.1%) would take second and third place respectively. Yurii Boiko and Anatolii Hrytsenko would each receive 9.3%, Vadym Rabinovych 7.9%, and Oleh Liashko 7.5%. These figures are calculated among respondents who have decided on their choice and intend to vote. Overall, about 21% of voters were undecided, while 18% said they did not plan to participate in the election.
• When asked who they personally believed would win the presidential election, respondents most often named Petro Poroshenko (19.2%), followed by Yuliya Tymoshenko (10.1%). At the same time, a large share of respondents (42%) could not say who they thought would become the next President of Ukraine.
• The survey also addressed attitudes toward the electoral system for the Verkhovna Rada. About 30% of Ukrainians support a majoritarian system, while 27% believe the current mixed system is the best option. Only 19% favor a proportional system in which voters cast ballots exclusively for party lists.
• At the time of the survey, the leading parties in parliamentary voting intentions were Batkivshchyna and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with Batkivshchyna slightly ahead (9.7% versus 9.4% among all respondents). Under these conditions, seven parties would enter parliament, and the projected distribution of seats by party lists would be as follows: Batkivshchyna 47 seats, Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” 45, Opposition Bloc 31, Civic Position 30, For Life 27, the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko 23, and Samopomich 22.
• A large majority of Ukrainians (68.2%) described the current situation in the country as tense, while 21.9% called it explosive and only 6.2% said it was stable.
• Public attitudes show a tendency toward preferring peaceful and less radical forms of protest. Most respondents said they were ready to express protest through participation in elections (58.9%) or by signing petitions and appeals (26.7%). Nearly 60% would not support organizing a new Maidan, and only 9.2% said they would personally take part in such protests.
• Public opinion continues to support the government’s declared course toward European integration and NATO membership. EU accession is backed by a clear majority of the population (56.2%), and support for joining NATO (43.2%) significantly exceeds opposition (33.3%).
• When it comes to Ukraine’s future development path, society is currently divided between supporters of integration with the European Union (44.9%) and those who favor Ukraine pursuing its own independent path of development (40%).

• According to the survey conducted by the Rating Group in September 2017, the majority of the respondents (77%) agree with the statement that the 1932-33 Holodomor was the genocide of the Ukrainian people, 13% do not agree with this, 11% - have not decided.
• It should be noted that the number of those who perceive the Holodomor as the genocide has increased as compared to the last year (from 72% to 77%), while this number is slightly lower than in 2015 (80%).
• The statement that the 1932-33 Holodomor was the genocide of the Ukrainian people is supported by the vast majority of the citizens of the West (91%), the majority of the respondents of the Center (84%), two-thirds of the South (65%) and more than a half of the East (56%)
• The rural residents are more likely to agree with the thesis on the Holodomor-genocide as compared to the urban residents (79% vs 76%). Among the respondents whose native language is Ukrainian, 85% do support this thesis, while among those who consider their native language to be Russian - 57%.
• In terms of the age cut, the number of those who support the Holodomor-genocide thesis varies from 72% to 80% in different categories (the strongest support among the middle-aged people). At the same time, there is a difference in the number of the opponents of this thesis in the various age groups: the older the respondents, the more they disapprove the thesis. In the context of education level, the number of those who support the Holodomor-genocide thesis ranges from 74% to 79% in different categories.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017 on behalf of the Ukrainian Partnership Forum among employees of research institutions in Dnipro, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Kharkiv, 64% of respondents said that the situation in Ukrainian science is deteriorating. About 23% described the situation as stable, while only 8% reported an improvement. The most negative assessments were given by Doctors of Science and those with more than 20 years of experience in research.
• Almost half of the surveyed scientists (46%) stated that conditions at their own research institutions are worsening. Thirty percent reported stability and only 18% saw improvements. In this case, deterioration was more often reported by Candidates of Science and those with more than 10 years of scientific experience.
• With regard to the media that cover science and innovation, 41% said the situation is stable, 29% believed it has worsened, and 12% thought it has improved. Again, the most critical views were expressed by Doctors of Science and researchers with more than 20 years of experience.
• Scientists were most optimistic about their own professional development: 40% reported improvement, 37% stability, and only 10% deterioration, while 13% could not assess their situation. Less optimistic views were more common among those with the highest academic degrees and the longest research careers.
• When asked who contributes most to the development of science in Ukraine today, 47% named individual scientists, inventors, and specialists. Research institutes were mentioned by 35%, higher education institutions by 33%, and the National Academy of Sciences by 28%. Only 16% said the Ministry of Education and Science plays this role, and the same share pointed to civil society organizations, foundations, innovation hubs, and coworking centers. Business structures and science-related media were mentioned by 8% each, while general secondary schools by only 4%.
• At the same time, 74% of respondents believe that the Ministry of Education and Science should be the main driver of scientific development in Ukraine, and 65% pointed to the National Academy of Sciences. Research institutes were named by 37%, universities by 28%, business by 14%, and media or civil society organizations by around 9–10%. Only 6% believed that schools or individual scientists and inventors should play this role.
• Two thirds of surveyed scientists (66%) agreed that the state, private sector, and civil society should promote vocational and technical education among young people instead of higher education. Twenty-three percent disagreed, and 11% were undecided. Support for this idea was strongest among Doctors of Science and the most experienced researchers.
• More than half (52%) believe there is demand from international corporations for the work of Ukrainian scientists and inventors, while 32% disagreed. In contrast, a majority believe that domestic businesses and especially state authorities show little demand for Ukrainian scientific developments. Only about one third disagreed with this view. Regarding media and civil society foundations, about a quarter believe such demand exists, while around half believe it does not.
• Looking ahead, 60% of respondents said Ukraine most urgently needs innovation in medicine. Around half also highlighted energy and agriculture, and 46% pointed to electronics, programming, and telecommunications. About one third named aviation and space, the defense industry, and mechanical engineering. Smaller shares pointed to chemicals (22%), metallurgy, heavy industry, and transport (18–19%), and even fewer mentioned automotive manufacturing, construction, light industry, and mining.
• As for scientific fields that should become strategic priorities for Ukraine in the near future, technical sciences (engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, etc.) were named by 75% of respondents. About half identified medical and physical-mathematical sciences as priorities. Biological, agricultural, and chemical sciences were supported by 40–45%. Military sciences were named by 19%, while economics, public administration, and pedagogy were mentioned by 11–13%. Psychology, political science, history, law, philosophy, philology, and arts were mentioned by fewer than 10%.

• According to a study conducted by Rating Group in September 2017 on behalf of the Ukrainian Partnership Forum, among researchers working in scientific institutions in Dnipro, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Kharkiv, 86% believe that scientists should engage in science communication and public outreach, such as giving public lectures, publishing in non-academic outlets, providing media commentary, and participating in television programs. Only 5% expressed the opposite view, while 9% were unable to answer.
• At the same time, 45% said they personally engage in science popularization, including 21% on a regular basis and 24% occasionally, while more than half do not. The longer a respondent’s scientific career and the higher their academic degree, the more likely they are to engage in outreach.
• Among those who have experience in science popularization, 85% said they did so on a voluntary basis, and only 6% received financial compensation. However, 41% of all surveyed scientists believe this work should be paid, 37% think it should remain voluntary, and 22% were undecided.
• Half of respondents said their scientific institution encourages them to take part in science popularization, while 35% said it does not and 14% were unsure.
• More than half of respondents (55%) believe it is difficult for scientists to communicate information about their inventions through the media, while 26% think it is not difficult and 19% were undecided. The longer a person’s scientific career, the more likely they are to see this as a problem. The main obstacles named were the media’s preference for entertainment over science (59%), lack of government funding for science communication (56%), the absence of a culture of science popularization in Ukraine (42%), the need to pay to access media outlets (35%), and the complexity of scientific information for most people (36%). About one fifth said that the public is simply not interested in scientific innovations, and only 4% believed there are no serious barriers.
• Universities received the highest ratings for effectiveness in science popularization, with 57% saying they are effective and 35% ineffective. Research institutes were rated effective by 48% and ineffective by 42%, the National Academy of Sciences by 43% and 48% respectively, and the media by 32% effective versus 54% ineffective. The Ministry of Education and Science was rated effective by only 28% and ineffective by 63%, the worst among all institutions assessed. NGOs, business structures, and secondary schools were also more often rated ineffective than effective.
• Nearly 90% support the idea of creating a national center in Ukraine dedicated to science popularization and support for domestic research, providing technical assistance to scientists and startups, shaping a positive image of scientists and science-based entrepreneurs, and disseminating news about science and innovation. Only 7% oppose this idea and 4% were undecided.
• The most desired services from such a center include lectures by prominent scientists, startup founders, and science communicators (60%), foreign language courses (46%), roundtables, workshops, and master classes (42%), interactive exhibitions of innovations (30%), help in preparing professional project presentations (23%), science media museums and video production (22%), professional support with press releases and articles (21%), science journalism training (14%), coworking spaces and press briefings (13% each), and hackathons (7%).
• As additional infrastructure, 56% would like access to modern presentation equipment, 47% to computer workstations with internet access, 31% to a mini-printing facility, 21% to 3D installations, 13% to a professional video studio, and 9% to a dedicated rapid-recording area.
• Fifty-seven percent of respondents collaborate with foreign colleagues, while 37% do not. International cooperation is most common in Kyiv and Odesa, and among doctors of science and those with long scientific careers.
• Only 2% say their research is adequately funded, 55% say it is partially funded, and 35% say it is not funded at all. Funding conditions are relatively better in Kyiv, among doctors of science, and among those with more than 20 years of experience, and worse among respondents in Dnipro, those without an academic degree, and those with shorter careers.
• More than half (54%) have additional employment beyond their scientific work, and 72% of them say this work is related to their main job. Researchers without an academic degree more often report that their additional work is unrelated to their scientific activity.
• Only 28% are considering leaving the scientific profession, while 55% are not and 17% are undecided. Such intentions are more common in Lviv, among researchers without an academic degree, and among those with five to ten years of experience. Among those who want to leave, the main reasons are low pay (87%), insufficient funding of research (57%), disappointment in the development of Ukrainian science (41%), a desire to work in another field (19%), and the perceived irrelevance of their research (10%).
• At present, 60% say the main thing they get from their scientific work is satisfaction from doing what they love, while 14% cite scientific recognition, 10% practical implementation of results, and only 5% financial reward. In contrast, when asked what they would like to receive in the near future, 46% said financial compensation, 24% practical implementation of their results, 13% scientific recognition, and only 9% satisfaction from their work.
• More than half (56%) do not consider moving abroad for scientific work, while 26% do and 18% were undecided. Among those who consider “scientific emigration,” the main expected benefit is financial reward (43%), followed by practical implementation of results (28%), scientific recognition (14%), and moral satisfaction (10%).
• Ninety-three percent believe it is important that the results of their research have practical application. Forty-seven percent said their work has already been applied in practice, while 38% said it has not. Practical application is most common among doctors of science and those with more than 20 years of experience.
• The main reason for the lack of practical implementation is lack of funding (48%), followed by the theoretical nature of research (27%), lack of interest from institutional leadership, or lack of relevance to current realities (7–9%). Very few cited fear of mistakes, lack of media support, or lack of public interest.
• Two thirds of respondents have not applied for government or international research grants over the past five years, while about one third have. More than 80% have not applied for grants from civic initiatives. About one fifth received grants from the state or international organizations, while only 3% received grants from civic initiatives. Among those who applied, more than half succeeded in obtaining state or international grants, compared to 36% for civic grants. Success rates are highest in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv and among senior researchers.
• International grant programs are seen as the most transparent, while government and civic grants are viewed as much less transparent.
• When choosing a grant program, respondents say the most important factors are relevance to their research topic, opportunities to find investors, and the size of funding. Fewer prioritize the opportunity to popularize their research, and very few see emigration as a key motive.
• Nearly half believe it is difficult to win international grants, and even more think it is difficult to win government grants. Those who have applied for grants are twice as likely to say it is easy.
• Three quarters receive information about science and innovation from specialized websites and journals, over half from colleagues, and many from events, social networks, and lectures. Most use the internet daily, with Facebook being the most common social network. Most prefer to receive information in text or visual form rather than audio. Finally, 76% would like to receive more information about innovation and new opportunities for scientists in Ukraine.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017, 54% of respondents said they would be ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms if such a threat arose, almost twice as many as in 2012. In the Central and Western regions, this share reaches about two thirds, while in the South it is around half. In the East, however, 52% said they would not be ready to defend the country with weapons (26% said they would, and 22% were undecided). Patriotic attitudes are more common among men, Ukrainian-speakers, and people with higher incomes.
• Fifty-nine percent of respondents support establishing Defenders of Ukraine Day on October 14, and nearly the same share (56%) do not support abolishing the celebration of February 23, the former Soviet Army and Navy Day. Support for October 14 is stronger in the West, while opposition to abolishing February 23 is more widespread in the South and East. Notably, support for October 14 is equally strong among men and women, and there are also no gender differences in opposition to abolishing February 23. Almost half (45%) of those who support October 14 as Defenders of Ukraine Day nevertheless do not support canceling the Soviet-era holiday.
• Nearly half of respondents (49%) support recognizing the OUN and UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence, while 29% oppose this idea; about one quarter were undecided. Compared with 2015, support for recognition has increased (from 41% to 49%), and since 2010 it has grown by a factor of 2.5.
• Support for recognition is highest in the West (80%), while about half of respondents in the Center also support it. At the same time, nearly half of residents of the East and South oppose recognizing the nationalist insurgent movement. Men, younger people, rural residents, people with higher education, and Ukrainian-speakers are more likely than others to support recognition of the OUN and UPA.
• A majority of respondents (56%) have a positive attitude toward the idea of reconciliation between soldiers of the Soviet Army and the OUN-UPA, up from 44% in 2012. In the West, support is more than twice as high as in the East (75% versus 34%). Support for reconciliation is also stronger among people with higher education, rural residents, and Ukrainian-speakers, and is almost twice as high among those who support recognition of the OUN-UPA compared with those who do not.
• An overwhelming majority (90%) agree that soldiers of the Soviet Army defended their homeland during World War II, while 53% also agree that fighters of the OUN-UPA defended their homeland during the war. Support for the latter view has increased by about one and a half times since 2012. Those most likely to support the idea that OUN-UPA fighters defended their country are young people, men, rural residents, Ukrainian-speakers, and residents of Western Ukraine.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017, 61% of respondents said they would not like to move abroad permanently, while 35% said they would like to do so and 4% were undecided. Compared with the previous year, the share of those wishing to emigrate increased slightly, from 30% to 35%. The highest proportion of potential emigrants is found in Western Ukraine (41%). In the South the figure is 34%, in the Center 33%, and in the East 33%. Among young people aged 18–35, as many as 54% would like to move abroad permanently, compared with only 19% among older respondents. The desire to emigrate is somewhat more common among people with higher education and higher incomes. At the same time, those who have already worked abroad are less likely to want to emigrate than those who are only planning to look for a job abroad.
• The most common reason for considering emigration is the hope of better living conditions (64%). A better future for children was mentioned by 34%, lack of decent jobs in Ukraine by 23%, and the desire to obtain better education by 12%. Fewer than 10% cited insecurity in Ukraine, better healthcare, better business conditions, personal self-realization, or family circumstances. Value conflicts and political persecution were mentioned by no more than 1%. Better living conditions were most often cited in the East, securing children’s future in the South, and lack of decent jobs in the West. Young people more often mentioned lack of jobs and opportunities for self-realization, while the oldest respondents more often pointed to insecurity and healthcare.
• Overall, 44% of respondents would like to work abroad. Regional differences on this issue are small, but age differences are significant: 68% of young people want to work abroad, compared to 52% among middle-aged respondents and only 20% among the oldest.
• The main motivation for working abroad is higher wages (72%). Between 16% and 20% also mentioned better working conditions, earning money for housing, children’s education or relatives’ treatment, professional self-realization, and better social protection. About 7% cited the opportunity to start a business or to gain experience in international companies.
• Young people more often want to work abroad in order to develop professionally and gain experience in international companies, while older people are more motivated by better social protection. Those who only plan to work abroad more often cite wages as their main motivation, whereas those who have already worked abroad more often point to better working conditions.
• Among preferred destination countries for work, Germany was named most often (37%), followed by Poland (26%), the United States (22%), Canada (21%), Czech Republic (16%), Italy (15%), the United Kingdom (14%), France and Sweden (12% each), Israel (11%), Spain (9%), the Netherlands (7%), and Russia (6%). Less than 5% named other countries. Germany, the United States, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom were chosen more often in the West, while Russia was chosen more often in the East.
• Forty-four percent of respondents said they have no chance at all of working abroad in the future, 30% assessed their chances as low, and 17% as high. Young people are the most optimistic: 32% see high chances and another 41% see low chances. Among middle-aged respondents, 15% see high chances and 37% low chances. The oldest group is the least optimistic (5% and 17% respectively).
• Only 14% of respondents had previously worked abroad, while 86% had not. Such experience is most common in the West, among people with higher education, higher incomes, the self-employed, and those working in the private sector.
• If they had a permanent job abroad, 65% said they would definitely or probably return to Ukraine, while 23% would not and 12% were undecided. The share who would not return is lowest in the West (17%) and highest in the East and South (27% each).
• One third of respondents (33%) have already looked into employment opportunities abroad, while 67% have not. Interest is highest in the West, among people with higher education, young people, those working in the private sector, the self-employed, and higher-income groups.
• Among those who looked for such information, 64% received it from relatives, friends, or colleagues; 40% from the Internet; 37% through acquaintances; 12% from media advertisements; and 13% from overseas employment agencies.
• Overall, 46% believe there is enough information about working abroad, while 37% think it is insufficient. Western residents, young people, those who have worked abroad, and higher-income respondents are more likely to say information is sufficient.
• More than half (52%) would like to receive more information about working abroad, while 40% would not. This desire is more common among young people, residents of the Center and West, urban residents, those who want to work abroad, the higher educated, and the better-off.
• More than half (55%) said they know people whose children study abroad. This is more common in the West, in cities, and among young respondents.
• Seventy percent would like their children or grandchildren to study abroad, while 20% would not. Support for this is over 70% in the West, Center, and South, and 59% in the East. Support rises with younger age, higher education, and higher income. The most preferred countries for children’s education are Germany (34%), the United Kingdom (29%), the United States (25%), Poland (24%), Canada (17%), France (12%), the Czech Republic and Sweden (10% each), Italy (7%), the Netherlands and Spain (5% each), and Russia (4%).
• More than half (55%) said they are personally interested in the introduction of the visa-free regime with the EU, while 38% are not. Interest is highest in the West (72%) and lowest in the East (40%). Young people, the higher educated, and wealthier respondents are more interested.
• Fifty-two percent believe visa-free travel will have positive effects for Ukraine, 17% think it will have no effect, and 18% expect negative consequences. Optimism is highest in the West (68%), followed by the Center (53%) and around 40% in the East and South.
• At the same time, 80% believe visa-free travel will lead to increased emigration of Ukraine’s working-age population.
• Nearly three quarters also believe that Poland and Hungary are simplifying employment rules for Ukrainians primarily to benefit their own economies rather than as a friendly gesture toward Ukraine.
• More than half (54%) think that a work visa is required to work abroad, while 29% think it is not.
• Two thirds of respondents do not want dual citizenship, while 35% would like to have a second passport. This desire is most common in the South, among young people, the employed, and higher-income groups. Among those who want another citizenship, EU countries were preferred by 42%, the United States by 18%, Canada by 15%, and Russia by 12%.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in September 2017, 55% of Nikopol residents believe that the situation in the city has somewhat or significantly worsened over the past two years. Another 28% say it has remained the same, and only 11% report an improvement. Younger residents (aged 18–35) are less pessimistic than older people. More than two thirds of voters of the Opposition Bloc and “For Life” say the situation has deteriorated. The most optimistic group are supporters of BPP “Solidarity”: one third of them report improvement and another 40% stability.
• Almost two thirds of respondents believe the city is moving in the wrong direction, while only 12% say it is moving in the right direction and 29% were unable to assess the situation. Again, younger people are more optimistic. Voters of “For Life” and the Opposition Bloc give the most negative assessments (over 70%), while BPP “Solidarity” supporters are the most positive (44% say the city is moving in the right direction).
• Seventy percent of respondents say the economic situation of their families has worsened over the past year (47% say it has worsened significantly). 23% report no change and only 4% say it has improved. In all social groups, more than half report worsening material conditions.
• At the same time, 39% have optimistic expectations about Nikopol’s future, while 43% are rather or very pessimistic and 18% cannot assess the city’s prospects. Young people are more optimistic. Optimism is also higher among voters of BPP “Solidarity,” Vidrodzhennia, and Batkivshchyna, while pessimism dominates among supporters of “For Life” and the Opposition Bloc.
• Among utilities, residents rated gas supply and electricity the highest: 34% rated them as good or excellent, and about 42–43% as average. However, around one fifth rated them as poor or very poor.
• Water supply received the worst evaluations: 37% rated it as poor, 35% as average, and only 26% as good or excellent.
  Heating was rated good or excellent by 16%, average by 25%, and poor by 30%, while another 30% could not assess it.
• Nearly 90% of respondents consider gas, electricity, and water services to be expensive, and almost 70% say the same about heating.
• Among other services, schools and kindergartens, markets and shops, and universities and colleges receive mostly average ratings, with relatively few good evaluations and around 15–30% negative assessments.
• Cultural institutions, sports facilities, street lighting, monuments, and industrial zones are generally rated poorly or only average.
  Roads and sidewalks receive the worst evaluations, with more than 80% dissatisfied.
• When asked what should be improved first, 36% chose road repairs, followed by city beautification (10%), healthcare (6%), renewable energy, street lighting, parks, water quality, job creation, and playgrounds (3–4% each).
• Among priority infrastructure projects, 48% again chose road repairs, followed by improvement of residential areas (11%), street lighting, parks, and new sports facilities (5–6%).
• If parliamentary elections were held soon, 54% would vote, while 38% would not. Among likely voters, the Opposition Bloc leads (17.5%), followed by Batkivshchyna (13.6%), For Life (9.4%), BPP Solidarity (8.5%), UKROP (6.6%), Vidrodzhennia (6.3%), Radical Party (4.4%), and Svoboda (3.1%). Almost one fifth are undecided.
• The highest trust is placed in the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant (66%), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) (58%), neighborhood associations (49%), and civic organizations (46%).
  The lowest trust is shown toward the city council, executive committee, courts, police, and prosecutors.
• Among NGOs, veterans’ organizations (42%) and youth organizations (41%) are rated best.
• Fifty-six percent of residents have a positive attitude toward foreign investors. Investors from Canada and Germany are viewed most positively, while investors from Russia are viewed most negatively.
• Seventy-six percent support renewable (“green”) energy.
• A majority supports key elements of the healthcare reform, including medicine reimbursement, public health centers, medical insurance, and price regulation of medicines. Overall, 55% support the medical reform package.
• Only 14% reported paying a bribe in the past year, while about half believe local corruption has not changed over the last two years.
• Eleven percent say they have been victims of crime.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in July–August 2017, 47% of respondents said that over the past two years the overall quality of public healthcare in the country had worsened, while only 10% reported improvement. One third (34%) said that the quality had not changed, and 9% were unable to answer.
• The overwhelming majority of respondents (71%) trust advice on treatment and healthy lifestyles from relatives and friends. Almost the same high level of trust is shown toward medical professionals: ambulance doctors are trusted by 68%, qualified nurses by 66%, pharmacists and pharmacy staff by 65%, and family doctors and therapists by 63%. Half of respondents (51%) trust advice from medical lecturers, and almost as many (46%) from athletes. Priests and clergy are trusted by 31%, while 15% listen to folk healers and psychics. Only 4% trust advice from members of parliament on health and treatment.
• Trust patterns vary across groups. Relatives and friends are trusted most in the South, among older people and those with lower incomes. Medical professionals are trusted most in the East, among older people, women, and those with medium or high incomes. Medical lecturers and athletes are trusted more by youth and middle-aged people, especially men and higher-income respondents. Clergy are trusted more in the West, among older people and women. Folk healers are trusted more in the East, among middle-aged and older people, and more by women than men.
• Almost half of respondents (46%) do not trust homeopathy as a system of treatment. At the same time, 30% do trust it, especially in the East, among women and older people, while 24% were undecided.
• 57% know their family doctor or therapist. Awareness is highest in the East, among city residents, women, and older people.
• The vast majority of respondents (93%) do not have private health insurance; only 7% do. Even among respondents with relatively high incomes (more than 5,000 UAH), only 11% have insurance. More than half said that even if they had insurance, they would visit doctors in the same way as before; one third said they would go more often, and 6% less often.
• The share of people who say treatment is very expensive for them and their families has increased sharply — from 39% last October to 61% now. This concern is strongest in the Center and South, among older people, low-income respondents, and those without insurance. Only 13% say treatment is more or less affordable. Even half of those with insurance say healthcare is very expensive.
• Among government healthcare initiatives, respondents are most aware of the free or low-cost provision of medicines for diabetes, asthma and cardiovascular diseases by prescription (77%) and the introduction of national health insurance (61%). About half know about raising doctors’ salaries through contracts and tight control over charitable funds for the Okhmatdyt hospital (54% and 50%), both much higher than in May 2017.
• More people do not know than know about reference pricing of medicines, patient–doctor contracts, public health centers, hospital districts, subsidies for internally displaced persons, and standardized treatment protocols based on evidence-based medicine. Nevertheless, public awareness of healthcare reforms has grown over the past three months.
• Support for reforms is very high. The most supported initiatives are free or low-cost medicines by prescription and control over Okhmatdyt funds (91% and 89%). Public health centers and reference pricing are supported by 77%, medical subsidies for IDPs by 71%, national health insurance by 69%, standardized treatment protocols and doctors’ salary reform by 67%, patient–doctor contracts by 57%, and hospital districts by 44%.
• Overall, 72% support the healthcare reform bills, 15% oppose them, and 12% are undecided. Support is higher in the West, among women, young and middle-aged people, higher-income groups, and families with medical workers, and lowest in the East.
• Regarding financing, 53% support the principle “money follows the patient”, while 20% support funding based on the number of hospitals and beds; 27% are undecided or reject both models. 58% prefer international standardized treatment protocols, while 20% prefer domestic ones.
• Nearly all respondents (97%) believe healthcare should be provided regardless of a person’s income. Large majorities support transparency of medical donations (84%), a 70/30 state–patient cost split (83%), priority funding for ATO veterans (82%), tax exemptions for medical donations (81%), money following the patient (80%), tax benefits for employers who insure workers (79%), and a special fund for ATO veterans (79%).
• The least supported ideas are allowing doctors to work as entrepreneurs with lower taxes (51%) and denying state-funded treatment to people who neglect their health (44%).
• Vaccination is supported by 84%; 75% believe it should be mandatory.
• 56% say they were not asked for bribes in the past year, 20% experienced corruption, and 22% did not visit doctors.
• 73% support co-payment for medical services, especially if it helps eliminate bribes. 78% would support cost-sharing if it reduced corruption.
• 63% support organ donation after death, 80% support medical training for ambulance drivers, and 85% support creating a paramedic service.
• The share of people who see the Ministry of Health as important for their families increased from 49% to 57% between May and August 2017.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in August 2017, 83% of respondents said they consider themselves patriots of their country. Compared with the same period in 2014, the overall share of patriotically minded citizens has almost not changed. Only 10% expressed the opposite view, while 7% were unable to answer.
• In all macro-regions of Ukraine, the share of those who consider themselves patriots exceeds 75%: 88% in the West, 84% in the Center, 83% in the East, and 77% in the South. At the same time, in the southern regions 18% of respondents said they do not consider themselves patriots. In the East this share is 11%, in the Center 8%, and in the West 5%. The older the respondents, the more likely they are to describe themselves as patriots.
• 76% of respondents said that if the choice were made today, they would support the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. This figure has not changed since 2014. For comparison, in 2013 this share was 61%.
• Support for Ukraine’s independence is highest in the West (93%). In the Center, 76% support it; in the South, 66%; and in the East, 64%. At the same time, in the South and East the share of those holding the opposite view reaches 21–22%. Younger respondents and those with higher education are more likely to support Ukraine’s independence.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in July 2017, 37% of respondents support the creation of a Unified Local Church in Ukraine. 18% oppose this initiative, while 23% say the issue is not important to them and another 23% were undecided.
• Compared with 2014, the share of those who support church unification has changed little, while the number of opponents has fallen by about one and a half times. At the same time, the proportion of those without a clear position has increased.
• Support for the creation of a Unified Local Church is highest among members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (66%) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (61%). In contrast, among parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), opponents (42%) outnumber supporters (23%). At the same time, 36% of UOC-MP followers say they are either indifferent to this issue or have no clear opinion. Among believers of other denominations, those without a defined position also prevail.
• Regional differences are pronounced. Support for unification is highest in Western Ukraine (61%). In the Center, 40% support the idea, 17% oppose it, and 43% have no clear position. In the South, 24% support the creation of a Unified Church, 25% oppose it, 33% are indifferent, and 19% are undecided. In the East, only 11% support the idea, 20% oppose it, 40% could not answer, and 29% said they are indifferent.
• Support for church unification is more common among older respondents, women, people with higher education, and those with higher incomes.
• Among those who support unification, two thirds favor creating a Unified Local Church based on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 16% support unification on the basis of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and 7% on the basis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).
• The vast majority of UOC-KP and UGCC followers prefer unification around their own Churches. Among UOC-MP parishioners, only slightly more than half support unification around the UOC-MP, while one quarter would prefer unification around the UOC-KP. Among believers who do not identify with any denomination, two thirds favor unification around the UOC-KP.
• Compared with 2014, the share of UOC-KP and UGCC adherents has remained almost unchanged, while the share of UOC-MP followers has declined (from 22% to 17%). At the same time, the proportion of those who consider themselves believers but do not belong to any denomination has increased (from 24% to 31%).
• The UOC-KP is most strongly represented in the West, Center, and South, and least in the East. The UGCC is concentrated primarily in Western Ukraine, while the UOC-MP is strongest in the East.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group on behalf of Focus magazine, more than 70% of Kyiv residents say they would take part in mayoral elections if they were held in the near future, while 23% say they would not and 5% are undecided.
• If the mayoral election were held now, Vitalii Klitschko would receive 39.4% of the vote among those intending to participate. Boryslav Bereza would get 8.5%, Volodymyr Bondarenko 5.9%, Oleksandr Omelchenko 4.6%, and Tetiana Montian 2.4%. All other candidates are below 2%. About one quarter of respondents remain undecided.
• Almost half of Kyiv residents believe the city is moving in the wrong direction, 30% say it is moving in the right direction, and one quarter cannot assess the situation.
• More than 40% are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Vitalii Klitschko, while about half are dissatisfied and 8% are undecided. Compared to 2016, satisfaction has increased from 35% to 43%.
• Only 22% are satisfied with the Kyiv City Council, while over 60% are dissatisfied. Communal services receive even worse ratings: only one in five residents is satisfied, while more than 70% are dissatisfied.
• The cost of коммунальні послуги (utilities) is the biggest concern for 60% of Kyiv residents. Nearly two thirds are worried about rising crime and drug or alcohol abuse. Around 30% point to illegal construction, a quarter to poor road conditions, and about one fifth to low quality of medical care and high public transport fares.
• Among young people, the most pressing issues are drug and alcohol abuse, poor funding of schools, lack of parking spaces, shortages in kindergartens, stray animals, and lack of sports facilities. Middle-aged respondents more often mention bad roads, traffic congestion, and street vending. Older residents are more concerned about crime, poor quality of medical services, public transport, sidewalks, street lighting, and the condition of housing.
• Forty-seven percent say the visa-free regime with the EU is important to them personally, the same share say it is not.
• Sixty-two percent believe Ukraine should join the European Union, 5% support joining the Customs Union, about one fifth support a neutral position between the EU and Russia, and 12% are undecided.
• If a referendum on NATO membership were held today, 55% would support it, 18% would oppose it, 10% would not vote, and 17% are undecided. Support for visa-free travel, EU membership, and NATO is stronger among younger people and those with higher incomes.
• Sixty percent support restricting economic relations with Russia, while about one quarter support maintaining or expanding them. About half support introducing a visa regime with Russia, while almost 40% oppose it.
• Fifty-six percent support ending the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) only after full restoration of Ukrainian control over Donbas. Smaller shares support broader autonomy, federalization, or separation.
• Fifty-three percent support the trade blockade of the self-proclaimed DNR/LNR territories.
• Sixty percent believe Ukraine should use all possible means to return Crimea, while a quarter think the country should accept its annexation.
• Views on the Minsk agreements are divided: 36% want new agreements, 13% support full implementation, nearly 20% favor withdrawing from negotiations, and more than 30% are undecided.
• Victory Day on May 9 remains personally meaningful for 84% of respondents. International Women’s Day (March 8) is personally meaningful for 70%, and May 1 is meaningful for almost half.
• More than 70% oppose granting Russian the status of a state language. Nearly 70% do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, though about one fifth do.
• Fifty-four percent support banning the St. George ribbon, while over 30% oppose it. In contrast, only one quarter support banning Russian websites, while a majority oppose it.
• About one third of Kyiv residents receive utility subsidies, and another quarter intend to apply. Public opinion is split between keeping subsidies and shifting support toward energy-efficiency assistance.
• Seventy-seven percent use the Internet at least once a week.
  Facebook is used by 61%, VKontakte by 34%, Odnoklassniki by 33%, Twitter by 16%, and Instagram by 13%. People with lower incomes use VKontakte and Odnoklassniki more, while higher-income users prefer Facebook.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group for Focus magazine in May 2017, more than 60% of Ukrainians consider a unitary state structure to be optimal for Ukraine, while 20% support a federal model and 18% are undecided. Support for a unitary system is strongest in Western Ukraine. Among respondents who express distrust toward Russia, one in ten supports a federal structure for Ukraine.
• For 40% of respondents, the visa-free regime with the European Union is personally important, while 55% say it is not important, and 7% are undecided. These figures have changed little since 2016. Visa-free travel is more important for residents of Western Ukraine and for young people, and least important for pensioners.
• Half of Ukrainians believe Ukraine should become a member of the European Union, 12% support joining the Customs Union, and 28% prefer equidistance from both the EU and Russia. One in ten is undecided. Support for EU membership is strongest in the West and among young people. Among those who do not trust the EU, only 15% support EU membership, while 30% favor the Customs Union and 45% prefer neutrality between the EU and Russia.
• If a referendum on NATO membership were held, 43% would vote in favor, 30% against, 13% would not vote, and 14% are undecided. Support for NATO is higher in Western Ukraine and among young people. Even among those who distrust NATO, one in ten would still support joining it.
• In terms of international trust, Ukrainians express the highest trust in Belarus (60%), the European Union and Canada (56% each), and the United Nations (48%). Russia is trusted least (73% do not trust it). Trust in Canada, the EU, NATO, the United States, the OSCE, and the IMF is higher in the West and Center, while Belarus, the CIS, China, and Russia receive more trust in the South and East.
• Nearly 60% support limiting economic relations with Russia, about 30% support maintaining or expanding them, and 15% are undecided. Compared with 2016, support for limiting ties with Russia has slightly increased. Support for maintaining or expanding relations is more common in the East and South, among older people, and among supporters of the “For Life” party and the Opposition Bloc.
• Almost 40% support introducing visas for travel to Russia, about half oppose it, and 10% are undecided. Support for visas has grown somewhat in recent months and is strongest in Western Ukraine, rural areas, among younger people, and among supporters of Svoboda.
• Regarding Donbas, 40% support ending the Anti-Terrorist Operation only after full restoration of Ukrainian control over the entire region. 13% support broader economic and humanitarian autonomy, 18% support federal-style autonomy within Ukraine, 12% support separation, and 18% are undecided. Support for restoring full Ukrainian control is strongest in the Center and West, in rural areas, and among youth.
• 43% oppose the trade blockade of the territories controlled by the so-called DPR/LPR, while 40% support it, and 17% are undecided. Support is highest in Western Ukraine, rural areas, and among young people.
• More than half believe Ukraine should use all possible means to return Crimea, one quarter believe Ukraine should accept its annexation by Russia, and about 20% are undecided. Support for returning Crimea is strongest in the West, rural areas, and among young people.
• 56% say they are superficially familiar with the Minsk Agreements, one third are not familiar, 7% know them well, and 4% are undecided. Awareness is higher in the East, in cities, and among men.
  Almost 30% support revising the Minsk Agreements and signing new ones, 16% support full implementation, 17% favor withdrawing from negotiations, 5% support another option, and one third are undecided. Full implementation is more supported in the East and among voters of For Life and the Opposition Bloc, while revising the agreements is more supported in the West and Center.
• Regarding historical and symbolic holidays, 82% view Victory Day (May 9) as personally meaningful, while 7% see it as outdated. More than 70% view International Women’s Day (March 8) as meaningful, and 50% consider May 1 meaningful. Residents of Western Ukraine, rural populations, and Svoboda voters are more likely to see these holidays as outdated or simply days off.
• Two thirds do not support granting Russian the status of a state language, 30% support it, and 7% are undecided. Support for this has slightly increased and is strongest in the East, South, and in cities.
• One third regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, 53% do not, and 14% are undecided. Regret is most common in the East and South, among women, older people, and voters of For Life and the Opposition Bloc.
• 45% support banning the St. George ribbon, about 40% oppose, and 17% are undecided. Support is strongest in the West and among younger and middle-aged people.
  Nearly 60% oppose banning Russian websites, about 25% support the ban, and 20% are undecided.
• More than half believe church property and parish transitions should be decided by parishioners themselves, while smaller shares assign this role to church leadership, priests, or authorities.
• One third of households own agricultural land, most commonly in the West and among rural residents. Only 11% support free land sales, while 53% believe land should not be a commodity at all.
• Nearly two thirds believe cooperation with the IMF leads to falling living standards and higher prices, while views on whether the IMF helps or harms Ukraine are deeply divided and strongly linked to party affiliation.
• Large majorities oppose raising the retirement age and increasing required years of contributions, but 63% support mandatory sex education in schools.
  Support for restoring the death penalty stands at 38%, while 47% oppose it.
  Only 23% support banning abortions, 18% support legal gun ownership, 14% support legal prostitution, and 6% support legalizing soft drugs.
• Only 6% consider NABU effective in fighting corruption, while 83% believe tougher criminal punishment is the best anti-corruption tool.
• 51% receive utility subsidies, and support for subsidies has grown since 2016. Most believe the current subsidy system is better than energy-efficiency assistance.
• 65% use the internet weekly, and 48% use Facebook, 44% VKontakte, and 43% Odnoklassniki, with strong regional differences.

• According to a Rating Group survey conducted in May 2017, more than 60% of Ukrainians reported that their material situation had worsened over the past year, 30% said it had not changed, and only 6% said it had improved. Another 2% were undecided. More than 60% said they are unable to pay utility bills, while 35% said they can afford them. Almost all respondents (97%) said they feel the impact of rising consumer prices.
• When asked about the causes of the country’s socio-economic situation, 65% blamed the incompetence and corruption of the current authorities, 54% cited the war in the East, 31% the inability of parliament to pass needed laws, and 28% corruption and incompetence of previous governments. In the West, war and the failures of previous authorities are more often blamed; in the South and East, respondents more often blame the current government, parliament, lack of political compromise, external interference, and weak public support for reforms.
• Most Ukrainians describe the country’s condition in strongly negative terms.
  85% believe Ukraine is in a state of chaos, 75% say it is in a state of collapse, while only 44% think it is in a state of change, 21% in development, and 17% in consolidation.
• 52% support dissolving parliament and holding early parliamentary and presidential elections, while nearly 40% oppose this, and 10% are undecided.
• Parliamentary voting intentions: Among those who plan to vote and have decided on a party:
  • Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) – 13.2%
  • BPP Solidarity – 11.3%
  • Opposition Bloc – 10.4%
  • Radical Party – 8.9%
  • For Life – 8.2%
  • Civic Position – 7.6%
  • Self-Reliance (Samopomich) – 7.1%
  • Svoboda – 6.4%
  • UKROP, Agrarian Party, People’s Control – 2.3% each
  • New Forces Movement – 2.2%
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• If their preferred party did not run, many would shift to Fatherland (5.5%), Self-Reliance, Radical Party, and Svoboda (around 3.7% each), while 45% would be undecided.28.6% say they would never vote for BPP Solidarity, followed by the Opposition Bloc (15.5%), Radical Party (7.3%), and Fatherland (6.5%).
• Presidential race: If presidential elections were held the following Sunday (among decided voters):
  • Yulia Tymoshenko – 15.2%
  • Petro Poroshenko – 11.6%
  • Oleh Liashko – 8.5%
  • Yuriy Boyko – 8.5%
  • Vadym Rabinovych – 7.8%
  • Anatoliy Hrytsenko – 7.2%
  • Andriy Sadovyi – 6.6%
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• Second-round simulations show Tymoshenko beating Poroshenko (32% vs 24%), Tymoshenko beating Boyko (36% vs 28%), and Tymoshenko beating Liashko (33% vs 21%). Turnout in these scenarios would be low, with around one third saying they would not vote.
• Who can fix the country? Only small minorities believe any politician can:
  • Pull Ukraine out of the economic crisis: Tymoshenko 13%, Rabinovych 9%, Liashko 8%, Poroshenko 7%. One third believe no one can.
  • Stop the war: Poroshenko and Tymoshenko 8% each; 38% say no one can.
  • Unite the country: Tymoshenko 10%, Poroshenko 8%; one third say no one can.
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• Protest potential: 70% believe the current situation could lead to mass nationwide protests similar to 2004 or 2013.
  41% support launching protests immediately, 47% oppose, and 12% are undecided.
  Nearly 40% say they would personally join protests if they began soon. Protest readiness is highest in the West and among supporters of Self-Reliance, the Radical Party, and For Life.
• Land reform: If a referendum were held on lifting the ban on selling agricultural land, about 75% would vote against, 20% in favor, and 7% would abstain or be undecided.
  If land sales were allowed, 40% say they might join protests, while half would not.

The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from April 21- May 5, 2017. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size. Additionally, 1,378 respondents were surveyed in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 64,2%.

The survey was financed by Government of Canada.